IMPLICATIONS OF RENEWED VIOLENCE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 5, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26:
CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3
40
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26:
CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3 25X1
Central Intelligence Agency
? ?
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
5 January 1988
Implications of Renewed Violence in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Summary
Tel Aviv's tough military response to the violence
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in December suggests it
has misjudged the nature of the locally-inspired unrest--
particularly its galvanizing impact on younger and more
radical Palestinians--and the likelihood of more violence
in the future. The wave of protests indicate that the
leadership of the Palestinian movement may be shifting
from the exiled leaders of the PLO to younger
Palestinians resident in the Israeli-occupied
territories. Tel Aviv will not be able to maintain its
security crackdown indefinitely, and Palestinian youth
most likely will take to the streets again when Israel's
security presence is relaxed. Despite the spread of
rioting to the Israeli Arab sector, we do not believe
that Israel's Arab citizenry has been radicalized by the
recent unrest, though they probably will again stage
sympathy demonstrations in the event of new unrest in the
territories. Most Arab leaders have been forced by the
Palestinian disturbances to refocus some attention on
Arab-Israeli issues even though they regard the Gulf war
as the most immediate threat to their security.
****************t****
The two-weeks of violence in the West Bank and Gaza, during
which 21 Palestinians were killed and more than 150 were wounded,
subsided just before Christmas almost as quickly as it had erupted.
Calm had been restored by Israeli security forces even before the
arrest of about 800 Palestinian activists after Christmas. The
reinforcement of Israeli forces, greater reliance on non-lethal
crowd control measures to reduce violent Israeli-Palestinian
This memorandum was prepared by Arab-Israeli
Division, and Issues and Applications Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Arab-Israeli
Division,
NESA M 88-20002
npriassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3
25X1
25X1
')cY1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3 25X1
confrontations and th onset of cold, wet weather helped to defuse
tensions.
In addition, most demonstrators probably wanted calm restored
for economic reasons. the
disturbances and general strikes depleted the cash reserves of many
Palestinian workers. Most of the 48 labor unions in the West Bank
registered with the Jordanian Government ran out of money to
compensate members idled by strikes and riots and have since
appealed to Amman for financial assistance.
many West Bankers were forced to stop their
work in order to buy food.
The Palestinian Dimension
strikes
and return
to
The wave of unrest marks the coming of age of West Bank and
Gazan youth, in our view, as they have begun to assume the mantle
of leadership of the Palestinian movement from the far-off leaders
of the PLO. The protests were confined largely to Palestinians
below the age of 25 and most were spontaneous and self-generated--
not organized or controlled by Palestinian groups outside the
occupied territories. Yasir Arafat's Fatah and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine tried to exploit the situation and
prolong the unrest but without apparent success. A source of the
US Embassy in Amman says that Arafat appeared genuinely surprised
by the intensity of the disturbances. The source comments that
while watching television coverage of the rioting, Arafat exclaimed
at one point, "Look?girls!"
Although media accounts of the violence have emphasized the
hopelessness and frustration of Palestinians with the Israeli
occupation, we believe their actions also demonstrate growing
frustration with the PLO leadership. The PLO still is the single
strongest focus of political allegiances in the occupied
territories, particularly among the young and the refugees. Their
loyalty is reinforced by the degree to which the PLO provides
financial support directly to them or to relatives living outside
the occupied territories who are on the PLO payroll.
Nonetheless, US officials in Tel Aviv have noted that many
young West Bankers and Gazans are frustrated with the exiled PLO
leadership, which is seen as out of touch with the problems of
daily life under the Israeli military occupation. They consider
the PLO to be neither responsive to nor representative of their
needs and aspirations. Moreover, many residents of the territories
differ with PLO leaders over the organization's tactics and
strategies--particularly whether the PLO should focus on
establishing a Palestinian state in the occupied territories
alongside Israel as its ultimate goal or only as an interim measure
toward a state in all of Palestine.
We do not know who the leaders of the younger Palestinian
generation are, but, on the basis of the recent protests, they
probably are organized only at local street levels.
2
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3 25X1
The PLO is alarmed by the recent events in the West Bank and
Gaza, in our judgment, particularly the spectre of its declining
influence there. As a result, Arafat and his deputies have taken
steps in recent weeks to reaffirm the PLO's leadership. At an
emergency meeting of the PLO Executive Committee in Tunis in late
December, members discussed--though took no action on--establishing
a Palestinian government-in-exile. The idea is not new, but
disagreements among Palestinian factions and opposition from Syria
have deterred the PLO from going ahead in the past. We believe the
the PLO leaders' fear of losing their claim to speak for the
residents of the occupied territories has prompted them to
reconsider the proposal at this time, and further discussions are
likely in the months ahead.
We believe Arafat also approved the ill-fated, 25 December
terrorist infiltration into Israel, evidently mounted from Iraq
through Jordan unknowingly, to reaffirm his and the PLO's
revolutionary credentials. The Palestine Liberation Front, headed
by Arafat's close associate, Muhammad Abbas--Abu Abbas--claimed
responsibility for the infiltration. Abu Abbas was also
responsible for the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship in
1985.
The Impact in Israel
Israeli leaders have traditionally regarded the occupied
territories as a two-dimensional problem--what to do with the
territories in the event of a peace settlement and controlling
Palestinian unrest until peace arrives. Israeli officials have
said publicly they do not view the latest wave of Palestinian
violence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a benchmark in the 20-
year occupation. Despite the unusual length and intensity of the
protests, they do not believe that the territories have become
uncontrollable. Israeli officials concede that the poorly-prepared
Israeli troops who overreacted and fired into threatening crowds
helped to fan tensions and prolong the cycle of violence, and they
were particularly stung by the international--and US--outcry at the
heavy-handed Israeli response. They believe that more effective
use of riot control techniques and better trained security forces
will enable them to manage future unrest.
The current Israeli security crackdown has the overwhelminn
approval of the Icrapli public.
69 percent of the Israeli
public supports the tough security measures ordered by Defense
Minister Rabin as necessary to ensure security in the occupied
territories.
The disturbances in the territories have not prompted many
Israelis to reassess the urgency of moving on the peace process in
A
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
LOA-I
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3
order to address underlying Palestinian grievances.
Is
pollsters have often pointed out, however, that Israeli public
opinion on peace-related issues is very sensitive to external
developments--the Israeli public becomes less willing to make
concessions for peace as the prospects for peace appear more
remote.
Israeli hardliners associated with Prime Minister Shamir 's
Likud and other right-wing parties point to Palestinian violence as
evidence of the intolerable security threat Israel would face if it
were to withdraw from the territories. In their view, Israel must
remain permanently in the West Bank and Gaza to prevent radical
Palestinians from taking control of the territories.
For Labor and the supporters of territorial compromise, the
violence highlights the demographic problem Israel faces if itAoes
not disengage from the territories. In the absence of a viable
peace process, however, territorial compromise is seen by Labor
leader Peres as a negative political issue. Consequently, he
focuses on the arrangements for negotiations--direct Arab-Israeli
talks within the loose framework of an international cenfcrence--
rather than the end result of negotiations. Moreover, until peace
is achieved, Peres supports using tough measures, if necessary, to
maintain order in the occupied territories.
Israelis across the political spectrum were disturbed by the
spread of rioting to the Israeli Arab sector on 21 December. The
Israeli Arab disturbances seemed to confirm the worst fears. of many
Israelis that Israeli Arabs would become increasingly radicalized
by the growing nationalism of Palestinians in the occupied
territories. Some Israeli leaders have tried to downplay the
significance of the rioting, describing it as a passing phenomenon.
In a conversation with US officials., Defense Minister Rabin
attributed the violence in the Israeli Arab sector to the Israeli
communist party, Rakah, which allegedly instigated the
demonstrations and could not keep them under control. We do not
'believe Israel's Arab citizenry has been radicalized by the recent
unrest, but Israeli Arabs probably will again stage sympathy
demonstrations in the event of new unrest in the territories.
Regional Reaction
Middle Eastern leadere had focused almost exclusively on the
Persian Gulf until the unrest in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
erupted U The scant attention given Arab-Israeli issues at
November's Arab League summit, for example, reflected a consensus
that Iran, not Israel, Posed the principal threat to Arab
interests.
The Palestiniantdemonstrations and Israel's heavy-handed
reaction, however, have rekindled anti-Israeli sentiment and
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3
25X1
demonstrated the explosive potential of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The violence also has probably underscored to Arab leaders that a
resolution of the Palestinian problem requires the active support
and participation of the inhabitants of the occupied territories
and that the PLO alone is not capable of pressing Israel to accept
a settlement acceptable to the Arabs. Most Arab leaders believe
that Tel Aviv will not participate in negotiations that call for an
exchange of land for peace as long as the Palestinian problem does
not pose a serious domestic security problem for Israel or elicit
greater international attention.
Radical states in the region will try to exploit Palestinian-
Israeli tension for their own gain, and Syria and Iran almost
certainly see a revival of the Palestinian issue as a timely
distraction from developments in the Persian Gulf. In the past
several months, Tehran and Damascus have had to make tactical
political shifts to accommodate growing Arab and international
pressure, and Palestinian-Israeli clashes present a convenient
vehicle to help ease their regional isolation. Syria, Iran, and
Libya probably will try to use their surrogates to fan the fires of
Palestinian-Israeli tensions.
Tehran will try to show common cause with the Arabs against
Israel to weaken growing Arab steadfastness against Iran. It
will try to provide more aid to fledgling fundamentalist
groups in the occupied territories and may extend support to
radical Palestinian groups such as the Abu Nidal Organization.
-- Syria may encourage Palestinian operations against Israel but
will seek to conceal its hand for fear of Israeli retaliation,
Particularly after the recent hang-glider incident in northern
Israel.
Moderate Arab leaders, such as Jordan's King Hussein and
Egypt's President Mubarak, hope that the recent violence will lead
to broader recognition in Israel that the absence of Arab-Israeli
peace and the desperate living conditions of Palestinians living
under Israeli control will lead only to more bloodshed. They
almost certainly still believe, however, that Israel will not
moderate its terms for a negotiating process or a settlement unless
the United States applies strong political pressure on Tel Aviv.
Hussein will try to convince Israeli leaders and Palestinian
notables in the occupied territories that they are losing.
influence and control over events in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip to young Palestinian firebrands. He will encourage both
sides to move boldly on the peace-seeking process to preserve
their interests while there is still an opportunity.
-- Hussein will also forge ahead with the West Bank development
program in hopes of rebuilding Amman's influence among
Palestinians, which he probably believes has been undermined
by the recent unrest.
5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3 25X1
-- Mubarak will place peace issues and the need for US
involvement hT on his aqnda when he visits Washington in
late January.
Outlook
Reliance on an "iron fist" policy against Palestinian unrest
suggests Tel Aviv has misjudged the spontaneous nature of the
recent disturbances and their galvanizing impact on younger, more
radical Palestinians. It also misreads the changing nature of
Palestinian attitudes in the territories--particularly among the
younger extremists who appear increasingly willing to engage in
confrontations with Israeli soldiers. Tel Aviv will not be able to
maintain the security crackdown indefinitely, and Palestinian youth
most likely will take to the streets again when Israel's security
presence is relaxed. Although Israeli security officials have said
they are determined to use more effective and non-lethal means to
bring the next bout of Palestinian violence under control, Rabin
has warned publicly that Israel will use "massive force" if
necessary.
In the nearterm, Arab-Israeli issues are likely to be treated
with more prominence by Middle Eastern leaders. The radical states
are likely to fuel the fires, and the moderates will continue
pressing their ideas for an acceptable negotiating framework. Most
Arab leaders are probably uncertain if this latest round of
violence is a turning point in the Palestinian movement, and they
will wait to see if Palestinian activism in the occupied
territories endures before making any major policy adjustments.
6
25X1
25X1
OFYI
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3 25X1
1200
1100
1000
900
BOO
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
WEST BANK: LOW LEVEL CIVIL VIOLATIONS
Ess Molotov Cocktails
Mt:
Raising the PLO Flag
IIII Barricades (road)
m Stone Throwing
Milittitat66660662*
1986
1987
50
40
30
20
10
SERIOUS INCIDENTS OF UNREST, 1986-1987
1986
1987
West Bank
Bombing
Assault
Armed Attack
rr/e,
Adg
? ?
VWWWWW.? ... .
1986
Gaza
1987
Statistics indicate a sharp increase in low-level violence,
but a decrease in more serious and terrorist incidents in 1987
from 1986. The number of low-level incidents has been twice as
great on the West Bank in 1987 than in 1986. Conversely, the
number of serious incidents have decreased in 1987, with the
number armed attacks and bombings cut in half.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3 25X1
SUBJECT: Implications of
and Gaza Strip
NESA M#88-20002
Renewed
Violence in the West Bank
Distribution:
External:
1
- Lt.
Col. Douglas Menarchik, Office of VP/Natl
Sec Affairs
1
- Mr.
Philip Wilcox, State/NEA
1
- Mr.
John L. Hirsch, State/NEA/IAI
1
- Mr.
Daniel Kurtzer, State/Policy Planning
1
- Mr.
George Marchak, State/NEA/ARN
1
- Mr.
David Dunford, State/NEA/EGY
1
- Ms.
Sandra Charles, OSD/ISA/NESA
1
- The
Hon. Robert B. Oakley, NSC
1
- Mr.
Dennis B. Ross, NSC
Internal:
25X1
1
- DIR/DCl/DDCI Exec Staff
1
- DDI
1
- ADDI
1
- NIO/NESA
1
- C/PES
1
- PDB Staff
1
- NID Staff
6
- CPAS/IMD/CB
1
- D/NESA
1
- DD/NESA
1
- C/NESA/PPS
2
- NESA/PPS (One Copy to Analyst for
Sourcing)
1
- C/NESA/SO
1
- C/NESA/IA
1
- C/NESA/PG
1
- C/NESA/AI
1
- NESA/AI/I/Chrono
1
- NESA/AI/I
25X1
1
- NESA/IA,
25X1
DI/NESA/AI/I,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/26: CIA-RDP06T00412R000707490001-3
25X1
25X1