IRAQ'S TAHA YASIN RAMADAN: POTENTIAL SUCCESSOR TO THE PRESIDENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000807910001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 17, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Iraq's Taha Yasin Ramadan:
Potential Successor to the President
il
Summary
First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan is the
Revolutionary Command Council member who we believe can run Iraq in
wartime and preserve Ba'th Party rule should President Saddam Husayn
leave the scene unexpectedly. He has the respect of senior Ba'thists, a
broad network of loyalists in the government, important support in the
military, and proven managerial talent. His personality is well suited to
Iraq's authoritarian political system. As president, Ramadan would
probably continue moderate, pro-Western trends in Iraqi policy, including
expansion of US-Iraqi economic ties, although he would maintain relations
with the USSR. He would also improve the country's military performance
against Iran by allowing senior officers a freer hand in operations, and he
might work toward reconciliation with Syria.
This memorandum was prepared byl (Office of Leadership Analysis. 25X1
Information available as of 14 October 1986 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, South Asia/Persian Gulf Branch,
LDA, 25X1
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Although Saddam Husayn sets overall policy in Iraq, most decisions arise from collegial
debates within the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the country's highest
policymaking body. We know that few decO-ions are made without 25X1
significant input from First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan. Ramadan, who
is Iraq's "economic czar," has the most influential voice in economic debates; moreover,
he formulates the national economic plan and ensures its implementation by overseeing
the economic ministries. Ruthless and fearless, he seems to have emerged from Iraq's
turbulent politics relatively unscathed and with an extensive network of supporters in
the party, the government, and, to a lesser extent, the military. ~ 25X1
The assassination of President Saddam is currently the most likely scenario for
a leadership change in Iraq. Despite Saddam's tight political control and
extensive private guard, there have already been numerous attempts on his life,
Continued military and economic reversals would increase
We believe that, should an assassination attempt succeed, the succession
process would be peaceful. The Constitution requires the election of a new
president by the Revolutionary Command Council within seven days of a
vacancy. Although constitutional procedures have not always been followed, a
violent succession is unlikely, given the Ba'th Party's pervasive control. The
RCC has held ultimate authority since the Ba'th regime took power in 1968, and
Ba'thists view its decisions as legitimate. Iraqi leaders probably also realize that
a succession crisis in the current wartime environment would leave Iraq
vulnerable to Iran.
Ramadan as Party Man
Ramadan has built his support in the ruling Ba'th Party through his participation in its
early struggles and his rise within its ranks. A member since at least 1958, he was
elected to the party's highest body, the Regional Command, in 1966, while the party was
still underground. Two years later, he participated in the coup that brought the regime
to power, further establishing his reputation as a key Ba'th leader. In 1969 then
President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr appointed Ramadan, his protege, to the newly formed
RCC, of which Saddam became Vice Chairman.
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, Ramadan's responsibilities increased. As
director of the Military Bureau during 1969-70, he was charged with ensuring loyalty by
controlling appointments, transfers, retirements, and promotions. As head of the
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Baghdad Branch Command in the early 1970s, he influenced critical appointments and
activities in the capital, In addition, he has
commanded the Popular Army, the party's militia, since 1 Although the Popular
Army is carefully monitored by Saddam loyalists and its aging recruits have performed
poorly against Iran, support from Ba'thists in the militia would marginally augment
Ramadan's endorsement as a potential successor.
Ramadan as Political Operator
In addition to his party following, Ramadan can draw on extensive contacts and personal
connections made during his 15 years in government. By ensuring the implementation
of his directives, his bureaucratic network enabled him to continue to develop the
economy in the early years of the war and, more recently, to avert economic collapse.
Ramadan's team would help him and the RCC minimize disruptions associated with
succession, a critical consideration given Iraq's poor military and economic situation. C
As Minister of Industry and Acting Minister of Planning in the early and mid-1970s,
Ramadan filled his departments with his loyalists, many of whom still hold government
positions. The current Minister of Industry is his protege, according to Embassy
officials. As chairman of the powerful Foreign Economic Relations Committee since
1979, Ramadan carefully monitors the Ministry of Trade. He frequently sends his
subordinates to important trade negotiations with foreign leaders, undercutting some of
the authority of the Trade Minister, a senior RCC member and longtime Saddam
associate.
Several well-placed or high-ranking government officials and military officers come from
Ramadan's hometown of Mosul. The Ministers of Oil and Finance are Mosul natives
(Moslawis) who enjoy his patronage, say Embassy officers. These officials also note that
in 1983 Ramadan engineered the Finance Minister's appointment. Ramadan would
probably enjoy the support of senior Moslawi military officials such as the Armed Forces
Chief of Staff. the Minister of State for Military Affairs, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations.
Ramadan as Manager
Ramadan's organizational talents and success in managing the economy are also likely
to influence the RCC's consideration of him as a succession candidate. Given the recent
military and economic reversals suffered by the regime, we think he could appear
indispensable to the RCC.
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? In his economic management positions during the 1970s, he was instrumental in
channeling increased oil revenues into economic development programs that
largely succeeded in raising living standards and, therefore, his stock in the party
and government.
? He has kept Iraq's economy afloat despite heavy wartime expenditures. In 1983,
to stabilize the economy, he successfully managed a huge deflation, reducing
imports by about 50 percent, according to US officials.
capacity to compensate for revenues lost by closure of the Iraq-Syria pipeline
and two key export terminals on the Persian Gulf and by falling oil prices,
? He has presided over the soon-to-be-completed upgrading of Iraq's oil export
Underscoring the respect accorded Ramadan in economic issues, party leaders recently
persuaded Saddam to return to him the economic decision making authority Saddam
had assumed from him early this year. Since then, Ramadan has improved Iraq's
economic position by rescheduling accumulated debt, extracting large financial aid
pledges from Iraq's Arab allies, and formulating the delayed 1986 budget, which slashed
imports and cut waste, according to Embassy officers.
Ramadan, who is about 48, is well suited to the turbulent politics of Ba'thist Iraq. US
diplomats say he is ruthless, incorruptible, and fearless. The tough Ba'th system
rewards such qualities; any leader perceived as soft could easily lose his grip on the
party and, in turn, jeopardize the party's grip on power. Action oriented, Ramadan is
extremely demanding of his subordinates. He has refused to use his position to shelter
family and friends from military service. Despite his lack of charisma and dour
demeanor, Ramadan is the most publicized Iraqi next to Saddam and therefore a familiar
authority figure. He is also the only RCC member willing to stand up to Saddam. As a
protest of Saddam's increased involvement in economic policy earlier this year, he
initiated his "work to rule" campaign, refusing to implement economic decisions without
specific orders and thereby slowing the economy, say Embassy officers.
Although we believe Ramadan's assets make him the probable successor to Saddam, he
faces several obstacles. He has powerful rivals, including Saddam. Tensions between
the two began in 1969 when then President Bakr, Saddam's rival, appointed Ramadan to
the newly formed RCC.
refused to attend am s lavish birthday celebration, believing that it glorified Saddam
at the expense of the party, according to the Embassy. Embassy officers believe
In 1984 Ramadan
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Saddam holds Ramadan responsible for encouraging the RCC in early July 1986 to
challenge the President's centralization of authority. These recurring tensions--coupled
with Ramadan's powerful position--have led some US diplomats to speculate that
Saddam may again try to undercut his authority by delegating some of his
responsibilities to other RCC members.
There is a possibility that Ramadan would fail to win the RCC's endorsement. Fearing
his toughness, some of its members may suspect that he would purge any among them
he considers disloyal--and most owe their positions to Saddam. Should their fears
carry the day, RCC members would probably select an interim candidate, such as the ill
and weak Vice Chairman Izzat Ibrahim, whom they believe they can manipulate.
Although our knowledge of internal RCC politics is limited, we think these apprehensions
are misplaced, at least in the near term. the RCC is
a highly collegial body; all its members, including Ramadan, have worked together
successfully throughout Saddam's presidency and probably realize that infighting could
end Ba'th Party rule as it did in 1963.
Members of Saddam's extended Tikriti family (natives of Tikrit), who hold key positions
in the military and security services, would probably resent Ramadan's selection. They
dislike him and view him as an outsider who does not depend on them for support,
However, Embassy officers report that the
Tikriti clan does not form a cohesive power bloc and probably could not unite to thwart
his succession. Nevertheless, clan members would probably resist efforts to reduce
their control over the military and security apparatus.
Ramadan's undisputed, RCC-endorsed succession to the presidency would not have an
immediate major impact on Iraq's policies. A product and a victim of the consensual
decisionmaking process of the RCC, Ramadan probably would not deviate from its policy
endorsements--at least initially--and would continue to fight Iran, whose leaders have
demanded the removal of the Ba'th regime as a precondition for ending the war. In the
longer term, however, to solidify his control of the country and place his own stamp on
policy, he would probably:
? Promote his loyalists to key positions.
? Continue to expand the US-Iraqi relationship, especially in high technology. He
and his technocratic staff realize that US trade is vital to Iraq's healthy economic
performance and development, say Embassy officers. They add that, in keeping
with a general improvement in US-Iraqi relations, his attitude toward the United
States has warmed markedly over the past two years.
? Preserve Iraq's ties to the USSR. He needs Soviet military equipment to continue
the war with Iran. In addition, his experience in the Ba'th Party and in managing
a centrally planned economy has undoubtedly caused him to identify with the
Soviet system, which is the model for both.
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? Improve military performance by allowing field commanders a freer hand in the
planning and execution of operations. According to the Embassy, military officers
think that Saddam's micromanagement hampers their ability to defend Iraq. To
win their support, Ramadan, who never advanced beyond the rank of captain and
does not pretend to possess tactical expertise, would have to allow them more
authority. Nevertheless, we do not expect him to delegate overall military
decision making authority to senior officers or to shift to a predominantly
offensive strategy. Like Saddam, he probably fears potential coup plotting by an
overly independent military and the political costs of increased battlefield
casualties.
Increase the prospects for Iraqi-Syrian reconciliation. A large part of the rift
between the two countries is due to enmity between Saddam and Syrian
President Hafiz al-Assad, say US officials. Ramadan might be more forthcoming
in negotiations with Syria if he believed that he could persuade Assad to
decrease his support for Iran.
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SUBJECT: IRAQ'S TAHA YASIN RAMADAN
POTENTIAL SUCCESSOR TO THE PPESIDENT
LDA M 86-20017
DISTRIBUTION:
EXTERNAL:
1-Howard Teicher, NSC
1-Dennis Ross, NSC
1-Ronald St. Martin, NSC
1-Morton Abramowitz, STATE
1-Richard Murphy, STATE
1-Marion Creekmore, STATE
1-George Harris, STATE
1-Peter Burleigh, STATE
1-Greg Berry, STATE
1-Richard Armitage, ISA
1-Robert H. Pelletreau, ISA
1-Roger Pajak, TREASURY
1-James Kelly, COMMERCE
INTERNAL
T-DIR/DCI/DDCI/EXEC STAFF
1-DDI
1-NIO/NESA
1 -DDO/NE
1-C/NID
1 -C/PDB
6-CPAS/IMD/CB
1-D/NESA
1-DD/NESA
2-PPS/NESA
1-C/NESA/AI
1-C/NESA/IA
1-C/NESA/SO
1-C/NESA/PG
1-C/NESA/PG/I
1 -D/LDA
1-C/AN/LDA
1-C/LE/LDA
1 -C/UE/LDA
1 -C/RS/LDA
1 -C/PPD
1 -OIR/OSD
1-C/VIP
1-C/PSB/RS/LDA
1-
LDA/AN/SAPG
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