CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP CHINESE MINORITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78-01617A002800100004-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 5, 2013
Sequence Number:
4
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 2, 1946
Content Type:
REPORT
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CIA-RDP78-01617A002800100004-6.pdf | 675.14 KB |
Body:
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JC Q.g.
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CONFyENT I AL
2 DECEMBER 1946 COPY NO.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
CHINESE MINORITIES IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA
ORE 7
THE LONG-STANDING CHINESE MINORITY ISSUE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA HAS
GAINED NEW PROMINENCE SINCE V-J DAY AS A SOURCE OF INTERNATIONAL
FRICTION IN THE FAR EAST. THIS ISSUE CENTERS AROUND 4.500.000 ALIEN
CHINESE AND MILLIONS MORE PERSONS OF PART-CHINESE BLOOD. WHO FOR MANY
YEARS HAVE OCCUPIED AN UNUSUALLY STRONG ECONOMIC POSITION IN SOUTH-'
EAST ASIA COUNTRIES. BUILT LARGELY AROUND THEIR DOMINATION OF THE
PROFITABLE *MIDDLEMEN' TRADES--RETAILING. DISTRIBUTION. PROCESSING.
AND FINANCING. THEY HAVE MAINTAINED THIS STRONG POSITION-EVEN THROUGH
THE LONG JAPANESE OCCUPATION.
THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF OVERSEAS CHINESE. THEIR DISPOSITION
TO LIVE IN ISOLATED POLITICAL AND CULTURAL GROUPS AND TO RETAIN
STRONG TIES WITH CHINA. HAVE BEEN A RECURRENT SOURCE OF IRRITATION TO
THE NATIVES IN SbUTHEAST ASIA AND HAVE ON MANY OCCASIONS LED TO THE
IMPOSITION OF RESTRICTIVE MEASURES BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.
SINCE V-J DAY. THE RESURGENCE OF NATIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
COUNTRIES HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY REVIVED RESENTMENT AGAINST THE
ALIEN CHINESE. ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE.
ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. MALAYA AND SIAM.
THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASINGLY SPIRITED PRESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST ALL
ALIENS IN THE PHILIPPINES SINCE INDEPENDENCE DAY. IN ALL SOUTHEAST
ASIA COUNTRIES. PUBLIC OPINION HAS BEEN DEMANDING OFFICIAL RESTRICTIONS
ON CHINESE IMMIGRATION. DUAL CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS. AND ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.
BOTH IN THE PRE-WAR PERIOD AND SINCE V-J DAY. THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT HAS ATTEMPTED--BY DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS. PROPAGANDA
CAMPAIGNS. AND OTHER 'AD HOC' MEASURES--TO DEFEND ITS NATIONALS
ABROAD AGAINST DISCRIMINATION AND ILL-TREATMENT. ITS EFFORTS TO
THIS END. HOWEVER. HAVE BEEN-SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED BY THE POLITICAL
AND MILITARY SITUATION IN CHINA ITSELF. INTERNAL CIVIL CONFLICT
HAS MONOPOLIZED THE GOVERNMENTS ATTENTION. THUS BLOCKING THE FORMA-
TION OF A WELL-DEFINED POLICY ON BEHALF OF CHINESE MINORITIES ABROAD.
MOREOVER. THESE MINORITIES THEMSELVES. VITALLY INTERESTED IN AFFAIRS
AT HOME. HAVE SPLIT INTO MUCH THE SAME POLITICAL FACTIONS AS EXIST.
IN CHINA. THE EXISTENCE OF STRONG RIVAL KUOMINTANG AND CHINESE
COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA NOT ONLY HAS AGGRAVATED
NATIVE RESENTMENT THERE BUT ALSO HAS PREVENTED THE OVERSEAS CHINESE
FROM FORMINGA UNITED FRONT AGAINST LOCAL PRESSURES.
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REGARDLESS OF CHINA'S INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS. THE CENTRAL GOVERN-
MENT CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE GREATER EFFORTS IN THE FUTURE ON BEHALF
OF OVERSEAS MINORITIES. WHO REPRESENT BOTH A VALUABLE ECONOMIC ASSET
AND A POTENTIAL TOOL FOR THE EXTENSION OF CHINA'S INFLUENCE IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA. THESE EFFORTS WILL BE VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED BY NATIONALISTIC
GROUPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND HINDERED BY CHINAS INTERNAL CONFLICT
AND ITS OVERSEAS COUNTERPART. IF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S UNILATERAL
EFFORTS FAIL TO SECURE MORE PROTECTION AND FREEDOM-FROM DISCRIMINA-
TION. THE QUESTION OF CHINESE MINORITY RIGHTS MAY BE PLACED BEFORE
THE UNITED NATIONS.
A MORE COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT IS CONTAINED IN
THE ENCLOSURE HERETO.
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3 CONJrNTIAL
ENCLOSURE
CHINESE MINORITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
THE CHINESE MINORITY ISSUE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. INVOLVING ABOUT
4.500.000 ALIEN CHINESE AND MILLIONS MORE PERSONS OF PART-CHINESE
BLOOD. DID NOT ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL STATUS UNTIL THE
PRESENT CENTURY. EVEN-THOUGH THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN EMIGRATING?TO
CHAT AREA FOR HUNDREDS OF YEARS. MINORITY PROBLEMS. WHICH CENTERED
AROUND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RESTRICTIONS. IMMIGRATION CURBS. AND
THE QUESTION OF DUAL CITIZENSHIP. DEVELOPED DURING THE 1920's AND
1930'S FROM (1) THE NATIONAL TENDENCY OF OVERSEAS CHINESE TO REMAIN
IN ISOLATED GROUPS. RETAINING STRONG TIES WITH THE HOMELAND BY
MEANS OF MANY PUBLIC AND SECRET SOCIETIES: (2) THE ALIEN CHINESE.
DEEP PENETRATION OF THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA
COUNTRIES--WHERE THEY NOT ONLY COMPRISED AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE
LOCAL LABOR FORCE BUT ALSO GAINED A DOMINANT POSITION IN 'MIDDLEMEN'
ACTIVITIES: RETAILING. PROCESSING. DISTRIBUTING. AND MONEY-LENDING.
A POSITION ACHIEVED AND MAINTAINED BY BUSINESS PRACTICES THAT WERE
CONSISTENTLY SHREWD AND OFTEN RUTHLESS AND DISCRIMINATING: (3) THE
ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE LESS CAPABLE NATIVE WORKERS: AND (4)
A GROWING FEELING OF NATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG THE NATIVE
PEOPLES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.
STIMULATED BY INCREASING POPULAR RESENTMENT AGAINST CHINESE
MINORITIES. THE GOVERNMENTS IN SOUTHEAST AS!A MADE DELIBERATE AT-
TEMPTS BEFORE THE PACIFIC WAR TO LOOSEN THE CHINESE' ECONOMIC HOLD
AND. IN VARYING DEGREE. TO RESTRICT CHINESE POLITICAL REPRESENTA-
TION. AND ACTIVITIES. NATIVE ANTAGONISM AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL
RESTRICTIONS. WHILE TENDING TO WEAKEN THE INFLUENCE OF OVERSEAS
CHINESE. ALSO GAVE IMPETUS TO. THE CHINESE' OWN DISPOSITION TO ISO-
LATE THEMSELVES POLITICALLY AND CULTURALLY. AND TO DIRECT.THEIR
LOYALTIES TO CHINA. THIS ALLEGIANCE TO THE HOMELAND. HOWEVER. HAS
FOR SEVERAL YEARS BEEN A DIVIDED ONE. SINCE THE POLITICAL CONFLICT
WITHIN CHINA HAS BEEN REFLECTED IN THE FORMATION OF RIVAL CAMPS AMONG
THE OVERSEAS CHINESE.. HEADED BY OPPOSING NATIONALIST AND COMMUNIST
ASSOCIATIONS.
PRE-WAR EFFORTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO STEM THE INFLUENCE OF
CHINESE MINORITIES WERE. OPPOSED TO SOME. EXTENT BY CHINAS CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT.`MAINLY THROUGH DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS. OVERSEAS
CHINESE REPRESENTED A SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC ASSET TO CHINA. IN THEIR
ROLE OF MIDDLEMEN. THEY PROVIDED THE MEANS OF STIMULATING TRADE
WITH-THE REST OF ASIA ON FAVORABLE TERMS FOR CHINA: ALSO. A'LARGE
PORTION OF OVERSEAS PROFITS AND WAGES RETURNED'TO=THE~HOMELAND IN
THE FORM OF REMITTANCES. THEREBY EXPANDING DOMESTIC`PURCHASING POWER
AND SWELLING CHINA'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESOURCES. -
DURING THE PACIFIC WAR. OVERSEAS CHINESE IN AREAS OCCUPIED B.Y--
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JAPAN SUCCEEDED IN PRESERVING TO A LARGE EXTENT THEIR LEADING ROLE
IN TRADE AND FINANCE ALTHOUGH SUFFERING FINANCIAL LOSSES. POLITICALLY.
THEY WERE COMPELLED TO RENDER LIP SERVICE TO THE PUPPET REGIME IN
NANKING. BUT MANY IMPORTANT CHINESE TOOK ACTIVE PART IN THE UNDERGROUND
RESISTANCE MOVEMENT.
CURRENT SITUATION
GENERAL. SINCE V-J DAY. RISING NATIVE NATIONALISM AND ANTI-
FOREIGN SENTIMENT IN THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA HAVE LED SEVERAL
SOUTHEAST ASIA GOVERNMENTS AGAIN TO FOCUS THEIR ATTENTION UPON THE
CHINESE PROBLEM. THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A -NUMBER OF ANTI-CHINESE
INCIDENTS AND RESTRICTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN OPPOSED BY CHINESE MINORITY
GROUPS AND BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WITH VARYING DEGREES OF SUCCESS.
SIAM. IN SIAM. THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AFTER V-J DAY WAS
MARKED BY SEVERE ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS SET OFF BY SIAMESE RESENTMENT
AGAINST CHINESE VICTORY CELEBRATIONS. ALTHOUGH A SINO-SIAMESE TREATY
OF AMITY WAS CONCLUDED IN JANUARY 1946. NO REAL MOVES TO IMPLEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT HAVE YET BEEN UNDERTAKEN. SIAM APPEARS TO BE UNWILLING
TO CARRY OUT CONCESSIONS PROVIDED IN THE TREATY AND CHINA APPARENTLY
IS TOO OCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL AFFAIRS TO PRESS FOR EXECUTION OF THE
TERMS. HOWEVER, THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO SIAM DECLARED IN A SPEECH
ON 20 NOVEMBER THAT SINO-SIAMESE FRIENDSHIP COULD NOT BE POSSIBLE UN-
LESS SIAM REDRESSED WRONGS DONE TO CHINESE. THE CHINESE MILITARY ATTACHE
IN BANGKOK IS ATTEMPTING TO ORGANIZE THE CHINESE IN SIAM AGAINST NATIVE
DISCRIMINATION AND AGAINST CHINESE COMMUNIST COUNTER-ORGANIZATIONS
THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF THE SAN MIN CHU I YOUTH CORPS. WHICH WAS RECENTLY
INVOLVED IN CLASHES WITH THE SIAMESE POLICE. THERE ARE OCCASIONAL REPORTS
THAT AGENTS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S SECRET POLICE HAVE APPEARED IN
SIAM FOR THE PURPOSE OF RALLYING LOCAL CHINESE SUPPORT FOR KUOMINTANG
POLICIES IN CHINA.
MALAYA. IN MALAYA. BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR POSTWAR GOVERNMENTAL
REFORM., AS EMBODIED IN THE MALAYAN UNION PLAN. GAVE PROMISE OF
IMPROVING THE POSITION OF THE LARGE CHINESE MINORITY IN THAT AREA--
CONSTITUTING FULLY 43 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF MALAYA--
BY OPENING MALAYAN CITIZENSHIP TO ALL CHINESE BORN OR RESIDENT THERE
FOR 10 YEARS. OPPOSITION TO THE PLAN ON THE PART OF THE MALAY
POPULATION HAS CENTERED AROUND THIS POINT AND HAS PROVED SUFFICIENT
TO FORCE THE BRITISH TO POSTPONE AND RECONSIDER THE SCHEME. ANY
BRITISH RETREAT FROM THE PROPOSAL OF-CITIZENSHIP FOR THE CHINESE
HAS BEEN ATTACKED BY THE CHINESE PRESS AS A BETRAYAL OF THE LEADING
CHINESE ROLE IN THE UNDERGROUND RESISTANCE MOVEMENT DURING, THE WAR.
INTERRACIAL FEELING ON POLITICAL ISSUES HAS RUN HIGH AND HAS RESULTED
IN NUMEROUS RIOTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS BY BOTH MALAY AND CHINESE GROUPS.
As IN SIAM. EFFORTS TO UNIFY CHINESE GROUPS IN MALAYA HAVE BEEN
SPONSORED BY THE KUOMINTANG AND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT;AND?DIRECTED THROUGH
CHINESE CONSULAR OFFICES. BECAUSE OF BRITISH RECOGNITION.OF THE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA. BRITISH CONTROL AND RESTRICTION OF KMT
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ACTIVITIES IN MALAYA IS A DELICATE PROBLEM. LIKEWISE. BRITISH CONTROL
OVER CHINESE COMMUNISTS. WHO DOMINATE THE MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY. IS
COMPLICATED BY THE PUBLIC RECOGNITION ON THE PART OF BRITISH AUTHORITIES
OF THE USEFUL ROLE OF CHINESE COMMUNISTS IN THE UNDERGROUND. STRONG
COMPETITION FOR MEMBERSHIP BETWEEN KUOMINTANG AND COMMUNIST GROUPS
CAN BE ANTICIPATED, HAMPERING CHINESE UNITY AGAINST NATIVE HOSTILITY
AND WEAKENING THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHINESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN MALAYA.
NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. SINCE THE ORGANIZATION OF THE INDONESIAN
REPUBLIC. THE POSITION OF CHINESE IN THE NEI HAS DETERIORATED RAPIDLY.
ALTHOUGH CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE REPUBLIC TO
PROTECT THE CHINESE IN ORDER TO ENLIST THEIR SUPPORT. THE REPUBLIC'S
MILITARY FORCES ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PREVENT HOSTILE ACTS BY EXTREMIST
ELEMENTS WHOSE ANIMOSITY HAS BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST THE CHINESE BECAUSE
OF THE LONG-STANDING EXPLOITATION OF THE NATIVES BY CHINESE MONEY-LENDERS
AND MIDDLEMEN. AND BECAUSE MANY CHINESE WERE NEUTRAL IN THE STRUGGLE
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC AND THE DUTCH. IN AREAS WHERE DUTCH OR REPUBLIC
CONTROL HAS BEEN WEAK. THESE ELEMENTS HAVE MADE SEVERAL ATTACKS.
CULMINATING IN THE MASSACRE OF SEVERAL HUNDRED CHINESE AT TANGERANG IN
WESTERN JAVA. EARLY IN JUNE 1946. THE REACTION OF THE CHINESE GOVERN-
MENT TO THIS INCIDENT WAS IMMEDIATE AND SEVERE. THE CHINESE CONSUL
GENERAL IN THE INDIES WAS RECALLED TO NANKING AND THE CHINESE FOREIGN
OFFICE ANNOUNCED THAT THE DUTCH AND INDONESIANS *WOULD'BE HELD JOINTLY
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGE TO CHINESE LIVES AND PROPERTY' AND THAT THE
PROTECTION OF OVERSEAS CHINESE INTERESTS WAS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT
TASKS OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.' A CHINESE MISSION HAS TOURED THE
NEI TO OBSERVE THE CONDITIONS OF ITS NATIONALS IN THE AREA AND TO
REMIND OVERSEAS CHINESE THAT THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS INTERESTED IN
PHILIPPINES. IN THE PHILIPPINES. THERE HAS BEEN STRONG PUBLIC
PRESSURE. LED BY VIGOROUS ANTI-FOREIGN PRESS CAMPAIGNS. FOR GREATER
RESTRICTIONS ON RESIDENT ALIENS (OF WHOM THE CHINESE COMPRISE OVER
60 PERCENT). THIS PRESSURE HAS INCREASED APPRECIABLY SINCE
INDEPENDENCE DAY. IN THE LAST REGULAR SESSION OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONGRESS. ENDING IN SEPTEMBER. BILLS WERE ENERGETICALLY PUSHED.
ALTHOUGH NOT PASSED. TO PLACE MORE STRINGENT REQUIREMENTS ON
IMMIGRATION AND TO DOUBLE THE REQUIRED CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE PERIOD'
FOR ALIENS SEEKING FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP. OTHER MEASURES BEFORE THE
RECENT SESSION OF CONGRESS RESTRICTED ALIEN LABOR AND BUSINESS
ACTIVITIES. ATTEMPTS BY THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT TO OFFER SOME
RESISTANCE TO THE ANTI-FOREIGN TREND HAVE LED TO SHARP PUBLIC CRITICISM.
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAS MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO PRESIDENT ROXAS
ON CURRENT ANTI-CHINESE LEGISLATION (AND HAS EVEN MADE AN ILL-
CONCEALED EFFORT TO ENLIST US SUPPORT IN BEHALF OF CHINA). BUT
THESE REPRESENTATIONS WERE ANSWERED BY ROXAS ON 8 OCTOBER WITH THE
STATEMENT THAT THE PHILIPPINE ADMINISTRATION WAS ACTUALLY RESTRAIN-
ING PUBLIC SENTIMENT AND MOVING MUCH SLOWER IN THE DIRECTION OF ANTI-
CHINESE MEASURES THAN PUBLIC OPINION DEMANDED. FINALLY. THE CHINESE
MINORITY, QUESTION HAS BEEN ONE OF THE CHIEF STUMBLING-BLOCKS IN
PHILIPPINE-CHINESE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY OF AMITY.. AND FOR A
COMMERCIAL TREATY. AMITY TREATY DISCUSSIONS ARE BELIEVED TO BE AT AN
IMPASSE. IN THE COMMERCIAL TREATY NEGOTIATIONS. THE CHINESE WERE
CONFTIAL
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L,l 1 I I'lL.
'
COMPELLED TO WITHDRAW THEIR INSISTENCE THAT ALIEN CHINESE BE ACCORDED
NATIONAL TREATMENT IN FILIPINO RETAIL TRADE. THE PROPOSED COMMERCIAL
TREATY HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN PARED DOWN TO A SET OF VERY GENERAL PROVISIONS
BEGGING THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES' DOMESTIC
TRADE.'
INDO CHINA. IN INDO CHINA. THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE NATIONALIST
ARMIES IN THE NORTHERN. AND MOST NATIONALISTIC. AREA.?AFTER V-J DAY
PREVENTED ANY SIGNIFICANT ANTI-CHINESE ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE
NATIVE' POPULATION. HOWEVER. THE CONDUCT OF CHINESE OCCUPYING FORCES
AND THEIR EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE DOMESTIC POLITICS THROUGH TWO
KUOMINTANG-SPONSORED PARTIES. HAVE LEFT A LEGACY OF RESENTMENT AGAINST
THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE NATIVE MIND. FRENCH AUTHORITIES HAVE
ALSO BEEN ANTAGONIZED BY THEIR EXPERIENCES WITH CHINESE NATIONALIST
MILITARY CONTROL IN NORTHERN INDO CHINA AND THEIR ALARM AT THE
GROWTH OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN THE STATE OF VIETNAM. AL-
THOUGH THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE POPULATION IN INDO CHINA AS REGARDS
TAXATION AND JUSTICE WAS GUARANTEED BY THE FRANCO-CHINESE TREATY OF
FEBRUARY 1946. IT IS EXPECTED THAT NATIVE AND FRENCH DISLIKE WILL
MAKE ITSELF DISTINCTLY FELT IN THE FUTURE.
CHINESE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
IN ITS DEFENSE OF OVERSEAS CHINESE TH.ROUGHOUT SOUTHEAST ASIA.
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT. HAS AS YET SHOWN NO WELL-DEFINED POLICY. 9UT
HAS' OPERATED ON AN 'AD'HOC' BASIS. GENERALLY SPEAKING. CHINESE POL-
ICY IS PRESENTLY ON THE OFFENSIVE FOR CHINESE MINORITY OBJECTIVES IN
SIAM AND MALAYA. AND ON THE DEFENSIVE IN THE NEI. THE PHILIPPINES.
AND INDO CHINA. GREATER EFFORTS BY THE KUOMINTANG TO UNIFY OVERSEAS
GROUPS THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF KMT ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE EXPECTED IN
THE FUTURE. WITH CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICIES DISSEMINATED AND IM-
PLEMENTED AMONG OVERSEAS POPULATIONS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF CHINESE
DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS AND MILITARY ATTACHES. EXTENSIVE PROPAGANDA
CAMPAIGNS. COUPLED WITH DEMANDS FOR THE EDUCATION OF CHINESE IN
OVERSEAS CHINESE SCHOOLS. CAN BE ANTICIPATED AS PART OF THE PLAN TO
STRESS CHINESE HOME TIES. CULTURAL AND DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS WILL
TOUR THE SOUTHEAST ASIA AREAS. EMPHASIZING THE INTEREST OF THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE AFFAIRS AND WELL-BEING OF CHINESE ABROAD. THIS
INTEREST WAS CLEARLY EXPRESSED IN AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT IN SEPTEMBER
,1946. WHICH ANNOUNCED THAT CHINA'S SYMPATHY FOR INDEPENDENCE
MOVEMENTS IN ALL COUNTRIES WOULD BE WITHDRAWN IF THOSE MOVEMENTS
RESULTED IN ACTIONS DETRIMENTAL TO OVERSEAS CHINESE.
COUNTRIES THAT CHINA INTENDS TO USE ITS OVERSEAS h,INORITIES AS
FIFTH COLUMN SPEARHEADS FOR EXPANSION. THERE IS LITTLE CONCRETE
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EVIDENCE THAT WOULD REFUTE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS REPEATED PRO-
NOUNCEMENTS THAT CHINA HAS NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA. THE MINORITIES. NEVERTHELESS.. REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT TOOL
THAT CHINA MIGHT USE IN EXTENDING ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IN-
FLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. CHINAS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN THE
INDEPENDENCE AND PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF OVERSEAS CHINESE. THERE-
FORE. WILL PROBABLY INCREASE. THESE EFFORTS. HOWEVER. WILL BE
VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED BY NATIONALISTIC GROUPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND
HINDERED BY CHINAS INTERNAL CONFLICT AND ITS OVERSEAS COUNTERPART.
IF UNILATERAL EFFORTS BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FAIL. THE QUESTION
OF CHINESE MINORITY RIGHTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA MAY BE PLACED BEFORE
THE UNITED NATIONS.
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