JORDAN: IMPLICATION OF TORNADO AIRCRAFT PURCHASE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000707440001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 26, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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? Central Intelligence Agency
?-
Washington.D.C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
26 January 1988
Jordan: Implication of Tornado Aircraft Purchase
Summary
Recent indications that Jordan appears close to purchasing the
British-built Tornado fighter aircraft--despite an excellent Soviet offer
of a squadron of MIG-29s--demonstrate King Hussein's politically-motivated
preference for Western planes to modernize his increasingly obsolescent Air
Force. Hussein also seems to anticipate external financing for the buy is
forthcoming--a key obstacle in earlier negotiations for the considerably
more expensive West European planes. The King realizes that he cannot
begin to compete with the vastly superior air inventories of Israel and
Syria, but he wants to retain a credible force to deter attackers and
defend Jordanian airspace.
The King is committed to acquiring an aircraft that can perform ground
attack missions as well as the more important role of gaining air
superiority--a mix of tasks better suited to the Tornado's interdiction
strike model rather than its air defense version. The King's determination
to acquire new aircraft is reinforced by his sensitivity to the political
need to preserve high morale and regime loyalty among Jordanian military
leaders, who are keenly aware of Israel's purchase of 75 advanced US F-16s
and Syria's recent acquisition of a squadron of Soviet MIG-29s.
Tel Aviv will oppose a Tornado sale on grounds that its superior
low-altitude strike capability makes it more difficult than the MIG-29 for
Israel's existing air defense network to counter and will press the US to
block the sale--although British-built, the Tornado contains US subsystems
This memorandum was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Anal
be directed to Chief, Arab-Israeli Division
sis.
Arab-Israeli Division,
omment
I ? ? "
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which require Washington's approval to sell the aircraft to Jordan. If the
sale goes through Israel probably will request additional US security
assistance.
* * * * * * * * *
Hussein is close to accepting a British deal for
the Tornado suggests that he believes the Saudis may be willing to
underwrite the purchase. Assuming the Saudis have consented to fund such a
deal, the Tornado would be a logical and mutually acceptable choice--Riyadh
recently purchased 72 Tornados for its own Air Force.
The US F-16 is the King's first choice for a modern fighter plane, but
US Congressional restrictions make it unavailable. Until recently,
he was unable to secure financing--from Saudi
Arabia or the Gulf States--to buy either the British Tornado or its nearest
West European competitor, the French Mirage 2000. Additionally, neither
the British nor French can afford to make the sizeable cost concessions
Jordan would require to purchase either plane unilaterally, thereby leaving
King Hussein no alternative but to accept the generous Soviet offer for the
MIG-29.
Manpower and Inventory Constraints
While the Tornado, especially the strike version, will upgrade Amman's
combat aircraft capability, it will not significantly alter the military
balance in the region. King Hussein fully recognizes that acquiring an
advanced fighter will not enable Jordan to defeat Syria or Israel, but in
our judgment he believes it would substantially strengthen Jordan's ability
to inflict heavier losses on an aggressor and possibly even deter an
attack.
Even with the acquisition of eight Tornados or a squadron of MIG-29s,
the heart of Jordan's Air Force will remain its aging inventory of two
squadrons of French F-1s and three squadrons of US F-5E interceptors, which
are no match for the advanced fighters of Israel and Syria. Jordan's
Mirage F-1 fleet gives the Air Force an all-weather intercept capability,
but only modestly reduces Jordan's vulnerability to attack. Although
Mirage F-1s are better fighters than Jordan's F-5Es in avionics and range,
they are inferior in air combat maneuverability. Jordan relies heavily on
its F-5Es to accomplish its primary air defense mission. Although
reasonably effective for daytime, clear weather intercepts, they lack
satisfactory electronic countermeasures and rear attack warning systems.
Furthermore, the F-5Es are incapable of carrying advanced air defense
missiles and possess only a limited low altitude capability.
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U U
Moreover, chronic deficiencies in Jordan's air force to include
insufficient numbers of qualified pilots, critical spare parts and
ammunition shortages, an inadequate logistic system, and glaring
limitations in the range and payload of its aircraft are unlikely to be
offset by receipt of the Tornado. Jordan undoubtedly is aware of the
Tornado's maintenance problems experienced by the Saudis and that the
favored Tornado strike variant would require two pilot-trained crewmen to
operate it--further stretching the limited pool of trained pilots available
to maintain current operational readiness. Furthermore, the King's
commitment to his military--the linchpin of his regime--would compel him to
allocate the lion's share of his dwindling defense budget to amortize the
purchase of a big ticket weapon system like the Tornado--at the cost of
improving and even maintaining much of the current equipment inventory.
Concerns Over Soviet Influence
King Hussein has become increasingly frustrated and embittered by US
Congressional opposition in recent years to Jordan's arms package requests.
Despite a genuine desire to preserve the US-Jordanian military
relationship, he has increasingly turned to Moscow to meet his military
equipment needs and has purchased mobile air defense systems such as SA-8s
and SA-13s, ZSU-23/4 self-propelled antiaircraft guns, BMP-2 armored
personnel carriers, as well as armored reconnaisance and command vehicles.
King Hussein, however, is deeply distrustful of the Soviets and would
prefer to conclude a major deal for equipment--particularly advanced
aircraft--with the far more politically compatible West,
land US Embassy reporting. Hussein fully recognizes
Moscow's motives for offering the MIG-29 on such easy terms as self-serving
and an attempt to gain increased access to Jordan's military and greater
Influence in the region. The King also is acutely aware that a major
aircraft purchase from Moscow would probably double the 50 to 60 Soviet
advisers in the country.
Comparing the Leading Contenders
We thus believe that the King's decision to purchase any one of the
alternatives to the F-16--the British Tornado, French Mirage 2000 or
MIG-29--will hinge more on political and, especially, economic
considerations than on performance criteria. Although the King now appears
close to choosing the Tornado, we assess all three contenders as excellent,
modern fighter aircraft.
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I L.)
Political Rating
The Tornado is the King's favorite for political reasons, edging out
the Mirage 2000, although the Jordanians would prefer either over the
MIG-29. The King probably favors the Tornado because his air force
continues to be dissatisfied with French support following the earlier
purchase of F-1 aircraft. Despite problems with the Tornado's maintenance
record, Amman has a long history of satisfactory military dealings with the
British. Jordan has stepped up its equipment buys and training with
Britain since the US began restricting arms sales to Amman following the
1973 Arab-Israeli war and particularly after Congress enacted a moratorium
in 1984. For example, when Jordan's bid to procure US M-60A3 tanks
stalled, Amman decided in 1979 to buy British Chieftain variants. During a
visit to Amman in September 1986--which followed another Congressional
denial of military aid the previous January--British Prime Minister
Thatcher agreed to supply Jordan with ground and airborne electronic
warfare equipment, radars, naval patrol craft, tank ammunition and spares,
and engineering and communications gear.
Money Problems
Jordan could negotiate a far more generous deal with the Soviets for a
purchase of a squadron of 18 MIG-29s than Amman will receive from either
West European contender--and the Tornado is substantially more expensive
than the Mirage 2000. Without Saudi financing and/or an offer of easy
credit terms Jordan could afford only the MIG-29. Counteroffers by the
British and French fall far short of matching the Soviet terms. For
example, the price of 18 MIG-29s would buy fewer than 10 Tornados.
Performance Criteria
Both the Mirage 2000 and MIG-29 are basically designed as quick, agile
fighters. The Tornado strike variant is much larger and less maneuverable
than the other two, but it is able to carry at least twice the bomb load.
Although these characteristics make it difficult to compare the aircraft,
we can gauge basic performance levels assuming similar rapons loads at
constant weather conditions and altitude.
Maneuverability
--The Tornado trails considerably behind the Mirage
2000, and the MIG-29 outperforms both. The Soviet
plane has superior thrust per weight and a much
higher specific excess power--key measures of an
aircraft's ability to accelerate or decelerate
quickly and an important indicator of its overall
maneuverability.
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(,..j
Endurance
--The Tornado strike version is superior in this
category--the MIG-29's extremely limited combat
radius is a particularly serious deficiency. Also,
the MIG-29 is fitted with a centerline tank rather
than one tank under each wing, causing the plane to
be "bottom heavy" and also considerably limiting the
bomb payload it can deliver over longer distances. ?
The Tornado's greater endurance is ideally suited for
Hussein if, as we believe, his defensive strategy
provides for basing his new fighters as far as
practical from Israel and Syria to shield them from
preemptive attack.
Maintenance/Logistics
--We believe the Tornado, despite its notoriously poor
maintenance record actually leads in this category.
the
Jordanians point to many past examples proving the
British bargain in good faith and believe they can
count on British after-sale support to be far
superior to that of the French. The MIG-29 lags far
behind its Western competition in this area--its
engine needs to be replaced twice as often and must
be returned to the Soviet Union for a major overhaul
after only 600 or fewer hours of flight time.
The Final Tally
The MIG-29, despite the low rating for maintenance and endurance, is
probably the better overall performer--at least in a defensive role--and
nearest competitor to the F-16, and would ideally fulfill the primary air
defense role required by the King. In view of Jordan's considerable
deficiencies in maintenance and aircraft support systems, and its obvious
distrust of Moscow, however, we believe the Tornado would provide the King
with a sound alternative.
The Syrian Angle
The Syrian Air Force has a decisive edge over Jordan's because of its
larger inventory of advanced combat aircraft--further enhanced by the
recent delivery to Damascus of the MIG-29. In the event of a
Syrian-Jordanian confrontation, the larger size and superior equipment of
Syria's air force probably would more than compensate for the greater skill
of Jordanian pilots even if flying the MIG-29 or Tornado. Moreover,
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Jordanian air defenses are woefully inadequate--despite recent deliveries
of Soviet air defense equipment such as mobile SA-8 and SA-13
surface-to-air missile svstems--and would be easily overwhelmed in a Syrian
airborne attack.
By comparison, the Soviets have dramatically increased their efforts to
rebuild and improve Syrian air and air defense capabilities following
Syria's poor performance in the 1982 war in Lebanon against the Israelis.
Syria has received new radars, new fighter-interceptors, helicopters
equipped with electronic countermeasures, and an automated air defense
command and control system. This would allow Syria easily to defeat any
Jordanian aggression.
The Israeli Perspective
Israel will look unfavorably on any sale of advanced aircraft to
Jordan--particularly a Western plane. Israeli pilots, like their Jordanian
counterparts, are serious students of Western air combat tactics and
training, and regard Western aircraft as superior overall to comparable
Soviet planes. Eight Tornados would not be a serious match for the IAF's
top-of-the line, newly received F-16s, and the Israeli air force outclasses
the Jordanians not only in the quantity and quality of its aircraft systems
but also in its leadership, command and control, training, and pilot
initiative. Nevertheless, Tel Aviv, in our view, would perceive the
introduction of the Tornado strike version into the region as a development
that would complicate its air defense planning and operations.
The Tornado possesses a long combat range and can fly at extremely low
altitudes, enabling Jordan to base it far from the Israeli border, but
Jordanian Tornados still would be within range of detection by Israel's
superior early warning and ground control network soon after takeoff.
Moreover, recently have begun
improving une network to Increase their ability to detect low-flying enemy
aircraft such as the Tornado strike version. They have installed new US
early warning and target tracking radars at two of their three air defense
control and rennrtino opntorR.
Furthermore, the Israeli air force is continuing to improve the
capabilities of its E-2C airborne early warning and control aircraft, which
it uses to fill gaps in the ground-based air defense radar network. The
approximately 200 nautical mile range of the three air defense and ground
control tracking stations--which are responsible for early detection of
enemy aircraft and alerting Israeli interceptors--effectively provides
overlapping radar coverage of all Jordan's airbases except two relatively
minor ones in the northeast.
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Implications for the US
We assess that King Hussein would view Washington's rejection of a
Tornado purchase as demonstrating serious disregard for Jordanian security
and reinforce the military's growing perception of the US as an
inconsistent and reluctant ally. Having exhausted every alternative to
procure Western equipment--barring an eleventh hour French revision of its
Mirage 2000 offer--he would have no choice but to accept the Soviet MIG-29
package. Such a sale would further distance Jordan's military from its
traditional US mentor, and probably reduce the frequency of joint
US-Jordanian military training.
US support for the Jordanian Tornado purchase will almost certainly
spark active Israeli opposition, including an Israeli attempt to head off
the sale by mobilizing a political action campaign. Tel Aviv, already
aware of a possible Tornado deal for the Jordanians, is acutely sensitive
about sales of modern fighter aircraft to potentially hostile air
forces--particularly when such purchases involve Western aircraft. Israeli
officials have confided to US diplomats in Tel Aviv that they would prefer
that the Jordanians buy the MIG-29, which would require fewer adjustments
for Israel's air defenses--currently geared to the Soviet-equipped Syrian
air force.
We believe that a Jordanian acquisition of the Tornado will lead the
Israelis to seek further US security assistance, particularly for grant aid
to improve and expand Israel's air defense system. If the US were to
approve the Tornado sale in the nearterm it could aggravate an already
contentious issue between Tel Aviv and Washington, as it would coincide
with heightened Israeli displeasure with US criticism of Israel's handling
of the continuing unrest in the occupied territories.
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SUBJECT: Jordan: Implication of Tornado Aircraft Purchase
NESA M 88-20015
Distribution
External
1 - Roger Sievers DoD
1 - Richard A. Tropp AID
1 - Philip Wilcox State
1 - Robert McMahan State
1 - Leon Weintraub State
1 - George Malleck State
1 - Daniel Kurtzger State
1 - Lt. Col. Douglas Menarchik, Office of the Vice President/NSA
1 - Dennis Ross NSC
Internal
1 - Dir/DCl/DDCI Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - NIC/Analytic Group Room 7E47 Hqs
1 - C/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS (1 copy to analyst for sourcing)
1 - C/NESA/SO
1 - C/NESA/IA
1 - C/NESA/PG
1 - C/NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/I
DI/NESA/AI/I
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T4W,
TABLE 1
The Air Balance in the Levant
Israel
Syria
Jordan
Total
620
680
96
Modern fighters
1120
580
28
Other aircraft
200
100
68
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Article 3
TABLE 2
Characteristics of the Competitors
F-16
Mirage 2000
Tornado
MIG-29
Wingspan (m)
9.4
9.0
13.9
11.5
Length (m)
14.5
15.3
16.7
15.0
Combat weight kg
10,100
14,000
39,700
14,000
Maximum speed
At 10,000m
Mach 2
Mach 2.2
Mach 2.2
Mach 2.35
Ceiling (m)
20,000
18,000
21,335
20,200
Combat radius
380
250
420
230
/with two wing
tanks (km)
1,070
840
850
230
Armament
1 20mm gun
2 30mm cannons
2 27mm guns
1 30mm
2 Sidewinder 4 Matra
4 Skyflash
6 AA-8, -10
2 Sidewinder
Bomb load (kg)
5,000 4,500
8,000
2,000
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Article 3
TABLE 3
Performance of the Competition
Specific Thrust to
Excess Power a Weight
Sustained Sustained
Turn Rate a G's* a
Combat
Radius b
Mirage 2000
2
2
2
2
2
Tornado
3
3
3
3
1
MIG-29
1
1
1
1
3
a Calculated under similar air combat circumstances, 6,000 meter altitude
b Calculated using similar weapons and fuel loading and flight profile.
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Technical Feature
F-16 AND MIG-29 TECHNICAL COMPARISON
F-16
MIG-29
Size:
Wingspan(Meters)
Length(Meters)
Combat Weight
Maximum speed at 10,000 meters
Ceiling(Meters)
Combat radius(CR) in kilometers
CR with two wing tanks(Kilometers)
Armament
Bomb load(Kilograms)
9.4
14.5
10,100 kilograms
Mach 2
20,000
380
1,070
1 20mm gun
2 Sidewinders
5,000
11.5
15.0
14,000 kilograms
Mach 2.35
20,200
230
230**
1 30mm gun
6 AA-8, ?10
2,000
**: The MIG-29 cannot be equipped with wing tanks only a centerline tank that substantially reduces
the key strength of the MIG-29--its maneuverability.
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Year
JORDANIAN ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE SOVIET UNION
Amount? Equipment
1981 $292.5
1982-1983 $60.0
1984 W5.0
20 SA-8 surface?to?air missile(SAM) systems
20 ZSU-23/4 anti?aircraft artillery systems
miscellaneous air defense equipment
small arms, ammunition and spare parts
trucks
22 ZSU-2314 anti?aircraft artillery(AAA)
24 SA-13 SAM systems
10-16 SA-8 SAM systems
250 SA-14 missiles, launchers
14 BTR-60 armored command vehicles
75,000 AKM rifles
1985 $2.5 2 SA-8 SAM simulators
spare parts
1986 $800.0 undetermined number of SA-8,SA-13, and SA-14 systems
MTLB armored command vehicles
1987 $22.0 30 BMP-2 armored recconnaisance vehicles
9 BRDM command vehicles
a In millions of dollars.
SUMMARY: Jordan has purchased just over $1.6 billion in arms from the Soviets. Just over $1 billion
worth is in Jordan--a large portion of the 1986-1987purchases have yet to be delivered.
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