THE SOVIET INFORMATION REVOLUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01145R000200170007-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 11, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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ATTACHMENT B
The Debate Over "Openness" in Soviet Propaganda and Culture
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Summary
A vital component of Gorbachev's program during his first
year in power has been his effort to revitalize Soviet propaganda
and culture to increase their effectiveness as instruments for
indoctrinating and mobilizing the population behind his
policies. The regime shows great sensitivity to the challenge
posed to its stability and credibility by the influx of Western
information and culture in recent years. Due in part to
Brezhnev's detente policies of the 1970s and in part to the
revolution in media technology, a mass audience has developed for
Western radio broadcasts and video movie cassettes and rock music
tapes are widely available on the black market. Greater access
to information from abroad and strict censorship inside the USSR
have made many Soviet citizens increasingly cynical about
official propaganda and increasingly alienated from the stale
offerings of Soviet culture.
Gorbachev recognizes that making propaganda more credible
requires the release of more information on a selective basis.
Similarly, for Soviet literary and artistic works to attract
audiences they must be interesting enough to compete with foreign
culture and indigenous underground subcultures. More media
candor in discussing domestic problems also serves to marshall
public support for Gorbachev's policy initiatives--such as the
campaigns against alcohol, corruption, and crime. Finally,
Gorbachev is using publicity of shortcomings within the elite to
bring pressure to bear on officials to behave in accordance with
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new standards he is setting.
Gorbachev has pursued this glasnost
several fronts.
(openness) effort on
o A number of controversial plays, films, and literary
works--which deal with formerly taboo topics and were
long held back by censorship--have been released.
o Soviet media have begun to deal more frankly with
problems and shortcomings in Soviet society and
economy. Significantly more candid treatments of such
subjects as crime, elite corruption, alcoholism, drug
abuse, economic inefficiencies, natural disasters, and
the war in Afghanistan have appeared.
o Increased funding is being made available to the arts,
decrees have established several new cultural organi-
zations, and an experimental procedure has been set up to
allow many theatres and other arts organizations more
autonomy over programming and finances.
o By skillful use of television interviews and well
publicized informal visits to work sites, Gorbachev is
attempting to project an image of a leader who is
accessible to the public. Many other high-level
officials have followed his lead.
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There are clear limits to Gorbachev's desire for "openness"
as demonstrated by the simple fact that no criticism of his
leadership has appeared in Soviet media since his accession. In
recent weeks these limits were made glaringly evident, by
treatment of the nuclear power plant catastrophe at Chernobyl.
Because the regime's initial obfuscation produced a public
relations debacle, however, Chernobyl has moved the debate over
information policy squarely into the center of leadership
attention.
With the recent addition to the Politburo and Secretariat of
several men who appear to share his orientation on propaganda and
cultural policy, Gorbachev's approach probably commands majority
support within the top leadership. Moscow party boss Yeltsin,
and to a lesser extent, second secretary Ligachev and propaganda
secretary Yakovlev, have been outspoken advocates of glasnost.
Moreoever, an ongoing blizzard of new appointments has replaced
many propaganda and media officials, and
named for key publications.
There are signs of resistance,
Brezhnev holdovers in the Politburo
new editors have been
however, among some of the
and within the cultural
bureaucracy. Many conservatives are apprehensive that moving to
open up public discussion of social problems and official
shortcomings could backfire. They argue that by exposing the
regime's weaknesses glasnost could stimulate a process of ferment
within the intelligentsia and criticism from below that could get
out of hand.
In fact, expanding the limits of the permissible in culture
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and propaganda harbors major risks for the regime and for
Gorbachev personally. As happened during the "thaw" under
Khrushchev, the partial relaxation of strictures on cultural life
has encouraged liberal intellectuals to press for an end to
censorship altogether. Failure to curb the liberals could
strengthen the hand of Politburo hardliners, produce a swing back
to more repressive policies, and perhaps damage Gorbachev's
political position.
By casting the public spotlight on official abuses,
Gorbachev is also running the risk of creating a backlash within
the elite. Soviet officials have traditionally viewed their
immunity from public criticism as an inviolable privilege. If
Gorbachev presses his campaign for media pillorying of errant
officials too far, political opposition
around one or another Politburo leader.
In the final analysis, Gorbachev's
to him could coalesce
effort to make Soviet
media more credible conflicts with his desire to maintain
ultimate regime control over the flow of information.
Gorbachev's twin goals for Soviet culture--higher artistic
quality and ideological purity--are likewise irreconcilable. In
practice, Gorbachev has thus far managed to balance these
contradictory sets of objectives. While opening up the media and
culture to more frank treatment of sensitive topics, he has
cracked down on dissidents and continued jamming foreign
broadcasts. His defense of censorship demonstrates determination
that the newly expanded arena for expression not be interpreted
as a removal of all limits. Gorbachev can be expected to come
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down hard on liberals who breach the boundaries of the
permissible.
If Gorbachev can control the process of glasnost, he may be
able to reinvigorate Soviet culture and to use propaganda more
effectively in support of his other policies. But a delicate
management job lies ahead--a job for which Soviet history has not
prepared the leadership.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary i
I. "OPENNESS" WITH A PURPOSE 3
A. Propaganda and Arts in Service of
Domestic Policy 3
B. The Challenge of Western Culture
and Information 7
II. GORBACHEV SETS A NEW COURSE 12
III. CHERNOBYL AND GLASNOST 18
IV. POLITICAL FORCES AND PERSONNEL CHANGES 21
A. The Leadership Alignment 21
B. The Bureaucracy 26
V. POLICY DEBATE 35
A. Key Issues 36
B. The "Afanas'yev Affair" 43
C. Yevtushenko Tests the Limits 45
D. Debate over Organizational Change 48
VI. PROSPECTS 51
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I. OPENNESS WITH A PURPOSE
Gorbachev has a pragmatic motive in moving toward glasnost
(openness) in propaganda and culture. Propaganda and even
culture in the USSR are seen by the regime as key instruments for
indoctrinating and mobilizing the population, reestablishing
regime credibility and revitalizing the system to combat the
societal malaise and apathy that Gorbachev has identified as key
obstacles to his economic programs. However, in recent years
their effectiveness has eroded. Gorbachev reportedly has
described Soviet propaganda as "obsolete," and he has publicly
decried the "dullness" of many cultural works. He recognizes
that in order for propaganda to be effective it must be credible;
in order for Soviet culture to attract the Soviet audience it must be
interesting enough to compete with Western culture.
A. Propaganda and Arts in Service of Domestic Policy
Strict censorship in the years since the Khrushchev "thaw"
has made Soviet propaganda increasingly unconvincing and Soviet
culture increasingly stale from the point of view of many Soviet
citizens. Many intellectuals and artists have been alienated by
the crude and unimaginative ideological and cultural standards of
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recent years.1/ Boring and unattractive productions have also
turned off the general populace, which has become more highly
educated and more sophisticated during recent years. Articles in
Sovetskaya Rossiya late last year stated that attendance at films
produced by the largest Soviet studios has declined by 50% over
the past decade, although viewers eagerly pay premium prices to
see foreign film festivals. According to an article in a
December 1985 issue of Knizhnoye Obozreniye, stockpiles of
unwanted books collect in publishing houses while popular young
poets find it impossible to get their works printed.
Young people, in particular, appear to find propaganda
presentations uninteresting and poorly presented. According to a
recent Soviet sociological survey in Leningrad young people
prefer public lectures on art to the current mix of political and
ideological themes. The study, evidently commissioned to guide
the propaganda apparatus and published in a tiny edition of 500
copies, also found that only about 5% of the respondents thought
officially sponsored public lectures were "very good" and only
29% "good."
Gorbachev apparently thinks glasnost in propaganda and
culture will serve his purpose of marshalling public opinion in
support of particular policy initiatives. He probably believes
_31 The stagnation of the Soviet cultural scene has impelled a
number of the USSR's finest artists to emigrate to the West.
These include the innovative director of the avant-garde Taganka
Theatre, Yurii Lyubimov, and the controversial filmmaker Andrei
Tarkovsky, both of whom left in 1984.
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that franker portrayals of social problems in the media and in
literary works are necessary to raise public awareness of the
seriousness of these phenomena, and to condition the population
to accept the need for vigorous remedial measures--as in the
drives to strengthen law enforcement, curtail alcohol abuse, and
tighten worker discipline.
The decision to release a number of productions with Russian
nationalist themes may indicate that Gorbachev is attempting to
associate the regime more closely with traditional Russian
nationalism as a legitimizing force to substitute for the waning
appeal of ideology. A striking case in point is the official
backing recently displayed for the controversial painter Ilya
Glazunov, whose 700-canvas show was opened in early June by First
Deputy Minister of Culture Yevgeniy Zaytsev at Moscow's
preeminent exhibit hall adjacent to the Kremlin. Russian
nationalism--portrayed by historical, natural and religious
motifs--came through as the common theme of the exhibit, which
reportedly was held at the personal order of Moscow party chief
Boris Yeltsin. As in his 1978 show, Glazunov's huge painting of
the Prodigal Son returning to his Russian heritage was a center
of attention. US Embassy contacts have reported that Raisa
Gorbacheva is an admirer of Glazunov's work.
Gorbachev's desire to stimulate public concern rather than
complaisance contrasts sharply with the approach of the latter
Brezhnev years. Gorbachev is attempting to establish his own
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reputation by exposing problems he inherited from his
predecessor. Brezhnev, after years in power, had little
incentive to allow, much less encourage, literary or media
commentary that raised questions about his leadership ability by
exposing the true dimensions of the domestic ills that had
mounted during his tenure. Moreover, since Brezhnev placed a
higher priority on social tranquillity and the avoidance of
conflict than on vigorously acting to redress societal problems,
he had more reason to conceal information
trends than to publicize them.
Finally, Gorbachev is using
bring pressure to bear on elites
about adverse social
the policy of
"openness" to
to behave in accordance with new
standards he is setting. Media exposes engineer public support
for the discrediting and firing of corrupt and incompetent
officials. Publicity of such abuses serves to hold officials
more strictly accountable both for discharge of their public
duties and for their personal judgment and sobriety. Thus,
Gorbachev's propaganda and cultural policy, by demonstrating that
party elites are not "outside the pale of criticism," challenges
one of the most treasured of the privileges that have grown up
around party membership--that of immunity from public censure.
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B. The Challenge of Western Culture and Information
One reason for increased popular cynicism about regime
propaganda and the decreased attractiveness of Soviet official
culture is that in recent years the regime's monopoly of
information flow and control over the population's access to
Western culture have weakened. In part because of the regime's
detente policies in the 1970s, and in part because of
technological developments in modern mass communications, Soviet
citizens gained greater access to information from abroad during
Brezhnev's tenure than ever before. In particular, Western radio
broadcasts have developed a mass audience in the USSR, giving
millions of Soviet citizens an alternative source of information
that enables them to evaluate regime propaganda more
critically.
At the same time, Western popular culture, especially music,
has increasingly challenged the dominance of official Soviet
culture. According to a recent article in a Soviet sociological
journal, a 1985 survey of students at a Ukrainian technical
institute showed that over 90 percent of male students preferred
rock music to all other types. The availability of new
technology--video movie cassettes, music tapes, video cassette
recorders--is making it more difficult than in the past for the
regime to prevent the illegal dissemination of foreign
materials. KGB Chief Chebrikov's speech at the party congress
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expressed concern about black marketing of VCRs-a/
foreign videos are easily available
through the Soviet underground and US films are the most
popular. He estimated that in the Moscow area alone the number
of people involved in the illegal cassette market is in the
thousands, and that hundreds more deal with technical aspects of
conversion of Soviet television sets to make them compatible with
US cassettes. Nor is foreign video traffic confined to the
capital cities. Embassy officers recently visited a
"bar/videotek" in a Georgian city, where for a 3-ruble cover
charge, patrons were treated to 90 minutes of Western
entertainment video in English with a voice-over in Russian.
They were told that the videotapes came from tourists who had
2/ The regime's uncertainty about how to deal with the
"information revolution" is demonstrated in its contradictory
policies toward VCRs. Although clearly apprehensive that Western
video movie cassettes could become vehicles of Western
ideological penetration, the Gorbachev leadership has apparently
recognized the futility of attempts to exclude completely the VCR
technology and adopted a competitive approach. The government
has opened 10 video film rental stores, which offer over 400
Soviet and foreign films, and there are plans to expand the VCR
industry (according to state cinema official V. V. Markov).
Legal production cannot meet popular demand, however. Rental VCR
machines are virtually unavailable and only Soviet machines--
which are cheaper than smuggled foreign ones but inferior--can be
purchased legally in state stores. Markov, implying that Soviet
films are unsatisfactory, has lamented that there are too few
foreign films available. Consequently, the regime itself has
apparently in effect sanctioned unofficial importation.
Soviet
seamen are authorized to bring into the USSR one VCR and 5 blank
tapes each year, duty free, which usually immediately enter the
black market.
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visited the West and that the club was crowded at each of the
four daily shows.
Soviet media report widespread
black market trafficking for video equipment. Soviet sailors
routinely bring VCR tapes and recorders
Finnish tourists smuggle Western movies
them for escalated prices.
The partial opening up of Soviet
into the country, and
into the USSR to sell
society to Western
influences has been a matter of growing concern among Soviet
authorities. Since 1980 the regime has increased efforts to
block information coming in from outside and to stem the
circulation of unauthorized materials--through such measures as
radio jamming and cracking down harder on samizdat.
BEGIN BOXED TEXT
Shutting Out Western "Voices"
The regime has stepped up its efforts to limit Western
influence on Soviet citizens during recent years. Of primary
concern to the leadership are radio and television broadcasts
from Western Europe and the United States, as well as from
Finland.
In 1980, following the invasion of Afghanistan and the onset
of the crisis in Poland, the USSR resumed jamming Voice of
America, the British Broadcasting Corporation and Deutsche
Welle. The stations had not been interfered with during the
1970s. Since 1980, 80 percent of the Russian language broadcasts
into the Soviet Union have been jammed. The Soviets have always
jammed Radio Liberty, which is particularly bothersome to them
because of its focus on Soviet internal developments and emigre
writings. Nevertheless, much broadcasting continues to get
through with varying degrees of audibility, and some 30-38
million Soviet citizens tune in monthly to VOA alone. RL and the
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Baltic services of Radio Free Europe have from 17 to 25 million
listeners monthly. Listening rates are highest in Western
borderlands of the USSR, where anti-Russian sentiment is strong.
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But Gorbachev appears to recognize that repression alone
cannot solve the problem of Soviet society's vulnerability to
outside influences. In fact, modernization of the economy will
necessitate further technological innovations--such as
computerization--that will make it impossible to regulate
information flow from above to the extent that was possible in
earlier periods. Consequently, he has adopted a combined
strategy of curtailing access to unofficial information and
culture where feasible, while attempting to upgrade official
culture and propaganda. This effort involves relaxing rigid
controls on cultural life to permit more sophisticated works to
appear. It involves releasing more information through regime-
sanctioned channels to preempt foreign "voices" while attacking
and countering foreign information more aggressively. /
Gorbachev apparently is attempting to use culture to mount
an aggressive campaign against the West's "psychological warfare"
which--the regime charges--tries to win over Soviet citizens to
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capitalist values. Cultural figures are often used as goodwill
emissaries abroad and spokemen for official positions. In
addition, more controversial or relatively liberal artists, such
as Yevgeny Yevtushenko, are presented in the West to impress
foreign public opinion with the "cultural diversity" and "freedom
of expression" under Gorbachev. A closely related goal of
Gorbachev's new policy may be the perceived opportunity it
provides the regime to attempt to lure eminent emigre artists
back to the USSR, in order to lend lustre to the cultural scene
there and improve the credibility of claims of artistic
freedom. There have been reports in the Western press lately
that prominent artists abroad--such as Lyubimov, Tarkovsky,
sculptor Ernst Neizvestny, and writer Viktor Nekrasov--have been
contacted by Soviet officials and by visiting Soviet writers
Yevtushenko and Voznesensky, with the message that if they came
home they would be well treated.
II. GORBACHEV SETS A NEW COURSE
Gorbachev's new course for Soviet arts and information comes
against the background of many years of stultifying official
controls, which reached an apex in the terror of Stalin's purges
of artists and intellectuals. After the temporary relaxation of
these rigid constraints during Khrushchev's anti-Stalin campaign
inadvertantly encouraged liberals to go beyond limits considered
safe by the regime, the policy was swiftly repudiated when
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Brezhnev took power. Movement toward more candor in propaganda
policy began before Gorbachev's accession. Andropov began a
process of
population
selectively releasing more information to the
about political activities--for example, he initiated
_
the practice of publishing reports of Politburo meetings--and
Chernenko talked about the need to discuss regime shortcomings
more frankly.
Gorbachev, however, has begun a systematic implementation of
a policy of glasnost (openness) and cultural revitalization. He
has moved during his first year as General Secretary to loosen
ideological strictures on Soviet cultural life and open up a
limited discussion of domestic problems in official propaganda.
The media are carrying more factual accounts of domestic events
and providing coverage of some formerly taboo topics. A number
of controversial plays and films dealing with sensitive political
issues have been released. These steps are consistent with
Gorbachev's
a leader in
He has
skillful use of television to cultivate the
close touch with ordinary citizens.
encouraged the media to engage in investigative
image of
reporting to expose a wide array of "negative" phenomena in the
society and in the elite itself. Editors from central newspapers
have recently been sent to the provinces with instructions for
local editors to be more assertive and critical in uncovering
problems.
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As a consequence, the Soviet domestic audience now receives
much more information than was previously available about such
social problems as crime, the black market, alcoholism, drug
abuse, and draft dodging. The media are putting the spotlight on
cases of malfeasance and incompetence within officialdom and
letting out more information about reasons for removals and
transfers of officials. They are also providing more discussion
of Soviet troop activity in Afghanistan and providing live
coverage of such things as the space launch. An especially
striking example of the new frankness appeared in the 18 April
Moscow Komsomol newspaper,
young addicts, after years
exists in the USSR.
which presented harrowing portraits of
of media denial that a drug problem
High-level officials previously remote to the public have--
since the appointment in December 1985 of a new chief for the
State Committee for Television and Radio (Gostelradio)--appeared
on live television and radio call-in programs to explain policy
and respond to listener criticisms, and the press conference--
initiated during Andropov's tenure--has now become a familiar
propaganda device. Gorbachev himself is putting his relative
youth and skill in fielding questions to good political effect by
using carefully televised "walk-arounds" during which he
converses informally with ordinary citizens. These forays into
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public view are doubtless orchestrated to some extent, but they
reflect the importance he places on building a reputation as an
accessible leader.
The cultural scene in the Soviet Union--particularly the
theatre--is now more lively than at any time since Khrushchev's
cultural "thaw" during the height of destalinization in the
1950s. The sense of deja vu is heightened by the reissuance of
works by leading liberal authors of that period. Several
literary figures active during the fifties who were under a cloud
for years are being featured prominently at cultural events.
These include Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, Andrei Voznesenky, and Bulat
Okudzhava. It is reported that a new novel will be published by
Vladimir Dudintsev, whose novel Not by Bread Alone ushered in the
Khrushchev "thaw." A number of films, plays and literary works
have been released to the public after being held back many years
by the censorship, and a commission has been set up to review
feature films and documentaries which have been rejected by
censors over the past 20 years. Commissions have also been
formed to honor underground folk singer Vladimir Vysotskiy--whose
enormously popular satirical and earthy songs were suppressed by
the Brezhnev regime, and to study the verse of Osip Mandelshtam--
a famous poet who died in a Stalin labor camp.
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BEGIN BOXED TEXT
CONTROVERSIAL CULTURAL PRODUCTIONS UNDER GORBACHEV
Films
o "Agonia"--released after many years on the shelf,
portrays the 1917 Revolution as a spontaneous popular
rebellion rather than a triumph of Bolshevik
organization. Striking for its tones of Russian
nationalism and even monarchism.
o "Roadblock"--made in 1971 but never before released,
depicts the persecution of a returning Soviet partisan
who had been forced to join the Nazis.
o "Double Trap"--a realistic crime drama showing the
corruption of a group of Latvian youth, degeneracy and
pornography.
Literature
o Publication of 2-volume collected works of Boris
Pasternak, enthusiastically reviewed in Pravda.
Collection does not include "Doctor Zhivago."
o Reissuance of collection of stories by group of "Village
Writers" popular in the 1950s and 1960s because of the
forthright treatment of rural problems and overtones of
traditional Russian nationalism in their writings.
o Republication and rehabilitation of many important
writers of the early 20th century, previously banned--
including Marina Tsvetaeva, Velimir Khlebnikov, and
Mikhail Bulgakov. Others still remain in oblivion.
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Theatre
o "Silver Anniversary"--a morality play dealing with a
corrupt party official, a muckraking journalist who is
fired for exposing a scandal, and other unsavory
functionaries. Attended by Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Ligachev,
and reportedly made mandatory viewing for party congress
delegates.
o "40, Sholem Aleichem Street"--a frank treatment of Jewish
emigration and its tragic impact on a family split over
the issue.
o "Dictatorship of Conscience"--a mock trial of Lenin that
exposes various tyrannical figures drawn from fiction and
history as having distorted socialist principles by their
brutality.
o "Speak Out!"--based on 1950s writings of Valentin
Ovechkin (a popular writer on the rural scene and
Khrushchev favorite) it calls for open discussion of past
party wrongdoings. The action takes place under the gaze
of a statue of Stalin prominently on stage.
o "Burden of Decision"--adapts an article on the Cuban
Missile Crisis by liberal political commentator Fedor
Burlatskii, for the stage. An appeal for leaders'
restraint and responsibility for peace, with Kennedy
favorably portrayed.
o "Brothers and Sisters"--the title taken from Stalin's
famous appeal to fight the Nazi invasion, this play
raises the spectre of Stalin's repressions against the
backdrop of popular wartime heroism and suffering.
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Gorbachev and his wife have personally patronized the arts,
and have in effect endorsed a number of controversial plays by
attending performances.
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III. CHERNOBYL AND GLASNOST
Both the limits and the purposes of the new information
policy have been graphically displayed by the regime's handling
of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster. It is ironic that prior
to the accident, on 27 March, serious problems at the plant were
very frankly dealt with in a caustic expose of management
inefficiencies and supply snafus published in the Kiev paper
Literaturna Ukraina. Yet when disaster actually struck, the
regime reacted with silence, followed by minimal and misleading
bulletins. Once the regime realized it could not prevent the
world or its own population from learning about the disaster,
however, it shifted tactics. While continuing to suppress many
details, the propaganda machinery began to release much
information in an effort to persuade the population the regime
was levelling with them and to counter alarmist rumors and
Western radio broadcasts into the USSR. Eventually, the
reluctant seepage of information became a flood, coupled with
attacks on Western media for its "shameful" attempts to "whip up
hysteria," culminating in Gorbachev's report to the nation 15
days after the event.
The regime's belated,
of news harmed Gorbachev's
credibility; and there are
grudging and initially sparse release
attempts to build up international
signs of some domestic implications as
well. It may have reinforced perennial skepticism of official
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information among more sophisticated and intellectual elements of
the Soviet populace and fed, rather than quelled, rumor and fears
among the public at large. It is probable that the Gorbachev
leadership would have followed longstanding precedent to suppress
news of this accident entirely had not other countries been
affected. Disaffected Soviet intellectuals have told US Embassy
sources they think that the media has been relatively open about
this disaster, but only because of the need to respond to Western
broadcasts into the USSR and to calm the population.
The catastrophe may have heightened friction among Politburo
members over how much information should be given to the
population and on what subjects. The dissident historian Roy
Medvedev told La Repubblica of Rome that all of the Politburo
except Vorotnikov and Chebrikov opposed Gorbachev when he
proposed a policy of forthright information on Chernobyl, and
that only Western outcry finally moved the other leaders away
from their insistence on containment of the facts. A Western
businessman told US Embassy officers that he had heard from an
aide to Ukrainian party secretary Shcherbitsky that Shcherbitsky
had asked Gorbachev for instructions within an hour of the
accident, only to receive a cable an hour and a half later
telling him to "say nothing and avoid panic." The aide went on
to say that Shcherbitsky is holding the message as insurance
against an attempt by Gorbachev to remove him from his post. The
new Novosti chief, Valentin Falin, indicated to Der Spiegel that
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Soviet media treatment of the accident was flawed and "done
offhand" because of a lack of preparation for such an event.
Falin stated that "no country is in a position to keep such
matters secret," and that in hindsight he felt it would have been
"better to publish on
Monday."
Several articles
-
Sunday the information we published
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in Pravda have acknowledged that delayed
and incomplete information on the catastrophe was a mistake that
caused "all kinds of rumors" and public anxiety, which have been
only partially dealt with by ensuing official statements. A
reader's letter published in Izvestiya urged that scientists
should be able to discuss ecological issues "honestly, without
avoiding Chernobyl." If Soviet leaders conclude the lesson of
Chernobyl is that total suppression of information is counter-
productive, the incident could give further impetus to the policy
of glasnost.
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The Soviet leadership's instinct--today as much as in the
past--probably is to suppress news of a catastrophe like
Chernobyl. But, because of its inabliity to hush up or even
completely control the information flow in this case, the regime
may be beginning to recognize the practical wisdom of more
sophisticated and active management of information rather than
crude denials and repression of facts in such instances.
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IV. POLITICAL FORCES AND PERSONNEL CHANGES
A majority of top leaders appear to support Gorbachev's
propaganda and cultural policies. Recent changes in the
Politburo and Secretariat brought in several men closely
associated with Gorbachev's approach. The General Secretary's
actions and statements indicate he believes his attempt to
revitalize Soviet culture and propaganda also requires broad
restructuring and restaffing of the relevant bureaucracies. He
has pointedly insisted that those officials who are corrupt,
incompetent or unwilling to work in the new, more open and
responsive style must be removed. So far, Gorbachev has replaced
most key Brezhnev holdovers in the media and propaganda
bureaucracies with younger and more supportive officials--a
process which was highlighted at the party congress.
Conservatives remain in several key posts, however.
A. The Leadership Alignment: Supporters of Glasnost...
Within the top leadership, the most active supporters and
spokesmen for Gorbachev's new direction in cultural and
propaganda policy are Moscow party boss Boris Yeltsin and, to a
lesser degree, "Second Secretary" Yegor Ligachev and propaganda
secretary Aleksandr Yakovlev.
Yeltsin, who has become a candidate member on the Politburo
since Gorbachev's accession, is an outspoken proponent of the new
glasnost policy. He delivered a stinging attack on party
privileges at the 27th Party Congress in February. His flat
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demand for the abolition of "unjustified benefits" for party
leaders at all levels was not picked up by other speakers.
Yeltsin also appeared to act as point man for Gorbachev by
criticizing "stagnation" in the arts and calling for reorganization of
the Central Committee Culture Department in
"weakening of party influence."
Yeltsin has also been more forthcoming
order to prevent a
than other leaders in
discussing the Chernobyl disaster. In an interview published in
West Germany, he divulged more information about the accident
than had other regime spokesmen and directly took on the openness
issue. Acknowledging that a "certain reserve" "formerly" existed
in Soviet information policy, he maintained that "under the new
leadership" nothing is being held back. Yeltsin's pattern of
frank discussion of problems apparently goes back some years; he
reportedly initiated a weekly live call-in program when he was
oblast first secretary in Sverdlovsk, which carried citizen
complaints and his own discussion of problems.
Ligachev appears to be playing a key role in the propaganda
area. Speaking to television and radio officials in November
1985, he stressed that broadcasting must be "wholly and fully
political" but nonetheless expressed concern over the low
artistic quality of much programming. Writing in the party
journal Kommunist the same month, he called for a deep
restructuring of the cultural apparatus.
immediately following the congress Ligachev summoned
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editors of the leading newspapers and journals and lectured them
on the need to upgrade their work. He has publicly praised a
poem by Yevgeny Yevtushenko attacking Stalin's repression of
writers. The Western press has reported that he authorized the
staging of a controversial play on corruption among party
officials ("Silver Anniversary"). According to US Embassy
contacts, Ligachev approved another new play critical of Stalin's
repressions ("Dictatorship of Conscience"), gave its author a
personal appointment, and allowed him access to party archives
for research for a new play about the period following Lenin's
death. At an April conference of theatre officials, playwrights
and party secretaries at the Central Committee, Ligachev stressed
the party's need for "the whole truth"--achievements,
contradictions, successes, and failures. He voiced support of
the contemporary "fight for the new against
urged more rigorous literary criticism with
the quality of theatrical productions.
the outdated," and
the objective of raising
At the same time, there are signs that
Gorbachev over how far to carry glasnost.
may have objected to the recent replacement
Ligachev may differ with
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of the ultra-orthodox head
of the Writers Union and to Pravda's publication of letters to the
editor attacking the privileges of the party elite in unusually
pointed fashion.4/
4/ See below, pp. 43-44.
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BEGIN BOXED TEXT
The Theatre's Special Role in Promoting Glasnost
The theatre apparently is playing a leading role-in breaking
down old taboos. A number of controversial plays on sensitive
issues have recently been revived or premiered, and policy issues
are being debated through the dialogue of fictional characters on
the stage.
The special properties of the theatre may explain its use as
a vehicle for the airing of controversial matters and floating
political trial balloons. As a non-print medium, a theatrical
production runs less risk of being held to account for every
word, while stage effects and actors' gestures or facial
expressions can silently convey controversial concepts. Also,
audiences for drama are limited to the number of persons who can
attend the theatre. Moreover, the Soviet repertory theatre can
move more quickly to get a production on the boards than can a
literary journal. Gorbachev's reported personal fascination with
the stage may also be a factor in the choice of medium.
END BOXED TEXT
Yakovlev has been widely reported to be a close adviser to
Gorbachev on foreign policy and propaganda. He was elevated to
the Secretariat at the Party Congress, and appears to have
assumed the responsibilities of Mikhail Zimyanin, who had
supervised culture and propaganda since 1976. Yakovlev's
appointment as head of the Propaganda Department in July 1985 was
one of the first high-level promotions Gorbachev made after
becoming General Secretary. Yakovlev reportedly played a key
role in the large number of changes in the media made since he
took over the department. Like Ligachev, Yakovlev has displayed
unusual concern to combat the so-called Western "psychological
offensive." Both men probably see glasnost as a means of
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limiting the impact of foreign ideas on the Soviet popultion.
Vadim Medvedev, also elevated to the Secretariat at the
Congress, presumably also backs Gorbachev's cultural and
propaganda policies. Although he has taken charge of the Bloc
Relations Department, much of his career has been spent in the
party ideological apparatus. Medvedev was deputy chief of the
Central Committee Propaganda Department from 1970 to 1978,
serving as Yakovlev's deputy during part of that period. In 1978
he became rector of the Central Committee's
Sciences, until Andropov tapped him to head
Education Department in August 1983.
Academy of Social
the Science and
In addition to these men, there are several leaders who have
no specific responsibilities for propaganda or culture, but who
--as part of his coalition--would be expected to go along with
Gorbachev's policy direction in this area. These include Nikolay
Ryzhkov and Lev Zaykov, who were promoted to the Politburo under
Gorbachev and evidently support him on most major political and
economic issues. Eduard Shevardnadze, whom Gorbachev brought
into the Politburo, has promoted improved monitoring of public
opinion and greater official responsiveness to it.
...and Opponents
The group at the top level resisting Gorbachev' new cultural
and propaganda policy probably includes old guard Politburo
members Andrey Gromyko and Dinmukhamed Kunayev. In a tough
speech to filmmakers two years ago, Geydar Aliyev was outspoken
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in his advocacy of tight party control and ideological
orthodoxy. The functional responsibilities of KGB Chairman
Viktor Chebrikov may make him wary of any loosening of controls
over the spread of unorthodox ideas. However, Chebrikov is
probably allied with Gorbachev on most political and economic
questions and is reported to have been one of two Politburo
members to support the General Secretary's relatively frank
information policy on Chernobyl. The appointment of Minister of
Culture Petr Demichev as Gromyko's first deputy in the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet removed the last Brezhnev holdover at the
top cultural policymaking level.
resisted Gorbachev's initiatives,
post but retained his position as
Demichev, who reportedly has
has given up his ministerial
candidate member of the
Politburo. In their congress speeches both Chebrikov and
Demichev stressed the danger of ideological subversion.
B. The Bureaucracy
Changes in the Party and Government Apparatus
Below the leadership level, there have been a number of
important personnel changes in the propaganda
bureaucracies, both at the congress and since
Gorbachev appointees were active in the 1960s
and cultural
then. Several
and have now made
dramatic comebacks to replace more cautious officials installed
under Brezhnev. One of these is the liberal poet and journalist
Yuriy Voronov, who after the congress was named to replace
veteran hardliner Vasiliy Shauro as head of the Central Committee
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Cultural Department. Voronov--who had campaigned against rigid
orthodoxy while editor of Komsomolskaya Pravda in the early
1960s--had been shunted to lower-ranking posts since 1965. But
following Gorbachev's accession to power, he was brought out of
BEGIN BOXED TEXT
KEY PERSONNEL SHIFTS IN CENTRAL PROPAGANDA
AND CULTURAL BUREAUCRACIES UNDER GORBACHEV
Propaganda and Media
o Leading hardliner and vocal opponent of economic reform
Richard Kosolapov was not reelected to the Central
Committee and lost his post as Chief Editor of Kommunist,
which he had held since 1976.
Kosolapov now has returned to an academic position as
head of the Marxism-Leninism Department at Moscow State
University.
o Outspoken liberal philosopher Ivan Frolov has been made
the new Chief Editor of Kommunist and elected to full
membership in the Central Committee, promoting him out of
the post in the Academy of Sciences to which he was
relegated in the mid-1970s after he collided with
ideological conservatives. Frolov is reportedly close to
Gorbachev's ideology adviser Georgiy Smirnov, Zagladin
and Yakovlev. He spoke out forcefully against Lysenko in
the 1960s and favors greater tolerance for cultural and
intellectual activity, as well as "market socialism" in
the economy. he was chosen to
replace Kosolapov at the last minute at Yakovlev's
urging. Although no other changes in Kommunist's
editorial board have been announced, Embassy sources
predict that Frolov will shake up the board.
o Valentin Falin--who was demoted to the position of
Izvestiya political observer in 1983, according to rumor
for corruption or because of a family disgrace--returned
to political favor as the new head of Novosti and
candidate member of the Central Committee.
o Mikhail Nenashev recently left Sovetskaya Rossiya's Chief
Editorship to head Goskomizdat. Under Nenashev's
leadership Sovetskaya Rossiya became a principal forum
for spokesmen for reform initiatives and controversial
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cultural and social notions. According to the US Embassy
in Moscow, he is reportedly close to Yakovlev.
Presumably he will bring the energy and innovative
managerial style sought by Gorbachev for the publishing
industry.
o Valentin Chikin has been appointed Editor-in-Chief of
Sovetskaya Rossiya. While First Deputy Editor-of this
important daily newspaper under Nenashev early in the
decade he used historical vignettes from Lenin's life as
allegories to press for more youthful and innovative
leadership and administrative reform. Removed from the
paper in 1984, the liberal Chikin was moved to a less
visible position as first deputy chairman of Goskomizdat.
o New chief editors have been named for ten central
newspapers and journals.
o Aleksandr Aksenov was moved from diplomatic posting in
Poland to replace the longterm chief of the State
Committee for Television and Radio (Gostelradio).
o The chief of the Soviet Copyright Agency (VAAP) has
resigned amid rumors of corruption throughout his agency
and been replaced by a functionary from the Central
Committee apparatus.
Culture
o The innovative film director Elem Klimov--whose
controversial films "Agonia" and "Go and See" were only
recently issued after years on the shelf--was elected
first secretary of the USSR Cinematographers Union. The
official report of the congress omitted the customary
description of the vote as "unanimous."
Vladimir Karpov--Editor-in-Chief of the prestigous
literary journal Novyy Mir--has been elected to replace
ultra-orthodox Georgiy Markov as first secretary of the
Writers Union. Karpov's political rise was demonstrated
by his election to candidate membership of the Central
Committee at the party congress, the first editor of the
journal to be so honored since 1961. Novyy Mir under his
leadership has published a number of controversial works,
including Yevtushenko's poem "Taboo", despite the
opposition of conservative officials to that work
(according to the poet himself).
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political obscurity and made chief editor of a prominent literary
journal.
With his appointment to the Secretariat, Yakovlev apparently
retains his post as chief of the Propaganda Department, and the
responsibilities of this department are being expanded. The
International Information Department (responsible for framing
international propaganda) has been disbanded and control over
both foreign and domestic propaganda consolidated under
Yakovlev.
Aside from changes in the Central Committee apparatus,
Gorbachev has executed a broad purge of editors of leading
newspapers. Several central government officials with
responsibilities for media and publishing have also been
ousted. These changes probably portend a further shake-up at
lower levels. There has already been some downward ripple of
personnel changes. For example, a new deputy chief has been
identified in the Propaganda Department. The head of the RSFSR
Goskomizdat was replaced by the first deputy chief editor of
Pravda in mid-March, and retirement of the deputy chairman of the
USSR Goskomizdat has opened up another post to be filled.
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And Unfinished Business
There remains unfinished business in restaffing the cultural
and media bureaucracies, however. The months preceding the
congress were rife with rumors about forthcoming shakeups in the
propaganda and cultural bureaucracies, which were only partially
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borne out in fact. Moreover, Zimyanin remains on the Secretariat--
and Demichev on the Politburo--albeit no longer supervising
propaganda and culture.
The central press has published many articles decrying the
failure of local and regional newspapers to expose the corruption
and bureaucratic inefficiency of local officials.
BEGIN BOX TEXT
Two Press Conferences--Two Policies.
Gorbachev's line of march and the nature of the opposition
he faces were uniquely displayed at a pair of unusual press
conferences held during the congress.
The first featured Yakovlev. Acting as official interpreter
of Gorbachev's policy to Soviet and foreign journalists
immediately following Gorbachev's speech, he responded to a
request to characterize Gorbachev's comments on culture as either
a "squeeze" or expansion of freedom of expression. His reply--as
reported by the US Embassy in Moscow--hewed to Gorbachev's
formulation, ruled out a squeeze and emphasized that works which
considered problems and elucidated the "truth" would be
supported.
Another press conference held at the end of the congress,
apparently organized by the Central Committee's International
Information Department, was in sharp contrast in focus and
political orientation. Chaired by the department head Leonid
Zamyatin, it featured as panelists a battery of conservative
cultural bureaucrats, including Writers Union first secretary
Markov and Literaturnaya Gazeta editor Chakovsky. The cultural
old guard made a show of unity against Gorbachev's demand for
truthful portrayal of Soviet life, warts and all. Without
directly criticizing Gorbachev's policies, but professing not to
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understand or twisting the focus of such questions as the
possibility of publication of presently banned books, they
conveyed their absolute determination to stand for "socialist
realist" orthodoxy and strict party control in the narrowest
sense.
END BOXED TEXT
_
Signs of high-level resistance to Gorbachev's housecleaning
are particularly evident in the organs controlling culture. A
case in point is the situation of the reactionary writer
Aleksandr Chakovsky, author of several pro-Stalin works. He has
hung onto his post as Editor-in-Chief of the important
newspaper Literaturnaya Gazeta and was promoted at the
from candidate to full Central Committee membership.
cultural
congress
Gorbachev is not a fan of
Chakovsky and had resisted several proposals that he be
promoted. The survival of Chakovsky in the face of removals of
other media conservatives suggests that he has a powerful
protector.
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Ferment in the Cultural Unions
Divisions are crystallizing within the cultural unions, as
the policy of glasnost is apparently providing both justification
and opportunity for liberals to attempt to take over these
organizations from conservative holdoversJi A recent meeting of
Moscow filmmakers to select delegates to the forthcoming congress
of the Union of Cinematographers turned into a revolt against the
prepared list of candidates, according to a US Embassy source who
was present. In a tumultous session which lasted until 3 A.M.,
liberal insurgents nominated 17 colleagues from the floor,
insisted on a secret ballot, and inserted themselves into the
group tallying the votes. All 17 were elected, at the expense of
several top bureaucrats (including the chairman of the State
Committee on Cinematography).
Official reaction to the cinematographers' revolt was
swift. Within a few days
"offices connected to the Central Committee" had managed to
engineer the election of all 17 bumped candidates to represent
f/ The organizations which unite Soviet writers, painters,
composers, and other artists are theoretically autonomous
collectives which represent the professional concerns and public
positions of their memberships. But from the early years of the
Soviet regime, when the cultural unions were brought to heel by
the party, the regime has taken pains to ensure the malleability
of their leaders and to bend their agendas to its own needs.
Whenever there are signs of loosening in official policy toward
culture, however, the more independent members are encouraged to
speak out and the cultural unions become arenas for struggle over
the permissible limits of expression--as happened under
Khrushchev.
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other union districts. Nonetheless, the Congress replaced First
Secretary Kulidzhanov--a noted director who was one of the 17 not
elected by the Moscow membership--at a 15 May session attended by
Yakovlev and Voronov. The new first secretary, Elem Klimov, who
was nominated by Yakovlev, has himself suffered at the hands of
the censors and has now become a symbol of artistic talent
triumphant over bureaucratic rigidity.
This jockeying within the filmmakers union may reflect
divisions within the leadership over how far to carry the process
of cultural liberalization, as suggested by the involvement of
Yakovlev and Voronov in removing Kulidzhanov. Gobachev's
personal commitment to a change in the leadership of the union
was hinted at the party congress, when the General Secretary
interrupted Kulidzhanov during his speech and rebuked him for his
repeated and fawning personal references to Gorbachev. The
liberals may have been led to believe that they had backing at
higher levels for their revolt. However, their actions may have
confirmed the fears of more cautious leaders and triggered the
Central Committee reversal of the Moscow election.
At the USSR Writers Union Congress in late June, the
struggle between conservatives and liberals broke into open and
sometimes bitter argument. Following several days of stormy
debate, a strong supporter of Gorbachev's cultural policy was
elected first secretary of the union. Vladimir Karpov, editor-
in-chief of Novyy Mir, has replaced the orthodox Georgiy Markov
who headed the union since 1971. Karpov's liberal editorial
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policy at Novyy Mir had tripled the journal's circulation and
brought it back to the status it enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s
as the premier Soviet literary journal. Markov, on the other
hand, consistently advocated rigid ideological controls over
literature and strict adherence to the party line during his
fifteen-year leadership of the Writers Union. In addition to the
removal of Markov, a number of incumbent conservatives were voted
off the new board of the Writers Union, which is now dominated by
proponents of greater openness in literature.
US Embassy sources have reported that--in contrast to
traditional party manipulation of such events--the elections did
not appear to have been engineered ahead of time, and that Karpov
won out for the first secretary position over two other strong
candidates only at the very end of the process. Voznesensky
openly challenged union leadership control of the selection of
delegates to the congress. He accused the chairman of the Moscow
union, Feliks Kuznetsov, of falsifying the balloting for
delegates in order to exclude a number of the city's most
innovative and independent writers. After a reportedly
"passionate debate," these persons were invited to attend as
"honored guests" with full rights of discussion, and several were
elected to office. Yevtushenko even called implicitly for a
dilution of the power of the Writers Union first secretary, by
proposing that a rotating panel of five outstanding writers be
created instead of continuing to place all organizational
responsibility on a single person.
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Contention within the Politburo may have accounted for the
presence of conservatives as well as liberals in the newly
elected union leadership and the apparent lack of regime control
of the election process. Gorbachev, addressing leading literary
figures on the eve of the writers congress, reportedly spoke of
the need for restructuring and praised the cinematographers for
"cleaning their own house." One Soviet source told the US
Embassy that Ligachev, by contrast, had asked Markov to stay on
as first secretary of the union. However, the 75-year-old
Markov's collapse during his congress speech may well have
strengthened the arguments of those pressing for his removal.
The fact that Markov was named to the largely ceremonial post of
chairman of the union--vacant for many years--and along with
several other conservatives was elected to its 8-man bureau
suggests a compromise between those leaders who wanted a clean
sweep of the Writers Union bureaucracy in order to revitalize
Soviet literary life and those who either opposed the change
altogether or favored a more cautious, slower-paced and face-
saving approach to its problems.
V. POLICY DEBATE
Greater turnover in personnel has been accompanied by
heightened debate pitting ideological and styllistic
conservatives against the more liberal and/or artistically
talented media and cultural spokesmen. Scenting a fresh breeze
from the new regime and taking their cues from Gorbachev's
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signals, the more liberal artists and commentators began to test
the limits of regime tolerance for diversity and candor in the
arts and propaganda. In response, conservatives stiffened their
resistance, which has been particularly strong in regional and
local media. Both groups made use of preparations for the 27th
Party Congress--which legitimized public discussion of policy
options in the draft Party Program and Rules--to air their
views.
A. Key Issues
The debate over Gorbachev's propaganda and cultural policy
revolves around several key issues. A number of these points of
disagreement, although familiar staples of Soviet public
discourse over the years, have been raised to heightened
significance and immediacy by virtue of Gorbachev's
initiatives. Other aspects of the debate are more novel or
specific to this regime.
Does a more open discussion of social problems and official
shortcomings serve to shore up regime legitimacy and party
authority, or does it weaken public confidence in the
party? Some articles in the media have gone even further
than Gorbachev's public statements in urging an independent
watchdog role for the press to ensure public accountability
of officials. Mikhail Nenashev--former editor of Sovetskaya
Rossiya--recently characterized the requirement that
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journalists get permission from party officials to publish
criticisms as a violation of journalist ethics. And a
February Kommunist article proposed that the CPSU Program
require every communist and "leaders of all ranks" to
respond publicly and promptly to criticism in the media.
Other officials have warned that such public airing of dirty
linen would harm the regime's reputation. Presumably the
leadership's hesitancy and reluctance to reveal facts about
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster revolved mainly
around this dilemma.
BEGIN BOXED TEXT
Soviet Readers Speak Out on Glasnost
(letters to editors of Sovetskaya Rossiya,
published 16 February 19-86)
The newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya has established itself as a
frontrunner in raising controversial issues and views, including
some critical self-analysis of standards for publishable
literature and the problem of "boring" and uninformative
treatment of the news by Soviet media. A readers' questionnaire
circulated by the newspaper early in 1986--querying their level
of information on party and trade union decisions and asking
their ideas on ways to improve public awareness--yielded a "vast
amount" of mail and some very sharp complaints about official
secrecy and cover-up.
"At a Party report-and-election meeting, I decided to
devote my speech to the subject of public openness and to
what its absence can bring. As long as I reminded people of
the negative examples that had already been cited in the
report, everything went smoothly. But as soon as I began to
talk about the fact that keeping quiet about certain
instances of stealing is conducive to mass and group
stealing, I was interrupted by a representative of the Lenin
Borough Party Committee who was present at the meeting. He
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not only interrupted me, he made me stop talking
altogether."
[I. Ovsyannikov, member of the CPSU since 1942, Smolensk.]
* * *
"I would like to suggest that the decisions adopted at
Party meetings be displayed for all to see on a special
stand near the board where orders and announcements are
posted."
[V. Glavatskikh, carpenter, Norilsk.]
* * *
"When an executive is removed from his post, precise and
clear information should be carried in the local press: Why
was this action taken? The objective would be to deter
conjectures and idle conversation, to prevent rumors and
gossip...You see, in our district three chairmen of the
district Soviet executive committee, two vice-chairmen and a
secretary of the district Party committee have 'disappeared'
in a short time. I don't want to believe the idle talk. In
this case, public openness can only be beneficial. But our
district newspaper remains silent."
[V. Dorotov, physician, Leninsky settlement, Tula Province.]
* * *
"Unfortunately, it is true that we know much more news
about any faraway African country than about what's
happening under our own noses. People standing in lines in
the stores will be buzzing, and a trolleybusful of people
will listen to the story of an 'eyewitness' about events
that, frankly, are unbelievable...Rumors spread discord,
keep people from working, and put us in a bad humor. How
important the truth is in such instances!" [N. Ivanova.]
END BOXED TEXT
Can public criticism be held within regime-designated
limits, or will some intellectuals and artists be encouraged
by a policy of glasnost to act as if there no longer are any
bounds to expression of ideas? Much of the resistance
coming from conservative leaders and old guard cultural
establishment figures is apparently motivated by fears of
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opening a Pandora's box by discussion--even in fictional
form--of the purges and other tragedies associated with
Stalin or too frank treatment of contemporary social and
economic problems. Even the liberal theatre director Igor
Gorbachev (no relation)--who has urged that society's
"sorest points" should be dealt with on the stage--warned
the party congress that although "we have no right to turn a
blind eye to shortcomings...is it worth going into hysterics
when you notice a scab on a healthy body?" On the other
hand, the first secretary of the Moscow Writers
Organization, Feliks Kuznetsov, told a Radio Moscow
interviewer on 27 February that the Soviet press ought to
print "the most varied points of view," let opponents of
controversial writers "try to prove their point," and let
time decide which one is correct. And a recent editorial in
Izvestiya (22 March) took the position that "prompt and
frank information shows confidence in people...and [their]
ability to understand events on their own."
How far can the public revival of formerly disgraced, banned
or neglected artists be allowed to proceed without
stimulating the expectations of liberal intellectuals beyond
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the regime's ability to control themZI/ Recent controversy
over Boris Pasternak's banned novel Doctor Zhivago
illustrates the difficulty of containing intellectual hopes
once the process of rehabilitating formerly proscribed
literary works has begun. According to US Embassy literary
sources, Voznesensky, in a recent article written on
commission from Literaturnaya Gazeta, called for publication
of Doctor Zhivago. Editor-in-Chief Chakovsky reportedly
rejected the article specifically because of the request.
(Voznesensky subsequently consented to its publication by
Sovetskaya Rossiya without the Pasternak reference.)
Pasternak's son and literary executor, in response to an
emotional question from the audience at a public lecture he
gave recently, stated that the Writers Union had vetoed his
proposal to include the novel in the recent two-volume
edition of his father's work. US Embassy contacts report an
increasing pressure from the Soviet literary community to
publish the novel. The former Writers Union chief Markov,
however, had a personal stake in the matter. He was
2/ This issue was joined both at the 19 June meeting of writers
with Gorbachev, Ligachev, Yakovlev and Voronin, and at the
subsequent Writers Union Congress. Soviet sources have told the
US Embassy that at the meeting a liberal playrwight faced off
against a conservative writer who had asked for a clearer line on
culture and a reaffirmation of Stalin-era decrees such as the one
that anathematized the satirist Mikhail Zoshchenko and poet Anna
Akhmatova. According to the sources, the political leaders
present did not intervene in the argument--thus lending fuel to
the liberals' cause. At the congress, many speakers demanded
withdrawal of the bans on such writers.
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prominent in the 1958 campaign against the novel and at a
press conference not too long before the Writers Union
congress categorically ruled out publishing it. At the
Writers Union congress in June which retired Markov,
however, publication of Pasternak's works was a prominent
issue, and Yevtushenko's petition,
open a museum at the writer's home
with no opposing votes.
signed by 40 writers, to
reportedly was adopted
What is the proper balance of facts versus ideology in
official history? Liberal scholars and commentators have
been pushing for a more neutral treatment of past Soviet
leaders, especially Stalin, as necessary to the regime's
credibility and to educating younger generations about past
shortcomings that must be avoided in the future. Some
liberal intellectuals are boldly denouncing Stalin's
crimes. In a recent dramatic reading at the Taganka
Theatre, for example, the poet Bulat Okudzhava swore not to
forgive the "generalissimo" for "the blood you made flow
like water, while blissfully twirling your mustache" and for
the death of his father--shot "for nothing" in 1937. But
conservatives argue that the primary function of history
must continue to be the openly political defense of regime
legitimacy, which requires suppressing full disclosure of
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Stalin's abuses of power.
Will more open treatment of "negative" as well as positive
news play into the hands of foreign enemies and give them
ammunition with which to undermine Soviet society?
Gorbachev has argued that glossing over problems "opens up a
loophole for hostile propaganda" since the Soviet public no
longer accepts "oversimplified answers to questions and
clearly recognizes falsehood resulting from...fear of
disclosing...the source of problems" whereas conservatives
fear that foreign radios will capitalize on any admission of
Soviet domestic shortcomings in an effort to turn Soviet
citizens against the political system.
Will graphic portrayals of societal problems have a
contagious effect, particularly with respect to
impressionable young people? A tried-and-true argument for
strict controls over the arts has been that weak members of
society imitate explicitly violent and pornographic films in
criminal and deviant behavior--juvenile delinquency, sexual
abnormalities, and violent crime. For example, Writers
Union First Secretary Markov registered "alarm" at the party
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congress over the increase in recent years of cheap
"entertainment" which panders to "adulterous and consumerist
passions."
B. The "Afanas'yev Affair"
Controversy over propaganda policy also surfaced this spring
during the media discussion of proposed changes in the Party
Program and Rules. Pravda published several letters from readers
strongly attacking special privileges of party officials and
calling for a reinstitution of "periodic" and "thorough" purges
of the apparatus. According to US Embassy sources, the article
provoked a sharp response in party circles and Pravda chief
editor Viktor Afanas'yev--a Central Committee member since 1976--
was summoned personally by Ligachev and reprimanded. Two days
later the paper printed what amounted to a retraction, by
publishing a letter from another reader objecting to invidious
generalizations about all party officials. Rumors began to swirl
predicting that Afanas'yev would
Central Committee membership.
The "Afanas'yev affair" may
lose his job as well as his
have reflected a split within
the top leadership over the limits to be set on frank discussion
of sensitive issues.
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Afanas'yev has in fact retained both his job and party
status. A senior Pravda correspondent recently assured a US
Embassy officer that the editor's position is secure and that he
continues to enjoy good relations with Gorbachev. And a self-
confident Afanas'yev was quoted in the Madrid El Pais of 3 April
as mentioning that he uses his direct telephone line to Gorbachev
when Yakovlev and Ligachev cannot settle a matter for him. He
admitted that criticism of party privileges in the controversial
article was "expressed in an infelicitous manner" and that
Gorbachev also thought it ambiguous, but that the General
Secretary had since reiterated--at his meeting with media
officials on 14 March--that editors must take more responsibility
for making criticism of shortcomings sharper and more thorough.
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C. Yevtushenko Tests the Limits.
The most outspoken advocate of cultural liberalization, and
one of the first to come forward to test the limits of glasnost,
is the controversial poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko. Yevtushenko--
whose poem published in Pravda in 1962 was one of the most famous
public attacks on Stalin in the Khrushchev period--returned to
the Stalin issue after a silence of almost 25 years in a new poem
published in Pravda on 9 September 1985. The poem indirectly
maligned Stalin by mocking his favorite Trofim Lysenko,
criticized Stalin's refusal to allow the USSR to enter the
computer age, and condemned his repression of Mikhail Bulgakov's
novel Master and Margarita--with its religious themes and
parodies of Soviet officials.
A few months later Yevtushenko's speech to the RSFSR Writers
Union congress railed against censorship and cultural mediocrity,
insisting that writers "do not have the right to be silent" about
collectivization and the purges under Stalin. Yevtushenko argued
that there are pragmatic as well as aesthetic reasons for looking
the truth in the face: "A nation that allows itself to analyze
its own mistakes and tragedies bravely knocks the ideological
weapon out of its enemies' hands." Although the published
version of this speech was heavily edited (as were the other
speeches to the congress), his general message was clear and
reportedly generated broad sympathy from many fellow writers.
Since December Yevtushenko has been accorded broad attention by
the Soviet media and has made a trip to the United States.
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Pravda has published a favorable review of his long-banned
autobiographical prose poem, which appeared last fall in the
prestigous literary journal Novy Mir.
Yevtushenko has apparently gained courage from what he sees
as a favorable shift of political forces. He told a US Embassy
officer in early April that he believed the political climate has
become even more receptive to "bold ideas" since the party
congress. His writings and interviews have grown increasingly
sharp and policy-oriented over the past several months. His
latest poem, "Backwardness," hits at the "criminal" shortages
afflicting the Soviet consumer.
A recent essay inaugurating a new column in the newspaper
Sovetskaya Kultura, whose chief editor was replaced in January,
is even bolder. In this essay Yevtushenko casts off the
protective cover of poetry and fiction to argue forthrightly that
resolution of today's problems requires a frank confrontation of
historical taboos, and that the achievement of economic reforms
is impossible without intellectual honesty. Praising the "fresh
wind of publicity" and other "encouraging signs of the new time,"
but evidently unsatisfied with progress to date, he presses for
the "precious right of unpunishable personal opinion" and an end
to censorship. Counterposing Stalin's repressions of scientists
and artists with Lenin's supposed "administrative tolerance and
respect" even for opinions he did not share, Yevtushenko derides
the "threats" of conservatives that "publicity could turn into
anarchy" and their fears of "losing face." The "incompetent" and
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"hopelessly obsolete dinosaurs" did not disappear with Stalin, he
suggests, but continue to block valuable inventions and artistic
works. By choosing this audacious call for liberalization to
kick off a new series of articles, Sovetskaya Kultura in effect
invited editors to take it as a standard of frankness for future
contributions.
Yevtushenko has now come out on behalf of rehabilitation of
the romantic poet Nikolai Gumilev, who was accused of
counterrevolutionary activity and shot without a trial in 1921.
During the past year unattributed quotations from his religious
and patriotic poems have appeared in the Soviet press, but
Yevtushenko's article in the 14 May Literaturnaya Gazeta makes
the discussion explicit. He openly defends Gumilev--charging
that there was "no proof at all" of his "crime"--and argues obliquely
for publication of his works by contending that he is part of today's
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heritage and that "heritage is a serious word."
Yevtushenko as a stalking horse
that his recent works have been
Gorbachev may be using
promote glasnost. The fact
acclaimed in press reviews and published in prominent journals
suggests that he has high-level backing, and the regime
undoubtedly sees a propaganda advantage in having him travel
abroad to publicize the "fresh wind" in Soviet cultural life. At
the same time, he appears to be pressing at the outer limits of
the glasnost policy and at some point Gorbachev may find it
politically expedient or necessary to rein him in.
to
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D. Debate Over Organizational Change.
The debate over Gorbachev's new propaganda and cultural
policy perforce has engendered spirited discussion of the
organizational changes needed to carry it out. Disagreement
between Gorbachev's supporters and the conservative old guard has
focused on the interrelated issues of financial self-management
of cultural institutions and decentralization of controls over
them. Liberals are pressing for greater autonomy for cultural
institutions than Gorbachev has granted thus far, while
conservatives appear to be resisting Gorbachev's policy of
loosening administrative regulation.
Serious disagreements have developed over a recent decree
which set up an experiment--to be conducted in 8 republics for 2
years beginning January 1987--giving theatres, circuses, and
concert organizations more direct control over their repertoire,
staffing and finances. The exact provisions of the regime decree
are ambiguous, which affords the opportunity of debating what
should be done in the guise of discussing what has actually been
mandated. Capping a series of articles in the cultural media on
lack of audiences and shallow productions in Soviet theatre, a
lengthy article by Oleg Yefremov in Pravda on 21 February called
art the people's "common memory" and argued for both financial
and artistic reorganization of Soviet theatre to allow for better
quality and more courageous productions. By placing financial
and artistic authority directly in the hands of the theatre
director rather than higher bureaucrats, he said, the theatres
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would no longer be rewarded for "gray, pedestrian art" and would
be returned to "at least the taste of risk." Yefremov noted that
the proposal for autonomy was causing "disputes" in various
quarters.
Similar sentiments were expressed at the party congress by
theatre director Igor Gorbachev, who called for greater
independence from central planners and an end to the practice of
funding culture out of the "leftovers" from other budget items.
And the head of the film workers union complained that
centralized programming so burdens movie houses with a steady
diet of unappealing films that theatre managers are forced
periodically to show trashy box-office hits and "vulgar foreign
rubbish" in a desperate effort to recoup their financial
losses.
The main source of opposition to liberalizing Soviet theatre
organization appears to be the Ministry of Culture--which would
lose its direct control over stage repertory and staffing. There
is some evidence that ministry officials are maneuvering to
subvert its effectiveness and divide supporters. In addition,
Gorbachev's moves to loosen some stifling central controls may
unintentionally work against provincial elites of small cultural
institutions and set their managers against proposed
organizational changes. For example, the director of Kazan's
youth theatre shared his reservations about the impact of the
theatrical reorganization experiment with US Embassy officers in
early March. He fears that making theatres more self-sufficient
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financially could endanger smaller houses, like his own, that
depend heavily on state subsidies.
It was probably this resistance to decentralization, which
centers in the Ministry of Culture and the cultural unions, that
impelled Gorbachev to create several new organizations to
circumvent the cultural bureaucracies, at least for the short
term, until their leaderships can be replaced with his own
supporters. Recent moves in this direction suggest that a
pattern may be emerging. There are now two new societies--for
theatre and music--which seem to be directed at popular and
amateur groups as well as more established artists and
organizations, but their duties are as yet not well defined.
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The Politburo has also approved creation of a new kind of
public organization--a Soviet Culture Foundation. The foundation
will apparently channel public funds to give "material and moral
support" to both professional and amateur arts, in accordance
with an already drafted (but unpublished) charter to be discussed
nationwide in the near future. The few specific examples TASS
gave of its activities suggest a broad mandate which will cut
across and take precedence over some functions of existing arts
unions: the new organization will provide material and intellectual
resources to aid young talent, back improvement and creation of
cultural facilities in small towns and new areas, help in preservation
of the "national cultural heritage" and restoration of "artistic
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The new organizations may serve Gorbachev's purposes in
several ways. Their creation follows up on recommendations made
at the congress that new public bodies should be created, for
such groups as women and older citizens, in the mode of
Gorbachev's stress on developing "socialist democracy" (public
participation). The Culture Foundation, in particular, appears
designed to counter popular alienation by encouraging some
voluntarism in cultural activities. Absent any information on
actual membership and operations, it is as yet unclear whether
the new foundation will in fact fulfill these intentions. What
is clear, however, is the political thrust of this move, which
will bypass the conservative leadership of the cultural unions
and divert resources to weaken the stranglehold of mediocrity
emanating from the Ministry of Culture, which was sharply
criticized at the congress.
VI. PROSPECTS
Gorbachev has achieved significant success in setting in
motion a new cultural and information policy and in restaffing
the bureaucracies responsible for implementing it. He has
undertaken several reorganizing initiatives to shake up
stultified artistic institutions, and the cultural scene has
become much livelier. The General Secretary's political style of
relative accessibility has become de rigeur for ambitious Soviet
officials. However, there is still conservative resistance to
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his policy from within these bureaucracies; cultural policy in
particular remains contentious. Moreover, Gorbachev's policy of
expanding the limits of permissible criticism and creativity
itself entails serious potential hazards.
The encouragement of more open discussion of problems could
undermine popular respect for the party and system, rather than
have the intended effect of enhancing public support. The fears
of the old guard in the cultural establishment are indeed not
unfounded. If not carefully managed, relaxing strictures could
produce a progressive unraveling of the party's authority and
lead to runaway criticism--especially in view of the party's
traditional insistence on its own infallibility and the Soviet
public's lack of understanding of the concept of responsible
criticism or "loyal opposition" to the government. Many Soviet
citizens themselves are probably unnerved or bewildered by the
new frankness in the media--not necessarily because they oppose
Gorbachev's solutions to problems but simply because they are not
used to open discussion of options. An Izvestiya article in
February quoted one Soviet citizen who--although innocent of any
wrongdoing himself--opposed open criticism because many people
would take it the wrong way, and also out of fear of future
reprisals against critics should the policy change.
There is also a real risk that Gorbachev is alienating
midlevel and lower elites by subjecting them to increased
criticism of their performance.
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If Gorbachev's initiatives toward
reorganization of the propaganda and cultural bureaucracies have
undoubtedly heightened career anxieties and could prompt
opposition to his policies. His "populist" effort to bypass
recalcitrant bureaucrats in cultural and media institutions by
creating new cultural institutions "from below"--which could be
extended to other areas of public life--may raise the specter of
popular voluntarism traditionally feared by Soviet elites.
In pressing for greater accountability of officials to the
public, Gorbachev runs the risk of heightening elite fears of a
purge. Gorbachev's invitation to Soviet citizens to criticize
officials for abuses has already increased the number of
anonymous denunciatory letters reminiscent of the Stalin era.
Many lower-level officials probably are apprehensive about the
possibility of vindictive abuse by political rivals and personal
enemies, in the name of accountability. Recently the press,
legal scholars and law-enforcement authorities have begun to
speak out against such poison-pen letters, labeling them as
against the spirit of Gorbachev's glasnost. In mid-April the
USSR Supreme Court instructed lower courts to crack down on their
authors: slanderous unsigned letters will now be regarded as
grounds for criminal investigations. The court also recommended
that the results of most trials be reported in the media. But
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these efforts to reassure elites that they will be protected from
informers bearing grudges have probably not fully allayed the
concerns of many officials.
The main risk is the danger that the regime may not be able
to contain cultural life and freedom of expression within the new
boundaries. As happened during the "thaw" initiated by
Khrushchev, the partial relaxation of cultural strictures has
encouraged some artists to press for further liberalization,
either because they honestly misread the signals from above or
because they are intentionally misinterpreting them in order to
push for greater intellectual freedom. For example, the poet
Andrey Voznesensky has recently gone beyond Yevtushenko's
argument at the Russian Republic Writers Congress that censorship
should be loosened, to say that it should be eliminated
entirely. In an interview published in Sovetskaya Rossiya on 23
February, Voznesensky is quoted as saying, "people are now mature
enough to see and read anything" in literature. According to US
Embassy sources, some speakers at the Writers Union Congress
questioned whether the official censorship agency, Glavlit, is no
longer necessary.
Gorbachev and his supporters clearly think that they can
avoid the fate that befell Khrushchev's move toward partial
liberalization in the cultural arena. This view was articulated
by Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the International
Department, in an interview published in the Prague Tribuna on 26
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February. Asked if the frail boundary line "between criticism
and violent attack" might now have been breached and an
"unstoppable avalance" unleashed in the USSR, Zagladin insisted
that the "absolute majority" of people are mature enough for the
recent frank discussion of past mistakes and that the
"substantial part" of public criticism is accompanied by
constructive proposals.
But demands for an end to censorship could well become a
flashpoint triggering conservative pressure on the regime. In an
interview published in Pravda on 8 February, Gorbachev made an
unprecedented public defense of censorship, asserting that
censorship does exist in the USSR but justifing its role as the
prevention of publication of state and military secrets, war
propaganda, and pornography. But many conservatives undoubtedly
believe that Gorbachev's own encouragement of glasnost is
responsible for prompting liberal intellectuals to challenge this
key instrument of regime control. Failure to curb liberal
"excesses" such as those of Voznesensky could strengthen the hand
of Politburo hardliners and produce a swing back to repressive
policies.
Thus, the policy has proved very difficult to implement.
The Chernobyl disaster has cast a shadow on regime credibility
and has demonstrated that, as Novosti chief Falin lamented to Der
Spiegel, "openness cannot be achieved overnight." Gorbachev
apparently miscalculated the Afanas'yev affair by underestimating
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the intensity of the hostile reaction from hardline party
officials to Pravda's publication of letters they felt impugned
the entire party bureaucracy instead of a corrupt few.
Yevtushenko and other liberals continue to elaborate dangerously
on Gorbachev's message, and the question hangs in the air if and
when they will be reined in--and at what cost to the momentum of
Gorbachev's glasnost policy. The risks of missent, missed or
misunderstood signals from the leadership to the media and
cultural elites, are real. Gorbachev faces not only sullen
footdragging of the old guard but also fast-rising expectations
from the liberals--whose impatience could trigger a conservative
backlash.
In theory, Gorbachev's dual priorities for Soviet propaganda
and culture--high quality and believability without sacrifice of
ideological correctness--are irreconcilable. In practice,
Gorbachev has thus far managed to strike a balance between the
needs for creativity and reliability. While Gorbachev has been
active in opening up Soviet cultural expression and information
to a broader discussion, this has been done not to undermine the
existing system but to make it more effective, and he has been
equally vigorous in acting to restore the regime's monopoly of
information by shutting out foreign broadcasting and crushing
unauthorized domestic publications. He can be expected to crack
down hard if liberals exploit his policy of glasnost with purely
"negative" criticism or challenge party dominance, thus killing
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the espirit he wants to build among the population and the
intellectual community.
If Gorbachev can control the process of glasnost, he may be
able to reinvigorate Soviet culture and to use propaganda more
effectively in support of his other policies. But a delicate
management job lies ahead--a job for which Soviet history has not
prepared the leadership.
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