THE MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY IN THE USSR

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• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 22, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
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THE MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY IN THE USSR
CIA/RR 47
22 November 1954
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains " information affecting
the National Defense of : the United States
within the meaning Of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794,, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY IN THE USSR
CIA/RR 47
(ORR Project 34.229)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
S-E-C-R-E-T
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_ _ _ _ _
CONTENTS
Summary
I. Introduction
Page
2
A. General
2
B. History
3
C. Technology
?
?
L.
D. Organization
5
II.
Supply S
6
A. Plants and production
6
1. Estimated Production ? ? ?, OOO OOOOO
.?
?
?
?
6
2. Plants
6
B. Imports
9
C. Inventory
12
III.
Demand
12
A. Use Pattern
12
B. Exports ?13
C. Substitutes ........ . . . . .......
.
?
?
?
14
IV.
Future Expansion
14
A. Existing Capacity
14
B. Expansion Under Way or Projected
14
C. Requirements for Plant Expansion or Conversion
15
V.
Inputs
16
A. For Production
16
B. Expansion
18
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? ? ? ? ? ?
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VI. Vulnerabilities and Intentions
A. Vulnerabilities
B. Intentions
Appendix A.
Appendixes
Page
18
18
18
Summary of Available Data on Machine Tool Plants
in the USSR, Primary Producers 21
Appendix B. Summary of Available Data on Machine
in the USSR, Partial Producers
Appendix C. Summary of Available Data on Machine
Tool Plants
Tool Plants
23
in the USSR, Ancillary Producers 25
27
31
37
Appendix D. Definitions
Appendix E. Technology
Appendix F. Methodology
Tables
1, Estimated Production of Metal-Cutting Machine Tools
in the USSR, 1927-54
2. Comparison of Production of Machine Tools by Weight
in the USSR and in the US
7
3. Distribution of Plants and Percent of Estimated Machine
Tool Production by Economic Region in the USSR, 1954 . . . . 10
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4. Calculated Input Requirements for Estimated Production'
of Machine Tools in the USSR, 1954
5. Comparison of Two Production Estimates for the Machine
Tool Industry in the USSR, 1940 and 1945-51
6. Published Information on Ratio of Change in Plans
and Production of Machine Tools in the USSR,
1946-51 39
7. Published Inventory of Machine Tools in the USSR ? ? ? 44
Page
38
8. Calculated Inventory of Machine Tools in the USSR,
1940-54 45
9 Proportions of Metals Used in Machine Tools in the US,
1947
10. Conversion to B.t.u.'s of Fuels Used by the Machine
Tool Industry in the US, 1947
Illustrations
Figure 1. USSR: Organization of the Machine Tool
Industry, 1954 (Chart)
46
50
Following Page
Figure 2. USSR: Estimated Production of Machine Tools,
1927/28-1954 (Chart) 6
Figure 3, USSR: Machine Tool Producing Plants (Map) . 10
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CIA/RR 47 S-E-C-R-E-T
(ORR Project 34.229)
THE MACHINE TOOL INLUSIHY IN THE USSR* ,
Summary
The machine tool industry in the USSR has the current active
capacity to support any anticipated program of industrial expansion
and has sufficient reserve facilities to meet the needs of a wartime
economy. Consisting of fewer than 100 plants with a labor force of
about 100,000, the industry has an estimated production for 1954 of
92,000 machine tools. The rate of production is steadily rising.
The estimated value of machine tool production in the USSR during 1954
is 1 billion dollars -- an amount equaling the estimated value of ma-
chine tool production in the US during that year.
The current inventory of machine tools in the USSR is estimated at
1.5 million units, or about 65 percent of the US inventory in 1953.
At least 65 percent of the Soviet tools have been produced since World
War II and are consequently of modern, efficient design, whereas only
45 percent of the US inventory has been produced during the past
10 years.
The machine tool industry has always been able to meet or exceed
its quotas because it is given a high priority in government planning
and makes small demands on the industrial resources of the USSR. Any
type of machine tool could be produced with the facilities, materials,
and skilled labor available. In case of war, the available plant
space could be increased more than 50 percent by curtailment of pre-
sent unrelated production.
The industry is undertaking an intensive research and development
program, not only to improve the quality of Soviet machine tools., but
also to develop more rapid production methods. Soviet tools are
already precise and efficient, even by Western standards, and experi-
mentation with unconventional types has received more attention than
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 30 June 1954.
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it has in the US. Superior production methods are made possible by
standardization of components and conveyor assembly techniques. In
the US, diversification of models usually renders conveyor lines im-
practicable.
Information on the types produced is sparse, but there is
evidence that the industry is producing a large number of the heavier,
special-purpose units.
. When the Russians consider their inventory satisfactory, they can
be expected to enter the world market on a large scale. They have
advertised extensively and have signed reciprocal trade agreements to
export machine tools. Thus far, however, their shipments have been
insignificant and have been confined to the Soviet Bloc countries. At
the present rate of production, the Soviet inventory requirement should
be filled by the end of the next Five Year Plan, and it is likely that
.Soviet machine tools will begin to appear on the world market.
Such an increase in exports may be taken as evidence that the
Soviet machine tool inventory is adequate to meet estimated wartime
demands. There is no indication whether Soviet planning has considered
the vulnerability to air attack of the machine tool industry. Nearly
half of Soviet production is concentrated in the Central Region,
30 percent in Moscow Oblast alone. In addition, production of certain
essential types is concentrated in a few individual plants.
I. Introduction.
A. General.
The machine tool industry in any country is a key industry in
peacetime and a strategic one in preparing for war. Interchangeable
parts made possible by this industry are the foundation of modern mass
production, civilian and military. Machine tools are the producers of
other machines and are the only machines which are able to reproduce*
themselves. They are used in experimentation, production, and
* See Appendix D for definition.
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maintenance and repair of industrial equipment. Although the industry
,represents a small part of capital investment, material inputs, and
number of employees of an industrialized country, the level of in-
dustrialization of a country depends to a large extent upon the size
and quality of its machine tool inventory. 1/*
B. History.
Before the Revolution of 1917, Russia was not a large producer
of machine tools. Predominantly agricultural, the country filled most
of its relatively small requirements by imports. Machine tool produc-
tion was 1,500 units in 1913. 2/ The machine tools in use were
predominantly of simple design. In 1918, 76 percent of the inventory
was of foreign origin. 3./
Significant development of the Soviet machine tool industry
began with the First Five Year Plan (1928-32). Production and in-
ventory grew in quantity and variety until the German invasion in
June 1941. At this time, machine tool production dropped sharply
because of the destruction of plants, the movement of facilities to
the east, and the conversion of the industry to the production of war
materials. By December 1941 the German advance had cut off an esti-
mated 70 percent of the Soviet machine tool producing capacity.
Total war losses of the Soviet machine tool industry were 18 machine
tool plants 2/ and 175,000 machine tools Y out, of a 1940 inventory
of 630,000 machine tools. 1/
During the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50), machine tool
building capacity was increased by restoration of the 18 machine tool
plants destroyed by the Germans. Two new plants were constructed for
the production of heavy machine* tools and three new plants for the
production of combination and special machine tools. _8./ In late 1947
or early 1948, the prewar (19)4-0) production rate of 49,000 units was
attained as planned. 2/ In 1950 the enterprises under the Ministry of
Machine Tool Construction fulfilled their planned production by 102 per-
cent, 12/ accounting for about 75 percent of the total production.
Although a figure is not available for the nonministry plants, they are
believed to have made up the remaining.25,percent of the total output.
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The Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55) goals are "to expand sub-
stantially the existing capacities and commission new capacities for
the Manufacture of the big machine tools, cutting machines, and presses,
as well as precision measuring instruments, and instruments for .the
automatic guidance of technological processes." 11/ There is no
evidence of new plant construction since 1950. Existing facilities are
being utilized more efficiently. The Soviet postwar experience in ma-
chine tool building is yielding machine tools that are much more pro-
ductive and of much better quality than the prewar products.
C. Technology.
Whenever any industry makes a major shift from one product to
another, it usually requires a corresponding shift in the types of
machine tools produced. Soviet machine tool technology has been able
to cope with these conversions, even the major ones of World War II.
Considering the limited Soviet experience, the solutions of conversion
problems were surprisingly successful,
Since World War II', the industry has progressed from copying
foreign machine tools to designing and building complex, electronically
controlled machines equal to any in the US technology and is also build-
ing larger machine tools than the US has ever built: Standardization of
basic types of machine tools is going on to a greater degree than in the
US, and will aid the USSR to mass-produce more types of machine tools in
the near future. Production methods in a few plants equal or surpass
US methods.*
Research in the variety of fields related to machine tbol
building is carried out onLa much greater scale in the USSR than in
the US. ? Soviet centralized control of research plants and facilities
tends to produce results that can be disseminated throughout thein-
dustry more quidkly than the results of research done in the US by
individual companies. Technical assistance was offered by the USSR
to foreign countries for building, remodeling, and modernizing machine
tool plants in1953.12/ Technology in this industry at the present
time should enable the USSR to convert to a wartime production
economy without any major difficulty,
* See Appendix D.
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D. Organization.
Since April 1954 the production, design, and sales of machine
tools in the USSR have been under the direction and control of the
Ministry of Machine Tool Building and Tool industry,A.leaded by
A.I. Kostousov. 13/ Figure 1* shows the organization chart of the
machine tool industry in the USSR in 1954, including the subordinate
bodies mentioned under the ministry which has controlled the indus-
try at various times from 1948 Up to 1953. 1V It is believed that
this chart portrays the current status of the organization.
The industry has been reorganized twice since 1953. In March
of 1953 the ministry, then known as the Ministry of Machine Tool
Building, was given main administration status under a reorganized
Ministry of Machine Building headed by M.Z. Saburov.. In April 1954
it was changed back to ministerial status, headed again by
A.I. Kostousov, and the name was changed to the Ministry of Machine
Tool Building and Tool Industry. The announcements of the above
changes specified only those atministry level; therefore the exact
status of the main administrations shown in Fig. 1 is not known
during the period of control by the Ministry of Machine Building,
,March.1953 to April 1954.
The dominant personality of the industry is the present
Minister, A.I. Kostousov. He was first associated with this industry
as a student of the Stalin Institute for Machine Tools and Precision
Instruments. He is the author of articles on machine tool technology
and production and was among a group of machine tool experts receiving
a Stalin Prize in 1947. His first high-level position in the industry
was in 1946 as Deputy Minister of Machine Tool Construction. In 1949
he became the Minister and remained at this post till 1953, despite
very strong criticism of him in the press, which accused him of
"slowness in introducing and mastering new technology.". In March
1953, he became Deputy Minister of Machine Building and in April 1954
was again appointed to head the present ministry.:12/
* Following p. 6.
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? ? ? ? ?
II. Supply.
A. Plants and Production.
1. Estimated Production.
Production of-machine tools in the USSR rose from 1,800
units in 1927-28 to a prewar peak of 55,000 units in 1939. As a
result of the German invasion, production dropped to 10,000 units in
1942. Postwar recovery has been rapid, with the result that the
estimated production for 1954 is 92,000 units.* Table 1** presents
estimates of the annual production of machine tools in the USSR in
1927-54, and Figure 2*** presents these data in graphic form.
The rate of growth of the Soviet machine tool inventory
has declined slightly since 1950, but the annual unit production is
now higher than the normal peacetime output of the US.
It is probable that the Russians intend to level off
their production at approximately 100,000 units per year. This out-
put could be attained by an increase in productivity without any
additional plant capacity. An increase in productivity would mean
an increase in the number of light-type units produced.
? A comparison of Soviet and US production of machine
tools according to weight is given in Table 2.****. Percentages for
the USSR are estimates for 1954 Percentages for the US are the
latest data.available for 1952:
2.. .Plants.
The machine tool industry, originally concentrated in the
Moscow area and around other industrial cities in European USSR, has
to some ,extent been diversified., partly as a conscious effort under -
the planning era and partly under the pressure of the 'German invasion.
The original locational pattern, however, has been only slightly
modified. In 1954, more than 40 percent of the estimated production
See Appendix F, Methodology, for derivation of estimates.
** Table 1 follows on p. 7.
XXX Following p. 6.
xxxx Table 2 follows on p. 8.
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Main Administration
of Supply
USSR
ORGANIZATION OF THE MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY, 1954
MINISTRY OF
MACHINE TOOL BUILDING
AND TOOLS INDUSTRY
Main Administration of
Educational Institutions
Technical
Administration
ENIMS2
Main
Construction
Administration
All-Union State Trust
Main Administration
for Sales
Main Administration of.
Workers Supply
Main Administration of
Heavy Machine Tool
Building
Plant
Main Administration of
Tool Industry
Plant
Main Administration of
Combination and Special
Machine Tools
Plant
Main Administration of
Machine Tool
Building Industry
Plant
All-Union Trust for
Repairs and Restoration
of Machine Tools and
Presses and Forges
o Up to Morch 1953 was Ministry of Machine Tool Building, then was changed to
Ministry of Machine Building. In April 1954 was changed to current designation.
Plant
Main Administration of
the Abrasives Industry
Plant
Main Administration of
Ancillary Production
Plant
Main Administration of
Press and
Forging Machine Building
Plant
Main Administration of
Heavy Machine Tool
and Press Building
I
Plant
5150X1
Figure 1
Main Administration of
Foundry Maehine Building
and Molding Materials
Plant
Main Administration of
Heavy Hydraulic Presses
Plaht
2 Experimental Scientific Research Institute of Metol-Cutting Machine Tools.
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80
Figure 2
USSR
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION OF MACHINE TOOLS, 1927/28-1954
20
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1927 28 29 1930 31 32 33 34 1935 36 37 38 39 1940 41 42 43 44 1945 46 47 48 49 1950 51 52 53 1954
1 1 1
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Table 1
Estimated Production of Metal-Cutting Machine Tools
in the USSR 2/
1927-54
Thousand Units
Year
Published and
Estimated Production b/
Published
Planned Production 21)
1927-28
1.8
N.A.
1928-29
3.8
N.A.
1929-30
7.1
N.A.
1931
17.0
N.A.
1932
18.0
N.A.
1933
18.0
N.A.
1934
21.0
N.A.
1935
24.0
N.A.
1936
32.0
32.0
1937
36.0
41.o
1938
54.0
N.A.
1939
55.0
N.A.
1940
49.0
N.A.
1941
34.0
58.0
191.1.2
10.0
70.0
1943
14.0
N.A.
1944
21.0
N.A.
1945
23.0
N.A.
1946
31.0
N.A.
1947
48.0
N.A.
1948
59.0
N.A.
1949
71.0
N.A.
1950
79.0
74.0
1951
82.0
N.A.
1952
85.0
N.A.
1953
88.0
N.A.
1954
92.0
N.A.
a. Estimated margin of error, plus or minus 2 percent for
1927-39; estimated margin of error, plus. 15 Percent for
1940-54.
b. Figures for 1927-39 published, 16/ figures for 1911.0_511.
estimated. See Appendix F, Methodology, for derivation of
estimates.
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Table 2
Comparison of Production of Machine Toole by Weight in the USSR
and in the US
Percent
USSR US
Weight -(1954) 2/ (1952)
Light (Under 3 Metric Tons)
Medium (30 Metric Tons)
Heavy (Over 30 Metric Tons)
61
35
4-
58
37
5
a. Estimated.
of machine tools in the USSR came from 5 plants in the Central
Region.* Moscow and Moscow Oblast were repotted to be producing about
30 percent of all machine tools produced in the country in 1952. 2j../
There is also a heavy concentration of machine tool production in the
South Region. All but 8 of the 69 producers are located west of the
Urals. Plants located east of the Urals are estimated to produce only
5 percent of the production.
The exact number of plants in the industry has not been
established. An analysis has been made of all plants reported at
various times as machine tool plants. The plants shown in Appendixes
A, B, and C are believed to be those presently producing machine
tools.
Forty-four plants have been identified as primary producers of
machine tools in the USSR.** These plants are estimated to have pro-
duced in 1954 approximately 78 percent of the output of the Soviet ma-
chine tool industry. Twenty-five additional plants have been
identified as partial producers, XXX or plants producing some machine
tools in addition to their principal products-. These plants are
estimated to have produced in 1954 approximately 22 percent of the
7
* The term region in this report refers to the economic regions de-
fined and numbered On CIA Map 12048, 9-51 (First Revision, 7-52), USSR:
Economic Regions.
** See Appendix A.
xxx See Appendix B.
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output of the Soviet machine tool industry. Figure 3* shows the
plant locations and Table 3** the percentage of estimated production
for 1954 by economic region.
The geographic distribution of plants is similar for the
primary and partial producers. Seventeen Of the 11.11. primary pro-
ducers and 14 of the 25 partial producers are located in the South
and Central Regions. Taken together, these 2 regions account for
56 percent of the output by both the primary and secondary producers.
? In addition to plants producing machine tools, 14 plants have
been identified as ancillary, or supporting producers.*** Four of
these plants have been identified under a Main Administration of the
Ministry of Machine Tools. It can be assumed that the major portion
of their production goes to supply the machine tool industry.
Capacity and volume of production are not known, but reports
indicate that 4 of the plants provide the machine tool industry with
castings, 3 furnish attachments and accessories.; 2 furnish hydraulic
apparatus., 3 provide electric motors and controls, ?urnishes parts
(for example, flywheels, handles, levers, and pulleys), and 1 is a re-
pair plant for finished products. Eight of the 14 supporting plants
are located in the Central Region, and the others are in 3 regions
west of the Urals.
B. Imports.
Since the end of Lend-Lease shipments in 1946, Soviet.im-
ports of machine tools have amounted to less than 2:percent of their
estimated annual production. Before 1946, imports varied from a low
of 8 percent in 1940 to a high of 120 percent in 1943. 19/ Since
the imposition of export controls by the US and the :Western European
countries, the West has supplied less than 0.5 percent of current
Soviet unit production. The largest individual Western supplier is
Switzerland, although Italy, France, the UK, and other countries
supply a few machines within the quotas allowed by the controls.
Most of the imports from Switzerland are gear-making machines and
**
***
Following p. 10.
Table 3 follows on p. 10,
See Appendix C.
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Table 3
Distribution of Plants and Percent of Estimated Machine Tool
Production by Economic Region in the USSR
1954
Economic Region
Machine Tool Plants
Percent of Production
Primary
Partial
Total
Primary
Partial
Total
I
North and Northwest
3
2
5
8.3
.1,8
10.1
II
West
7
2
9
9.1
1.8
10.9
III
South
7
8
15
6.7
7.0
13.7
IV
Southeast
3 .
o
3
1.1
o
1..1
V
Transcaucasus
4
o
4
4.0
o
4.o
VI
Volga
2
2
4
' 3.6
1.8
VII
Central
10
6
16
37.4
5.2
42.6
VIII
Urals .
5
4
9
5..7
3.5
9.2
IX
West Siberia
2
0
2
1.8
0
1.8
X
Kazakhstan and
Central Asia
0
1
1
0
0.9
0.9
XI
East Siberia
1
0
1
0.3
o
0.3
XII
Far East
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total:
44
25
69
78.o
',0.o
100.0
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40
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 ,50 330 170
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1
al,Ki5hir1e41Kolomno
*lobo") ? 0 All \?04in)1(1/,Kinesh Kovrov4.'d.
Yeg or 'y evsle
0
Go
USSR: Machine-Tool Producing Plants
? Machine-tool plant
J Other plant producing machine tools
o Other plant producing machine-tool parts
Some boundaries shown on this map erode facto bound-
aries (Ma), not necessarily recognized os definitive by the
United Stotes Government; the United States Government
hos not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania into the Soviet Union.
50X1
4
55
120 125 130 135
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jig borers.* All are of top quality. Imports from the other Western
countries are types that are not under embargo usually general-
purpose equipment.
The majority of Soviet imports come from the Soviet Bloc,
with East Germany as the major supplidr. Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Poland follow in the order named..** Since the beginning of the
current Soviet Five Year Plan, imports from East Germany and Czecho-
slovakia have included heavy machine tools, such as large planers,
vertical boring mills, and lathes; and precision machine tools, such
as jig borers. 12/
In February 1954', the Russians were negotiating with UK
machine tool manufacturers for the placement of machine tool orders
subject to UK government approval of export licenses. El/ The types
the Russians were attempting to purchase were the heavy and precise
types which normally had been imported from Switzerland and East
Germany. UK official approval for shipments has not yet been granted.
The emphasis on importation of heavy and precise machine
tools coincides with the emphasis on domestic production of the same
types. The production of prewar Germany and Czechoslovakia included
a large percentage of heavy and precise machines; therefore the
Soviet demand from these countries is not unusual. It appears to be
an effort to aid the Satellites to attain their prewar production,
while the Soviet authorities hasten fulfillment of their own Plan to
provide more heavy and precise machine tools.
The USSR imports some of each type of machine tool that
Hungary produces, mainly radial drills, turret lathes, small milling
* Swiss information is confined to a number of. reports giving
shipments in weight or value or both. Switzerland is rated the largest
supplier only because shipments from other Western countries are
negligible. When items are identified, they are usually gear ma-
chinery or jig borers.
** The relative rating of the Soviet Bloc countries as machine tool
suppliers to the USSR was estimated by summarizing all available
reports on the known machine tool-producers. .
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machines., and lathes. EE/ Practically all the imports from Poland are
railroad-type axle lathes. 2._3_/ The quality of the East German and
Czechoslovak machine tools is very good. Hungarian and Polish equip-
ment is not quite up to the same standard, but is adequate for the
purpose intended and is improving.
.Water and railroad transport are used, with Switzerland and
West Germany using the railroad through Austria. Satellite shipments
usually travel by rail. Most of the transport by water is to the
ports of Gdynia, Poland; Constanta, Rumania; Stalin, Bulgaria; and
Ventspils, Odessa, and Rostov, USSR, although some shipments move up
the Danube.
Soviet importation of machine tools is handled by Stankor
Import.*
C. Inventory,
It is calculated that the _Soviet inventory** of machine tools
will reach approximately 1,,5 million units by the end of 19511..XxX
The US inventory was reported to be more than 2 million units in
November 1953. 24/. Since World War II the Soviet inventory has more
than doubled, While.the US inventory has risen about 15 percent. Re-
parations accounted for approximately one-third of the Soviet in-
crease. 2.2/ About 65 percent of the present Soviet Inventory is
estimated to be less than. 10 years old, whereas about 4-5 percent of
the US inventory in 1953 was reported to be leas than 10 years
old. 26/
- Inventory breakdown by type of machine tool was not
attempted, because the necessary information is not available the
percentages of demand by each consumer industry for each type are. 'not
'mown, and US statistics are not considered analogous,:
III. Demand.
A. Use Pattern...
The fragmentary information available did not indicate any
meaningful pattern of Soviet machine tool distribution, and the
* Machine Tool Import.
** Often referred to in the USSR as Ipark.'"
*** See Appendix F, MethodolOgy, for derivation of calculations.
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Russians have not published any statistics that provide a.basis
for estimPting the percentage demands of the Soviet metalworking in-
dustries. Even if .data on the US machine tool use pattern were
available, the use patterns of.the US and the USSR could not be con-
sidered analogous, because of the great differencesbetween the two
metalworking industries. .In peacetime,, for example, the largest
single US consumer of machine tools is the automotive industry;, how-
ever, in the USSR the automotive industry is very small. During
wartime, practically all machine tools produced in either country
would be used by war industries.
Machine tools are ordinarily used for capital investMent to .
produce end products and other machines, research and development, and
.maintenance of existing equipment. The demands for machine tools vary
with each change it priority of types of goods to be made by the
metalworking industries. It can be assumed that Soviet Machine tools
are being distributed according to the priority assigned to industries
in the current Five Year Plan.
B. Exports.
The. quantity of machine tools exported by the USSR is in- -
significant, estimated at 1 or 2 percent of current production.* The
Russians have been exporting some machine tools since 1948, but thus
far have confined such shipments to the Soviet Bloc countries,
Communist China, and North Korea. Soviet machine tools have been
displayed at Bloc trade fairs since 1948, and in Western. European
countries since 1951. 22/ In 1952, tools were exhibited at Bombay,
India. Efi Although the Russians advertise these tools as available,
there is no evidence of any sales taking place, except that a few of
the demonstrator models have been sold on the spot to avoid the ex-
pense of shipping them back to the USSR. During 1953 the USSR signed
numerous trade agreements.with.varibus Western countries, some of
these agreements including the shipment of machine tools from the
USSR. 29/ To date, however, there is no evidence of.such shipments
having been Made.
Exports of machine tools to the Soviet Bloc are confined to
the basic types of general-purpose machines.: Most reports refer to
lathes, milling machines, and drilling machines.** In some instances
* See Appendix F, Methodblogy.
** Reports consist largely of Soviet press comments on individual ma-
chines being made by some named or unnamed machine tool plant.
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the Russians are exporting to the Satellites the same types of ma-
chine tools that they import from the same Satellites, but the
quantities are small and there are technical differences, such as
precision, capacity) and number of speeds, in the machines exchanged.
There is MO evidence that the USSR is exporting any precision machine
tools, such as jig borers, or any heavy machines, such as vertical
boring mills.
Except to Bulgaria, Communist China, and North Korea, ex-
port shipments are by rail. Shipments to Bulgaria are usually made
by water ,from Odessa to Stalin (Varna), in Bulgaria. Soviet ex-
port of machine tools is handled by Stanko-Import, the same
organization that handles import of machine tools.
C. Substitutes.
There is only a slight degree of substitutability between
machine tool types, although a few of the operations they perform
can be accomplished by other means. Improved casting and forging
methods hold tolerances close enough for some products, eliminating
the need for machine tools. Other products can be fabricated by
welding. Nevertheless, machine tools are still needed to provide
casting, forging, and welding equipment, and to maintain this
equipment. Machine tools are the only machines that can perform all
of the operations required to build and maintain precision machinery.
They are also the only machines that can perform all operations to re-
produce themselves.
IV. Future Expansion.
A. Existing Capacity.
The Fourth Five Year Plan for machine tools was to achieve
by 1950 a productive capacity of 94,800 metal-cutting machine
tools. ]2/ The plants identified in Appendixes A, B, and C, are
capable of this productive capacity, which is approximately the cur-
rent production of machine tools.
B. Expansion Under Way or Projected.
The Fifth Five Year Plan does not call for construction of
any new enterprises that can be identified as machine tool plants,
but does mention the "commissioning of new enterprises and
units." 2../ The absence of any evidence of new machine tool plants
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being built at this time, halfway through the Plan period, suggests
that "commissioning of new enterprises" means assignments to build
machine tools at existing plants which have not previously built them.
Modernization of facilities and methods is constantly going
on in most of the Soviet machine tool plants. New methods of produc-
tion are being initiated, 2/ such as installation of conveyors for
the painting of machine tools. A number of plants have created "conl-
plex brigades" made up of engineers and Stakhanovites for the purpose
of reviewing the designs and manufacturing technology of machine
tools. ]3../ Their efforts are concentrated on increasing productivity
by shortening machining and handling time. In one plant at Gomel,
the Russians Claim to have saved 16,000 man-hours in 11 months in
-1953. 1).1/
C. Requirements for Plant Expansion or Conversion.
It is highly probable that the existing plants producing ma-
chine tools in the USSR may be the extent of capital construction that
Soviet authorities intend for this industry. Factors to bear this out
are as follows:
(1) Existing plant capacity can be increased to produce
approximately 100,000 units annually, which is more than US peacetime
production.
(2) If necessary, the plants can go on a multiple shift
basis to produce at least 50 percent more with existing facilities.
(3) Since 1953, the existing plants have been aiding the
agricultural program by devoting part of their facilities to produc-
tion of tractor and other parts. These facilities could be reconverted
to machine tool production. -
(4) Since import and export of machine tools are about equal,
the annual Soviet increase in machine tool inventory is about equal
to the annual production.. .The Soviet economy probably cannot absorb
such rapid increase for any prolonged period of time without an in-
crease in exports. An alternative might be a leveling off of produc-
tion, possibly during the next Plan period.
If the Soviet authorities do intend to expand their plant
base, however, the material inputs required would depend upon the
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expansion. plan. For example, constructing a new plant to produce
2,000 units annually may require five times more inputs than the re-
conversion of anexisting plant to produce an. additional 2,000 units'
annually.
.. It is doubted that Soviet machinetool plants will ever be
converted from building machine tools to any great extent during a
peacetime economy. If conversion takes place, it will probably be
a change to the production of engineering equipment or products re-
quiring approximately the same capacities, productive equipment, and
skills that the industry employs at present. A cbnversion of this
type can ,be made with an estimated time-lag of only 2 months.
A conversion to wartime economy would involve an estimated
lag of about 6 months, because the industry" would be called upon
to tool up all the other war material producers. The.USSR would not
be in so poor a position as the US was at the beginning of the
Korean conflict, because the current,Soviet plan places most,
emphasis on the heavy and the precise tools. The US in 1950 was
short of such types'as-large vertical boring mills, large planers,
and jig borers, and it took up to 18 months to produce them. The
present Soviet program, if successfully carried out during this Plan
period,ending in 1955, may leave the USSR in the position of needing
only the smaller and the specialized mass-production type machine
tools to convert to full-scale war requirements.* Expansion would
not be necessary, since the conveyor assembly lines in some of the
machine tool plants can be adapted to most of the smaller single-
purpose machine tools used in quantity during wartime.
V. Inputs.
A. For Production.
Soviet input requirements to produce the estimated output of
92,000,machine tools in 1954 are shown in Table 4..** These require-
ments are very small when compared with total industrial requirements
of the national economy. Estimates for electric motor requirements
are the highest, about 4 percent of the total national output. The
estimated requirements for antifriction.bearings amounted to 2.5 per-
* There is much evidence to substantiate the fact that the produc-
tion of heavy and precise tools is being emphasized, although quan-
tities cannot be determined. Emphasis is also being placed on the
import of these tools.
** Table 4 follows on p. 17.
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Table 4
Calculated Input Requirements for Estimated Production
of Machine Tools in the USSR
19511.
Item
Steel
Iron Castings
Copper
Aluminum
Rubber
Lumber
Preservatives
Paint
Bearings Antifriction
-Motors,
Electric Energy
Coal
Labor (All Types)
Quantity 1.21
149,000 MT
316,000 MT
2,400 MT
1,400 MT
835 MT
20,000 NM
250 MT
655,000 Litres
3,680 Thousand Unita
851,000 (Total Rating) KW
684 Million KWh
568,000 MT
84,000-Workers
a. On basis of total estimated production of 92,000
units. See Appendix F, Methodology, for derivation of
data.
b. Estimated margin of error, plus 10 percent.
cent of the total national output. It is estimatedthat other major,
inputsi'such as Metals, electric energy, coal, and labor used lest,
than 2 percent of the total Soviet-production-or availability.
It is estimated that plant floor space used by the industry.
is 25,200,000 square feet,* or no more than 1 percent of the total
Soviet industrial plant capacity. The number of machine tools re-
quired is estimated to be 25,000,or less than 2 percent of the
estimated Soviet machine tool inventory.**
* See Appendix F, Methodology, for derivation of data.
** See Table 7, p. 44, below, for calculated inventory.
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B. Expansion.
Expansion of the machine tool industry in the USSR would not
be difficult. The industry is located mainly in the industrialized
regions of the country, where materials are available in the small
quantities needed. Skilled labor should be available, since the
Russians are constantly training apprentices in the trade. As ex-
pansion progressed, floor space and machine tools needed to expand
production would be required at a constantly diminishing rate.
Transportation of materials would become a problem only if the ex-
pansion took place in areas remote from rail centers.
VI. Vulnerabilities and Intentions.
A. Vulnerabilities.
The chief strategic vulnerability of the Soviet machine
tool industry is the extent to which production is concentrated in
the Leningrad and Moscow areas. These two cities produce approxi-
mately one-third of all Soviet machine tools.
Another vulnerability is the concentration of production of
basic machine tools in a few plants. The Krasnyy Proletariy Plant
in Moscow produces approximately 50 percent of all lathes, and the
Gor'kiy Milling Machine Plant produces about the same percentage of
all milling machines. The Komsomolets Plant at Yegorevsk produces
approximately 75 percent of the gear processing machines, .
The most strategic machine tool input is electric motors,
without which the tools are of no value. A curtailment in motor
supply would result in a corresponding curtailment of machine tool
production. All inputs are provided from the Soviet economy, and
the percentages of available totals used by the industry are so
small that imports of materials are of negligible importance. The
USSR depends on imports for only one type of Machine tool, the jig
borer.
B. Intentions.
The Soviet machine, tool industry appears to be operating at a
near-capacity level on a 1-shift basis. There is no evidence at the
present time of the sudden rise in production characteristic of this
industry when war is imminent, nor is there any, sign of a sudden
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shift to single-purpose, munitions-making equipment. This lack of
indicators does not mean that the Russians are neglecting to build
up war potential. Every machine tool can contribute to a war. Under
the guise of a long-range industrial plan, it would be possible for
the USSR to expand its machine tool inventory to meet wartime demands.
The US Strategic Bombing Survey of German industry showed this to be
true of the German machine tool inventory. 22/
Soviet concentration on production and importation of 'heavy
machines is probably the result of past experience. Both the US and
the USSR were short of heavy machines for the World War II effort.
Although all Soviet production is officially reported to be
going to industries producing consumer goods and civilian capital
investments, machine tools of any kind can be regarded as potential
instruments of military production. The present buildup in the
Soviet machine tool inventory is progressing at a faster rate than
any country has ever experienced. A continuation of this rate of
buildup with continued emphasis on the heavy type tools, if carried
on through the next Five Year Plan, will put the USSR in the position
of having the best equipped base in the world for the production of
war materials.
Although the USSR is building more machine tools than any
other country and can control the building of machine tools in some
Satellite countries, it is not yet in the world market. It is
nevertheless, advertising machines for export, showing them to the
Western world at trade fair's, and even offering technical assistance
to less industrialized countries. These publicity efforts may be
politically motivated to let the world know that the USSR is a con-
tender in this field. Actually, the USSR is exporting very few ma-
chine tools, most of which go to the Satellftes.
The USSR is probably trying to build up a large inventory
of machine tools that can easily be converted to production of war
equipment. When the USSR considers this inventory to be adequate,
it can be expected to enter the world market on a large scale,
probably underselling where necessary to gain economic advantage,
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_ _ _ _ _
APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE DATA ON MACHINE TOOL PLANTS IN THE USSR
PRIMARY PRODUCERS
WAC
Plant Region Number li*.
Principal Products
Alapayevsk Machine Tool Building Plant
Chialov Machine Tool. Building Plant
,
Dmitrov Milling Machine Plant ?
Gomel Machine Tool Building Plant imeni Kirov
Gor'kiy Milling Machine Plant ?
Irkutsk Machine Tool Building Plant (No. 4)
Kharov- Machine Tool Plant imeni Molotov
Kiev Machine Tool Building Plant imeni Gor'kiy
VIII
VIII
VII
II-b
VII
XI
III
III
156
236
154
167
154
200
234
233
Turret lathes. E/
Shapers, slotters, and horizontal boring
machines. 2131
Milling machines. 22/
Shapers and slotters (hydraulic) and planers. 12/
Milling machines. Ill/
Lathes. 1E/
Grinding machines and boring;machines.112/
Philtispindle lathes and automatics, and?horizontal
boring mills. )14,/
Kblomna Heavy Machine Tool Plant
VII
3...7
Heavy lathes and gear-making machines and vertical
boring mills. ?/
Ktamatoisk Heavy, Machine Tool Building Plant
III
234
Heavy lathes. 4
Krasnodar Machine Tool Building Plant imeni Sedin
IV
249
Vertical boring mills.
Kuybyshev Machine Tool Building Plant Middle Volga
(Srednevolzbskiy)
VI
165
Screw-cutting lathes and thread mills. 48
Leningrad Machine Tool Building Plant Avtomat
I-a
153
Automatic lathes and long-bed lathes. 49
Leningrad Machine Tool Building Plant imeni
SVerdlov,
I,s,
153
Horizontal boring mills, profile mills, and special
boring machines. 22/ ?
Leningrad Machine Tool Building Plant imeni
I-a
153
Profile grinders, and polishing machines.
Lubny Machine Tool Building Plant imeni Kommunar
III
233
Lathes, screw-tutting and turret types. 52
Maikop Machine Tool Building Plant Lanni Frunze
IV
249
Diamond boring machines. 22/
Malitopol Machine Tool Building Plant imeni
23 October
III
249
Automatic screw- and thread-cutting machines. 2)i/
Minsk. Machine Tool Building Plant imeni Voroshilov
II-b
168
Planers. 22/
Minsk Machine Tool Building Plant imeni Kirov
II-b
168
Broaches, cut-off saws, and lathes. 2g
Moscow Ktasnyy Proletariy Machine Tool Building
Plant imeni A.I. Efremov
VII
167
Lathes, all sizes, screw-cutting and multicut. 22/
Moscow Machine Tool Building Plant imeni Sergo
Ordzhonikidze
VII
167
MUltispindle automatics. 2Y
Moscow Grinding Machine Building Plant MSZ
VII
167'
Grinding machines, surface and cylindrical types. 22/
Mbscow Internal Grinding Machine Building Plant
ZVShS
VII
167
Internal grinders, transfer lines, and jig borers.
* Footnote for Appendix A follows on P. 22.
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Plant
WAC
Region Number !V
Principal Products
MOSCOW Machine Tool Building Plant
Stankokonstruktsiya
VII
167
Experimental models of machine tools, and transfer
lines. LI
Novocherkassk Machine Tool Building Plant
IV
249
Turret lathes. ?E/
Novosibirsk Machine Tool Building Plant imeni
16th Party Congress
IX
162
Combination Machine tools.
Novosibirsk Heavy Machine .Tool and Hydraulic Press
Building Plant imeni Efremov (Tyazhstankogidro-
press)
IX
162
Heavy lathes, vertical boring mills, planers, milling
machines, and hydraulic presses. LI./
Odessa Radial Drilling Machine Tool Building Plant
III
250
Radial drilling machines.. .12/
Odessa Milling Machine Tool Building Plant imeni
Kirov
III
250
Milling machines, and copying machines. ?,,L6./
Ryazan Heavy Machine Tool Building Plant
VII ,
166
Screw-cutting lathes and large turning lathes.
Saraktaph Machine Tool Building Plant imeni
Kommunar
VIII
236
Grinders and polishing machines.
Saratov Machine Tool Building Plant
VI'
235
Shapers, drill presses, and internal grinders. .62/
Sterlitamak Machine Tool Building plant imeni
Lenin
VIII
165
Upright drilling .and honing and lapping machines. 1EV
Tbilisi Machine Tool Building Plant imeni Kirov
V
325
Screw-cutting lathes and pipe-threading machines. 11/
Tbilisi Machine Tool Building Plant imeni Stanok
V
325
Screw-cutting lathes and bolt threaders. 72
Tbilisi Casting and Machinery Plant
V
325
Screw-cutting lathes and accessories. 73 .
Troitsk Machine Tool Building Plant -
VIII
164
Power hack saws, and pipe cut-off machines. /LI
Vil.'nyus Machine Tool Building Plant imeni
Zhalgiris
Il-a
168
Bench drills, shapers, and milling machines.
Vitebsk Machine Tool Building Plant imeni Kirov
II-b
167
Surface grinders and milling machines. 1.61
Vitebsk Machine Tool Building Plant imeni Komintern
II-b
167
Drills, radial, upright, and multispindle. /1/
Vitebsk Tool Grinding Machine Building Plant (Zavod
Zatochnyy Stanki)
II-b
167
Tool grinders and hob grinders. 22/
Yegorevsk Machine Tool Building Plant imeni
Komsomolets
VII
166
Gear-making machinery. 12/
Yerevan Machine Tool Building Plant imeni
Dzerzhinskiy
V
325
Screw-cutting lathes. ?21/
-
a. Numbers refer to US Air Force World Aeronautical charts.
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APPENDIX B
SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE DATA ON MACHINE TOOL PLANTS IN THE USSR
PARTIAL PRODUCERS
Plant
WAC
Region Number
Machine Tool Produced
Artemovskiy Machine Building Plant
VIII
156
Lathes and drill presses. f/
Baranovichi Machine Building Plant
II-b
168
Lathes. f2/
Dnepropetrovsk Machine Building Plant imeni
Kaganovich
III
234
Milling machines. fg/
Frunze Tool Plant
X-b
328
Screw-cutting lathes.
Izhevsk Machine and Armaments Plant
VIII
155
Lathes, turret lathes, and milling machines. f2/
Kaments-Podolski Lathe Building Plant
III
233
Lathes. ff/
Khar'kov Combination Machine Tool Plant
III
234
Machine tool production - combination Machine tools.
Kineshma Machine Building Plant imeni Kalinin
VII
154
Shapers, milling machines,.and special lathes.f/
Kishenev Machine Plant imeni Kotovskiy
III
250
Grinding and polishing machines, and lathes. 89
Kizel Machine Tool Plant imeni Gor'kiy
VIII
156
Turret lathes. 22/
Kovrov Kirkizh Arm's Plant
VII
154
Vertical milling machines. 21/
Kuybyshev Plant No. 525 (Bezymyanka Suburb)
VI
165
Milling machines, drilling machines, lathes, and
shapers. 22/
Kursk Machine Plant
VII
234
Lathes and upright drilling machines. 25./
Leningrad Vtory Pyatiletka Machinery Plant
I-a
153
Anode-mechanical machines. 2)1/
Leningrad Vulcan Machine Plant
I-a
153
Grinding machines and special milling machines. 22/
Novograd-Volinski Machine Tool Building Plant
imeni Stalin
III
233
Lathes. 2f/
Odessa Plant imeni 16th Party Congress
III
250
Drills and parts for transfer lines. 2//
Orsha Machine Tool Plant Krasnyy Borets
II-b
167
Upright drills. 2!4/
Pololsk Machine Building Plant imeni Kalinin
VII
167
Lathes and grinders. 22/
Khmal Nitskiy Lathe Building Plant
III
233
Lathes. 122/
Sverdlovsk Heavy Machine Building Plant imeni
Ordzhonikidze
VIII
156
Lathes. 101/
Tula Machine Building Plant
VII
167
Milling machines. 102/
Ulyanovsk Plant Volardarskiy No. 3
VI
165
Lathes. 103/
Vladimir Plant
VII
154
Grinders and drilling machines. l04/
Voroshilovgrad Plant 270
III
234
Grinders. 105/
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APPENDIX c
SUMMARY OF AVAILABLE DATA ON MACHINE TOOL PLANTS IN TBE USSR
ANCILLARY PRODUCERS
Name
Region
WAC Number
Products
Yhar'kov Hydraulic Equipment Plant Gisroprivod
Kharkov Electrostanok (Electrical Equipment)
Klin Repair Plant
Leningrad Dividing Head Plant
Leningrad Machine Tool Attachments Plant
Leningrad Machine Tool Foundry Lenstantolit
Moscow Electric Pump Plant
Moscow Low-Voltage Equipment Plant
Moscow Attachments Plant Prisposobleni
Moscow Stankolit Works
Moscow Stankonormal Plant
Merom Stankopatron Plant imeni Ordzhonikidze
Tbilisi Tsentroilit Foundry
Yelets Plant for Machine Tool Hydraulic
Apparatus
III
III
VII
I-a
I-a
I-a
VII
VII
VII
VII
VII
VII
V
VII
234
234
154
153
153
153
167
167
167
' 167
167
166
325
167
Hydraulic machine tool driving equipment. 106/
Electric controls, switches, speed selectors, and limit
switches for automatic control. 107/
Machine tool and press and forging equipment repair.
108/
Machine 'bobl accessories, including dividing heads. 109/
Machine tool attachments, including pneumatic chucks,
and accessories. 110/
Castings for machine tools. 111/
Machine tool components, including small electric
motors. 112/
Electrical machine tool controls, starters, and
parts. 112/
Machine tool attachments, including pneumatic
chucks. 114/
Machine tool castings. 115/
Standardized parts for machine tools -- chuck jaws,
flywheels, handles, levers, and soon. 11Y
Machine tool attachments, including chucks. 117/
Castings for machine tools. 11.8/
Castings and hydraulic apparatus for machine tools. 112/
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APPENDIX D
DEFINITIONS
1. Definition of Machine Tools.
There are six basic arts of metalworking: drilling and boring, mill-
ing, turning, planing, grinding, and shearing and pressing.- This report
is confined to equipment performing the first five operations.
The National Machine Tool Builders' Association (N.M.T.B.A.) defines
a machine tool as a "power-driven, complete metal-working machine, not
portable by hand, having one or more tools or work-holding devices and
used for progressively removing metal in the form of chips." 122/ Grind-
ing) honing, and lapping machines are included in this definition, even
though the chips removed are microscopic. The Soviet definition of ma-
chine tools is "all machines for machining metals by cold chip removal" 121/
and/or "machine tools for the machining of metals through the cutting-off
of shavings from metals by any method." 1.?2/ This definition coincides
with that of the US with respect to the method of metal removal. This re-
port has assumed, therefore, that Soviet sources have a similar definition
for machine tools, unless the Soviet source stated otherwise.
2. Machine Tool Types.
The basic types of machine tools are drilling machines, boring ma-
chines, milling machines, lathes, planers, shapers, and grinding ma-
chines. Within the type category there are numerous breakdowns, for ex-
ample:
(1) Degree of automatism, semiautomatic or fully automatic.
(2) Position (plane) of cutting spindle or tool movement, horizontal
or vertical.
(3) Number of spindles or heads, single, duplex, or multi-spindle.
(4) Surface that the machine works on, internal or external.
(5) Degree of versatility, plain or universal.
A semiautomatic machine tool performs a predetermined cycle of opera-
tions automatically, but a worker is required to start each cycle. An
automatic machine tool repeats a predetermined cycle of operations, as
long as power is available and a work piece is kept in the machine.
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A "type-size" represents the capacity of a machine in various terms,
for example, a 16-inch lathe with a 24-inch center distance, or a 10-ton
broaching machine with a 36-inch stroke.
In the US and the USSR, the word "universal" is used to indicate the
versatility of a machine. Plain and universal cylinder grinders, for ex-
ample, both grind workpieces, but the universal can grind tapers while
the plain cannot do so. The term is also used to distinguish between
single-purpose and general-purpose machine tools. In this report, "uni-
versal" refers to machines adaptable to more than one operation, either
by means of built-in features, or by addition of attachments and acces-
sories. This type is not normally as productive as specialized types.
Other types mentioned in the report are "combination" and "transfer" '
machine tools. The term "combination" refers to a multitool machine that
automatically peforms more than one predetermined operation, such as drill-
ing, boring, or milling on more than one surface of the workpiece. The
machines usually called horizontal boring, drilling, and milling machines
are classed as boring machines and not "combination."
A "transfer" machine tool is a series of combination types which pass
workpieces automatically from one working station to the next until all
required operations are completed. All operations are performed in a
predetermined sequence and are electrically or hydraulically controlled.
Manual work consists of inserting the workpiece into the line and remov-
ing it after completion.
3. Unit of Measure.
This report has used the number of Machine tools as a basis for its
measurement of production and inventory. This is far from an ideal meas-
ure, because machine tools are heterogeneous with respect to type, size,
quality, produCtivity, and age.*: Standard machine tools in the US include
* A better measure of the volume of machine tools has not been used,
either, to describe the Output Of'machine,tool6 in the US. An Index of
production based On a deflated dollar volume of production adjusted for
productivity would probably be better and could be developed with respect
to output in the US. .It probably would not be possible to develop a sim-
ilar:indek for the USSR from the scanty information available, nor would
it be proper to cOmpileduch'an index for the USSR based on US weights.
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drilling machines weighing as little as 400 pounds and costing $500, as
well as 72-inch planers weighing as much as 60 tons and costing
$100,000. 123/ Heavier and more costly machines are often built on spe-
cial order, yet each has been counted as one. The capacity ranges of
Soviet and US machine tools are estimated to be the same, but the propor-
tionate mix of each range and type cannot be determined.
Units are used as the basis for measurement in this report, because
Soviet statistics on production and inventory, when they make a distinc-
tion between unit and value, are usually given in units.
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APPENDIX E
TECHNOLOGY
The majority of machine tools produced by the Russians in the early
1930's were general-purpose or universal type. Only 5 automatic and
7 semiautomatic machine tools were displayed at the 1935 Moscow Machine
Tool Exhibition. 124/
Industrial expansion and World War II brought heavy demands for mass
production of equipment and the saving of manpower. The result was a
greater concentration on the building of special and single-purpose ma-
chine tools and led to the development of combination and transfer lines.
The transfer line is the outstanding Soviet achievement in this in-
dustry. The lines are being built for the food, agriculture, automobile,
tractor, timber, and even construction industries. Twelve transfer lines
were installed in the Moscow Automobile Plant in 1952, 125/ and the USSR
claimed to have 39 such lines in May 1953. 126/ These lines are many
times more productive, use less space, and require less labor than an
equivalent setup of universal tools. A line for tractor piston pins will
reduce both production area and number of employees by a large percent-
age. 127/ A Soviet radio broadcast in English to the UK is reported
3 January 1954 as stating that the "Soviet Union has more than 100 such
lines." The previous statement of 39 lines is considered more accurate,
and the building of 61 lines in the period between May 1953 and January
1954 is inconceivable.
It is believed that since 1950 the USSR has emphasized the'production
of very large machine tools, for example, the following:
Lathe
Gear Cutter
Vertical Boring Mill
?
Weight
(Metric Tons
Capacity
450 3 metere diameter x
30 meters length
180 60-ton gear
500 (estimated) 13 meters diameter x
5 meters height
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_ _ _
Presently under construction is a vertical boring mill which will
weigh 1,700 metric tons and process parts 22 meters in diameter. 128/
The largest size built in the US had a capacity of 43 feet, the equiv-
alent of the Soviet 13-meter size.
Modern technological advancement manifests itself in Soviet machine
tools by the use of the following:
(1) Speeds of 3,000 rpm on engine lathes
(2) Stepless electronic speed controls
(3) Electronic copying and contouring devices
(4) Hydraulic gear shifting ? -
.(5) Built-in optical measuring devices.
These features are all used on US machine tools but are usually
confined to the top-quality machines.
The Soviet degree of automatism is estimated to be comparable to
that of the US in the postwar period. They are not behind the US in
the required technology, butare still producing a higher percentage
of universal machines than-the US now produces. The need for increas-
ingly specialized and consequently moreproductive machine tools. is
'constantly being stressed by Soviet authorities, engineers, and plant
directors. The proposed solution is to expand standardization of ma-
chine tool components and profit by'the savings of-. labor and materials
which, result from mass production. At present, such standardized'com-
ponents as-main drive mechanisms, beds, and feed drive mechanisms are
being.aasembled into more types of general-purpose machine tools than
in the US.
In a few of their more highly productive plants, the Russians have
copied the mass production technique of the automotive industry by
installing conveyors for assembling lathes and milling machines. 129/
This type of mass production is feasible only where the number of uni-
form products to be assembled runs into the thousands. Conveyors of
this'type automatically carry to the assembly stations the parts and
subassemblies of the unit being built. They provide a steady flow of
parts to maintain a continuous stream of finished products. US machine
tool builders cannot afford this type of installation, because they
produce only a limited number of machine' tools in any one model. Con-
veyors capable of handling the range of models made by any one of the
large US machine tool builders would not be economically justifiable.
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Most Soviet plants do not use .conveyors for assembly, .but produce in
batches of 10 or 20.machines, depending upon requirements. Large ma-
chines and special single-purpose. machines are usually, custom-built
individually.
The variety of machine tools manufactured in the USSR has expanded,
greatly. The USSR claims to have perfected or produced 55 type-sizes
by 1933, 500 by 1950, and 2,000 by 1950..9J Claims such as these are
misleading. It is known that every time they make a revision, however
minor it is, they claim to have perfected anew type-size. They are,
nevertheless, known to be producing every basic type of machine tool
required by a metal working industry and are rapidly increasing the
number of variations on an unknown number of types.
Examinations and tests of Soviet machine tools built in 1950 and
1951 show them to be of good quality, with their accuracy to US stand-
ards. 131/ The machines are well designed, the materials are good, and
performance tests prove them adequate for the purposes intended. Lubrica-
tion is adequate, and antifriction bearings are used on all parts moving
at high speeds. The designs facilitate maintenance and assembly.
The safety of operators has not been overlooked. All exposed rotat-
ing parts are guarded to prevent accidental.contact by the operator.
Electrical lighting and controls have been stepped down to safe voltage
operation.
Standardization is evident in the accessories, such as chucks, and
in the lighting systems and coolant pumps. Machines built in.. the larger
plants indicate. that jigs and fixtures are being used for manufacturing.
parts. Machines built in the smaller plants show evidences of handwork ?
instead of jig and fixture production.
The workmanship is generally good. Close fits and finished parts
are used where required, but the Russians do not put good finishes on
machined parts that do not mate. Their aim appears to be to turn out
adequate machines with a minimum of labor and expense. Some of their
machines, therefore, lack the eye appeal of US and Western European
products. This condition will change rapidly when they start competing
with Western machines on a world market, because the buyer of precision
equipment expects precision appearance.
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Soviet technology in this industry is at least equal to that-of.the
West. The industry fosters the interchange of technical information by
promoting plant, interplant, and industrywide engineering conferences.
Extensive research for this industry is carried on at the Experimental
Scientific Research Institute for Metal-Cutting Machine Tools (ENIMS),
whichAm 1950 had the following laboratories 132/:' ?
Laboratory for Architecture and Modeling of Machine Tools
Laboratory for Automatic Lathe Work
Laboratory for Electrification of Machine Tools
Laboratory for Grinding and Finishing Work
Laboratory for Hydraulic Driving Gears
Laboratory for Machine Tool Testing -
Laboratory for Metals
Laboratory for Optical Study of Stresses
Laboratory for Testing Experimental Models in Connection with the
Planning of Standards and Departmental Norms
Laboratory for Testing of Surfaces
Chemical Laboratory
Control and Measuring Laboratory
Mechanical Laboratory
Thermic Laboratory
Tool and Cutting Laboratory
Welding Laboratory
X-Ray Laboratory
Laboratory. for Treatment of Plane Surfaces.
The variety of fields covered by these laboratories indicates that
the USSR is making:efforts to develop techniques which yieldiefficient,
economical, and durable machine-tdols.
Technical information has been widely circulated in the machine tool
industry. A highly competent technical journal of the machine tool in-
dustry (Stanki i Instrument) has been published since 1930. Theoretical
monographs such as Research on Machine Tool Bearings, Calculation of
Machine Tools, Testing of Surface, and the like, indicate the accumula-
tion of technical knowledge.
Other evidences of an,advanced technological level are numerous.
Designers, for example, are working on a photoelectric eye device which
responds to changes in profile on'a drawing of a required part and
actuates the machine tool movements to produce a duplicate in metal. 133/
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Such a device was developed in the US in 1953 and used on one model.
The Russians have also constructed plants which automatically cast, ma-
chine, inspect, sort, and pack aluminum pistons ready for shipment. l31/
Soviet designers are exploring new techniques of metal removal, such
as the electrospark and anode-mechanical methods. The former technique
has limited application in the US; the latter is not yet perfected.
? In spite of adequate theoretical progress, the USSR is apparently
short of some of the indefinable experience acquired by the common prac-
tice of "cut and try" and "scrape and fit" methods. Lack of this know-
how is reflected in their reticence regarding jig borers, the production
of which requires a high degree of practical experience and skill.
There is evidence, on the other hand, that some plants are not prof-
iting by advanced techniques. Individual plants are sometimes criticized
at engineering conferences for failure to use modern methods. There is
no indication, however, that such failure has prevented their fulfilling
production quotas.
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APPENDIX F
METHODOLOGY
1. Production.
a. Basis of Production Estimates (1949-51).
All estimates for 1940 and for 1946 through 1951 were based on
the 1950 planned output of 74,000 units 135/ and published figures on
percentage increases. No clear sequence of percentages has been found
to cover total production for these years. Figures refer variously to
ministerial production of all products, ministerial production of ma-
chine tools, ministerial production of special and aggregate machine
tools, and total production of machine tools. The categories to which
these percentages apply are often not specified.
Table 6,* which presents the available information on the pro-
duction of machine tools for 1949-51, shows how little information there
is on total production. Most of the information refers to ministerial
production.
Two estimates were made on the basis of these data. The first
of these is presented in Table 1 and in Table 5,** and is based on the
following assumptions and data:
(1) Total production for 1950 was planned at 74,000 units.
(2) The 1950 Plan for ministerial production, which was
150 percent of the 1940 ministerial output, was assumed to apply to
total output as well.
(3) The total output for 1951 was 165 percent of that: for 1940.
(4) The unassigned production for 1948 divided by the unassigned
production for 1947 is a ratio of 1.24, which is assumed to apply to
total production. :
(5) The percentages for ministerial production for 1950 divided
by 1949, 1949 divided by 1948, and 1947 divided by 1946 were assumed to
apply to total production-as:well.
* P.39, below.
** Table 5 follows on p. 38.
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(6) The ratio of 1.34 for 1946 divided by 19451 listed in both
the unassigned and special and aggregate columns, was assumed to apply
.to total production. Further data are presented in Table 6.*
The second estimate resulted from calculating forward from a
1940 production figure based on Vosnesensky's statement that 1941 pro-
duction of machine tools was scheduled to exceed 1940 production by
28 percent. 136/ Since the 1941 State Plan set machine tool production
at 58,000 units, 1940 actual production would have been 45,000. Pro-
duction in 1950 was 1.6 times that of 1940 and in 1951, 1.65 times that
of 1940. Output for the years 1945-49 was calculated for 1950 production
on the basis of the same percentage increases for those years used in
the first estimate.
Table 5
Comparison of Two Production Estimates
for the Machine Tool Industry in the USSR
1940 and 1945-51
Thousand Units
Year
First Estimate
Second Estimate
1940
49
45
1945
23
22
1946
31
29
1947
48
44
1948
59
55
1949
71
65
1950
79
73
1951
82
75
The methodology employed in producing both estimates is identical
with the exception of the derivation of the base-year (1940) estimate.
As a result of this difference the first estimate is about 10 percent
above the second. This higher estimate has been selected for inclusion
in this report because it is more consistent with other known develop-
ments in and indicatlons of the growth of the industry.
* Table 6 follows on p. 39.
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Table 6
Published Information on Ratiopf,Change in Plans and Production
of Machine Tools in the USSR a/*
1946-51
Ratio
Special
Ministerial and Aggregate Total Unassigned
Production Production Production Production
1946 Output
1945 Output
1.34 137/
1.34 138/
1947 Output
1946 Output
1.52 139/
1.30 140/
1.5011+1/
1948 Output
1947 Output
1.421122/
1.24 143/
1949 Output
1948 Output
1.19 144/
1950 Output
1949 Output
1.12 145/
1950 Output
1940 Output
1:6 146/
1950 Output
1946 Output
2.58 147/
1951 Output
1940 Output
1.65 148/
.1952 Output
1951 Output
1.03 149/
1946 Output
1946 Plan
0.98 15o/
Footnote for Table 6 follows on p. 4o.
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Table 6
Published Information on Ratio of Change in Plans and Production
of Machine Tools in the USSR 2/
1946-51
(Continued)
Ratio
Ministerial
Production
Special
and Aggregate
Production
Total
Production
Unassigned
Production
1947 Output
1947 Plan
1.06 151/
1948 Output
1948 Plan
1.08 152/
1949 Output
191.1.9 Plan
1.06 153/
1.03 154/
1950 Output
1950 Plan
1.02 155/
1951 Output
L951 Plan
1.00.156/
1950 Plan
1940 Output
1.50 157/
9.5 158/
Spaces left blank in this table indicate that data are not available.
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The base period figure of 49,000 units used in the first estimate
is more nearly in accord with the reported output for 1939 of 55,000 units
and planned production for 1941 of 58,000 units, than is the lower figure
used in the second estimate. It is very difficult to explain the 20-per-
cent decline in output between 1939 and 1940 which would follow from the
acceptance of the second estimate.
Scattered reports of increases in plant output and plant pro-
ductivity indicate that actual production increases have been above those
given in Table 5. The higher output figures in the first estimate are
more consistent with these reports..
Finally, independent estimates of plant capacity used in the
preparation of the 1954 capacity estimates support the conclusion that
the capacity in 1951 was more than adequate to meet the output levels of
the first estimate. Since there is no evidence that the USSR was produc-
ing below capacity during this period, both estimates are conservative,
although the first is closer to reality than the second.
The 1941 production estimate of 34,000 units was based on these
hypotheses. First, the output up to the German invasion of 21 June 1941
was approximated at 26,000, prorating the average of the 1940 production
of 49,000 and the 1941 Plan of 58,000. Second, the output for the rest
of the year was judged to be about 8,000 units. This was based on an
examination of the maps of the German advance, 159/ which suggested that
the USSR lost 70 percent of its machine tool production capacity for the
last 6 months of 1941.
b. Basis of Estimates of Production (1953-54).
The estimates for this period were based on an arithmetic straight
line projection of the 1950-52 increase in production.
The low rate of annual growth for this period (4 percent) can be
attributed to the Soviet effort to fulfill planned production. The cur-
rent Five Year Plan (1951-55) calls for increased production of heavy
and higher precision machine tools by 1955, setting the respective goals
at 2.6 and 2.0 times the 1950 level: 160/ The Flan does not specifically
call for an increase in the capital investments of the machine tool in-
dustry or in its material or labor inputs. It must be assumed, therefore,
that any concentration on units of the heavy or precise types must be re-
flected in a decline in the number of units produced.
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A reported production increase of 14 percent in 1953 was not used
because the figure is lower than the stated margin of error in the pro-
duction estimates. 161/ The administrative changes of 1953 may have
changed reporting methods to include machines not previously reported.
Reports now include a simple babbit boring machine of the type now used
in US garages. 162/ In addition, in 1953 the industry started producing
parts for agricultural machines and tractors.
c. Use ?of Percentage Figures.
For many years, production reports gave percentage relationships
between production in various years or between actual production and
planned production. In some cases, however, it was not stated whether
these ratios were based on units or on the value of machine tools pro-
duced. It has been assumed, unless otherwise stated in the source, that
percentage figures referred to units.
d. Derivation of Weights of Soviet Machine Tool Output in 1954.
Some very bold procedures were used to derive the proportion of
1954 production in the various weight classes. The light and medium
classifications were arbitrary selections, but the heavy classification
conforms to Soviet definition. 163/ The Soviet special heavy class
(over 100 tons) was included in heavy, since the quantity produced is
small and would not change the percentages. More than a year is required,
in fact, to build some of the larger machines; thus only a part of the
total is produced annually. A machine tool expert estimated the 1954 out-
put of each of the 44 known primary plants on the basis of the data pre-
sented in Appendixes,A, B, and C. The following outputs of machine tools
were derived for the primary producer plants: light-weight tools (under
3 metric tons), 36,140; medium-weight tools (3 to 30 metric tons), 32,220;
and heavy-weight tools (over 30 metric tons), 3,490 units, totaling
71,850 units.
This method accounted for only 71,850 of the 92,000 machine tools
estimated to have been produced in 1954. It was assumed that the dif-
ference (20,150) was entirely in the light category and was added to the
36,140 light-weight units, bringing the total to 56,290. Plants other
than the primary producers are assumed to be producing light-weight ma-
chines, and heavier machines are probably produced in the 44 known
primary plants. This was the basis for the calculation of the percentage
distribution among weight classes which was presented in the chapter on
production.
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e. Derivation of Weights of Output of Machine Tools in the US
in 1952.
The calculation of the US percentage distribution of machine
tool production in 1952 was based on 1952 output data in a Department
of Commerce publication together with Weights of the various items as
estimated by a machine tool expert. 164/
f. Value of Production.
The $1-billion estimate of the value of production in the USSR
is based on an average estimated price per unit of $11,000. This was
derived by converting the annual yield per. Soviet employee of 1.1 units
of machine tools to number of hours. The Soviet employee works 48 hours
per week for 50 weeks, a total of 2,400 hours annually. This figure
divided by 1.1 equals 2,182 hours required to produce a unit. A $5.00
estimate* of the value produced in each hour was multiplied by 2,182,
giving $10,910 as the value per unit. The unit value multiplied by the
number of units produced gives a total of $1 billion. (10,910 x 92,000 =
1,003,720,000).
g
Soviet Data.
This report has assumed that Soviet published statistics are
reasonably accurate reports of production and inventory.
2. Inventory.
Quantitative information on the Soviet inventory of machine tools
is fragmentary. Figures released by the USSR are limited to those
shown in Table 7.**
The Soviet inventory was calculated as shown in Table 8,***.be-
ginning,with the year 1940, which was the last year for which a Soviet
Census figure was available.
* A rule of thumb estimate by a machine tool expert. Estimate of
error, plus 20 percent,
** Table 7 follows on p. 44.
*** Table 8 follows on p. 45.
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Table 7
Published Inventory of Machine Tools in the USSR
Date
'-10
Units
Before 1917
1928
Apri1,1932
January 1938
November 1940
End of 1950 (Plan)
72,000
93,000
, 181,400
380,000
630,000
1)300,000
15/
i66/
17/
'77
1-67/
170/
Production figures were taken from Table 1,*. Imports for the years
1941 through 1948 are a total of calculated shipments from the US, the
UK, and Germany. 111/ Since war losses were reported to be 175,000 ma-
chine too1,172/ half of this figure was subtracted for each of the
2 war years of German occupation. For purposes of retirement, a maxi-
mum useful life of 30 years was used. This figure is based on the
assumption that the Soviet need for machine tool units is greater than
that of the US,- and that they would not discard them as quickly. Accord-
ing to the US Treasury; the useful life of a'machine tool, for amortiza-
tion purposes, is 15 to 25 years. There are many machine tools in the
US, however, which are over 40 years old and are still in active use.
A breakdown by year of installation or manufacture was reported in the
Soviet census of April 10) 1932.17)4/ The inventory prior to 1913 was
given as 37)900 units; therefore this figure was deducted in 1943, the
year these machines became 30 years old. Other figures were reported -
for a span of years, such as 1914-17, 20,500 units; 1918-22, 9,400 units;
and 1923-27, 25,100 units. 175/ The reported figures 'were divided equally
for the years covered, and these amounts were deducted as retirements:
It is doubtful that the Russians retired the 48,000 units during the
war years 1943-45 as shown in Table fL? It is more logical to assume that
they were retired in the postwar years; however, for purposes of calcula-
tion, all units were considered as retired when they were known to be
30 years old.
* P. 7, above.
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Table 8
Calculated Inventory of Machine Tools in the USSR
1940-54
Units
Year
?
Production
Imports
Retirement
and
War Losses
Reparations
End-of-Year
Inventory
1940
630,000 173/
1941
34,000
6,000
-87,000
583,000 gr.
1942
10,000
7,000
-87,000
513,000 .../
1943
.14,000
17,000
-38,000
506,000 i/
1944
21,000
22,000
-5,000
544,000 fil
1945
23,000
10,000
-5,000
572,000 a/
1946
31,000
5,000
-5,000
68,000
671,000 g./
1947
48,000 ?
1,000
-5,000
?68,000
783,000 i/
.1948
59,000
1,000
-2,000
68,000
909,000 a/
1949
71,000
12/
-2,000
68,000
1,o46,000;."/
1950
79,000
b/
-2,000
1,123,000 2/
1951
82,000
g
-2,000
1,203,000 2/
1952
85,000
12/
-2,000
1,286,000 Cl
1953
88,000
b/
-5,000
1,369,000 C./
1954
92,000
12/
-5,000
1,456,000 72/
a. Estimated margin of error, plus or minus 20 percent.
b. No estimates are made for these years. As the USSR started export-
ing at about this period, it was assumed that imports and exports would
cancel each other. If they did not exactly cancel, the difference would
not affect the inventory significantly.
c. Estimated margin of error, plus 15 percent.
The USSR was reported to be dismantling and acquiring 270,000 units
for reparations. 176/ This figure was divided by 4 and added as a gain
for the 4 postwar years. The estimate for the percentage of inventory
less than 10 years old was arrived at by totaling production, reparations,
and imports for the years 1945 through 1954.
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3. Inputs.
a. Production.
To arrive at the material input requirement of the Soviet ma-
chine tool industry, it was necessary to determine the average weight
per machine tool unit. In 1951, A. I. Kostousov, Minister of Machine
Tool Building, stated that the average weight of a machine tool was
1.92 tons* in 1940 and 2.85 tons in 1950. 177/ He also said that the
weight of the average machine tool in 1952 must be increased 25.3 per-
cent. 178/ Assuming the average weights for 1950 and 1951 to be about
the same, an increase of 25.3 percent would bring the 1952 average to
3.56 metric tons. A 10-percent annual increase was estimated for 1953
and 1954 because of current plans calling for an increase of heavy ma-
chine tools by 2.6 times (units). 112/ The average weight for the
Soviet finished machine tool unit, motorized and equipped, was estimated
at 4.3 metric tons, or 9,477 pounds. To find the proportion of the
various metals entering into the manufacture of machine tools in the US)
the weights of these metals given in the US Census of Manufactures 180/
were expressed in percentages of the total, as shown in Table 9.
Table 9
Proportions of Metals Used in Machine Tools in the US
1947
Short Tons
Percent
Steel, All Shapes
61,995
31.8
Iron Castings
130,964
67.4
Copper and Alloys
921
0.5
Aluminum and Alloys
609
0.3
Total
194 449
100.0
* Soviet weights are assumed to be in metric tons.
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In order to utilize properly the above developed percentages,
the weight of items manufactured outside the machine tool industry,
that is; motors, antifriction bearings, rubber,. and paint, was deducted
from the weight of the finished, equipped machine tool. The total
weight of these items was estimated at 563 pounds per Unit. Subtract-
ing this from 9,477 pounds leaves 8,914 pounds as the portion of the
total weight which is produced by the Soviet machine tool manufacturer.
Data gathered from US machine tool manufacturers reveals that there is
a 20 percent loss in producing the finished unit from the raw metals.
Soviet chip removal for cast iron averages 28 percent of finished weight
and runs as high as 40 to 50 percent for forgings. 181/ Chip loss on
rolled steel is normally less than on cast iron. Since forgings com-
prise a stall percentage of the finished unit, 25 percent was used as
the chip loss in producing the average Soviet machine tool. On this
basis, a Soviet machine tool requires 8,914 pounds plus 2,228 pounds,
or 11,142 pounds (5.1 metric tons) of raw metals. This tonnage figure
multiplied by the annual production figure of 92,000 units gives the
metals requirement as 469,200 metric tons. This figure multiplied by
the percentages previously established for each metal gives the tonnage
input requirement for each metal.
b. Rubber or Synthetics (Deductible).
The items requiring rubber or synthetic materials include vee
belts for drive, oil wipers, seals, and the like, and are estimated to
weigh 20 pounds per unit. This figure multiplied by 92,000 units totals
1,840,000 pounds, or 834.6 metric tons.
c. Lumber.
It is assumed that the Russians prepare their product for ship-
ment as carefully as do US manufacturers. On this basis, it is esti-
mated that the requirement in lumber for skids, crates, bracing, pack-
ing boxes, and excelsior would be 5 percent of the weight of the fin-
ished equipped machine tool unit. Although lumber is measured in cubic
meters in the USSR, the metric ton was used as a satisfactory index to
Include all the wood requirements. With 4.3 metric tons as the average
weight of a finished equipped unit, the lumber requirement is 0.18 metric
tons per unit (4.3 metric tons times 5 percent equals 0.22 metric tons),
or 20,240 metric tons for the total production of 92,000 units.
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d. Preservatives.
It is estimated that an average of 6 pounds of preservative is
used to protect exposed finished machined surfaces while the unit is in
transit. This figure multiplied by 92,000 units equals 552,000 pounds
of preservative, or 250 metric tons (552,000 pounds divided by 2204.6
equals 250).
e. Paint (Deductible).
The average unit machine tool is estimated to have a combined
internal and external surface of 250 square feet requiring painting or
sealing. The average coverage of one gallon of paint (enamel) is
400 square feet. 12/ The average unit requires at least one coat each
al
of seer, primer or filler), and enamel totaling 750 square feet of
area requiring 15 pounds or 1.88 gallons of paint per unit. The 1.88 gal-
lons multiplied by the 92,000 units totals 172,960 gallons of paint re-
quired, or 654,652 liters (172,960 times 3.785 equals 654,652).
f. Antifriction Bearings (Deductible).
Forty antifriction bearings are estimated to be the requirement
for the average Soviet machine tool unit. This figure multiplied by
92,000 units equals 3,680,000 antifriction bearings. The types of bear-
ing used would be roller, ball, and thrust. The average bore is esti-
mated to be about 50 millimeters. By tabulating the three types used
that have a 50-millimeter bore, the average weight is established as
1.96 pounds per bearing, or 78 pounds per unit. 183/
g.
Motors (Deductible).
In 1951, A. I. Kostousov stated that the average power rating
of motors per tool was .7 kilowatts in 1940 and 5.5 kilowatts in
1950. 184/ In September 1953,- power onmilling, planing, and broaching
machines was said to have increased 2 to 2.5 times over the prewar pe-
riod. 185/. The 3.7 kilowatts reported in 1940 was multiplied by the
2.5 times reported increase i?953,_and the total of 9.25 kilowatts
was used as the average for 1954 (3.7 times 2.5 equals 9,25 kilowatts).
The 92,000 units multiplied by 9.25 kilowatts equals 851,000 kilowatts.
A US motor with a rating of 15 horsepower, 3-phase, operating at
1,200 revolutions per minute, with its weight given as 380 pounds in
a General Electric Company catalogue, is considered as equal in weight
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to a Soviet 9.25-kilowatt motor. Suitable starters and switches are
listed as weighing 50 pounds, and wiring is estimated to be about
20 pounds.
h. Electric Energy.
It is assumed that Soviet and US electric power requirements run
in the same ratio as Soviet and US metal inputs. The US metal input of
194,449 short tons in 1947 required a total energy input of 257,000,000 kil-
owatt-hours. 186/ The 194,449 short tons equals 176,404 metric tons.
(194,449 times .9072 equals 176,404). Therefore, the US 1947 requirement
was 1,457 kilowatt-hours per metric ton of metal input (257,000,000 div-
ided by 176,404 equals 1,457). The Soviet metal input of 469,200 metric
tons multiplied by 1,457 kilowatt-hours equals 684 million kilowatt-
hours (469,200 times 1,457 equals 683,624,400).
i. Coal.
It is assumed that coal requirements are proportional to weight
of metal inputs. US fuel requirements for the machine tool industry are
given in several categories, that is, coal, coke, fuel oil, and. gas. 187/
There is substitutability among these fuels, and lacking information on
their proportional use in the USSR, estimates were converted to coal,
since it is probably the standard fuel for this industry in the USSR.
The US 1947 fuel requirements amount to 5,950 billion British thermal
units (B.t.u.'s), as shown in Table 10.* This means that each metric ton
of metal consumed by the US machine tool industry required 33.7 million
B?t6u.'s (5,950 billion B.t.u.''s divided by: 176,404 metric tons equals
33,729,393). There are 27.8 million.B.t.u.'S in 1 metric-ton of coal 187/
therefore each metric ton of metal requires 1.216 metric tons of coal
(33.7 million divided by 27.8 million equals 16216). The 469,200-metric
tons of metal consumed multiplied by 1.21 equals 567,732 metric tons, Or
the amount of coal required by the Soviet machine tool industry. '
j. Labor.
Labor estimates are based on the US figUre for the percentage of
one machine tool which an employee would produce in one year. The esti--
mated Soviet production was divided by the calculated percentage of
unit per employee per year, to arrive at the number of Soviet employees.
* Table 10 follows on p. 50.
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Table 10
Conversion to B.t.u.'s of Fuels Used by the Machine Tool Industry
in the US 12Y
1947
Fuel
Quantity
B.t.u.'s Per Unit
Total B.t.u.'s
(Billion)
Coal (short tons)
Bituminous
112,000
26,000,000
2,900
Anthracite
12,000
24,000,000
290
Coke (short tons)
16,000
341600,000
550
Fuel Oils (short tons)
40,152 9.,/
39,000,000
1,570
Gas (cubic feet)
Natural
29,100,000
1,150
330
Manufactured
22j700)000
600
140
Mixed
21,300,000
800
170
Total
51950,
a. Multiplying 239,000 barrels times 336 pounds per barrel gives a
total of 40,152 short tons.
The only available Soviet labor figure is that of 26,800 for
1935. 122/ Dividing this figure by the 24,432 units produced in 1935
shows that it took 1.097 employees to produce one machine tool per year;
that is, each employee produced 0.912 machine tools. Many Soviet re-
ports claim an increased productivity, and it seems fair to assume that
labor productivity has increased since 1935. On the other hand, the ma-
chine tools produced today are larger and considerably more complicated,
hence require more man-hours to produce. It might be assumed that the
increase in productivity overbalances the greater complexity, so that
the rate is now one machine tool per year per worker. In that case the
labor force in 1954 would be 92,000.
Another method of computation is to compare US and Soviet labor
productivity in the machine tool industry. US statistics for the years
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1946 through 1950 are used.* This period did not include peak wartime
rates of production, which would abnormally raise the yield per person. ,
The average number of units produced during this period was
52,200 per year. The average number of employees was 46,56o per year 191/;
production per worker was, therefore, 1.1 units. A yield of 1.1 units per
employee for the USSR is therefore assumed. Applying this rate to the
estimated 1954 production, a labor figure of 83,636 is derived (92,000 div-
ided by 1.1 equals 83,636).
The second estimate is favored over the first because it is based
on more recent data. Even though Soviet labor is less productive, the
analogy is believed to be accurate, because the Soviet 48-hour week raises
the annual yield per worker.
k. Floorspace.
Estimates for floorspace are based on US figures for average square
feet of plant floorspace per employee. The data on floorspace and number
of employees of 13 selected US machine tool plants were used. 192/ The
plants are geographically dispersed and include producers of small machine
tools, producers of large machine tools, producers of a single type of
machine tool, and producers of varied types. Data for 1951 have been sel-
ected because they are thought to be representative of a normal economy
and 1-shift operation. Productivity factors are assumed to balance.
The average number of square feet of floorspace per employee is
300. This figure, multiplied by the estimated 84,000 Soviet employees,
yields the estimated Soviet floorspace.
1. Machine Tools Used by the Industry.
The estimate for the number of machine tools used by the industry
is considered tenuous but is presented for lack of better information.
* The National Machine Tool Builders' Association only reports statistics
for its members, which include approximately 90 percent of the machine tool
producers in the US. Data provided by this organization are therefore rep-
resentative of machine tool industry conditions. It is felt that N.M.T.B.A.
statistics are more accurate than Bureau of Census data. Bureau of Census
data include many items (for example, thousands of bench grinders valued at
about $50.00) which are not defined as machine tools in this study. Since
N.M.T.B.A. estimates were not available for 1950 and 1951, Department of
Commerce figures were used.
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The data used were obtained from two US machine tool plants in 1952.
The information is considered accurate, but it is weak because the sam-
pling is confined to only 2 plants, 1 specializing in the production of
turret lathes, the other in milling machines. The floorspace for the
2 plants averages approximately the same as the average floorspace for
the 13 US plants that are used for the Soviet floorspace estimates. This
floorspace average is divided by the number of installed machines to
arrive at the average floorspace for each installed machine, 1,000 square
feet. The estimated figure for Soviet floorspace is then divided by
1,000 square feet to arrive at the number of machine tools used by the
industry.
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