THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES IN SOVIET SOCIETY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01145R000200180019-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 120
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: July 29, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES IN SOVIET SOCIETY:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS*
S. E. Goodman
University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
July 29, 1986-
* The author wishes to thank Dr. William McHenry for several
valuable contributions and discussions.
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0. Executive Summary ..................................... El
I. Introduction
A. Scope of coverage .................................
1
B. A perspective on Western-style
information societies .............................
3
II. The Information Technologies and Their Applications:
Current Soviet Capabilities
A. Where does the USSR stand with regard to the
development and application of C&C technologies?
..
16
B. Where, and in what forms, are there gaps between
the stages of development in West and East? ....... 41
C. What have the Soviets been doing to improve their
capabilities? ...................................... 45
III. A Soviet-style Information Society
A. Will there be a Soviet-style information society? .. 54
B. What features might characterize a
Soviet-style information society? ................. 55
C. Terminology ........................................ 60
IV. Prospective Progress and Problems to the Year 2000
A. Industrial modernization, gains in productivity
and living standards .............................. 62
B. Economic planning and control ..................... 70
C. Military and internal security .................... 73
D. Image and influence ............................... 83
E. The limits of systemic evolution .................. 88
F. Will the different uses of the C_&C technologies
in the US and USSR strengthen or weaken the relative
position of the Soviet Union as a superpower? ..... 93
Glossary ............................................... 95
Short Bibliography ..................................... 98
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0. Executive Summary
Will there be a Soviet-style information society?
The USSR will be compelled to develop and apply the information
technologies on a wide national scale to support their own aspirations
and to contend with foreign pressures. Much of this will be concerned
with the preservation and enhancement of political and economic
control and military power, and with economic modernization through
both blue- and white-collar applications. It is also important for
them to present the image of'a progressive society to the world and to
their own population, if only to maintain military credibility,
proclaim ideological superiority, and to contend with Western
influence and rising internal expectations.
What features might characterize a
Soviet-style information society?
Roughly speaking, our model of a Western-style information
society is described by general, intensive, somewhat unconstrained,
problem-plagued, chaotic, and broadly debated and determined progress
in many directions. The main trends are a result of driving forces
which operate within the constraints and possibilities determined by
systemic conditions.
Similarly, our model of a "Soviet-style information society"
considers the driving forces, systemic conditions and constraints
which are influencing the evolution of C&C (computing and
communications) applications in the USSR. The combination of main
Western trends is excluded under these circumstances; so a different
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compact characterization is necessary, and what is emerging is best
characterized by goals rather than trends. Our analyses of past and
current Soviet efforts and sensitivities identify four primary goals:
1. To attain real gains in productivity and to modernize the
industrial base.
2. To maintain and improve the economic planning and control
mechanism.
3. To support both military and internal security needs.
4. To present the image of a progressive society both to the people
of the USSR and to the outside world.
These form an irreducible set in two senses: (1) Other goals,
such as keeping up with the West or building a national computer
education program, may be understood in terms of these four; (2) None
of the four may be entirely understood in terms of the other three.
Compact models for both "information societies" are given in
Table 3 (p.58).
A common thread that emerges from both models. is the need and
desire to improve control over increased complexity and opportunity
and reduced time scales. Even fantasy and entertainment applications
may be seen as quests for greater control. Both societies see the
information technologies as increasingly necessary means for the
control of production, distribution, and demand. Both see these
technologies as means for the control of the dissemination of
noneconomic information, for the control of military and intelligence
activities, for controlling the volume and efficiency of
communications, etc. Both are seeking to use the C&C technologies for
greater concentration and greater distribution of control, but with
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different emphases. The trends in the Western model exhibit the very
broad dissemination of controls for increased economic efficiency, for
personal activities, and for more communications of all kinds. They
also exhibit greater mixed centralization/decentralization controls in
some government and economic activities. Prospective Soviet
dissemination of controls is much more limited and focused. There is
also a stronger element of political control and concerns in Soviet
applications. But there is an increasing Soviet realization that some
form of more distributed hierarchical control is necessary and
desirable.
Prospective progress and problems to the Year 2000
Industrial modernization and gains in productivity
This is one of the Gorbachev administration's overarching goals,
and success or failure here will greatly affect the extent to which
the other three model goals are realized. The proposed means for
achievement involve a combination of greater discipline, the
elimination of waste, and automation. The C&C technologies have the
potential for ameliorating the effects of a labor shortage, providing
basic industrial modernization in both the manufacturing and the R&D
sectors, increasing the volumes and quality of goods produced,
imposing additional discipline, and helping to eliminate waste. These
applications have the highest profile in the Soviet media, and are at
the core of the program for computing to the Year 2000.
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The most important questions concerning the effects of the
systemic conditions on progress towards this goal are twofold. Will
the Soviet information industries be capable of providing the
technology to support industrial automation? Will the superstructure
(general systemic conditions) problems that have plagued ASUP
(enterprise MIS) for 20 years be much of an impediment?
There are two plausible views as to whether or not societally
pervasive applications are necessary to support a sufficient
infrastructure (the technical-economic-social environment of C&C
applications) to meet this goal. The first holds that the Soviet C&C
industries are large and not impotent. They cover the full spectrum
,of the relevant technologies. As long as they are not expected to
meet the combined overall Western standards of extent of applications,
technological level, sophistication of integration and service, the
Soviet industries can perform at a reasonable level with the aid of
foreign technology. They can be improved to where they at least
better their undistinguished performance in support of the ASUP
program. The need for a pervasive presence of microcomputers,
entertainment applications, computer networks, etc. in Soviet society
as a prerequisite for successful large scale industrial automation in
the USSR has been exaggerated. One can learn to tend an FMS without
having to have a microcomputer at home.
The second view holds that every stage of pervasiveness requires
a corresponding support level from the infrastructure. The
pervasiveness of applications (demand-pull) stimulates the
infrastructure to respond, just as a healthy infrastructure fosters
demand by making applications possible (supply-push). One can learn
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to tend an FMS without having to have a microcomputer at home, but can
the infrastructure provide sufficient, technologies and products
without the demand base that home personal computers and other
applications provide?
Our view is a hybrid. Significant resources will be added to the
C&C industries to help them improve their performance and there will
be improvements in infrastructure, but this will not be up to
supporting pervasive applications across Soviet enterprises. However,
pervasiveness in selected sectors might be possible and adequate.
Demand pull has never been sufficient to prod the C&C industries into
overcoming certain fundamental deficiencies in hardware reliability
and service, and for software development and support. The Soviets
therefore must unfetter the demand side by (a) unleashing some forces
of private industry within the infrastructure, or (b) allowing
enterprises to act more autonomously, or (c) by providing more and
better equipment on the supply side to help stimulate demand.
Although it may not be as bad in some ways, almost all of the
superstructural and infrastructural problems that afflicted the ASUP
program during the last two decades will also handicap the industrial
automation program. The main advantages CAM may have over ASUP are
that measurable forms of Soviet-style, quantity oriented, productivity
increases may be obtainable from localized use of industrial
automation in the short term, and that Soviet managers and workers may
perceive less risk from using CAM than MIS. But most of Soviet
industry has not yet reached a level at which it is ready to try to
reap the full benefits of of the information technologies. Within the
Soviet environment, computing relieves some problems, but is an
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additional form of inefficiency itself and exposes others that it
cannot correct.
The Soviets hope to overcome these problems through slow
structural changes and technological improvements, and through the
exposure of younger workers and managers to the information
technologies at work and school. The latter may make more effective
use of what there is and create some constructive demand from below in
the short term, and perhaps see to better solutions in the long term.
This seems to be the view held by several prominent academicians and
technocrats, and they are gaining political support, perhaps because
there is no better and feasible alternative.
This is not to say that little or nothing will be done. The
Soviets have no choice but to try hard, and something will come of the
effort. In the short term, there will be several prominent and
perhaps exaggerated successes, but serious initial work and
experimentation will take place both in high priority
military-industrial and in lesser sectors. In time, islands of
advanced industrial automation will emerge. The rest, perhaps most,
of Soviet industry will be left behind in a backwater that will be
more distanced from the advanced sectors and Western counterparts than
is the case today. The selection process will reflect priorities
given to the other three basic goals. We would expect to see the most
rapid rate of introduction in ASUTP/TPC. The Soviets are adding more
than 500 of these per year, and this rate can be expected to increase
as a result of technical progress and emphasis placed on this area
under goal 1. By the end of the century the most important,
well-understood, and not exorbitantly expensive processes will be
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partially computer controlled. ASUP/MIS will continue to suffer from
crippling problems, and will be introduced at the slowest rate. The
introduction of robots and FMS will be at a rate between the first
two, with the rate for robots being faster than that for FMS and more
integrated forms of CAM. Even this level of success would help
vindicate central planning and control and "discipline" as effective
ways for running a country.
Even if the Soviets should be modestly successful in attaining
the four primary goals, the gap between the relative Western-USSR
standards of living may grow for the rest of this century. The
information technologies have been contributing to some dramatic and
high profile changes in this gap.
B. Economic planning and control
The USSR remains strongly wedded to comprehensive central
planning. In the effort to maintain close control over an
increasingly complex economic domain and planning -process there is
little choice but to turn to the C&C technologies.
The Soviets will continue to build national and and
ministry-level systems. The fundamental problems to be faced again
involve the ability of the infrastructure to deliver the necessary
services, and the national ability to absorb the applications.
However, by the Year 2000 there will probably be a substantial amount
of data exchange via .telecommunications and data base technologies
will be widely used. Computers will be almost universally used to
collect and process data from enterprises.
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Three serious problems arise from the surrounding environment.
First, the planning and control process is and will remain a highly
political. Second, computerization has not substantially changed the
nature of the data which is being collected, nor has it dramatically
changed the way it is collected and processed. Finally, there is the
problem of planning from the achieved level, on which much of the
incentive system is based. Soviets at the highest levels have talked
about these problems, but so far little has been done.
More pervasive use of computers for economic control might take
some forms that would yield results by the Year 2000. For instance,
the maintenance of large data bases of information may help the
authorities uncover reporting inconsistencies and track down phony
data. Planners should be able to make more use of the available data
for analysis purposes. Faster reporting and analysis will be
possible. But large scale optimal plans will remain out of reach.
It might be possible to solve some of the false data problems by
using direct, sensor-based collection methods that are integrated with
industrial automation. This would be enormously expensive, and would
require that computing be used at all levels of the hierarchy, down to
the shop floor, on a near-universal basis. It would also require a
tremendous telecommunications infrastructure. This kind of universal
and effective economic surveillance will not become reality by the end
of the century.
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Military and internal security and sociopolitical risk
Goal 3 exists in strong competitive-complementary relations with
the others and with Western efforts and policies. If Western
high-tech military systems are perceived to be the most important
potential military threat to the USSR, then the Soviets will focus on
developing the necessary technologies and industries to deal with this
threat. This plausible long term response is consistent with our
analyses, and is based on the premise that the Soviets value the other
three primary goals for social and economic reasons that greatly
transcend their contributions to military power. In this case, more
resources will be poured into the C&C industries and important
applications sectors to the benefit of all four goals, and less may be
poured into more conventional military means which contribute far less
to the other three goals. This would help preserve and modernize
Soviet military power vis-a-vis the West, and it is also a sensible
approach with regard to China.
Success in the pursuit of goal 3 will depend on aspects of
civilian-military relations in the C&C industries. Ideally, there
should be a mutually beneficial, complementary relationship between a
strong set of C&C industries and strong user communities, as has been
the case in the West. It can be argued that many of the problems
the Soviet C&C industries stem from the lack of a strong feedback
relationship with a world-class user community, and that the Soviet
military and military industrial sectors fall short of being such a
community. Conversely, it may be argued that Soviet military-related
applications suffer because of the problems of the C&C industries.
The military and military-related industry and R&D organizations enjoy
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many privileges, but these do not make them a C&C using community
comparable to the general purpose users in the US, Western Europe, and
Japan.
Some substantial part of the detailed technological push for the
Soviet C&C industries comes from the examples provided by the Western
military and civilian user communities. Does the Soviet military need
a general computing base that is broader and deeper than the one it is
capable of building and supporting entirely within itself? Yes, as is
evidenced by the way it uses Western computing communities as a
surrogate for what it does not have at home. Furthermore, for all its
resources and privileges, the Soviet military cannot control all that
is necessary to build a civilian computing base comparable to that in
the West, or even to put pressure on the Soviet C&C industries
comparable to the pressures that exist on Western jndustries.
For at least the rest of this century it is unlikely that Soviet
progress in the C&C technologies will strengthen them to the point
where they can broadly catch up with or surpass Western military
applications. In order for that to happen, we believe the West must
stumble or fall down.
There is little evidence to the effect that the KGB is doing
particularly well in the use of the information technologies for for
domestic surveillance. This may be the case because these
applications would clearly be of value to such an agency; they are
within current technical capabilities; the KGB can obtain the
necessary resources to make them realities; and there are few
constraints to prevent them from doing so.
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In time, we would expect additional use of the C&C technologies
in the form of embedded, somewhat transparent, surveillance in systems
which are used by the population on a daily basis, e.g., the telephone
system. It is important that the surveillance is not obvious, but
that everyone be conditioned to think it might be there. In the past,
resource constraints prevented the Soviets from making such
surveillance really pervasive. Computers will not immediately bring
this about, but may make the present system work more effectively and
eventually lead to higher surveillance levels.
It is unlikely that the Soviet population will see Orwellian-like
surveillance during this century. The reasons are threefold: they
are well beyond current technology; a nationally pervasive system
would be enormously expensive; and they could not be imposed on the
population by anything short of a return to a neo-Stalinist regime.
The effort to do so might even destabilize the political system.
Of the technologies and applications considered in this study,
few taken alone present as much sociopolitical risk as some Western
analysts have claimed or that the Soviets seem to fear. Soviet
authorities remain very cautious with regard to the widespread
introduction of any of the information technologies that have serious
potential for being used to increase exposure to information from
foreign sources, that may be willfully used for dissident activities,
or which increase the volume of two-way communications. Soviet
concerns for secrecy, and the importance they attach to presenting a
unified front and showing that they can control information, will
continue to severely retard the introduction of the information
technologies and handicap the achievement of at least goals 1 and 4.
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However, if there is to be substantial progress towards all four
goals, it will be necessary for the Soviet leadership to permit and
encourage the much expanded utilization of the information
technologies. The inevitable result will be less effective
containment controls over an expanding user base than had been
possible in the past, e.g., when photocopy machines were the main
concern. Control of photocopiers was relatively simple, and the
economic cost of such control was easily acceptable against the
potential risk. This will not be the case with some of the newer
technologies of Table 2 (p.40).
On balance, for the rest of the century, expanding C&C
applications will be more of a problem with regard to internal
security and information control than it will be an asset for
increased surveillance. In the past the Soviet, authorities had all
the technological advantages. This is shifting fairly rapidly, and
uses for political dissent are becoming increasingly hidden or swept
under by the much larger demand for consumer and entertainment
applications. It will become increasingly difficult for the
authorities to separate dissidence from entertainment, as may be seen
in the definition of fantasy as a powerful form of control of one's
private environment. By the Year 2000, the net result may be
something of a semi-controlled opening up of information flows among
at least the more educated elements of Soviet society. However, this
will not result in a wholesale erosion of political power, although
there may be significant modifications in intra-Party processes, and
the Soviets will find these people to be mainly interested in their
own well being.
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Image and influence
The USSR has a long history of proclaiming its ideological and
moral superiority over the West. These claims have been heavy with
"scientific" justification and emphasis on the unparalleled
progressiveness of Soviet society. Computing is one of the
centerpiece technologies of the Scientific-Technological Revolution
(NTR). Ideology is also of some practical importance, even if most
officials and citizens are less than "true believers."
The information technologies have become so prominent that Soviet
claims ring hollow to themselves and the outside world if they look
backward and dependent on Western technology transfer. The population
may become more disillusioned with Marxism-Leninism, driving a greater
wedge between publicly maintained and privately held beliefs. This
will not help the Soviets. improve morale, confidence in centralized
planning, work incentives, and interest in using computers. There
would be serious negative implications for the other three primary
goals, and the resulting frustration could be a factor leading to
limited systemic changes.
Our models and analyses show that the USSR cannot or does not
want to keep up with the West in many ways. But they are under
pressure to look like they are. We can expect to see a lot of "we
have that too" noise and examples, and the Soviets will try to make up
in image what they lack or do not want to have in substance. In some
cases, they want substance to go with image, e.g., for military
credibility. In others, they want a little to go a long way, e.g., to
meet some rising expectations and avoid further disillusionment of the
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population for consumer goods.
The Soviets have a conflict between the noble claims of the
ideology, which should welcome the Western trends, and the realities
of desired controls. In a sense there is a conflict between Marxist
theory and Leninist practice. They want to retain the control and
power structure, but present an image in keeping with the modernized
ideology and realities elsewhere in the world.
To-this end, they need to at least look like they are succeeding
with goals 1-3. Beliefs about computing and the host social/economic
system play a role in promoting or hindering its absorption into
society. Conversely, nothing would contribute more to the image of a
progressive society than significant progress toward the other goals.
The Soviet image has suffered severely, both domestically and
internationally (in the West, in Eastern Europe, and in China), as a
result of problems with the development and application of the C&C
technologies. This is likely to continue.
Not only are the applications of the information technologies
changing the basis of image and influence, but they are also the
vehicles for making it more difficult for the Soviets to control
information more generally. They expose the Soviet population to more
of what is going on beyond their borders, and they expose much of the
rest of the world to more of what is going on within the USSR.
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The limits of systemic evolution
The Soviet system is not entirely inflexible. There are four
commonly considered models of how the Soviet economy and polity might
evolve during the rest of this century, and they collectively define
the potential systemic boundaries within which progress will take
place. These are: conservative (what the USSR has now), progressive
(the GDR model), neo-Stalinist, and radical (the Hungarian model).
We- have explicitly or implicitly assumed a hybrid of the
conservative and progressive models for this study, and believe our
model and assessments of a Soviet-style information society to be
fairly insensitive under either of these two models or hybrids. A
similar statement may be made for the neo-Stalinist case. The
Hungarian model is a true hybrid of the two "information society"
models, but a strong form is considered unlikely for the USSR.
Will the different uses of the C&C technologies
in the US and USSR strengthen or weaken the relative
position of the Soviet Union as a superpower?
The information technologies may be weakening the positions of
both superpowers.
The analyses and syntheses in this study show that the different
uses of of the information technologies in the US and USSR have
weakened the relative position of the USSR as a superpower, at least
within the domains where these applications influence such status, and
that this is likely to continue for the rest of the century.
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Relative US-USSR positions may also change due to a weakening of
the US position. The information technologies will decentralize
Western leadership. Japanese progress is such that they have already
and will continue to partially displace the US as the most technically
and economically advanced of the Western countries, and it is not hard
to envision a future four-power world economic-technological order.
This weakening of US leadership may make it more difficult for the
West to act collectively on East-West matters.
There is some potential for Soviet gains against the US
information industries and applications in manufacturing, but not
against the West as a whole, because of the decline in US
technological. leadership. In particular, the US is in risk of losing
important parts of domestic industries due to their inability to stand
up against foreign competition in domestic and international markets.
Soviet forms of control of their economy allow them to maintain a
complete set of industries, even if they are not competitive by
international standards. More generally, the US has some serious
"information society" problems that affect its position in a tough,
less remote, world.
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A. Scope of coverage
How will the USSR adjust to the dramatic and pervasive
opportunities and pressures presented by the development and
application of the information technologies? This study is an initial
attempt to analyze the component pieces and synthesize an overview of
the issues that underlie this critical question.
To this end, we define and partially answer a number of important
questions covering: current Soviet progress and capabilities (Ch.
II), a characterization of a "Soviet-style information society" (Ch.
III), and prospects and implications for the rest of this century (Ch.
IV). For our purposes, the information technologies are essentially
the computing and communications (C&C) technologies for the
transmission and processing of data.
Coverage of current Soviet progress and capabilities falls under
three basic questions. A. Where does the USSR stand with regard to
the development and application of the C&C technologies? Answers will
be provided for six key areas: the structure and performance of the
C&C industries, white- and blue-collar applications, some forms of
communications, a few security-related issues, education, and consumer
and entertainment applications. B. Where, and in what forms, are
there gaps between the stages of development in West and East?
Attention will again be f-ocused on these six areas. C. What have the
Soviets been doing to improve their capabilities? We consider: plans
to increase efforts and resources, technocratic and organizational
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changes, "campaigns", and technology transfer.
Under the heading of Ch. III, we consider: A. Will there be a
Soviet-style information society? Is it necessary for the USSR to
venture into the information age at this point? Or does it possess
sufficient scope for modernization below the threshold of an
information society? B. What features might characterize a
Soviet-style information society? What are the most important
systemic determinants and goals? To what degree does the Soviet-style
model require or permit the emergence of the trends that characterize
a Western-style information society?
The final chapter is concerned with prospective progress and
problems to the Year 2000. To what extent can the Soviets meet their
goals within the means and boundaries set by past performance and the
systemic determinants? What are the likely limits for systemic
evolution for the rest of this century? Can Soviet prospects improve
dramatically within these boundaries? We also consider a few of the
broad implications for relative "superpower" status.
Some of the boundaries of this study. should be noted. It is
based entirely on unclassified work. The most important of these are
14 academic studies by members of our research group [Davi78; Dola85;
Good79a; Good79b; Good79c; Good82b; Good84; Good84b; Good85; Good85d;
Hamm84; Mche85; Mund8l; Stap85b]. In total, this work is explicitly
or implicitly based on more than ten thousand written and oral
sources, equipment inspections, and several recent visits to the USSR
and Central Europe. As an unclassified report, discussions of certain
subjects, especially security-related applications, is severely
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constrained. Spatial restrictions have limited coverage to the USSR
and topics strongly connected with computing. Two of the notable
casualties in this regard are communications not related to computing
(see [Shan85; Robe86]), and Eastern Europe, which deserves a separate
study. A number of the questions in the outline are from [Good8Sg;
Seit85].
For three reasons, this introductory chapter will end with a
necessarily short and oversimplified perspective on Western-style
information societies. First, some basic vocabulary and viewpoints
should be introduced. Second, there are important and explicit
comparative aspects to the analyses and overviews in all the later
.chapters. And, third, the development and broad application of the
C&C technologies in the West are major factors forcing the USSR to
come to grips with the issues considered throughout this study.
Knowledgeable readers may want to move directly to Ch. II.
B. A perspective on Western-style "information societies"
1. Basic characteristics
There is no universally accepted definition or vision of a
Western-style "information society," nor will there ever be. Even the
term "West" needs to be augmented to keep up with rapidly changing
developments in technology and international business. There is now a
significant membership from the Far East where several countries have
important places as producers and consumers.
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Although it is clearly impossible for us to provide a
comprehensive discussion, some loosely defined characteristics will
prove useful. We consider two basic trends:
1. The pervasive application of the C&C technologies.
2. The expanded access to information.
The common denominator of all portraits of Western-style
information societies is that a broad spectrum of C&C technologies
will pervasively become part of a large number of products and
processes that will be widely distributed throughout all of the major
organizational components of advanced societies: offices, factories,
farms, schools, government institutions, and the home. It can be
argued that virtually all pervasive, or potentially pervasive,
technologies pass through five rough evolutionary stages: (1) an
experimental rarity, often an entrepreneurial discovery; (2) an exotic
tool or toy used by a small group of experts; (3) products that are
well known and manufactured in modest quantity, but direct use is in
limited industrial or other institutional environments; (4) widespread
production and availability, with direct use, requiring little or
modest training, in a broad domain by a sizable minority of the
population; and (5) the technology has become part of the fabric and
infrastructure of daily life, and its absence is often more noticeable
than its presence (modified from [Birn85b]).
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Each of these five stages involves technology and infrastructure
in more general terms than that often associated with narrow technical
developments. For example, the presence of TV at the fifth stage is
dependent on an infrastructure and technology that includes the large
and varied number of network and cable TV stations, program listings
and reviews in the printed media, repair services, etc. There is also
some domain dependence to these definitions. For example, by its
nature computer aided manufacturing will never attain household
pervasiveness, but it might reach stage 4 or 5 pervasiveness in a
broad industrial domain.
The second frequently defined feature is the opportunity for much
greater access and choice with regard to the range, volume, and time
of information. This feature is often brought up in the context of
greater democratization And decentralization, but this need not
necessarily be so from a purely technical standpoint.
For both trends, three general forms of qualitative advancement
in applications might be distinguished. In the first, systems do the
same things that people did previously, but faster and more
accurately; e.g., hand held calculators. In the second, they allow
new or much enhanced applications to be developed; e.g., the solution
of some previously unapproachable scientific problems or the ability
to control processes in environments where humans cannot work. The
third form brings previously unthinkable or exotic applications; e.g.,
when data, text, voice, and image processing are all integrated, C&C
technologies may serve as greatly augmented senses for humans. A
somewhat more troublesome form of application is the kind that
replaces, rather than augments, humans.
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A common element that emerges from this discussion and the
specific areas covered in the next subsection is the pervasive need
and desire to cope with and control increased complexity and
opportunities, and reduced time scales. This is a key prospect that
the information technologies hold for a wide spectrum of applications.
Taken together with other economic and demographic trends, all of the
elements of our discussion so far push for more control possibilities
and a more rapid pace of life. The Western systemic environment
encourages the broad dissemination of controls for increased economic
efficiency, for personal activities, and for greater communications.
However, the C&C technologies themselves also generate additional
complexity and opportunities and shortened time scales, sometimes to
the point of making human capabilities inadequate. Players who do not
keep up with this fast and more-or-less uncontrollable treadmill of
technological improvement fall behind in an increasingly competitive
world. The more powerful a C&C system, the more difficulties there
are integrating it into the surrounding environment.
Technology-related pressures and opportunities increasingly dictate
how that environment has to be changed. .
These control-oriented features are of such generality and
importance that it may be as appropriate to use the term "control
revolution" as "information society" [Beni86]. We address some
questions of terminology in Ch. III.
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Other often-cited characteristics are those generally associated
with "post-industrial societies," e.g., the redistribution of the
population away from agriculture and towards the service industries,
near universal literacy, access to advanced education, etc. [e.g.,
Masu80J. The information technologies are increasingly contributing
to the definition and achievement of these characteristics.
2. Some Western trends, driving forces, and problems
The information industries
The core of the information industries consists of private
companies, universities, and government facilities providing research,
development, production and services closely connected with the C&C
technologies. Other "information industries," like publishing, are
considered part of the applications world. The range, number, and
spread of the units comprising these industries is enormous. The
spectrum is densely filled with everything from tiny, local, single
product/service companies to national and international giants like
AT&T and Hitachi with strong and deep forms of vertical integration.
The single most overarching word that might be applied to these
industries and the applications they fuel is "fast." The rates of
appearance of new products and incremental innovations are awesome.
There have been many spectacularly rapid business successes and
failures.' Personnel stress and burnout also appear faster than in
most other industries.' Cost/performance capabilities of new products
frequently change dramatically over 2-4 years. Even service and
software, whose productivity growth has been slow compared with other
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parts of the industry, have grown rapidly in total functions and size.
The driving forces for the industry and many of the applications
areas come in three basic, interwoven, forms. First, the C&C
technologies themselves offer unusually fertile ground for large and
small, short and long term innovations. Second, there are huge and
diversified markets for C&C products and services. Customer groups
with massive, voracious, and continuously renewed appetites range from
teenagers to the US Department of Defense. They have a tremendous
pull effect on the industry. Finally, there is fierce domestic and
international competition. Almost no unit or part of the industry, on
any scale, is free from intense and possibly devastating competition.
For example, large parts of the once overwhelmingly dominant US
semiconductor industry have been more than decimated by Japanese
competition and the future of what remains is seriously threatened
(Ferg85).
White- and blue-collar applications
The four primary intra- and inter- organizational "workplace"
applications areas are: management information systems (MIS), office
automation (OA), computer aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM),
and technical process control (TPC). Current and near-term use covers
a wide spectrum of functions at stages 2-4 of our pervasiveness model.
Visionaries see all four deeply integrated in the globally linked
factories, corporations,, and government offices of the future.
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The range of functions supported by MIS runs from straightforward
personnel record systems, through simple and sophisticated accounting
and inventory systems, through high level decision support and
strategic planning systems. Some of the most common OA functions
include word processing, which is approaching the stage 4-5 status of
the typewriter, and automated filing systems. CAD systems are
becoming increasingly necessary for the design of very complex
objects, most notably aircraft and integrated circuits.
CAM systems are for the manufacture of discrete items such as
automobiles or batches of machined parts, and TPC systems are for the
control of continuous processes, e.g., refining oil. Robots are often
thought of as a subset of CAM, and most robots are used in CAM
applications, but they have potential uses in the home and in the
military as well. Of the four areas, CAM is the least widely used at
present, and the US may be falling behind other countries in its
effective and widespread use-to modernize manufacturing industries.
In addition to these four internal applications areas, companies
are becoming more heavily involved with putting C&C technologies into
their products and services. An example of the latter is the direct
use of computerized banking systems by customers. As to the former,
the "intellectualization of dumb equipment" is well under way and can
be expected to continue for a long time. The US alone may be
producing over a million microprocessors a day [Birn85b].
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Many serious problems are associated with these applications. A
lot of expensive systems have been failures. There are threats of
major economic and social shocks because of unemployment, productivity
problems, management dislocations, and "techno-stress"
Simo85; Thur851. Are some "successful" computerized systems
[Shai84;
really
contributing to productivity or just providing new forms of
information flow wheel spinning? Cost-benefit analyses for the
purchase and use of computerized systems should be made on the
criterion of information value, but there is no information economics
by which we can value information directly, and we only judge it in
terms of influence on other measures of value, such as profit. It
remains to be seen how societies will distribute the benefits and
risks between haves, partial haves,'and have nots.
Expanded communications
There is general agreement that developments in microelectronics,
computing and optical technologies present opportunities for much
expanded forms of communications, and that such expansions are a
characteristic of both trends used to define an information society.
Some "older" communications technologies have attained stage 5
pervasiveness. These include radio, TV, the printed media, and
telephones. New technologies continue to pump life into all four at
impressive rates. Witness cellular radio, cable TV, computerized
typesetting, videotex, and many recent telephone-related devices.
More is on the way into the next century: e.g., interactive TV and
perhaps automatic "bilingual" interpretation- telephone systems
[Koba86].
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Other communications technologies have reached stage
pervasiveness since the early 1970s. A partial list would include
photocopy, audio cassettes, video disks and cassettes, electronic
mail, computer networks, videoconference, telefax, and CB radio.
There have been major advances in satellite, microwave and optical
transmission technologies. Transportation-communications systems,
such as railroads and airlines, have also profited from advances in
the C&C technologies.
Security-related applications
C&C technologies appear, or will appear, in almost all large
weapons. C3I, logistic, simulation, training, and administrative
systems in the US military. They are becoming omnipresent in tactical
and strategic, nuclear and conventional, quick reaction and peacetime
garrison systems, and in the military industrial sphere. Many of
today's, and perhaps all of tomorrow's, large military systems cannot
be designed, built or maintained without these technologies.
Part of the foundation of US national security policy has been
that technological superiority can balance or defeat numerical
superiority. While that view and policy has had a mixed historical
report card, it is almost forced on the advanced industrialized
democracies since their polities will not support very long term and
large military manpower commitments comparable to those of the
Communist countries. The electronics-information technologies have
become the most pervasive group of technologies in the implementation
of this policy.
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This is not without problems. High technology and greater
sophistication are making military systems much more costly, and there
has been a sad history of expensive total and partial failures. Cost
has severely limited the number of weapons and platforms, thereby
increasing vulnerability should the uncertainties of combat result in
the loss of a small number of them. Battle management has become much
more complex and it is not clear that our C31 capabilities have been
able to keep up with such factors as the reduced real time scales of
the modern battlefield. For the first couple decades after World War
II, military applications were clearly a driving force in the
development and application of the C&C technologies, and there was
considerable positive spillover to the general economy. There is now
a greater flow in the other direction. While military-related R&D and
production still results in a useful flow to the general economy, the
Japanese experience argues that there may be better ways to use those
resources to strengthen US technological and economic development and
international competitiveness.
A partial list of other national-security related C&C
applications would include: political and economic surveillance,
intelligence analysis, and non-military C&C security. As with almost
all of the rapidly expanding applications, there are serious
unresolved problems, such as the protection of individual rights.
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Education
The two basic national literacies, verbal and mathematical, seem
destined to be joined by a third - computer literacy. At this time
would be pretentious to it
give computer literacy full status with the
other two, and it might be argued that it is an extension of the
others rather than a new form of literacy, but at least a weak form of
computer literacy is emerging.
The achievement of computer literacy is taking place both within
formal educational institutions and without. There has been
dramatic rise in the a
presence and application of C&C at US colleges
and universities in the last 10 years. Computers are also showing up
in the elementary and secondary schools. g
It will not be long before
e
most high schools have at least a rudimentary computing facilit
Much training also takes place at y
privately run technical schools, on
the job, and in the home, and it is likely that more
person-training
hours are built up here than in the schools and colleges.
As always, there are problems. Colleges and universities are
having serious difficulties recruiting and retaining faculty because
of heavy teaching loads and competition from industry. There is a
great shortage of well trained teachers at the pre-college level.
Both college and pre-college educational programs are developed mainly
by local private and ly
government organizations. This has resulted in a
wide spectrum of quantity and quality. Although this
stronger and better tailored produces many
programs than would be likely under a
uniform national program, it also tends to spread the gaps between the
haves, partial haves, and have nots.
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Consumer and entertainment applications
There is universal agreement that a feature of any future
Western-style information society will be the use of the C&C
technologies in consumer products, services and entertainment. Much
of what will come at pervasiveness stage 5 will be via such
applications.
The entertainment aspect of the information society is not
frivolous in human, technical, or economic terms. Like the thirst for
communications, an argument can be made that indulgence in fantasy is
a basic human need that.'may also be seen as a form of control
[Kay84b]:
[Fantasy is) that collection of worlds where things are
simpler and more controllable. It is not just displacing
ourselves from the real world when we go to the theater, or
the movies, or watch TV. It is also things like mathematics
and science. They are all simpler and more controllable than
real life. Fantasy becomes much more powerful when we'can
control it. Video games are the triumph of control over
detail. It is actually a way of enfranchising a
disenfranchised society as far as being able to control
things.
There are great technical challenges in these areas. A robot for
household cleaning would have to be much more sophisticated than the
robots used in industry today and probably for some time to come.
However, the potential markets for some of these applications, and
potential military and industrial spinoffs, are so great that they may
serve as a technical driving force.
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Such applications are rapidly changing the the size, structure,
and orientation of the C&C industries themselves. "The computer
industry is moving from a box selling industry to a service industry.
If the leaders in the industry have any sense, the computer industry
will become a way-of-life industry" [Kay84b].
If the C&C technologies are to become deeply embedded in the
Western way of life, it will be necessary to rebuild and expand most
of our physical communications systems. New developments, like fiber
optics and powerful computerized switches, make the problem
technically solvable, but the scale and price are enormous.
Finally, it is clearly beyond the scope of this short discussion
to consider different assessments under various possible domestic and
international situations. More optimistic or pessimistic evaluations
are possible. For the most part, these exhibit greater or lesser
social' and economic costs and different rates of progress, but they
still reflect most of the features described above.
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II. The Information Technologies and Their Applications:
Current Soviet Capabilities
A. Where does the USSR stand with regard to the
development and application of C&C technologies?
1. The structure and performance of the
Soviet information industries
The major organizational players that are directly, and heavily,
involved with research, development, production, training, and service
functions include at least eight ministries (Minradioprom,
Minelektronprom, Minpribor, Minsvyazi, Minpromsvyazi, Minstankoprom,
Minpros and Minvuz), and a department of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences (OIVTA). Several other, ministries supply equipment and
services whose importance has been underestimated in the USSR: air
conditioners, power supplies, high quality paper, customized software,
maintenance, etc. A large number of high level Soviet state and CPSU
organizations, including the recently formed State Committee for
Computing and Informatics (GKVTI), have important, long term,
functions in the areas of policy, planning, trade, and technology
transfer for the C&C technologies. All of the organizations in this
last group are also serious users of the information technologies for
their own purposes. A refined mapping of participating
suborganizations and their inter-relations would be impressive.
On paper, this array of organizations gives the USSR a
comprehensive set of industries and functional capabilities.
Included, in particular; are the full range of computer systems from
microprocessors to supercomputer and 5th generation machines; a
complete set of telecommunications options; extensive educational,
research and development facilities; and coverage of the CAM spectrum.
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Furthermore, the Soviet Union has an internal user community with the
size, range, and sophistication of applications to warrant and support
all of this. Only two other countries, the US and Japan, exceed the
total of Soviet capabilities.
In practice, the picture is not as bright, but is it not entirely
dismal. It is arguably brightest in some areas of hardware.
Respectable development and production programs exist for
microprocessors, multiboard minis, and upward compatible general
purpose-mainframes. Much of what is most widely used throughout the
Soviet general economy, and what is being produced in volume today, is
in the form of functional duplicates of successful US systems that
were in production from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s. In no case
has Soviet production volume and system reliability reached that of US
predecessors. Serious hardware weaknesses continue with regard to the
quality and availability of ICs, main memory, secondary storage,
peripherals, data communications and supercomputers. Average growth
of the computer industry has been at least 10 percent per year since
the early 1970s, and much greater for some subtechnologies during
certain subperiods.
The massive reorientation towards Western technology in the late
1960s led to a decline in the level and relative importance of
domestic innovation in computer systems hardware and software, and
this continued into the 1980s. However, an enormous amount of on-site
engineering development and implementation was necessary in order to
assimilate Western technology and to produce respectable machines in
quantity. Although unimpressive compared with Western states of the
arts, they show substantial progress over the Soviet past. This may
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be seen as a form of improvement in "local" innovation. Global
innovations, i.e., accomplishments that significantly advance
world-level frontiers, have been essentially nonexistent. However,
some recently announced projects may indicate a renewal of indigenous
design efforts. It remains to be seen how far they depart from
Western predecessors and to what extent they are global innovations.
At the weakest end of the performance scale, the industry is more
impressive in the form of a static organization chart than it is as a
dynamic entity caring for the myriad complex of day-to-day needs of a
large and growing applications community. This shows up most
pointedly in software, maintenance, and telecommunications products
and services.
Soviet claims that they can achieve world levels across the
complete spectrum of the information technologies and applications
solely on the basis of their own indigenous capabilities are not
supported by history, detailed technological assessments, or
international trends. Soviet computing has been hurt throughout its
history by various forms of of Western- and self- imposed isolation.
In fact, no computing community, including that of the US, would be
able to move at its current pace if it were to have its contacts with
the rest of the world severely restricted. However, the Soviets have
achieved a certain form of self sufficiency in that they run a large
industry of their own, and produce most of what they use. They have
also become less dependent on Western technology in the sense that, if
all their overt and covert transfer opportunities were to suddenly
disappear, they would be able to function indigenously at a level far
above the one that existed in the late 1960s.
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Also noteworthy is the substantial development and integration of
the CEMA computer industries that has taken place during the last
fifteen years. Economic and technological factors appear to have been
at least as effective in bringing this about as Soviet pressure.
Although involving a massive transfer of Western technology, and
lagging behind Western achievements in important ways, CEMA
performance has been impressive relative to its own past and in terms
of some basic accomplishments. The most important of these include:
a nontrivial international division of labor across a broad range of
products; significant levels of compatibility, interoperability, and
standardization; much improved products and productive capacities in
some areas; considerable growth of the industries in almost all of the
CEMA countries; much expanded trade; the creation of an effective
system of contention whereby the participating countries carve out
suitable niches for themselves without totally destructive infighting;
and the creation of a reasonably effective CEMA-level
Intergovernmental Commission for Computer Technology (MPKVT) that
continuously oversees all of this, but which enables the national
industries to remain fairly autonomous.
One could also produce a long list of what has NOT been achieved.
We mention only the unimpressive progress toward more comprehensive
and deeper forms of integration, especially those involving the broad
use of the most active forms of technology transfer, and the poor
level of integration of the national computer user communities.
Rhetoric aside, activities to date indicate that neither the Soviets
nor the East Europeans seem overly enthusiastic about what would have
to be done to bring about the next big steps in these directions.
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These serious shortcomings aside, the main point to be made here
is that something substantial has been built in an important advanced
technological sector through a cooperative CEMA effort. This
relatively successful approach for one advanced technology is a model
for others. Indeed, in the last few years CEMA has begun similar
programs for microelectronics and robotics. So far, neither has
achieved the success of the computer systems program.
2. The Soviet enterprise environment:
white- and blue-collar applications
The most important problem facing the USSR under the scope of
this study is the absorption of C&C technologies and products into the
fiber of the Soviet economy. We define this to be the enterprise
level: factories, research institutes, educational centers, service
organizations, assorted forms of associations, etc. Almost everything
else the Soviets do with computing will be substantially devalued if
they do not make serious progress here.
The range of technologies that are of tremendous, long term,
importance at the enterprise level includes: TPC, CAD, CAM, ASUP
(Enterprise-level Automated Systems of Control and Management -
roughly the Soviet counterpart of Western MIS), OA, data
communications, and computing for small organizational and personal
use. In principle, C&C could be used to create an enormous spectrum
of centralized and/or decentralized systems across the entire economy
of the USSR.
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Soviet "automated management systems" (ASU) originated with the
cybernetics "boom" of the late 1950s. It was hoped that the massive
introduction of "economic cybernetics" would lead to significant
improvements in the operation of the economy. In 1971 ASUs were
embraced by the CPSU as a means of increasing productivity without
fundamental economic reform. Over the course of the last twenty
years, about 7,500 ASUs have been constructed at every level of the
Soviet economy. These include about 3,400 ASUPs, 3,500 TPC systems,
and systems-at various state committee, regional, and ministry levels.
And what of "economic cybernetics"? One of the great
expectations for ASU was the optimization of planning and management.
However, a large portion of the calculations normally found in ASUP
are for processing accounting data. Optimization methods have
received little use in practice. The limited absorption of computing
is not due to any one overriding cause, but represents a confluence of
technical, organizational, economic, and political constraints
affecting users, service suppliers, and higher-level organizations.
These factors can be divided into the infrastructure and the
surrounding environment. The entire ASU program has suffered both
broadly and deeply from the problems of the information industry
infrastructure noted in the preceding subsection.
Another great failing of the Soviet infrastructure has been in
designer-user relations. ASUPs were not aggressively marketed to
enterprises. Articles about leading users painted a bright picture
which often led to later disillusionment. Users received insufficient
training, both in computing and in management more generally, and
exerted little influence over ASUP designs. The contact of designers
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with the enterprise was through the ASUP department, which itself was
removed from the mainstream of enterprise activities. Pieces of ASUPs
were farmed out to different organizations without the direct
participation of high enterprise officials so no one in the enterprise
could protect its overall interests. Design organizations were not
interested in correct specifications, testing, maintenance, and
enhancement; their plans were fulfilled once a certain number of tasks
were built. Subsystems and tasks that were easiest or cheapest to
develop were created first, even though they did not bring the largest
returns. The result was that the old management system could not be
dismantled because not enough of the new one had been implemented, and
because technical and incentive Oroblems discouraged the pursuit of
complete conversion. The net result was additional work for
management personnel, complication of the management system, and
increased costs.
The enterprises themselves had few incentives to take advantage
of even the limited services offered by the infrastructure. Computing
threatened the way that business is done in Soviet enterprises on a
number of levels, and has met with resistance at all of them. At
upper management levels, an ASUP is viewed as a huge risk which can
potentially interrupt production and cause plan targets to go
unfulfilled. The data on the economic payoff of computer systems does
not give the reassurance that great benefits will follow. Intangible
benefits, such as improving the quality of decisions, have not been
extensively realized and do not serve as additional inducements.
Despite improvements in hardware and software, the enterprise director
still faces a number of problems and uncertainties which make him
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reluctant to stake too much on the computer.
A comparison of the goals of the enterprise manager and the ideal
goals set for ASUPs shows that, without guarantees that compensating
resources will be given to an enterprise manager who accepts an ASUP,
there is little incentive to adopt one (Table 1). Achieving many of
the goals on the "idealized" side of the table would, in theory, be
desirable, but he knows that the behavior on the "actual" side are
necessary to function successfully on a month to month basis. If the
manager, against all odds, did achieve the goals on the "idealized"
side of the table and meet the plan, he would face the pernicious
ratchet effect, or the tendency to "plan from the achieved level." The
ministries increase plan targets every year, so enterprises that
operate close to their true production capacities are likely to end up
much worse off. Then he would be subjected to even more scrutiny,
which would be facilitated by the detailed audit trail on the ASUP.
An ASUP that does everything that it is supposed to do may be a
frightening prospect to most managers.
In the Soviet economy, informal links through phone calls,
ministry visits, expediters, "blat," and outright bribes are
important. Sales departments know that they should first ship to
customers that can return a favor, not to ones that are "optimal"
based on idealized computer calculations. Accounting procedures which
reveal how expediters are financed or any other computer operations
which threaten these activities will be circumvented or rejected.
Plans which are carefully constructed by computing may be amended by
the ministry for a variety of reasons.
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Idealized ASUP and Actual Enterprise Goals Compared
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Idealized ASUP Enterprise Manager
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Maximize and optimize production Fulfill the plan so that next
year's targets are fulfillable
Optimal, minimal levels of
inventories
Acquire as many supplies as
possible
Maximize plan flexibility
Realistically evaluate capacity
Realistically evaluate actual
Use computer to audit, control,
cross-correlate, analyze
Improve data processing
Hoard labor
Minimize plan targets changes
Understate capacity
Overstate performance if
necessary
Avoid dangerous revelations
to superiors, find out as much
as possible about subordinates
Improve data processing
These and other perversities have led to the perception that
enterprises that use computers are worse off than those that do not
[Emm85c]. Demand for computing frequently results from outside,
sometimes cosmetic, pressures. Further advancement of
management-oriented applications will have to overcome widespread
disillusionment about their efficacy.
Over the last decade, the rate of introduction of ASUP has
declined dramatically, to an average of less than 200 per year. If
this rate.is maintained, then the majority of Soviet enterprises will
still have no in-house MIS mainframe computing capabilities by the
year 2000. Conversely, the rate of introduction of TPC, CAD/CAM,
robotics, and FMS are all on the rise, and some new initiatives
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towards OA have begun. This shift was fueled by the creation of
technologies which facilitated the development of numerical control
machine tools, process control systems, and robots. In 1984, 700 new
TPC systems were built, compared with 100 systems for management
applications [Prav85cj.
Soviet R&D in industrial robotics began in earnest in the early
1970's when a number of prototype models were created. Having
established a base for the serial production of robots during the
1976-1980 period, the Soviets intended to significantly increase the
rates of both production and user introduction during the Eleventh
Five-Year Plan (1981-85). Production claims rose from 3,300 units in
1981 [Nark83;? Comp831 to over 13,000 in 1984 [Rrc84c; Rrc84j],
yielding a stock of over 30,000 robots and manipulators.
However, effective introduction appears to have lagged production
badly. The reasons for this at least
partly parallel those for ASUP.
Poor infrastructure support and difficult horizontal and vertical
external connections limit effectiveness and curtail demand. While
robots do not threaten enterprise business in the same fundamental way
that an ASUP does, their incorporation demands a highly organized
production process which are difficult to deliver under Soviet
conditions. The integration of CAD, CAM and MIS will be even harder
to achieve.
Although the rhetoric of the Gorbachev administration indicates
renewed and expanded support for technology-based solutions to Soviet
economic problems, the experience of the ASUP program over the past 20
years indicates that the strong integration of computing into the
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Soviet general economy will remain difficult. At present it appears
that no one component in the various technologies which comprise
flexible or computer-integrated manufacturing (FMS, CIM) can alone
significantly improve the performance of the Soviet enterprise. What
is needed is the complete restructuring of the enterprise (or building
of a new enterprise) using integrated computer technology from bottom
to top. But even this "factory of the future" cannot be completely
isolated from the vagaries of the surrounding economic and political
system.-
3. Computer-related communications in the USSR
The drive to bring computers into the enterprise environment
began in the early 1960s with plans for the State Network of Computer
Centers (SNCC). In 1971, the SNCC proposal resurfaced in a stronger
form as the Statewide Automated System for the Collection and
Processing of Data for Accounting, Planning, and Management of the
National Economy (OGAS). OCAS, which continues to be embraced by some
top-level planners, represents the ultimate in centralized use of
computers. It is eventually supposed to allow planning and
statistical information to be sent up and down the economic hierarchy
automatically, providing a flexible feedback mechanism by which the
center can exercise finer control.
In spite of the plans and the improved availability and variety
of equipment, it is only within the last several years that
significant practical developments in networking have started to take
place. This constitutes more activity than is often appreciated, but
less than the impressions the Soviets would like to make, and far less
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than what might put them on the threshold of a broadly based
information society or the realization of OGAS. We briefly consider
four topics: local area networks (LAN), wide area networks (WAN),
remote access to databases, and network support technologies.
LAN. The enterprise level integration of now-separate
applications will try use LAN to bring together CAD, NC machine tools,
robotics, FMS, TCP and MIS. This is seen as a crucial advance by
leading-Soviet advocates of expanded computer applications.
Soviet progress with LAN is unimpressive. A small, but growing,
number of scientific research centers have managed to put together LAN
of various sorts, but most would be'considered rudimentary by Western
standards. To date, the number of industrial enterprises which have
even simple, hierarchical, low bandwidth, connections between
mainframes at a computer center and mini- or microcomputers on the
shop floor remains small. Data collection often takes place using
unsophisticated terminal devices, or consists of card punching from
documents. A few more sophisticated systems are under development
[Klim85; Sots85iJ.
WAN. WAN for the general economy have received the most
publicity over two decades. The almost nonexistent state of
networking into the early 70's stands in stark contrast to grand plans
that were being put forth for developing an All-Union Data
Transmission System (OGSPD), the SNCC, and OGAS. The drive to
construct OCAS has had little effect on the day-to-day application of
computers. Individual applications have been developed without regard
to how they could be incorporated into OGAS, the number of enterprise
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computer centers proliferated, and the number of collective use
computer centers (VTsKP) fell behind plan targets. Today the effort
to link together VTsKP has finally begun in earnest. Nevertheless,
the Central Statistical Agency (TsSU) has had trouble attracting
industrial customers to the VTsKPs, and the proliferation of computer
centers and isolated pieces of batch-oriented data processing systems
continues.
Of the approximately 300 ministry-level MIS (OASU), only a few
have so far made use of interactive computer communications. These
include the systems of Minpribor, Minavtoprom (automobile industry)
[K1yu841, and a few ministries in the energy sector. Other national
organizations have their own networks, including the following mixed
sample. TASS has a worldwide network. An experimental system
developed in 1981 is now used by Gossnab. The railroads use data
communications, often via the telegraph system. The Moscow Savings
Bank network is hierarchical, uses minicomputers at lower nodes, and
is said to include 3,000 terminals. Foreign technology is commonly
found in some of the more successful networks.
Akademset' is the USSR Academy of Sciences' effort to link its
institutes together with a packet switched network. The planned
network backbone will connect regional centers in Moscow, Sverdlovsk,
Tashkent, Leningrad, Riga, Kiev, Novosibirsk, Khabarovsk, Tashkent,
and Vladivostok [Ntsa85]. According to the man in charge of its
development, "all of the country's scientific centers... will be
linked by telephone" [Bbcw85i]. Reports indicate that sections of the
network have begun to operate, though perhaps at slow speeds [Bbcw85i;
Mds85102J and with weak inter-regional data flows.
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Access to databases. We consider two categories: access to
Soviet databases (by either Soviets or foreigners), and Soviet access
to foreign databases. Both are suffer from severe technical
limitations and political controls.
Effort has gone into the development of at least two types of
domestic databases not directly related to national security. These
are for library and economic-statistical applications. The Soviets
have long given much publicity to the collection and wide distribution
of scientific-technical information using modern technologies. So
far, we have seen little evidence that such databases are readily and
remotely accessible via computer-based telecommunications.
Economic-statistical databases seem to be closely held, in many cases
restricted and possibly classified, by their developing and using
organizations. Such access as there is seems to be on an
institution-to-institution, rather than on an individual, basis.
Publicly available, general consumer databases, e.g., the directory,
travel, or news databases that are common in the West, appear to be
nonexistent in the USSR. Foreign - either Western or East European -
access to domestic Soviet databases is extremely limited. In
particular, a much advertised access to two Soviet databases through
IIASA has yet to amount to anything.
A National Center of Automated Exchange of Information with
Foreign Computer Networks and Data Bases (NTsAO), which is based at
the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Automated Applications
Systems (VNIIPAS), has also been created. The tasks of NTsAO
supposedly include: providing connections with foreign data bases and
computer networks; providing reciprocal access to Soviet networks and
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data bases, including training for foreign users; coordinating
socialist exchange programs; and helping foreign companies in the USSR
and Soviet organizations access outside networks and data bases to
send and receive information. Apparently, more than 15 USSR
institutions have a direct or indirect connection to the NTsAO gateway
[Ntsa85]. Other forms of access to Western networks also exit,
including a reported packet-switched connection between Moscow and
Helsinki [Taka85b].
Network supporting technologies. The state of the Soviet
telephone and telegraph systems have severely handicapped the spread
of network development and use. Data is still regularly transmitted
at very slow speeds on telegraph and special lines. Use of the
general telephone system for data communications is limited by statute
to nine minutes an hour, and arranging a link on.a switched line can
take a few minutes or more because it may necessary to test several
lines before one is found that is good enough for a data connection
[Levi85]. Not infrequently, there may also be problems with the
quality of line connections over long use sessions. The cost of
either switched or dedicated lines for data communications is very
high.
The computing environment for networking is not as bad as the
telephone system, but has some problems. It is colored by the
decision to follow IBM for mainframes. Much work has been done in
connecting smaller computers to the IBM-like ES machines as front end
processors. One of the puzzles has been to find out to what extent
the Soviets are following IBM's Systems Network Architecture, but, the
evidence is mixed. Many computers in enterprises are IBM 360-like
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machines, which are poorly suited for networking applications. A
number of modems, multiplexers, and terminals have gone into
production, but these peripherals are often cited as being in short
supply, and not completely compatible with each other.
Technically, fiber optics, satellite and other forms of nonwire
transmission links hold the promise for much improved data
communications - in terms of volume, reliability, transmission speeds
and cost. The Soviets are doing work in all of these areas. For
example, there are several fiber optics research and development
programs and some fiber ,optics, including at least one short
"permanent" line in Leningrad, with more extensive lines are planned
for 1986-90 [Izv85120]. It remains to be seen how quickly, how
widespread, and how effectively this is done. The technology to
greatly improve phone and digital communications is well established
in the West, and available to the Soviets through various sources.
Although extensive modernization and expansion of the national
communications means is supposedly a high priority goal, past
performance is so bad that truly impressive progress is unlikely in
the short term, but necessary in the longer term.
4. Security-related applications
It is beyond the scope of this study to explicitly review Soviet
military or other security-related C&C systems. The discussion of
this section will be linfited to some aspects of the interdependence of
the civil-military development and applications communities and
domestic surveillance.
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It would appear that some high level policy makers in the CPSU
and industry have recognized the need for a better mix between several
of the high technology ministries under the VPK (Military-Industrial
Commission) and the general economy. It must be emphasized that there
has been no great "opening up" of the VPK ministries, or any great
"flowing together" of these two sectors. However, there are
developments worth mentioning in the computer industry.
Soviet work on electronic digital computers began in the late
1940s,- and much of this effort has been under the purview of the VPK
ministries (or the organizational predecessors of the current
ministries) and Academy institutes. Although computers found their
-way into the general economy, and although there were various forms of
"borrowing" from the West, Soviet computing was cloistered and
introverted in many ways. A good deal of this had to do with the
nature of the primary development and production organizations. In
contrast, the US computing industry, which also had important early
roots in military activities, blossomed in the late 1950s when it
began to spread out over a much larger user community. At this time,
and for these reasons, the so-called US-USSR "computer gap" really
started to open up. The Soviet industry remained conservative and
introverted, and it was strongly oriented to the needs of a limited
and somewhat myopic user community. In contrast, the US industry
became more aggressive and innovative, and began to have an impact
across a broad economic spectrum.
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During the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets had to face an assortment
of military and economic problems. These included falling behind in
the "space race," the use of advanced technologies for the upgrading
of an extensive range of military systems, declining economic growth
rates, increases in the administrative and clerical work forces,
difficulties in managing large, dynamic systems like airports and
railroad yards, and problems with the control of the economic planning
process.
If computing was to help solve so many important problems
spanning the entire economy, then it would be necessary to get
computers into the entire economy, or at least to raise the extent of
use to a much higher level than had been the case before. It also
became clear that the small, introverted Soviet computer industry was
not even capable of meeting the growing needs of the
military-industrial sector. Sometime earlier, the US military had
realized that it alone was not capable of nurturing the development of
a computing community that would be able to meet its perceived needs,
and it benefited greatly from the existence of a large and healthy US
civilian computing community. The Soviet military had nothing
comparable at home, so they used the US general computing community as
a surrogate.
The Soviet approach to expanding and strengthening the computer
and microelectronics industries was basically to pour resources into
those organizations that were already in the business, although
important new organizations have been created in both the Academy and
many ministries, and to increase acquisitions from the West. At least
three VPK ministries, and others that also deal with the military and
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its suppliers, were thus provided with more resources. This clearly
helped the military-industrial sector directly. But much of the
additional and qualitatively improved output from these ministries
went into the civilian economy. The military benefited significantly
from this as well through the proximity of a larger and improved
general computing base with a vastly expanded software inventory, and
the greater availability of computing in educational institutions.
Finally, the C&C technologies are the technologies for
implementing any Orwellian vision of totalitarian control of people
and information. However, the technological basis for (computerized
versions of) Orwell"s telescreens lies beyond the turn of the century.
While it is difficult to find any well advertised evidence of KGB use
of C&C for such purposes, it is not hard to imagine applications that
would be within their interests and capabilities. To mention a few:
mainframes for large centralized databases, microelectronic-based
surveillance systems, and personal computer use by KGB case officers.
? We cannot judge the extent to which this exists today, but the
potential is there. What is perhaps as important as the fact is the
perception the population has or might have of the pervasiveness of
these applications, of the enormous power they add to the state
security organs, and of their own impotence to confront either the
issue or the fact.
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5. Education
Computing at Soviet universities and advanced research facilities
in the Academy has a long history going back to the 1950s. However,
the overall curricula, facilities and research results developed at
these institutions for over 30 years are rather unimpressive for a
country with the resources and aspirations of the USSR. This
statement holds for computer science, the application of computing in
other academic disciplines, and the general literacy training of
university students. The poor track record at this level does not
bode well for the much larger educational tasks to be faced in the
future.
at
The Soviets are looking to improve computer-related training
all levels, but the highest profile program is for the secondary
schools. Essentially no computer facilities existed at any
significant number of Soviet secondary schools until the last 2-3
the
years, and not very much exists there now. In March 1985,
Politburo decreed that standardized computing courses are to be
introduced at the ninth and tenth grades throughout the USSR. The
ninth grade course and its text book have been highly publicized, and
this course was to be universally taught during the 1985-86 academic
year. It is not being taught at all schools, official claims to the
contrary.
Politburo decrees notwithstanding, the program for the secondary
schools suffers from basic difficulties that will not be easy to
remedy. In spite of several publicized candidates, the USSR has yet
to be able to produce a technically suitable microcomputer and related
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peripherals in anything approaching the necessary quantities for a
national educational program of this.size. Even if this equipment
were to be produced some day, and it is hard to imagine that they will
not be able to do so since the technology is well established in many
other places in the world, the Soviets would still have to come up
with a support infrastructure for millions of machines distributed
over the entire country. Tens of thousands of teachers would have to
be trained, and the Soviets presently do not have the personnel, in
either the schools, industry or higher educational institutions, to do
the training.
By comparison, problems with student samizdat, and other
"dissident" activities which have received much attention in the
Western press, are secondary. Currently, the hardware and software in
Soviet schools appear to be tied down to unsophisticated use in varied
technical fields, and are inadequate to serve as engines for
politically creative thinking.
However, there may be some short term solutions to the technical,
infrastructure, and potential political/ideological problems. Not
surprisingly, the focus of these solutions is on collective and
centralized use. There may also be some sizable purchases of small
microcomputers from abroad. Equipment cost, availability, and
maintenance constraints will make it impossible for the Soviets to
provide well equipped laboratories for most schools outside the major
metropolitan areas. Few labs will be well provided with the more
troublesome technologies such as hard disks and certain kinds of
printers and software. Laboratory configurations may be centralized
around the teacher's terminal. Given the extent and hierarchy of
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Soviet geography, there is reason to believe that the computerization
of the secondary schools, if it is to succeed at all, will initially
be in the form of local centers such as the one that exists in
Tbilisi, where students are brought to the computers, rather than
having the computerized classroom brought to the students. In theory,
this would provide a strong form of control and more efficient use of
equipment and trained personnel. Further efficiencies and
geographical reach would be forthcoming with the extensive use of
remote dial-in to such facilities, but technical problems will prevent
widespread use in the short term. Slow growth of this kind will also
give educational authorities and youth organizations the time and
.opportunity to "translate" foreign ideas on personal computers to fit
Soviet "particular circumstances", and to create a new, modern,
high-tech, "enlightened collectivism" [Yasm86].
These problems also limit the prospects for extensive, high
quality, training programs in other parts of the Soviet educational
establishment, including training in industry, in the military, and
correspondence courses. Publicity has been given to computer training
in the Soviet military in the last few years, but there is little
evidence of sophisticated and widespread programs. Much of the
potential of a national TV "open university," such as those that exist
in the UK or Hungary, is lost because of the lack of computers in the
home. Broadcast TV lessons would still be helpful for school and
industrial courses.
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6. Consumer and entertainment applications
A few consumer service systems, e.g., for transportation
ticketing, appear to exist in the larger cities, and there are
microelectronics-based consumer products available, e.g., hand held
calculators and some "personal" computers. Even games are by no means
disdained. Pong-like TV-set games were announced in 1979, and Soviet
children are often shown playing microcomputer games. Games have been
recognized as an important part of the national computer literacy
program and their development and use is encouraged.
But one has to look fairly hard to find even traces of the uses
that have reached stage 4-5 pervasiveness in the West, e.g.,
relatively "low tech" items like touch tone phones or digital cash
registers. There have been rumors that private access to electronic
entertainments has become one of the perks of the elite, and a few
public VCR and calculator stores have appeared in the major
metropolitan areas.
7. A summary-overview
We conclude this section with a rough summary-overview_of a broad
range of information technologies and applications in the USSR as
evaluated by two criteria: state interest, and technical and economic
capacities. Table 2 is significantly modified from [Dibe84).
Evaluations are based on current capabilities and short term future
prospects.
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Additional comments on Table 2 are in order. Western technical
and economic capacities are defined as "high," and by this standard no
Soviet capacity is rated above "medium-high" for any technology or
application. There is a certain amount of subjectivity inherent in
the judgments of this table. Other analysts might argue that several
of the evaluations are one level too high or too low by either or both
of the primary criteria, but such perturbations 'do not change our
general assessments. Except as labeled, the listing of criteria and
technologies/applications is not meant to imply relative ranking
within categories. "Advanced transmission technologies" refer to
satellite, microwave, and fiber optic transmission. uE _
microelectronics.
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Summary Evaluation of Current Soviet Information Technologies
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Evaluation Criteria
-------------------
State Interest
Functions fulfilled and types of information processed
Geographic/demographic factors
Direct productivity gains
Propaganda and "progressive image" value
Catching up with the West
Military value
Pervasiveness
Value for economic/social/political control
Technical and Economic Capacities
- Investment and operating costs
- Technological levels and complexity mix
- Distance behind the West
- Volume production capabilities
- Support infrastructure
- Possibilities of substitution for older techniques
- Pervasiveness
Evaluation
State
Interest
Technical & Economic Capacity
Medium
High
Low-Medium Medium-High
Videodisk
Electronic mail
Smart consumer
products
Local TV
Computer
networks
VCR
Telephone
augmentations
Foreign radio/TV
Video games
Videoconference
Telefax
Videotex
Telephone
Large computers
Microcomputers
CAM
MIS/OA
Databases
Software
CAD
Photocopy
Mai I
CB
Cable TV
Audiocassette
National radio
Local radio
National TV
Adv. trans. tech.
Press
Cinema
TPC
uE/optical components
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B. Where, and in what forms, are there wide gaps between
the stages of development in West and East?
There are wide East-West gaps in every area considered in Section
II.A. In spite of substantial Soviet and East European progress in
some areas, the greater pace and range of Western developments and
applications is such that few, if any, of the major gaps are closing
rapidly, if at all.
The Western industries maintain leads in volume of production of
semiconductor, computer, and telecommunications hardware; reliability;
sophistication of manufacturing and quality control processes; the
variety, quality and availability of products and services; the
variety, inventory, and sophistication of software; software
production capacities; the number and sophistication of R&D
facilities; and the quantity and quality of what is already in
operation at user installations. For many quantitatively measurable
differences, Western leads are by at least an order of magnitude in
volume and 2-16 years in time. Some of the largest gaps may be in
areas, like software, where quantitative measures are less meaningful
and more difficult to estimate.
We have not been able to clearly identify any major areas where
the Soviet bloc is clearly ahead of the West, or where a gap is
rapidly closing. This includes computer science theory broadly, a
field where some analysts expected the Soviets to do well because of
general mathematical strengths, and so-called "older" technologies
like printers and telephone equipment (but not more-or-less obsolete
technologies like paper-tape equipment). Two areas where analysts
have conjectured that the Soviets are even or ahead of the West have
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been parallel processing and optical computing. For parallel
processing, we do not believe this is the case for broad practical
capabilities, and as of at least 1982 this was not true for theory.
This assessment for optical computing appears to be based primarily on
Soviet research programs. So far, it has not been explained how the
Soviets are going to overcome the post-research deficiencies of the
present electronics-based. industries when the time comes for building
a full_optical computing/telecommunications industry.
More generally, if we were to put together a Western version of
Table 2, with suitable modifications to the "state interest" criteria,
almost all evaluations relative to the Soviets would be "high" by both
sets of criteria and this was clearly a factor in the judgments of
Table 2. Furthermore, with the partial exception of large scale
economic planning, the Soviets are almost never clearly innovative in
developing and disseminating qualitatively new applications.
Some of the most important and dramatic differences relate to
pervasiveness. In the US most of the technologies and applications
listed in Table 2 are in pervasiveness stages 3-5, with many firmly
entrenched in at least stage 4, and often with rapid movement from
stage 2 to stage 4. In contrast, in the USSR, most are in stages 2-4,
with few in stage 4 and only national radio/TV and the press weakly in
stage 5. Several examples will illustrate these differences.
Small calculators have become discretionary and "throw-away"
items in the US, with universal availability and dramatically
improving performance/price ratios. In the Moscow metropolitan area,
with more than 10 million people, there are probably less than a half
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dozen stores with more than several hundred units of a half dozen hand
held calculator models in stock at any given time. Even this level of
availability deteriorates rapidly with city size and geography. And
this is the status of a useful, cheap and fairly "old" technology,
with no "sociopolitical risk" element, that should have been
sweepingly embraced by a society that glories in having far more
engineers and scientists than any other in the world.
In 1985, there were approximately 25-30,000,000 telephones in the
USSR. Only 23% of urban families and 7% of rural families have
phones, and there are 260,000 coin-operated phones [Bbcw85d].
Essentially all are rotary dial. In 1986, it is nearly impossible to
find a touch-tone phone (push button phones shown at exhibits are not
touch-tone). Infrastructural and support deficiencies include poor
service and the lack of public phone books and consumer options.
Problems with long distance, and especially foreign, calls are well
known. The service infrastructure is poor.
There are dozens of American universities that are quantitatively
and qualitatively far better provided for in the C&C technologies than
the best Soviet universities. Most of these US universities are also
using their equipment more effectively. Hundreds of US colleges and
universities are better equipped than all but a small handful of the
best Soviet universities. The volume of hands-on computer literacy
training for technical and nontechnical students at US colleges and
universities is incomparably greater than in the USSR.
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At the pre-college level, Soviet schools are probably doing at
least as well, on a nationwide basis, as their US counterparts in the
areas of basic verbal and especially mathematical literacies.
partially because of serious problems in US school systems; the
Soviets are probably not doing as well as the Japanese or West
Germans. These US deficiencies probably at least partially neutralize
substantial qualitative and quantitative. advantages in the hardware
and software available and in place at US primary and secondary
schools. The centralized and relatively disciplined Soviet
pre-college school system has the potential to eventually develop a
minimally respectable national computer literacy program. We say this
in spite of serious shortcomings noted earlier.
Outside of the mainline school tracks, US training programs are
far stronger than those of the Soviets. This is the result of the
much greater quality and quantity of available hardware and software,
experienced teachers, and home use of computers.
Not surprisingly, the most striking gap between US-USSR use
levels in the information technologies is in the areas of consumer and
entertainment applications. The reasons for the differences encompass
technical, economic and political factors. The Soviet information
industries lack the orientation and the combined
technical/cost-performance capabilities to provide the range of
applications and the widespread distribution of hardware, software and
services in these areas. The Soviet leadership also clearly does not
trust its own population with these technologies at this time. As a
result, overall Soviet progress lacks much of the volume, color,
flavor, and spirit that has come to characterize what is happening in
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C. What have the Soviets been doing to improve
their capabilities?
1. Plans for increased effort and resources
In early 1985 a "nationwide program of creation, development of
production and effective use of computer technology and automated
systems to the year 2000" was approved by the Politburo [Eg85d;
Prav85; Yasm86]. It has yet to be published in full, and it may not
even exist as a single document, but it apparently calls for better
service, more hardware standardization, specialized computers, new
training measures, the integration of TPC, CAM and ASUP, and the
introduction 'of computer workstations at the sub-enterprise levels.
Significant increases in production are also mandated.
The largest development area within this program is at the lower
end of the spectrum, emphasizing applications such as CAM and TPC.
The program continues to support the development of the SNCC and OGAS,
which are directed towards improving centralized control of the
economy and better utilization of computer resources by enterprises.
While pushing expanded usage of computing in society, the program
apparently does not envision reaching stage 5 pervasiveness in any
major areas. We do not know to what extent this plan encompasses all
aspects of the C&C industries, and it may be weak on specifics,
particularly in the areas of computer-related communications and
software.
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As noted earlier, one of the most interesting developments during
the last couple of years has been the big increase in attention paid
to national computer literacy, especially within the formal
educational system. This is seen as a necessary means to help attain
the more general goals of using the information technologies to help
modernize the Soviet economy and military.
In the 12th FYP, special effort is to be devoted to the telephone
situation, which remains extraordinarily poor by the standards of
advanced industrialized societies. This may be the most important and
rudimentary area to watch for large scale, short term improvement in
the quality and access of the public to the information technologies.
By Soviet standards, these are ambitious plans. In 1986-1990,
12,200,000 new subscribers are to receive phones. The new Five-Year
Plan calls for the addition of 10 million numbers by 1990, 75 percent
of which will be for private citizens. The Soviets hope to have one
phone per family by 2000; by 1990 all collective and state farms
should have at least one phone. By 1990 it is planned to have
automatic exchanges which allow direct inter-city dialing in 85% of
country's 3,600 rayon centers. With demand estimated to be 100
million phones and a current waiting list of 10 million, it is clear
that the Soviets have a long way to go [Bbcw85d]. The past and recent
performance of Minsvyazi inspires little confidence. Nevertheless, we
expect that a much expanded and improved centralized voice phone
system will be built by 2000. It will not support anywhere near the
volume of private and business traffic that has existed on the US
system for many years, but there are so many compelling economic, and
perhaps military, reasons for improving and expanding the system that
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it will be done. We have seen no comparable information on improving
the telephone system for data communications applications.
2. Organizational and technocratic changes
In the past two years the Soviets have made a number of
organizational changes with a direct impact on the C&C technologies.
These changes extend from the top levels of government to the ordinary
user. A new State Committee for Computing and Informatics (GKVTI) was
formed in early 1986, and it joins at a Council of Ministers-level
"Buro" for machine building [Hans86c; Izv85i; Prav86c]. The Machine
Building Bureau has the power to issue mandatory decrees for its
ministries. It remains to be seen exactly what power will be given to
the GKVTI. At least four new Deputy Chairmen of the Council of
Ministers have held high level positions with purview over the
development and application of the C&C technologies.
A new Department for Informatics, Computers, and Automation
(OIVTA) has been created within the Academy of Sciences, finally
giving these technologies the position they deserve and promising more
involvement by the Academy in applied research. The Academy is
sponsoring cross-organizational task forces for special projects, for
example, the "Start" program to develop a parallel computer that may
be part of the Soviet 5th Generation program.
One of the most significant developments may be the
Inter-Industry Scientific Technical Complexes (MNTK), which consist of
scientific research and design engineering institutes, and
experimental enterprises, all of which may fall under the jurisdiction
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of several ministries, and Academy institutes. An MNTK for personal
computers is being formed under the Institute of Informatics. Other
relevant MNTKs include one for robotics, to be headed by the
Experimental Scientific Research Institute of Metal-Cutting Machine
Tools under Minstankoprom, and those for lasers and fiber optics
[Izv85o; Pank85].. Some of these organizations will have direct ties
with CEMA-wide programs, especially in the field of robotics.
Changes have taken place at lower levels as well. Within
ministries, the all-union industrial association level of management
is to be eliminated, leading to a two-tiered form of management
[Hans85f]. More scientific-research-production associations will be
formed. The first branch to undergo this change has been Minpribor.
A small number of consumer electronics stores and "microcomputer
consulting centers" are beginning to appear in major cities.
The Gorbachev administration inherited a useful legacy from
Brezhnev that is likely to be continued and strengthened. The latter
greatly expanded the technical elites who had a voice in policy
formulation and implementation [Hoff85]. The Brezhnev leadership
acknowledged the complexity of C&C-related problems and the need to
have more experts investigate feasible options. So much information
is necessary to manage a large, advanced industrial. society that an
information monopoly among a very small elite is no longer necessary
nor possible if such a society is to be efficiently run. The
leadership can more effectively retain power by controlled devolution
of information and secondary decisions. The top political leadership
will still retain ultimate decision making power, but there is plenty
of room to expand the political communications system to come closer
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to "democratic centralism."
As noted earlier, CEMA cooperative programs in microelectronics
and robotics have been launched to complement the program in
computers. A new cooperative program in telecommunications that would
progress well beyond simply producing standardized data communications
hardware may be taking shape. Plans have been made to create an
inter-CEMA network called Interset', but little is known about it.
Taken together, all of these changes represent an attempt to
overcome serious problems of the centralized economic system, such as
departmentalism, gaps in the R&D-production cycle, appropriation - of
experimental production facilities for series production, poor overall
coordination of research and production, and too much interference
from higher levels. The leadership may well consider them essential
if the USSR is to avoid falling even farther behind the West in the
C&C technologies. Whether these measures prove effective will depend
on the extent to which the old mechanisms are truly dismantled, rather
than simply transplanted, as happened with the original all-union
industrial associations.
3. "Campaigns"
Policy changes in the USSR are often enacted as part of
campaigns, or large scale efforts on the part of Soviet authorities to
promote new techniques or programs which are portrayed as having
potentially great benefits. The typical life cycle of such an effort
is initial advocacy, determination, and mainly positive press reports
about early results; a middle stage where the positive statements are
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gradually replaced by accounts of isolated difficulties and then more
general conclusions about problems with the program; and a final stage
in which the subject fades from view. At this point incrementalism
takes over, and slow improvements are made, but without the hope of
the massive returns at the early stages. Although such returns are
never realized, the campaigns usually do help to produce some modest
positive results. It can be argued that the ASUP'program is in the
final stage, the robotics program has reached the middle stage, and
the drive for computer literacy is still in the first.
Why are the campaigns seemingly destined to make a big bang and
then fizzle out? If significant changes are not made in the host
-political, social and economic environment (superstructure), the
incentives for using the new technology will remain cosmetic. Knowing
that in fact little has changed, Soviet managers are used to waiting
out the storm of a campaign until clear skies return. In addition,
the objectives of campaigns are severely limited by the ability to
shift extra resources to enterprises once they are introduced on a
broad scale. Constraints on the enterprise infrastructure imposed by
the superstructure must be released before the changes can be
effectively implemented on a wide basis.
On the other hand, the campaigns tend to drag on and are never
fully abandoned because the power of the symbolism attached to
"progressiveness" remains. This phenomenon is particularly acute for
the information technologies. The ideology of the so-called
Scientific-Technical Revolution (NTR) has placed computing in the
forefront of technologies which will put social management on an even
more scientific, Marxist-Leninist basis. Therefore, the ASUP program
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specifically, and the computer-related technologies more generally,
persist as symbols of Communism which cannot be abandoned or
significantly altered. The Soviets have greatly limited the extent to
which the discourse on such topics as ASUP or robotics or computer
literacy can involve questions of the superstructure. Nevertheless,
the campaigns serve as a useful form of national dialogue and a means
for the leadership to present its goals to the population.
4. Technology transfer
From the perspective of'this study, the most important form of
technology transfer has been the broad exposure to and partial
appreciation of Western computing activities at the national level.
This helped lead to the change of Soviet perceptions that has evolved
over the last two decades, to the dramatic changes in policy that
affected much of what we have described above, and has had profound
influence on the development of the Soviet and East European
industries. Western activities are taking place at a rate, and on a
scale, that is impossible to hide from the Soviets. What is most
important is most readily accessible to them.
The detailed implementation side of the technology transfer
picture is the acquisition, duplication, and assimilation of Western
systems, applications, etc. Soviet accessibility to this level of
technology has increased dramatically during the last decade, and
world technological and business trends are such that this
accessibility will continue to increase for some time. These trends
include: new system architectures, impressive sustained rates. of
microelectronic miniaturization, the explosive growth in availability
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of computing in all sectors of the US economy, the variety and rate of
emergence of new products and incrementally innovative ideas, and an
increase in the number of capable non-US firms. Collectively, these
and other trends are making it easier for the Soviets to find
alternate solutions to their needs, to acquire and transport products,
and to approach a larger number of potential suppliers for what they
want.
But acquisition is not necessarily assimilation, and Soviet
progress should be considered in both absolute and relative terms. It
may be instructive to view this rapidly changing world from the Soviet
side.
The Soviets are observing an incredible range of computer-related
activities in the West, particularly in the US and Japan. In roughly
the last half dozen years alone, in addition to rapid progress in many
"older" areas like microelectronics and disk stores, there has been an
extraordinary combination of interwoven technical development and
widespread absorption in areas that have "taken off" during this
period, including: CAD, CAM, MIS and OA, data communications and
networks, and computing for small organizational and personal use.
All of this makes for an acquisition bonanza. Each year the
Soviets obtain many thousands of Western research papers, new product
announcements, products, descriptions of new applications, etc. These
are being used by the Soviet computer industry more effectively than
has ever been the case before. This outpouring of Western activity is
making it easier for them to get around Western export controls. But
it is also making it necessary for the Soviets to acquire much more
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just to try to control the rate at which they are falling behind.
The Soviets are increasingly being forced to contend with these
pressures and opportunities. But the enormity and range of what is
involved precludes getting most of what is needed through a few
transfers on the "atomic bomb secrets" or "turnkey plants for the
automotive industry" models. What the Soviets are seeing are very
broad and rapid rates of incremental innovation, and they are not
fully capable of understanding or coping with it.
Perhaps worst of all from the Soviet standpoint, it is precisely
at the level of the national "big picture", where Western computer
technology is most exposed and where past claims regarding the
advantages of the "Soviet system" were most pronounced, that
technology transfer has been least successful. This is also the level
where the Soviet industry has been almost impotent in its ability to
perform broadly and innovatively. Rhetoric aside, the combination of
Soviet leadership, industry, and user community has never been able to
generate massive, innovative, qualitatively new directions in
computing such as those described above as "take off" areas.
Furthermore, they have difficulty making the technical and systemic
adjustments necessary to move in directions defined by the West, the
confluence of computing and telecommunications being an important
example. These difficulties seem to have become more pronounced since
the mid-1970s, with the rapid expansion of Western activities in
several major directions, and are likely to continue even if the
Soviets should become more innovative at the detailed technical level.
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III. A Soviet-style Information Society
A. Will there be a Soviet-style information society?
It is clear from our analyses in Chs. I-II that the Soviets will
be compelled to develop and apply the information technologies on a
large scale to support their own aspirations and to contend with
foreign pressures. Much- of this will be concerned with the
preservation and enhancement of political and economic control and
military power, and with economic modernization through both blue- and
white-collar applications. It is also important for them to present
the image of a progressive society to the world and to their own
-population, if only to maintain military credibility, proclaim
ideological superiority, and to contend with Western influence and
rising internal expectations.
Progress toward all these ends may be made through the use of
more traditional means. But the information technologies hold out the
promise for significant gains in productivity and control which could
not be achieved by other means. If the USSR is to do well by
international standards it will have no choice except to pursue much
more effective and widespread use of the C&C technologies.
Because of the range, scale, and importance of these problems,
there will have to be a
sovietized" nationwide presence of the
information technologies by the end of this century. We next consider
some prospective features of this presence.
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B. What features might characterize a
Soviet-style information society?
1. Trends vs. goals
Roughly speaking, our model of a Western-style information
society is described by general, intensive, somewhat unconstrained and
chaotic, and broadly debated and determined progress in many
directions. The nature of the evolving-society is beyond the control
of any small number of centralized or strongly hierarchical
organizations.
The Western-style information society is therefore best
characterized in terms of rapidly emerging major trends as outlined in
Section I.B. The trends are a result of driving forces which operate
within the constraints and possibilities determined by systemic
conditions.
Similarly, our model of a "Soviet-style information society"
considers the driving forces, systemic conditions and constraints
which are influencing the evolution of C&C applications in the USSR.
The combination of both main Western trends is clearly excluded under
these circumstances; so a different compact characterization will be
necessary. We believe that what is emerging in the USSR is best
characterized by goals rather than trends. Our analyses of past and
current Soviet efforts and sensitivities identify the following four
primary goals:
1. To attain real gains in productivity and to modernize the
industrial base.
2. To maintain and improve the economic planning and control
mechanism.
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3. To support both military and internal security needs.
4. To present the image of a progressive society both to the people
of the USSR And to the outside world.
We emphasize the importance of all four. They form an
irreducible set in two senses. (1) Other goals, such as keeping up
with the West or providing selected improvements in education or the
standard of living, may be understood entirely within the context of
these four. (2) None of the four may be understood entirely within
the context of the other three, unless one is prepared to believe
(which we do not) that the military dominates the the entire polity.
The goals are not determined in a simple dictatorial fashion, but
rather through a fairly long and multifaceted process involving the
broad participation of a growing technocratic elite.
Our analyses in Ch. II have also identified the most important
driving forces, systemic conditions, and development and applications
areas for the Soviet Union. This enables us to construct a compact
model similar to the one discussed for the West. Both models are
summarized in Table 3.
In our view, the contrast between trends and goals as very
important relative Western-Soviet features is the most pointed short
statement that can be made to illustrate what is happening and how
things are happening in the two kinds of societies. Western progress
is chaotic, rapid, highly pluralistic and relatively unplanned and
unconstrained. A mish-mash of a large number of independent,
interrelated or conflicting goals emerges in some gross statistical
sense in the form of major trends. The trends may themselves be
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considered overall goals, but they also have the stronger status of
established trends, and so we prefer that term. Soviet progress must
await the cautious consideration and approval of the central
authorities, and suffers from relatively backward production and
distribution capacities and options. Soviet goals are comparatively
less complex and more easily enumerated. Soviet trends are
comparatively underdeveloped, and prospects have to be assessed in
terms of past performance and goals.
A common thread that emerges from both models is the need and
desire to improve control over increased complexity and reduced time
scales, as discussed in Section I.B. As noted there, even fantasy and
entertainment applications may be viewed as a quest for greater
control, in this case for building private worlds and of having the
control to occasionally escape from the rest.. of society. Both
societies see the information technologies as an increasingly
necessary means for the control of production, distribution, and
demand. Both see these technologies as means for the control of the
dissemination of noneconomic (e.g., political or entertainment)
information, for the control of military and intelligence activities,
for increasing the volume and efficiency of communications, etc., etc.
For both societies, there is a strong control element in all these
applications, but the emphases and subgoals are often very different.
Most of the differences, e.g., those that govern access to and the
dissemination of noneconomic information, are deeply rooted in the
ways Western and Soviet societies have functioned for many decades.
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A Model of a Western-style Information Society
Best characterized by emerging trends:
Pervasive application of the C&C technologies
Expanded access to information
A Model of a Soviet-style Information Society
Best characterized by centrally formulated goals,
To improve industrial'productivity and to modernise
the industrial base
To maintain and improve the economic planning and
control mechanism
To support both military and internal security needs
To present the image of a progressive society to the
people of the USSR and to the outside world
Driving forces,
Opportunities for innovations inherent in the
C&C technologies
Large and diversified push-pull markets
Pierce domestic and international competition
Systemic conditions,
Little national level control of social change
Organizational flexibility
Relatively weak controls on access to
and dissemination of information
Supports the broad dissemination of controls for
economic efficiency# private activities and
for more communications of all kinds
Development and application of the Cic technologies:
Interest in all technology areas
Technological strength in all areas
Interest in all applications areas
Near universal user community
Driving forces,
National-level political processes
Western achievements
Systemic conditions:
Powerful national level controls on social change
Organizational rigidities
Strong controls on access to and dissemination of
information lower level controls
A strong form of centralized planning and control
A leadership that distrusts the general population
Development and application of the C&C technologies:
Interest in most technology areas
Modest technological capabilities in most areas
Interest in a relatively small number of applications
areas narrowly related to goals
Restricted, semi-isolated, relatively small user
communities
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that both are seeking to use the
information technologies for both greater concentration and greater
distribution of control, but of course in vastly different
proportions. The trends in the model of a Western-style information
society strongly exhibit very broad dissemination of controls for
increased economic efficiency, for personal activities, and for more
communications of all kinds. They also exhibit greater mixed
centralization/decentralization controls in such areas as military C31
and corporate management. Prospective Soviet dissemination of
controls is much more limited and focused. There is also a much
stronger element of political control and concerns in Soviet
applications. But there is an increasing Soviet realization that some
form of more distributed hierarchical control, in contrast to the
strong forms of centralization of the past (in graph theoretic terms,
a hierarchically layered tree vs. a star), is necessary and
desirable.
At some point, we would like to do a more extensive comparative
study of Soviet and US societies that more broadly, in the
technological, social and historical senses, considers these aspects
of control.
Clearly, all the Soviet goals are subsumed under the Western
trends, but with differing emphases and different approaches to their
achievement. One should be careful not to draw conclusions on Soviet
prospects that are based exclusively on Western precedents.
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It is not clear if the four primary goals are fully achievable by
the end of the century under the given driving forces, systemic-
conditions and constraints. Ch. IV assesses Soviet prospects and
problems for each of the four goals, and discusses some international
implications to the Year 2000.
C. Terminology
The term "Soviet-style information society" appears to be a
contradiction of terms since it excludes so much of the Western-style
model. Although there are many other terms used in the West to label
the aggregate of the kinds of C&C-related activities described in
Section II.B - information age, computer revolution, microelectronics
revolution, telematic society, to name only a few - none applies
particularly well to the Soviet model. Neither do terms like the
Scientific-Technological Revolution or "enlightened socialism" or the
"lack-of-information society" or the "surveillance society.
In discussing this subject with a number of Soviets and Central
Europeans (Hungarians and East/West Germans), we asked if they had a
name for what was emerging in the CEMA countries. The answer was
always "no," and conversations continued on the basis of their
agreeing to use any name of our choice which they would simply adopt
as a working term for the purposes of the discussion. They seemed
content with "information society." The impression we got from each
such conversation was that few people in these countries have given
the subject the breadth of thought presented here, and that none felt
the information technologies would be so pervasive and dominant among
the mix of new technologies to the Year 2000 (e.g., nuclear energy,
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biotechnology and materials in addition to computing and other
automation technologies) to warrant a technology-specific name for
describing the whole society.
As discussed in the preceding section, in some important ways,
the common point of departure for both models is "control." Progress
in both the US and USSR can be seen as different forms of a "control
revolution" as much as these countries can be seen as different forms
of societies that are partially characterized by how information is
treated. But a term like "controlled society" or "control revolution"
sounds too harsh and misleading for the Western model, and adds
nothing that is C&C specific in the case of the USSR, which is a
strongly controlled society in many other ways.
So, more or less by default, we will use the term "Soviet-style
information society" for the model on the Soviet side of Table 3.
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IV. Prospective Progress and Problems to the Year 2000
A. Industrial modernization, gains in productivity
and living standards
1. Industrial modernization and gains in productivity
This is one of the Gorbachev administration's overarching goals,
and success or failure here will greatly affect the extent to which
the other three goals of our model are realized. The proposed means
for achievement involve a combination of greater discipline, the
elimination of waste, and automation. The information technologies
themselves, primarily in the forms of CAD, CAM, TCP and MIS/OA, have
the potential for ameliorating the effects of a labor shortage,
providing basic industrial modernization in both the manufacturing and
the R&D sectors, increasing the volumes and quality of goods produced,
imposing additional discipline, and helping to eliminate waste. These
applications have, by far, the highest profile in the Soviet media,
and are at the core of the program for computing to the Year 2000.
The most important questions concerning the effects of the
systemic conditions on progress towards this goal are twofold. Will
the Soviet information industries be capable of providing the
technology to support industrial automation? Will the superstructure
problems that have plagued the ASUP program for 20 years be much of an
impediment?
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There are two plausible views as to whether or not societally
pervasive applications are necessary to support a sufficient
infrastructure to meet this goal. The first holds that the Soviet C&C
industries are large and by no means impotent. They cover the full
spectrum of the relevant technologies. As long as they are not
expected to meet the combined overall Western standards of extent of
applications, technological level, sophistication of integration and
service, the Soviet industries might be able to perform at a
reasonable level, both qualitatively and quantitatively, with some
foreign technology transfer and additional resources. The Soviets
should be able to build them up to the point where they at least
better their marginal and undistinguished performance in support of
the ASUP program.
According to this position, the need for a pervasive presence of
microcomputers, entertainment applications, computer networks, etc.
in Soviet society as a prerequisite for successful large scale
industrial automation in the USSR has been exaggerated. The lack of
private automobiles and telephones has not prevented Soviet industry
or the military from having a large number of trucks and tanks and
field communications systems with adequately trained operators.
Similarly, one can learn to tend an FMS without having to have a
microcomputer at home.
The second view holds that every stage of pervasiveness requires
a corresponding support level from the infrastructure. It is the
pervasiveness of applications (demand-pull) that stimulates the
infrastructure to respond, just as a healthy infrastructure fosters
demand by making applications possible (supply-push). One can learn
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to tend an FMS without having to have a microcomputer at home, but can
the infrastructure provide sufficiently reliable microcomputers and
other technologies without the demand base that home personal
computers provide?
Our view is a hybrid. Significant resources will be added to the
C&C industries to help them improve their performance and there will
be improvements in infrastructure, but this will not be up to
supporting stage 5 pervasiveness in Soviet enterprises. However,
stage 4 in selected sectors might be possible and adequate. Demand
pull has never been sufficient to prod the C&C industries into
overcoming certain fundamental deficiencies in hardware reliability
and service, and for software development and support. The Soviets
therefore must unfetter the demand side by (a) unleashing some forces
of private industry within the infrastructure, or (b) allowing
enterprises to act more autonomously, or (c) by providing more and
better equipment on the supply side to help stimulate demand. To some
extent, the efforts described in Ch. II represent progress along the
lines of (b) and (c).
The creation of small, perhaps private, enterprises would help
fill in the cracks in the infrastructure. Small software companies or
service vendors might be allowed in order to promote technological
innovation and improve the quality of services. Such companies would
surely provide some services better, but might well run into the same
barriers that would-be'users now suffer from, especially with respect
to obtaining and repairing hardware.
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Although it may not be as bad in some ways, almost all of the
superstructural and infrastructural problems that afflicted the ASUP
program during the last two decades will also handicap the broader
industrial automation program. The main advantages CAM may have over
ASUP are that measurable forms of Soviet-style, quantity oriented,
productivity increases may be obtainable from localized use of
industrial automation at the shop level and in the short term, and
that Soviet managers and workers may perceive less risk from using CAM
But most of Soviet industry has not yet reached a level of
organization at which it is ready to try to reap the full benefits of
of the information technologies. For example, consider the technique
of just-in-time production (JITP). JITP requires that production
processes be so highly coordinated, well-timed, and well-executed that
there is practically no margin for error and, as such, has given some
US companies fits. But the Soviets, with their erratic supply system,
could obtain greater gains merely by ensuring consistency in the
arrival of most supplies and by making sure that everything supplied
was of good quality. The USSR is said to be facing a labor shortage
that will supposedly be relieved by automation, but anybody who has
ever visited a, Soviet store knows that there is plenty of
underemployed labor. Within this environment, computing relieves some
problems, but is also an additional form of inefficiency itself and
exposes others that it cannot correct.
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The leadership may hope to overcome these problems through slow
structural changes and technological improvements, and through the
exposure of younger workers and managers to the information
technologies at work and school. The latter may make more effective
use of what there is and create some constructive demand from below in
the short term, and perhaps see to better solutions in the long term.
This seems to be the view held-by several prominent academicians and
technocrats, and they are gaining support, perhaps because there is no
better and feasible alternative at this time. Consider, for example,
the frustration and hope expressed by the director of a major Georgian
ASU institute:
Unfortunately, today the real interest in ASU has
significantly diminished, and this is at the moment when we
have sufficiently powerful hardware and software and data
processing technology to make it possible to satisfy the needs
of economic management. Sharp changes in the practice of the
use of ASU can be expected with the arrival of the new
generation, the new type of manager-commanders of production
and workers of the management apparatus, who today, in the 9th
and 10th classes, are grasping general 'computer literacy'
IEmm85c].
There are risks that such programs might lead Soviet society
further away from computing if they are not carried out well. Many
experienced enterprise directors have more misgivings about using
computers now than they did 20 years ago [Emm85.; Emm85c]. Potential
for similar disillusionment exists in the program for industrial
automation.
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The limitations of the Soviet C&C industries, and the more
important superstructural/infrastructural problems, will make it
impossible for the USSR to automate - in both the MIS and CAM senses -
most of its industry and commerce by the end of the century. Strong
testimony to this effect is given by the legacy of the introduction of
computing into Soviet enterprises and R&D organizations over more than
20 years [Mche85J. It is questionable if they will do much better
with the larger, more complicated, and riskier problem of industrial
This is not to say that little or nothing will be done. The
Soviets have no choice but to try hard, and something will come of the
effort. In the short term, there will be several prominent and
perhaps exaggerated successes, but serious initial work and
experimentation will take place both in high priority
military-industrial and in lessor sectors. In time, we would expect
islands of advanced industrial automation to emerge, and some are
already emerging. The rest, probably most, of Soviet industry will be
left behind in a backwater that will be more distanced from the
advanced sectors than is the case today. The selection process will
no doubt reflect the priorities given to the other three basic goals
in our model. We would expect to see the most rapid rate of
introduction in ASUTP/TPC. The Soviets are adding more than 500 of
these per year, and this rate can be expected to increase as a result
of better and cheaper hardware, and the emphasis placed on this area
under goal 1. By the end of the century they may reach the point
where most important, well-understood, and not exorbitantly expensive
process will be partially computer controlled. The introduction of
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ASUP will continue to have problems along the lines already discussed,
and will be introduced at the slowest rate and perhaps with the least
effect. The introduction of robots and FMS will be at a rate between
the first two, the the rate for robots being faster than that for FMS
and more integrated forms of CAN. Even this level of success would go
far to vindicate central planning and control and "discipline" as
effective ways for running a country.
2. Gains in living standards
An improved standard of living should be more than just a
positive incentive towards achieving state goals. It is an important
goal in itself, and the most important the vast majority of citizens
see in their one pass at life.
Even if the Soviets should be modestly successful in attaining
the four primary goals of Table 3, the gap between the relative
Western-USSR standards of living may grow for the rest of this
century. The information technologies have been contributing to some
dramatic and high profile changes in this gap. This trend may be
accelerated in spite of prospective Soviet improvements, the Gorbachev
administration's real interest in increasing domestic consumption, and
the need to come up with entertainment options to fill some of the
time that has until recently been spent with vodka.
Most of the West is now well beyond minimum subsistence levels
for housing, food and education. Standard of living is increasingly a
matter of range of choice and availability of services and products,
greater career and leisure time opportunities, more personal
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communications, the quantitative and qualitative expansion of
entertainment possibilities, etc. In these terms, a more efficient
industrial economy as defined by our model of a Soviet-style
information society will not provide a great improvement in standard
of living for most of the Soviet people.
The information technologies are making it possible for the
Western set of products, services and opportunities to expand rapidly
in both-quality and quantity. The Soviet subset is expanding much
more slowly. In a world where the variety and volume of
electronics-based consumer products and services are growing
unprecedented. rates, the USSR is producing little and exporting less
of what anyone really wants to directly improve their standard of
living. Imports are limited to items for the elite or near elite and
for the never ending, never really successful, goal of strengthening
industrial sectors that need more than what Soviet indigenous
technology can provide. The USSR chooses to constrain its citizens'
opportunities by remaining outside of a world that is increasingly
capable and increasingly inclined to communicate among it components.
To do'otherwise would be to weaken the internal position of the Party
and the ruling elites, and to inevitably permit some "dissidence." In
the past, when the stakes were more modest technologically and in the
more limited extent of-the technological interface with daily life
(e.g., photocopying machines), it was relatively easy for the
leadership to impose strong and fairly effective controls. Now the
cost and pace are much higher, and this East-West gap is growing.
The vigor of a society can, in the short run, be stimulated
by revolutionary ardor or wartime discipline. But over the long
haul, social vigor is a function of fun, in this sense: People
will be more energetic, creative, productive, fecund when they are
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enjoying themselves. A capacity for enjoyment is grounded in
self-esteem. That is difficult to develop in a society in which
the individual is considered a mere manifestation of this or that
collective category ("worker," "peasant," "vanguard"). Individual
attributes and achievements are made to seem trivial in comparison
with ideological goals [Wil186].
In terms of this view of societal "vigor" and changing world-wide
standards of living, the four primary goals of Ch. III, and the
likely Soviet means for achieving them, do not offer much for the
average- Soviet citizen, although it would be an exaggeration to say
they offer nothing. Conversely, under the circumstances it may be too
much to expect the average Soviet citizen to rise to heroic efforts to
help the state achieve those goals.
B. Economic planning and control
The USSR appears to be more strongly wedded to comprehensive
central planning than China or most of Eastern Europe. The reasons
for this are historical, ideological, and political. In particular,
this may be the Soviet Union's most notable economic innovation, and
it would be very difficult for the Soviets to back away from it. Some
continue to see centralized planning as having great potential to help
use resources optimally, and to increase output and productivity.
Others may see it as an important form of political and information
control. In any case, in the effort to maintain close control over an
increasingly complex economic domain and planning process there is
little choice but to turn to the C&C technologies. If there is
anything that could be seen as a singularly Soviet element of an
information society, this is it.
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We expect that the Soviets will continue to build OGAS and other
state committee and ministry-level systems. The fundamental problems
to be faced again involve the ability of the infrastructure to deliver
the necessary services and the ability of the host environments to
absorb the applications. However, by the Year 2000 there will
probably be a substantial amount of data exchange via
telecommunications between these systems, and data base management
technologies will be widely used. Computers will become almost
universal in the TsSU system, which will be used to collect and
process data from the vast majority of enterprises.
Three serious problems arise from the surrounding environment.
-First, the whole planning and control mechanism is a highly political
process. Despite efforts to computerize Gosplan since the early 60s,
most of the automation simply replaces the calculators of yesterday
without changing the methods used in order to balance the plan. Are
Soviet planners really ready to allow a computer to make decisions for
them when their decision making power is their most valuable
possession? Will planners who are concerned about gross
inconsistencies be interested in using computers to fine-tune plans?
Second, computerization does not substantially change the nature
of the data which is being collected, nor does it address the problem
of collecting data in machine readable form. The TsSU collects the
same data and simply processes and delivers it faster. To what extent
is this data accurate? This question cannot be answered with any
certainty, but at any given time there is probably a good deal of
incorrect data in circulation. Branch autonomy may also hinder links
between various systems and the sharing of accurate data, which may be
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one reason superministries are being created.
Finally, there is the problem of planning from the achieved
level, on which much of the incentive system is based. It Jr. too
difficult, even with computers, to determine from scratch what each
economic unit should be producing. Solving this kind of problem
involves repeated iterations of balancing global and local optimal
solutions across tens of thousands of organizational units; it has not
even been solved for organizations as simple as a single oil company
with multiple refineries. Supercomputers that would be capable of
doing this over many sectors of the Soviet economy will probably be.
unavailable for some time to come. Planning from the achieved level
results in an enormous amount of inertia and has given rise to gross
structural imbalances in the Soviet economy. The choices which could
be made by using computers are severely limited.. Soviets at the
highest levels have talked about changing this aspect of the system,
but so far no clear and effective alternatives are being widely
implemented.
More pervasive use of computers for economic control might take
some forms that would yield results. For instance, the maintenance of
large data bases of the reported information may help the central
authorities uncover reporting inconsistencies and track down phony
data. Planners should be able to make more use of the available data
for analysis purposes. Faster reporting and analysis will be
possible, so that some decisions which now come too late to be of any
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It might be possible to solve some of the false data problems by
using direct, sensor-based collection methods. This would be
enormously expensive and would require that computing be used at all
levels of the hierarchy, down to the shop floor, on a near-universal
basis. It would also require a tremendous telecommunications
infrastructure. This kind of universal and effective economic
surveillance will not become reality by the end of the century.
We-expect that there will some improvements in the overall
performance of the economic control and planning mechanism, but that
these gains will fall far short of what the Soviet leadership desires.
Computers will help the central planners to keep up with the growing
volume of data and to have somewhat more control over the complexity
of the economy. But the planning process will still be constrained by
all the problems just noted, and will still be shot through with
politics. Large scale optimal plans will remain out of reach.
C. Military and internal security
We consider certain aspects of civilian-military relations in the
C&C industries, some US-USSR military implications, and internal
security and sociopolitical risk.
1. Civilian-military relations in-the C&C industries
Goal-3 exists in a.competitive-complementary relation with the
others and with Western efforts and policies. If Western high-tech
military systems are perceived to be the most important potential
military threat to the USSR, then the Soviet Union should focus on
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developing the necessary technologies and industries to deal with this
threat. This plausible long term Soviet response is consistent with
our discussions of Cho. II-III, and is based on the premise that the
Soviets value the other three primary goals (Table 3) for social and
economic reasons that greatly transcend their contributions to
military power. If this is the case, then more resources will be
poured into strengthening the C&C - industries and important
applications sectors to the benefit of all four goals, and less may be
poured into more conventional military means, such as in the numerical
growth of existing forces, which contributes far less to the other
three goals. Not only would this help preserve and modernize Soviet
military power vis-a-vis the West, but it is also a sensible approach
with regard to China.
In our view, and within the scope of this study, success in the
pursuit of goal 3 will depend on certain aspects of civilian-military
relations in the C&C industries. Ideally, there should be a mutually
beneficial, complementary relationship between a strong set of C&C
industries and strong user communities, as has been the case in the
West. Each should help bootstrap the other.
In our model, most of the user community strength in the USSR is
heavily concentrated in the production enterprises of the Group A
economic branches, including the Soviet military and
military-industrial (VPK) enterprises. The centralized planning and
control mechanism exists in part to guarantee and reinforce the status
of these high priority portions of the Soviet user community. In
theory, all of this is well connected and expedited through the. VPK
since a large part of the core of the Soviet C&C ministries and this
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part of the user community fall under its purview. These
relationships look fine in theory, and seem to work well for areas
like the production of armored vehicles. They do not work as well for
the C&C applications because the complexity and competition are
different.
Looking at the Soviet civil-military high-tech relationship from
a different perspective than we did in subsection II.A.4, it might
argued that many of the problems of the Soviet C&C industries stem
from the lack of a strong feedback relationship with a world-class
user community, and that the'Soviet military is not such a community.
Conversely, it may be argued that Soviet military-related applications
suffer because of the many problems of the C&C industries. The
military, and military-related industry and R&D organizations, enjoy
privileges: they have advantages over normal civilian organizations
with regard to recruiting and rewarding capable people; they may have
priority in tasking covert acquisitions and. greater exposure to
Western technology; military representatives are in a position to
exercise quality control functions at computer production facilities;
and the Soviet military is in direct competition with Western
counterparts in a way that has no strong parallel in the civilian
economy. But all of this does not make the Soviet military-industrial
establishment a C&C using community comparable to'the general purpose
users in the US, Western Europe and Japan.
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Consider the following three "meta C&C user communities:" the
Soviet military, the US military, and the US civilian communities.
The first is the smallest, most conservative and risk averting, and
least well supported. The second is much larger, considerably less
Conservative in its computer-related activities, e.g., it is
inconceivable that the Soviet military would have been the first to
take an ARPANET-like initiative, and is much better supported and more
experienced in almost every important sense. The third is far larger
than the first two combined, extraordinarily diversified across a
mind-boggling range of users and applications, is extremely well
supported and provides most of the support for the second, and is a
main prize of what may be the most singular technological competition
in history between the US and Japanese C&C industries.
So where does the detailed technological imperative or push for
the Soviet industry come from? From the high reaches of the
Party-Government pyramid? From the relatively impotent, general
civilian user community? From the the military? Where does the
Party-Government or Soviet military get many of their perceived needs?
Some substantial portion comes from the examples provided by the
Western military and civilian user communities. Does the Soviet
military need a general computing base that is broader and deeper than
the one it is capable of building and supporting entirely within
itself? Yes, as is evidenced by the way it uses what is available in
the West? as a surrogate for what it does not have at home.
Furthermore, for all its resources and privileges, the Soviet military
cannot control all that is necessary to build a civilian computing
base comparable to that in the West, or even to put pressure on the
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Soviet information industries comparable to the pressures that
on the Western industries. The complexity and scale of what is
involved is well beyond that for building an atomic bomb or launching
a Sputnik.
The Soviet military and C&C industries are far from impotent, but
both are at a considerable disadvantage relative to their Western
counterparts. The East-West gap here may not be as great as in other
C&C applications areas, but the gap exists. It is one of the few
areas where the relative advantages bestowed on the Soviet military
have not overcome Western advantages.
The successful pursuit of goal 3 will be strongly dependent on
how well the Soviets contend with the problems and relative
disadvantages discussed above. Their past record is such that they
will be doing well if the East-West gap does not widen.
2. Some US-USSR military implications
The US is increasingly setting the pace and directions with
regard to the military applications of the information technologies.
US successes and failures determine the relative Soviet position and
the way the game is played at least as much as anything the Soviets
themselves do. In our view, the converse statement, i.e., regarding
Soviet determinants on the US, is weaker.
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For at least the rest of this century, it is unlikely that Soviet
progress in the C&C technologies will, strengthen them to the point
where they can broadly catch up with or surpass Western military
applications. In order for that to happen, we believe the West must
stumble or fall down. For example, if the West fails in the
development of SDI, the Soviets may be able to close some of the gaps
in military applications because the West will have wasted scarce
resources that would have been better used elsewhere. On the other
hand, if the West succeeds with SDI, the USSR will not have the
overall C&C capabilities to match it. The most sensible plan, given
Soviet accomplishments, prospects and the importance of these
technologies to an SDI-like effort, would seem to be to invest the
necessary resources to counter, rather than match, an SDI system. An
obvious possibility might be to try to overwhelm it by using less
sophisticated technologies than SDI itself employs. It is possible
that, in the case of SDI, the West might be trying to press it's
technological.advantages too hard, and the net result may be poorer
risk-to-gain prospects than what the US is, in effect, forcing on the
The Western lead across a broad spectrum of security-related
applications of the C&C technologies is such that the USSR will
continue to have to rely on a wide range of 'technology transfer
mechanisms to keep this gap from growing more rapidly than it is.
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Finally, We do not seem to have a good understanding of
Soviet-American perceptions of the real military value of each other's
C&C-based systems. We would speculate as follows: The Soviets know
how weak their on systems are. They probably have an exaggerated
perception of what US has, given the sources they probably have and
use. We probably have a much exaggerated perception of what they have
because of our sources. But the two sides' view of US systems most
likely -is closer than the two sides' view of USSR systems. The net
result is that the Soviets may see larger gaps than really exist, and
the US may be seeing smaller,gaps.
3. Internal security and sociopolitical risk
We know of no strong evidence to the effect that the KGB is doing
particularly well in the use of the information technologies for the
applications described in subsection II.A.4 for domestic surveillance.
This may be assumed to be the case because: these applications would
clearly be of value to such an agency; they are within current
technical capabilities; the KGB can obtain the necessary resources to
make them realities; and there are few constraints to prevent them
from doing so.
In time, we would expect additional use of the C&C technologies
in in the form of embedded, somewhat transparent, surveillance in
systems which are used by the population on a daily basis, such as the
telephone system or possibly industrial electronic funds transfer
systems if they ever come into common use. For such applications, it
is important that the surveillance is not obvious, but that everyone
be conditioned to think it might be there. In the past, manpower
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constraints have prevented the Soviets from making such.-surveillance
really pervasive. Computers will not immediately bring this about,
but may make the present system work more effectively and eventually
lead to higher surveillance levels.
It is unlikely that the Soviet population will see Orwellian-like
telescreens during this century. The reasons are threefold: they are
well beyond current technology; a nationally pervasive system would be
enormously expensive; and they could not be imposed on the population
by anything short of a return to a neo-Stalinist regime. It is also
possible that the effort to do so would destabilize the political
system.
Will the expanded use of the information technologies open a
social/political Pandora's Box, or will the authorities be able to
maintain control? Of the technologies and applications considered in
Ch. II. few taken alone present as much risk as some Western analysts
have claimed or that the Soviets seem to fear. Nevertheless, Soviet
authorities remain very cautious with regard to the widespread
introduction of any of the information technologies that have serious
potential for being used to increase exposure to information from
foreign sources, that may be willfully used for dissident activities,
or which increase the volume of private two-way communications. A
small number of dissidents with typewriters were able to have a
disproportionate effect, at least on the Western media and the KGB,
during the 1970s. From.this standpoint, the prospect of a prominent
academic with Sakharov-like thoughts and access to hundreds of
domestic and foreign colleagues through computer networks must be
unnerving. Soviet concerns for secrecy, and the importance they
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attach to presenting a unified front and showing that they can control
information, will continue to be an important factor that will
severely retard the introduction of the information technologies and
handicap the achievement of at least goals 1 and 4.
However, if there is to be substantial progress towards all four
goals, it will be necessary for the Soviet leadership to permit and
encourage the much expanded utilization of the information
technologies. Given the potential of C&C applications, the inevitable
result will be less effective and more flexible controls over an
expanding user base than had been possible in the past, e.g., when
photocopy machines were the main concern. Control of photocopiers was
relatively simple, and the cost, of such control, in terms of lost
economic opportunities, was easily acceptable against the potential
risk. This will not be the case with some of the newer technologies
of Table 2. For example, at first attempts were made to exclude VCRs,
but so many were imported that the leadership chose to co-opt the
black market with its own regulated supply of machines and cassettes
(Taub86; Yasm86b). Nevertheless, VCRs remain a troublesome technology
for the authorities. The microcomputer could become the next
most-coveted item by the elite, and its importance to all four goals
will force even greater accommodations than has been the case with
VCRs. Both the education program and the broad' distribution of work
stations among professionals may create a large pool of knowledgeable
people who are demanding access to computers. To a certain extent
this is exactly the result that the leadership hopes to achieve. And
this is the quandary in which the leadership finds itself: educating
people to use computers effectively in order to meet its goals will
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inevitably lead to increased expectations for private ownership and
The one area where the Soviets have achieved stage
pervasiveness is in the control and distribution of domestic radio,
TV, and the press. In a sense, this has been the first "information
society" achievement in the USSR. The development and spread of other
technologies - VCR, technologies for the reception of foreign radio
and TV, microcomputers, etc. - have the potential to weaken Soviet
controls over the volume and nature of information flows. Fairly
significant increases in all forms of Soviet information controls -
legal, manpower, propaganda, vigilance, product shortages, etc.
will be necessary to keep even a porous lid on all of this, and a
porous lid is all that can be expected.
On balance for the rest of the century, expanding C&C
applications will be more of a problem with regard to internal
security and information control than it will be an asset for
increased surveillance. In the past the Soviet authorities had all
the technological advantages. This is shifting fairly rapidly, and
uses for political dissent are becoming increasingly hidden or swept
under by the much larger demand for consumer and entertainment
applications. It will become increasingly difficult for the
authorities to separate dissidence from entertainment, as may be seen
in Kay's definition of fantasy as a powerful form of control of one's
private environment (Section I.B). By the Year 2000, the net result
may be something of a semi-controlled opening up of information flows
among at least the more educated elements of Soviet society. However,
we believe that this will not result in a wholesale erosion of
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political power, although it may lead to significant changes in
intra-Party processes, and that the Soviets will find these people to
be mainly interested in their own well being.
More generally, Gorbachev's growing technocratic "elites" may be
more secure in their power than their predecessors, and less
distrustful of the population. On the other hand, the KGB "elites"
may find these problems to be opportunities for their own further
growth and employment.
D. Image and influence
The USSR has a long history of proclaiming its ideological and
'moral superiority over the West. It is inconceivable that the Soviets
will drop these claims, which have been heavy with "scientific"
justification and emphasis on the unparalleled progressiveness of
Soviet society. In particular, computing is one of the centerpiece
technologies of the Scientific-Technological Revolution (NTR), perhaps
the most important augmentation to and modernization of
Marxist-Leninist theory in decades. Ideology is a significant
consideration in the formulation of policy, at least to the extent of
precluding actions which would seriously contradict or subvert it, and
it is important to the official self-image and to the legitimacy of
the regime, even if most officials and ordinary citizens are something
less than "true believers."
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The information technologies have become so prominent that Soviet
claims ring hollow to themselves and the outside world if they look
backward and dependent on Western technology transfer. If the
population observes that the NTR is not working according to official
plans and pronouncements, it may become more disillusioned with
Marxism-Leninism, driving a greater wedge between publicly maintained
and privately held belief systems. This will not help the Soviets
improve morale, confidence in centralized planning, work incentives,
and interest in using computers. There would be serious negative
implications for the other three primary goals, and the resulting
frustration could be - in fact, has already been - a factor leading to
limited systemic changes (see sections II.C and IV.E).
It is difficult for the Soviets to swallow the appearance of not
keeping up with the West. This is a matter of defending the ideology
and of national and ethnic pride. With regard to the development and
application of the information technologies, our models and analyses
show that the USSR cannot or does not want to keep up with the West in
many ways. But they are under pressure to look like they are so as
not to appear backward. We can expect to see a lot of "we have that
too" noise and examples, and the Soviets will have to try to make up
in image what they lack or do not want to have in substance.
In some cases, of-course, they genuinely want a lot of substance
to go with the image, e.g., for military credibility. In others, they
want a little to go a long way: to meet some rising expectations, or
at least to avoid further disillusionment, of the population for more
and more interesting consumer goods.
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The Soviets have a conflict between the noble claims of the
ideology, which among other things should welcome the Western trends
with open arms, and the realities of desired controls. In a sense
there is a conflict between Marxist theory and Leninist practice.
They want to retain the control and power structure, but present an
image in keeping with the modernized ideology and realities elsewhere
in the world.
To this end, they need to at least look like they are succeeding
with goals 1-3. Beliefs about computing and the host social/economic
system play a major role in promoting or hindering its absorption into.
society. A good self-image will help progress towards goals 1-3.
Conversely, nothing would contribute more to the image of a
progressive society than significant progress towards the other three
goals.
Soviet image has suffered, both domestically and internationally,
in recent years as a result of problems with the development and
application of the C&C technologies. This is likely to continue for
the rest of the century.
The Soviet leadership and significant parts of the general
population will see their society become increasingly backward
relative to the West. The differences in host conditions for and
applications of the information technologies will provide broad, high
profile contrasts that cannot be ignored. This will be true even if
the Soviets are modestly successful in their pursuit of the four
primary goals discussed in Ch. III, but it will be much worse if they
are not. Pressure towards a more negative self image will be
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maintained by the rate and scope of change in the West. Doubts will
continue to arise about the scientific and progressive claims made on
behalf of Soviet ideology and achievement. They may seek a certain
solace in claims that Western uses of the information technologies
make for more immoral, corrupt, and unstable societies.
Compared with the West, the USSR has always been relatively
backward technologically. Time and various forms of exposure (see
below) are making it look worse. Much of the world has become more
consumer and entertainment oriented to the relative disadvantage of
the Soviets. The Soviet system has shown itself to be slower to adapt
to a much quickened pace. Western styles, products, and culture catch
people's imagination more thoroughly and more rapidly than ever. This
has been, and will continue to be, greatly accelerated by the
information technologies.
The East Europeans see growing gaps between what is going on in
the West and the USSR. Even taking into account differences between
and within the so-called CEMA-6 countries, most would want to move
towards many Western-type applications. Self- and Western-imposed
constraints limit East European access to what they want from the
West. They are pulled to the Soviet Union by political, military and
economic conditions, and will have to be wedded to Soviet progress for
these reasons. In some ways, Soviet influence is growing as its image
weakens.
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With regard to the C&C technologies, Soviet image and influence
have both suffered in China. Perhaps in no other technological area
have the Chinese so clearly shown dissatisfaction with Soviet ways
(P01185]. If the Chinese are very successful, and it is by no means
clear that they will be, this could have a profound effect on Soviet
and Chinese self perceptions.
Much of the Third World population craves the entertainment and
other benefits, such as improved health care and education, that the
information technologies can help bring. Western applications may
become increasingly more attractive and available to them. Soviet
alternatives should be comparatively much weaker. They may also
increasingly perceive the. USSR as being backward. However, most
Marxist Third World governments should be capable of suppressing this
craving, and it is not likely to be an important factor. Furthermore,
parts of the Third World, especially among the Islamic societies, are
very ascetic, and probably see Western information societies as
increasingly bad models, with more chaos, less God, greater personal
freedom and immorality, etc. Countries like Iran and Libya have even
less reason to want to have anything to do with Western-style
information societies than the USSR.
Not only are the applications of the information technologies
changing the basis of image and influence, but they are also the
vehicles for making it more difficult for the Soviets to control
information on these and other changes and pressures. They expose the
Soviet population to more of what is going on beyond their borders,
and they expose much of the rest of the world to more of what is going
on within the Soviet Union. When the Soviets resist or seem oblivious
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to or contemptuous of such things, as in the cases of the KAL 007 and
Chernobyl incidents, their image and credibility suffer even further.
E. The limits of systemic evolution
The Soviet system is not entirely inflexible. We briefly
describe four commonly considered models of how the Soviet economy and
polity might evolve during the rest of this century [Ber184]. It is
likely that they collectively define the potential systemic boundaries
within which progress must take place. The Soviets themselves are
experimenting with one model, and the East Germans, Hungarians and
Chinese with two of the others. The C&C technologies may be seen as
the most difficult test arena for all four models and for all four
countries. We briefly consider whether the experiences of these other
countries under these other models hold much- promise for Soviet
progress well beyond the assessments of this study.
The conservative model is essentially what evolved under Brezhnev
and appears to be what has been reaffirmed for the near term. The
commitment to central planning remains solid. Various incremental
changes may be made in planning, success indicators, discipline, size
of firms, contracts, labor and price policy. Some measures to promote
technological improvement are possible, like the creation of new
organizations or organizational bonds, but it is accepted that the
USSR will always lag by some years behind the West, except perhaps in
a few high-priority areas. It may be argued that such a society will
remain stable as long as consumption is above a minimum threshold and
there is enough growth to support sufficient incentives.
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If, in time, the conservative model simply cannot provide
minimally acceptable levels of progress, the Soviets may find a
palatable alternative in what might be called the progressive model.
This is roughly what is used in the GDR. In comparison with the
conservative model, the ministerial system is relatively weaker and
state enterprises have more autonomy. It permits the selective use of
small private enterprises in certain sectors, recognizing that there
are some areas in which strong centralization does not promote
incentives for productive work, and that the central planning process
cannot cope with all the detail of all levels of the economy. Yet
central planning remains a powerful factor. From the Soviet
perspective, a stumbling block of this model may that it would lead to
greater inequalities in income distribution which could force the
political and technocratic elite to share power with "capitalists,"
and there may be fears that any form of private enterprise will lead
to an unacceptable erosion of central planning and social control. So
far, the record in the GDR has been such as to dispel these fears for
the most part.
The neo-Stalinist (reactionary) model posits a return to a system
with a stronger police state, reduced foreign contacts and greater
emphasis on discipline and order. In this scenario the information
technologies are used extensively for surveillance and control.
Central planning would be strengthened, and further organizational
centralization likely. Control would be much more sophisticated, and
the excesses under Stalin would be avoided. This model may bring
short term gains through better discipline, a high-investment growth
strategy, a slow growth in consumption, a drive against the second
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economy, and a purge of the less productive. In the long term, it
would only accentuate the worst faults of the current system as far as
the development and application of the C&C.technologies are concerned.
Its resuscitation could follow from several possible scenarios of
failure and popular discontent.
The so-called radical model is essentially what exists in
Hungary. It incorporates significant private ownership and a
decentralization of planning and management, leading to changes in
supply, performance evaluation, prices, labor, finance, etc. Party
and government control is 'maintained through investment, prices,
continued central ownership and control, taxation. The Hungarian
experience shows increased quality and service, but overall Hungarian
performance in the six C&C development and applications areas has had
severe problems. From the Soviet perspective, it seriously
compromises centralized control of the C&C technologies and economic
planning, and opens the door for greater social diversity. Because it
changes both the infrastructure and the superstructure, it means
abandoning a significant part of the Soviet system as it exists today.
We have explicitly or implicitly assumed a hybrid of the
conservative and progressive economic models for most of the analysis
in this study, and believe our model of a Soviet-style information
society would be fairly insensitive under either of these two economic
models or hybrids. We would expect little change in the four primary
goals, the driving forces, or the systemic conditions of our model.
There might be differences in rates and levels of achievement, but our
overall assessments to the Year 2000 would remain essentially
unchanged. Much the same might be said about some evolution towards
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the neo-Stalinist model. Obviously, there would have to be major
changes to the model if the Soviets were to move to a strong form of
the Hungarian (radical) model, but we consider this unlikely in spite
of the apparent presence of advocate groups within the USSR.
Some brief comments about evolving information societies in other
Communist countries are in order. The GDR operates its information
industries within a fairly well established progressive model, and
China is moving in that direction [Econ86e; Po1185]. Both are giving
the C&C industries very high priority. On a per capita basis, the GDR
is doing better than any other Communist country in the development
and application of_the C&C technologies, and the regime is surviving
its inability to control the availability of West German TV. This has
certainly been noticed by senior members of the Gorbachev
administration, and is likely to have some influence on and appeal to
the Soviets. However, the progressive model is only one factor in the
relative East German success. Other factors to be considered are
scale, the special relationship between the two Germanies which
provides for the most effective hard currency and technology transfer
arrangements in CEMA, differences in national characters and
experiences, and the superpower position of the USSR. All of its
relative advantages do not make the GDR's C&C industries first rate by
Western technological and commercial standards, but they do keep them
from becoming third rate.
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It is too early to draw conclusions about China, and we do not
claim to be experts on developments in China. To date progress
appears to be modest, but significant. The Chinese experience is of
interest both because of the size of the country and because it is a
truly independent Communist power. In our view, Chinese achievements
have been less impressive and more dependent on Western technology
transfer than some analysts believe. The PRC Also seems to have
better technological relations with the West than does the USSR.
Hungary is the only Communist country to exhibit a real hybrid of
both the Western- and Soviet-style information societies. It does so
through weak forms of most of the trends, goals, driving forces, and
systemic conditions on both sides of Table 3. Within its technical,
economic, and political means, and these are very serious limitations,
Hungary has opened up to the C&C technologies. It has, by far, the
highest per capita private and small institutional ownership of
microcomputers in CEMA. It may become the first CEMA country to have
something approximating a broadly accessible national computer
network. Within the last few years, a nontrivial fraction of the
Hungarian computing community has been privatized, partially
privatized, or at least freed from strong forms of centralized
control. The lack of modems and printers for micros is more of a
problem of not being able to build or pay for them than a political
limitation. Unfortunately, what has been happening in Hungary may be
approaching its limits, and prospects for continued progress leave
such to be desired. Nevertheless, this more colorful and spirited
form of absorption of the information technologies in Hungary has
contributed to that small country's positive self perception of the
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way it runs itself and of its standard of living.
F. Will the different uses of the C&C technologies
in the US and USSR strengthen or weaken the relative
position of the Soviet Union as a superpower?
The analyses and syntheses in this study have shown that the
different uses of of the information technologies in the US and USSR
have weakened the relative position of the USSR as a superpower, at
least within the domains where these applications influence such
status,=and that this is likely to continue for the rest of the
century. We conclude by briefly noting that relative US-USSR
positions as superpowers may also change due to a weakening of the US
position.
The information technologies will tend to decentralize Western
leadership. For example, Japanese progress is such that they have
already and will continue to partially displace the US as the most
technically and economically advanced of the Western countries. More
generally, capabilities in the C&C technologies are diffusing rapidly
among the advanced, and some not-so-advanced, countries, and it is not
hard to envision a future world economic-technological order dominated
by four powers (Europe, the Far East, the US and USSR). This
weakening of US leadership may make it more difficult for the West to
act collectively on East-West matters.
There is some serious potential for Soviet gains relative to the
US information industries and applications in manufacturing, but not
against the West as a whole, because of the decline in US
technological leadership. In particular, the US is in risk of losing
important parts of domestic industries due to their inability to stand
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up against foreign competition in domestic and international markets.
This has already happened in semiconductors, computer peripherals, CNC
machine tools and other areas. The US is becoming increasingly
vulnerable and building undesirable dependencies in this sense.
Soviet forms of control of their own economy allow them to maintain a
complete set of industries, even if they are not competitive by
worldwide standards.
Finally, American society might do well to learn to deal more
effectively with problems induced by these technologies. What are the
the information technologies doing to internal US social strengths?
The emerging information society has strengthened dissent and the
power of the media in the US. Is this providing us with a better form
of democracy, or is it permitting so much diversification that the US
is becoming increasingly incapable of acting with the full power and
backing of the nation for sustained periods in a tough, and less
remote, world? Is the US capable of regaining its declining
technological and economic leadership and controlling its appetite for
imports?
The information technologies may be weakening the positions of
both superpowers.
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AI Artificial Intelligence
AN Academy of Sciences
ARPANET Packet Switched Network Sponsored by ARPA
ASU Automated Control/Managament System
ASUP Automated Enterprise Management System
ASUTP ASU for Technological Processes (TPC)
CAD Computer-Aided Design
CAM Computer-Aided Manufacturing
C&C Computing and Communications
CEMA Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (also CMEA and
COMECON)
CIM Computer Integrated Manufacturing
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
FMS Flexible Manufacturing System
FYP Five Year Plan
GKNT State Committee for Science and Technology
GKVTSI State Committee for Computing and Informatics
GOSPLAN USSR State Planning Committee
GOSSNAB USSR State Committee for Material and Technical
Supply
GPKIASU State Design Institute of ASU, Volgograd
IC Integrated Circuit
IIASA International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis,
Laxenburg, Austria
JITP Just In Time Production
KGB USSR Committee for State Security
LAN Local Area Network
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MINAVTOPROM USSR All-Union Ministry of the Automotive Industry
MINELEKTRONPROM USSR All-Union Ministry of the Electronics Industry
MINPRIBOR USSR All-Union Ministry of Instrument Construction,
Means of Automation, and Control Systems
MINPROMSVYAZI USSR All-Union Ministry of the Communications
Equipment Industry
MINPROS USSR All-Union Ministry of Education
MINRADIOPROM USSR All-Union Ministry of the Radio Industry
MINSTANKOPROM USSR All-Union Ministry of Machine Tool and Tooling
Industry
MINSVYAZI USSR Union-Republic Ministry of Communications
MINVUZ USSR Union-Republic Ministry of Higher and
Specialized Secondary Education
MIS Management Information System
MNTK Inter-Industry Scientific-Technical Complex
MPKVT Inter-Governmental Commission on Computer Technology,
CEMA
NTR Scientific-Technological Revolution
OA Office Automation
The National Center of Automated Exchange of
Information with Foreign Computer Networks and Data
Bases
OASU Branch Automated Management System
OCAS All-Union System for the Collection and Processing of
Information for Accounting, Planning, and Management
of the National Economy
OGSPD Statewide Network for Data Transmission
OIVTA Department of Informatics, Computer Technology, and
Automation, USSR Academy of Sciences
POLITBURO Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU
SNCC State Network of Computer Centers
TASS Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union
TSSU USSR Central Statistical Administration
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TPC Technical Process Control
VCR Video Cassette Recorder
VNIIPAS All Union Scientific-Research Institute for Applied
Computerized Systems, Moscow
VPK Military-Industrial Commission
VTSKP Collective-Use Computer Center
WAN Wide-Area Network
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[Bbcw85i] "Computerized Information Network for All Soviet
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[Beni86] Beniger, James R., The Control Revolution:
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[BerlB4]
[Birn85b]
[Comp83]
[Davi78]
[Dibe84J
[Dola85]
[Econ86eJ
[Eg85d]
[Emm85J
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[Emm85c] "Round Table of the Editors: Problems and Prospects
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XXI, 5 (Sep.-Oct., 1985), 920-934.
[Emm85c] "Round Table of the Editors: Problems and Prospects
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[Ferg85] Ferguson, Charles H., "American Microelectronics in
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[Good79a] Goodman, Seymour E., "Soviet Computing and Technology
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[Good79b] - Goodman, S. E., "Computing and the Development of the
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(Good82b] Goodman, S. E., "U.S. Computer Export Control
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[Good84] Goodman. S. E., "Socialist Technological Integration:
[Good84bI
[Good85]
[Good85d]
[Good85g]
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[Hamm84) Hammer, C., Dale, A. G., Feldman, M. B., Goodman, S.
E., McHenry, W. K., Schwartz, J., Walker, S. T.,
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Business: Commercial Uses 1 Artificial Intelligence,
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[KiLm85]
[Klyu84]
(Koba86]
[Levi85]
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[Mche85] McHenry, William K., "The Absorption of Computerized
Management Information Systems in Soviet Enterprises,"
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[Shai84J
[Shan85]
ISimo85]
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