COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN JAPAN ORE 46-48 PUBLISHED 28 SEPTEMBER 1948

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003300010001-3
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• Document Release Date: May 20, 2013
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• Publication Date: September 28, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPYA10.-90.
POW THE .ASSISTANT. DIRECTOR
FOR REPORTS ?A-ND - ESTIMATES
41749
COMMUNIST STRENGTH
IN JAPAN
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ORE 46-48
Published 28 September 1948
This document has been
approved for release through
the HISTORICAL RHVIEW MGM of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
Auth:
Date:
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Apr 77
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
RETURN TO AliginES & RECORDS CESItk
iriMEDIATEIV AFTER USE
role.00%,"kli1QaGx3) AR000.1.
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ORE 46-48
COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN JAPAN
SUMMARY
While the Japan Communist Party (JCP) is, on the surface, only a minor political
party, it wields an influence out of all proportion to its Diet strength through its domi-
nation of Japan's largest labor federation and its ability to capitalize on the complaints
of disgruntled groups suffering from the chaotic economic situation or perplexed by the
postwar ideological confusion. The JCP has a membership reasonably estimated at
60,000 with additional strength to be found in the approximately 25,000-strong Young
Communist League and the numerous and easily exploited Communist sympathizers.
The? Party holds four seats in each house of the Diet, an insignificant representation
in terms of effecting legislation but useful from a propaganda viewpoint. The success
of the JCP has been due in large part to its aggressive and well trained leaders while
the interlocking relationship of the upper level committee membership makes for
smooth coordination.
Communications between the Soviets and the Japanese Communists range from
the open to the clandestine. In the latter category are the secret Moscow-planned
directives which are channelled to the Party's Soviet Fraction, which, in turn, attempts
to implement these decisions through the group's powerful position in the Party. The
so-called Tokuda group occasionally has a doctrinaire difference of emphasis from the
Soviet Fraction with the former generally favoring a more nationalistic and less of the
international Communist approach. Despite protestations that the JCP is strictly
nationalistic in outlook, it is now evident that the Party is in contact with other Asiatic
Communist Parties and may be represented at a Far Eastern Communist Congress.
The JCP was largely responsible for organizing, and now makes no attempt to
conceal its domination of, the National Congress of Industrial Unions, the largest of
the labor federations with a claimed membership of approximately 1,200,000 and
eighteen member unions in such vital industries as communications (government em-
ployees), steel, transportation, and electric and chemical workers. Communist influ-
ence is also exerted in varying degrees on some of the unaffiliated but large unions such
as the National Council of Government Workers' Unions, the All-Japan Coal Industry
Workers' Union, the Japan Teachers' Union, and recently the Party has made gains at
the expense of the anti-Communists in the Government Railway Workers' Union. The
Party and its labor federation have cooperated closely as is evidenced by their parallel
activities in labor disputes including the "October Offensives" of 1946 and 1947, the
abortive Communist-instigated general strike of February 1947, where SCAP's prohibi-
tion of the strike caused both organizations to suffer a loss of prestige, and in March
1948, when prompt action by SCAP forestalled an acute party-inspired crisis.
Note: The information in this report is as of 23 August 1948.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force
have concurred in this report.
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The JCP has aggressively attempted to penetrate other groups besides labor. The
Party has found the leftist League of Koreans Residing in Japan, representing over half
of the long oppressed 600,000 Korean minority in Japan, susceptible to infiltration and
utilization by the Party. The Communists have given high priority to penetrating the
Japan Farmers' Union, the largest farmers' union, but vigorous anti-Communistic
opposition has left the outcome of control deadlocked. The JCP has devoted time and
energy to the successful development of cultural groups and has organized those of an
obviously pro-Communist nature, as well as those of the "front" variety. The Party
has energetically courted the returning repatriates from Soviet territory but apparently
without any marked success.
The JCP has adopted a so-called "civil strife" campaign for discrediting the Govern-
ment, blocking Occupation and US objectives, impeding the democratization program
and hampering progress towards economic recovery. Appealing to cupidity, credulity,
or nationalism, Communist strategy overlooks no angles or opportunities for promoting
its aims.
An anti-Communistic Sentiment has been gradually but significantly crystallizing
during the past fifteen months. The general public's attitude has been influenced by
the now soft-pedalled Communist attack on the Emperor, the USSR's tardiness in re-
patriating POW's, and the JCP's tactics which helped impede economic recovery. Labor
has become discontented with the Communist minority control and employment of
violence. Not only has the Socialist-controlled labor federation rejected Communist
overtures for a united labor front and launched a positive anti-Communist campaign,
but even within the ranks of the Communist-dominated labor federation itself there has
been a strong attempt to attack Party interference in trade union activities. A further
manifestation of this anti-Communist sentiment is the small but growing, ultra-nation-
alistic-groups which now attack Communism but might eventually be directed against
all foreign interference.
The JCP gives no promise in the immediate future of altering its minor party status
?at the polls. Ideologically, the traditionally conservative USSR-fearing Japanese are
not attracted to Communism. The JCP advantages in Japan are largely economic.
Should trade with the West and US pump-priming fail to develop successfully, Japan
might feel compelled to deal with the USSR (eventually on the Kremlin's terms) in
order to maintain markets and access to raw materials. Internally, until the public is
shown tangible evidence of economic recovery, it will be susceptible to the Party's anti-
government and anti-Occupation propaganda, and without relatively stable living
standards labor especially will find militant tactics attractive.
As long as the Occupation forces remain, Communism is no threat to the Japanese
Government's structural political stability although potentially a strong element in
developing xenophobia. In the event of an early Occupation withdrawal, the Govern-
ment will be handicapped by the economic problem, the psychological disadvantage of
the USSR's geographical proximity and a decentralized police force which is still ineffec-
tive. The Japanese Government, very much aware of the Communist problem, may,
after repatriation from the USSR is considered completed and if permitted to act
as a free agent, very likely outlaw Communism.
SF/RET 2
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COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN JAPAN
1. SIZE AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.
In October 1945, a SCAP directive ordered the release of all political prisoners.
Among these were to be found the majority of those Communists who, along with the
returned exile, NOZAKA Sanzo, have since formed the leadership of the Japan Com-
munist Party (JCP) . In the same month the JCP became a legal political party.
The basic guide followed by the JCP is its first postwar directive from Moscow calling
on the Japanese Communists to train and develop new leadership in order to expand
the area of Communist influence, and cautioning the Party against activities which
might jeopardize its legal status or give the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
(SCAP) cause to suppress it.
a. Size.
The JCP registered with the National Election Management Committee only
18,088 "official" members throughout Japan as of March 1948. This figure is deceptive
as regards the Party's actual strength and power. A recent estimate, based on repre-
sentation at the JCP's Sixth National Congress, places Party membership at approxi-
mately 60,000. The first figure obviously fails to include secret members, or the large
but undetermined number of genuine Communists, who, although not actually mem-
bers, are active in furthering the Party cause. There are also many sympathizers who
are ever ready to permit themselves and their organizations to be exploited by the
Communists. Another source of strength is the Young Communist League whose
members per se do not hold Party membership and whose size might reasonably be
estimated at 25,000. The JCP has political influence out of all proportion to its mem-
bership because of its able top leadership, the rigorous discipline and fanatical devotion
of its membership, and also its ability to penetrate non-Communist groups and exploit
postwar suffering.
JCP success at the polls as contrasted with that of the Socialists is one yard-
stick for judging Communist strength. In the 1946 general elections the JCP polled
slightly more than two million, or 3.8 percent, of the total votes as contrasted with the
Socialists' 17.8 percent. Placing 142 candidates in the race for the 466 lower house
Diet seats to the Socialists' 330 candidates, the JCP elected five, the Socialists 93.
(Communist Diet strength was increased to six when a Communist runner-up was seated
after the disqualification of a successful Liberal candidate.) One year later in April
1947, the JCP polled 3.7 percent to the Socialists' 26.3 percent. In this campaign the
Communists put 120 candidates into the field to the Socialists' 285. Communist repre-
sentation, however, dropped from six to four while the Socialists' increased to 143. The
Party won four of the 250 seats in the Diet's Upper House in the April 1947 elections.
Thus JCP strength in the Diet is insignificant in terms of effecting legislation and is
useful primarily as a propaganda vehicle. Communist success in the 1947 local elec-
tions was also negligible, falling below that of the elections for the Diet.
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b. Organization. (See Chart - Appendix B)
Theoretically the supreme power of the Japan Communist Party resides in the
National Party Congress which meets annually. When not in session, the Congress is
represented by a twenty-five-member Central Committee which the former elects. Sup-
plementary to the Central Committee is the Central Committee Candidate Pool whose
ten members are similarly elected and whose function it is to fill any vacancies that may
occur in the Central Committee. Actually, superior even to the Central Committee is
the Supreme Council, top policy organ of the JCP, whose very existence is concealed
from most Party members. Of the nine members, the names of only six are to be found
on the Central Committee. A Control Committee is responsible for Party discipline.
Real executive power, however, lies in the Political Bureau of nine members and the
five-man Secretariat with the former making all important Party decisions and the
latter handling routine administration. The Political Bureau and the Secretariat
supervise the activities of some sixteen departments into which the work of the Central
Headquarters is broken down.
The Party's bureaucratic structure has a chain of command from the Central
Committee through 9 Regional Committees to 46 Prefectural of Metropolitan Com-
mittees, to the District Committees, the Squads and the Groups. Far-reaching struc-
tural reorganization took place after the 6th National Party Congress of December 1947.
A major innovation was the introduction of the Regional Committee to the chain of
command in an effort to improve local leadership, liaison between Headquarters and
the lesser committees, and possibly to decentralize command looking forward to the
possible future necessity of going underground.
Behind the JCP's activities is a complex organization of men who have qualified
for their present positions of leadership through long experience in Communist tactics
and a belief in their ideology, unfaltering even through long imprisonment The lead-
ership is aggressive, well trained, and hardened. Of the 53 members of the JCP head-
quarters all but five have been behind bars; seven have had experience and training
in the USSR and 13 are graduates of university-level institutions. The close inter-
locking relationship of the membership on upper level committees makes for a tight,
well disciplined organization and for smooth coordination. The top level leadership
rests in the hands of the "Big Three": TOKUDA Kyuichi, NOZAKA Sanzo, and SHIGA
Yoshio. All three are members of the Supreme Council, the Central Committee, and
the Political Bureau. TOKUDA and NOZAKA are members of the Secretariat and each
of the three heads up at least one of the Central Headquarters' departments. JCP
policy is very largely controlled by these three who have retained their top positions
through the reshuffling of officials at headquarters.
The JCP obtains its financial life blood for carrying on its countless activities
from illegal as well as legal sources. In this legal bracket there are the customary
membership fees, subscriptions to various publications, and the donations of sympa-
thizers. On the local level, party members have organized business concerns from
which the profits are deposited in the Party coffers. Should the firm plan to engage
in the blackmarket, the organizers will ostensibly divorce themselves from the JCP in
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order to save the Party embarrassment in case the activities should be disclosed.
Japan's economic condition, rudimentary police force, and long coast line offer a sizable
profit in smuggling. Evidence indicates that the JCP has resorted to this type of
enterprise. The traffic in Santonin offers an interesting example of JCP enterprise.
Santonin is a product prepared largely in the USSR from domestic plants and is widely
prized in Japan as a vermifuge. The limited quantity introduced since the War and
the origin of the drug have offered the JCP a near monopoly position.
c. Factionalism.
Available evidence indicates that there are two major factions within the JCP?
one identified with the theories of NOZAKA Sanzo and one with the policies pursued by
TOKUDA Kyuichi, the Party's Secretary General, and his group of adherents.
TOKUDA's theory, relying on leadership by the trusted few and the orthodox Marxist
principal of revolution by violence, distrusts united front tactics and the parliamentary
methods of the bourgeois democrats which it is felt will impair Party purity and virility.
The TOKUDA group, sometimes referred to as the "Prison Communists," although
decidedly pro-Soviet, apparently desires to establish a communized but independent
Japan which will cooperate closely with the USSR and with Communist Parties in other
countries but which will not become an integral part of an international Communist
machine. Reportedly TOKUDA's nationalism makes him wary of joining a "Far East-
ern Corninform," since he is doubtful of the advisability of too closely identifying the
JCP with the USSR in the Japanese mind.
As contrasted with TOKUDA, NOZAKA favors a slower, more parliamentary
approach with the use of united front tactics while simultaneously preparing for the
ultimate revolution by violence. There appears to be growing antagonism to
TOKUDA's "bassist" rule of the Party organization and disappointment with his leader-
ship of the abortive general strike of February 1947. Even though the 6th Party Con-
gress adopted NOZAKA's outline for "Revolution by Peaceful Means" after heated
debate, TOKUDA was re-elected the Party's Secretary General which position largely
governs party appointments. It would be na? to over-emphasize "factionalism" as
an internal factor inhibiting the growth of the Japan Communist Party. It is rather
a doctrinaire difference of approach and emphasis.
d. External Relationships.
Channels of communication between the Soviets and the Japanese Com-
munists are numerous and naturally range from the obvious and somewhat open to
the clandestine. In the latter category are the Moscow-planned directives for the JCP
which are channeled to the Party's Soviet Fraction from the Soviet Mission's Intern-
gence Section via TASS representatives. Available evidence indicates that the mem-
bership of the Soviet Fraction is largely identical with that reported for the Supreme
Executive Council and that it is, therefore, in a position to implement Soviet directives
at the highest party levels. At the same time overt communications take place through
the Office of the Soviet Delegate to the Allied Council and of the USSR Representative
at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo. These are principal centers for intern-
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gence reports and for the giving of instructions and advice to Japanese Communist
leaders. Copies of anti-US and anti-Occupation Japanese newspapers as well as Pravda,
Izvestia, and other Soviet propaganda vehicles are disseminated. TASS news service
is made available while the Soviet broadcasts beamed to Japan are monitored and made
available to the Japanese. Considerable Soviet propaganda effort is conducted in
accordance with SCAP directives designed to give the Japanese access to foreign infor-
mation, while supplementary activities are conducted in violation of regulations.
There has been considerable speculation about Japanese participation in a
congress of Asiatic Communist parties frequently referred to as the "Far Eastern Com-
inform." Despite the protestations of JCP leaders that the Party is organized on
national lines and would not consider participation in an international Communist
organization, it appears from recent directives that Japanese Communists are at least
in contact with other Far Eastern Communist Parties and may be represented at a
Far Eastern Communist Congress. These recent directives evidence a desire to im-
plement policy which appears to have been decided upon by the Far Eastern Communist
Parties jointly.
2. ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY.
At the time of Japan's surrender the Government rigidly controlled or suppressed
every form of activity of an organized nature. The freedoms introduced by SCAP and
the lack of widespread understanding of the meaning and aims of democracy combined
with Japan's economic deterioration have made it -possible for the Communist Party,
with its newly legalized status, to infiltrate almost every phase of Japanese life.
a. Labor.
The Japan Communist Party has placed its greatest emphasis on the penetra-
tion of organized labor. Except for the short lived severely government-restricted pro-
letarian movement of the twenties and thirties, the Japanese have had little experience
with labor unions. SCAP has actively encouraged the organization of trade unions and
the period of the Occupation has witnessed a phenomenal growth of organized labor,
presently numbering over six million. Union leadership, however, was to be found only
among the organizers of the earlier proletarian movement who now form the nucleus
of the present Communist and Socialist parties. JCP leaders were largely responsible
for organizing the National Congress of Industrial Unions, the "Sanbetsu," which has
become the largest of the labor federations with eighteen member unions and a claimed
membership of approximately 1,200,000 as contrasted with the Socialist-dominated
Sodomei's claimed membership of over 1,100,000. Communist influence is also exerted
in varying degrees on certain unaffiliated unions including the National Council of
Government Workers' Unions (105,000 approximately) which closely follows the San-
betsu line; the Japan Teachers' Union (475,000 approximately) in which JCP influence
has declined; Party influence may now be decisive in the All-Japan Coal Industry
Workers' Union (215,000 approximately) ; and recently the JCP has gained somewhat at
the expense of anti-Communist elements in the Government Railway Workers' Union
(565,000 approximately) .
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It is reliably estimated that of the rank-and-file membership of the unions
affiliated with the Sanbetsu, not more than 5% are believed to be party members and
even the inclusion of sympathizers brings the figure to not more than 10%. The expla-
nation of how such a minority of the Sanbetsu's total membership controls the national
leadership is to be found in the so-called "pyramid system" of electing leaders. The
"pyramid system" may be defined as one wherein those in authority on each level elect
those who are to take the positions of authority on the next higher level, enabling a
bare majority on a lower level to be converted into a near-unanimous majority at the top.
A review of the leadership of the Sanbetsu as the situation existed in February 1948, is
as follows:
Central Executive Committee 63% Communist
Administrative Dept. Chiefs 91% Communist
Secretariat 81% Communist
Officials 75% Communist
The situation is now generally recognized and neither the Party nor Sanbetsu make any
attempt to conceal the Communists' dominant position in the labor federation's central
organization.
The Sanbetsu's eighteen national member unions include unions in such vital
industries as steel, communications, transportation, electrical equipment and power
distribution, publishing and printing. Reliable authority lists seven of these eighteen
unions as Communist dominated, seven are probably Communist infiltrated, while the
remaining four are dominated by non-Communists. Among these seven Communist-
dominated member unions are the large and strategically located Communication
Workers (government employees), Electric Workers, and Chemical Workers.
_ The first major dispute of the Sanbetsu involving political action came with
the "October Offensive" of 1946 when the federation demanded the resignation of the
YOSHIDA Cabinet. The close relationship between the Party and its labor federation
is apparent in their parallel activities in labor disputes. The projected 1 February 1947
abortive general strike, originally included the Socialist-dominated Japan Federation
of Labor as well as the Sanbetsu. Immediately prior to the deadline the former with-
drew, leaving the Communist-dominated Sanbetsu in complete control. The strike
was organized under Communist slogans and political policies. Over two-thirds of the
top general strike leaders were Party members or sympathizers. SCAP's prohibition
of the strike caused both Sanbetsu and the Party to suffer a serious loss of prestige and
touched off a wave of public criticism at both organizations. The delayed "October
Offensive" of 1947 was carried out with some measure of success, very little effort being
made to disguise Communist instigation and guidance. Only prompt action by SCAP
in March 1948, forestalled coordinated nationwide walkouts by Sanbetsu's Communica-
tions Workers and some other groups of government workers' unions.
The ban on general strikes has created new strike techniques of which the
"piston strike" is characteristic. In the "piston strike," under orders from union head-
quarters, regional branches declare in turn twenty-four hour mass "vacations." The
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ii
S. ET
,
,
staggered system of striking is repeated in other regions until the cumulative effect
is that of a general strike.
b. Farmers' Organizations.
The JCP gives high priority to penetrating the large agricultural population.
An independent Communist farmers' union, even if organized, however, probably
would not be effective because of the native conservatism of the rural Japanese. The
Party's efforts have been concentrated on the Japan Farmers' Union, the largest
farmers' union, which they entered easily due to prior affiliation with groups incorpo-
rated into the Union and because of the Union's policy of political neutrality. This
organization has offered a medium for exerting a modicum of influence on the rural
community. The Union has been torn by the issue of Communism during the past
year, and the conflict between the pro- and anti-Communists is presently deadlocked.
c. Koreans.
The Koreans, numbering approximately 600,000, are the largest non-Japanese
minority group in Japan and are divided politically into right-wing groups and the
leftist League of Koreans Residing in Japan, with the latter considerably larger than the
former. Resentment over their long persecution at Japanese hands, coupled with the
new freedom brought them by the Occupation, and the economic and social discrimi-
nation from which they still suffer makes the Koreans susceptible to infiltration tactics
and renders the League a useful tool in JCP hands. The Communists have been the
only political party sympathetic to the Koreans' problems, and in its role of self-
appointed protector of the oppressed the JCP has endeavored to stimulate Korean unrest
and utilize it for party aims.
Communism as a political factor within the Korean population in Japan dates
back to 1928 when the Korean Communist Party was organized around a nucleus of 43
members. Communism then being outlawed, the Party was forced underground and
shortly thereafter its principal leaders including KIN Ten Kai, the most able of the
group, were imprisoned. Loss of leadership and the influence of the Third Interna-
tional led to the Party's gradual dissolution and its absorption by the JCP. This merger
brought the Korean Communists under the virtual domination of the Japanese Com-
munists in the "class struggle." The release of all political prisoners from Japanese
jails in October 1945 returned KIN and the other leaders to active Communist agitation.
Within a matter of months KIN became the supreme adviser of the League and in
conjunction with Korean Communist colleagues he has been responsible for its leftist
complexion and constant espousal of the Communist cause. The importance placed
on organizing and controlling the Koreans in JCP policy is demonstrated by KIN's
place on the JCP's Central Committee and Political Bureau.
d. Young Communist League and Youth Organizations.
Youth organizations, particularly the Young Communist League (YCL) , and
similar youth groups provide the Communist Party with an effective organization for
indoctrinating prospective Party members, training future leaders, and for providing
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strong-arm squads for the Party. The YCL has centered its activities around labor
unions, schools, universities, and farm villages. These groups appeal to the malcontent
youthful elements of the population and to the unsettled ex-servicemen; they also
serve as rallying points for the most aggressive and irresponsible elements of society.
The YCL was organized in the fall of 1945 as a Party subsidiary and although
technically separated in February 1946, the organization, plans, policies, and actions
of the two are too closely parallel to be accidental. The paper separation was intended
to make the YCL appeal to a wider range of prospective members and to improve its
position in efforts for a united youth front. Open to youths from 14 to 25, estimates on
membership vary from 10,000 to 36,000 with the figure of 25,000 being reasonably reli-
able. The YCL has been used effectively in the Party's "civil strife" campaign and in
labor disputes. Likewise, the Youth Action Corps and The Assault Corps are both
Communist-inspired youth groups working primarily within the labor unions as goon
"squads."
e. Cultural Front Organizations.
The end of the War removed the police restrictions on all associations (of other
than an ultra-nationalist nature). Cultural groups, always popular in Japan, have
mushroomed as a result. The JCP has devoted time and energy to the development of
cultural groups, both those of an obviously pro-Communist nature and also those of a
"front" nature with a heavy non-Communist membership which offers "cover" for
activities which might be repudiated by the non-Communists if they realized their
nature. In the former category are such organizations as the Soviet Study Association
and the Japan-Soviet Cultural Relations Association. Ostensibly free of political or
economic interests, they provide the Soviet Mission with a seemingly harmless cover
for close personal contact with the JCP and for the dissemination of propaganda.
The Japan Democratic Cultural League heads the "front" groups and is an
alliance of 21 member organizations with numerous branches. It is additionally sup-
ported by 38 non-member cultural organizations and cultural departments of labor
unions not directly affiliated with the League. Seven of the eight top officials of the
League are Party members and many member groups have almost equally strong
Communist leadership. These societies appeal to different age groups with varied but
ostensibly non-political interests.
The League is currently promoting an ambitious program to unite all Japa-
nese cultural organizations for the announced purpose of establishing a thorough
"democratic" revolution of Japan but naturally to facilitate over-all Communist con-
trol. Approximately 140 groups responded, out of an invited list of 950, to a nation-
wide cultural convention in July 1947, which made some progress looking to the estab-
lishment of the over-all control group. Progress in infiltrating cultural organizations
has partly offset the Party's loss of prestige at the failure of the February 1947 strikes
and the repudiation at the polls the following April. Cultural groups have served as
powerful propaganda vehicles and as "cover" for activities hostile to the Occupation
and to the successful democratization of Japan.
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f. Other Groups.
The JCP has been extremely zealous and untiring in its efforts to organize any
disgruntled group whose activities could either be so guided as to give increasing
strength to the Party's voice or to engage in activities detrimental to the Occupation
and embarrassing to the Japanese Government. A potentially fertile field for Com-
munist penetration which the Party has not overlooked is the "Eta," the Japanese out-
cast class. Estimated by the Government as numbering a million, and by their own
leaders as three million, this socially and economically stigmatized group is a "natural"
for Party equalitarian propaganda. In the 1947 general elections, the Eta organiza-
tion supported the Socialists and there has as yet been no indication of the Eta having
been won over en masse by the JCP.
The USSR has taken a direct hand in encouraging the growth of the JCP by
indoctrinating the Japanese prisoners awaiting repatriation from Soviet territory.
While the indoctrination has not been markedly successful, the program has returned
a number of converts. In Japan, the Party has energetically courted this group with
the general economic situation playing into Communist hands.
3. "CIVIL STRIFE" CAMPAIGN.
The so-called "Civil Strife" campaign is the strategy adopted by the Party for dis-
crediting the Government, harassing officials, blocking Occupation and US objectives,
impeding the democratization program, engineering chaos, and disrupting Japanese
progress towards economic recovery. Appealing to cupidity, credulity, or nationalism,
the Party seizes every opportunity, whether logical or illogical, to promote its aims. The
tactics are typical of Communist-seized opportunities the world over to take advantage
of unpleasant realities to prove to the working masses that the Party champions their
cause against the oppressive and reactionary "capitalist" leaders.
Communist strategy, overlooking no angles for disruption of the national life,
makes it mandatory for the Party either to disapprove or to attempt to dominate any
non-Communist movement, particularly those likely to obtain popular support. The
Community Chest fund-raising campaign, for instance, received a "thumbs-down"
decision. The tactics briefly discussed hereafter are not an all-inclusive list but are
typical of the popular issues adopted by the JCP.
a. Hidden Goods Exposure.
The Japanese Government has recently been investigating individuals and
organizations which may be responsible for the illegal disposal of vast amounts of Japa-
nese Army and Navy supplies which were returned to the Japanese by Occupation
authorities for civilian use. The JCP has exploited on a wide scale to its own advan-
tage this Government-sponsored campaign to expose hoarded goods. Hiding behind
the ostensible objectives of reconstructing the national economy and revealing those
individuals blocking recovery, the Communists, usurping police functions, have agi-
tated mobs to storm business enterprises under the guise of unearthing illegally
acquired property. With the average Japanese suffering financial difficulties the expo-
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sures have wide appeal and the large-scale "investigations" bear many of the charac-
teristics of mob rule?predecessor to the breakdown of law and order.
b. Anti-Tax Movement.
The KATAYAMA Cabinet's increase in tax assessments in June 1947, brought a
spontaneous wave of non-Communist-inspired popular resentment on which the JCP
has been able to capitalize. The Party has found in the anti-tax drive a movement
which provides a common ground for uniting the interests of both agrarian and urban
communities, labor unions in the latter category being particularly susceptible. The
campaign became evident shortly after the tax increases were announced, and reached
nation-wide proportions by the end of 1947. Employing petitions, posters, public hear-
ings, organizing anti-tax "strife" committees and holding demonstrations, which occa-
sionally ended in violence, the Party has bolstered its prestige with lower-income groups
which would otherwise be indifferent to the JCP. The movement has gained the fre-
quent cooperation of the Communist-infiltrated National Finance Workers' Union, the
government tax office employees, whose members have even encouraged the non-
payment of taxes. The Party may be expected to intensify its campaign prior to the
next general election. The drive also has provided the JCP with a vehicle for attacking
the Occupation on the grounds that payment of Occupation costs are responsible for
higher taxes.
c. Rice Deliveries.
The Communists have adopted a program of duplicity in dealing with the
government's rice delivery plans. In rural areas farmers have been encouraged not to
meet Government-assigned rice delivery quotas. This message has appeal for the
farmer since any amounts not sold to the Government may be disposed of on the black-
market at several times official prices. In urban areas, however, the Party has held
rallies to demonstrate against delays in the delivery of rice rations or the Government's
inability to supply the full rice ration. The program has, on occasion, boomeranged on
the JCP, when those farmers who had accepted Party advice were then compelled by the
Government to meet the assigned quota. The quota could sometimes be met only by
purchasing blackmarket rice and naturally the farmers blamed the JCP for their
financial frustration.
d. Promotion of the "Race" Issue.
Paradoxically the Communists, usually associated with the struggle for the
world-wide "emancipation" of the working masses, have adopted as their most recent
issue in Japan the formation of a "democratic racial (Japanese national) front." This
ingenious strategy is a revival of the plea for a united front with other "democratic"
groups and an appeal to the deeply rooted nationalism of the Japanese masses lost in
the ideological confusion of postwar Japan. As a psychological stimulus to patriotism
the race issue is devised to combat the importation of foreign, particularly US, capital
which the JCP claims will reduce Japan to a semi-colonial status. There is no indica-
tion that other parties such as the Socialists will not continue to reject the united
front appeal while the effect of race issue on the masses should be severely limited by:
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(1) the traditional relationship in Japanese minds between nationalism and the Em-
peror system which the Party is on record as opposing; (2) the introduction of American
capital which appears to most Japanese to be the best chance of improving Japan's cur-
rent economic plight; and (3) US assistance which is seen as promoting rather than
obstructing the restoration of Japan's former international position.
e. Anti-US and Anti-Occupation Attitude.
Initially the Occupation and the Party enjoyed a "honeymoon" period engen-
dered by the release of the political prisoners and the Soviet directive to the JCP not
to incite any action which would offer SCAP reason for suppressing the Party. The
campaign originally attacked by indirection, taking the form of criticising Occupation
expenses in the Diet's budget sessions or the Occupation's use of rolling stock and
communications facilities. SCAP's attitude, however, has gradually stiffened toward
politically inspired strikes while the Communists have become increasingly outspoken.
The attack is now directed quite openly against economic aid as being the
vanguard of imperialism, and typical of the JCP line is the statement of a labor leader
that "the actual enemy of labor is not the present government, but the US." Even
more recently the JCP attacks on the US give the appearance of being coordinated with
the anti-US directives of a "Far Eastern Cominform." Should the withdrawal of the
Occupation be indefinitely postponed, the race issue may be expected to have some
appeal to latent Japanese xenophobia. In the near future the anti-Occupation propa-
ganda of the Party, such as the "race issue," will lack wide appeal.
4. ANTI-COMMUNISM. ?
During the past fifteen months there has been a gradual and significant crystalli-
zation of anti-Communist sentiment in Japan. The Occupation's release of all political
prisoners in October 1945 was widely misinterpreted as representing SCAP approval of
Communism. More recently the clearly expressed opposition of the Occupation to
Communism and the educational activities of SCAP's Labor Division warning against
minority control of unions have undoubtedly been influential in encouraging the
growth of anti-Communism. Socialist Party attempts to limit_ Communist activities
have become particularly marked since the left wing of the Party repudiated coopera-
tion with the JCP in May 1947. The rank and file of labor has grown significantly dis-
contented with undemocratic methods of minority control and with the Communist
employment of violence. The general public's attitude has been influenced by the now
soft-pedalled Communist attack on the Emperor, the USSR's tardiness in repatriating
and treatment of Japanese prisoners, and the Communists' constant engagement in
"civil strife" which has obviously retarded the rehabilitation program.
The growth of anti-Communism has been particularly marked within the labor
movement itself. The Socialist-controlled Sodomei (National Federation of Labor)
has launched a positive anti-Communist campaign and has consistently rejected San-
betsu overtures for a united labor front. The anti-Communist element gradually
appeared to be gaining control over the government railway workers, the largest inde-
pendent union, until recently when it suffered a serious set-back. The anti-Commu-
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nists, however, continue to remain very influential within the union. Even the San-
betsu has not been immune to this type of activity. By the end of 1947, developments
among press, mine, and railroad workers, as well as less dramatic manifestations of the
movement in other unions, have opened the way for a campaign to eradicate Communist
influence from the trade-union movement as a whole. That the Sanbetsu is aware of
the dangers to itself of this campaign is amply. demonstrated by its defensive cries for
trade-union unity. Within labor the anti-Communistic movement has organized on a
nation-wide basis the Trade Union Democratic League for the furtherance of trade-
union democracy and the rejection of Communist interference in trade-union activities.
Outside the limits of the labor movement, anti-Communistic feeling is growing,
although unorganized. Responsibility for this may be credited in large part to the
repatriation problem. The dilatory Soviet tactics have aroused resentment against the
USSR as well as anxiety among relatives of prisoners still in Soviet hands. This resent-
ment has reflected upon the JCP, especially as the Party feels called upon to whitewash
the USSR. As a whole, the repatriates themselves, although undoubtedly many have
succumbed to Communist propaganda, appear bitter over their treatment in Soviet
hands and are unyielding opponents of Communism. The JCP, considering repatria-
tion a serious handicap, has, with its customary aggressiveness, sought as a counter-
measure to claim credit for the successful arrival of the returnees.
Another form of activity typical of the growing anti-Communism is the Japan
Revolutionary Chrysanthemum Flag Comrade Society, a youth group which is opposed
to the JCP because of the latter's threat to the Emperor system. While this and similar
groups suffer from a lack of members, financial backing, and cooperation with one
another, interest in them is increasing. Even though their ultra-nationalistic fervor is
now being directed against the JCP, these groups, many of which have Japanese veteran
appeal, bear a strong resemblance to Japan's prewar super-patriots' organizations and
could possibly be directed against all foreign influences.
5. COMMUNIST POTENTIAL IN JAPAN.
The Japan Communist Party is essentially a minor party and it gives no promise
in the immediate foreseeable future of altering this status at the polls. From a purely
ideological viewpoint the masses are not attracted to the banner of Communism because
of their innate conservatism and their traditional fear of the USSR which amounts to a
virtual obsession. The Japanese relationship with the US on the other hand has histori-
cally been a friendly one. The Occupation has revived in large part this traditional
friendship. By and large the Japanese are only too aware of the inimical relationship
between the US-USSR. The differences between the Soviet claims to large reparations
and demands for a relatively low level of industry as contrasted with US plans for aid
and actual shipments of food have not been lost on the Japanese. Further handicaps
to JCP progress are Soviet delays in repatriation which have soured public opinion, and
the Communist threat to the Emperor system.
Communism's advantages in Japan lie largely in the economic field. In the realm
of foreign trade, while a very large part of Japanese import and export trade was with
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#RET
areas now under Communist domination, the possibility of re-creating her prewar
lucrative trade with the "West" combined with US rehabilitation, leave Japan oriented
toward the US, initially at least. Should a successful combination of western trade
along with US pump-priming fail to develop, and should the USSR "open the door,"
Japan might, against her will, feel forced to deal with the USSR (eventually on the
Kremlin's terms) in order to maintain markets and access to raw materials.
Domestically, until the Japanese people are shown tangible evidence of economic
recovery they will remain susceptible to Communist anti-government and anti-Occupa-
tion propaganda. The economic desperation of labor, especially, caught in the usual
wage-price race of a violent inflation leaves this field wide open to Communist guidance.
The unions of the low-paid government employees will be particularly susceptible.
Anti-Communism, on the other hand, will be a growing factor both with the general
public and with organized labor. The less radical elements of labor are showing a
growing maturity, a rising discontent with the unrest created by minority control, and
a growing awareness that Japan's economic recovery rests in large part with the smooth
operation of the industrial machine uninterrupted by labor strife. The JCP will con-
tinue to find little response to its appeals for a united front, either from more conserva-
tive labor leaders or from political parties. For so long, however, as economic conditions
in Japan make it impossible for either management or the government to satisfy labor's
demands for improved and relatively stable living standards, militant tactics may
become increasingly attractive and prevent the elimination of Communist influence
from the ranks of labor. Anti-Communistic labor leaders may also be pushed into a
movement for labor union unity as a defensive measure should the Government attempt
to adjust the present labor regulations over-hastily or without moderation.
As long as Occupation forces remain, Communism is no threat to the Japanese
Government's structural political stability, although a constant economic handicap
because of the JCP's vigorous promotion of civil strife. The Party's constant oral snip-
ing at the Occupation will remain a thorn in the flesh and potentially a strong element in
developing xenophobia in the event of a too-prolonged Occupation. In the event of an
early withdrawal of Occupation forces, however, the Japanese government will be
severely handicapped in dealing with its Communist problem not only by the economic
problem but by the proximity of the USSR. That geographical factor is one of which
Japanese officialdom is very conscious and remains a threat-in-being on which the JCP
relies as a psychological weapon. The weak and decentralized police, in their present
state of effectiveness, give no promise of being strong enough to cope with any large-
scale Communist-fomented trouble. The police force requires more adequate equip-
ment, higher-calibre personnel, and possibly a greater numerical strength before the
Government could be expected to control the JCP.
The Japanese Government is very much aware of the Communist handicap to
Japan's recovery and has believed for many months that the Communists have been
playing an important role in impeding the execution of many government policies such
as the taxation program, rice deliveries, and the discharge of duties by Government
and public employees. As long ago as January 1948, officials indicated Government
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consideration of an offensive against Communist influence. More recently Premier
ASHIDA has indicated that the Government is studying the exclusion of Communists
from public office. It is believed, however, that with over five hundred thousand
Japanese remaining as hostages in Soviet-dominated areas, no Japanese Government
will risk the USSR's cancellation of repatriation because of the outlawing of the JCP.
After repatriation is completed, however, or when the Japanese feel that the USSR will
return no more Japanese, and if the Government is permitted to act as a free agent, the
outlawing of the JCP is a strong possibility.
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p
SET
APPENDIX A
OUTLINE OF JCP ACTIVITIES
The Japan Communist Party became an independent body in 1921. At this time
Bolshevik successes in Russia had convinced a number of Japanese radicals of the
merits of Communist ideology and a small underground group was formed. In 1922,
the JCP received the blessings and instructions of the Comintern at the First Congress
of the Toilers of the Far East. Counsels of violence emanating from the Comintern
representatives were not lost upon the Japanese government, however, and in June of
1923 a number of arrests were made. The effects of these arrests and further attacks
upon the Left were disastrous for party organization and for some years thereafter
those who escaped imprisonment, as well as those subsequently released, met in Shang-
hai and Moscow in attempts to draw up plans for the reorganization of the Party.
A reorganization was effected by the end of 1926, but this did not serve to end internal
dissension arising from ideological differences. In 1927, therefore, the Executive Com-
mittee of the Communist International adopted Theses which were to guide the JCP
until 1932. A long-range program prescribed revolutionary perspective and absolute
party independence, with proletarian organizations to be regarded only as sources of
and channels through which new membership might be drawn. Despite this and sub-
sequent precedents established by the Comintern, however, discord within the JCP
continued. The conditions of economic distress which faced Japan in the period
between 1928 and 1931 and which might otherwise have given impetus to left-wing
activity were countered not only by the continued disunity and dissension within the
party but also by increasingly repressive government measures. In early 1928, a sys-
tematic police campaign against suspected Communists and their sympathizers was
inaugurated which resulted in the jailing of a large proportion of Communist leader-
ship. Finally, by means of an emergency ordinance, the Government revised the Peace
Preservation Law thereby drastically increasing the penalties for leadership of, or
membership in, organizations having as their objective the alteration of the national
polity.
In the spring of 1932, the Comintern once again intervened in the troubled affairs
of the JCP. The Theses issued at this time were in part a scathing denunciation of the
Japanese Communists and in part a restatement of the then current Communist doc-
trine calling for penetration of socialist parties and reformist trade unions in an attempt
to split them and win their members away from the leadership. By 1935, however, the
Soviet Union's position in the international scene was reflected in a reversal of inter-
national Communist policy which, in turn, was immediately echoed in the program of
the JCP. The principal features of this policy consisted of a new interpretation of the
nature and dangers of fascism and, in consequence, a new attitude calling for a united
front with democrats and other democratic elements.
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Japanese expansion into North China in 1937 marked the beginning of a period in
which the proletarian movement was to disappear entirely as a political force. In part
this disappearance was the direct consequence of continued suppressive government
action; in part, due to the growing conviction that Japan's overseas policy could not be
successful without stronger government control and an end to bickering between parties
and interest groups. By 1940, the government-sponsored one-party movement ended
in the dissolution of all political parties and the organization of the Imperial Rule
Assistance Association.
While labor disturbances and slackening morale in Japan Proper were occasionally
attributed to Communist or other leftist activities, no evidence has emerged of any
significant wartime underground. In China a handful of exiled radicals did seek to
keep the Japanese left-wing tradition alive and to lend their efforts to the defeat of the
Japanese Government. Here two centers of Japanese radicalism developed?one of
very modest proportions in the Kuomintang area and one in the area under Commu-
nist control. In the Communist area, the use of Japanese prisoners in psychological
warfare led to the organization of a movement that, although small and limited in its
activities, was important because of the training it gave its members in organizational
and indoctrination techniques and the groundwork it established for present-day
Communist united front efforts.
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CONATIAL
ORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY
SUPREME COUNCIL
Hokomodo, Sotomi
Hattori, Bokusei
It6, Ritsu
Kikunomi, Kotsumi
Kondd, Kozuyoshi
Miyomoto, Kenji
Nozoko, Song
Shigo, Yoshio
Tokudo, Kygichi
Hokomodo, Satomi
Hasegawa, Hiroshi
DO, Ken-ichi
116, Ritsu
Komeyorno, Kozo
Komiyomo, Shigeo
Kosuga, Shoichi
Kosuga, Sh6jiro
Kin, Ten Kai
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Konno, Yojiro
Kishimoto, Shigeo
Kurohoro, Korendo
Matsumoto, Kozumi
Motsumoto, Mirnosu
Miyomoto, Kenji
Nozoko, Ry?
Nozoko, Sonz6
50t5, Satoji
Shido, Shigeo
Shigo, Yoshio
Shirokowo, Seiichi
Tokokuro, Teru
Tokenoka, Tsunesabur6
Tokudo, Kyriichi
Tosoko, Hiroshi
Boku, On Tetsu
Horada, Ch6ji
Hosoko, Hirooki
Iwoto, Eiichi
CENTRAL ,COMMITTEE CANDIDATES
Konishi, Mosoo
Nishidote, Hitoshi
Sunomo, Kozuyoshi
Todo, Tomeji
Tbsokq Ry5ichi
Yomomoto, Hitoshi
POLITICAL BUREAU
Hosegowo, Hiroshi Nozoko, Sonzo
Do, Ritsu Shido, Shigeo
Kin, Ten Koi Shigo, Yoshio
Konno, Yojir5 Tokudo, Kyilichi
Miyomoto, Kenji
, ORGANIZATION &
ACTIVITIES BUREAU
Chief: Tokudo Kyuichi
Vice-Chief:
Hasegawa, Hiroshi
Hosegowa, Hiroshi
Ito, Ritsu
SECRETARIAT
Komeyomo Kozo
Nozoko, Sonzo
SECRETARY-GENERAL
Tokudo, Kyriichi
CONTROL COMMITTEE
Chief: Miyomotq Kenji
Iwamoto, !woo
Masud?, Kokunosuke
Matsumoto, Soichir6
Nishizowo, Ryriji
Okada, Bunkichi
Wodo, Schizo
Shiino, Etsur6
Yomobe, Kenton,
Propaganda a Education Dept.
Publications Dept.
Cultural Affairs Dept
Investigation Dept.
Financial Affairs Dept.
Local Affairs Dept.
Science 0 Technology Dept
Personnel & General Affairs Dept.
Matsumoto, klatsulorb
Minato, Todato
Kurahara, Korendo
Kazahoya, Yosoll
Komeyoma, Korb
Kozak; Sonzb
NOZOILO, Sanzb
Matsumoto, Wichita
AKAHATA Dept.
Vanguard Dept.
Youth Affairs Dept
Local Administration Affairs Dept
Urban People's Dept.
Rural People's Dept
Women's Dept
Election Affairs Dept.
115, Ritsu
lifiyamolo, Kenji
Ondo, Hideichl
Maim duke*
Kitazoe, Tadao
itd, Ritsu
Nozoko, RyL
Kamiyamo, Toshio
Ship, Yoshio
C0141_F/ITIAL
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20 JANUARY 1948
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C.)
SEIC?Rtair
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
29M?S?I948
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