IMPACT OF IRANIAN AND AFGHAN EVENTS ON SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09-00438R000100450001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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1-2:.?Foreign
1' fdUWIdI
Assessment
Center
Impact of Iranian and
Afghan Events on South Asia
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
PA 80-10007
January 1980
Copy
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National Secret
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Impact of Iranian and
Afghan Events on South Asia
An Intelligence Assessment
Research for this report was completed
on 7 January 1980.
The author of this paper is Office of
Political Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and should be directed to the Chief, Near
East-South Asia Branch, Office of Political Analysis,
The paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South
Asia.
Secret
PA 80-10007
January 1980
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Key Judgments
Impact of Iranian and
Afghan Events on South Asia
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The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is the latest in a series of events that
have caused deep concern in neighboring South Asian nations.' In
combination, the initial Marxist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978, the
establishment of Ayatollah Khomeini's fundamentalist Islamic state in Iran,
and the overt movement of the Soviets into Afghanistan have brought about
major changes in intergovernmental relations and heightened fears both of
internal disturbances and of great-power intentions.
The coup in Kabul in April 1978 was unwelcome throughout the region,
altering, as it did, bilateral relations that had evolved over a period of years
into well-established patterns. Pakistan and Iran were notably disturbed,
viewing the event as an expansion of Soviet influence into an area from
which attempts at subverting tribesmen within their own countries might be
launched. The Afghan coup led to a massive influx of refugees into Pakistan
and a decision by Islamabad to provide some military assistance to the
Afghan insurgents. The Shah's hostility toward the Marxists in Kabul has
been surpassed by that of Khomeini, who views the struggle in Afghanistan
as between Islam and the "atheists."
The installation of an Islamic republic in Iran has had an effect throughout
South Asia. Khomeini's influence extends far beyond the minority Shiite
communities, and his controversy with Washington has found general
support from both Muslims and others in an area where latent anti-
Americanism has been growing for some time. Although the occupation of
the US Embassy in Tehran has been criticized privately by most senior
officials throughout South Asia, there have been no strong public statements
of condemnation. This reluctance to comment publicly is based on both
political and ,economic factors, including a desire not to intervene in support
of the United States when it is in confrontation with a Third World nation.
The recent coup in Kabul and the Soviet invasion have caused a severe shock
in all neighboring states. The initial reaction from Iran has been hostile and
may presage an increase in aid to the Afghan insurgents. Pakistan, with
Soviet troops moving up to its border for the first time, finds itself in a
particularly vulnerable position. Islamabad could decide to adopt a strong
anti-Soviet stance?initial reaction has been highly condemnatory?or it
'For purposes of this report, "South Asia" includes Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal.
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could choose to seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Much will
depend on the willingness of Pakistan's friends and allies to provide
adequate assistance to confront the Soviets. India, meanwhile, finds itself in
a particularly vexing position?opposed to any direct great power involve-
ment in South Asia, where India has aspiration of being a regional power,
but deeply concerned over possible new arms aid to its traditional foe,
Pakistan.
For the United States, the chaos and the fear that have been generated in
South Asia would appear to present only limited prospects for gaining new
friends or allies. Our relations with Iran and Afghanistan are at their lowest
ebb, while India is highly suspicious of new US assistance to Islamabad.
Bangladesh and the small nations in the region are determined to avoid
involvement in a potential great-power crisis. The Pakistanis, who recall past
disappointments in relations with Washington, have yet to make up their
minds.
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Impact of Iranian and
Afghan Events on South Asia
Events in Iran and Afghanistan over the past 20
months have had a significant and growing impact on
relations among and between the various nations of
South Asia. The coup d'etat of 27 April 1978 that
established a Marxist government in Kabul set off
shock waves throughout the region. The Islamic
revolution in Iran that toppled the Pahlavis increased
concern in the area. The recent Soviet-backed coup in
Afghanistan, combined with the arrival of Soviet
combat troops in that nation, has caused still greater
anxiety over possible further instability in adjacent
areas and an eventual great-power confrontation in the
region.
Prior to the coup that ousted the essentially neutralist
government of President Mohammad Daoud in April
1978, relations among states in South Asia had
developed into a fairly stable pattern, although there
were indications that fundamental changes might be in
the offing. Iran and Pakistan were closely allied in the
Central Treaty Organization. Afghanistan and Paki-
stan were in dispute over their common border, and the
Afghans regarded the Shah as a potential adversary
seeking to exert his influence over their backward and
poverty-stricken nation. Pakistan and India had long
been at odds over Kashmir and a number of other
issues, with Islamabad continually fearful of Indian
efforts to establish both political and military hege-
mony over the subcontinent. More or less on the theory
that an enemy's enemy is a friend, the Indians tended
to cooperate with the authorities in Kabul. The other
nations of South Asia?Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and
Nepal?were not directly involved in the complex
relationships to the west of them, but all regarded their
huge neighbor, India, with undisguised apprehension,
fearful that New Delhi would seek to exercise more
direct control over their destinies.
Slight changes had begun to appear in these relations
as 1978 dawned. The Indian Government under Prime
Minister Moraji Desai implemented a more coopera-
tive policy toward its neighbors, and despite occasional
interruptions, the policy had begun to pay off in terms
of improved ties with Pakistan as well as with
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Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. India's relations
with the Soviet Union, which had been excellent while
Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister, remained good but
not as close as before, while relations with the United
States improved slightly. Iran, meanwhile, had set
about improving relations with India?to the concern
of Pakistan. Islamabad, which found itself at odds with
the United States, moved closer to China while
cautiously examining improved relations with Mos-
cow. Both Iran and Pakistan increasingly found the
Central Treaty Organization irrelevant and an impedi-
ment to joining the nonaligned movement. There were
also hints of foreign policy changes in Kabul in the 25X1
weeks immediately preceding the coup, with Daoud
appearing eager to improve relations with Tehran and
work out some accommodation with Pakistan over the
border dispute. 25X1
The Marxist Coup in Afghanistan
Installation of a Marxist government in Kabul imme-
diately led to fears in Pakistan and Iran that the new
government, with Soviet support, would reignite the
border dispute with Pakistan and, also with Soviet
help, might attempt to spur tribal dissatisfaction into
open insurgency in the provinces bordering Afghani-
stan. It is an article of faith in both nations that
Moscow, operating through a compliant government In
Kabul, intends eventually to secure access to the
Indian Ocean through Iranian and/or Pakistani
Baluchistan. The Shah also viewed the coup as a
successful Soviet penetration of an area of vital
concern to Iran. Officials in New Delhi viewed the
27 April coup in Kabul with less concern, but were
frank to admit they were uneasy over the direct
influence Moscow could now exert in Afghanistan. In25X1
Indian eyes, any action that tends to increase super-
power influence or presence in the South Asian region
is undesirable. Government leaders in Bangladesh,
Nepal, and Sri Lanka privately expressed anxiety over
the changes in Kabul. 25X1
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As months passed, the unstable situation in Afghani-
stan, which eventually evolved into open insurgency
against the central government, caused added appre-
hension in the various capitals, most directly in
Islamabad, secondarily in Tehran. Thousands of refu-
gees, today numbering more than 350,000, fled across
the border into Pakistan as the government in Kabul
attempted to put down the tribal rebellion. Guerrilla
leaders, based in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Prov-
ince, organized their forces and plotted campaigns
against the Marxist regime in Kabul. Islamabad
provided the refugees with food and other necessities
and gave some logistic support to the insurgents.
In Iran, the Shah's government prepared to grant
assistance to the tribal guerrillas. The fall of the Shah
and the installation of Ayatollah Khomeini's regime
only intensified the criticism of Kabul and increased
direct assistance to the Afghan insurgents. Khomeini,
like the Afghan rebels, viewed the government in
Kabul as atheistic and anti-Islamic?a "tool" of the
Russians. There is good evidence that Iranian religious
leaders, if not the government, established refugee
camps in which to train the Afghan insurgents and sent
arms and supplies across the border. The recipients of
this aid, however, were limited primarily to the small
Shiite minority in Afghanistan.'
Khomeini's appeal, however, extends far beyond the
Shiites. His success in establishing an Islamic republic
and his denunciations of the regime in Kabul as
"infidels" have received an enthusiastic response from
the Sunni tribesmen fighting in various parts of
Afghanistan.
Khomeini's Victory
The victory of Khomeini in Iran, the subsequent
reprisals against the Shah's followers, and attempts to
create a new theocratic government in accordance with
the doctrines of Shiite Islam stirred mixed feelings
within Iran's eastern neighbors. Many members of the
upper and middle classes and the Westernized intelli-
gentsia in Pakistan and Bangladesh viewed attempts to
establish a fundamentalist Islamic state with disdain.
Most Afghan Shiites are Hazaras, a Mongoloid people in central
Afghanistan who have ionS been discriminated against by the Sunni
majority in that nation.
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Many students and the lower economic classes in the
cities, however, appear to have been favorably im-
pressed with Iran's revolution. A revival of interest in
and dedication to traditional Islamic values (both
Sunni and Shia) had been growing in both Pakistan
and Bangladesh in recent years. In many instances this
movement has increasingly combined with a rejection
of Western social, economic, and political values
Khomeini's success in Iran has had its most direct
impact on Pakistan. Since assuming direct power in a
military coup in July 1977, President Zia-ul-Haq has
attempted to establish a republic based on Islamic
principles. He has been moderately successful in
introducing Islamic laws over both public and private
life, but has been unsuccessful in creating a stable
civilian government to succeed his martial law regime.
He is believed to have only limited popular support and
remains in power largely at the tolerance of his fellow
generals. He is not in a position, in short, where bold
initiatives in either domestic or foreign policies can be
expected from him.
The sudden eruption of anti-American demonstrations
in Pakistani cities?and elsewhere in South Asia?on
21 November followed Khomeini's charges that the
United States was involved in the attack on the grand
mosque in Mecca. This revealed a latent but poten-
tially explosive anti-Americanism that exists in many
parts of South Asia and which the Iranian leader has
been able to exploit. This reservoir of ill will toward the
United States existed prior to Khomeini, however, and
is based on accumulated frustrations, envy, and a kind
of extreme nationalism to which has now been added a
violent form of religious fanaticism.
Subsidiary to the above but important is the Palestin-
ian issue?an issue that finds not only the Muslim
governments and peoples of South Asia at odds with
Washington, but is reflected as well in the statements
of non-Muslim governments that see the issue essen-
tially as a United States-versus-Third-World contro-
versy. Government propaganda has also played a role
in the growth of anti-American feeling. In Pakistan,
the government-controlled press has repeatedly and
stridently denounced Washington's attitude toward
Pakistan's nuclear aspirations, its request for debt
rescheduling, and its pleas for a more liberal arms
supply policy.
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The attack on the US Embassy in Islamabad may have
been planned and initiated by Iranian and Palestinian
students, but the mob was recruited in the streets of
Islamabad and neighboring Rawalpindi. Khomeini's
influence in Pakistan is considerable, and Zia, not in a
strong political position, would be most reluctant to
cross him. This has become clear during the crisis
following the occupation of the US Embassy in
Tehran. At US request, Zia sent a private appeal to
Khomeini asking for release of the hostages. He has
taken no further action, howevet, and the government
press has become increasingly critical of recent US
moves in the crisis.
Indian officials have been privately critical of
Khomeini and his followers since the occupation of the
US Embassy, but publicly have issued only a brief and
highly legalistic statement calling for compliance with
international law and practice. There are several
factors at work on the Indian Government that have
caused New Delhi to be cautious in commenting on
events in Iran. The present caretaker government will
be replaced now that national elections have been
completed. Additionally, India's Muslim minority of
some 70 million, while traditionally apathetic politi-
cally and overwhelmingly Sunni in composition, may
be receptive to the propaganda emanating from
Iranian religious leaders. Moreover, India has some
6,000 citizens resident in Iran, hopes for continuation
of Iranian participation in Indian development plans,
and relies on Iran for significant quantities of petro-
leum. Finally, India's traditional aversion to the
introduction of superpower military force in the region
makes officials in New Delhi critical of both the
deployment of US naval vessels to the area and
warnings of possible US military action.
The other nations in the area are less directly affected
by recent events in Iran. Bangladesh is overwhelmingly
Muslim, mostly Sunni, and its officials have been
critical of Khomeini in private but silent in public.
Unlike Pakistan, however, Bangladesh appeared ready
to handle any violence against US facilities in late
November. The demonstrations in Bangladesh were
far smaller than those in Pakistan, however, and thus
more easily controlled. Bangladesh, as a member of the
Security Council, has not been particularly helpful to
US efforts at the UN to gain the release of the
hostages.
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The small Hindu kingdom of Nepal, with only a
handful of Muslims in the population, has, like its
neighbors, been privately supportive of the US position
on the hostages, but has made no public statement on
the issue. The youth organization of the opposition
Nepali Congress Party, however, has issued one of the
strongest condemnations of the Iranian students'
action to come out of South Asia. The government of
the largely Buddhist island republic of Sri Lanka has
also been privately critical of Iran on the hostage issue.
Two trips by the Foreign Minister, a Muslim, to
Tehran, ostensibly to gain release of the hostages, have
been unproductive and appear to have been more a
mission to enhance the Foreign Minister's prestige
than a serious effort to find a solution to the problem.
Soviet Intervention
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The recent direct Soviet intervention in Afghanistan
has shocked the other nations of the region. Statements
by leading Iranian officials denouncing the Soviet
invasion as an attack on Muslims everywhere probably
are a prelude to stepped-up assistance to the Afghan
insurgents. A major Soviet presence in Afghanistan is
viewed with particular concern due to Iran's own
problems with its minorities. The Soviet Union borders
on or is close to the areas where potential separatist
groups?the Kurds, Azerbaijanis, and Turkomen?
live. With the arrival of Soviet troops and officials in
Afghanistan, Moscow will have easy access to yet
another dissatisfied minority?the Baluchis.
Khomeini, despite his opposition to the latest Soviet
move, has been able to tie it into his overriding anti-
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colluding in the Soviet invasion as another part of the
larger "superpower plot" against the world's Muslims.
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Pakistan is most directly affected by the Soviet
invasion, as the move could, for the first time, bring
Soviet troops to the borders of Pakistan. Like the
Iranians, the Pakistanis will fear Soviet-inspired ef-
forts at subverting the tribes along the border with
Afghanistan?particularly the frequently discontented
Baluchis of Pakistan, some of whom have been
involved in a smoldering insurrection against the
central government since the creation of the nation in 25X1
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1947. Another fear that undoubtedly has surfaced in
Islamabad is the recurrent vision of a Soviet-Afghan-
Indian axis bent on the partition of present-day
Pakistan. This concern will be given further impetus
now that Indira Gandhi has been returned to power.
Zia's position within Pakistan may have been moder-
ately strengthened by Soviet intervention, as the other
generals, faced with a serious new crisis, will tend to
rally around the President?at least temporarily.
Surrounded by new and dangerous circumstances, the
Pakistanis would appear to have two options?they can
seek assurances and assistance from their allies or they
can attempt to reach an accommodation with Moscow.
While the government in Islamabad has been pleased
by strong statements of support from Washington, it
has remained cautious of becoming too closely identi-
fied with US foreign policy in the area until satisfied
that significant military assistance will be forth-
coming, without strings attached to such vital issues as
the Pakistan nuclear program. Zia recognizes that he
probably has some time to examine US intentions, as
the new government in Kabul can be expected to seek
good relations with Islamabad at least until it has
established control throughout Afghanistan. Rapidly
improving ties with the United States could cause
complications in Pakistan's relations with the Soviet
Union, Afghanistan, India, and possibly Iran. The
Pakistanis presumably will seek reassurances and
increased aid from their other great power ally, China.
If the two allies of Pakistan fail to reassure Islamabad
that they can and will protect Pakistan against the
Soviet threat, Zia or his successors could seek ari
accommodation with Moscow. This option has been
examined in the past by Zia's predecessors and would
appear to be an attractive alternative to finding
Pakistan hopelessly wedged between an Afghanistan
occupied by massive Soviet combat forces and an India
that is not trusted.
One of the immediate problems facing the government
in Islamabad is how to deal with the Afghan insurgents
in light of the changed situation in Kabul. Soviet
officials have previously been-highly critical of Paki-
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stan's support to the guerrillas and have sought to have
the assistance terminated. With combat troops now
operating close to the Pakistani border, Moscow would
appear to have the means to apply increased pressure
for compliance with its demand. The Pakistani deci-
sion in regard to future aid to the rebels will depend to
a considerable extent on Islamabad's re
support it is likely to get from its allies.
The Soviet invasion has caused an ambivalent reaction
in India where the acting Prime Minister expressed his
"deep concern" at the news, but coupled this with an
expression of "grave concern" over possible new US
arms deliveries to Pakistan. The next prime minister,
Indira Gandhi, has been even less critical of the Soviet
action. No senior Indian leader has ever condoned
great power involvement in South Asia, however, and
the presence of Soviet troops along the Pakistani
border will give little satisfaction to the Indian
Government. Moscow will be blamed, at least implic-
itly, for creating a situation in which Pakistan may be
given new military assistance by its allies. The Indian
press has already started warning that new US
military aid to Pakistan will fuel an arms race on the
subcontinent.
Conclusion
By the end of 1979, two of the nations of South Asia,
Iran and Afghanistan, were in ferment, a third?
Pakistan?was becoming more deeply involved, and all
the rest were increasingly concerned about the sudden
and dramatic changes that were taking place within
the region. Two revolutions are taking place in an area
of extreme poverty, population pressures, and numer-
ous bilateral disputes. Khomeini's call for a resurgent
Muslim fundamentalism and increased Islamic politi-
cal power has had dramatic impact in those states with
sizable Muslim populations?Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and India. At the same time, the new
leaders of Afghanistan are attempting to recast
traditional society and politics in that nation. The
Afghans seek to eradicate feudalism and to create a
Marxist state closely tied to the Soviet Union.
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Pressures from both revolutions have been felt
throughout the area, further complicating an already
unstable political environment. Because of the influ-
ence that Khomeini wields among the Muslim popula-
tions of Pakistan and Bangladesh, the leaders of those
two countries would be under intense domestic pres-
sure to give at least lipservice to any future call by the
Iranian leader for a holy war against either the United
States or the Soviet Union. The problem is somewhat
different in the case of India. Muslim resurgence in
nations around India could inflame communal passions
in that country and lead to increased support for
militant Hindu organizations?an obvious danger in a
secular state.
The most serious danger to South Asia from the
Afghan situation stems not from the export of the
Marxist revolution itself, but from the presence of
Soviet combat troops and the intentions of the Soviet
Government toward Afghanistan's neighbors, Paki-
stan and Iran. Although all of the governments in the
region deplore, at least privately, the arrival of Soviet
troops in their area, there will not necessarily be an
increase in receptivity toward a greater role for the
United States. Pakistan presumably will want to buy
arms from the United States, but probably will not
enter into a new defense arrangement or agree to any
widespread open cooperation with the United States at
the expense of the Soviet Union.
The universal concern that was aroused throughout the
region by the hint of the use of US military force
against Iran over the hostage issue is indicative of the
determination to keep both superpowers out of the
area, thereby reducing the chances of a confrontation
between them. To many leaders in South Asia, the
most unfortunate aspect of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan is the return of direct great-power in-
volvement in the affairs of the region. This is viewed as
a retrograde step that is both feared and resented,
particularly by India which has regional power aspira-
tions of its own in the area.
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