EUROPEAN REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000100070001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 6, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
r , -, M,
E~ W
L
MASTER
W1 ribA1e1`1 Lit`
European Review
EUR ER 85-025
6 November 1985
Copy 4 4 8
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European Review
Portugal: Growing Irritation With the United States
Spain: Another Communist PartyF_~
Italy: Social Democrats and Socialists To Merge?
Austria: Recent Electoral Trends
Rising Development Aid to Chad
Bulgaria: Gloomy Energy Outlooks
Going Slow on South African San
Recent agreements with several Third World countries will end a
four-year slump in British arms sales and bring renewed life to UK
defense industries. The revival is due in part to a more sophisticated
British sales program combining more attractive financing and
Prime Minister Thatcher's personal support. These new incentives
may presage a more aggressive export campaign in other Third
World countries.
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EUR ER 85-025
6 November 1985
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principal challenger to Socialist Prime Minister Gonzalez.
The election of a new regional assembly in Galicia on 24 November
will have important national implications. The election there is the
last regional vote before the next national election, which must
occur by the end of 1986 and is expected to take place next spring.
Politicians and pundits alike consider the vote in Galicia a major
bellwether of opinion that will have considerable impact on
campaigns for national office. Current trends suggest that Manuel
Fraga's conservative Popular Coalition is likely to repeat its victory
in Galicia in 1981 and consolidate its position nationally as the
in Reform Debate
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The staunchly conservative and clannish political leadership of
Yugoslavia's Bosnia-Hercegovina republic is playing a unique role
in the country's continuing reform debate. It opposes political
change that might upset the delicate ethnic balance within its own
republic and resists any economic reforms that might threaten
Bosnia's little-publicized but impressive growth over the past few
years. Despite historical and cultural links to the south, Bosnia
increasingly finds itself in at least tacit alliance with the northern
republics on key economic questions. F__]
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
will be designated as uncoordinated view
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The provincial elections held in Upper Austria last month surprised no one as the
conservative People's Party (OeVP) retained its parliamentary majority by
securing just over 52 percent of the vote. The Socialists, on the other hand, lost
more than three points, dropping to 38 percent. The Freedom Party (FPOe)-a
junior partner with the Socialists in the Federal Government-also lost out, falling
from 6.4 to 5 percent of the vote. The Communists polled a mere 4 percent while
the three Green parties accumulated a combined 2.2 percent, neither winning any
seats. F_~
The regional results themselves were less notable than the continuation of several
trends manifested in regional and federal elections over the last few years,
according to the US Embassy. Austrian voters, like their German cousins to the
north, are exhibiting a weakened commitment to their customary political
affiliations as both the People's Party and the Socialists are losing support among
rural and blue-collar voters who make up their traditional constituencies. At the
same time, the personalities of leading candidates are becoming stronger factors in
determining a party's attractiveness. Finally, the continuing decline of the
Freedom Party probably reflects its diminished utility as a protest vehicle now that
it plays a role in the Federal Government.
How these trends will affect the next national election in 1987 is unclear. Neither
Chairman Alois Mock of the OeVP nor Federal Chancellor and SPOe leader Fred
Sinowatz has charmed the Austrian electorate with his charisma. The decline of
the Freedom Party does bode ill, however, for the current SPOe-FPOe coalition in
Vienna.
Italy Social Democrats and Socialists To Merge?
Party during the next year or so,
o strong opposition among Social Democrats to a merger-the third since
World War II most party officials believe it would lead to a larger
share of the vote than the 15 percent the two parties together now command. F_
Sentiment in favor of reunification almost certainly arises from the Social
Democrats' eroding support and continuing pressure from the Socialists. The
Social Democrats' share of the vote in nationwide regional elections last May fell
to 3.6 percent, down from 5 percent in 1980. Press and US Embassy reporting
indicates that the party's organizations in several major cities (such as Rome,
Milan, Turin, Florence, and Naples) are divided and losing members. Embassy
1 Secret
EUR ER 85-025
6 November 1985
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reports suggest that party officials attribute their loss of support not only to former
party chief Longo's alleged involvement in the P2 Masonic Lodge scandal but also
to a more fundamental loss of purpose. Prominent Social Democrats complain that
the rightward movement of the Socialists and their disassociation with the
Communist Party have eliminated meaningful policy differences. In some large
cities, like Milan, local Social Democrats merely follow the Socialist lead.
Moreover, as the Social Democrats' share of the spoils of office decreases,
ambitious young members are defecting to the Socialists. The Socialists, for their
part, are eager to eliminate a competitor and increase their own share of the vote.
They are also quick to point out that reunification would simplify the complicated
politics of Italy's governing coalitions.
The Social Democrats' new leader, Franco Nicolazzi, has publicly opposed
reunification, although he heads a faction that has long favored closer ties to the
Socialists. The movement toward a merger may have been temporarily set back by
the government crisis in October which magnified differences between Socialists
and Social Democrats on Middle Eastern policy. Although Social Democrats
objected to Socialist Prime Minister Craxi's strong denunciation of the Israeli raid
on PLO headquarters in Tunis and his release of PLO leader Abu Abbas after the
Achille Lauro hijacking, these disagreements are not likely to override the
domestic imperatives for a merger. Unless the Socialists take another left turn and
mend fences with the Communists, the two parties will probably continue their
courtship.F__1
Portuguese frustration with perceived unfair trade practices by the United States
threatens to spill over into other areas of the bilaterial relationship. Almost every
Portuguese government since the revolution in 1974 questioned whether being a
staunch ally of the United States pays dividends. Lisbon's complaints have been
relatively low key, but there are signs that the irritation is growing. US restrictions
on major exports-particularly textiles-and perceived unfairness toward
Portuguese firms in awarding contracts, such as the recent construction contract at
Lajes Airbase in the Azores awarded to a US firm, have sparked strong
complaints. F___]
What makes the complaints worrisome are hints that Lisbon will link trade issues
to security-related matters. The recent refusal-later reversed-of a last-minute
US request for a routine transit through Lajes of a US military aircaft was
probably intended as a reminder that Portugal should not be taken for granted.
Most politicians-with the exception of the Communists-are pro-US, but many
believe that former Prime Minister Soares failed to adequately champion
Portuguese interests in dealing with the United States. We believe the next
generation will seek ways to demonstrate its independence from the United States
and that the bilateral relationship could become more difficult. F__1
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Spain Another Communist Party
Continuing factionalism among Spain's Communists, evident in the emergence of
yet another Communist party, aids Socialist Prime Minister Gonzalez and could
improve his chances of keeping Spain in NATO. Former Secretary General of the
Spanish Communist Party (PCE) Santiago Carrillo set up the new Communist
Party (Marxist-Revolutionary) after his ouster from the leadership of the
mainstream Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and an unsuccessful attempt to gain
support from the Moscow-backed splinter Communist Party (PC). Carrillo claims
that he set up the party to give his supporters a vehicle for participation in the
legislative election next year if a common Communist electoral front proves
impossible. His motives, in fact, go beyond that. F__~
Carrillo no longer has any real base of support within the existing parties and is
trying to regain influence and power. As a putative bridge between the two other
parties, Carrillo hopes to be the moving force behind a reunification of the
fragmented Spanish Communists. His gambit, however, is unlikely to draw a
positive response from either the PCE or the PC. Personal animosities and the
three-way split in the Communist camp complicate negotiations among them on
any matter, although opposition to NATO remains a potential rallying point.F_
French President Mitterrand's visit to Brazil in mid-October succeeded in its
primary goal of strengthening bilateral political ties but yielded only minor new
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economic initiatives. The US Embassy in Brasilia reports that Mitterrand received
more media attention than any other visiting head of state in recent years.
Mitterrand praised Brazil's commitment to democracy, and he and Brazilian
President Sarney hailed the progress of the "France-Brazil Project" aimed at
promoting cultural and scientific cooperation.
Contrary to press reports, Mitterrand did not unveil a new proposal to relieve
Brazil's foreign debt. He did suggest, however, that France might consider
rescheduling debts and accepting more Brazilian imports in lieu of cash payments.
French spokesmen later qualified this further, characterizing Mitterrand's
remarks as a statement of possibilities to be studied, not official policy. French
officials probably were wary of making specific debt proposals without the
involvement of French banks or prior consultations with creditors in other
developed countries. Mitterrand proposed reactivating a 1978 agreement
permitting Brazilian firms to manufacture consumer goods in the city of Le Havre
as a means of providing them better access to the lucrative EC market. Although
the trip produced little else concrete, the positive atmosphere and the warm
affirmations of mutual support are likely to assist France in its quest for a special
relationship.
A French official responsible for relations with South Africa recently told US
counterparts that Paris and its EC partners have yet to decide on how to
implement the restrictive measures against South Africa they adopted in
Luxembourg on 10 September. He ruled out significant commercial sanctions-
cessation of coal, fruit, and vegetable imports, for example-explaining that the
falling rand and cheap labor make South Africa's products irresistible. F__]
Paris has milked its early announcement of sanctions-restrictions on new
investments-against Pretoria for every advantage in the Third World without
ever having to adopt hard-hitting measures. Only a substantial escalation of
violence in South Africa is likely to stiffen French resolve to impose sanctions that
would require self-sacrifice at home.
French assistance to Chad has almost doubled in comparison to 1982 and is
moving away from emphasis on emergency measures toward long-term
development projects, according to publicly announced figures. Over $40 million in
direct civil assistance and $13.5 million in loans are reportedly devoted to large-
scale projects-road construction and rehabilitation of public buildings-but an
additional $8.7 million is direct budgetary support. F__~
Paris almost certainly has decided that the north-south conflict in Chad, as well as
civil strife in the south, has subsided to the extent that the lion's share of its aid to
N'Djamena can now be cast in more traditional terms. It probably also has
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decided to reward Chadian President Habre's success in reconciling with southern
dissidents and his apparent willingness to negotiate directly with Libyan leader
Qadhafi to end hostilities in the north by increasing significantly its financial
support for his regime. F__1
Bulgarian officials expect energy problems to continue this winter and into next
year, creating further consumer austerity and industrial problems. A decline in the
production of hydroelectric power caused by this year's drought and a cut in Soviet
oil deliveries have prevented Bulgaria from rebuilding adequate energy reserves.
energy supplies remain insufficient to
meet domestic needs, and the US Embassy in Sofia reports that power outages and
curtailed shop hours and services are becoming routine.n
Following the hike in prices of electricity, heating oil, and motor fuels in
September, Sofia in mid-October replaced the head of its State Planning
Committee and created a party-government commission on energy problems
headed by Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandrov. The new commission probably
will impose even tighter controls on energy supplies, promote development of
domestic resources, and pursue conservation through wage incentives, exhortation,
and sanctions.F-I
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United Kingdom:
Revival of Arms Sales
A series of recent agreements with several Third
World countries will end a four-year slump in British
arms sales and bring renewed life to UK defense
industries. Besides the sale of Tornado aircraft to
Saudi Arabia and Oman, the British have negotiated
major deals with Jordan and India for ships, planes,
missiles, and communications equipment. The revival
is due in part to a more sophisticated British sales
program combining more attractive financing and
Prime Minister Thatcher's personal support. These
new incentives may presage a more aggressive export
campaign in other Third World countries. The
increase in arms sales will benefit British industry and
encourage NATO purchases of British equipment by
reducing unit costs for individual systems, providing a
greater return on R&D investment, and-in the case
of the Tornado sale-reducing startup costs for the
new European Fighter Aircraft.
The Slump and Its Impact on Industry
For most of the post-World War II era, the United
Kingdom was among the world's leading arms
exporters, ranking third behind the United States and
the Soviet Union. Since 1981, however, Britain's
position in the international arms market has declined
steadily, slipping by 1984 to fourth in Western Europe
behind France, West Germany, and Spain. F__-]
The arms export market is critical to the profitability
and survivability of British defense industries, which
typically employ some 400,000 workers. Exports
generally account for about a fourth of production,
including more than half the fighter, attack, and
trainer aircraft. Sixty percent of aerospace
manufacturing and one-third of shipbuilding are
Table 1
Estimated Dollar Values
of Military Equipment Deliveries
by West European Suppliers in 1984
Declining export sales since the late 1970s have led to
layoffs in several defense industries and have forced
the closing of at least one shipyard. According to
attache reporting, Vickers, a tank manufacturer,
plans no new hiring and will streamline its current
work force through attrition. The Royal Ordnance
factories also will cut employment once production of
gun tubes for Egyptian tanks ends. Without the recent
Tornado sale, some 30,000 workers reportedly would
have been laid off when Tornado production ended.
Foreign Buyers
Sales of British armaments are concentrated in a few
Middle Eastern and South Asian countries that
maintain close security assistance relations with the
United Kingdom. India, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Oman accounted for roughly half of UK military
deliveries during 1980-84. Elsewhere, Britain sells
arms to its European allies and has developed a
devoted to military work.
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EUR ER 85-025
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British Arms Deliveries
1980-84
limited market for aircraft in Nigeria. The British
also have established joint ventures with US firms for
production of Harrier jet fighters and Hawk trainers
that promise to bring several billion dollars of defense
work to British industry over the next few years. In
fiscal year 1984, for example, the United States
bought nearly $500 million worth of British military
training and maintenance.
The Nascent Revival
The large sales of British military equipment this year
reflect a continuing reliance on their primary export
markets rather than a major expansion into new
markets:
equipment.
Aerospace and electronic equipment account for more
than half of British military exports, with Jaguar
fighters and Hawk trainers heading the list. Ground
forces equipment-such as Chieftan tanks and FH-70
field guns-have played a lesser but still important
role, representing 15 to 20 percent of annual exports.
The British also provide substantial training and
support services. In 1982, for example, they signed a
? India has agreed to purchase the aging aircraft
carrier Hermes-which will be overhauled by
British firms-plus 11 Sea Harriers and 26 Sea
Eagle antiship missiles for $316 million.
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Table 2
Major British Deliveries of
Military Equipment, 1980-84
System Number
Delivered
Jet combat aircraft
Jaguar
Hawk
Helicopters
Sea King
Lynx
Commando
Missiles and launchers
Blowpipe
Rapier
Swingfire
Tanks
Chieftan
Vickers
Artillery pieces
FH-70
105-mm field gun
? The deal with Saudi Arabia involves 72 Tornado
fighters and 30 advanced Hawk trainers for $5.6
billion. British industry will receive approximately
$3.6 billion from the Saudis with the remainder
going to Britain's West German and Italian
partners in the Tornado program. Support
packages-including spares, technical assistance,
and service over the life of the aircraft-will
generate another $5 billion.
? In Jordan, the provision of $360 million in military
equipment for the most part supports British
equipment already in Jordan, and may include a
training package similar to that regularly provided
Saudia Arabia.
Australia, India, Argentina, Norway, West Germany, France,
Denmark
Australia, Thailand, Qatar, Egypt, Singapore, Chile, Nigeria,
Portugal, Norway, Ecuador
Malaysia, Nepal, Kenya, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Nigeria, Iraq, Tanzania, Portugal, Oman, Ireland, UAE
Australia, Nigeria, Trinidad, Tobago, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia,
Oman, Egypt
The revival of arms exports will help stem the growing
costs of British weapon systems to other countries and
may enable the Ministry of Defense to preserve
procurement programs in the face of tighter budgets.
Higher production runs will lower unit costs and allow
for the recovery of R&D costs. In the case of aircraft,
for example, the equipment purchaser pays a unit
manufacturing cost plus a proportional share of the
total R&D cost of the aircraft. The R&D costs are
divided over the projected total quantity of aircraft to
be produced. When additional aircraft are sold, each
buyer may be refunded a portion of its original R&D
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costs. R&D expenditures make up about 11 percent of
the UK defense budget and represent important seed
money necessary to keep design teams together and
develop new weapon systems. F__1
Prospects
The $3.6 billion Tornado sale should keep Tornado
production lines open until the new European Fighter
Aircraft (EFA) takes its place in the early 1990s.
With the transition to EFA, Tornado facilities will
have to be retooled, but other potentially large startup
costs, including training skilled workers, should be
reduced. The Tornado sale also should give a
significant boost to overall economic activity and
employment. Using CIA's econometric model of the
British economy, we estimate that, if the sale had not
gone through, 30,000 jobs in the aerospace industry
would have been lost, plus another 20,000 to 30,000
laid off from jobs indirectly dependent on Tornado
production. The sale also should raise real GDP about
4 percent, and the foreign trade balance should
improve by about $300 million. If UK arms sales
reach $8 billion in a three-year period, as the press
has speculated, the economic effects would be roughly
double those of the Tornado sale.
Many of the new arms deals are attributable to a
more sophisticated sales effort and aggressive,
personal lobbying by Prime Minister Thatcher-
tactics that may continue to help exports. For
example, British negotiations with India were
successful in large part because of London's ability to
offer flexible financing and pricing, including a 2.5-
percent discount for the Sea Harriers. Rigid financing
and high unit costs in the past have made British
military equipment unattractive to financially
constrained Third World countries. And, according to
attache and press reports, the Prime Minister's
personal salesmanship played a key role in winning
the Saudi aircraft contract and also helped seal both
the jet fighter deal with Oman and the Jordanian
arms package
British industry still must overcome several
weaknesses before it can return as a viable long-term
competitor with other Western suppliers. The recent
sales indicate Britain has not broadened its narrow
Continued British aggressiveness, particularly in
courting the Middle Eastern arms market, could
present a serious challenge to US industry. Recent
sales suggest that Middle Eastern countries are
attempting to diversify their Western arms purchases
to avoid an overdependence on the United States.
According to press and attache reporting, many
Middle Eastern customers view the US
decisionmaking process in arms sales as overly
political and heavily burdened by technology-transfer
issues that are less a problem with European arms
producers. The US defense attache in London reports
that both Egypt and Turkey would like to reduce
their dependence on the United States and are
attempting to obtain EC credits for the purchase of
European weapon systems. London's recent sales
could provide the British with incentives to offer the
same attractive financing arrangements in future
sales to make their high-quality weapons available to
other countries that may prefer a non-US supplier for
their weapons.
customer base. France and Italy, for example, make
sizable sales in Latin America, East Asia, and Africa
in addition to the lucrative Middle Eastern market.
The new British pricing discounts and financing
packages may increase their competitiveness in these
markets. Nonetheless, British industry continues to
design and develop equipment primarily suited for use
on the European battlefield and has yet to follow the
lead of France and Italy in tailoring its weapon
designs for Third World use. F_~
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Spain: The Political Stakes
in Galicia
The election of a new regional assembly in Galicia on
24 November will have important national
implications. Galicia consists of four backward,
conservative provinces in the remote northwest. The
region's small family farms, religious peasantry,
distinctive dialect, and cool moist weather make it
atypical in comparison with the rest of the country.
Nonetheless, the election there is the last regional vote
before the next national election, which must occur by
the end of 1986 and is expected to take place next
spring. Politicians and pundits alike consider the vote
in Galicia a major bellwether of opinion that will have
considerable impact on campaigns for national office.
Current trends suggest that Manuel Fraga's
conservative Popular Coalition is likely to repeat its
victory in Galicia in 1981 and consolidate its position
nationally as the principal challenger to Socialist
Prime Minister Gonzalez.)
The Socialists
The Socialists recognize that they have little chance
of winning in Galicia, where they received only 16 of
the 71 seats in the assembly four years ago. Rather
than risk Gonzalez's prestige in a losing effort, they
have relied on appearances by his second in command,
Deputy Prime Minister Alfonso Guerra, to bolster the
local campaign. Potential Socialist backing is
concentrated in industrial and shipping centers along
the Atlantic coast. The Communists have tried hard
to woo working-class support in those areas away
from the Socialists by organizing large
demonstrations protesting the region's high
unemployment and the government's unpopular
attempts at industrial reconversion and pension
reform. Under these circumstances, the Socialists
would be content-and pundits would accord them a
moral victory-if they managed to avoid losing too
many voters to their left and finished a respectable
second to the Popular Coalition.F_~
political base by forming the Popular Coalition with
Oscar Alzaga's Christian democratically oriented
Popular Democratic Party, Jose Antonio Segurado's
business-oriented Liberal Party, and a variety of small
regional parties-the latter represented in Galicia by
the center-right Centrists. These partners do not get
on well with each other either locally or nationally,
and one of the Popular Coalition's principal objectives
in Galicia is to show that it does have enough cohesion
to be a viable alternative to the Socialists.
The Coalition's need to establish its credibility goes
even deeper. The conventional political wisdom in
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the Franco regime mace him unacceptable to
moderate voters and will prevent him from mounting
a serious challenge to Gonzalez in the next national
election. Fraga knows, though, that his party's
surprise victory in Galicia four years ago rescued him
from the margins of Spanish politics and set the stage
for his second-place showing in the national legislative
election a year later. He is hoping that an even
stronger performance in Galicia this time around will
silence his detractors and improve his national
credibility.
Even though Fraga is not a candidate himself, he
began campaigning for the Coalition's regional slate
in August-when even the most ambitious politicians
are almost always on vacation-and has been hard at
it ever since. The key factors in his favor are his status
as a native son and the absence from the race of the
Center Democratic Union (UCD), the previous
national ruling party which won approximately one-
third of the seats in the regional assembly in the
previous election. Fraga's biggest handicap is the
lackluster record the AP regional government has
compiled over the past four years.
The Popular Coalition
The core of the Popular Coalition is Fraga's own
Popular Alliance (AP), which won 26 seats in Galicia
in 1981. Since then Fraga has tried to extend his
Operation Roca
The regional election is the first and perhaps crucial
test for Miguel Roca's effort-dubbed "Operation
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Roca" by the press-to launch the Democratic
Reform Party (PRD) as a broad center-right
alternative to the Socialists. Roca is the leader of the
Catalan Convergence and Union coalition's
parliamentary delegation in Madrid. For more than a
year he has tried to cobble the PRD together from a
disparate collection of regionalist parties, independent
politicians, and former members of the UCD. In
Galicia his followers have organized themselves as the
Galician Coalition (CG). Roca, however, has had
trouble getting both the PRD and the CG off the
ground. Six months ago he proclaimed Galicia as one
of his prime target areas and seemed to be hoping for
a second-place finish there. Since then some of his
principal local allies have defected, and he would
probably be pleased now to wind up in third place
behind the Popular Coalition and the Socialists.
Pundits agree that finishing worse than that would be
a serious blow to the PRD's national pretensions.
to come in ahead of Roca and bolster his claim of
being the strongest centrist challenger to Gonzalez.
The Communists
The stakes in Galicia are especially high for the
Communists, who won only one seat in 1981. They
have since split into three warring factions nationally,
and the mainline Communist Party under Gerardo
Iglesias needs to show that it can still mount an
effective leftist challenge to the Socialists. The
Communists' failure to convert their leadership in
antigovernment protests into electoral gains at
Socialist expense would damage the party's credibility
in the national election. The Communists, though, are
as badly split locally as they are nationally, and they
have had little success so far in shifting the voters'
attention from their internecine bloodletting to their
programs. F_~
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The Social Democratic Center
Thus far, the center-left Social Democratic Center
Party (CDS) of former Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez
has reaped more national benefits than the PRD from
Fraga's inability to capitalize on voter
disenchantment with the Socialists. Suarez has
considerable personal popularity, and he has lately
begun to transfer it to the CDS. Indeed, recent polls
show that the Center Democrats are the third most
popular party in the country, and the press has begun
speculating that Suarez will emerge in the end as the
"real" alternative to Gonzalez.)
Suarez's task in Galicia is to show that the CDS's
recent climb in opinion polls has been no flash in the
pan. His principal problems there, as well as in the
rest of the country, are an apparent inability to raise
money and to develop a grassroots organization.
Morever, the core of the party's support nationally-
trendy Spanish-style yuppies-is notably small in
Galicia, and the party's slate consists largely of local
nonentities. Suarez, however, is an effective
campaigner, and he has tried to compensate for the
CDS's deficiencies with several campaign swings
through the region. He knows he will finish far behind
the Popular Coalition and the Socialists, but he hopes
The Regionalist Left
The "sleeper" factors in the election could be the
Bloque Nacionalists Galego (BNG) and the Esquerda
Galega (EG), two leftwing regionalist groups which
won a total of four seats in 1981. These Galician
leftists expect to attract a number of votes from
leftists disenchanted with the Socialists and infighting
among the Communists. They also believe they should
benefit from being the only regionalist parties in the
race. Leaders of the BNG, the stronger of the two
groups, have particularly high hopes that the election
will transform their party from a peripheral to a
central factor in regional politics. F__1
Outlook
The uninspiring record of the AP government
apparently is not a serious issue in Galicia.
Government of any sort has seldom had a positive
impact in this backwater area, where expectations
from political initiatives are traditionally low. The
voters do seem, though, to be flattered by Fraga's
extensive courting of them. That factor and their own
basic conservatism, we believe, are likely to produce a
strong showing by the Popular Coalition on 24
November. Neither Roca's nor Suarez's campaign
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efforts, however, appear to have stirred much interest.
Suarez can probably survive a poor finish in Galicia,
but for Roca a bad defeat there would probably
damage much of what remains of his national
aspirations-particularly if this party finishes behind
the CDS. If Roca and Suarez do indeed falter while
the Popular Coalition does well, Fraga would herald
that result as vindication of his contentions that
Spanish politics are bipolar and that he-and not one
of the centrists-is the only viable alternative to
Gonzalez and the Socialists.
The Socialists, for their part, undoubtedly prefer a
strong showing by Fraga over Roca and Suarez. They
recognize that the AP chief is far weaker nationally
than in Galicia and would welcome a chance of
running against him. The Socialists also would cheer
a poor Communist showing in Galicia. The greatest
threat to these likely Socialist gains from the regional
vote would be a strong showing by the BNG and EG.
The regional leftists are neither well known nor highly
regarded outside the area. A strong finish on their
part-winning, say, more than a fourth of the left-of-
center vote-would fuel speculation that the Socialists
are not without vulnerabilities. That perception, in
turn, would energize opponents on both their left and
right in the general election.F_~
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Ljubljana
SLOVENIA
BOSNIA AND
HERCEGOVINA
Yugoslavia
Po l tion .... 2.8 million
Bo a and lercego
Population. . A.2 million
aloel %
rot 18%!:
er 32?1..,
Zagreb
Skopje
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Yugoslavia: Bosnia-Hercegovina-
Pivotal Player in Reform Debate'
In the traditional struggle between Yugoslavia's
richer northern and poorer southern republics,
Bosnia-Hercegovina seems to stand in the middle.
Bosnia's staunchly conservative and clannish political
leadership is playing a unique role in the country's
continuing reform debate. It opposes political change
that might upset the delicate ethnic balance within its
own republic and resists any economic reforms that
might threaten Bosnia's little-publicized but
impressive growth over the past few years. Despite
historical and cultural links to the south, Bosnia
increasingly finds itself in at least tacit alliance with
the northern republics on key economic questions.
Bosnia and Political Reform
Bosnia has traditionally been considered part of
Yugoslavia's less developed south, but it now stands
its own ground in the reform debate. A coalition of
southern and Federal Government officials, headed
by Serbian leaders, is pressing to reduce the power of
republic-level politicians. But Bosnia is increasingly
with the developed northern republics, Slovenia and
Croatia, in strong opposition to such efforts.
Bosnian leaders publicly object to almost all proposals
for change in the political status quo. They reject the
Serbian claim that the country's decentralized system
requires substantial reforms to strengthen federal
institutions and harshly criticize suggestions to
change the constitution. Moreover, Bosnian leaders
have taken a tough stance against dissent, whereas the
Serbian leadership has made greater political
tolerance an implicit part of its reformist platform.
In public, Bosnian leaders join many Serbs in calling
for greater party unity and stronger organizations at
the national party level. Their appeals, however, have
a hollow ring. US diplomats report that Bosnian
leaders in reality remain committed to retaining as
much power as possible at the republic level.
at the party
Even Bosnia's occasional support for specific reform
measures has been lukewarm. Bosnia appeared to
back efforts by the Federal Government and southern
regions to recentralize control over foreign exchange,
a step adamantly opposed by the northern republics.
The republic Assembly, however, expressed
"reservations" when it approved the draft legislation,
singling out for criticism the increase in Federal
Government power. Moreover, the Bosnian speaker at
the party plenum devoted to the foreign exchange
system in September called for retention of old
measures which benefited the republic's producers of
primary and intermediate products.
the southern republics in backing a proposal to reduce
republic control over representatives on the Central
Committee and Party Presidium.
Economic Reform: Mixed Signals
Bosnia's public positions on economic questions are
often ambiguous, but on balance they oppose change
in the national economic system. Sarajevo backs
specific proposals for change only if it believes the
republic's economy will gain-as, for example, in the
recent debate over shared foreign exchange authority.
Current economic reform proposals call for shifting
power away from republic officials in two directions:
upward to the Federal Government in some areas and
downward to individual enterprises through greater
reliance on market mechanisms. The US Embassy
reports that Bosnian officials almost unanimously
oppose granting Belgrade greater power, even in
selected financial areas. On the issue of devolving
Secret
EUR ER 85-025
6 November 1985
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Republic's member of
Federal Presidency ...
age 57 ... Croat ...
often called republic's
most influential
politician ... extremely
conservative.)
Republic Party President
... age 57 ... Croat ...
conservative ... long-
time head of republic
internal security.
Representative on
Federal Party Presidium
... age 62 ... probably
most powerful Moslem
politician ... rumored to
obey Islamic law in his
home. F-1
Foreign Minister ... age
59 ... member of one of
Bosnia's leading Moslem
clans ... brother Nijaz
sits on republic
Presidency, brother Faik
BBC Enterprises .... an
ambassador. F--]
Member of Federal
Presidency 1974-84 ...
age 82 ... his virtual
retirement signals
decline of Serb influence
in republic. F-]
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Republic President 1984-
85, now member of
Presidency ... Croat ...
age 57 ... energetic,
interested in economics
... reputedly a Mikulic
protege.F7
Republic Premier ... age
58 ... conservative ... a
Serb, but a close friend
of Mikulic since
university days ...
reportedly watches
Sarajevo when Mikulic
is in Belgrade and vice
versa.
Republic President ...
age 57 ... Moslem ...
rapid rise through
Sarajevo party apparatus
suggests strong backing
from senior Moslem
patron.F7
Representative on
Federal Party Presidium
... age 52 ... Serb ...
allied with Mijatovic
during leadership
jockeying in past.
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authority to enterprises, however, the Bosnian
leadership appears divided. Embassy officers say that
mid-level officials and enterprise managers generally
favor Western practices of economic management.
Conservative senior leaders, by contrast, appear
uncomfortable with market processes and enterprise
independence. Senior Bosnian politician Branko
Mikulic, for example, has called for tighter republic
control over enterprises.
A Yugoslavia in Miniature
Concerns over internal stability almost certainly
weigh heavily in the leadership's insistence on
retaining power at the republic level. Bosnian leaders
reportedly view the republic's problems as a
microcosm of those affecting Yugoslavia. They
apparently believe that only their tight control keeps
the lid on in Bosnia
Ethnic rivalry is the major leadership concern. Of the
three major ethnic groups in the republic-Croat,
Muslim, and Serb-none constitutes a majority of the
population. As in the federation, there is a danger that
economic problems will inflame latent ethnic tensions.
The harsh punishment for manifestations of
nationalism meted out regularly by the courts
illustrates the leadership's worry.
Divisions Affect Leadership
The republic leadership, not surprisingly, exhibits
many of the divisions in Bosnian society.
considerable jockeying has
taken place on ethnic lines since a coalition of Croats
and Moslems broke the Serb domination of republic
politics 15 years ago. Moreover, political rule in
Bosnia is frequently autocratic in a traditional Balkan
style. Western observers often liken the personal
authority of leading Bosnians to that of mafia leaders.
Family ties, particularly among Moslems, are
reportedly extremely important. A knowledgeable US
official said recently that the heads of influential
families, known as the "Princes of Sarajevo,"
dominate society in the republic capital. The best
known Bosnian clan is the Dizdarevic family, which
has placed five brothers-including the current
foreign minister-and other kin in influential
positions in the republic and federation. F-~
Senior Bosnians use ethnic links to express their will
locally and probably to stay in touch with local
concerns. Branko Mikulic said publicly in early 1983
that it is an "old truth" that Bosnian Communists
must wage the struggle against nationalism primarily
within their own ethnic group
= a pattern of senior figures interfering in local
events involving their fellow nationals.
Sarajevo: Unifying Center
Despite internal divisions, the Bosnian leadership has
been remarkably successful in presenting a united
front when dealing with outsiders. Ranking Bosnians
rarely disagree in public, and any differences of
opinion in republic state and party bodies are kept
from the press. F__1
Ironically, the personalistic nature of Bosnian politics
probably largely accounts for this leadership
solidarity. The network of personal ties and
understandings between the members of the Partisan
generation-men who have worked together since
World War II-almost certainly has been a key
factor in the development of a pan-Bosnian outlook
within the heterogeneous senior leadership. The often-
rumored clashes among republic strongmen
presumably affect only power relations within the
republic; they have no discernable influence on the
republic's positions in federal forums.F__-]
Concentration of Power
The republic's few strongmen appear to hold
inordinate power, shared with a small elite in the
republic's state and party executive bodies. The
republic Assembly meets infrequently and seems to
act as a rubber stamp for government proposals. The
party Central Committee also meets infrequently, and
we have seen scant evidence that it does much more
than approve decisions of its Presidium.
overseeing their domain.
the internal security apparatus is more aggressive
than in most other republics, and republic organs
appear to retain tight control over questions of
enterprise organization, economic planning, and
investment.)
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Bosnian leaders also carry the ideological baggage of
behaving for years as the orthodox watchdogs of
Yugoslav Communism. Bosnians still snipe regularly
at "liberal" tendencies in other republics. Embassy
officers report that Bosnian leaders seem to resent
their image as hardliners, yet at the same time are
proud of it. Average Bosnians, in turn, seem to admire
their "strong" leaders
Successes of the Existing System
Bosnians have every reason to defend the economic
status quo, which has provided fertile ground for
economic growth. Under the decentralized system, the
republic has been able to patch over its problems and
build on its successes, a flexibility threatened by many
reform measures.
Bosnia has scored significant economic successes
under the present system. It has largely avoided the
large-scale investment failures which plagued other
republics, achieved a level of wage distribution similar
to that of "developed" Serbia, and recorded only
minor deficits in its hard-currency balance. US
diplomats describe the
economy as booming.
Bosnians play down their success, with good reason.
As long as the republic can justify its current status as
"underdeveloped," it will continue to receive federal
aid. Yugoslavs from other republics claim that in all
economic indexes Bosnia actually meets or surpasses
the national average, and they accuse Bosnian
officials of doctoring their figures to keep Bosnia
below the average officially. F__-]
Worrisome Economic Vulnerabilities
Like most of Yugoslavia, however, Bosnia faces some
serious and chronic economic difficulties. Official
figures indicate that worker productivity, for example,
is only 88 percent of the Yugoslav average. Moreover,
Bosnia is more dependent on heavy industry than any
other republic and would suffer greatly in a Western-
style competitive environment. Bosnian leaders face a
serious unemployment problem: 20 percent of the
labor force was jobless in the first half of 1985, well
above the federal average of 14 percent.
Bosnia relies on its autonomy to deal with trouble
spots. The republic, for example, continues to protect
inefficient industries through direct subsidies and
other means of insulation from market forces.
Similarly, Bosnian officials will not tolerate
liquidation of unprofitable capital or layoffs of
redundant workers-as called for by the federal
stabilization program; they move them instead to
other enterprises.
Bosnia in Future Debates
Bosnia in the near term will remain a republic in the
middle. Sarajevo probably will continue a tacit
alliance with the northern republics of Slovenia and
Croatia in obstructing sweeping changes in the
political and economic system, preferring to let those
republics fight the bruising battles. Differences with
those republics over political liberalization and
mandatory aid to underdeveloped regions will
preclude more open cooperation for now. Should the
Slovenes and Croatians succeed in having Bosnia
reclassified as a developed republic in the next few
years, Bosnia would likely find its economic interests
even more in line with those of the north.)
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Coming Changes
in West German and
NATO High Commands
The West German Defense Ministry announced in
September a series of high-level military command
changes that for the first time in recent years will
place a naval officer at the top of the Bundeswehr.
The new inspector general of West Germany's armed
forces (the equivalent of the US Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff) is to be Vice Adm. Dieter Wellershof,
currently Inspector General of the West German
Navy (the equivalent of the US Chief of Naval
Operations). Wellershof will succeed Gen. Wolfgang
Altenburg, who has been elected Chairman of the
NATO Military Committee. These changes will
become effective on 1 October 1986.1
General Altenburg will bring considerable practical
experience to his new NATO post, having served from
1978 to 1980 on the Military Committee as its West
German Military Representative. Earlier service as
commander of West Germany's III Corps helped
shape his concern over the possible vulnerability of
NATO's forward defense strategy and the need for
stronger conventional forces. Serving as Inspector
General of the Bundeswehr since April 1983, he has
guided acquisition of advanced conventional weapon
systems including the Tornado fighter aircraft, the
Leopard II main battle tank, and the Frigate Type
122. Fluent in English, he is highly respected as a
military professional and is considered pro-Western
and pro-NATO. F__]
General Altenburg will replace Gen. Cornelis de
Jager of the Netherlands as Chairman. Coming from
a more influential NATO country and reportedly
enjoying the strong backing of the Kohl government,
Altenburg should wield greater influence than de
Jager. US Gen. Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe, will continue to be the
dominant source of military advice within the
Alliance, but under Altenburg the post of NATO
Military Committee Chairman may become a
stronger second source of military advice for the
NATO political authorities.
Gen. Wolfgang Altenburg
Next chairman, NATO
Military Committee
Vice Admiral Wellershof has built his career in the
West German Navy with a record of effective service
in the German Navy's minesweeper force. Speaking
fluent English, he appears pro-NATO and has
supported US foreign policy in the past. In a recent
review of the highly publicized Russian naval exercise
in July 1984, the largest ever conducted by the Soviets
in the Atlantic, Wellershof voiced his uneasiness
about Soviet naval capabilities for interdicting
NATO's lifeline to the United States. Wellershof's
solution includes significant increases in NATO
frigate and destroyer forces as well as expanded
minesweeping and aerial reconnaissance capabilities.
Given the Navy's status as the smallest of West
Germany's armed services, Wellershof's selection as
the Bundeswehr's next inspector general may signal
an imminent increase in the Bundesmarine's share of
procurement funds.
In another high-level change, the Inspector of the
West German Army, Lt. Gen. Hans-Henning von
Sandrart, will replace another senior German army
officer as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central
Europe (AFCENT). Von Sandrart will succeed Lt.
Gen. Leopold Chalupa, AFCENT Commander since
October 1983.F___1
Secret
EUR ER 85-025
6 November 1985
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Vice Adm. Dieter Wellershof
Next Inspector General of the
Bundeswehrn
Lieutenant General Chalupa, who is retiring, was a
veteran of the later stages of World War II. He is
known as pro-NATO and has been considered very
friendly toward the United States, having graduated
from the US Army's Command and General Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1965.
During his career, General Chalupa built a reputation
as a strong advocate of NATO weapons and
equipment standardization and played a key role in
coordinating standardization agreements between the
US and West German Armies.)
Lieutenant General von Sandrart, Chalupa's
successor, brings a different mix of experience to the
AFCENT post. While Chalupa's career included
considerable time in command of troops at the
battalion, brigade, and corps level, von Sandrart has
spent much of his career in NATO staff posts. His
senior command prior to appointment as Inspector of
the Army was as Commanding General of the 11th
Armored Infantry Division in Oldenburg. While
Chalupa studied for a year at Fort Leavenworth, von
Sandrart's overseas education consisted of a tour at
the British Army Staff College, Camberley, England.
Both officers speak fluent English, but von Sandrart's
background of study at Camberley and broader
NATO staff experience may smooth his tenure at
AFCENT where,
relations between
Chalupa and the British commander of Northern
Army Group (NORTHAG) have not been close. As
AFCENT commander, von Sandrart will support
NATO's policies of forward defense and flexible
response. Of interest in this context are views
Lt. Gen. Leopold Chalupa,
retiring)
expressed by von Sandrart in 1984 on the possibility
that the United States might make a commitment for
no first use of nuclear weapons. Stressing that these
were his personal views, von Sandrart reportedly said
that if there were such a change in US policy, West
Germany would have to review its commitment to
NATO and consider the creation of an independent
German nuclear capability.
In a further change, Lt. Gen. Eberhard Eimler,
currently head of the West German Air Force, is
scheduled to replace Gen. Hans-Joachim Mack, also
retiring, as the German Deputy Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe.
General Mack replaced General Kiessling in 1984
and brought to the position of Deputy Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe (DSACEUR) an unusual depth
of experience as a commander of armored troops at
the platoon, company, battalion, and brigade level and
as commander of the 6th Armored Infantry Division
and the German III Corps. He may have been in line
for the top job in the Bundeswehr before getting the
call to restore the image of the West German military
at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE) after the "Kiessling Affair."' As
DSACEUR, Mack received added responsibility as a
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Lt. Gen. Hans-Henning von
Sandrart, Next Commander
in Chief, AFCENT n
Lt. Gen. Eberhard Eimler
Next DSACEURIf
principal adviser on NATO nuclear weapons issues.
He has voiced concern that the Strategic Defense
Initiative not be funded by cuts in conventional force
modernization but has also indicated a belief that
Germany must participate in SDI in order to preserve
an influence on future NATO strategy. General
Mack has also expressed an interest in the
development of defenses against tactical ballistic and
cruise missiles.
Eberhard Eimler, Mack's successor at SHAPE,
replace Mack would lend credence to German press
speculation early this year that Germany had
assigned one of its best (General Mack) to SHAPE in
order to bolster long-range efforts to convert
SHAPE's four-star chief of staff slot from an
Gen. Hans-Joachim Mack,
retiring n
Lt. Gen. Henning von Ondarza
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American to a German billet. Lieutenant General
Eimler is pro-US and has trained and worked
effectively with Americans throughout his career as a
fighter pilot and a commander of fighter units. He
speaks English fluently. F_~
Since assuming command as Inspector of the West
German Air Force in April 1983, Eimler has pursued
a number of initiatives aimed at reducing the 25X1
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these, Eimler has pushed a study on the feasibility of
performing maintenance at the squadron level 25X1
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dispersed locations. He also wants to add 40 more
Tornado aircraft, configured for the electronic 25X1
combat reconnaissance mission, to the West German
Air Force's planned procurement totals, and he wants
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to set up a reserve F- 104 squadron outside NATO
command as an independent national resource under
exclusive West German control.
Lt. Gen. Hans-Henning von Sandrart's successor as
Inspector of the West German Army has not yet been
announced, but Lt. Gen. Henning von Ondarza is
considered the top contender by some observers. Von
Ondarza, currently Commander of Allied Forces in
Jutland-Funen and Schleswig-Holstein, is a graduate
of the US Army Command and General Staff College
at Fort Leavenworth and has served a tour as defense
attache in Washington. He is a strong nationalist and
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The Myth of the
French Presidency
This article does not represent a DI or CIA position;
it is solely the view of the author. It has not been
coordinated or reviewed.
French President Mitterrand will more than hold his
own against a hostile National Assembly after the
elections next March, not least because he can draw
on the potent myth of his own office.F__-]
Counting the eggs that are likely to fall into the
conservative basket after their victory in next year's
legislative elections has lately become a favorite
indoor sport in France. Attention focuses especially on
the Socialist President, whose term extends to 1988.
No other president of the Fifth Republic has had to
contend with an antagonistic parliament. Pundits
have scrambled to pore over old but unread copies of
the Fifth Republic's constitution and have concluded
that Mitterrand's days may be numbered; according
to the constitution, the French presidency is a frail
thing and the real focus of power should be the prime
minister. It is easy enough to marshal constitutional
arguments proving that a hostile prime minister, at
the head of a fire-breathing parliament, could drive
any president from office. The Third Republic yields
plenty of precedents; in the last century Marshal
MacMahon tried in vain to maneuver around a hostile
legislature, and, in 1924, a similarly star-crossed
Socialist president-ironically named Millerand-fell
before an adamant Assembly. There is no shortage of
speculation that charts a similar future for President
Mitterrand.
These forecasts, however, fail to take into account two
essential considerations: Mitterrand's constitutional
powers will be magnified by the significant potential
weakness of the opposition conservatives and the
powerful myth of the French presidency. In fact, the
constitution defines a fairly strong presidency by
French republican standards and lists an assortment
of powers that will afford Mitterrand plenty of room
to maneuver after 1986. Not the least of these is his
ability to keep the new majority off balance by his
power to dissolve its National Assembly. Short of that
drastic step, Mitterrand's office will provide a "bully
pulpit" from which he can blast any hint of opposition
unreasonableness or footdragging and accuse the
parliament of working against France's best interests.
This will give the Socialists something that no French
legislative opposition has ever had-a powerful voice.
By skillfully using his own willingness to compromise,
however, the President can open and exploit fissures
in rightist solidarity and perhaps peel off centrist
voters and politicians from their alliance with the
Gaullists.l
From his choice of prime minister to his function as
president of the Council of Ministers-both
constitutional prerogatives-Mitterrand will also be
able to exploit cleavages in opposition leadership,
especially between contenders and would-be
contenders for the presidency. For example, by
choosing as prime minister Giscard d'Estaing or
Francois Leotard-both frothing for a call-he could
touch off an immediate crisis within the majority
alliance since neither Jacques Chirac nor Raymond
Barre will allow Giscard or Leotard a chance to make
a success of the office and thereby get a running start
at the brass ring in 1988.
Ultimately, Mitterrand can turn to the historical and
extraconstitutional myth of the French presidency as
a powerful weapon against his adversaries. De Gaulle
spoke from long tradition-embracing Louis XIV and
Napoleon-when he defined the myth to suit himself:
"The indivisible authority of the state," he said in
1964, "is entirely entrusted to the President by the
people who have elected him, and all other authority
whether ministerial, civil, military, judicial is
conferred and maintained by him." No French
constitutional scholar would accept de Gaulle's
definition, but that is beside the point. It exercises a
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strong popular appeal because it embodies history and
the assurance of a strong stabilizing force at the top; it
also clothes the office in the grandeur commensurate
with the quasi-religious concept of la nation. This
elegant myth and its attendant (assumptions for
example, that foreign policy is a "reserved sphere" of
the president) do not appear in the constitution but,
nonetheless, have become a part of the "constitutional
consensus" of the Fifth Republic. As fundamental
political myth, it can only be amended by
confrontation, and since those most likely to lead the
attack are the very ones who aspire to the presidency
in 1988, it is improbable that they will press forward
hard enough to debase the myth and thereby diminish
the office.
Mitterrand does not have to absorb his adversaries in
the myth; they and their constituents already embrace
it-and hope to profit handsomely from it in 1988. In
France, the myth of the presidency is what political
struggle is all about. Americans often inaccurately
identify Gaullism with an independent foreign policy;
it is more fundamentally a compelling conception of
presidential power. Mitterrand knows well that the
opposition cannot denude him of power without
simultaneously stripping the Gaullist myth. For this
and other reasons outlined above, he knows that
leaders of the traditional opposition will "cohabit"
uncomfortably with him, even when he bludgeons
them publicly for their unwillingness to cooperate.
They will endure this until Mitterrand decides to
dissolve the National Assembly, perhaps until 1988,
when he could put both the legislature and the
presidency up for grabs.F___-]
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On the Road in
Southern Yugoslavia
Following are excerpts from a report on a recent 15-
day visit to southern Yugoslavia.
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I begin my visit to Yugoslavia in Belgrade, the capital
of both the country and the Republic of Serbia and a
city with many faces. It has the cafe life of Italy, the
crumbling building facades and gray drabness of
Eastern Europe, and the Balkan bustle and swagger of
Turke
Shortly after arriving I visit the construction site of
the St. Sava Church, which was consecrated in a big
ceremony last May and which when finished is
intended to rival St. Peter's in Rome. The site is
locked, but a Serbian Orthodox clergyman opens the
gate and gives me a tour. The man is tall and thin,
about 40, with black hair and piercing eyes
The cleric points proudly to the church's dimensions,
about 100 yards in either direction, and voices
bitterness that the Communist government waited 40
years before granting a building permit. He seems
pleased that I plan to visit other churches in Serbia,
but counsels me to take along a companion if I visit
the mostly Albanian province of Kosovo, center of the
1981 riots
I leave Belgrade by public bus for Kraljevo, a Serbian
town some three hours to the south. Sitting next to me
on the bus is a modishly dressed Serb woman of 20
who is a Belgrade University student and sometimes
rock singer. She is bright, articulate, and politically
moderate-that is, until the conversation turns to
Kosovo]
The Albanians are not like other Yugoslavs, she says.
They had their chance in the 1970s, when granted
considerable autonomy, but this only led to the
disorders and demands for a separate Albanian
republic. They terrorize Kosovo's Serb minority and
do unspeakable things to the Serbian women.
Moreover, the perpetrators are not brought to justice,
as the Kosovo Albanian authorities are as corrupt and
impenetrable as the Mafia.
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I arrive in Kraljevo, a sleepy town of about 70,000 25X1
which was once the center of the medieval Serbian
kingdom and which in recent months has been the
scene of an Albanian scare. A Kosovo plant upstream
had been dumping lethal industrial pollutants into the
river flowing through town, an act that Kraljevo
residents believed was aimed at them. In the town
square is a symbol of burgeoning Serbian
nationalism-a giant statue of a Serbian soldier
commemorating the fallen heroes of the Balkan wars 25X1
and World War I. It was built in the 1930s but
banished to an outlying park after the Communists
took power. The city fathers recently had it restored
to its original place, a local resident tells me~ 25X1
I meet a 30-year-old Serb working in a travel bureau.
Showing customary hospitality, he pours me a rakija
from under the counter and suggests we later visit a
renowned monastery. The Serb's work history is a
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Ljubljana
SLOVENIA
Zagreb
,Novi Sad
Yugoslavia
BOSNIA AND
HERCEGOVINA
Travel route
National capital
Autonomous area boundary
Republic or antonomous area
ELGRADE
OA
Titograd
Einje
Pri?tina'
Koso too
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lesson in the continuing value of connections. He got
his job partly because his father was a partisan and
several school chums are well placed in the local
hierarchy. Like the woman on the bus, this Serb is
passionate on the subject of Albanians. Not only are
they poisoning Serbian waters, but Kosovo Albanian
doctors have been found giving newly born Serbs
injections that sterilize them for life. Were he a
Kosovo Serb under pressure by Albanians to sell his
home and move out, he says, he would kill first
My arrival in Kosovo the next day is less than
auspicious. At a hotel in Vucitrn, north of the
provincial capital of Pristina, my bags are taken to the
room through a dark corridor by a young Albanian
who smiles and tells me he was just released from
prison for attempted murder. He stabbed another
Albanian near the heart in a lovers' quarrel. The man
lived, so this Albanian was allowed to work during the
day and only sleep in prison. His daytime job was and
is ... hotel security guard
The front desk clerk, another Albanian, appears to be
a police informer. He suspects that I have some
connection to the Serbian cab driver who brought me
to the hotel. After dinner I want to stroll into town,
but this visibly upsets both the guard and desk clerk,
who show relief when I promise to stay in the hotel.
The next day I see why.
Vucitrn is the most backward, dirt-poor town I have
seen in Yugoslavia, worse even than other Kosovo
towns I saw on a visit last year. It features ramshackle
Turkish-style houses, a few unkept mosques, and a
center that looks like a Middle Eastern bazaar. I see
gypsy women in colorful trousers, a man with a peg-
leg, and dozens of grizzled old Albanians vending
bric-a-brac from wooden, horse-drawn carts. The
main and only department store looks like it finished a
closeout sale, the shelves are so depleted. I dress
inconspicuously but cannot help standing out since I
am wearing eyeglasses, a rarity almost anywhere in
Kosovo.
The feeling of being in the Third World is heightened
by the knots of people with plastic jugs and tin cans
gathered around water trucks. The water may now be
safe in Kraljevo, but it is not here. When I wait for a
bus to Pristina that afternoon, a bevy of school
Primitive construction typical of Kosovo town of
Vucitrn ... contrasts with flashier development
in capital of Pristina (u)
children crowd around. They have never seen an
American before. They have probably never seen
anyone carrying belongings in luggage instead of
cartons. They are bright looking and curious. In other
Kosovo towns they have reportedly stoned outsiders.
Pristina is just down the road, but light years away,
from Vucitrn. It is a showcase capital, with a modern
hotel, civic center, university, bus station, and 25X1
apartment blocks, built mostly with money given by
the richer northern regions. The security presence
nowadays is low-key, even if a military headquarters
is located right downtown. The crowds seem relaxed
but are so thick in the evening that one senses any
incident could spread like wildfire. I meet an
Albanian private businessman in a cafe. He is about
35, good-humored, and apolitical. He professes little
interest in ethnic relations but shows resentment that
so many Serbs living in Kosovo refuse to speak
Albanian. The workers generally can and do, he says,
but those in higher positions pretend they cannot. This
is wrong, he says, since they live in an Albanian land.
I go to a concert that evening given by national pop
idol Lepa Brena, who is in Pristina on one of her ' 25X1
occasional appearances. The woman sitting next to me
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is a Kosovo Serb of about 40 with child. She says
Pristina looks calm only at first glance. The
Albanians are wild and temperamental. Serbs are
exposed to constant, often subtle pressures and their
numbers are dwindling. She was born in Kosovo and
hopes to die there, she says, but her voice conveys
little hope
The next day I leave Kosovo by bus for the western,
heavily Albanian part of Macedonia, the country's
southernmost republic. I travel first to Tetovo, a
colorful town of about 40,000, west of Skopje, with
strong Turkish flavor. As in most of southern
Yugoslavia, the main highways are only one lane in
either direction. A woman on the bus, a Tetovo
Albanian, tells me she is a university student in
Pristina because she cannot pursue higher education
Titograd in the dead of night I planned to book into a
hotel but the young Macedonian sitting next to me
insists I stay with him at his brother's. It is another
example of sometimes overwhelming Balkan
hospitality. The barracks in which his brother lives is
in an industrial part of town and is run by his firm as
ersatz bachelor housing. We find his brother's room in
a long, open-air corridor. The room where we stay is
about 16' x 16', has one bare lightbulb, a narrow
window, a clothesline, a hotplate, and eight bunk
beds, two of them double-decker. The smell hits you
like a brick. The blankets are covered with grime and
the sheets probably have not been washed for weeks.
Conditions surely are worse on summer nights, when
the heat turns the rooms into steam boxes. Winter can
hardly be much better, as no heating unit can be seen.
in Macedonia in the Albanian language
Economic prospects for Albanians look better in
Macedonia than Kosovo, and it is no wonder that
hundreds reportedly flock here each year. The
political situation seems less favorable. Signs on
streets and public buildings, even in mostly Albanian
Tetovo, are written only in Macedonian. Only on the
doorframes of privately owned shops can the Albanian
language be seen, and then in second place
The following day I meet a Macedonian schoolteacher
on a bus from Tetovo to the southern Macedonian
town of Ohrid. He complains that the local Albanians
speak poor Macedonian and confirms my impression
that few are policemen or officials. The grandmother
who rents me a spare room in her house in Ohrid is
more vehement. Albanians are out to destroy
Yugoslavia, she says, drawing a thumb across her
throat
In the morning we trek through the open air to a cold-
water-only washhouse. Urine runs out into the hall
from a toilet, which is a little more than a hole in the
ground. The men emerging from the rooms, however,
look little different from other Yugoslav workers. The
visitor to Yugoslavia seeing them on the street would
have no idea how close they live to the margins.
Once on the road it becomes clear why Montenegro
has been the bane of every invader. The land is little
more than rocky mountains. The coastline is even
more dramatic than along the Croatian Adriatic just
to the north, with craggy cliffs dropping off into the
sea. The Albanians here are among the most healthy,
relaxed, and prosperous that I see in Yugoslavia. In
the southernmost town of Ulcinj, near the Albanian
border, they own property in the town's nicest parts
and benefit from its thriving tourism business. The
strikingly tall and fair-haired Albanian woman who
rents me a room tells me Albanians and Montenegrins
get along pretty well. There have been a few youth
Ohrid is like coming up for a breath of fresh air.
People here dress in neat, clean, pressed clothing with
some regard for color and pattern. In small towns of
Kosovo and western Macedonia tattered, mismatched,
hand-me-downs are often the norm. The town is set
stunningly on Lake Ohrid, which it shares with
Albania, and contains some of the most ancient
churches in Europe.
Traveling to Montenegro I spend my first night in a
workers' barracks. On arriving by bus in the capital of
incidents, she says, but they have been minor
In the former Montenegrin capital of Cetinje I witness
a lightning visit by East German leader Erich
Honecker, who is in the country on an official trip. A
fleet of highly polished Mercedes limousines with low-
number Titograd tags pull into the main square.
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Honecker and Yugoslav party leader Vidoje Zarkovic
step out as television cameras whir. Honecker looks
stiff and ill at ease; Zarkovic plays the jovial host. The
limousines pull out as quickly as they arrived. The
local security men, unaccustomed to such a high-level
activity, look relieved. I fly back to Belgrade and end
my trip
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West German financial authorities have raised
monetary growth target for 1986
... this plus the August discount rate cut
intended to stimulate economy ... Kohl government
probably hoping to boost chances in 1987 national
election.
Wrangling over 1986-87 budget has forced London to
postpone announcing welfare reform proposals ... also
deciding how to deal with hostile reactions to plans for
revamping pension system ... White Paper now
promised by Christmas.F_~
UK Energy Secretary Walker recently told high-level
OPEC official that London would not curtail North
Sea oil production as means of stabilizing world
energy prices ... claimed restraints on production
would choke off investment needed to bring new off-
shore wells on stream in 1990s ... expressed interest
in continuing bilateral meetings with OPEC countries
but rejected formal dialogue between OPEC and non-
OPEC producers.
Greek Economic Minister Simitis announced that
additional measures are unnecessary to reach
economic targets ... means government will not offer
incentives to revive investment ... current austerity
policies probably insufficient to improve long-run
outlook for Greek competitiveness and investment.
Madrid introduced new consumer price index in
October ... based on 1980 survey of consumer
purchasing patterns and includes additional 30,000
items ... may slightly increase 1985 inflation figure
from projected 7.9 percent by placing less weight on
food products whose prices have been declining. F_
Swedish Central Bank has lowered short-term interest
rates ... monetary authorities pushed rates up last
spring to offset heavy currency outflows ... reversal
of trend now permits Bank to encourage higher
domestic production. F___]
Norwegian Government proposal includes first deficit
in nine years ... spending to increase by 12.6 percent,
revenues by only 2.1 percent ... Prime Minister
Willoch sought to hold line on spending due to
uncertainty over oil revenues.
Protocol on 1986-90 plan coordination between USSR
and three of its largest trading partners-Poland, East
Germany, Czechoslovakia-signed last
month ... plans call for 28-percent and 30-percent
increase in trade over next five years with East
Germany and Czechoslovakia, respectively, and 50-
percent increase with Poland ... negotiations
continue with other East Europeans.
Prolonged drought this summer following harsh winter
has damaged crops in Bulgaria and Romania and, to a
lesser degree, in Yugoslavia ... dims hard currency
trade prospects ... means more belt-tightening for
consumers
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EUR ER 85-025
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November
Austria
Looking Ahead
Governing Socialist Party will hold national congress 11-13 November
... probably wants to give image of party unity with federal election only a month
away ... Chancellor and Chairman Fred Sinowatz probably hopes to display firm
leadership and control over party in wake of scandals and internal feuds. F---~
EC-Central America Foreign Ministers' meeting scheduled for 11-12 November in Luxembourg ... will
sign economic framework agreement probably increasing aid but granting no trade
concessions ... likely to issue separate political communique supporting Contadora
negotiations. F-~ - 25X1
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