CONSTRUCTION AND IMPORTS OF VESSELS FOR THE SOVIET MARITIME FLEET 1946-60

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• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 14, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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N? 35
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
CONSTRUCTION AND IMPORTS OF VESSELS
FOR THE SOVIET MARITIME FLEET
1946-60
CIA/RR 125
14 March 1958
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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W ARNING
This material contains informaticn affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
CONSTRUCTION AND IMPORTS OF VESSETS FOR Ta SOVIET MARITIME FTEET
1946-60
CIA/RR 125
(ORR Project 35.17)43)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
S-E-C-R-E-T
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FOREWORD
The purpose of this report is to show the volume and the value
both of maritime vessels constructed by the USSR during 1950-56 and of
newly constructed maritime vessels imported from the European Satel-
lites, Communist China, and countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc
during 1946-56. Construction in the USSR is measured in 1955 US dol-
lars, calculated on the basis of the estimated cost of construction
of similar vessels in the US.
This report is part of the program of ORB to estimate the magnitude
of the shipbuilding effort in the USSR. Parallel reports will deal
with construction of naval, fishing, and inland waterway vessels; the
total gross value of this construction; and the value added by the
shipbuilding industry in the USSR during 1950-56.
The estimates contained in this report of construction during 1956-
60 are based on the announced goals for the original Soviet Sixth Five
Year Plan (1956-60) and the capability of the shipbuilding industry of
the USSR. Recently the USSR announced that a new long-term economic
plan would be instituted covering 1959-65. No attempt has been made to
adjust the estimates in this report or to anticipate probable new goals
that may be set forth in the forthcoming plan.
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CONTENTS
Summary and Conclusions
I. Introduction
A. Historical Background, 1920-45
B. Postwar Developments Through 1956
Page
1
3
5
II.
Types and Sizes of Vessels Added, l9-i-6-56
6
A.
General
6
B.
Dry Cargo Vessels
8
C.
Tankers
8
D.
Refrigerated Vessels
8
III.
Volume and Value of Vessels Added, 1946-56
8
A.
General
8
B.
Vessels Imported from the European Satellites and
Communist China
9
1. Poland
2. Hungary
3. East Germany
4. Communist China
10
10
11
11
C. Vessels Imported from Countries Outside the Sino-
Soviet Bloc
11
D. Vessels Constructed in the USSR
12
1. Tankers
13
2. Refrigerated and DrTCargo-Vesse1s
14
IV.
3. Other Vessels,
Projected Estimate .of Volume and Value of Construction,
1956-60 . ? . , ... - .. ..........
-
15
15
A. Dry Cargo'Vessels and Tankers
16
B. Passenger Vessels
17
C. Tugs
17
D. Refrigerated and Miscellaneous Types of Vessels ?
?
17
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V. Capability and Limitations
VI. Intentions
Appendixes
Page
18
19
Appendix A. Statistical Tables 21
Appendix B. Input Requirements for Soviet Construction of
Maritime Vessels, 1955
Appendix C. Methodology
31
37
Tables
1. Volume and Value of Maritime Vessels Added to the Soviet
Fleet, 1946-56 7
2. Classification of the Principal Vessels Added to the
Soviet Maritime Fleet, 1946-56 22
3. Estimated Volume of Soviet Imports of Maritime Vessels
from the European Satellites and Communist China,
1946-56 23
4. Estimated Value of Soviet Imports of Maritime Vessels
from the European Satellites and Communist China,
1946-56 24
5. Estimated Volume of Soviet Imports of Maritime Vessels
from Countries Outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1946-56 . 25
6. Estimated Value of Soviet Imports of Maritime Vessels
from Countries Outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1946-56 . 26
Estimated Volume of Soviet Construction of Maritime
Vessels, 1950-56 27
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Page
8. Estimated Value of Soviet Construction of
Maritime Vessels, 1950-56 28
9. Classification of Vessels Constructed in Poland
and Imported by the USSR, l91-6-56 29
10. Estimated Input Requirements for Soviet Construc-
tion of Maritime Vessels, 1955 32
11. Input Factors for US Construction of Maritime
Vessels, 1955
12. Costs of Selected Merchant Vessels
Charts
34
39
Following Page
Figure 1. USSR: Volume of Additions to the Maritime
Fleet, 1950-56 10
Figure 2. USSR: value of Additions to the Maritime
Fleet, 1950-56 10
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(ORR Project 35.17)3)
CONSTRUCTION AND IMPORTS OF VESSELS FOR THE SOVIET MARITIME FTRET*
1946-60
Summary and Conclusions
Construction of maritime vessels in the USSR since World War II,
with the exception of the Kazbek-class** tanker, apparently has been
on the basis of availability of shipyard capacity rather than on the
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the
best judgment of ORR as of 1 November 1957.
** The Kazbek-class tanker is a medium-size tanker having the follow-
ing characteristics: cargo capacity of 10,000 deadweight tons, full
load displacement of 16,250 metric tons, diesel propulsion of 4,000
horsepower (hp), speed of 13 knots, and internal cubic capacity of
7,961 and 8,229 gross register.tons (GRT). An average of 8,100 GRT
is used in this report. The deadweight tons cargo capacity (dwtcc)
is the total weight of cargo in tons which the vessel can carry in
the full load condition. The deadweight tons cargo capacity is equal
to the deadweight tonnage minus the full load allowance weight of
crew, passengers, provisions, fuel, water, and other items necessary
for use on a voyage. The deadweight tonnage of a vessel is the
carrying capacity of the vessel, in tons of 2,240 pounds -- tonnages
are given in tons of 2,240 pounds throughout this report unless other-
wise indicated. It includes the crew and their effects and all items
of consumable or variable load such as stores, fuel, and cargo. The
deadweight tonnage is the difference in tons between full load dis-
placement and light ship displacement (LSD). Full load displacement
of a surface vessel is the number of tons of water displaced by the
vessel afloat, fully loaded, including all equipment, outfit, crew
and their effects, fresh water, provisions, fuel, and all other items
necessary for the operation of the vessel. Light ship displacement
is the weight of the vessel complete, ready for service in every re-
spect, including permanent ballast and liquids in the machinery at
operating levels but excluding the crew and their effects and any
items of consumable or variable load such as stores, fuel, and cargo
Gross register tonnage is a measure wherein the entire internal
cubic capacity of the vessel is expressed in register tons -- 100
cubic feet to the ton. Not included in the measurement are certain
spaces such as peak tanks and other tanks of water ballast, open
forecastle, bridge and poop, hatchway excess, certain light and air
spaces, anchor gear, steering gear, wheelhouse, galley, cabins for
passengers, and other minor spaces specified by law.
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basis of a program of priorities for shipbuilding, because of the high
priority assigned to construction of naval vessels in the USSR.
Western international controls forced the USSR in 1951 to under-
take construction of Kazbek-class tankers in its own shipyards. By
the end of 1956, 36 vessels of this class had been delivered. Until
mid-1955, no other major Soviet program for the construction of mari-
time vessels was evident. In mid-1955 the Ministry of Shipbuilding
undertook construction of a series of refrigerated vessels (5,217 GRT)
for the Ministry of the Fish Industry and a series of dry cargo* ves-
sels (5,49)i. GRT) for the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet. In 1954'a
shipyard of the Volga River basin began a small program of constructing
tankers (3,000 GRT) for the Caspian Sea - Volga River service and by
the end of 1956 had constructed six vessels.
The USSR attached more importance to building up the maritime
fleet, however, than is indicated by the apparently low priority
assigned to construction of maritime vessels. During 1946-56 the
USSR added to its maritime fleet 1.7 million GRT of new vessels
valued at almost 1955 US $1 billion.** Of these amounts, 1.1 mil-
lion GRT valued at $644 million were in oceangoing xxx self-pro-
pelled dry cargo vessels, tankers, and refrigerated vessels. The
remaining 0.6 million GRT valued at $346 million were in tugs,
schooners, self-propelled and non-self-propelled lighters, barges,
passenger ships, and miscellaneous auxiliary vessels. Countries
outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc constructed for the USSR maritime ves-
sels valued at $395 million, or 40 percent of the total; the Euro-
pean Satellites and Communist China produced $349 million, or 35 per-
cent of the total; and the USSR constructed $245 million, or 25 per-
cent of the total. With the exception of the Kazbek-class tankers,
the USSR constructed mostly low-cost, non-self-propelled types; the
European Satellites and Communist China, mostly simple self-propelled
types; and the non-Bloc countries, the more complex and therefore the
more costly types.
* For a discussion of dry cargo in relation to the original Sixth
Five Year ,Plan (1956-60), see the footnote on p. 15.
** Dollar values are given in 1955 US dollars throughout this report
unless otherwise indicated.
*** The term oceangoing as used in this report refers to the principal
types of vessels of the maritime fleet operating more than 20 miles off
shore. These vessels are engaged in transporting freight and passengers
in ocean or coastal voyages as opposed to secondary types such as
schooners, lighters, passenger cutters, auxiliary vessels, and harbor
craft.
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The USSR constructed a negligible amount of tonnage for the mari-
time fleet during 1946-49. Construction during 1950-56, however, valued
at $245 million, was only 2 percent of the total value of all vessels,
naval and merchant, constructed during the same period in the USSR.
The order of vessels constructed in the USSR during 1950-56 is as fol-
lows: first, naval vessels (92 percent of the total value); second,
inland* vessels (4.8 percent of the total); third, maritime vessels
(2 percent of the total); and, fourth, fishing vessels (1.2 percent of
the total).
The original Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60) indicates that the value
of maritime vessels to be constructed by the USSR during 1956-60 will
more than double the value of vessels constructed during the Fifth Five
Year Plan (1951-55). There are no indications of possible nonfulfill-
ment of the plan. A changeover of idle facilities, formerly used for
construction of naval surface vessels, to construction of maritime ves-
sels, together with the appraisal that the projected plan could be ful-
filled without the use of these idle facilities, strongly indicates that
plans for construction of maritime vessels will be met.
The USSR announced on 25 September 1957 that a new long-term eco-
nomic plan would be drafted by 1 July 1958 to cover 1959-65. This
action would imply setting aside the goals of the original Sixth
Five Year Plan and the institution of new ones. Because there have
been no announced or implied adjustments during 1956-57 of the goals
originally announced for the Sixth Five Year Plan for maritime ship-
building, it is believed that the shipbuilding industry will continue
at its present rate of construction or at a slightly increased rate
through 1958 and possibly through the period of the new plan.
I. Introduction.
In the shipbuilding industry of the USSR the sector which constructs
oceangoing vessels was developed largely to implement the Soviet deci-
sion to become a world naval power. Because construction of naval ves-
sels carried top priority, construction of maritime vessels apparently
* The term inland as used in the report refers to inland waterways,
which include rivers, lakes, and canals. The term inland fleet com-
prises all self-propelled and non-self-propelled vessels using the in-
land waterways and does not include harbor craft in maritime ports and
vessels in or for the Caspian Fleet.
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has been on the basis of availability of shipyard capacity. Therefore,
the USSR has had to depend extensively on imports to supply the mari-
time fleet.
A. Historical Background, 1920-45. 1/*
After the Communist Revolution in Russia the major Russian ship-
yards were in a state of disrepair and required almost 8 years for re-
construction to a level where a limited program for the construction of
maritime vessels could be undertaken.
The first major program for construction of large maritime ves-
sels was instituted in 1924. This program called .for construction of
170 vessels totaling 401,000 GRT. These vessels were chiefly cargo-
carrying types such as lumber carriers, oil tankers, and general cargo
vessels. Of the total program for 1924, 9 lumber carriers and 1 re-
frigerator vessel totaling 23,000 GRT were completed by the beginning
of the First Five Year Plan (1928-32).
With the institution in 1928 of the First Five Year Plan, the
1924 program was revised. The first 5-year program for construction
of maritime vessels, largely including the same types as the 1924 pro-
gram, called for construction of 117 vessels totaling 306,000 GRT.
During the same period, 95 vessels totaling 185,000 GRT were to be
procured from foreign countries. The fulfillment of the first 5-year
program fell far short of the goal, and only 63 vessels totaling
141,000 GRT were constructed. Fourteen vessels were in varying
stages of completion at the end of the period.
The beginning of the Second Five Year Plan (1933-37) was marked
by the intensification of the program for construction of naval vessels.
Although a number of maritime vessels were constructed during the pe-
riod, no specific goals were included in the announced plan.
In spite of the achievements made by the shipbuilding industry
up to 1939, construction of oceangoing vessels fell short of the goals
set by the USSR. Between 1924 and the end of the Second Five Year Plan,
193 vessels totaling 325,000 GRT were built by the USSR, and it is
estimated that about 413,000 GRT were procured from foreign countries,
principally the Netherlands, France, Sweden, England, Denmark, and
Japan.
The beginning of the Third Five Year Plan (1938-42) saw no les-
sening by the USSR of the intensity of construction of naval vessels.
This plan noted that the tasks of the USSR were as follows 2/:
* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix E.
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To provide sea and ocean fleets with all types
of modern ships and to create production capacity
for -shipbuilding sufficient to meet the growing
demands of Soviet ocean and river transportation
with domestic production facilities.
Few maritime vessels were constructed in the USSR between the begin-
ning of the Third Five Year Plan and the outbreak of World War II.
Construction of maritime vessels in the USSR practically
ceased during World War II. During World War II, major shipyards of
the USSR suffered varying amounts of damage from total destruction,
as in the case of the Nosenko (formerly Marti) shipyard in Nikolayev,
to slight damage, as in the case of the shipyards in Leningrad.
B. Postwar Developments Through 1956.
The Soviet shipbuilding industry during 1945-56 experienced the
greatest expansion in its history. Construction of vessels for the So-
viet Navy was assigned an even higher priority than in the prewar years.
The Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) included the following
statements _V:
By 1950, seagoing freight carriage shall be in-
creased to 2.2 times that of prewar.
Domestic building of deep-sea merchantmen shall
be increased in 1946-50 by building 2 shipyards,
1 on the Black Sea to build seagoing freighters and
1 on the Baltic Sea to build trawlers and seagoing
tugs.*
Soviet shipbuilding shall be greatly developed.
In 1950 the tonnage of ships built shall be double
the 1940 figure. The building of a strong and power-
ful navy for the USSR shall be ensured. New vessels
and bases shall be built for the Soviet Navy.
The major effort made by the shipbuilding industry during the
Fourth Five Year Plan was in the rehabilitation and expansion of its
shipyards and its plants for building ship components. No large cargo,
tanker', or passenger vessels were constructed in the USSR during the
Fourth Five Year Plan. A negligible number of tugs, barges, small
coastal vessels, and small miscellaneous types, however, were constructed.
* The Black Sea shipyard referred to may be the new shipyard at Kherson,
although this shipyard was not capable of constructing vessels until
1953. The Baltic shipyard referred to may be the new Baltic shipyard in
Klaipeda, Lithuanian SSR.
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The directives for the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) disclosed
little information about the proposed buildup of the maritime fleet
beyond the stated increase in domestic construction of 2.9 times the
1950 rate of construction by 1955 and an increase in sea transportation
of 55 to 60 percent compared with that in 1950.
By 1950, most major shipyards had been rebuilt to the extent
that construction of new vessels could be undertaken. Construction of
all classes of vessels (naval, maritime, fishing, and inland) during
the Fifth Five Year Plan far exceeded construction during any other
5-year period in Russian or Soviet history.
II. Types anA Sizes of Vessels Added, 19116-56.
A. General.
At the end of World War II the Soviet maritime fleet was in a
state of imbalance with respect to its own needs as well as to trade
with the newly acquired Satellites. Vessels acquired through lend-
lease from the US during the war and vessels obtained through repara-
tions and salvage immediately following the war failed to provide the
necessary balance in freighters and tankers for oceangoing and coastal
service. The greatest gaps were in the categories of large tankers,
small freighters, and tugs and, to a lesser extent, refrigerator ves-
sels, passenger ships, and miscellaneous types. The immediate need
for the latter types was not so pressing as that for the cargo and
tanker types.
During 1946-56, more than 1.7 million GRT of maritime vessels,
valued at almost $1 billion, were added to the Soviet maritime fleet.
Of these vessels, more than 400 were new oceangoing self-propelled
cargo, tanker, and refrigerated types, aggregating 1,088,000 GRT.
The volume and value of new maritime vessels added to the Soviet
fleet during 1946-56 are shown in Table 1,* and a detailed break-
down of gross register tonnage by type of principal addition is shown
in Table 2.**
To implement industrial development in the USSR, the planners
for Soviet transportation set out to provide a balanced maritime fleet.
Because of the need for shallow draft vessels for coastal traffic,
emphasis first was placed on the procurement of vessels in the range
of 1,000 to 2,500 GRT.xxx Nearly 52 percent of the total number of
Table 1 follows on p. 7.
XX Appendix A, p.22, below.
xxx For a detailed listing of vessels by range of gross register tons,
see Table 2 (Appendix A, p. 22, below).
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Table 1
Volume and Value of Maritime Vessels Added to the Soviet Fleet
1946-56
Type of Vessel
Cargo vessel a/
Tanker 21
Refrigerated vessel
Tug
Schooner, lighter, barge, and other
miscellaneous types of freight-
carrying vessels
Passenger vessel, crane, dredger,
icebreaker, and other types of
non-freight-carrying vessels
Total
Gross
Register,
Tonnage 2/
612,400
385,300
90,200
91,700
Value
(Million 1955 us $) 12/
386.4
165.6
92.0
99.9
462,700 169.9
71,700
1 714 000
75.8
989.6
a. Taken from Tables 3,
below).
b. Taken from Tables 4,
below). For methodology
c. Principal oceangoing
p.22, below).
5, and 7 (Appendix A, pp. 23, 25, and 27,
6, and 8 (Appendix A, pp. 24, 26, and 28,
used in valuing construction, see Appendix B.
types only, as compiled in Table 2 (Appendix A?
vessels added to the fleet during 1946-56 were in the range of 1,000
to 2,500 GRT, a range which comprised about 40 percent of the cargo
gross register tonnage added and almost 30 percent of the total gross
register tonnage added. Because of the lack of railroads and highways
in the coastal areas of the Soviet Far East, a large number of these
vessels was assigned to coastal service to implement industrial develop-
ment. These shallow draft vessels were useful in these areas because
of the low level of development of harbor facilities. It is estimated
that-more than 50 percent of the current dry cargo fleet of the Caspian
Sea also is composed of new vessels in the range of 1,000 to 2,500 GRT.
No new vessels larger than those of 9,050 GRT were added to the fleet.
Most of the vessels added to the fleet were in the speed range of 9 to
13 knots and were powered with low-horsepower diesel or steam recipro-
cating engines. Some steam turbine vessels were built for the USSR by
countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
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B. Dry Cargo Vessels.
Of the principal vessels added, 68 percent of the total number
and 56 percent of the total gross register tonnage were dry cargo types.
The dry cargo types averaged 2,210 GRT per vessel principally because
of the large number constructed in the range of 1,000 to 2,500 GRT.
C. Tankers.
Tankers made up 23 percent of the oceangoing vessels added but
constituted 35 percent of the total gross register tonnage. Tankers
averaged 4,140 GRT each, almost twice the average of the dry cargo
types. This higher average was caused principally by the addition of
36 Kazbek-class (8,100-GRT average) tankers during 1951-56. These 36
tankers constituted the only major program evident by mid-1955 for
construction of maritime vessels. The Kazbek-class tankers largely
were put into Black Sea - Soviet Far East service to au&ent the facil-
ities for transportation of oil on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The
Caspian Sea tanker fleet was augmented by the addition of 6 new tankers
of approximately 3,000 GRT each. These tankers were designed to oper-
ate in the Caspian Sea as well as on the Volga River, thus obviating
the necessity of transloading to shallow draft vessels to transit the
Astrakhan and Krasnovodsk roadsteads and the Volga River.
D. Refrigerated Vessels.
The 38 refrigerated vessels constructed during 1946-56 largely
have been assigned to the Soviet Ministry of the Fish Industry for the
transportation of fish from the fishing fleets to the mainland.
III. Volume and Value of Vessels Added, 1946-56.
A. General.
Because of the high priority assigned since World War II to
construction of naval vessels in Soviet shipyards, it became necessary
for the USSR to look to other countries for new maritime vessels.
Resuming its prewar practice of purchasing vessels from foreign coun-
tries, the USSR entered into trade agreements with Finland, Sweden,
France, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands and purchased new ships
from Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and West Germany. Additional and
more important sources of supply of maritime vessels for the USSR were
the European Satellites and Communist China. An examination of the
percentage of total construction of maritime vessels exported to the
USSR by these countries shows the extent of exploitation by the USSR
of their shipbuilding industries.
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The estimated value of new vessels added to the Soviet Maritime
Fleet during 1946-56 is almost $1 billion, with $395 million (4o per-
cent) originating in countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc, $349 mil-
lion (35 percent) in the European Satellites and Communist China, and
$245 million (25 percent) in the USSR. Comparisons of the volume and
the value of annual imports from the European Satellites, Communist
China and countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc with Soviet construc-
tion are shown in the accompanying charts, Figures 1 and 2,* respec-
tively.
It is evident that in planning both construction and procure-
ment of vessels from other countries the USSR placed orders according
to the industrial capability of the individual countries to supply
maritime vessels. With the exception of the Kazbek-class tankers,
the USSR constructed mostly low-cost, non-self-propelled types; the
European Satellites, mostly simple self-propelled types; and the
countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the more complex and there-
fore the more costly types. The following tabulation shows the
average price per gross register ton for each of the three principal
sources of supply:
Source of Supply
Average Price
(1955 US $ per GRT)
European Satellites and Communist China
652
Countries Outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc
747
USSR
378
B. Vessels Imported from the European Satellites and Communist
China.
Immediately following World War II the USSR gave technical
assistance and presumably some material aid to those European Satellites
developing shipbuilding facilities. Similar assistance later was given
to Communist China. After the European Satellites had begun construc-
tion of maritime vessels, it became evident that the types under con-
struction were of Soviet design and that almost all the construction
was being exported to the USSR. For the most part these vessels were
* Following p. 10. Because of the small, erratic production during
1946-49, estimates of volume and value for these years are omitted in
Figures 1 and 2. Estimates for construction, by country, for these
years, are shown in Tables 3 through 6 (Appendix A, pp. 23 through 26,
below). The estimates for value are based on prices shown in Table 12
(Appendix C, p. 39, below).
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simple cargo types that were being serially produced. Imports from
Communist China largely were barges and tugs also of Soviet design.*
During 1946-56 the European Satellites and Communist China con-
structed 535,900 GRT,** about 31 percent of the total new tonnage added
to the Soviet maritime fleet. These additions are valued at $349 mil-
lion, or 35 percent of the total value of all vessels added to the
Soviet maritime fleet during 1946-56. Of this tonnage, approximately
391,000 GRT, or 63 percent of all cargo types added during this period,
were oceangoing, self-propelled vessels. These vessels were generally
small types that were in short supply iri the Soviet maritime fleet at
the beginning of the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55).
1. Poland.
Construction in Poland fell behind the Polish Six Year Plan
(1950-55) by 40 percent, but exports to the USSR lagged behind the plan
by only 11 percent. The Six Year Plan called for Poland to export to
the USSR 57 percent of total planned construction of oceangoing cargo
vessels. Actually the USSR received approximately 85 percent of these
vessels, totaling about 247,000 GRT, or 40 percent of the cargo vessels
added to the Soviet fleet during 1946-56. These vessels are valued at
about $144 million. A classification of vessels constructed for the
USSR in Poland is given in Table 9.xxx
2. Hungary.
Hungary constructed about 93,000 GRT, or 15 percent of the
principal oceangoing self-propelled cargo types added to the Soviet
maritime fleet. For the most part these vessels were of the Tisza-
class of 1,194 GRT, of diesel propulsion, and with a speed of about 9
knots. Other types of cargo vessels constructed before 1950 consisted
of a series of 1,050-GRT vessels and a few vessels in the range of 500
to 600 GRT. Oceangoing vessels exported by Hungary to the USSR during
1946-56 had a total value of approximately $54.5 million. During these
years, Hungary exported more than 95 percent of its construction of
oceangoing cargo vessels to the USSR. During the same period, Hungary
constructed a number of 100-ton and 5-ton floating cranes for the USSR,
valued at $28.8 million.
* Detailed estimates of maritime vessels constructed in the European
Satellites and Communist China and imported by the USSR during 1946-56
are shown in Tables 3 and 4 (Appendix AI pp. 23 and 24, below).
** Including 144,900 GRT of floating cranes, barges, tugs, and mis-
cellaneous auxiliary vessels.
xxx Appendix AI P. 29, below.
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USSR
VOLUME OF ADDITIONS TO THE MARITIME FLEET, 1950-56
Thousand Gross Register Tons
Million 1955 US Dollars
400
300
200
100
0
1950
FIGURE 1
mportsfrOin the European Satellites
.
Chinaand Communist
Soviet Construction
250
200
150
100
50
1951
1952 1953
USSR
1954
1955
1956
FIGURE 2
VALUE OF ADDITIONS TO THE MARITIME FLEET, 1950-56
TOTAL ADDITIONS---...
/
Imparts from:the:European:Satellites
Y' gZai Si .6;irifciz-',/
. ? . ? - ? - ? - ? - ? ? ? ? ?
ezeizzoiyx,
Soviet Construction
1950 1951
26285 1-58
1952
1953
1954
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3. East Germany.
East Germany constructed 15 oceangoing cargo vessels, aggre-
gating 49,000 GRT, or 8 percent of the total oceangoing self-propelled
cargo types added to the Soviet maritime fleet. These vessels were of
the Kolomna-class of 3,258 GRT, of propulsion by a steam reciprocating
engine with exhaust steam turbine, fueled by coal, and with a speed of
12 knots. East Germany also produced 54,600 GRT of auxiliary types of
vessels such as tugs, small self-propelled and non-self-propelled ves-
sels for dry and livid cargos, and miscellaneous non-cargo-carrying
types.
Of a total value of $81 million worth of maritime vessels
exported to the USSR by East Germany, the Kolomna-class vessels accounted
for $32 million and the auxiliary types of vessels for $49 million.
4. Communist China.
Communist China did not produce any major vessels for
oceangoing service in the Soviet maritime fleet, with the possible
exception of tugs. China did produce, however, approximately 57,000
GRT of tugs, barges, passenger cutters, and the like, all of which
were assigned by the USSR to maritime service. These vessels were
valued at $41 million.
C. Vessels Imported from Countries Outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
During the years of the rehabilitation and growth of ship-
building in the Soviet Bloc and Communist China, the simpler standard
cargo types were assigned for construction by the European Satellites.
The more complex and also more costly types of vessels, such as cargo
ships with steam-turbine propulsion, large icebreakers, large dredgers,
refrigerated vessels, and the like, were contracted for in countries
outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc.*
During 1946-56, countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc con-
structed 529,000 GRT** of vessels for the Soviet maritime fleet. This
construction is valued at $395 million, or 4o percent of the total
value of all vessels added to the maritime fleet during 1946-56.
* Detailed estimates of maritime vessels constructed by non-Bloc
countries and imported by the USSR during 1946-56 are shown in Ta-
bles 5 and 6 (Appendix A, pp. 25 and 26, below). .
** Including 191,200 GRT of passenger vessels, tugs, dredgers,
schooners, lighters, icebreakers, and cranes.
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Countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc have contributed to the
value of these vessels, in order, by percent, as follows:
Country Percent
Finland
58.8
Netherlands
10.5
Denmark
8.1
Sweden
6.1
Belgium
5.6
West Germany
5.0
France
3.3
Italy
1.3
UK
1.1
Japan
0.2
Of the maritime vessels added to the Soviet fleet during 19)4-6-56,
countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc produced 34 percent of the gross
register tonnage of the principal oceangoing cargo types, 15 percent of
the tanker vessels, and 83 percent of the refrigerated vessels.
D. Vessels Constructed in the USSR.
By integrating construction of maritime vessels in the European
Satellites and Communist China with Soviet construction and by procuring
from countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc various categories of these
vessels -- except for medium-size tankers -- the USSR succeeded in
building up its maritime fleet without undertaking a major maritime
shipbuilding program.
Because of the state of disrepair and war damage the shipyards
of the USSR produced a negligible amount of tonnage during 1946-49.
During 1950-56 the USSR built 648,7oo GRT,* or about 38 percent of the
total new gross register tonnage added to the maritime fleet. These
additions were valued at $245 million, or 25 percent of the value of
the tote.]: additions to the Soviet maritime fleet.xx The value of mari-
time vessels is estimated at 2 percent of the total value of all ves-
sels, naval and merchant, constructed in the USSR during 1950-56. The
value of maritime vessels ranked third in the order of value of vessels
* Including 290,000 GRT of tugs, schooners, lighters, barges, passen-
ger cutters, and other miscellaneous auxiliary types.
** Detailed estimates of maritime vessels constructed in the USSR dur-
ing 1946-56 are shown in Tables 7 and 8 (Appendix A, pp. 27 and 28,
below), which are based on Tables 10 and 11 (Appendix B, pp. 32 and 34,
below).
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constructed, being precededfirst by naval construction (92 percent of
the total) and second by construction of inland vessels (4.8 percent
of the total). Construction of fishing vessels was last in the order
of value (1.2 percent of the total).
Of the principal oceangoing vessels added to the Soviet mari-
time fleet during 1946-56, as shown in Table 2,* the USSR produced
3 percent of the gross register tonnage of cargo types, 85 percent of
that of tanker types, and 17 percent of that of refrigerated types.
1. Tankers.
Of the 347,000 GRT of tankers constructed by the USSR dur-
ing 1946-56, 291,600 GRT were in the Kazbek class, 18,000 GRT in the
Oleg Koshevoy class,** 17,000 GRT in the Zhdanov class, XXX and the
remainder in small miscellaneous self-propelled barges and coastal
types.
The actual inauguration and subsequent acceleration of the
Soviet program for construction of tankers appears to have been timed
largely to offset international controls by the West. Further impetus
to the acceleration of this program was the increasing need for tanker
tonnage occasioned by the Korean War and the Chinese Communist trade
and supply problems arising from it. During the Soviet Fifth Five Year
Plan (1951-55) the USSR was forced to allocate two major shipbuilding
yards and a part of a third for construction of the medium-size Kazbek-
class tankers. The Nosenko Shipyard No. 444 in Nikolayev began con-
struction of Kazbek-class tankers with construction of the tanker Kaz-
bek in 1951. By the end of 1956 this shipyard had produced 11 tankers.
A new shipyard, completed in late 1952 at Kherson, delivered its first
Kazbek-class tanker, the Kherson, in 1953. This shipyard has been
devoted exclusively to construction of this class of tanker and by
the end of 1956 had delivered 14 tankers. The Krylov Shipyard No. 194
in Leningrad shifted from construction of cruisers to construction of
Kazbek-class tankers in 1953. By the end of 1956 this shipyard had
produced 11 tankers, 1 of which, the Volkhov, was delivered to the
Soviet Navy.
* Appendix A, p. 22, below.
** The Oleg Koshevoy class of tanker was designed for service on the
Caspian Sea and the Volga River. The vessels in this class have a cargo-
carrying capacity of about 4,000 tons at full load draft and are esti-
mated at about 3,000 GRT.
XXX Little is known about the Zhdanov class. It has been observed
under construction in the Zhdanov Shipyard in Leningrad since 1953.
Most of these vessels, it is believed, are being assigned to the
Soviet Navy. The vessels in this class are estimated at 1,000 GRT.
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The Oleg Koshevoy-class tanker, constructed for service on
the Caspian Sea - Volga River system, was the second most important
series of tankers to be undertaken in the USSR during 1946-56. The
first tanker in this series, the Oleg Koshev9y, was delivered in late
1954, 2 more were delivered in 1955, and 3 in 1956. These vessels
were constructed at one of the shipyards of the Volga River basin. 2/
Aside from several small foreign-built tankers transferred to the
Caspian Sea, the Oleg Koshevoy-class represented the first new tan-
kers added to the Caspian Sea tanker fleet since World War II. A
series of small (possibly 1,000-GRT) tankers, designated as the
Zhdanov-class, has been constructed since 1953 by the Zhdanov Ship-
yard in Leningrad.
2. Refrigerated and Dry Cargo Vessels.
In mid-1955, after completion-of the proaram for construc-
tion of cruisers at the Baltic Shipyard the
Soviet Ministry of Shipbuilding began construction of a series of
5?217-GRT refrigerated vessels for the Soviet Ministry of the Fish
Industry. The first three vessels in this series Were delivered in
1956. At about the same time, the Ministry of Shipbuilding began con-
struction of a series of dry cargo vessels of 5,494 GRT in the No-
senko Shipyard in Nikolayev. The first three vessels in this class
were delivered in the latter half of 1956. These refrigerated and
dry cargo vessels are the first vessels of significant size in these
classes to be built in the USSR since World War II. The general
characteristics of these vessels are essentially the same. It is
believed that these two classes of vessels have the same hull form
and the same propulsion plant.*
* Both classes have an over-all length of about 130.85 meters, a width
of 16.8 meters, a height at midship of 9.5 meters, and a draft of about
7.63 meters. The full load displacement of these vessels is about 10,400
tons. The diesel electric propulsion system consists of 4 generators
driven by ZD-100-mark diesel engines. The ZD-100 is a vertical, 10-
cylinder, 2-stroke, opposed-piston type of engine which develops 1,800
hp at 810 revolutions per minute (rpm). Each generator produces
about 1,375 kilowatts at 500 volts. These diesel-generator units were
built by the Kharkov Transport Machine Building Plant and are identical
to the diesel-generator sets being built for the TE-3 locomotives.
The designed speed of these vessels is reported to be about 18 knots
under full power with the 4 main generators operating both armatures
of the main driving (propulsion) motor, 16 knots with any 3-generator
units on both armatures, and 14 knots with 2 generators on 1 armature
of half-full power.
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The selection by the Ministry of Shipbuilding of a diesel-
electric propulsion plant for these vessels in preference to a steam
turbine, a large single 6,000- to 7,000-hp diesel with a low number of
revolutions per minute, or a steam reciprocating engine may be accounted
for in part by (a) the greater maneuverability through ice in northern
waters with a diesel electric propulsion plant than would be possible
under other systems; (b) the lack of a domestically produced satisfac-
tory large diesel; (c) the higher efficiency compared with a steam-
reciprocating engine; (d) a hesitancy to undertake the necessary re-
search and development to produce a steam turbine for these vessels,
particularly in view of the current requirements for the design and
construction of turbines for naval vessels, for land power plants, for
nuclear-powered plants, and for the 25,000 dwtcc tanker and the 10,000
dwtcc cargo vessel; and (e) the ready availability of the ZD-100 diesel
generator sets.
3. Other Vessels.
Until 1956, construction of other maritime vessels in the
USSR was of little importance. This construction consisted chiefly of
a few schooners, coastal vessels, tugs, self-propelled lighters, pas-
senger cutters, and barges.
IV. Projected Estimate of Volume and Value of Construction, 1956-60.
An analysis of the directives for the original Sixth Five Year Plan
(1956-60)* 2/ indicates a continuance of policies in effect at the end
of 1955 -- that is, that the USSR will continue to increase its domestic
construction of maritime vessels and at the same time import maritime
vessels from the European Satellites, Communist China, and countries
outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The original plan indicates that the
value of maritime vessels to be constructed by the USSR during 1956-60
will more than double the value of vessels constructed during the
Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55).
* Because of the indefinite terminology used by the USSR in announcing
the goals for the original Sixth Five Year Plan, it is not possible to
make an exact estimate of the several classes of ships referred to. It
is believed that the term dry cargo vessel refers only to self-propelled
freight-carrying vessels and does not include refrigerated vessels.
Refrigerated vessels generally have been mentioned in connection with
the transportation.of fish between the-fishing fleets and the mainland
and, therefore, would be a part of the Ministry of the Fish Industry.
The large refrigerated vessels (Aktyubinsk class, 5,217 GRT) currently
under construction at the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad are for the Min-
istry of the Fish Industry.
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The original Sixth Five Year Plan calls for an increase of more
than 30 percent in construction of oceangoing dry cargo vessels and
tankers in 1960 compared with 1955. This increase is believed to
refer solely to domestic construction, because a 30-percent increase
in Soviet construction in itself will not meet the goal for planned
additions to the maritime fleet. The plan also called for the addition
to the Soviet maritime fleet of modern dry cargo diesel vessels of
3,900 to 7,800 GRT and tankers of 15,100 to 18,800 GRT, refrigerated
vessels for the transportation of fish, reinforced concrete vessels,
and lumber carriers. These requirements are believed to have been
directed at the planning organizations for execution in the USSR, in
other countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, or in non-Bloc countries as
required. This directive gives an indication that vessels of a larger
size will be added to the cargo and tanker fleets than were added dur-
ing 1950-55. The plan required additions* to the Ministry of the Mari-
time Fleet of 885,000 GRT of dry cargo ships, 346,000 GRT of tankers
(an increase of 105 percent in dry cargo ships and 21 percent in tan-
kers, resulting in a total increase of 71 percent more than the addi-
tions during the Fifth Five Year Plan -- 1951-55), 198,000 hp of pas-
senger vessels, and 230,000 hp of tugs.
A. Dry Cargo Vessels and Tankers.
The USSR in 1955 constructed approximately 98,00,0 GRT of cargo
vessels and tankers. An increase of 30 percent by 1960 would mean con-
struction of 127,400 GRT of these vessels. Such construction easily
could be accomplished without additional facilities for construction or
without curtailing the 1955 rate of Soviet naval construction. On the
assumption that the USSR will increase construction at an average annual
rate of 5.4 percent,** total construction for 1956-60 will be 575,000 GRT
valued at $276 million. Because this tonnage is 656,000 GRT less than the
planned additions of 1,231,000 GRT, it is evident that the remainder
of the additions is to be obtained from the European Satellites and
from countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
Available data on contracts and trade agreements with countries
outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc and on the construction plans of the Bloc in-
dicate that the USSR will construct most of the tanker tonnage, 346,000
GRT, planned to be added to the Soviet maritime fleet and will construct
about 229,000 GRT of maritime cargo vessels. Current contracts between
the USSR and countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc, including permissive
* Additions included not only construction in the USSR but also
imports from the European Satellites, Communist China, and even non-
Bloc countries.
** At an annual increase of 5.4 percent, production in 1960 would be
30 percent more than the 1955 rate.
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construction through 1960 by Finland, indicate that 206,000 GRT of cargo
vessels valued at $124 million and 37/000 GRT of tankers valued at $18
million will be constructed for the USSR during 1956-60.
If the gross register tonnage of cargo vessels to be constructed
by the USSR and countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc is subtracted
from the total tonnage to be added to the Soviet maritime fleet, 450,000
GRT valued at $225 million remain to be constructed for the USSR by
other Bloc countries. From the data available this amount of cargo
tonnage is estimated to be about two-thirds the total amount planned
for export by other Bloc countries to the USSR.
In the last half of 1955 the Nosenko Shipyard in Nikolayev
undertook to construct a series of 5,400-GRT dry cargo vessels.* These
vessels represent the first series of major maritime cargo vessels to
be built in the USSR since World War II.
B. Passenger Vessels.
There is little information on the source or size of passenge
vessels and on whether or not these vessels will be new construction.
There is no evidence of contracts for construction of passenger vessels
in countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc. East German plans call for
construction for the USSR of 1.3 passenger vessels totaling approximately
100,000 hp, or 64l000 GRT. Polish shipbuilding plans do not include
construction of passenger vessels for the USSR. The greater part of
the remaining 100,000 hp to be added by the USSR probably will be small
vessels, mostly produced by the USSR with some imports from Hungary and
Communist China.
C. Tugs.
Present indications are that countries outside the Sino-Soviet
Bloc, principally Finland, will construct for the USSR approximately
77,000 hp of tugs valued at $52 million. East German plans call for
construction for the USSR of about 54,000 hp, leaving about 100,000 hp
to be constructed by the USSR and the remaining European Satellites.
It is estimated that during 1956-60 the USSR will construct tugs total-
ing between 40,000 and 50,000 hp.
D. Refrigerated and Miscellaneous Types of Vessels.
The original Sixth Five Year Plan did not specify any fixed
quantity of refrigerated and miscellaneous vessels to be constructed.
Commitments by countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc indicate construction
* For a description of these vessels, see III, D, 2, above.
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for the USSR of 54,000 GRT of refrigerated vessels valued at $57 million
and 2 icebreakers valued at $59 million. During the last half of 1955
the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad undertook to cOnstruct a series of
refrigerated vessels* for the Ministry of the Fish Industry.
With the European Satellites and Communist China, as well as
the USSR, having developed considerable shipbuilding capability, it is
to be expected that these countries will construct additional vessels
which may not have been indicated in the original Sixth Five Year Plan.
These vessels would include miscellaneous types for the maritime fleet
and, probably of more importance, auxiliary vessels for the Soviet
Navy.
There are no indications of a lessening in the shipbuilding
effort in the European Satellites and in Communist China. Construction
in excess of the demands of the USSR probably will be allocated to the
maritime fleets of the respective countries or possibly used in trade
with underdeveloped countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
V. Capability and Limitations.
The shipbuilding industry of the USSR has been developed to a
relatively high level of capability for construction of all classes
of naval and merchant vessels. According to the original Sixth Five
Year Plan (1956.--.60), the goal for construction of maritime vessels
is a small portion of the total capability of the industry.
During 1955 the shipbuilding industry of the USSR constructed approx-
imately 200,000 standard displacement** tons (Sm?) of naval vessels and
100,000 GRT of maritime dry cargo vessels and tankers. Studies of the
capability for construction of several Soviet shipyards disclose that
approximately 2 GRT of a maritime vessel can be produced by the same
facilities in the same amount of time that is required to produce 1 SDT
of a naval vessel. LI/ On this basis and on the assumption that all
facilities devoted to naval construction in 1955 were devoted to con-
struction of maritime vessels, the annual capability for construction
of maritime vessels would be about 500,000 GRT.
* For a description of these vessels, see III, D,.2, above.
** Standard displacement of a surface vessel is the displacement (in
tons of 2,240 pounds) of the vessel complete, fully manned, engined,
and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition,
equipment, outfit, provisions and freshwater for crew, miscellaneous
stores, and implements of every description that are intended to be
carried in war but excluding fuel or reserve boiler-feed water on
board.
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Currently there is no evidence that suggests any reason for
underfulfillment of planned goals by the USSR. Although unrest in the
European Satellites may interfere with orderly construction for the
USSR, an analysis of Soviet plans indicates that planned fulfillment
of additions to the Soviet maritime fleet would be possible with only
two-thirds of fulfillment of European Satellite plans for export of
maritime ships to the USSR. The expansion of the program for naval
shipbuilding or the diversion of established shipbuilding facilities
to some use other than that of construction of maritime vessels, how-
ever, undoubtedly would cause underfulfillment of the planned con-
struction.of maritime vessels.
VI. Intentions.
A course of action for the USSR in procurement of maritime ves-
sels, which seems possible from a study of Soviet practice since World
War II and is indicated by the directives for the original Sixth Five
Year Plan (1956-60), is to continue to integrate shipbuilding in other
countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc into the Soviet long-range program
and to procure vessels from non-Bloc countries. On the basis of the
volume of maritime vessels planned to be constructed within the USSR,
it is evident that the USSR intends to reserve the greater part of
shipbuilding capacity -- possibly for construction of naval vessels.
The utilization of currently idle naval shipbuilding capacity for
construction of merchant types of vessels is believed to be an interim
measure designed to keep a portion of shipyard labor active in contin-
uous shipbuilding in order to prevent a dispersion of this labor to
other industries and to implement the building up of the Soviet merchant
fleets.
The USSR announced on 25 September 1957 that a new long-term eco-
nomic plan would be drafted by 1 July 1958 to cover 1959-65. This
action would imply the setting aside of the goals of the original
Sixth Five Year Plan (1956-60) and the institution of new ones. Be-
cause there have been no announced or implied adjustments during 1956-
57 of the goals originally announced for the Sixth Five Year Plan for
maritime shipbuilding, it is believed that the shipbuilding industry
will continue at its present rate of construction, or at a slightly
increased rate, through 1958 and possibly through the period of the
new plan.
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APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES
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Table 2
Classification of the Principal Vessels Added to the Soviet Maritime Fleet 2/
1946-56
Groups According to Gross Register Tonnage
Under 1,000 GRT 1,000 to 2,500 GRT 2,500 to 5,000 GRT 5,000 to 7,500 GRT 7,500 to 10,000 GRT
Type of Vessel Number GRT Number GRT Number GRT Number GRT Number
3
Tanker 43
Cargo vessel 43 31,000 149 242,400 68 240,2o0
14, 76,300
45,600 12 30,000 38
Refrigerated
vessel 6 5,700 19 32,200 lo 36,600 3 15,700
Total
49 36,700. 211
320,200 90 306,800 17 92,000 41
Total
Average GRT
GRT Number GRT per Vessel
22,500 277 612,400 2,210
309,700 93 385,300 4,140
38 901,200 2,370
332,200 4o8 1,087,900 2/ 2,670
a. Excluding 626,100 gross register tons (GRT) of tugs, schooners, self-propelled and non-self-propelled lighters, barges, and small miscellaneous auxil-
iary types.
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Table 3
Estimated Volume of Soviet Imports of Maritime Vessels
from the European Satellites and Communist China
1946-56
Thousand Gross Register Tons
Country and Type of Vessel
1946-49
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
Total
Poland
Cargo vessel
0
1.9
2.0
21.0
28.0
67.0
70.0
57.0
246.9
Hungary
Cargo vessel
25.2
11.8
8.4
10.7
9.6
10.7
6.0
10.8
93.2
Floating crane
3.6
0.7
2.5
3.2
7.7
5.6
4.8
7.0
35.1
East Germany
Cargo vessel 2/
0
0
0.2
4.1
0
19.2
28.2
6.1
57.8
Tanker
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
4.o
2.4
0
1.2
7.6
Tug
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
2.2
1.8
0.6
0.9
1.3
6.8
Other vessel
N.A.
5.0
1.1
14.1
3.8
0.2
540
2.2
31.4
Communist China
Cargo vessel 2/
0
0
0
0
0
0.2
1.0
1.2
2.4
Tug
0
0
0
0
0
1.0
2.0
2.0
5.0
Other vessel
0
3.1
4.6
4.6
7.7
3.5
13.1
13.1
49.7
Total
28.8
22.5
18.8
59.9
62.6
110.4
131.0
101.9
535.9
a. Including other self-propelled vessels.
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Table 4
Estimated Value of Soviet Imports of Maritime Vessels
from the European Satellites and Communist China
1946-56
Million 1955 US $
Country and Type of Vessel
1946-49
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955 1956 Total
Poland
Cargo vessel
0
1.1
1.1
11.8
15.7
37.5
39.2
37.5
143.9
Hungary
Cargo vessel
14.7
6.9
4.9
6.3
5.6
6.3
3.5
6.3
54.5
Floating crane
3.3
0.7
2.0
2.7
6.7
4.7
4.0
4.7
28.8
East Germany
Cargo vessel aJ
0
0
0.1
3.5
o
16.4
24.1
11.3
55.4
Tanker
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1.8
1.1
0
1.5
4.4
Tug
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
2.7
2.2
0.7
1.0
1.0
7.6
Other vessel
N.A.
1.8
0.4
5.0
1.4
0.1
4.4
0.5
13.6
Communist China
Cargo vessel 21
0
0
0
0
0
0.3
1.2
1.5
3.0
Tug
0
0
0
0
0
1.0
2.1
2.1
5.2
Other vessel
0
2.5
3.8
3.8
6.4
2.9
6.7
6.7
32.8
Total
18.0
13.0
12.3
35.8
39.8
71.0
86.2
73.1
349.2
a. Including other self-propelled vessels.
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Table 5
Estimated Volume of Soviet Imports
of Maritime Vessels from Countries Outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1946-56
Thousand Gross Register Tons
Country and Type of Vessel
1946-49
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
Total
UK
Cargo vessel
0
3.2
0
0
o
7.4
o
o
10.6
Belgium
Cargo vessel
0
3.4
5.1
3.4
0
9.2
3.8
10.2
35.1
Italy
Tug
0
0
0.9
0.9
0
0
0
0
1.8
Passenger vessel
o
o
3.5
3.5
o
o
o
o
7.0
Denmark
Tanker
0
0
0
9.0
9.0
0
0
0
18.0
Refrigerated vessel
0
0
0
5.0
3.4
0
6.7
8.4
23.5
Netherlands
Cargo vessel
0
0
0
0
0
22.5
0
0
22.5
Refrigerated vessel
0
0
0
0
0
0
14.2
3.6
17.8
Dredger
0
0
0
1.1
2.1
3.2
1.4
0
7.8
West Germany
Refrigerated vessel
0
0
0
0
0
0
3.8
15.1
18.9
France
Cargo vessel
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
30.0
30.0
Sweden
Cargo vessel
0
0
0
0
o
5.5
o
0
5.5
Tanker
0
0
2.2
3.3
1.1
o
o
0
6.6
Refrigerated vessel
0
1.0
1.9
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.7
7.0
14.6
Finland
Cargo vessel
14.4
7.1
11.8
9.5
13.7
10.8
18.3
15.5
101.1
-Tanker
0
0
2.2
3.3
5.5
5.5
11.5
6.o
34.0
Tug
14.6
3.8
4.3
3.3
6.5
3.8
4.3
8.7
49.3
Schooner
13.2
4.2
9.3
3.3
4.5
4.5
4.5
o
43.5
Lighter
29.7
12.7
12.7
10.6
0
0
0
0
65.7
Floating crane
0
0
0
o
o
1.4
0.4
2.2
4.0
Icebreaker
0
0
0
o
o
3.8
3.8
3.8
11.4
Japan
Tug
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.3
0.4
0.7
Total
71.9
35.4
53.9
57.2
46.8
78.6
74.7
110.9
529.4
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Table 6
Estimated Value of Soviet Imports
of Maritime Vessels from Countries Outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc
1946-56
Million 1955 us $
Country and Type of Vessel
1946-49
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
Total
UK
Cargo vessel
0
2.1
0
0
0
2.3
0
o
4.4
Belgium
Cargo vessel
0
2.2
3.4
2.2
0
6.o
2.5
5.9
22.2
Italy
Tug
0
0.7
0.7
0
0
0
0
1.4
Passenger vessel
0
0
1.9
1.9
0
0
0
0
3.8
Denmark
Tanker
3.6
3.6
0
o
o
7.2
Refrigerated vessel
o
o
5.2
3.6
o
7.0
8.8
24.6
Netherlands
Cargo vessel
0
0
0
0
0
14.8
0
0
14.8
Refrigerated vessel
0
0
0
0
0
0
14.9
3.7
18.6
Dredger
0
0
0
1.1
2.1
3.6
1.4
0
8.2
West Germany
Refrigerated vessel
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.0
15.9
19.9
France
Cargo vessel
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
12.9
12.9
Sweden
Cargo vessel
0
0
0
0
0
2.5
0
0
2.5
Tanker
0
0
1.2
1.8
o.6
o
0
0
3.6
Refrigerated vessel
0
1.4
2.7
1.4
1.3
1.4
2.4
7.4
18.0
Finland
Cargo vessel
9.4
4.7
7.8
6.2
8.0
7.8
11.9
8.8
64.6
Tanker
0
0
1.2
1.8
3.0
3.0
6.2
3.2
18.4
Tug
16.4
4.4
5.3
3.8
7.6
4.0
4.6
9.2
55.3
Schooner
10.2
3.2
7.1
2.6
3.5
3.5
3.4
o
33.5
Lighter
10.5
4.5
4.5
3.7
o
o
o
o
23.2
Floating crane
0
00000.4
0.1
0.6
1.1
Icebreaker
0
0
0
0
0
12.1
12.1
12.1
36.3
Japan
Tug
0
0
0
0
0
o
0.4
0.5
0.9
Total
46.5
22.5
35.8
36.0
33.3
61.4
70.9
89.0
395.4
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Table 7
Estimated Volume of Soviet Construction of Maritime Vessels
1950-56
Thousand Gross Register Tons
Type of Vessel
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
Total
Tanker
5.0
13.1
13.1
29.3
87.0
93.0
106.1
346.6
Cargo' vessel a/
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
37.1
67.1
Tug
3.0
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.o
4.0
25.0
Barge12/
30.0
30.0
30.0
30.0
30.0
30.0
30.0
210.0
Total
43.0
51.3
51.5
67.9
125.8
132.0
177.2
648.7
a. Including other self-pi'opelled vessels.
b. Including other non-self-propelled vessels.
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Table 8
Estimated Value of Soviet Construction of Maritime Vessels
1950-56
Million 1955 US
Tyle of Vessel
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
Total
Tanker
2.7
6.0
6.0
12.5
35.8
39.0
45.1
147.1
Cargo vessel a/
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.3
26.2
46.0
Tug
3.6
3.8
4.o
4.2
4.5
4.7
4.7
29.5
Barge b/
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
22.4
Total
12.8
16.3
16.5
23.2
46.8
50.2
79.2
245.0
a. Including other self-propelled vessels.
b. Including other non-self-propelled vessels.
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Table 9
Classification of Vessels Constructed in Poland
and Imported by the USSR
1946-56
Gross
Register
Speed
Number
of
Class
Tons
Type of Propulsion
Fuel
(Knots)
Vessels
Donbas
3,816
Steam reciprocating
with exhaust steam
turbine
Coal
11
35
Pervomaysk (Soldek)
1,989
Steam reciprocating
Coal
11
25
Melitopol'
674
Diesel
Oil
10
24
Chulym (Kolno)
2,686
Steam reciprocating
Coal
12
16
Lewant
2,735
Diesel
Oil
14
2
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APPENDIX B
INPUT REQUIREMENTS FOR SOVIET CONSTRUCTION OF MARITIME VESSELS, 1955
There has been no indication of short supply of any resources of
materials allocated to construction of maritime vessels in the USSR.
On a few occasions since the inception of the tanker program, delays
were observed in construction of the tankers. It is believed, however,
that these delays were caused by technological difficulties rather
than by shortages of materials. The percentage of steel required in
construction of maritime vessels in 1955 was 40 percent of the total
required for construction of merchant vessels and 16 percent of that
required for all classes of ?construction of vessels.
The estimated input requirements for construction of maritime
vessels in the USSR during 1955 are shown in Table 10.* These esti-
mates were obtained by applying to Soviet construction input factors
which were derived from a study of requirements to construct similar
vessels in the US. The input factors used are shown in Table 11.**
* Table 10 follows on p. 32.
** Table 11 follows on p. 34.
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Table 10
Estimated Input Requirements for Soviet Construction of Maritime Vessels a/*
1955
Item
Tanker
Cargo Vessel b/ Tug
Barge LI
Total
Metric Tons
Carbon steel
49,000
2,900
3,100
15,000
70,000
Alloy steel
1,500
62
1,300
Negligible
2,800
Total
50,000
3,000
4 400
15,000
73,000
Cast iron
300
16
60
Negligible
380
Copper and copper-
base alloys
1,200
65
97
Negligible
1,400
Aluminum
60
3
48
Negligible
110
Lead
8
Negligible
18
Negligible
26
Tin
25
1
4
Negligible
30
Zinc
84
4
20
Negligible
110
Rubber
79
4
3
Negligible
86
Nickel and miscel-
laneous metals
68
4
15
Negligible
87
Lumber
2,200
120
250
Negligible
2,600
Thousand Kilowatt-Hours
Power 'LI/
66,000
3,900
3,100
20,000
93,000
Man-Years
Labor shipyards
4,200
370
1,100
1,40o
7,100
* Footnotes for Table 10 follow on p. 33.
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Table 10
Estimated Input Requirements for Soviet Construction of Maritime Vessels 2/
1955
(Continued)
a. The data used in this table were derived from requirements for con-
struction of similar vessels in the US. With the possible exception of
steel, all requirements for materials probably could be modified by sub-
stitute materials. All data have been rounded to two significant digits
after computation.
b. Including other self-propelled vessels.
c. Including other non-self-propelled vessels..
d. Equivalent of all inputs of power and fuel.
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Input Factors
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 11
for US Construction of Maritime Vessels 2/*
1955
Metric
Tons per Thousand Gross Register Tons
Item
Tanker
Cargo Vessel 22/
Tug
Barge L/
Carbon steel
527
586
773
512
Alloy steel
15.8
12.4
323
Negligible
Total
543
598
1,096
512
Cast iron
3.21
3.21
15.0
0.08
Copper and copper-
base alloys
13.2
13.2
24.2
Negligible
Aluminum
0.66
0.66
12.1
Negligible
Lead
0.09
0.09
4.38
Negligible
Tin
0.27
0.27
1.11
Negligible
Zinc
0.90
0.90
4.90
Negligible
Rubber
0.85
0.85
0.76
Negligible
Nickel and miscel-
laneous metals
0.74
0.74
3.76
Negligible
Lumber
24.2
24.2
62
Negligible
Kilowatt-Hours per Gross Register Ton
Power 710
780
1,44o
670
Man-Years per Gross Register Ton
Labor in shipyards 0.05
0.07
* Footnotes for Table 11 follow on p. 35.
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0.27
0.05
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Table 11
Input Factors for US Construction of Maritime Vessels a/
1955 ?
(Continued)
a. All input factors reflect US practice. Figures shown are
rounded to not more than two decimal places. Factors include
all inputs within the shipyard and within the component plants
but do not include inputs for the production of raw materials.
b. Includihg other self-propelled vessels.
c. Including other non-self-propelled vessels.
d. Equivalent of all inputs of power and fuel.
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APPENDIX C
METHODOLOGY
1. Range of Error.
The range of error varies with the type and size of vessel and
with the country involved. Most of the oceangoing cargo vessels and
tankers, regardless of where they were constructed, were sighted in
actual service, exceptions being coastal types operating in northern
coastal waters, in coastal waters of the Pacific Ocean, and in the
Black Sea. Few vessels are observed in Caspian Sea service, and the
Soviet press, therefore, provides the greater part of the data on
additions to the Caspian Sea fleet. The range of error for ocean-
going vessels is possibly plus or minus 10 percent.
Tugs, barges, lighters, schooners, and miscellaneous types of
vessels are subject to a much higher range of error because of a
lack of data on which to base estimates. Although the quantity of
construction by countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc is fairly
well known, construction by the European Satellites and Communist
China is subject to a wider range of error and construction in the
USSR to a range of error of as much as 50 percent because of a lack
of reports on construction.
The nature of the data on which the estimates were made precluded
a mathematical determination of the range of error. The range of
error for aggregate estiF1ates is believed, on the basis of experience,
to be no greater than plus 15 to minus 15 percent. A test check,
made by comparing the announced fulfillment of the Fifth Five Year
Plan (1951-55) with estimates of Soviet construction of maritime
vessels, showed the estimates to be within 3 percent of the reported
plan fulfillment.
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2. Valuation of Construction.
Construction was valued by using the costs* per unit of construct-
ing similar vessels in the US in 1955 dollars, as determined from US
cost data, and by adjusting certain costs of foreign shipbuilding by
data secured from the Maritime Administration of the US Department of
Commerce. The costs used to value maritime vessels are shown in
Table 12.**
The 5,400-GRT cargo vessel was priced by analogy with a US vessel.
The costs of the 2,000-GRT cargo vessel and the 10,000-GRT tanker are
based on West German costs. 9/. These costs were assumed to be 61 per-
cent of the US cost, which is the estimated cost differential deter-
mined by the US Maritime Administration. 22/
The cost of the 2,000-GRT tanker was calculated by the equation
493 403
657 x
where
493 . US cost in dollars per gross register
ton of a 6,750-GRT vessel
657 = US cost in dollars per gross register
ton of a 2,093-GRT vessel
403 = US cost in dollars per gross register
ton of a 10,000-GRT tanker
and
x = Cost in dollars per gross register
ton of a 2,000-GRT tanker
* The term cost as used in this report means cost to the pur-
chaser, whether an individual or a government, and should not be
confused with the term cost as used in the accounting sense, where
it implies the exclusion of profit.
** Table 12 follows on p. 39.
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Table 12
Costs of Selected Merchant Vessels
Type of Vessel
Cargo vessel
Cargo vessel
Cargo
Tanker
Tanker
Refrigerated vessel
Refrigerated vessel
Tug
Tug
Tug
Wooden seagoing schooner
Lighter
Self-propelled barge
Steel non-self-propelled barge
Wodden non-self-propelled barge
Passenger vessel
Floating crane
Dredge
Icebreaker
Size of Vessel
5,400 GRT 2/
2,000 GRT
1,194 GRT
10,000 GRT
2,000 GET
2,500 GRT
5,200 GRT
150 hp 12/
350 hp
800 hp
300 GRT
2,000 GRT
300 to 800 hp
1,000 to 2,000
dwtcc 2/
1,000 to 2,000 dwtcc
2,000 GRT
100 long tons 21/
500 GRT
Cost per Unit
(US $ 1955)
550
657
600
403
540
1,049
880
1,121
830
745
900
352
750
105
75
985
668,462
1,018
2,240
ment
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
per
ton
GRT
GRT
GRT
GRT
GRT
GRT
GRT
hp or
hp or
hp or
GRT
GRT
hp
dwtcc
1,601
1,186
1,064
per GRT
per GRT
per GRT
dwtcc
GRT or 1,630 per hp
unit
GRT
full load displace-
Remarks
Constructed in Hungary
Steam propulsion
Steam propulsion
Steam propulsion
250-hp diesel motor for
auxiliary propulsion
Constructed in Hungary
a.
b.
c.
d.
Gross register tons.
Horsepower.
Deadweight tons cargo capacity.
Lift capacity.
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The costs of the refrigerated vessels were estimated by analogy with
cargo vessels of about the same size, with allowance for the difference
in equipment, based on information from the US Maritime Administration.
The costs for 150- and 800-hp tugs are from the Soviet-Finnish reparations
agreement of 1946, and for the 350-hp tug the cost is from the Swedish-
Polish trade agreement of 1950. The figures were brought up to 1955 by the
Index of Shipbuilding Costs supplied by the US Maritime Administration, and
they were converted more closely to US costs by estimates of the rela-
tionship of US prices to Finnish and Swedish costs. Swedish costs were
assumed to be 70 percent of US costs, and Finnish costs were assumed to
be 100 percent of US costs, as suggested in information from the US
Maritime Administration.
The costs for dredgers and passenger vessels are based on East
German prices. 11/ These costs were converted to dollars by a ratio
of 5.5 Deutsche Mark East (DME) to US $1. The ratio of 5.5 to 1 was
calculated on the basis of the ratio of costs of a cargo vessel of
approximately the same size valued in East Germany and in the US. The
ratio, based on a 3,000-GRT vessel, was calculated as follows: 3,500 DME
per GET divided by $633 per GRT equals 5.5.
Lighters are estimated to cost, on a basis of gross register tonnage,
54 percent of the cost of cargo vessels. This estimate is based on the
assumption that propulsion machinery in a self-propelled cargo vessel
is 25 percent of the total cost and 17 percent of the light ship dis-
placement. The gross register tonnage of a lighter is 2.5 times the
light ship displacement. A 2,000-GRT self-propelled cargo ship is
valued at $657 per GRT, or $965 per LSD. If 25 percent is deducted
from the cost of the cargo vessel and 17 percent from its light ship
displacement, it is found that a non-self-propelled vessel would be
valued at $880 per LSD. If a weight relationship of 2.5 to 1* is
applied, the cost of 1 GRT of lighter is $352.
Icebreakers were estimated to cost $2,240 per full load displacement
ton. This estimate is based on information from the Coast Guard of the
US Department of the Treasury. The costs of the 1,194-GRT Hungarian
cargo vessel and the 100-ton floating crane used for this report are based
on the lists of official Hungarian planning costs for 1954, converted to
1955 dollars. 12/
The cost of schooners is based on the cost quoted in the Soviet-Finnish
reparations agreement of 1946. The index of shipbuilding costs of the US
Maritime Administration was used to convert the 1946 price to 1955. Prices
of self-propelled and non-self-propelled barges are based on information
from US builders. Prices of non-self-propelled wooden barges were estimated
from the cost of steel barges from information from US Army engineers.
* The light ship displacement multiplied by 2.5 gives the gross register
tonnage. Thus the cost of 1 LSD multiplied by 0.4 gives the cost of 1 GRT.
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