ARGENTINA: ALFONSIN AND EMERGING UCR LEADERS REDIRECT THE PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87-01133R000100010002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Argentina: Alfonsin and Emergin
UCR Leaders Redirect the Party
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
UCR Leaders Redirect the Party
10
n and Emerging
Argentina: Alfonsi
South America Branch
Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared by
Secret
LDA 86-10148
July 1986
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Scope Note This paper discusses the role of President Raul Alfonsin and a younger
group of like-minded emerging party leaders in moving the Radical Civic
Union (UCR) from a faction-ridden, ideologically bound party to one more
practical and forward leaning, with broad popular support. The paper also
speculates on the future role of these emerging leaders. Although a variety
of serious economic and political issues face the Alfonsin government and
put it in some jeopardy, this subject is beyond the scope of the present pa-
per, which focuses on the dynamics within the UCR.
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Summary
Information available
as of 26 June 1986
was used in this report.
Leaders Redirect the Party
Argentina: Alfonsin and Emerging UCR
Argentina's Radical Civic Union (UCR), which played a subordinate role to
the Peronist party for over 40 years, has come to the forefront since the
election of its leader, Raul Alfonsin, as President in 1983. Taking advantage
of 'Peronist disarray, Alfonsin has taken a tradition-bound and faction-
ridden party and forged it into the nation's major political force
attitude regarding differences within the party.
A group of younger, emerging UCR leaders-more practical, action ori-
ented, and flexible than many of their elders-have supported Alfonsin in
his efforts to shift the party's traditional focus in several important ways.
Specifically, Alfonsin and the younger leaders have:
? Broadened the party's base by appealing to sectors beyond its urban
middle-class core-particularly to labor, a traditional Peronist stronghold,
and the university student population, often susceptible to far-leftist
appeals.
? Abandoned traditional party tenets-particularly in the economic field,
where they have implemented a plan emphasizing austerity and privatiza-
tion, and in the appointment of nonparty members to key posts.
? Strengthened the party's infrastructure and mobilized its membership and
resources to support Alfonsin's policies by putting the UCR in touch with
the man in the street.
? Taken steps toward alleviating longstanding factionalism by striking
compromises on electoral lineups and strategy and by taking a conciliatory
Although exact membership figures are not available for the UCR, we
estimate that younger leaders make up about a quarter of the party's top
echelon. A majority of them appear to support Alfonsin's policies, and they
have been rewarded with key party, government, and legislative posts,
including five seats on the party's 23-member governing board, numerous
second-level posts in the government, and about a third of the committee
chairmanships in the Chamber of Deputies. They are now well positioned
both to implement the President's moderate policies and to inherit his
leadership mantle. (Alfonsin's term ends in 1989, and he cannot legally
succeed himself.) 25X1
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There is some limited opposition to Alfonsin in his party. A vocal leftist
minority of the younger leaders, primarily resident in the Junta
Coordinadora Nacional faction, endorses his leadership but not some of his
policy choices. Old-guard UCR members are also skeptical about the party's
new direction.
Added to disagreements among various UCR elements are other challenges
facing Alfonsin and his proponents. These include an uncertain future for
the economy, despite some progress by Alfonsin in that area, and continuing
tension between the government and the military services.
In our view, if Alfonsin enjoys some success over the next three years, it will
be due in part to the support of the emerging UCR leaders. Their increasing
experience, influence, and skill in negotiation should help keep the party
united and strong for the 1989 election.
A revitalized UCR augurs well for the future of democracy in Argentina. As
a successful democratic institution, it dominates the center of the political
spectrum, where most Argentines now find themselves, and thus limits the
audience for issues put forth at the extremes. The success that the moderate
UCR approach demonstrates could also encourage reformers among the
Peronists to seek a similar road to political rehabilitation of their party-a
first step toward the development of a responsible Peronist opposition.
The pro-Alfonsin emerging leaders may disagree with some areas of US
policy-for example, US actions in Central America and attempts to
regulate the development and proliferation of nuclear technology. Their
moderate statements, however, on such matters as IMF and debt negotia-
tions and narcotics control-plus their generally friendly attitude toward
this country-promise enhanced cooperation in those areas.
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The UCR: A Party of High Principles but an Often Secondary Role
1
Redirecting the UCR
Emerging Leaders
5
Prescription for Change
5
Extending Appeal
6
Making Inroads in Peronist Strongholds
6
Exploiting University Ties
7
Abandoning Party Precepts
8
Economic Policy
8
Government Appointments
9
Mobilizing the Party
9
Dealing With Dissension
12
Willingness to Compromise
12
Projecting a Moderate Image
12
Implications for the United States
13
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Argentina: Alfonsin and Emerging UCR
Leaders Redirect the Party
Introduction
Argentina's Radical Civic Union (UCR), accustomed
to playing second fiddle to the Peronist party for over
40 years, has been revitalized in recent years by Raul
Alfonsin, who has been President since 1983, and by
some of the party's emerging younger leaders. With
the UCR's unexpected victory in the 1983 election-
Alfonsin won 52 percent of the vote, and party
members running on his coattails won 147 of 300
seats in Congress-and the subsequent crumbling of
the Peronist party, Alfonsin has forged the UCR into
the nation's major political force.'
Although today Alfonsin dominates his party and has
successfully addressed several critical issues, notably
raging inflation, most observers agree that he faces
three more difficult years and then an uncertain
future for his party (he cannot legally succeed him-
self). This paper will describe how Alfonsin, with the
help of younger proteges, has launched the UCR on a
new course in the hope of establishing its lasting
influence.
The UCR: A Party of High Principles
but an Often Secondary Role
Founded in 1890, the UCR was the first Argentine
party to challenge the political dominance of the
traditional elite, composed of estate owners, bankers,
and wealthy merchants. The UCR, in contrast, repre-
sented the increasing importance of commerce and
industry and found support among the growing urban
middle class, including immigrants, small business-
men, professionals, and white-collar workers. The
party advocated democratic processes, honest govern-
ment, economic nationalism, and state intervention,
' No membership figures for the Radical Party or its factions have
been published. The party's relative size and strength can be
roughly inferred from the total vote it received in the November
1985 congressional elections: just over 6.5 million votes, or about 43
percent of the vote; Peronists, by contrast, received about 35
percent. (Both totals, of course, include ballots cast by nonparty
voters.) In addition, surging UCR membership and shifting and
temporary internal alliances make concrete membership estimates
Campaigning in 1983 against a Peronist party frac-
tured by internal dissension, Alfonsin moved to ex-
pand the Radical camp beyond its historical middle-
class constituency. His program combined familiar
populist economic and social welfare programs with
strong advocacy of democratic government, union and
military reform, and impassioned defense of human
rights. A fiery orator, he led an aggressive media
campaign that took his message to every part of
Argentina. He battled the Peronists in their own
stronghold-the working-class districts ringing Bue-
nos Aires and other major urban areas. According to
political preference polls , Alfon- 25X1
sin won with a broad electoral coalition including
workers-who saw their Peronist-dominated union
leadership as corrupt and too closely tied to the
detested military-as well as conservatives and left-
ists opposed to Peronism.
and it eventually grew strong enough to capture the
presidency, which it held from 1916 until a military
takeover in 1930.
The party then declined in influence, largely because
of its rigid adherence to its principles and its growing
factionalism. Deeply committed to establishing demo-
cratic government and extremely proud of their stand
for universal suffrage, justice, and equality, many
Radicals considered their party as much an ethical
movement as a political organization and were loath
to make political compromises with more authoritar-
ian groups, notably the emerging Peronists. Moreover,
despite the Radicals' shared principles, disunity arose
over means and methods and severely limited the
party's strength. The result was that from 1930 until
1983 the UCR was in power only once, during 1963-
66, before again being ousted by a military coup. The
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A broad spectrum of ideology finds a home in the
UCR, resulting in factional and often intrctfactional
differences. Moreover, the party grapples with genera-
tional differences. The largest and most influential
faction is Renovation and Change (RYC); it is Alfon-
sin's political base and is left of center. Making up
over half the UCR membership, it consists of two
groups. The larger of these-to which the major
portion of faction members belong-the "Historic
Line, " is close to Alfonsin, from whom it derives its
influence. Especially early in his term, the President
filled most key national posts from the ranks of the
RYC "Historicals, " who include most of his longtime
political allies. Although in the past year the Presi-
dent has turned to other factions, to technocrats, and
even to opposition figures to fill high-level positions,
the RYC Historicals maintain their dominant role.
Among the veterans within the Historic Line is a
small group (probably no more than 20 percent of the
faction) of well-established UCR politicians. Al-
though members of this so-called "Old Guard" occa-
sionally gain Alfonsin's ear, they favor more tradi-
tional UCR policies and therefore are largely outside
the circle of UCR decisionmaking, according to Em-
bassy reports. Because of their long party service and
sometime entree to the President, however, these
veterans can demand a voice in party councils. F_
The other main RYC group is the Junta Coordina-
dora Nacional (JCN), or Coordinadora, which tends
to have younger, more action oriented, and, in some
cases, more radical members. It is second only to the
Historicals in both size and influence, constituting
about a quarter of the total UCR membership.
Although organizationally part of the RYC faction,
the JCN tends to operate independently. For exam-
ple, the RYC and the Coordinadora compete in
elections head-to-head in Buenos Aires City and
Province and Santa Fe Province, and the issue of
whether to formally remain a part of the RYC divides
JCN members. Embassy officials say several JCN
members strongly favor a split from the RYC. (For
convenience, throughout this paper, unless otherwise
specified, the term RYC is used to refer only to the
Historic Line.)
The great majority of the party's younger leaders
belong to the Coordinadora. Most of them follow
Alfonsin's leadership and policies and are similar in
political orientation to the Historicals. A JCN minor-
ity-perhaps 20 percent of the JCN membership-
however, has vocally challenged the President's mod-
erate, left-of-center policies, staking out more mili-
tant positions.
The other major UCR faction, the Movement for
National Integration (MIN), is prominent only in the
Buenos Aires region and has fewer members than the
JCN, reports the Embassy. The institutional descen-
dant of Alfonsin's conservative rivals in the 1970s,
the MIN retains appeal with the middle class and
with older and non-Radical voters. At times, the
MIN, in alliance with the RYC Historicals, has
provided a potent counterweight to the Coordinadora
in struggles to formulate party positions.
There are other, minor UCR factions (see figure
page 3), which contain some party leaders and have
provincial strength. They have lacked national clout,
however, since Alfonsin's election.
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UCR Factions and Governing Board
UCR Factions
Relative strength
Renovation and Change
Q Historic Line
Closest of Alfonsin; derives its
influence from the President;
present in all provinces.
0 National Coordinating Board (JCN)
Majority of younger party leaders;
strongest in Buenos Aires City and
Province.
EJ National Integration
Movement (MIN)
Influence comes from importance
of its members; strongest in
Buenos Aires region.
National Line (NL)
Formerly the dominant force in
UCR; declining national influence
since Alfonsin's election.
Cordoba Line
Based in Cordoba province moderat
ing force in party; close to RYC.
Yrigoyen Affirmation
Movement (MAY)
Based in Chaco Province; declining
influence since Alfonsin's election.
President
Secretaries
o Raul Alfonsin
Ernesto Alderete Salas
Miguel Martinez Saravia
Acting President
Oswaldo Alvarez Guerrero
fJ Sergio Montiel
O Edison Otero
J Antonio Berhongaraya
JJ Prospero Nieva
1st Vice President
Ruben Chebaiaa
^ Rodolfo Quesadaa
El Cesar Jaroslavsky
2nd Vice President
Esther Crespo de Riera
^ Jesus Rodriguez a
El Ricardo Barrios Arrechea
Ramon Dussol
Angel Roig
3rd Vice President
Arturo Gonzalez Martin
Hipblito Solari Yrigoyen
O Anibal Reynaldoa
Q Edgardo Grosso
0 Federico Storani a
0 Norberto Marini
[] Marcelo Stubrina
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Radicals provided the only opposition throughout the
rule of Juan Domingo Peron (1946-55). Today, under
Alfonsin's direction, the UCR has for the first time
since early in the century begun to resolve some of its
internal differences and build bridges between its
factions (see figure)
Redirecting the UCR
Alfonsin Takes the Lead. Alfonsin first won recogni-
tion as a leader within the UCR in the early 1970s,
when he became discontented with the generally
conservative leadership of longtime party caudillo
Ricardo Balbin. As his speeches of that time indicate,
Alfonsin believed that the party leaders had lost touch
with the masses, whose thinking had moved to the
left. He therefore formed his own left-of-center fac-
tion, Renovation and Change (RYC). During the next
decade, his influence within the party grew, a develop-
ment widely attributed to his courageous support of
human rights and his condemnation of abuses com-
mitted by the military regime.
Alfonsin, more progressive and pragmatic than his
rivals in the UCR, achieved prominence by reaching
beyond the party's traditional constituency to the
working class and to students and other young people.
He also broke precedent by seeking the support of
disillusioned Peronists and independents rather than
clinging to the traditional Radical disdain for collabo-
ration with other political groups. By mid-1983 Alfon-
sin had formed a pact with other non-Balbin factions
in the UCR, launched a well-organized and well-
financed campaign, and captured the party's presi-
dential nomination.
As President, Alfonsin has been the first democrati-
cally oriented Argentine leader in almost 70 years to
exercise genuine political control.
the axis of power in both the govern-
ment and the UCR passes through Alfonsin's hands.
Despite the extensive factionalism within the party,
press and Embassy reporting indicates that he has
sizable support, enjoying the backing of a majority of
members of all the principal factions-the RYC,
Coordinadora (JCN), and Movement for National
Integration (MIN).
Age 59 ... popular and principled leader in both
party and government ... respectedfor his evenhand-
ed effort to deal with abuses committed by the
military during the 1970s "dirty war" on terrorism
and for his honesty and moral leadership ... has
learned important economic and political lessons
from his first two and a half years in power ... seeks
to maintain good relations with the United States
... was provincial and national legislator in the
1950s and 1960s.
A questioning of the President's policies by a vocal
minority of hardline Coordinadora members, as well
as by a limited number of old-guard RYC members,
presents a continuing challenge to Alfonsin's leader-
ship. At this time, however, the differences in policy
orientation in the party appear to represent no serious
threat to his authority. He has so far successfully
isolated the dissenters and consolidated his main-
stream support, and he is rarely attacked personally,
according to Embassy officials. As a human rights
activist with strong moral leadership qualities, he is
extremely popular with the people-over the past two
years he has consistently received at least 60 percent
approval ratings in a wide variety of polls. We believe
that his popularity, the power of his office, and his
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role as undisputed arbiter within the UCR give him
tremendous power over the party's future. That pow-
er, which he has so far used constructively, constitutes
a substantial step forward in the UCR's long quest for
unity and enduring influence.
Emerging Leaders. Embas-
sy, and press reporting indicates that in his bid for
political power and the presidency-and as Presi-
dent-Alfonsin has been helped by a new generation
of party leaders, highly influenced by his own rise to
power and style. These leaders first became active in
politics at the university level, and most held promi-
nent posts in UCR youth organizations. Today they
are linked by ties dating back to their student days-
even though they sometimes belong to different party
factions.
The young leaders, now in their thirties and forties,
were students when the last Radical administration
was overthrown by the military in 1966. They publicly
say that that government fell so easily because the
UCR had lost touch with the people and had become
a group of thinkers rather than doers. They also say
that their entry into politics was motivated in part by
a desire to remedy that weakness. Affected by the
violence of the military war on terrorism in the 1970s,
they stress dialogue with opponents rather than con-
frontation or coercion, according to the Embassy and
the press.
Throughout the 1970s these UCR activists were
establishing themselves as upcoming leaders through
their party and youth organization activities. They
gravitated to Alfonsin during those years, and many
of them performed key organizational and mobiliza-
tion work during his 1983 campaign. At present, these
younger leaders undoubtedly recognize that Alfonsin
has brought the party greater influence than it has
enjoyed for decades and that by attaching themselves
to his coattails they can obtain increased power within
the party and the government.
The emerging leaders are also motivated, in our view,
by a political environment that is ideal for the young
and ambitious. Embassy0 and press re-
porting describes Alfonsin as a leader who generally
seeks consensus and party harmony, even at the cost
of indecisive or conflictive policies. He often overlooks
overeagerness or occasional mistakes by the younger
leaders in return for their unswerving loyalty.
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Except for a minority-the vocal militants within the
JCN-the younger leaders appear to be completely
loyal to Alfonsin, to respect his authority within the
party, and to be eager to implement his programs. In
our estimation, emerging leaders represent roughly 25
percent of the party's top leadership. Limited evidence
from Embassy reporting, as well as
the press, suggests that the younger, pro-Alfonsin
leaders hold at least one-third of the committee
chairmanships in the Chamber of Deputies; numerous
second-echelon positions in the government, including
those of secretary general of the presidency, vice
minister of foreign affairs, under secretary of foreign
affairs and of interior, and key Central Bank posts;
and five seats on the party's 23-member national
executive board (for factional affiliations, see figure
page 3).
Prescription for Change
Alfonsin's number-one priority is to complete his term
and turn the government over to an elected UCR
successor, report US diplomats. They say he has not
pressed vigorously to solve such endemic problems as
statism, inefficiency, and corruption because pushing
too hard in these areas could cause a backlash from
entrenched interests that might threaten his govern-
ment. He believes his remaining time in office is too
short to address deep-seated problems. He therefore
strongly supports the idea of long-term democracy as
the only way to resolve these problems, as well as the
longstanding economic and class divisions within Ar-
gentine society.
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sin, with the help of his proteges, has taken four
tactical approaches, derived from his campaign for
the presidency, to reshape his party, help ensure its
dominance, and thus help attain his goals. These
approaches are:
? Extending the party's appeal beyond its traditional
boundaries.
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? Abandoning some traditional positions and precepts.
? Mobilizing resources and renewing grassroots
support.
? Moderating internal dissension.
Extending Appeal. The contributions by the younger
leaders to widening the party's appeal fall into two
main areas: winning working-class supporters away
from the Peronists and youth away from the left.
Making Inroads in Peronist Strongholds. Younger
UCR politicians have been a driving force behind
efforts to strengthen the party infrastructure, espe-
cially in the provinces, where the Peronists have long
held sway, notes the Embassy. According to press
reports, the young leaders have also enthusiastically
backed recent party rule changes that permit non-
UCR candidates to run on Radical tickets in the
provinces-a move designed to win votes away from
the Peronists and to attract Peronists to the UCR.
The main attack on Peronist support, however, is
through appeals to labor. While most older Radicals
have no links whatsoever to the Peronist-dominated
working class, some of the younger UCR leaders are
quite attuned to the labor sector. For example, 44-
year-old Juan Manuel Casella, a leading RYC mem-
ber (his father played a role in founding the faction), is
from the working-class Buenos Aires suburb of Ave-
llaneda, where he has a strong political base. A widely
respected and astute politician who had served since
1983 in the Chamber of Deputies (where he chaired
the Defense Committee), he was named Labor Minis-
ter in 1984. During a six-month stint in that post-he
had agreed to serve only in an interim, troubleshoot-
ing role-he demonstrated both an understanding of
workers' problems and keen negotiating skills. He
succeeded, say US diplomats, in reducing tension
between organized labor and the government that
other officials, including some old-guard UCR politi-
cians, had generated. Casella went on to become
chairman of the Buenos Aires Province UCR commit-
tee.
Upcoming UCR leader Enrique Nosiglia, 35, has also
reached out to the laboring classes. Polished and soft
spoken, he is a cool and calculating pragmatist who is
prepared to subordinate ideological considerations to
concrete political gains, reports the Embassy. As
under secretary of health and social action during the
first two years of Alfonsin's administration, he
launched several social service programs designed to
strengthen UCR support among the poor, despite
opposition criticism that they were used for partisan
purposes. These programs included:
? The National Food Plan, a government-financed
program for feeding the poor.
? A campaign to stamp out Chagas disease, an ail-
ment that afflicts primarily the lower class.
Nosiglia has since moved to the Council for Consoli-
dating Democracy, a special committee appointed by
Alfonsin. That post should give him even more time to
focus on developing party support. The Embassy
reports that Nosiglia, a key leader of the JCN, has
also promoted rapport between the UCR and the
military, traditionally a key actor in Argentine poli-
tics.
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Young UCR Leaders and the Military:
A Delicate Relationship
The young Radicals and the armed forces view each
other with considerable distrust, but with less appar-
ent hostility today than at the outset of Alfonsin's
presidency. young UCR
leaders, highly influenced by the military's human
rights abuses in the 1970s and poor performance in
the Falkland Islands crisis, firmly backed the Alfon-
sin administration's aggressive moves against the
military, including funding cutbacks and trials of
officers in early 1984. When the Minister of Defense
later moderated the government's approach, many
young Radicals were angry and called him
a traitor for conceding too much to the military,
By late 1985, however, the attitudes of younger UCR
leaders appeared to have changed significantly, prob-
ably because of their growing awareness, heightened
by experience in responsible positions, that improved
relations with the military might stave off an armed
forces intervention that could halt hard-won progress
toward democratization. At that time, one young
UCR leader (Secretary of Interior Facundo Suarez
Exploiting University Ties. The younger UCR leaders
maintain strong ties to party groups at universities
and to the Radical Youth organization. Coordinadora
leader Jesus Rodriguez was president of the national
committee of the Radical Youth during 1984-85.
Rodriguez, who shuns a formal image and often
appears before student groups in an open-necked
shirt, has encouraged Radical youth to take part in
Embassy cultural programs, report US diplomats. He
and other young politicians have attracted to the
party a wide following from the universities that
might otherwise have gravitated to the far left, ac-
cording to what UCR officials have told the US
Embassy.
Lastra) told Embassy officers that the Coordinadora
was carefully tending to its relations with the armed
forces. He said, moreover, that he sympathized with
military complaints that salaries were too low and
that he sensed efforts by the military to improve
Despite the signs of a thaw, we believe that relations
between the younger Radicals and the military are
still cool and likely to remain so. Some younger
leaders, notably Coordinadora hardliner Luis Cace-
res, continue to call publicly for trials of officers
involved in the 1970s "dirty war. " Such statements
arouse military suspicions,
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The younger leaders 25X1
thus have their job cut out in maintaining a delicately
balanced relationship with the military that will give
civilian government a chance.
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Emerging UCR Leaders-Mainstream
Juan Manuel Casella
(44)
RYC
Chairman, Buenos
Aires Province
UCR Committee
Enrique Nosiglia (35)
JCN
Key Coordinadora
leader in Buenos
Aires
Chairman, Commu-
nications Committee,
Chamber of
Deputies
Jesus Rodriguez (35)
JCN
Chairman, Budget
and Finance Com-
mittee, Chamber of
Deputies
Marcelo Stubrin (34)
JCN
Vice President, UCR
bloc, Chamber
of Deputies
Candidate for governor of province ... possible presidential contender ...
widely respected politician who has good relations with all UCR factions
... compromiser and key Alfonsin supporter.
Close to Alfonsin ... put together campaign slates for Buenos Aires City in
1983 ... has good rapport with labor, church, and military . . . key UCR
contact with non-Radical Alfonsin supporters ... presidential prospect ...
representative on the Council for Consolidating Democracy ... favors in-
creased narcotics enforcement coordination with United States.
RYC activist in Buenos Aires ... former member JCN.
Economist ... articulate supporter of Austral Plan ... strong ties to UCR
youth organizations.
Founder and ideological pillar of Coordinadora ... drafted JCN credo
... prides self on militant support of UCR ... close ties to party youth
organizations ... as often visited the United
Abandoning Party Precepts. One of the lessons the
more influential young UCR leaders appear to have
learned is the need to place political realism ahead of
party tradition if they are to be politically successful.
Two key areas in which they have apparently opted
for realism are economic policy and government
appointments.
Economic Policy. Many of the young UCR politicians
do not share the old-guard Radical commitment to
economic nationalism and an emphasis on state own-
ership and opposition to foreign investment. They
have vocally supported Alfonsin's Austral Plan-a
program emphasizing austerity, private ownership,
and attraction of foreign capital, which has signifi-
cantly reduced the country's rampant inflation (from
over 30 percent monthly in mid-1984 to 2 percent
monthly today)-and have garnered some of the
resulting public approval.
Casella has been a particularly staunch and eloquent
defender of the plan. He appeared on television
shortly after it was announced to discuss the economic
situation and call for patience and support for the
government. The Embassy reports that his appeal was
generally well received.
Another articulate spokesman, and a frequent speaker
at party rallies, is Rodriguez. The youngest (30)
member of Congress and the UCR's most prominent
young economist, he chairs the powerful Budget and
Finance Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. In
that post he works on both budget and foreign debt
programs; in doing so, say US diplomats, he has
deepened his understanding of his country's economic
problems and interests. Once a hardliner on debt
issues with a hostile view of the IMF, he now says that
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The United States. Younger Radicals recognize the
United States as the most powerful nation in the
hemisphere but advocate a neutralist Third-World-
oriented foreign policy. Most have visited this coun-
try and would like to come again, according to what
Radicals have told Embassy officials.
Finance. They want to end the decades offiinancial
speculation that have plagued Argentina and begin
rewarding productive investment. hey have
said that the public sector deficit must be reduced.
Most would like to continue to lobby the US Govern-
ment to press the IMF and creditor banks for liberal
repayment guidelines and new loan terms. Although
they distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
debt, they do not advocate repudiation, say Embassy
officials.
Narcotics. Increased narcotics tricking through
Argentina alarms the younger leaders, who have
asked for closer cooperation in law enforcement with
the United States. They have also suggested bilateral
cooperation in the area of drug education programs
as a useful area of future contact.
Central America. The Embassy reports that, like the
great majority of UCR members, the emerging lead-
ers are concerned about the possible emergence of a
Soviet surrogate state in Central America. They
disagree, however, with the US Government's assess-
ment of the extent of Marxist control within the
Government of Nicaragua. The younger leaders have
been much more critical in public of US Central
American actions than has President Alfonsin.
Nuclear Development. Several young UCR leaders,
with Alfonsin's backing, have spearheaded Argen-
tina's efforts to play a leading role in Third World
nuclear development. They see exports of nuclear
technology to foreign markets as an important means
of supporting their country's own large nuclear indus-
try. As proponents of independent nuclear develop-
ment, they have resisted US efforts to regulate the
use and transfer of nuclear technology.
creditor nations, banks, and debtor countries need to
share responsibility if the problem is to be solved.
Government Appointments. When the UCR held pow-
er in the past, a basic party precept was to rely on its
own people to run the government. Today the young
UCR leaders who are allied with Alfonsin are helping
the President break this pattern and bring in elements 25X1
from outside the party, including opposition politi-
cians and technocrats, to increase both the base of
support and the expertise of his administration. Some
young leaders have criticized old party barons and 25X1
Coordinadora hardliners who they believed were re-
sisting placement of outsiders in key government
posts. 25X1
25X1
In the case of apolitical technocrats who have been
brought into the government, the younger Radicals 25X1
have at times assisted some of them in gaining support
within the UCR for policies that go against Radical
tradition. For example, before the implementation of
the Austral Plan, Economy Minister Juan Sourrouille,
a technocrat, met with several young UCR leaders,
including Nosiglia, Rodriguez, and Casella, to enlist
their aid in implementing the program and selling it
to the rest of the UCR, reports the press.
Mobilizing the Party. The UCR, which traditionally
disdained the mass rallies and other populist devices
of Peronism, more recently has taken a page out of
the Peronists' mobilization book. Alfonsin, supported
by the emerging leaders, has sought to assemble and
energize party members for various reasons ranging
from his 1983 campaign to postelection demonstra-
tions in support of democracy.
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The Mobilization Committee. To oversee mobiliza-
tion activities, Alfonsin formed a committee under the
UCR governing board in early 1984. Since then,
according to press reports, it has become one of the
board's most important committees, marshaling sup-
port for administration policies and programs through
contacts with all segments of society. Alfonsin has
placed three young UCR leaders representing diverse
party elements in charge of this Mobilization Com-
mittee.
Committee cochairman Marcelo Stubrin, 35, is vice
president of the UCR bloc of deputies in the Chamber
and one of the most prominent members of the
Coordinadora. A member of the President's circle of
intimate associates with strong ties to the UCR youth
organizations, he was handpicked for the Mobiliza-
tion Committee by Alfonsin because of his contacts
and political acumen, say US officials. Cerebral and
urbane, he performs his duties with skill and commit-
ment, according to US diplomats. He is admired for
his political know-how even by conservatives-an
indication of the wide esteem he enjoys. At the UCR
congress in December 1985, he won a seat on the
party governing board.
Stubrin comes from an active political family. Al-
though he can never become president of Argentina (a
Jew, he is legally barred from holding that post), he
prides himself on his patriotism and militant support
of the Radical party, say US diplomats.
Another coleader is RYC activist Leopoldo Moreau,
who is about 40. Moreau headed the Buenos Aires
UCR slate in last fall's election and now chairs the
Communications Committee in the Chamber of Dep-
uties. Widely regarded as one of the UCR's most
capable congressional leaders, he has been deeply
involved in government lobbying efforts on several
difficult pieces of legislation. In addition, the press
reports that he represents the party at factory meet-
ings and ceremonies, visits trade unions and retire-
ment groups, and meets with community leaders.
The third coleader, Federico Storani, represents the
Coordinadora hard line. Although not considered as
staunch a supporter of Alfonsin as the other two
leaders, Storani has apparently worked effectively
with his coleaders.
Mobilization Activities. UCR mobilization efforts
first began on a large scale during the 1983 presiden-
tial campaign. Candidate Alfonsin relied heavily on
the Radical Youth organization and young party
leaders-such as Nosiglia, who engineered the suc-
cessful campaign in Buenos Aires City and Prov-
ince-to gather crowds for his political rallies.
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Luis Caceres ... about 44 years old ... key UCR
leader in Santa Fe Province ... represents JCN's
strongest foothold outside Buenos Aires area ... of-
ten critical of party leadership ... outspokenness re-
flects greater independence of party officials outside
Buenos Aires ... not directly critical of President but
believes Alfonsin has unwisely bypassed party appa-
ratus in making decisions ... expected to run for
governor of Santa Fe in 1987.
Alfonsin and his supporters have also mobilized the
party on several occasions since that election, includ-
ing the 1985 congressional elections. In the 1985
campaign-which prominently linked younger UCR
candidates to Alfonsin-Nosiglia again played a ma-
jor role. Preferring to work behind the scenes, he
avoids the press and does not like to have his picture
taken, according to Embassy and press reporting. He
told Embassy officers at one point during the cam-
paign that he would be unavailable for several weeks
because he was tied down with planning a rally in
support of the government's economic program. Sev-
eral other young Radicals-including Rodriguez and
Casella-gave key speeches at the final party rally
before the congressional voting.
Federico Storani ... age 35 ... president of Foreign
Relations Committee in Chamber of Deputies
... much backing in old, nationalist left wing of
UCR led by his father, a cofounder of RYC and now
Minister of Public Health and Social Action ... last
year initiated efforts to remove Alfonsin from party
presidency but was unsuccessful ... coleader of par-
ty's Mobilization Committee.
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In addition to organizing rallies, the young UCR
leaders have reached out to the rank and file in other
ways, reports the Embassy. They have:
? Used extensive door-to-door campaigning and other
grassroots organizational activities both to activate
dormant members and to recruit new ones.
? Implemented skillful publicity campaigns that have
attracted new members and renewed the sense of
mission of veterans. 25X1
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resulting compromise significantly strengthened the
UCR's performance in the congressional voting, re-
Dealing With Dissension. Although the UCR's long-
standing internal differences have led to conflicting
approaches to governing, the disunity has been miti-
gated by the style of the mainstream young Radicals,
who have demonstrated both flexibility and modera-
tion. They have aimed their conciliatory approach
particularly at the small doctrinaire group within the
JCN, including Storani and National Deputy Luis
Caceres. They and other hardliners have:
? Refused to close ranks behind the President on
issues, thus hindering his efforts at party unity.
? Attempted (unsuccessfully) to maneuver him out of
ports the Embassy.
Another example is the agreement reached in early
1986 on UCR candidates for the 1987 election for
governor of Buenos Aires Province. That agreement
(proposed by Moreau) forestalls bickering over the
ticket between the RYC and the JCN by making
Casella the candidate for governor and Coordinadora
hardliner Storani the candidate for vice governor. The
ticket has strong overall party backing, according to
press reports.
Projecting a Moderate Image. In addition to negotiat-
ing effectively with various members of their own
UCR generation, the mainline younger leaders have
also used compromise tactics with tradition-bound
members of the older generation. Possibly because
they believe time is on their side and they will
inevitably inherit the party leadership from the older
chiefs, many of the younger UCR leaders usually try
to work with their older rivals rather than confronting
them. According to Embassy officials, influential
younger leaders seek to project an image of responsi-
bility and moderation. Moreau, for example, now
associated with Casella and the RYC, has moved so
far toward the party center from the left that he has
broken off his former association with the Coordina-
dora. "Reality is hard," one Coordinadora member
told the US Embassy, when referring to adjustments
the party presidency.
? Prepared an alternative leftist program.
Willingness to Compromise. Despite the dissent, the
tradition of factionalism, and the sometimes aggres-
sive and combative styles of individuals, many of the
UCR's emerging leaders have demonstrated the abili-
ty to negotiate and compromise with politicians out-
side their own factions. This flexibility was demon-
strated, for example, in negotiations on the
composition of UCR candidate lists for the 1985
congressional voting in Buenos Aires Province, discus-
sions involving difficult issues that many observers
doubted could be resolved. Although the Embassy
reports that the talks between RYC leaders Casella
and Moreau and Coordinadora members Nosiglia and
Stubrin were indeed rough-and-tumble confronta-
tions, the participants did reach agreement. The
in thinking during Alfonsin's first two years.
Outlook
We believe that attention by Alfonsin and his young
supporters to the four areas of party revitalization
described above-coupled with relative success in
addressing economic, human rights, and other is-
sues-has led to the present, preeminent status of the
UCR and has provided momentum for the party to
look ahead with some confidence to three major
milestones:
? Senatorial elections in December 1986.1
1 It should be noted that the 1986 Senate elections are indirect
votes, by provincial legislatures already elected, and thus the party
winner, the UCR (though not the individual winners), is already
known. Most political observers expect the UCR to gain one or two
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? Gubernatorial elections in 1987.
? The presidential election in 1989.
party's old-line leaders, many of whom only grudging-
ly support nontraditional approaches, and the JCN's
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Although Alfonsin has been the catalyst and key
figure in the party's political success, the younger
leaders have also contributed to the UCR's reemer-
gence, in our judgment, through their flexibility,
loyalty, and support. They appear likely to play
increasingly important roles. There are reports that
Moreau will replace Buenos Aires gubernatorial can-
didate Casella in his present party post and that
Casella, or possibly Nosiglia, will eventually assume
the party leadership and run for president. Although
none of these younger leaders yet has the popular
appeal of the President, they and other pro-Alfonsin
emerging leaders have many of the requisites for
assuming the direction of the party and maintaining
its cohesiveness and strength:
? They have demonstrated their willingness and abili-
ty to resolve party disputes.
? They have gained valuable political and administra-
tive experience in party and government posts.
? They generally have bright political futures and are
likely to grow in influence.
The challenges to Alfonsin and the UCR, however,
are substantial. The outlook for the economy is uncer-
tain; unemployment is on the rise, and growth rates
are negative (-4.5 percent in 1985). The tension
between the government and the military also remains
a crucial area of concern. In addition, violence, which
has traditionally simmered just below the surface of
Argentine society, could erupt in the form of out-of-
control demonstrations like those during the late 1985
visit of US businessman David Rockefeller or terrorist
acts-such as the bombings that preceded the 1985
elections-to undermine the regime. Should Alfonsin
and his supporters lose control in any of these areas,
power could revert-depending on circumstances too
complex to predict at present-to the military, the
Peronists, or leftists inside or outside the UCRF-
Even on the assumption that the President maintains
a fair degree of control over economic, political, and
social problems, he and his supporters face an ongoing
challenge within the UCR, with its extensive history
of factionalism. They will have to cope with both the
young militant leftist minority.
If the popular President and his supporters remain as
strong as they are today, the UCR dissenters-
whether old or young-stand little chance, in our
estimation, either of gaining control of the party or of
changing its centrist, pragmatic course. Significant
problems such as a worsening economic situation,
however, could force Alfonsin away from his moder-
ate policies and give rise to renewed factionalism in
the party. Thus the political health of Alfonsin and his
supporters and, in our view, the future of the party as
an effective political force are tied to the economic
and political stability of Argentina.
If Alfonsin gets through the next three years with
some success, it will be in part because of the efforts
of the emerging UCR leaders who support him, in our
judgment. Those leaders will have used their increas-
ing experience, influence, and negotiating skills to
help keep the party together and strong for 1989.
Whether a leader such as Casella or Nosiglia can
carry the party to victory in that election cannot be
judged at this time, but an effective UCR could help
Alfonsin prepare the way for his successor.
Implications for the United States.
The perpetuation of a revitalized, less tradition-bound
Radical party (assuming a relatively stable political
and economic environment) bodes well for the future
of democracy:
? By demonstrating the success of moderation and
responsibility, the party develops a strong position in
the center of the political spectrum, where most
Argentines are now located, and restricts the poten-
tial support for issues advanced at the extremes.
? The success it has enjoyed would encourage reform-
ist elements within the Peronist ranks to try to lead
their party on a more moderate course-the first
step, in our view, toward the development of a
responsible Peronist opposition.
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In addition to the general advantages from the US
perspective of strengthened democracy in Argenti-
na-decreased prospect of extremism and increased
prospect of stability and of policies and governing
approaches compatible with this country's-the
emerging UCR leadership may represent other possi-
ble benefits to the United States. The generally
openminded attitude of most young Radicals toward
this country suggests enhanced US-Argentine cooper-
ation in areas such as IMF and debt negotiations and
drug trafficking control.
Nevertheless, these leaders-especially as managers
of a more stable country-could become more asser-
tive in pursuing Third-World-oriented positions. Two
particular problem areas could be US Central Ameri-
can policy and regulation of nuclear development and
proliferation.
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Secret
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