ARGENTINA: THE MILITARY UNDER CIVILIAN RULE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000200280001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Under Civilian Rule
Argen-ina.The Military
001/150/0010/0079996
O .
? ~ f ILE - COPY/SOURCED- CORY-
CONTROL BRANCH/CPAS./PDG/IMC
ROOM 7G07 HQS
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Secret
ALA 86-10029
June 1986
Copy 3
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Argentina: The Military
Under Civilian Rule
Office of Latin American Analysis, with a
contribution from the Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.)
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South America Division, ALA,
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June 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of31 March 1986
was used in this report.
Argentina: The Military
Under Civilian Rule25X1
ties, and low morale has spurred a manpower exodus.
Three years after Argentina's return to democratic rule, the nation's armed
forces are facing serious problems. President Alfonsin has sharply reduced
the defense budget; forced deep cutbacks in personnel benefits, training, and
equipment acquisitions; and forcibly retired most of the senior officers who
rose to key positions under military rule. He has tried to focus the armed
forces' activities exclusively on military matters and has limited their size to
reduce the drain on the economy. There is widespread resentment among the
officer corps against the administration for the resulting decline in capabili-
President Alfonsin is sensitive to the military's problems, but is also commit-
ted to longer term reforms designed to professionalize and depoliticize the
armed forces. He plans over time to transform the streamlined services into
a more professional fighting force, possessing a clear external mission and
armed with modern weapons. These measures, in our view, bode well for the
US goal of promoting democratic institutions in Argentina and throughout
South America. The military has been a persistent source of instability in
Argentina, but, with the measures implemented so far, it will probably not
play a major political role over the next few years. F-7
advice on military affairs.
We believe that Buenos Aires will almost certainly press Washington for
closer bilateral security ties and increased assistance in implementing its
military reforms. The Argentines have repeatedly stressed their preference
for military alignment with the West and favor a modernization program
that features Western-and particularly US-equipment. In our judgment,
Argentina will continue to seek US recognition and support of civilian
control over the military and will increasingly approach the Pentagon for
States, such as Iran and Libya.
Close bilateral ties have associated risks, however. Major sales of US arms
to Argentina could provoke a sharp response from London, but, by the same
token, if Buenos Aires is deprived of all access to Western weaponry, it could
flirt with the Soviets over arms supply issues. It is also possible that
Argentina may seek to reduce some of the military's budgetary strictures by
selling some of its warships, submarines, or aircraft-of both foreign and
domestic manufacture-to countries that are unfriendly to the United
Internally, the Argentine military is now in a state of transition as it tries to
reconcile itself to its new nonpolitical role. Defeat in the Falklands and the
record of poor economic performance and massive human rights abuses of
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the previous military government have left the services in a weak political
position and bereft of public support. The armed forces blame Alfonsin for
their reduced prestige and civil-military tensions remain high.
We believe Alfonsin will begin efforts over the next year to ease these strains
with the services both through symbolic gestures such as increasing civilian
government representation at military functions and by inviting their
involvement in the restructuring plans. In our judgment, these efforts may
ease tensions slightly, but they will not eliminate the major sources of
government-military friction. We believe that rapidly escalating military
fears of wholesale prosecutions of subordinate military officers for human
rights violations will probably force Alfonsin to declare an end to the trials-
in effect an amnesty-during the coming year.
For the moment, Alfonsin has succeeded in limiting the military's political
influence, but we believe the major test will come as he tries to implement
more far-reaching military reforms. Among these is the complete
reorganization of the Argentine forces, with an emphasis on joint service
cooperation. A new defense law currently being debated in Congress will
deprive the military of its responsibility for internal security, limiting its
activities to national defense. It will also strengthen Alfonsin's role as the
commander in chief of the armed forces and place all peacetime defense
planning under the control of the civilian Ministry of Defense. The armed
forces are troubled by these proposals and several key problems affecting the
military-the specter of continuing human rights trials, low salaries, re-
duced capabilities, and the fear of a resurgence of leftist terrorism-will
probably combine with this resistance to keep civil-military tensions high.
Aside from the issue of organization, we believe the civilian government is
far from reaching its broader based goal of establishing complete control
over the military and faces several long-term challenges. The administration
must promote acceptance of democratic government within the officer
corps, integrate the military into society, and try to convince the Argentine
public that the armed forces should focus exclusively on professional mili-
tary matters. Alfonsin will probably make only marginal progress toward
these ends during the remainder of his six-year term. Consequently, we
expect that civil-military relations will remain a prime concern of the
President or any successor administration.
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Summary
Declining Capabilities
3
Forcing Democracy on the Military
8
Short-Term Prospects
14
Long-Term Challenges
15
A.
Proposed Redeployment and Reorganization of the Argentine
Armed Forces
19
B.
Current Weapons Requirements and Possible Suppliers
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Figure 1
South
Atlantic
Ocean
Falkland Islands
(Islas Malvinas)
(administered by U.K.,
b. ~~. ~. claimed by Argentina)
400 Kilometers
400 Miles
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Argentina: The Military
Under Civilian Rule
The Argentine armed forces have undergone signifi-
cant changes since the return to civilian rule in
December 1983. According to the
has slashed the defense bud-
get, reduced equipment acquisitions and manpower
levels, and forcibly retired or tried for human rights
violations many flag officers, thereby causing a sharp
deterioration in the military's operational capabilities
and political influence. A new defense law now before
Congress will completely restructure the Argentine
military through changes in mission and organization.
This will go a long way in meeting what we believe
are Alfonsin's long-term objectives-permanently re-
ducing the size of the armed forces and transforming
them into a more professional fighting force armed
with modern weapons. The government is also openly
pressing for greater interservice cooperation and re-
forms in military education in an apparent attempt to
offset some of the financial cutbacks and to coax the
services into actively supporting democratic rule in
Argentina.F-7
US Embassy and press statements suggest that the
military views Alfonsin as an adversary and is resist-
ing what it perceives as governmental meddling in its
internal affairs. We believe, however, that Alfonsin
has so clipped the military's wings that the services
will not threaten his government's stability over the
next few years. Nevertheless, the armed forces show
few signs of even grudgingly accepting enhanced
civilian control, and government-military tensions are
likely to remain high for the foreseeable future.
long list of weapons contracts made by the military
government.
considered canceling many of these, but
provisions for penalties made this an unattractive
option. He decided, instead, to delay delivery of
equipment and extend deadlines as much as possible.
These economizing measures were insufficient to meet
the acute financial squeeze confronting the new gov-
ernment, and Alfonsin concluded that more drastic
military belt-tightening was required. In early 1984,
according to the US Embassy and press reporting, he
instructed the Ministry of Defense to reduce the
defense budget over a two-year period from the
traditional 4 percent of GDP to a total of 2 percent.
Reductions in the military budget are forcing deep
cutbacks in personnel benefits, training, and equip-
ment, acquisition and maintenance spurring many
careerists to leave the military. We believe that these
austerity conditions will persist, and will accelerate
the decline in military capabilities and morale.
Manpower Problems
Alfonsin's spending reductions have sharply reduced
military wages and other benefits. Military pay in-
creases did not keep pace with the high inflation that
characterized the President's first 18 months in office,
and the government has
been chronically late in making wage and pension
payments. The purchasing power of military person-
nel is now at its lowest point in 10 years, according to
The cuts in pay and other benefits, together with the
post-Falklands decline in the social status of the
military, have prompted an exodus of personnel from
all three services. Many officers and NCOs who
remain in the military feel forced to moonlight in the
civilian sector, according to
After Argentina's defeat in the Falklands conflict in
1982, the armed forces, anticipating a prompt return
to civilian government, moved quickly to purchase as
much foreign military equipment as possible, accord-
to the
took office, his administration was faced with a
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The Legacy of Military Rule
Argentina's tradition of military intervention in poli-
tics began in 1930 when the Army overthrew Presi-
dent Hipolito Yrigoyen, the founder of Raul Alfon-
sin's Radical Party. Since then, the armed forces
have mounted five successful coups against constitu-
tional presidents and launched innumerable abortive
uprisings. The military has held power for all but five
of the last 20 years. Only one freely elected presi-
dent-Juan Peron-has completed his term of office
in the past half century, and he was an Army colonel
who first achieved prominence through a coup. The
armed forces have toppled nearly every variety of
administration: conservative, Peronist, radical, and
military. In recent decades, moreover, the duration of
military regimes has increased while the lifespan of
the civilian governments se aratin them has become
shorter and more tenuous.
The responsibility for this pattern, in our view, rests
not only with the military but also with Argentine
political culture in general. Academic studies have
concluded that the armed forces have become accept-
ed by the public and the politicians as one among
many political power brokers, barely distinguishable
in this regard from the parties or labor unions.
Recourse by politicians to the military as a source of
power has become a tacit rule of the Argentine
political game. The services have worked in tandem
with virtually every significant political force over the
last 50 years. Few of the country's politicians can
truthfully claim never to have knocked on the bar-
racks door.F---]
commanders release personnel from their regular
duties to pursue such work. In the Air Force, more-
over, many servicemen request advance notice of
transfers so they can seek outside employment in the
area of the new assignment. Given these pressures,
junior and noncommissioned officers are leaving in
growing numbers to seek jobs in private industry,
Manpower
losses are not limited to more seasoned personnel. The
for example, that the
government has limited the Army's conscript intake
Some scholars and Argentine politicians have specu-
lated that Alfonsin's election marked a decisive shift
from military intervention in politics. They argue
that the systematic and massive counterterrorist
campaign launched by the preceding military regime
involved a degree of repression and violation of
constitutional liberties unprecedented in Argentine
history. This, combined with the Falklands disaster
and the military's economic failures, uniquely dis-
credited the armed forces, according to these observ-
ers. The result, in their view, has been a salutory
affirmation by Argentine society of democratic pro-
cesses and the rule of law. F____1
We agree with much of this analysis, but hesitate to
conclude that Argentina's basic political dynamics
have changed. The armed forces, in our view, remain
key players, and the political impact of their human
rights abuses will fade in time. The Argentine press
still lavishes attention on the political views and
maneuverings of the officer corps, and reporting from
the US Embassy indicates that
politicians, labor leaders, and businessmen are culti-
vating military contacts as eagerly as ever. Most of
the underlying causes of past coups-the absence of a
powerful conservative party, labor's recourse to polit-
icized strikes and protests, and the conffrontational
style of the political parties-continue unabated. We
believe that, at a minimum, Alfonsin needs to com-
plete his term and hand power to an elected successor
before the revolving door of military and civilian
regimes in Buenos Aires will begin to close.F___-]
for 1986 to 25,000-less than half the number of
draftees inducted under the military regime. The
administration has also shortened the normal one-year
conscription tour to four months and has implemented
enforced vacation periods of up to three months
annually for both officers and enlisted men. At the
same time, the well-publicized financial plight of
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Figure 2
Argentina: Shrinking Salaries and
Manpower Exodus, 1980-85
Shrinking Salaries and Cost of Living a
Index: 1980=100
military personnel has also caused enrollment in
military academies to fall off sharply in the past two
years. F__1
Army.l Ithe
Army had expected an attrition rate of approximately
400 in 1985, but was faced with 3,600 retirements
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0
Military Retirements and Releases b
Thousand
I I I I I I
0 1980 81 82 83 84 85
a Shrinking salaries are at their lowest level in 10 years.
The curve shows the decline in purchasing power.
b Military personnel are leaving the service in growing numbers.
Retirements and resignations are at record highs.
and discharges of officers and NCOs.
decline in real wages, and that many stayed on only
because other jobs were scarce. F_~
most personnel left because of the
enlisted technicians during 1984
Navy. The Navy lost a third of its noncommissioned
officers and about one-fourth of its officer corps and
dropped somewhat in 1985, but are still above normal,
and that morale among remaining officers is extreme-
Press reports indicate that the attrition levels
Air Force. The Air Force, in our view, is coping with
the funding cutbacks more successfully than the other
services and has not yet experienced the same massive
personnel losses.
however, that low wages and declining morale are
beginning to take their toll. Although most career Air
Force officers with 15 to 20 years' experience do not
consider themselves suitable for civilian employment,
many officers in the 24 to 27 age bracket feel they are
still young enough to find civilian jobs.
pelieves that even a small exodus of these
young officers from the Air Force would encourage
others to follow.
Declining Capabilities
The budget cuts have also harmed operational readi-
ness. The three services have suffered setbacks in a
variety of areas, includin training, equipment main-
tenance, and logistics.
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Figure 3. Morale among Argentine military per-
sonnel has plummeted as austerity measures
have reduced benefits, training, and equipment
Army. The Army-which has received about 40 per-
cent of national defense expenditures in recent
years-has been allocated only 30 percent under
Alfonsin's austere 1985 budget. These reductions,
coupled with manpower losses, have severely weak-
ened the Army,
reporting. The Army has closed down as many
as 30 installations and is also using NCOs and officers
to perform duties normally reserved for conscripts.
Moreover, equipment
maintenance has declined alarmingly because of the
growing shortage of technical personnel. Army offi-
cers are concerned that the deterioration of equipment
will accelerate as spare parts availability plummets.
Army logistics also appear to be breaking down. At
least twice during 1984 and 1985, suppliers stopped
deliveries of foodstuffs to the Army because of over-
due bills. The press reports that supplies of uniforms
and fuel are low, and that some units severely restrict
utilities to reduce operating costs. Finally, depleted
ammunition stockpiles have seriousl restricted train-
ing; that many con-
scripts have received little or no weapons training.
Navy. The Navy also has made dramatic cuts to stay
within the constraints of its reduced budget,
Slowdowns ordered by the
Figure 4. Many military facilities (upper and
lower) have been forced to close because of a lack
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Navy Chief of Staff in sea exercises from December
to February in both 1984/85 and 1985/86, for in-
stance, kept two-thirds of the fleet in port. Moreover,
warships-which require at least 60 days at sea
annually to maintain fighting trim, based on Argen-
tine Navy standards-sailed an average of only 20
days during 1985. With continued funding constraints
likely in 1986, we believe that the Navy will lack the
fuel and trained personnel to carry out lengthy exer-
cises at sea.
The United Kingdom's ban on military
equipment sales to Argentina has deprived the Navy's
British-built Type 42 destroyers of spare parts.n
Moreover, the he
flight deck and aircraft-handling equipment aboard
the Navy's only aircraft carrier are badly in need of
repair. Press reports also indicate that the carrier is
unable to sustain speeds necessary for armed aircraft
takeoff, thus limiting flight exercises to unarmed
aircraft.
Naval flight training has also suffered major cut-
backs. The Navy believes its pilots require a minimum
of 120 hours per year to maintain proficiency. The US
hat flight hours have been
well below this level in recent years for almost all
units and that naval air units do not meet the required
number of hours for night flying.
adds that the Navy has placed at least six of its Super
Etendard fighter aircraft in long-term inactive status
because it lacks funds to maintain them. Only a small
number of the best Super Etendard pilots are flying
regularly; the remainder are attending various mili-
tary schools.
Austerity is beginning to hamper the Navy's perfor-
mance and hinder part participation in joint exercises with
foreign navies. hat
manning problems and limited naval operations have
resulted in a higher than normal incidence of errors.
The effects of financial stringencies and loss of
trained personnel were evident at recent joint exer-
cises with Brazil's Navy. According to press reports,
Brazilian sailors were able for the first time to
outperform the Argentines in speed and precision of
weapons use-an embarassment for Argentina, given
the historical rivalry between the two services.
Air Force. Argentina's Air Force has sharply cut its
flight training. Flying time for Mirage fighter aircraft
is now limited to eight hours per month-compared
with 18 in 1984-and the service has also reduced
flying time for its A-4 Skyhawk fighters. Some A-4
squadrons, however, are cutting back on flight hours
but increasing the number of sorties to ensure that the
maximum number of pilots can maintain proficiency.
There is considerable evidence of growing concern
within the Air Force about safety and maintenance.
Air Force
officials attribute a rise in accidents to decreased
flight training time.
Lack of funds is forcing the Air Force to reduce
spending in several other areas,
The Air Force is scaling back its attache
representation overseas and is also canceling partici-
pation in many training programs abroad. Older
aircraft are being cannibalized for parts because the
service cannot afford spares. According to Argentine
press reports, ammunition shortages have led the Air
Force to sharply curtail exercises, while financial
stringencies have forced drastic reductions in electric-
ity, fuel, and paper usage. F_~
Impact on Arms Acquisitions
austerity has virtu-
ally halted all new weapons purchases; instead, the
he Alfonsin government
is trying to cover some military costs by exporting
Argentine- and foreign-manufactured weapon sys-
tems acquired in the 1970s. The Air Force has put
Mirage III aircraft on the international market and
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Figure 5. These Mirage Ills at
the Argentine Air Force Base at
Mendoza have been placed on
the international market in an
effort to generate funds for the
financially strapped military.
Figure 6. The trials of senior
military officers for human
rights abuses met with a gener-
ally favorable public response,
but the specter offurther prose-
cutions continues to be a chaf-
ing point in civil-military rela-
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Argentina's Arms Export Difficulties
Since he took office nearly three years ago, Alfonsin
has pushed to increase the export of domestic and
foreign-made weapon systems in the Argentine mili-
tary inventory to generate revenue and offset the
effects of the austerity program on the military. US
Embassy and
however, that overseas sales have been minimal
largely because of
? High unit production costs and consequent high
export prices.
? Argentina's difficulty in offering attractive credit
terms because of its financial problems.
? Export restrictions set by governments of coproduc-
ing countries.
? Opposition by some Argentine officials to arms sales
to potentially lucrative markets in the Middle East.
In addition, Argentine promotional efforts have long
been weak. Defense industry officials neither at-
tached high importance to publicity nor considered
market research a prerequisite to production deci-
sions.
negotiations have been conducted with several Asian
countries and Peru, no TAM export sales have been
concluded. Exports of other Argentine-made ground
force materiel have also been disappointing.
Argentina has also had trouble finding foreign buyers
for its aircraft. The only customer so far has been
Uruguay, which purchased six IA-58 Pucara light
attack aircraft,
as canceled a contract it had signe or
24 IA-58s-probably, in our view, because the air-
craft did not meet Venezuelan Air Force require-
in buying IA-58s but lacks funds.
Iraq has signed a contract to purchase 20 IA-58s, but
actual transfer of the aircraft is being delayed on
both political and financial grounds.
The TAM tank program embodies many of the
problems that have plagued Argentina's export ef-
forts. The TAM, like other Argentine ground forces
equipment, was developed for the national Army, and
little if any consideration was given to its exportabil-
ity. that, although
has offered to sell Argentine-made Pucara aircraft
already included in its inventory.
Buenos Aires is also seeking
customers for two British-built destroyers and two
West German-made Type 209 submarines. Argentina
has yet to close a single deal, however, and we suspect
that the glut on the arms market and the relatively
poor condition of Buenos Aires's offerings will contin-
ue to impede progress in this area.
to US reexport restrictions. The United States, re-
sponding to a request from the British Government to
halt military sales to Argentina as a result of the
Falklands conflict, has refused to permit delivery of
the aircraft. Argentina is pressing Washington to
release the planes, asserting that it has paid for them
and cannot recoup the funds from Israel. In recent
months, according to US Embassy and
Argentina has repeatedly raised the issue
with US political and military representatives-fol-
lowing Alfonsin's announcement that reequipment
appropriations for 1986 will again be minimal.
In 1982 Argentina contracted to purchase from Israel
a number of A-4 fighter-bombers, which are subject
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Forcing Democracy on the Military
nd press report-
We believe that Alfonsin sees the military as the main
obstacle to his goal of completing his term in office
and transferring power in an orderly manner to
another elected civilian government. The President
used budget cuts to dilute the immediate threat, but,
in our view, he must make more fundamental changes
to remove the long-term danger of military interven-
tion in politics. To achieve this end, the administration
is planning massive reforms to restructure the armed
forces and, it hopes, permanently alter their role in
Argentine society.
Many of Alfonsin's initial moves to curb the military
were punitive in nature. He moved quickly to prevent
the military from regaining any of the power and
prestige it had lost following the Falklands debacle
and the revelations of widespread human rights
abuses during the "dirty war" against subversion in
the 1970s. He established a national commission to
investigate and publicize military human rights viola-
tions and ordered the trial of nine former Junta
members for these abuses, first in military courts and
later-when the military refused to convict its own-
in the civilian judicial system. These trials resulted in
the sentencing of three former Presidents and two
Junta members to prison-the first time in Argentine
history that a military government had been held
accountable by a civilian successor regime. F___1
Alfonsin also moved to rid the military of potential
troublemakers, according to US Embassy and press
reports, forcibly retiring 50 out of 53 Junta-appointed
senior officers during his first year in office. The
President then promoted less contentious officers to
key positions in the Joint General Staff and strength-
ened the authority of this staff as an impediment to
independent action by the individual services. He also
eliminated the First Army Corps headquarters in
Buenos Aires-a staging area for past coups-and
transferred its subordinate units to other corps located
well away from the federal capitol. F-1
Alfonsin also made a number of bureaucratic changes
in the strength of the civilian hold on the military.
Alfonsin placed the armed forces under the adminis-
tration of the newly civilianized Ministry of Defense.
ing, he also wrested control of Argentina's numerous
defense-related industries from the individual services
and transferred authority for military production
policy making to the Ministry of Defense. This move,
in our view, was designed to both reduce military
autonomy and convert the arms industry to profitabil-
ity by replacing military managers with civilians with
business experience. The administration is now con-
sidering additional reforms that would transfer the
previously military-run industries to the private sec-
tor.
The administration's long-term goal according to US
Embassy and is to trans-
form the military into a streamlined, efficient fighting
force that will not be a drain on the national economy.
Alfonsin has already accomplished the initial phase of
this effort by reducing the annual number of con-
scripts per service and closing down many installa-
tions. In the next phase, Alfonsin hopes to ease his
restrictions on weapons acquisitions, to allow this new
smaller force to modernize its inventory (see
appendix B).
We view the proposed national defense law as the
culmination of Alfonsin's structural and organization-
al military reforms. According to US Embassy and
t changes the armed forces'
mission from internal security to external defense-a
radical alteration in the military's historical role in
Argentine society-and transfers units from their
traditional locations near major cities to remote but
strategically important areas on the Chilean and
Brazilian borders. In addition, the bill will shift all
responsibility for antiterrorist and anti-insurgency
efforts to the Federal Police, a security force under
the direction of the Interior Ministry.
This legislation also reinforces the concept of direct
government participation in armed forces planning by
establishing a National Defense Cabinet and a Mili-
tary Committee. The Cabinet, which will be com-
posed of the vice president, five key ministers, and ad
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The Argentine Military Today
The armed forces consist of the Army, the Navy, and
the Air Force and are directly subordinate to the
Ministry of Defense. The Army is predominant, with
the Navy being second in size, but probably third in
influence, after the Air Force. The Joint General
Staff is responsible for plans, interservice coordina-
tion, and joint service matters and will be the mili-
tary component of the proposed National Defense
Committee. In addition, there are three paramilitary
forces formerly under the direct orders of the individ-
ual services: the Border Patrol (Army), the Coast
Guard (Navy), and the National Aeronautical Police
(Air Force). Alfonsin has transferred all three to
civilian control-the Aeronautical Police to the Min-
istry of Justice, and the Border Patrol and the Coast
Guard to the Ministry of Defense. F__]
The Army's mission is to defend Argentine territory
against external threats. President Alfonsin has given
responsibility for internal security to the Argentine
Federal Police-a national police force somewhat
analogous to the US Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion-and the civilian justice system. The Army's
estimated nercnnnel ctrenuth for 1985 hncvd on tic
hoc presidential appointees, will assist the president in
potential threat assessments by developing wartime
strategies and coordinating force planning. The Mili-
tary Committee-consisting of the minister of defense
and four top military officers-will operate only
during wartime and will advise the president in his
capacity as commander in chief of the armed forces in
all matters relating to the conduct of war.F____1
As things now stand, the bill has passed the House of
Deputies and is now being debated in the Senate. US
Embassy and press reporting indicates that the bill
may face stiff opposition from the Peronists and from
some elements of the President's own Radical Party,
but we believe that Alfonsin will make the necessary
political compromises to assure its eventual passage.
21,070 noncommissioned officers, and 25,000 con-
scripts). Conscript duty normally lasts about nine
months but has been reduced to four months or less
to cut operating costs and scale down the size of the
Army. F_~
The Navy has the mission of defending the country
from attack by sea, protecting sea lines of communi-
cation, and enzforcin national fishing laws involving
offshore waters.
The Air Force's mission is to provide homeland
defense, tactical air support, and airlift support for
ground and naval forces. The Argentine Air Force
also has nonmilitary responsibilities such as the
development of civil aviation, air traffic control, and
administration of the national weather service.
US Embassy and press statements indicate that Al-
fonsin believes that he needs the law as a constitution-
al framework for further military reform and views it
as one of the administration's major achievements.
The officer corps, land
Embassy reporting, is grea y roublea oy admin-
istration's attempts to change fundamentally the mili-
tary's traditional role and organization. We believe
that the services view Alfonsin as an adversary who is
attempting to destroy them as viable institutions.
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election-arrested six active-duty and retired officers
accused of masterminding the violence and invoked
state-of-siege provisions to make the detentions stick.'
many officers 25X1
Figure 7. Alfonsin's long-term objective is a
smaller, more professional fightingforce.F-
The fragility of civil-military relations was exposed
during the wave of terrorist bombings that afflicted
Argentina last year. The government-suspecting
that extremist elements in the military were trying to
foment trouble prior to the November congressional
saw the arrests as part of a civilian campaign to
discredit the armed forces 25X1
ed that hotheads within the military were ready to
defend themselves against what they considered to be
a direct affront to the military.
the detainees and cancel the state of siege, but the
incident, in our view, had the salutory effect of
sensitizing the President to the persistence of military
discontent and the need to move carefully in restruc-
turing and depoliticizing the armed forces.
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One of the military's main complaints, according to
US Embassy eporting, is that the 25X1
human rights trials have become a forum for attack-
ing military honor in general and the services' record
in the war against subversion in particular. Despite
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press reports that Alfonsin intends to limit the trials to
Junta members and a handful of particularly notori-
ous offenders, the US Embassy affirms that many
junior and midlevel officers still fear they will be held
accountable in civilian courts for their role during the
The potential for renewed leftist subversion remains a
prime military concern. The US Embassy reports that
the services are particularly incensed over the national
defense law's proposals to restrict internal security
responsibilities to the Federal Police. The military
believes that the Federal Police proved their incompe-
tence during the "dirty war" and would be incapable
of countering any resurgent leftist threat.
The budget is another chafing point between the
military and the civilian government, according to the
US Embassy. The services want to preserve their
historically large share of the national budget to
ensure that military revenues will rise if and when
Alfonsin's austerity program generates economic
growth. Also, the military feels-in our view, correct-
ly-that Alfonsin's budget cuts are as much designed
to shatter its political and fighting power as to save
money. that many
officers assert that they do not have sufficient funds to
carry out even minimal duties, much less effectively
defend Argentina from an external threat. All three
services fear that the cutbacks will also thwart the
administration's force modernization program be-
cause it so severely limits the acquistion of new
equipment. F__1
Large sectors of the armed forces also believe that the
service chiefs and Ministry of Defense officials have
been co-opted by the administration and now serve
government policy interests rather than those of the
67 ... President Al onsin's longtime associate and
closest adviser ... in previous post as Secretary
General of Presidency was Al onsin's "eyes and ears"
in government ... no military or defense experience,
but has support of President and his party-requi-
sites for success of past defense ministers ...
appointment resisted by the armed forces because of
his antimilitary reputation ... employed by US
companies in Argentina for 30 years ... has been in
favor of increased ties to United States.
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military as an institution. 25X1
many military personnel see the Joint 25X1
General Staff-whose importance Alfonsin has re-
peatedly stressed-as little more than a home for
pliant officers willing to do the government's bidding. 25X1
Individual service chiefs also garner little respect 25X1
hat, with the excep- 25X1
tion of the Air Force, middle grade and junior officers
of the other services think that their leaders were
chosen because they would unquestioningly imple-
ment administration policies, rather than for their
professional competence. The recent appointment of
Defense Minister German Lopez also generated a
considerable amount of ill feeling within the military.
According to the US Embassy, Lopez has an antimili-
tary reputation; many officers worry that he will
adopt a much more confrontational stance with the
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advisers who are ignorant of military affairs.
The military's poor relations with civilian authorities
have hampered military acceptance of Alfonsin's re-
structuring and reorganization program.
near term, according to the US Embassy. The mili-
tary also lacks the support of erstwhile civilian allies.
Both the Peronists and organized labor-which
worked closely with the military in the past-are
steering clear of any association with what is now
possibly Argentina's most reviled institution. F__1
Divisions within the military itself have also worked to
keep the troops in the barracks. There appear to be at
least three major rifts preventing cohesive action by
the armed forces:
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many officers view the current plan
as rushed and unprofessional and lament that it did
not emerge from a well-thought-out threat assess-
ment. The military also criticized the government's
use of a blue-ribbon panel of retired officers and
Ministry of Defense civilians to draw u and imple-
ment the defense law.
felt shut out of this
ambitious effort to remold the Argentine military
establishment and resent Alfonsin for inadequately
consulting with those most directly affected by his
reforms. F
The Military: Isolated and Divided
Notwithstanding the open animosity between the
military and Alfonsin, many factors prevent the
armed forces from effectively opposing the govern-
ment. First and foremost is the issue of popularity.
Recent polls indicate that Alfonsin enjoys the support
of about 60 percent of the public. He has transferred
some of his personal appeal to his Radical Party,
which bested the Peronist opposition in last year's
congressional election. By contrast, the armed forces,
in our judgment, remain totally discredited in the
wake of the Falklands debacle, revelations of human
rights abuses, and the rampant economic mismanage-
ment that characterized the last military government.
Recent polls indicate that the public continues to
distrust the armed forces and believes that the ver-
dicts in the Junta trials should have been much stiffer.
Nearly 80 percent of the respondents in one poll do
not want future civilian government to include active-
duty military officers, and approximately the same
percentage believe that a coup could not occur in the
? Interservice rivalries. According to US Embassy
reports, the three services profoundly distrust one
another. They are reluctant to take any joint action
and constantly squabble over resource allocation, as
illustrated by the continuing feud between the Navy
and the Air Force over which service will receive the
A-4 aircraft now in Israel awaiting US reexport
approval. The government carefully cultivates these
? Intraservice rivalries. Both bureaucratic and per-
sonality-related disputes weaken solidarit w. hin
the services. The most drastic problems
xist within the Army
between the infantry and the cavalry. Army Chief
of Staff Rios Erenu is from the infantry branch, and
we believe that some of the criticism directed
against him results from the cavalry and artillery
branches' resentment at being shut out of top Army
positions.
there is a growing rift between
the senior and junior officers in each of the services.
Senior officers-colonels and above-frequently
support the decisions of the Joint General Staff and
are making some efforts to work within the new
budgetary and political restrictions established by
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Figure 8. President Alfonsin is
likely to increase civilian pres-
ence at military functions in an
effort to ease tensions with the
armed forces.7--l
Alfonsin. However,
and press reporting, the junior officers have little
respect for their superiors and have denounced them
for failing to stand up to the government. US Embas-
sy officials indicate that junior officers are more
willing to confront the Alfonsin administration, are
generally more anti-American, and are more receptive
to radical political and economic pronouncements
than are their seniors.
Short-Term Prospects
The key issues over the next year are likely to be the
same that have plagued Alfonsin since he took of-
fice-the tenor of civil-military relations, the exten-
sion of the human rights trials, continued austerity,
and the reorganization of the armed forces. We
believe that the military's relationship with Alfonsin
will remain adversarial and tense, but controllable. In
our judgment, the chances of a coup over the next 12
months are negligible, since the military will remain
unpopular and divorced from its traditional civilian
allies. Divisions within the military and efforts by the
services to protect their individual interests in the
planned reorganization process will continue to inhibit
a coordinated move against Alfonsin.
Alfonsin, in our view, will begin efforts to placate the
military. There will be more symbolic gestures by the
government, such as increased civilian attendance at
important military functions and more visits to troop 25X1
bases throughout Argentina during the coming year.
According to the US Embassy, Alfonsin views these
appearances as opportunities to applaud the armed
forces and to praise them publicly as legitimate and
necessary in a democracy. The government will also
probably begin to involve senior members of the
armed forces in the restructuring effort; 25X1
the service chiefs have al- 25X1
ready created working groups to supervise the imple-
mentation of the defense law. We believe that these
efforts may ease tensions slightly but that they will
not eliminate the major sources of government-mili-
tary friction.F_~
We believe that military fears of wholesale prosecu-
tions of subordinate officers for human rights viola-
tions will probably force Alfonsin to declare an end to
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these trials during the coming year. In our judgment,
he will try to appease human rights and leftist groups
by prosecuting those accused of particularly egregious
crimes. We believe that Alfonsin may try to deflect
criticism by trying to place responsibility for such an
action in the courts or in Congress, but he could also
unilaterally decree a reprieve as commander in chief
of the armed forces.F I
In recent months, Alfonsin has shown some signs of
softening his hardline stance on military austerity.
For example, the US Embassy reports that early this
year Alfonsin granted a 30-percent wage hike to
career armed forces personnel while retaining wage
controls on other public employees. We believe this
will give a temporary boost to military morale, but it
addresses only one facet of the military's disgruntle-
ment with continued budgetary constraints.F_~
In our judgment, the administration will start to
implement its armed forces' reorganization this year,
despite military objections. The US Embassy reports
that Alfonsin is committed to this effort and the
Ministry of Defense views restructuring as the only
way to halt the decline in capabilities in the face of
continued austerity. All three services, in our view,
will continue to fear that their readiness level is
dangerously low and that they would be hard pressed
to defend the country against a serious military
threat. As the Defense Minister lobbies for Senate
passage of the defense bill by stressing the need for
force modernization, we believe the armed forces will
become increasingly vocal in their demands that the
government give some credibility to this goal by
allocating funds for arms acquisitions. Government-
military relations on the issue are likely to remain
contentious, but the administration will almost cer-
tainly push its defense law through Congress and at
least begin to lay the groundwork for a more rational,
streamlined defense force.)
Long-Term Challenges
In our judgment, Alfonsin has effectively used short-
term coercive measures such as limited funding and
forced retirements to rein in the unruly military. Both
the US Embassy and the however,
question whether the military establishment can so
change from within that it ceases to threaten the
stability of democratic government in Argentina. We
echo that concern and believe that the administration
is far from reaching its goal of establishing strong
civilian control over the military. Several long-term
challenges remain:
? The administration must work to eliminate the
military's view of itself as a political party and
promote acceptance of the legitimacy of democratic
government within the officer corps. The Defense
Ministry has moved to reform the curriculum at
military schools, but has retained professors who
were on the staff under military rule and are
imbued with traditional notions regarding the
armed forces' political role.
? The government needs to promote the idea among
the general public that the armed forces should
focus exclusively on professional military matters.
As the US Embassy reports, the public is extremely
sensitive to the opinions of the military, and each
flutter of institutional or individual discontent be-
comes front page news.
? The civilian government must take steps to break
the "caste-apart" status of the professional military
and integrate it into Argentine society. We believe
that this will be a daunting task because the armed
forces have traditionally seen themselves as a sepa-
rate elite; what little information we possess indi-
cates that cadets continue to be recruited mainly
from military families. F__-]
In our judgment, the Alfonsin government will make
only modest progress in addressing these long-term
problems. The military is likely to remain disgruntled
and wary of Alfonsin's overtures toward conciliation
throughout the remainder of his term. Alfonsin will
probably have no option but to rely on punitive
measures to limit the military's involvement in poli-
tics. The armed forces' ability to mount a coup will
remain limited, but they will continue to probe the
weaknesses of any civilian government in an effort to
expand their influence.
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As things now stand, the only issue that could funda-
mentally shift public opinion is the handling of the
economy.' If Alfonsin's current policies failed and
Argentina was hit by runaway inflation and a major
erosion of living standards, the resulting economic
chaos could, in our view, spur social disorder, a
resurgence of rightwing and leftwing terrorism, and a
drop in the popularity levels now enjoyed by Alfonsin
and his Radical Party. In our view, this political
scenario could once again force the Argentine public
and important civilian institutions to turn to the
military for salvation, as they so often have in the
past.
We also believe that the military could move against
Alfonsin in the absence of these elements if it felt
sufficiently threatened as an institution. Two possible
actions that could lead to such a move would be a
decision by Alfonsin to initiate wholesale prosecution
of subordinate officers for human rights abuses or to
institute further drastic cuts in the defense budget or
military capabilities. In our view, Alfonsin under-
stands the potential impact of these actions and would
vigorously resist implementing either one.
We believe that Washington will face mounting pres-
sure over the next year from both the Alfonsin
administration and the military for an increased
bilateral security relationship. According to US Em-
bassy reporting, the Ministry of Defense seeks US
recognition and support of civilian control over the
military and looks to the Pentagon for advice on
restructuring. In an effort to reinforce the change in
military doctrine from internal security to national
defense, we judge that the military will approve
service participation in joint exercises such as
UNITAS 87, and we expect that the Defense
Minister may suggest additional bilateral exercises.
Buenos Aires has repeatedly stressed its preference
for weapons acquisitions from Western-and espe-
cially US-suppliers. The armed forces will press
Washington for training and equipment, with particu-
lar emphasis in coming months on the release of
Israeli A-4 fighter aircraft now awaiting US reexport
approval.
One pitfall to any expansion of US security ties to
Argentina is the danger that any rapprochement, and
especially sales of offensive weapon systems such as
fighter aircraft, will work against perceived British
interests in the region.' The Argentines are well aware
of this situation, and we believe Buenos Aires will
continue to hint that the consequent impasse may
force it to seriously consider Soviet arms deals. Ar-
gentina, in our judgment, is reluctant to accept Mos-
cow's offers, but if military equipment and capabili-
ties continue to deteriorate at the current rate and
financial strictures endure, Buenos Aires may eventu-
ally adopt a more favorable stance toward Soviet
offers.
Austerity is also the source of another arms transfer
issue that is a high concern of the US Government.
Buenos Aires has tried to limit its offers to sell arms-
of both foreign and domestic origin-to countries that
are acceptable to Washington and has refused sales to
areas of conflict.' Continuing austerity and repeated
requests by some countries-particularly Iran and
Libya-to purchase Argentine warships and subma-
rines, however, may eventually weaken Alfonsin's
resolve.
The low readiness level of the Argentine forces also
has a detrimental effect on US global wartime strate-
gy. the Argentine 25X1
military has responsibility for protecting the US
' Nearly four years after the Falklands war, negotiations between
the United Kingdom and Argentina are moribund. Prime Minister
Thatcher refuses to discuss the question of sovereignty and stresses
the importance of the islanders' self-determination. The Argentine
Government, for its part, insists that the sovereignty issue be
included in the agenda before it will consent to negotiations.F-
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USSR: Wooing the Argentine Military
Over the years, Moscow has made numerous unsuc-
cessful attempts to expand its South American mili-
tary equipment sales beyond Peru. Seeing Argentina's
difficulty in securing Western materiel and wishing to
balance its trade with Buenos Aires, Moscow may
work harder to lure the Argentines into a military
relationship. Moscow has renewed its longstanding
offer to sell military equipment-including. fighter
and transport aircraft-to the Argentine armed
forces,
Strings Attached
One of the more recent overtures occurred last No-
vember when, the
Soviets offered to sell the Argentine Air Force 30 to
36 MIG-23 or MIG-25 fighter aircraft. The USSR
offered attractive credit terms and guaranteed to
underbid the price of any comparable fighter on the
international market. how-
ever, Moscow placed severe conditions on the sale,
stipulating that:
? All Argentine Officer and NCO training must take
place in the Soviet Union.
southern flank and sea lines of communication in the
southern Atlantic. In our view, the deep cuts in
personnel, training, and equipment acquisition and
maintenance put in serious doubt Argentina's ability
to successfully meet these obligations.
Finally, Alfonsin's curbing of military influence bodes
well for the US goal of promoting democratic institu-
tions in Argentina. The armed forces' continued
exclusion from power should, in our view, help assure
that pro-Western civilian regimes-whether Radical
or Peronist-will rule in Buenos Aires. Also, the
gradual emergence of a more professional military
force focused on national defense instead of internal
politics could, in the long run, provide a salutory
example to other newly democratized countries in
South America.
? Argentina must offer Moscow all of its agricultural
exports before placing them on the international
market.
? Buenos Aires must permit a large Soviet support
mission, including pilots, to be stationed in
Argentina.
Buenos Aires was unresponsive, and Soviet officials
have since adopted a more low-key approach, includ-
ing promotional demonstrations of at least two types
of transport aircraft in Argentina. F_~
The Argentine military has made it clear
that it is overwhelmingly anti-
have been extremely cool.
however, that the Air Force and the Army are at least
beginning to show mild interest in Soviet technology.
One Army and two Air Force pilots recently went to
Peru to fly and evaluate Soviet-made MI-8 helicop-
ters and SU-22 fighter aircraft,
In addition,
may
have taken advantage of his visit to Lima for Presi-
dent Garcia's inauguration to inspect Peru's Soviet-
made army materiel.
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Appendix A
Proposed Redeployment
and Reorganization of the
Argentine Armed Forces
The government-directed reorganization plan will
focus on the establishment of a more streamlined,
professional force capable of conducting joint service
operations. The plan will primarily affect the Argen-
tine Army, which has appointed a separate staff
charged solely with implementing the proposed
changes. peace-
time reforms include dissolution of the I Army Corps
at Buenos Aires-a staging ground for past coups-
and its incorporation into an enlarged II Corps with
headquarters at Rosario. In addition, the Army com-
mand will replace the current basic organizational
structure of corps and independent brigades with a
larger division-sized unit that combines combat and
support forces. It will also merge several small subor-
dinate bases in urban areas and relocate them in rural
areas along the Chilean and Brazilian borders. The
proposed reorganization plan calls for far less drastic
changes to the Navy and the Air Force. Within the
newly integrated defense structure, the Navy may
expand its existing base facilities at Puerto Deseado
and Puerto Santa Cruz, with the obvious intention of
increasing its operational capabilities in the southern
part of Argentina
Proposed changes in wartime deployment for all three
branches of the military also reflect the new emphasis
on joint service cooperation. We expect to see an
increasing number of combined force exercises in
coming months, as the military tests the new mobili-
zation structure. According to press reports, defense
planning now centers on three hypothetical theaters of
operations in the case of armed conflict between
Argentina and any of its border nations,' each con-
taining a fixed complement of units of the three
services, plus an independent "Strategic Maneuver
Force."
The first theater of operation, the North-Eastern
Defense Force, will feature an enlarged II Corps
(headquarters, Rosario), comprising the Ist Armored
Cavalry Brigade (headquarters, Tandil) and the IX
Mechanized Infantry Brigade (headquarters, Como-
doro Rivadavia), the II Armored Cavalry Brigade
(headquarters, Curuzu-Cuatia) and the VII Jungle
Infantry Brigade (headquarters, Corrientes). Navy 25X1
units in the force will include the Navy's mine
warfare squadron and river units, the 1st Marine
Infantry Regiment at Zarate, the 3rd Marine Infan-
try Battalion at Rio Santiago, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
and 4th Naval Air Wings, all based near Bahia
Blanca. Participating Air Force units will be the III
(Reconquista), VI (Tandil), and VII (Moron) Air
Brigades; the first is an attack and reconnaissance
unit, the second contains the bulk of the Air Force's
interceptor assets, and the third is primarily a helicop-
ter element.
The Western Defense Force, primarily to counter any
threats from Chile, will merge elements of the IV
Army Corps with the III Corps (headquarters, Cordo-
ba). These will include the V Mountain Infantry
Brigade (headquarters, Tucuman) and the VIII
Mountain Infantry Brigade (headquarters, Mendoza),
together with the IV and V Air Brigades, (both are
fighter-bomber units based at Mendoza and Villa
Reynolds). F__1
The Patagonian and South Atlantic Maneuver Force
will combine the V Army Corps, whose headquarters
will be transferred logically from Bahia Blanca to
some point south of the Colorado River, with units
from the VI Mountain Infantry Brigade (headquar-
ters, Esquel) and the IX Mechanized Infantry Brigade
(headquarters, Comodoro Rivadavia). Naval and Air
Force units in the Maneuver Force will include the
Navy's minor combat units, based at Ushuaia, the 5th
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Marine Battalion at Rio Grande, the 6th (Antarctic)
Naval Air Wing, and the Air Force's IX (Comodoro
Rivadavia) and X Brigades (Rio Gallegos). F-~
The IV Airborne and the X Mechanized Infantry
Brigades are to be removed from the jurisdiction of
the III and II Army Corps to form a Strategic
Reserve Force with headquarters at Campo de Mayo.
The headquarters of these brigades will be transferred
from Cordoba to Mendoza and from Buenos Aires to
La Plata. The Strategic Maneuver Force may also
include the fleet, the submarine force, the 5th Naval
Air Wing, and the Air Force's I and II Air Brigades.
The former operates most of the Air Force's airlift
capacity, the latter is its only bomber unit. F-~
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Appendix B
Current Weapons Requirements
and Possible Suppliers
The Argentine military is slowly recovering from the
Falklands debacle of 1982 and is looking seriously at
its weapons requirements for the late 1980s.\
primary concern is the acquisition of new fighter
aircraft and the retrofit of its existing inventory. Navy
leaders are concentrating on upgrading air/sea rescue
operations and antisubmarine warfare capabilities
through the purchase of new helicopters. The Army
hopes to procure a small number of heavy-lift helicop-
ters to enhance its troop transport capabilities. The
profile of Argentine arms acquisitions and statements
by military leaders indicate that Argentina favors
Western suppliers, but the Soviets may be able, over
time, to exploit the Argentine military's reduced
budget and status with renewed efforts to establish an
arms transfer relationship with Buenos Aires.-]
Despite the sharp cuts in the defense budget under-
taken by President Alfonsin as part of his overall
national austerity program, the Argentine armed
forces have not halted their efforts to procure new
military materiel and to improve combat readiness.
Each service has prioritized its current requirements
and is offering to sell existing equipment to finance
new purchases
The supplier of choice for the Argentine forces at this
point appears to be the United States, although we
believe frustration with export restrictions imposed by
Washington may lead the Argentines to consider
alternate suppliers.
The Air Force's first priority is the acquisition of new
fighter aircraft to offset its losses in the Falklands and
to modernize its aging inventory
has placed
its French-made Mirage III/V fighters and a number
of the Argentine-built IA-58 Pucara ground attack
aircraft on the market to help finance such acquisi-
tions. The current focus of Air Force efforts is the
transfer of the 12 A-4/Skyhawk aircraft that Argen-
tina has purchased from Israel. These aircraft, cur-
rently in Israel pending US approval for reexport,
were originally earmarked for the Navy, but the Air
Force is hotly contesting that decision, according to
and Embassy reports. The US
hopes to resolve the argument through his request that
the United States not only release the A-4s in Israel,
but also sell Argentina an additional 16 A-4s that
could be given to the Air Force. F_~
Air Force leaders are considering longer term plans as
well, possibly without the administration's knowledge.
According t~
::]is proposing to replace its Mirage III/Vs in phases
with increasingly more sophisticated US-made air-
craft. The Argentine plan calls for the purchase of 24
A-4s in 1985, 24 A-4s in 1986, a squadron of A-7s in
1987, and discussions on the purchase of F-16s and F-
20s in the 1988-90 time frame. Air Force Chief of
Staff Crespo has already approached a US firm to
discuss the purchase of 12 A-4Bs
with approximately 12 rebuilt A-4B air-
frames with the original J-65 engines. A second phase
would involve reengining the retrofitted airframes
with newer US-made F404-100D engines-a version
with no afterburner. The US firm would provide the
prototype rebuilt airframe and would supply Argenti-
na with detailed guidelines, equipment, and technical
advice to complete the remaining airframes locally. In
addition, the US firm has proposed a one-for-one
swap as the aircraft are retrofitted-an old Argentine
Air Force A-4 would be retired when a rebuilt A-4
became operational
he swap plan was suggested to reduce the
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Table 1
Air Force Order of Battle, 1985
Personnel
16,300
Jet combat aircraft
Supersonic fighters
75 Mirage III and V
Subsonic fighter-bombers
24 A-4
Dual-capable trainers
8 Aermacchi MB-326 and
MB-339
Antisubmarine warfare/
maritime patrol
14 S-2 and P-2
Airborne tankers
2 KC-130
Transport/utility/special use
Jet aircraft
3
The Navy's procurement program centers on helicop-
ters for air/sea rescue operations and for antisubma-
Turboprop and piston 109 rine warfare (ASW). Navy officials are trying to
aircraft
generate revenues by offering for sale any items in
37 the Navy inventory, including the British Type 42
Trainers (other than jet) destroyers, the Type 209 diesel submarines, the new
initial cost of the contract and to increase the chances
for US Government approval of the sale. The cost of
the first phase, including the completed prototype,
technical advice, and the used airframes, is estimated
at $20 million.
If Argentina is unable to fulfill its fighter requirement
through US suppliers, there is some indication that it
may turn to the French.
VV wL vciuiau-UU1IL iiigaLco, allu UL Masi LW') 11.-
1700 attack submarines, accordin to US Embassy 25X1
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The Navy plans to procure 10 to 12 helicopters for
air/sea rescue operations.
These helicopters will be acquired in lieu
Moreover, the Air Force is also attempting to stan-
dardize its air transport capabilities,
of the Westland Lynx aircraft that had been ordered
from the United Kingdom prior to the Falklands
conflict. Two of the helicopters will be deployed
aboard each of four destroyers, and the remainder will
be land based for training and maintenance purposes.
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Naval Order of Battle, 1985
Antisubmarine warfare/ 14
patrol fixed wing
ASW helicopters
and concluded that the US-built
Kaman SH-2 Light Airborne Multipurpose System
(LAMPS) is the best helicopter for use on the new
Meko-140 frigates. The Argentines considered
French, Italian, and West German models but found
them unacceptable because they contain ASW elec-
tronic sensing equipment manufactured in the United
Kingdom
US State Department reporting also indicates that
Navy officials have expressed interest in the following
US-made items:
? Raytheon DE1191 hull-mounted sonar.
? AN/ASQ-18 sonar system.
? LVT-P7A1 marine tracked amphibious vehicle.
Because the Argentine defense industries produce
many of the items needed by the Army, its foreign
procurement requirements are minimal. According to
the US Embassy, the Army is seeking an unspecified
number of US-built Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk heli-
copters for troop transport. A likely alternate choice
would be the French Aerospatiale Super Puma. Ac-
cording to the State Department, the Army is also
interested in other US equipment such as the Bell
206B helicopter with combat configuration and the
M-113 family of armored personnel carriers. The
Army-as well as the Navy and the Air Force-is
also seeking US training through credits and grants to
offset the current cutbacks in the domestic defense
budget. F_~
Funding for new weapons procurement contracts is
likely to remain a problem for Argentina. The mili-
tary's 1984 budget allowed only for payments on
equipment contracts that had been negotiated by the
previous military government. The 1985 budget has
still not been approved, but press reports speculate
that, once again, very little funding will be designated
for weapons procurement. The armed forces hope to
supplement any allotted procurement funds with reve-
nues from sales of equipment now in their inventories, 25X1
but there has been little interest shown in these offers.
If Buenos Aires does not negotiate any successful
sales agreements in the near future, financing for new
military purchases will have to come from changes in
budget legislation, discretionary funds at the disposal
of the president, or easy credit terms offered by
suppliers.
Argentina's defense industries are also suffering from
the budget cutbacks, and President Alfonsin is placing
new emphasis on arms exports to generate needed
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Table 3
Ground Forces Order of Battle, 1985
Tanks, medium 380 (105 mm; TAM, M4)
Tanks, light 58 (105 mm; AMX-13)
Tank destroyers/ 115 (105 mm; Panzerjaeger K)
reconnaissance vehicles/
combat cars
Armored personnel carriers 470 (TAM-VCTP and M- 113)
Antitank guided missiles 600 Cobra-Mamba,
2,000 Mathogo
Artillery
Self-propelled and towed
155 mm 204
105 mm 227
Multiple rocket launchers Unknown number of Sapba-1,
SLAM-Pampero
Surface-to-air missiles I Roland, 117 SA-7 SAMs,
35 Tigercat launchers,
20 Blowpipe
income. The current industry offerings, however, have
not done well on the international arms market, and
defense production officials are pressing Western
nations for agreements to coproduce more marketable
weapons. Argentina has approached the Italians for
possible coproduction accords. The Defense Ministers
of Argentina and Italy signed a military cooperation
agreement in early September, according to press
reports, whereby Rome will provide technology for the
development and production of unspecified military
equipment.
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