CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP PETROLEUM RESOURCES WITHIN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002800070010-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 16, 1947
• Content Type: REPORT

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"This document contains information affecting ? the na-
tional defense of the United States within, the meaning of
.the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C.,. 31 and 32, as amended.' Its:
transmission or the revelation of its contents ,rin any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law."
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ORE 4/1 1,000C
16 June 1947 COPY NO 43
PETROLEUM RESOURCES WITHIN THE USSR
SUMMARY
General.
The extent of fulfillment of the current Soviet Five-Year Plan
for petroleum cannot be accurately predicted, since it depends not only
upon capabilities inherent in the petroleum industry itself but also upon
the progress achieved in other industries and, more importantly, upon
expediencies dictated by Communist Party strategy. The implementation of
Party strategy is readily effected through Government control of economic
activities enabling Soviet administrators to revise industrial priorities
to the extent feasible to meet a changing situation.
Organizational Control.
Since the governmental reorganization of 4 March 1946, the
exploitation of petroleum resources, formerly under Geographic Combines
supervised by a central Commissariat for Petroleum, has been the respon-
sibility of two separate ministries: Petroleum Ministry, South and West,
and Petroleum Ministry, East. The former has jurisdiction over the Cau-
casus, Ukraine and other areas of Western Russia; the latter over the
Volga-Urals, Central Asia and the Far East. Pechora (Ukhta field and
refinery) is reported to be under the direct control of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs.
Under the present organization, control is centralized in each
Ministry on a functional basis, thus eliminating the pre-1945 practice
of vesting the control of exploration, drilling, production and refining
in the Geographic Combines which in turn required each Operating -branch
to .clear through the head of the Combine before discussing even purely
technical problems with an opposite number in the Central Moscow Commis-
sariat. These organizational changes are indicative of (1) a willingness
to modify existing concepts of industrial organization if increased oper-.
ating efficiency is likely to result, and (2) the administrative imple-
mentation of a policy to build up oil output in the eastern fields.
Reserves (see Enclosure A).
While little is known regarding Russia's potential store of oil,
in view of the existence of vast areas favorable to theaccumulatioh of
petroleum, it is possible that total reserves are at least as large as
those .of any world power. Proven reserves, hdwevee, the measure of oil
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reasonably certain of being produced by current practices with equipment now
available, are much smaller. Estimates of proven reserves vary from 300
million to 1 billion metric tons. The latter figure, which is the official
Soviet estimate for 1938, is about 1/10 of proven world reserves and about
1/3 of like reserves in the United States.
Production (see Enclosure B).
The Fourth Five-Year Plan calls for a progressive annual increase
in crude oil output from 19.4 million metric tons in 1945 to 35.4 million -
metric tons in 1950. If viewed as a five-year goal beginning with 22.6
million metric tons in 1946, this rate of increase in production is greater
than that set in any previous Five-Year Plan. However, if the 1940 crude
oil output of 31.2 million metric tons is used as a reference, the goal
appears realizable without undue strain elsewhere in the Soviet system of
economy. This is at once apparent from the table below shading planned
percentage increases in output of selected industries between 1940-1950
and 1945-1950:
Industry
Percentage
Increase
Unit of Measurement
1940-1950
1945-1950
Crude Oil
Pig Iron
Steel
Coal
Electric Power Capacity
AluminUm
Machine Tools
Gross. Industrial Output
Million Metric Tons
TI It
II If
ft II
II Kilowatts
Thousand Metric Tons
. Units '
Billions 1926-27 Rubles
13.8
30.0
38.8
50.6
103.6
186.7
49.4
49.1
82.5
116.7
84.1
70.1
109.3
100.0
64.3
61.4
The bulk of Russia's petroleum comes from theCaucasus. The
Volga-Urals and Central Asia, areas referred to as the Eastern Fields,
rank next in importance. Sakhalin, Old Polish Galicia and Ukhta, though,
.minor producing areas by comparison, are important by reason of geographic'
location. The extent to which the annual crude oil production quotas Will
be met during the next five years is dependent, in large measure, on the
following considerations:
a. The extent to which production at Baku can be revived.
b. The rapidity with. which the devastated oil fields of
Maikop -Krasnodar and West Grozny in the Caucasus can be reha-
bilitated.
c. The measure of success attained in increasing the
annual rate of drilling hole from the 1945 figure, which was
well under the 1.9 million meters drilled in 1940, to approx-
imately 4. million meters in 1950. -Fulfillment of this drilling.
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program in turn is predicated upon a rise of 20% in commercial
drilling and 30% in exploratorY drilling per rig per month; a sub-
stantial increase over 1945 in the number, of working rigs; develop-
ment of improved equipment to obtain greater drilling depths; more
extensive use of geophysical prospecting; and increased output of
drilling machinery, pipe, and supplies.
d. Repair of pipelines and railroads in the Caucasus to pre-
war operating capacity; the building of several moderate length
pipelines and railroads connecting oil fields with refineries in
the Eastern oil areas; and the replacement, to required capacity,
of tankers on the Black and Caspian Seas and barges on the Volga
River.
Refining (see Enclosure C)'.
Much of the Soviet refining plant is operated at considerably
below rated capacity due to obsolescence, lax maintenance, inefficient
supervision, and too few experienced personnel. Nevertheless, the petroleum
refineries of the USSR can process, with capacity to spare, all crude oil
scheduled to be produced in that country under the Fourth Five-Year Plan.
Soviet difficultiesas regards the refining of petroleum are qualitative
rather than quantitative. Much gasoline and lubricating oil is of inferior
grade. In general, oil products are produced in accordance with a few basic
specifications satisfactory for common uses but unsuited to many specialized
requirements.
Transportation (see Enclosure D).
Although petroleum transportation facilities were considerably '
reduced by war damage, temporary reconstruction measures have progressed
sufficiently to permit the handling of all crude oil production.. Plans
for permanent reconstruction of facilities are phased in with scheduled
increases in crude output.
Because of primary dependence on rail transport, the distribution
of refined products will in all probability present a more serious trans-
portation problem than getting the crude to the refineries. It is esti-
mated that 40% of the investment in rail facilities, concentrated largely
in Western Russia, was lost during the war and that rehabilitation is far
from complete. Throughout the USSR there is a general lack of rolling-
stock-, a deterioration of rail facilitied, and frequent loading of trains
beyond capacity.
Availability of Refined Products (see Enclosure E).
It is not feasible to make an estimate of the total 'oil product
requirements based on the needs of principal. consumers. Demand would
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4SeT
certainly exceed supply if requireMents for propellants, lubricants and other
products of petroleum were met in accordance with American concepts of
adequacy. While some deficiencies of high grade lubricants are in prospect,
in general it can be assumed that Soviet administrators will succeed in
avoiding oil shortages serious enough to interfere with essential industry,
agriculture and transportation over prolonged periods or greatly impair the
effectiveness of the armed forces. This will be accomplished by absolute
control of distribution, a tight system of priorities, and use of inferior
products where high grade products are indicated.
Under the circumstances, it seems more useful to ascertain the
probable total availability of finished oil products. If the annual crude
oil production schedules established for the Fourth Five-Year Plan aremet;
if combined losses in refining, in transportation and for evaporation do
not exceed 10 percent; and, finally, if Russia receives annually from 2. to
3. million metric tons of refined oil products from the satellite countries,
apparent supplies will approximate:
1946 1947 1948 1949 11950
Million Metric Tons 22.8 25.8 28.6 31.5 34.4
No information is. available regarding storage facilities or oil
in storage, but because of wartime heavy demand and reduced production,
sufficient time has hardly elapsed to enable the accumulation of substantial
stocks.
Future Technological Developments (see-Enclosure F).
Notable contributions to the progress of petroleum technology,
particularly in the fields of exploration and production, can be expected in
the years ahead from the USSR. The turbo system of drilling and the geo-
chemical system of prospecting were both developed in the USSR. Although
neither have been exploited to any considerable extent elsewhere, some
American oil experts are of the opinion that these techniques are not
inferior to methods developed for the same purposes now employed in the
United)States. Based on the record to date, contributions of equal signifi-
cance to the technology of petroleum refining and transportation cannot be
antieipated in the near future.
A map, showing the principal oil fields', crude oil transportation
routes, and refineries (throughput and cracking capacity) within the USSR,
is attached at the end of this report.
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.ft'71
ietT
ENCLOSURE A
RESERVES
Immense reserves of petroleum are believed to exist in the USSR.
In addition to areas being developed, tested and partially explored, forma-
tions favorable for prospecting under-lie vast sections of the country. .
Reproduced in the table below is the latest available official
estimate of the petroleum reserves for the USSR:
PETROLEUM.RESERVES - USSR
(Million Metric Tons)
AREA
Official Russian Estimate 1938 ?
Proved &
Semi-Proved
Probable &
Possible
Total
(A1, A2, & B)
(C1 & C2)
Caucasus
Azerbaidzhan
(including Baku)
585.0
1,980.1
2,565:1
Georgia .
37.8
139.0
176.8
Dagestan and Grozny
121.6 ?
533.4
655.0
Krasnodar-Maikop and Crimea
22.6
214.1
236.7
Ukhta (Pechora)
1.1
48.5
49.6
Volga-Urals
154.6 -
2,549.6
2,704.2
Kazakh (Emba)
13.0
1,158.5
1,171.5
Centred Asia
19.2
793.0
812.2
(Uzbek, Tadzhik,
Kirgiz and Turkmen)
Far East (Sakhalin)
22.2
296.1
318.3
TOTAL
977.1
7,712.3
8,689.4
Petroleum reserves can only be approximated at best and figures
representing them .have little meaning unless fully explained. The Russians
define petroleum reserves as follows:
5
,
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A1 - Deposits from which petroleum can be extracted by means
of existing wells drilled in producing horizons.
A2 - Surveyed and delimited reserves, or reserves in a pro-
ducing field ready to be tapped by additional wells efficiently
spaced.
B - Reserves in horizons which contain oil as indicated by
several existing wells, but not delimited or completely surveyed.
Also, in producing fields, "B" reserves may be estimates for lower
untapped horizons which are oil producers in adjacent fields.
C1 - In producing areas this represents reserves in horizons
the existence of which is not yet established but is assumed on
the basis of the geologicjal structure and location. In areas in.
which the presence of oil in economic quantities is not yet estab-
lished, "CH represents reserves assumed to be present in known and,
in places, already partly surveyed favorable structures.
C2 - Reserves in possible favorable structures, the presence
and extent of which is assumed from the regional geology.
Few countries aside from the Soviet Union compile probable and
possible oil reserves. Such figures are generally considered to have little
or no connection with proven reserves. Proven reserves, though not suscep-
tible of accurate measurement, do constitute a uniform concept of the
probable existence of oil accepted by oil men in most countries.
American geologists who attended the 17th International Geological
Congress in Moscow in 1937 are reported to have estimated total Russian
proven oil reserves at approximately one billion metric tons, which compares
very well with the official Russian figure for 1938. This figure, however,
exceeds other unofficial estimates by about three to one.* Though many
specific claims have been made regarding prospects for the extension of old
oil fields discoveries of deeper oil horizons and exploration of favorable
geological structures since 1938, no official new estimates of proven re-
serves are known to have been released.
Annual Report on the Soviet Oil Industry in 1938, Afasselieff, N. K.,
April 1939, 272.4 million of metric tons;
Annual Report on the Soviet Oil Industry in 1939, May 1940, Wasselieff,
N. K., 305.3 million of metric tons;
Petroleum Resources of the USSR (1940) PAW et al 1944, 310.6 million
of metric tons.
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ENCLOSURE B
PRODUCTION AND EXPLORATION
, Although Russian production of petroleum still is concentrated
largely in the Caucasus, a continuation of pre-war efforts is strenuously
being made to reduce dependence on this area by building up production in
the Eastern fields. It was realized that even a region as prolific as Baku
could not be expected indefinitely to sustain a high rate of oil production
and that in the event of hostilities the Caucasus area might be difficult
of defense. Moreover, the principal fields in the Volga-Urals area are more
accessible than Caucasian oil to the new eastern industrial centers. The
eastward trend of petroleum production was accelerated during the war when,
the Caucasus was largely isolated from Western Russia and it is heavily
accentuated in the Fourth Five-Year Plan. Important oil-producing areas are
individually discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
4,
PETROLEUM PRODUCTION - USSR
.(Thousand Metric Tons)
1940
1945
1950
?
Actual
Per-
cent
Esti-
mated
Per-
cent
Planned
Per-
cent
Caucasus
26,900
86.4'
13,535
69:8
21,950
62.0
Baku
22,000
11,600
17,000
Maikop-Krasnodar)
Grozny
4,900
1,900
4,840
Dagestan
Georgia
Negligible
35
110
Ukhta (Pechora)
Unknown
100
.5
300
.8
Ukraine
400
1.3
200
1.0
325
.9
Volga-Urals
1,850
KUibyshev-Volga
250
Bashkiria
1,500
Molotov:
100
Central Asia
1,537
Uzbek
200
Tadzhik
30
Kirgiz
30
Kazakh '
697,
Turkmen
580
Far East (Sakhalin)
460
TOTAL
5.9
4.9
1.5
2,650
'1,250'
1,300 -
100
1,915
.515
45
?5
700
.600
1,000
13:7
9.9
5.1
7,315 20.7
3,000
4,000
315
3,510 9.9
1,066
60
80
1,200
1,104
2,000 5.7
31,147 100.0 19,200 100.0 35,400 100.0
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Caucasus. Baku was not invaded or Seriously bombed during the war,
but production had to be shut down for long periods due to the inadequacy of
storage and the diversion of men, materials and equipment to other.areas
during the German invasion. Such enforced shutdowns, together with periods
of over-production in the past, have probably impaired permanently the use-
ful life of many fields in the Baku region.
Several measures are scheduled to be undertaken under the Fourth.
Five-Year Plan to recover and sustain output at Baku. By 1950, the rate of
drilling is to exceed the 1940 figure of 960 thousand meters by 25 percent.
Additional wells are to be drilled off shore in the Caspian Sea where sub-
stantial production is in prospect. Likely oil-bearing areas throughout
the Aspheran Peninsula are to be intensively explored and deeper wells are
to be drilled all over the Baku region to tap oil horizons as yet little
exploited.
It is significant that even accomplishment of the foregoing pro-
gram is not expected to enable Baku to produce as much oil in 1950 as was
produced in 1940.
Although Grozny produced two-thirds as much petroleum as Baku in
1932 (about 8. million metric tons), subsequent exhaustion of the more
prolific oil fields had reduced output to slightly under 2.9 million metric
tons by 1938, and not until 1941 was the decline partially arrested by
finding oil in deeper formations. -Although only the West Grozny fields were
Occupied by the Germans, since re-occupying the fields in 1943, the Russians
have had to replace many facilities, restore equipment and replenish stores
of all kinds. Production by 1950 is expected to exceed 1945 output by
almost 50 percent if exploitation of deep horizons located 80 to 140 kilo-
meters distant from the City of Grozny-proceeds as expected.
' Before the whr, the Maikop-Krasnodar region was considered one of
the most promising oil!developments in the entire Soviet Union. Production
had risen from 531 thousand metric tons in 1931 to 2.3 million metric tons
in 1938 and further increases appeared certain. Though completely devastated
during the German invasion, an extensive program of rehabilitation already
under way is counted on to increase output from approximately 500 thousand
.metric tons in 1945 to 3. million metric tons in 1950. This is a reasonable
goal provided men and equipment are made.available, as proved deposits
should be productive for many years without the establishment of new reserves.
Production of petroleum in Dagestan and Georgia did not begin
until after the war commenced. Prospects appear favorable for a substantial,
output of oil for these regions, particularly Dagestan, but a large pro- .
-duction of petroleum is not anticipated cluiing the next few years. Dagestan
output in 1950 is expected barely to exceed 1945. and though a rise in pro-
duction is planned in Georgia, operations in that area during the next five
years apparently will be primarily exploratory.
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Ukraine (Old Polish Galicia). It is not surprising that Soviet
planners have scheduled no large increase in output for the old Polish
fields located mainly in the vicinity of Drogobych and Borislav. Production
nad declined steadily for years before the war owing to the onerous con-
ditions imposed by the former Polish Government on foreign oil companies
operating in that country and the inefficient production methods practiced
by the Polish oil industry.. Presumably, Soviet officials feel that the pro-
duction effort necessary to raise output can be more advantageously employed
in other areas inside the USSR easier of defense,
Volga-Urals ("Second Baku"). The Fourth Five-Year Plan calls for
'five times as much.drilling in the Eastern fields in 1950 as took place in
1940, and the bulk of this effort is to be concentrated in the Volga-Urals
area which includes the important oil-producing regions of Bashkiria and
Kuibyshev-Volga. Prior to 1940, most of Bashkiria's production centered at
the fields around Ishimbai. Exhaustion of these fields, together with
Soviet inability to locate new reserves during the war years, caused a heavy
decline in output only partly arrested by the discovery of oil in the deep
rocks of the Devonian Age. This fall in production at Ishimbai will prob-
ably be more than offset by developments at Tuimazy where output has in-
creased substantially since 1944. High initial production and low rate of
decline characterizes the wells which tap Devonian formations in this region.
The Kuibyshev-Volga region which includes all of the oil pro-
duction in the Kuibyshev Oblast, as Well as that of the Buguruslan field in
Chkalov Oblast, was the most favored of Soviet oil developments during the
war. Production was greatly expanded and operations here received top
priority in men and equipment at the time the Caucasus was isolated and
output in the Bashkiria region failed to reach expected levels. Like other
oil-bearing regions in the Middle Volga, Kuibyshev-Volga is dependent upon
oil from deep Devonian rocks to sustain its high rate of production.
Typical of these new fields are those at Zhiguli hills in the Samara Bend,
said to compare favorably with the best fields at Maikop and Grozny.
.The status of oil operations in Molotov Oblast is not clear.
Production effort there is being shifted from the field around Krasnokamsk
to Severokamsk. This is a logical development, as the Devonian formations
at Severokamsk are more prolific than the shallow deposits at Krasnokamsk.
Intensive exploitation of the region is scheduled to increase output by 300
percent between 1945 and 1950.
Pechora (Ukhta). Operations at the Ukhta fields in Pechora near
the Arctic Circle are believed to be under the Ministry of Internal Affairs
as penal labor is largely employed. It is reported that a large modern
refinery capable of processing many times the 1950 planned output of 300
thousand metric tons was erected in 1944, permitting the inference that
actual production might be higher than that scheduled in the Fourth Five-
Year Plan. Although seemingly isolated, the Ukhta fields are accessible
by rail.
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Central Asia. Loosely grouped as the Central Asia area are the
widelY scattered oil developments of Uzbek, including the very minor pro-
duction of Kirgiz and Tadzhik, of Turkmen and Kazakh. Uzbek oil comes al-
most entirely from the southern part of the Forgana Valley, mostly in the
vicinity of Palvantosh and Andizhan, though exploration is planned of areas
favorable to prospecting in the northern part of the Valley. Production in
Kazakh is concentrated in the Emba District. Prospecting, so far unsuccess-
AA, aimed at extending the field northward, is being done along the pipe-
line to Orsk and extending as far as the Southern Urals. The Nebit Dag
field near Krasnovodsk is the source of all petroleum produced in Turkmen.
Oil-bearing areas are believed to extend from the Balkhanski Mountains to
the Iranian border and from the Caspian Sea to Kopet Dagh. The output of
all three regions increased substantially during the war when it was feasi-
ble to employ many men and much eauipment normally at work in the Caucasus,
and future prospects are said to be favorable. It is questionable if planned
output for the next five years will be met, since the required drilling rigs
and men could probably be used elsewhere to produce oil more accessible to
the principal centers of consumption.
Far East. Commercial development of petroleum in the Soviet Far
East is confined to Sakhalin where, until 1944, production was shared with
the Japanese. It is reported that production in Northern Sakhalin, coming
from a narrow belt along the East Coast roughly between the Okha and Noglik
Rivers, rose from 460 thousand to 1. million metric tons between 1940 and
1945, and that Russian control of the entire island will probably enable the
1945 output to be doubled by 1950. This latter increase in production is in
part predicated upon exploitation of new horizons not yet fully developed.
Efforts will undoubtedly be made to exploit fully this region, where every
ton of oil produced avoids the long rail haul on the Trans-Siberian line or
procurement from foreign sources.
Synthetic Liquid Fuels.
The Russians are familiar with the basic processes for coal
liquefaction; they have developed further than anyone else the production
of gas by burning coal in mines; for years they have made limited use of
producer gas and similar propellants for automobiles, tractors, etc., and
it is reported that .sapropelite coals in several places in Siberia, where
natural petroleum is unavailable, are being processed for liauid fuels.
The Fourth Five-Year Plan calls for an annual output of 900 thou-
sand metric tons of synthetic liquid fuels in 1950. Meeting this goal would
seem to depend largely on the extent to which the Russians are able to move
equipment from plants like Leuna in Germany to the USSR and make use of
German technicians to operate them. It is doubtful if similar eauipment of
required capacity could be produced during the next five yaars in the USSR,
or sufficient know-how acquired for its efficient operation.
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ENCLOSURE D
REFINING
Petroleum refining capacity in the USSR was less adversely affected
during the war than production of crude oil. The Germans resorted to little
strategic bombing of Russian industrial targets, and several refineries,
particularly those in the Black Sea area, were dismantled before German
occupation and set up elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Acquisition of petro-
leum production was the principal objective of the German drive into the
Caucasus.
Refining capacity in the USSR now appears substantially in excess
of crude production and is likely to continue so for several years. Crude
throughput capacity, cracking capacity and rated aviation gasoline capacity
are shown in the table below:
Location
PRINCIPAL PETROLEUM REFINERIES
(Thousands of Metric Tons)
Crude Aviation
Throughput Cracking Gasoline
Caucasus and Southern Ukraine
Baku 14,440 1,715
Batumi . 3,055 802
Gi-ozny ' 6,460 ' 2,355 300
Krasnodar 951
Makhach-Kala 919
Tuapse 1,488 311
Other 38
Sub-Total 27,351 5,183 300
Moscow-Volga-Urals
- Astrakhan 150
Buguruslan 500
? Chkalov --- 1,000 250
Gorki 601 ---
Gurev (Lend-Lease 560) 610 1,005 187
Ishimbai 485 ---
Constantinovka 475 87
Kuibyshev (Lend-Lease 460) 485 998 169
Molotov 200 ---
Moskva --- 388
Orsk (Lend-Lease 515 - Cracking) 910 678 194
Saratov --- 2,011 250
Sterlitamak 960 ---
Syzran. 1,100. 694
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Location
Crude
Throughput
Aviation
Cracking Gasoline
Moscow - Volga-Urals (Cont'd)
Tuimazy
Ufa
Ukhta
Yaroslavl
Other
500
1,489
240
300
74
Sub-Total
Central Asia
Chimion
Kim
Krasnovodsk (Lend-Lease)
Melnikovo
Nebit Dag
Vanovskaya
Alma Ata (150 Lube Oil Only)
Sub-Total
Soviet Far East
Khabarovsk
Aleksandrovsk
Other
127
400
500
400
317
300 ?
190
100
52
Sub-Total
TERRITORIES INCORPORATED SINCE 1038
Poland
Drogobych
Other
Poland - Total
Czechoslovakia - Total
Latvia - Total
Sub-Total
GRAND TOTAL - USSR and
Incorporated Areas 39,310
348
? 96
444
35
15
494
SHALE OIL PLANTS
(Thousands of Metric Tons)
,Location
USSR
Gdov
Other
Ci-ude
Throughput
Cracking
Aviation
Gasoline
USSR - Total 200
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SEE T
Location
Crude
Throughput
Aviation
Cracking Gasoline
ESTONIA
Kohtla/Tarne
90
10
Other
110
ESTONIA - Total
200
10
GRAND TOTAL
400
10
The capacities shown in the table above are based in part on trans-
lations of German intelligence reports which are often difficult to evaluate.
These figures may be too high, as they substantially exceed other estimates.
For instance Krasnodar, though reported being rebuilt, was said to have been
destroyed by the Germans, and Grozny Tuapse may have suffered some damage
while the existence of certain plants such as Chimion, Kim and Alma Ata is
based primarly on German sources.* The aggregate amount of rated crude
throughput capacity in the USSR is less significant than the qualifying
factors: output and quality of refined products.
Although flexibility of modern refining processes, lack of precise
data on the characteristics of crude oil processed from refinery to refinery,
and unavailability of information as to the output of various refined prod-
ucts, make it impractical to attempt a comparison of the relative efficiency
of Russian and American petroleum refinery operations, some useful observa-
tions can be made. Between 1930 and 1942, thirty-eight units of American
petroleum refining plant, including units for topping, thermal cracking,
processing of lubriaating oil, polymerization and hydrogenation, went to the
USSR. Three complete modern refineries, an aviation lubricating oil plant
and two desalting and dehydrating units were furnished to the USSR under
lend-lease. Even so, much of the Soviet petroleum refining plant is Obso-
lete; maintenance is lax and operating personnel below supervisory grade is
poorly trained and insufficient in number; gasoline is often of inferior
quality and lubricating oils are generally produced in too few grades to
meet many of the specialized requirements of industry and transportation.
It is doubtful if the aggregate output of petroleum refineries exceeds 75
percent of rated capacity and may be even less.
ORI No. 3604, State Department, June 7, 1946: The total annual crude,
refining capacity of the USSR ranged from 26,405,000 to 34,954,000 metric
tons in 1945; the probable figure was about 30,780,000 metric tons.
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ET
ENCLOSURE D
TRANSPORTATION
Petroleum produced in the Caucasus is generally accessible to
refinery by pipeline and water transport. Though some use is made of the
railways to move crude oil, so far as petroleum is concerned they are used
primarily to carry refined products to ports on the Black and Caspian Seas
and to the rail center at Rostov-on-Don. Caspian Sea tankers connect with
Astrakhan, which provides access to the interior by rail and river; Black
Sea tankers unload oil at various ports in the Crimea and Ukraine for rail
trans-shipment north and west; and Rostov-on-Don, as yet not fully rehabili-
tated from the ravages of war, normally connects with all sections of the
USSR by rail.
Elsewhere in the USSR, except the Far East where Sakhalin oil
reaches refinery by river and pipeline, railways are still relied on to move
substantial quantities of crude oil. Short pipelines connect some oil fields
in the Volga-Urals area with refineries, and longer lines such as that
between Tuimazy and Ufa are under construction or projected. These pipe-
lines, however, still need to be supplemented by rail facilities. The
Gurev-Orsk pipeline carries Emba oil to Orsk for refining and short lines in
other parts of Central Asia connect some of the widely scattered fields with
refineries. Much of this petroleum, however, reaches refinery by rail.
In contrast with crude oil, the bulk of which Moves by pipeline
and water transport, most refined products reach Russian consumers by rail.
There are noteworthy exceptions: a pipeline from Grozny to Trudbvaya
delivers kerosene to the Donbass; tankers unload refined oils at many cities
along the coasts of the Black and Caspian seas; and oil barges on the Volga,
and to a less extent on other inland waterways, carry finished products to
many parts of the USSR.
. During 1947 some difficulty may be experienced in isolated
instances in getting petroleum to refineries, but serious bottlenecks are
not likely to develop. Railroads and pipelines in the Northern Caucasus
are reported to have been repaired sufficiently to handle current produc-
tion of crude oil in that area, while the capacity of tankers on the
Caspian and Black Seas and barges on the Volga River is believed to be ade-
quate for the present carriage of peti-oleum. Further replacement of both
land and water means of oil transportation in the vicinity of the Caucasus
will doubtless keep step with planned output of petroleum. Elsewhere in the
USSR, important crude oil carriers were not directly affected by German
military action.
On the other hand, because of the predominant reliance on rail
transport, distribution of refined products will be seriously hampered for
years to come throughout the USSR and at times may be completely tied up in
, some areas of Western Russia. In this part of the USSR, hundreds of miles
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?
of rail track, a great many bridges and a large number of river craft
still
need to be replaced before through traffic can be resumed. Both in Western
Russia and elsewhere in the USSR there is a lack of rolling stock, poor
maintenance of facilities and tendency to load rail cars much beyond
capacity.
???
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ENCLOSURE E
AVAILABILITY OF REFINED PRODUCTS
According to one estimate, by 1950 annual requirements for refined
petroleum products will approximate 41. million metric tons. Another source
states that requirements may reach 65. million metric tons each year from
1946-1950. Even the lower of these figures is substantially larger than the
planned production of 34.5 million metric tons for 1950.
Demand is almost certain to exceed available supplies both quanti-
tatively and qualitatively. It is difficult to visualize enough propellants,
lubricants and other petroleum products to go around if existing and pro-
jected Soviet industrial, transportation, agricultural and military require-
ments are estimated in terms of American experience as to grade and quantity.
There is the additional consideration that in many applications a greater
Quantity of refined products must be used because of their inferior quality,
harder use to which vehicles and machinery are subjected, and longer time
operated before replacement.
Depending upon the Soviet estimate of Russia's position vis-a-vis
the Western powers and internal considerations, heavy industry, agriculture
and the armed forces may be expected to share top priority for refined
products in the near future. The remainder will go to transportation, light
industry, consumer goods production and miscellaneous services with the
possibility that concessions will be made from time to time to the production
of consumer goods to allay unrest and dissatisfaction among the civil popula-
tion.
In general, it can be assumed that Soviet administrators will avoid
oil shortages serious enough to interfere with indispensable industry, agri-
culture, and transportation over prolonged periods or to impair greatly the
effectiveness of the Army, Navy and Air Forces. This will be accomplished
through complete control of distribution, absolute enforcement of priorities,
utilization of substantial quantities of finished products which would be
considered unacceptable for use in the United States, and considerable use
of producer gas vehicles and other applications of substitute fuels.
To expect that, in general, sufficient refined oil products will
be available to meet urgent needs is not to say that shortages in certain
products may not develop. The USSR is not believed to have sufficient
equipment for the manufacture of high grade lubricants. While facilities
for the production of aviation gasoline are considered adequate if operated
at rated capacity, it is doubtful if the Russians could attain the full
potential of these plants. However, since the Russians are fully aware of
the possibilities of jet propulsion, they doubtless will make extensive use
of aero-fuels much inferior to 95-100 octane gasoline. Reliance on either
Diesel or jet-powered planes would substantially reduce demand for high grade
aviation gasoline.
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Under the circumstances, it seems more useful to endeavorto as-
certain the probable total availability of finished oil products. If the
annual crude oil production schedules established for the Fourth Five-Year
plan are met; if combined losses in refining, in transportation and for
evaporation do not exceed 10 percent; and, finally, if Russia receives
annually from 2. to 3. 'million metric tons of refined oil products from the
satellite countries, apparent supplies will amount to approximately:
1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 ?
Million Metric Tons 22.8 25.8 28.6 31.5 34.4
From the foregoing dismission, it is apparent that the USSR could
not be expected to have.an exportable surplus-Of petroleum products. Never-
theless, this does not preclude oil shipments abroad from the USSR, Rumania,
Austria or Hungary: the USSR may well release petroleum products to obtain
foreign exchange. or commodities considered more essential notwithstanding an
urgent domestic demand within the Soviet Union.
No information is available regarding storage facilities or oil in
storage. It is believed that, because of neavy demand and reduced production
during the war, Sufficient time has not elapsed to enable the accumulation of
substantial stocks.
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ENCLOSURE F
FUTURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS
The production of petroleum in the USSR probably has been retarded
by an insufficient number of experienced engineers and geologists, drilling
crews less skilled and ingenious than American oil field workers, and inade-
auate equipment. Use of geophysical prospecting is not yet widespread and
secondary recovery techniques such as water-flooding and re-pressuring are
little utilized.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Russians have made sub-
stantial contributions to the advancement of petroleum-engineering. For in-
stance, turbo-drilling which makes use of a bit driven by a small turbine, in
turned propelled by mud fluid, is little employed in the United States, as
it use would necessitate extensive changes in practices and equipment now
considered efficient and satisfactory. .The Russians, less concerned re-
garding existing equipment, are employing the turbo system to an increasing
extent as they claim it is potentially faster than rotary drilling. Geo-
chemical 'prospecting, first developed in Russia, is perhaps more Versatile
than the geophysical methods widely employed in the United States. It has
not been more extensively utilized in the United States for the reason that
geophysical techniques developed first in this country were so well adapted
to conditions here.
So far as is known, no American or other foreign oil men have
visited the USSR in recent years to advise the Russians regarding petroleum
prospecting and production, but American refining engineers almost invaria-
bly go to the USSR to supervise the erection of United States refining plant
and generally stay until guaranteed performance is obtained. It is believed
that the Russians Will be heavily dependent upon German technical aid) as
well as equipment, for years for much of their production of synthetic ,
liquid fuels. In these '.circumstances, it is doubtful if Soviet progress in
the fields of petroleum refining and ,synthetic oil production will be par-
ticularly noteworthy for some years to cote..
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