MINUTES OF EIGHT IG/CM MEETING, 5 OCTOBER 1983.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000400070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 24, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Interagency(3roup/Countermeasures
Washington, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Invitees
FROM:
Executive Secretary
- SUBJECT: Minutes of Eighth IG/CM Meeting,
5 October 1983
D/ICS-83-0760
24 October 1983
Attached are the final minutes of the eighth IG/CM meeting held on 51
October 1983.
Attachment:
a/s
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SUMMARY OF IG/CM MEETING
g nrtnhar 1QR/
1. The eighth meeting of the IG/CM was convened at 1400 hours, 5 October
1983, by Chairman (DUSD-Policy) Richard G. Stilwell, General, USA (Ret.). A
listing of individuals attending is attached.
2. The Chairman indicated the primary purpose of this meeting was to
receive update status reports on work in progress by the IG. Lead agency
representatives were asked to summarize essential points of assgned issue(s),
STAT ?and subsequent discussions established follow-on actions:
a. Civil Overflight NSDD: Mr. Kenneth deGraffenreid, NSC Staff,
reported that Judge Clark had endorsed the IG/CM-proposed NSDD but that
some changes were made in its content by NSC staffers to preclude the
appearance of a policy reaction to the Korean Airline shootdown. Mr.
deGraffenreid advised that the proposed NSDD was before the President,
but he could not ascertain whether it had been signed prior to his
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ACTION: Mr. deGraffenreid will continue follow up. (The
Secretariat was advised after eting that the President had signed
the NSDD on 5 October 1983.)
b. Policy Mechanisms Other Than NSDDs: Mr. deGraffenreid reported
?on his attempt to identify policy mechanisms other than Presidentially
signed NSDDs for promulgating interagency national security policy.
Essentially, he advised that Judge Clark is not disposed to sign any type
of policy implementation document, believing strongly that this is the
province of the President. Based upon this position, Mr. deGraffenreid
opined that there would be no more National Security Council Intelligence
Directives (NSCIDs), observing also that by today's standards they would
be NSDDs. The Secretary to the IG/CM observed that this position would
require readdressing an Industrial Security issue which had been
forwarded to the NSC for issuance as a National Security Council Policy
Memorandum. Mr. deGraffenreid stated there was really nothing wrong with
continuing to use NSDDs, and suggested that the unusually weighty issues
in the security arena met the criteria for NSDDs.
ACTION: The Chairman requested Mr. deGraffenreid continue to carry
the fight withinthe NSC as an advocate of the IG/CM's position, e.g.,
that a mechanism short of NSDDs is needed for the promulgation of
policies. Such a mechanism would be signed with the knowledge arrig_tv_Ille
direction of the President -- a Chief-of-Staff type of function.
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The Secretary to the IG/CM will coordinate to deterMine the fate of,
and any follow up, to the recomMended National Security Council Policy
Memorandum on the Industrial Security issue.
c. NASI 4000: NSA, advised that publication
?of a revised Nationa Communications Security Instruction (NACSI 4000)
should occur by next month. While the revision does not provide the full
range of COMSEC freedom originally sought by the Community, it does
clarify and facilitate some of the former problems. Follow-on
discussions covered, from many angles, the subject of relaxation of
restrictions imposed by law. Mr. Cinquegrana, DoJ, finally opined that
it would take a constitutional change to accomplish all that was
desired. The Chairman concluded that perhaps half a loaf was better than
nothing.
ACTION: NSA will continue to push for early publication of the
revised Instruction.
d. National TEMPEST Policy: R stated that the question of STAT
whether a TEMPEST policy was needed had been ceferred until completion of
the Countermeasures Organization Study. He advised that the National
Communications Security Committee and its Subcommittee on Compromising
Emanations (SCOCE) were examining the CM Organization Study
recommendations. Different sets of TEMPEST criteria are being developed
for CONUS and OCONUS. A response is due from NCSC by 4 November 1983.
In a somewhat related matter, the Chairman observed that the NSA proposal
for a cryptographic access program and a CM Organization Study recom-
mendation for a review of the COMSEC equipment requirements were two
issues which the IG/CM had also referred to the NCSC on 3 August 1983.
The Chairman suggested that the IG/CM should also examine the need for
better articulation and dissemination of TEMPEST threat data
requirements.
ACTION: The IG/CM will await the results of the NCSC deliberations
on 1670M-sues referred to it. NSA will take the lead in presenting
these before the IG/CM. NSA will also put together an ad hoc group to
examine what, if anything, needs to be done to improve dissemination of
TEMPEST threat data requirements. Status reports will be provided to the
IG/CM on call.
e. Industrial Security Policy: Mr. Britt Snider, OSD, recalled
that copies of the DoD proposal for establishing a National Industrial
Security Advisory Committee (NISAC) had been distributed to members on 28
September 1983. Mr. Snider introduced the proposal and indicated that
although DoE and CIA are invited Committee participants, the basic thrust
is to address DoD concerns and issues. SECOM, indicated
the proposed charter seemed to overlap areas which are traditional DCI
prerogatives. He recommended some kind of limiting language in the
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specific areas of concern. The Chairman agreed that SECOM, CIA, and OSD
representatives could work out the Charter language changes during the
initial meetings of the NISAC. Mr. Cinquegrana, DoJ, requested DoJ or
the FBI also be invited to participate with the Committee. Mr. Snider
STAT will provide each agency a letter extending such invitation.
ACTION: ,t_a_hlishment of the NISAC completes direct IG/CM action on
?STAT this subject.
? f. Operations Security Advisory Committee: Mr. Jack Donnelly, OSD,
? provided a strawman Charter for the establishment of.the IG/CM-
recommended National OPSEC Advisory Committee. He also provided a list
of proposed initial issues to be dealt with and a tentative agenda for
STAT the first meeting..
ACTION: Member comments on
Secretariat by 17 October 1983.
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oposal are due to the IG/CM
g. Van Cook Study Evaluation: Mr. Britt Snider, OSD, recapitulated
the background leading to DoD consideration of the Van Cook study (see
IG/CM minutes 14 April 1983). He advised an action package (which
establishes procedures for DoD internal control of sensitive, albeit
unclassified, technical data) is presently before the SECDEF for
approval. He also indicated that additional assistance toward
controlling such sensitive information is contained in paragraph 1217 of
the FY84 DoD Authorizations Bill. This paragraph contains authority for
DoD to withhold from public disclosure, unclassified technical informa-
tion on items subject to export controls. He observed that since Defense
is the largest sponsor of such sensitive information, these new
provisions will greatly assist in alleviating a security problem of
concern to the Intelligence Community. He noted that after SECDEF
approval of the new internal dissemination controls, there will
a long way to go before actual implementation is accomplished.
ACTION: OSD will keep IG/CM members apprised of significant
developments at subsequent meetings.
h. Damage Assessments: Mr. Snider, OSD, distributed a joint DoD-
SECOM proposal to assist in correcting the varying content and quality of
damage assessments. Essentially, the proposal strengthens and emphasizes
standards to be used.
ACTION: Member comments on the proposed guidelines are due to the
IG/CM Secretariat by 5 November 1983.
i. Polygraph Policy: General discussions were held on this
issue. Mr. deGraffenreid advised that because of the media and
Congressional attacks on use of the polygraph, the Administration
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believes a more elaborate statement of Administration policy is needed
which will go beyond that stated in NSDD-84. The imminent testimony of
before the Brooks Committee will make that expanded
statement. The statement will take into account that we (CIA, NSA, DoD)
have equities involved and must preserve what we now have. It is
intended that the testimony be a prologue to a policy which will then
become the basis for the policies of individual departments and
agencies. The Chairman observed that it will be useful in the Brqoks
hearingto get away from the narrow NSDD-84 view of polygraph use
CIA, indicated that a dual track view of polygraph use, i.e.,
sensitive sources/methods and SCI arena and (2) the needs of the rest
of the Community, may need to be articulated in order not to lose the
advantages we now enjoy. Mr. Cinquegrana indicated this was the approach
DoJ was attempting to take in their related actions.
ACTION: None; for information only.
j. Embassy Security: Mr. Richard Curl, State, advised that the
Embassy Security Working Group of the IG/CM will meet again on 13 October
1983. A member of the DoS Office for Combatting Terrorism will
participate with the Working Group. Its main task is to prepare a report
on Working Group findings and recommendations concerning issues
identified in the CM Organization Study.
3. The Chairman asked Mr. deGraffenreid to introduce the two additional
issues the NSC wanted added as ad hoc agenda items:
a. Embassy Security--Moscow: Mr. deGraffenreid indicated recent
briefings received by the President's National Security Advisor had
raised new concerns. The chairman elected not to go into this issue in
the plenary session.
ACTION: State is to take the lead, together with other concerned
representatives to determine what new developments need addressing and
report to the Chairman.
b. Soviet Access to U.S.-Managed Data Bases: The NSC
representative indicated several reports had been received on this
subject. The questions were: are we looking at the problem, is damage
being done, and what's being done about such access? Mr. Robert P.
Gallagher, Commerce, spoke to the issue of the data base of most current
concern -- the National Technical Information Service (NTIS). He
described what this data base was and how it worked, emphasizing that the
data base was intended to contain only unclassified information. HP
advised that!
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about a month ago the Technology rans er ssessmen en er ) had
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distributed a paper reflecting the extent of the data base penetration
problem. Mr. Gallagher opined that the best course of action was to
ensure that what went into the unclassified data bases was in fact
unclassified. He suggested that, unchecked, the automatic
declassification provision of the information security program may
represent a major problem in this regard. He also suggested that
increasing Soviet use of cut-outs and the large number of data bases
similar to the NTIS would make any other approach to the problem
impractical. The Chairman agreed that control on the input side was
mandatory. Mr. Snider, OSD, revealed that approximately three-fourths of
the information in the NTIS is DoD related. DoD is, therefore,
considering the establishment of a review group to ensure data passing
through the Defense Technical Information Center (and ultimately destined
for NTIS) is checked for classification level. Moreover, he advised that
new authority to withhold data subject to export controls will also
change the level of information going into the data base. Mr. Gallagher
reemphasized that this was obviously a macro problem transcending NTIS
and that major agencies needed to get the word out to stop or review the
automatic declassification process.
ACTION: The Chairman requested all members determine whether their
agency submits data to NTIS, if so how it works, and how the process can
be improved. Reports of findings are to be submitted to the Secretariat
by 17 October 1983.
4. The meeting adjourned at 1553 hours.
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ATTENDEES
IG/CM Meeting, 5 October 1983
NAME
STILWELL, Richard G.
SNIDER, L. Britt
DONNELLY, John F.
CAMPANY. Richard
ORGANIZATION
OSD
OSD
OSD
OSD
,DU HADWAY, Thomas FBI
deGRAFFENREID, Kenneth NSC
VINNETT, Peter Army
BERK IN, Gerald Navy
WOMACK, Harold Air Force
GREISEN, Bruce Marine Corps
KLOS, Arthur DIA
CURL, Richard E. State
WHARTON, Royal State
CROSHER, F. Kenneth State
CINQUEGRANA, A. R. DoJ
ALLAN, Kimberly DoJ
PASCHAL, Donald SECOM
COHEN, Edmund SECOM
GALLAGHER, Robert P. Commerce
CASSETA, Michael Commerce
Secretariat
CONFIDENTIAL
IG/CM
IG/CM
PL 86-36
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