PRODUCTION OF LOCOMOTIVES AND ROLLING STOCK IN EAST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01141A000200110001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 5, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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T. ?
SECRET
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PRODUCTION OF LOCOMOTIVES AND
ROLLING STOCK IN EAST GERMANY
CIA/RR 27?S-1
5 March 1954
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PRODUCTION OF LOCOMOTIVES AND ROLLING STOCK
IN EAST GERMANY
CIA/RR 27-S-1
(ORR Project 32.12.2)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS
Summary and Contlusions
Page
1
I.
Introduction
5
A.
General Description of the Industry
5
1. Locomotives
5
2. Rolling Stock
6
B.
History of the Industry
7
C.
Technology
8
D.
Administrative Organization of the Industry
8
II.
Supply
A. Production
10
10
1. By Physical Units and by Value
2. Production in 1953 and Future Production .
10)
B.
Imports
15
1. Soviet Bloc
15
a. Locomotives and Rolling Stock
15
(1) New Equipment
15
(2) Return of Equipment from the USSR .
15
b. Raw Materials and Component Parts
16
2. Non-Soviet Bloc
17
a. Locomotives and Rolling Stock
17
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b. Raw Materials and Component Parts
17
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CONTENTS
Page
C. Inventories 18
1. Locomotives 18
a. Main-Line Locomotives 18
b. Mining locomotives 21
c. Industrial and Plant Locomotives 22
2, Rolling Stock 23
III. Demand
a. Freight Cars 23
b. Mining Cars 25
c. Industrial and Plant Cars 26
d: Passenger Cars 26
26
A. Consumption by Major Industries 26
1. Equipment for East German Internal Consumption 28
2. Reparations Shipments to the USSR 28
3. Exports to Other Soviet Bloc Countries 31
B. Importance of the Industry 31
1. Position in the Economy 31
2. Substitutes 34
IV. Expansibility 34
A. Existing Capacity 34
B. Growth of Normal Production and Capacity
through 1955 35
C. Expansion Possibilities 35
V. Inputs 37
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CONTENTS
Page
VI.
Plant Information
40
A.
Ammendorf
4o
B.
Babelsberg
41
C.
Bautzen
41
D.
Dessau
42
E.
Goerlitz
43
F.
Gotha
45
G.
Hennigsdorf
46
H.
Loessnitz
47
I.
Niesky
47
J.
Vetschau
48
K.
Weimar
48
L.
Werdau
49
VII.
Conclusions
50
A.
Capabilities
50
B.
Vulnerabilities
51
C.
Intentions
52
1. Over-All Summary
52
2. Indicators
53
a. Six-Axle Flatcar Program, 1952-53
53
b. Coal-Dust Locomotive Program
54
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Appendixes
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Tables
Page
1. Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock
in East Germany, 1946-53 2
2. Estimated Planned and Actual Production of Locomotives
and Rolling Stock in East Germany, 1946-52 11
3. Estimated Total Value of Production of Locomotives and
Rolling Stock in East Germany, 1948-52 12
4. Planned Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in
East Germany, 1953 13
5. Estimated End-of-Year Inventories of Main-Line Loco-
motives in East Germany, 1949-52 . .... ? . , . . 9
6. Estimated End-of-Year Inventories of Main-Line Loco-
motives in East Germany, 1954 22
7. Estimated End-of-Year Inventories of Freight Cars
in East Germany, 1949-52 24
8. Estimated Inventories of Passenger Cars in East Germany,
15 July 1951 and 31 January 1952 27
9. Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock
for Internal Consumption in East Germany, 1946-52 . . 29
- 10. Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock
as Reparations in East Germany, 1946-52 30
11. Estimated Exports of Locomotives and Rolling Stock
to the Other European Satellites, 1946-52
12. Estimated Capacity and Probable Actual Production of
Locomotives and Rolling Stock in East Germany,
1953-55
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13. Estimated Input Requirements per Unit of Production of
Selected Items of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in
East Germany, 30 March 1950
14. Comparison of Statistics on East German Items of Input
per Unit of Production of Rolling Stock as Calculated
Data with Statistics as Calculated
from the US Census of Manufactures, 1947 39
41
Page
38
15. Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonfabrik
Ammendorf, 1946-52
16. Estimated Production of Locomotives at the Karl Marx
Werke, Babelsberg, 1946-52 . . . . . . ........ 42
17. Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonbau
43
18. Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonfabrik
Dessau, 1946-52 44
Bautzen, 1946-52
19. Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonbau
Goerlitz, 1946-52 45
20. Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonbau
Gotha, 1946-52 46
21. Estimated Production of Locomotives at the Lokomotiven-
bau Elektrotechnische Werke (LEW), Hennigsdorf,
1946-52 47
22. Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggon- und
Stahlbau Niesky, 1946-52 48
23. Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonbau
Weimar, 1946-52 49
24. Estimates Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonbau
Werdau, 1946-52 50
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Illustrations
Following page
Figure 1. East Germany: Administrative Organization of
the Locomotive and Rolling Stock Industry,
21 November 1953 (Chart) 8
Figure 2. East Germany (Soviet Zone): Locomotive and
Rolling Stock Plants (MAID) 50
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(ORB Project 32.12.2)
PRODUCTION OF LOCOMOTIVES AND ROLLING STOCK
IN EAST GERMANY*
Summary and Conclusions
At the end of World War II, that portion of Germany which is
designated as East Germany (Soviet Zone) was left with substantial
plant facilities for the production of locomotives and rolling stock.
Subsequent dismantling operations by the USSR involved the removal
of a large percentage of the production equipment, and although some
production was resumed early in 1946, it was not until 1947 or later
that the majority of the plants were again able to produce signifi-
cant quantities of railroad equipment. The only plant in East Germany
which had the facilities for the production of main-line steam loco-
motives has never been re-equipped since the end of World War II. One
plant has produced some main-line electric locomotives as reparations
for the USSR (actually to be used in open-pit mining), but none. has
been produced for domestic use. East. Germany has not produced a single
main-line steam or diesel locomotive since the end of World War II.
Since 1946 the production of rolling stock and of mining loco-
motives and industrial and plant locomotives in East Germany has
consistently increased both in terms of physical units and in terms
of value. Table 1** shows this trend. Production in terms of physi-
cal units declined somewhat in 1952 and 1953, whereas production in
terms of value continued to rise. This apparent discrepancy is
accounted for by the production of larger numbers of more complex
units such as refrigerator cars.***
The conversion of some railroad equipment plants to the produc-
tion of other items and the cancellation of reparations payments as of
1 January 1954 leave considerable doubt as to what the longer-term
plans of the locomotive and rolling stock industry in East Germany
may be, but it is believed that by 1955 the industry may reach a point
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 December 1953.
** Table 1 follows on p. 2.
*** For a breakdown by type of unit produced, see Table 2, p. 11, below,
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Table 1
Estimated Production of. Locomotives and Rolling Stock in East Germany
1946-53
1953
Item
Units
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
(Plan)
Industrial and
Plant Locomotives
number
100
140
170
275
350
, 180
218
234
Freight Cars
number
2,150
2,900
2,900
4,200
5,000
5,200
6,000
5,527
Passenger Cars
number
N.A.
Negligible
10
215
600
670
620
943
Mining Cars
number
N.A.
4,000
4,200
4,650
6,650
6,000
N.A.
N.A.
Industrial and
Plant Cars
number
90
700
900
2,100
2,900
2,700
2,400
N.A.
Total Value
million DME 2/
N.A.
N.A.
112
275
453
485
511
586
a. Deutsche Mark East, January 1952.
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of equilibrium where all internal requirements and export require-
ments will be met by the productive capacity of the industry.
The industry is somewhat restricted in its production program by
shortages of raw materials. The export controls imposed by the West
have resulted in East Germany's turning toward the USSR and the other
Satellites for more of its raw material requirements. Some diffi-
culties in procurement as well as some complaints of poor quality of
material have been noted, but it is not believed that the shortages
will provide a very serious threat to the production program.
The inventories of main-line steam locomotives, freight cars,
and passenger cars have shown varying degrees of change since the
end of World War II. Operating inventories of main-line steam loco-
motives have increased at a very slow rate, but the concurrent rapid
increase in the number of unserviceable locomotives* has created a
serious problem. In an attempt to solve this problem, East Germany
has stopped production of small steam and diesel locomotives at the
Karl Marx Werke in Babelsberg for 1953 and 1954 and is using the
facilities of that plant in a concentrated repair program. This
repair program may increase the serviceable inventory by an amount
large enough to provide at least the required minimum service for
some time to come.
The freight car inventories have also increased since the end of
World War II, but in this case the acquisition of some new units from
internal production and the return by the USSR of 40,000 captured
cars** have meant that the inventory has been adequate, although it
must be noted that it has been only "just" adequate, with few or no
cars that might be termed reserve.
No long-range estimate of passenger car inventories is possible,
but available information shows no serious shortages.
Reparations deliveries to the USSR have accounted for most of the
production of East Germany. From 1946, when 100 percent of East Ger-
man production went to the USSR, reparations shipments have decreased.
* These are locomotives in the operating inventory but under or
awaiting repair.
** It is estimated that 24,000 of the 40,000 captured cars are
capable of operational service after repairs.
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to some 78 percent of the total value of production in 19524 In
addition, a very small percentage of the total value of production
has been exported to other Soviet Bloc countries (an average of 2
percent per year for the years 19)46-52).
Although it is not within the scope of this report, it should be
pointed out that the East German State Railways (Reichsbahn) have
been able to operate, although poorly, on the railroad equipment in-
ventories available. Such a condition cannot exist indefinitely, and
new equipment to meet increased transportation requirements and to
replace units mandatorially retired because of age or damage soon must
be supplied to the railroads. The cancellation of the reparations
contracts as of 1 January 1954 may well aid in this respect. Maintain-
ing and increasing railroad equipment inventories in an expanding
industrial economy is essential, and it must be assumed that production
will be retained domestically in sufficient amounts to meet these
requirements.
In the rolling stock segment of the industry, East Germany is fully
capable of producing enough equipment to meet its own requirements and
to provide a significant exportable surplus. Its ability to take full
advantage of its productive capacity has been severely limited in the
postwar years by the reparations demands of the USSR. It seems prob-
able that after 1 January 1954 exports will drop in volume, at least
to a point at which East Germany can more readily meet its internal
requirements.
At present, however, East Germany is not capable of producing main-
line steam locomotives. It is dependent upon major repairs to stocks
Of war-damaged units for additions to its operating inventory. Although
the repair program may supply its needs for some time to come, it is
to be expected that in the near future East Germany will make a serious
attempt either to build and to equip capital facilities for the pro-
duction of main-line steam locomotives or to import such units from
Soviet Bloc or non-Bloc sources.
The principal vulnerability of East Germany in the field of loco-
motives and rolling stock appears to be the lack of "cushion," or
reserve, in operating inventories. A reduction of these inventories
would have the twofold effect of throwing a high demand for new
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equipment on the productive capacity of the industry, and of reducing
4 the net operating inventory available to the economy as a whole.*.
With one exception, the intentions of East Germany seem to be the
normal expansions of production and inventory of an industrial econ-
omy. This exception is the unexplained 6-axle flatcar program.
About 3,600 to 4,200 flatcars, mostly of 80-metric-ton capacity, were
being built in 1952-53. Although it was thought at first that these
cars would augment the operating inventory,** it now appears that
they are to be held in marshalling areas for use as ordered by the
Soviet Control Commission. The cars are ideally suited for move-
ments of heavy military or industrial goods, and the situation regard-
ing their use should be watched carefully as a possible indicator of
intentions.
I. Introduction.
A. General Description of the Industry.
The primary concern of this report is with the production,
distribution, and inventory of locomotives and rolling stock in East
Germany. Production of parts and subassemblies and the activities
of repair shops will be covered in limited detail, but only as these
functions affect the production and inventory of the finished compo-
nents.
For the purposes of this report, locomotives and rolling stock
will be subdivided and defined as follows:
1. Locomotives.
a. Main-Line Locomotives.
Main-line locomotives include switching locomotives.
Such locomotives may be steam, electric, or diesel.
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b. Mining Locomotives.
Mining locomotives are used in both underground and
surface mining operations and may be steam, electric, or diesel.
c. Industrial and Plant Locomotives.
Industrial and plant locomotives are used in indus-
trial installations, timbering operations, metallurgical plants,
and the like. The category includes all locomotives not covered in
a and b, above. The locomotives may be steam, electric, diesel, or
fireless.*
2. Rolling Stock.
a. Freight Cars.
Freight cars include boxcars and flatcars and hopper,
refrigerator, and other freight cars of European, or standard, gage
(4 feet 8-1/2 inches) and Soviet, or broad, gage (5 feet).
b. Mining Cars.
Mining cars include small tub cars usually found in
underground mining installations.**
* A fireless locomotive is a steam locomotive without a firebox.
High-pressure steam is injected into an insulated tank, about three-
fourths filled with water, which replaces the boiler, and the loco-
motive is operated in and around the plant area until the pressure
drops to the point where refilling with additional steam is required.
** To avoid any misconception, it should be noted that in surface,
or open-pit, mining it is common practice to use a mining locomo-
tive as defined under lb, above, with freight cars of the hopper (or
gondola) type as defined in 2a, above. The subdivisions as made in
2, above, enable the statistics presented in II, below, to be tabu-
lated in a meaningful form.
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c. Industrial and Plant Cars.
For the purposes of this report, industrial and plant
cars are narrow-gage cars of various types usually found in timber-
ing operations. The category includes flatcars, boxcars, combination
freight-passenger cars, maintenance shop cars, and power cars -- all
of narrow gage -- as well as foundry, slag, and coke-quenching cars
found in metallurgical installations.
d. Passenger Cars.
Passenger cars include coaches and sleeping cars,
mail cars, dining cars, and such other equipment associated with
the transportation of personnel and their effects.
B. History of the Industry.
Before and during World War II, Germany* had an extensive and
modern railroad equipment industry. 1/** With the end of World War II
and the partition of Germany into four zones, East Germany (Soviet
Zone) was left with 12 plants engaged in the production of locomo-
tives and rolling stock. Two of these plants, located at Loessnitz
and Vetschau, were capable of producing only small mining cars.
Another, at Babelsberg, was capable of producing only small mining
and industrial locomotives. One, at Wildau, had produced main-line
steam locomotives during the prewar and wartime periods. The other
eight, at Ammendorf, Bautzen, Dessau, Goerlitz, Gotha, Niesky, Weimar,
and Werdau, produced rolling stock. 2/
In the immediate postwar period, at the direction of the
Russians, the plants at Wildau, Bautzen, Goerlitz, Gotha, Niesky, and
Werdau were subjected to severe dismantling operations, and it was
1947 or later before they were able to re-equip for production. The
plant at Wildau was never re-equipped for the production of locomotives,
but instead it was made a component of the VEG-ABUSxxx plants engaged
in the production of mining and metallurgical equipment. In addition,
* Prewar German boundaries.
*** Vblkseigener Betrieb - Ausruestung von Bergbau und Schwer-
industrie People-Owned Enterprise for Mining and Heavy Industrial
Machinery.
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the Russians planned and carried out the production of electric loco-
motives of varied types and sizes at the expropriated VVB-LEW* plant
in Hennigsdorf.
By the end of 1952, several more changes had occurred or were
contemplated. The rolling stock plants at Bautzen and Werdau were
converted to the production of automotive equipment, 3./ the plant at
Gotha was considered as a possible tractor plant, V and the plant
at Tabelsberg had stopped production of mining and industrial and
plant locomotives for a period of 2 years (1953-5)-i.) in order to
concentrate exclusively on the repair of Reichsbahn steam locomo-
tives. 2/ For more detailed descriptions of the estimated actual
production, of each of the above Plants, see VI, below.
C. Technology.
There is apparently nothing unconventional or unique about
East German technology in the manufacture of locomotives and rolling
stock. Plants appear to be largely modern and well equipped. Assembly-
line production on large orders is common, as is subcontracting of com-
ponent parts such as wheel sets, brake assemblies, springs, buffers,
and couplers. During World War II the increasing use of welding as
a means of saving weight; the economizing On material; and the reduc-
ing of man-hours expended on bodies, underframes, and bogies was
noted, and it appears probable,
that such practices have
been continued. y
It seems logical that much of the reparations produced for
the Russians was controlled by Soviet blueprints and specifications,
but because Soviet manufacturing processes in the locomotive and
rolling stock industry are modern and conventional, it is not likely
that production under Soviet direction has caused any significant
changes in East German technology. V
D. Administrative Organization of the Industry. Y
As of November 1953 the administrative organization of the
locomotive and rolling stock industry in East Germany was as shown
in Figure 1.**
* Verwaltung Volkseigener Betriebe - Lokomotivenbau Elektrotechnische
Werke -- Association of People-Owned Enterprises - Locomotive Electro-
technical Works.
** Following p. 8.
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EAST GERMANY
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION
OF THE LOCOMOTIVE AND ROLLING STOCK INDUSTRY
21 November 1953
Minister for Planning
OFFICE OF THE
MINISTER-PRESIDENT
Other Ministries
Ministry of Machine
Construction
Minister: Ziller
Other Ministries
Other Main
Administrations
Main Administration of
Vehicle Construction
Chief: Lang
Main Administration of
Electrical Equipment,
Radar, and Electronics
Chief: Melch
Association of People-Ownedi
Enterprises, Locomotive
and Railroad Car Works'
(WB LOWA)
_
Freight, Passenger, and
Industrial Car Plants
Locomotive Plant
Mining Car Plants
Repair and Parts
Plants
Locomotive Plant
Other Plants
Babelsberge.
Lossnitz
Vetschau
Hennigsdorf
Ammendorf Gotha b. c.
Bautzend. Niesky
Dessau c. Weimar f.
Gorlitz Werdaud'
Dresden (2 Plants)
Miihlhausen
Stassfurt (2 Plants)
Altenburg
Zittau
Johannisthal
Niederschonhausen
a'No longer exists as an administrative unit, but the name is still carried as a commodity classification.
b' May be converted to tractor production.
C. Reportedly will be converted to aircraft production under new Main Administration of Aircraft Production.
d' Reported converted to motor vehicle equipment production by end of 1952.
e. To engage in locomotive repair only during 1953 and 1954.
f. Production of railroad cars to be discontinued. Plant to be transferred to VVB-ABUS in 1953.
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In connection with Figure 1 it should be noted that three
of the plants listed under Freight, Passenger, and Industrial Car
Plants -- at Ammendorf, Dessau, and Weimar -- were Transmash SAG*
plants until 29 April 1952. At that time these 3 plants, along with
63 other SAG plants, were transferred from Soviet ownership to East
German ownership._ 12/ This transfer is believed to have been largely
political in nature, since the output of the plants has not been
noticeably affected by the change in administrative control.
ad-
ditional changes in administrative organization have been effected.
The Ministry of Machine Construction had earlier been dissolved and
replaced by three new ministries -- the Ministry of Heavy Machine ,
Construction, the Ministry of Agricultural and Transport Machinery,
and the Ministry of General Machine Construction. 11/ This, however,
was apparently unsatisfactory, and on 21 November 1953 the East
German press announced reconsolidation of the Ministry of Machine
Construction. VVB-LOWA,** together with the other VVB's, has been
dissolved as an administrative entity, and the plants formerly under
its direction report directly to the Main Administration of Vehicle
Construction, which again reports to the Ministry of Machine Con-
struction. 12/ The commodity classification LOWA, however, has been
continued, the establishment of a new
Main Administration of Means of Transportation -- (Hauptverwaltung)
Transportmittelxxx -- under the Ministry of Agricultural and Transport
* Ministerstvo Transportnogo Mashinostroyeniya Sowjetische Aktien-
gesellschaft -- Ministry of Transport-Machine Building, Soviet'Cor-
poration. The Russians set up in East Germany an administrative body
known as the Main Administration for Soviet Property in Germany
(USIG). Under the direction of USIG are 19 SAG' s, one of which is
Transmash SAG. Headquarters for Transmash SAG are located in Leipzig.
In transferring the plants at Ammendorf, Dessau, and Weimar to East
German control the Russians did not lose complete control Of the
activities of these plants, because among the plants remaining under
Transmash SAG are the plant in Berlin which manufactures brake sets
and another in Ilsenburg which manufactures wheel sets. 2/
** Verwaltung Volkseigener Betriebe - Lokomotiv und Waggonbau --
Association of People-Owned Enterprises, Locomotives and Railroad
Car Works. The locomotive plant at Hennigsdorf is under the Main
Administration of Electrical Equipment, Radar, and Electronics.
XXX Presumably in addition to the current Main Administration of
Vehicle Construction.
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Machinery.* This main administration was reported to be a cover
name for a Main Administration of Aircraft Production. The rolling
stock plants at Dessau and at Gotha reportedly will be converted
eventually for the production of aircraft. 13/
In summary, the efforts of the Russians and the high-level
political and economic leaders of East Germany seem to be directed
toward an administrative organization tightly knit to eliminate
needless channels but flexible enough to permit effective control
from the higher planning levels.
II. Supply.
A. Production.
1. By Physical Units and by Value.
Production of locomotives and rolling stock in East Ger-
many is given by physical units in Table 2.** In Table 3,*** which
is an extension of Table 2, the production by units has been trans-
lated into total value of production for the years 1948-52. xxxx
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2. Production in 1953 and Future Production.
Information on actual production of locomotives and
rolling stock in East Germany in 1953 has not yet been received in
sufficient detail to permit an estimate of actual production for
the year. Table 4*xxxx gives the reported Plan figures for 1953.
* The organizational position of the Main Administration of
Means of Transportation has not been clarified since 21 November 1953,
when the Ministry of Agricultural and Transport Machinery was recon-
solidated into the Ministry of Machine Construction.
** Table 2 follows on p. 11.
*** Table 3 follows on p. 12.
xxxx Sufficient information was not available to warrant a value
computation which would havemeaning for the years 1946-47. Values
per unit of production were found in various sources. 1/1/
xxxxx Table 4 follow t on p. 13.
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Table 2
Estimated Planned and Actual Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in East Germany 2/
1946-52
Units
Item
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
Plan Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Plan
Actual
Locomotives
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
639
N.A.
512
N.A.
432
N.A.
569
N.A.
Main-Line Locomotives
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
2
0
30
o
Mining Locomotives
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
200
N.A.
30
N.A.
100
N.A.
161
N.A.
Industrial and .
Plant Locomotives
N.A.
100
N.A.
140
N.A.
170
439
275
482
350
330
180
378
218
Rolling Stock
N.A.
N.A.
8,600
7,600
N.A.
8,010
12,000
10,965
14,670
15,150
14,975
14,570
N.A.
N.A.
Freight Cars
2,150
2,150
3,500
2,900
3,000
2,900
4,650
4,000
5,500
5,000
5,525
5,200
6,421
6,000
Boxcars
N.A.
N.A.
900
325
N.A.
700
700
300
2,950
730
600
1,100
N.A.
Negligible
Flatcars
N.A.
1,200
N.A.
1,450
N.A.
1,320
2,270
1,970
N.A.
550
N.A.
275
2,300
1,930
Tank Cars
0
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
600
600
600
600
Hopper Cars
o
o
N.A.
250
N.A.
250
N.A.
390
1,750
1,250
N.A.
800
Soo
Soo
Refrigerator Cars
50
50
N.A.
75
N.A.
100
N.A.
530
N.A.
1,490
2,190
2,190
2,290
2,420
Other Freight Cars
N.A.
900
N.A.
800
N.A.
530
800
810
N.A.
980
N.A.
235
N.A.
250
Mining Cars
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
4,000
N.A.
4,200
N.A.
4,650
5,600
6,650
N.A.
6,000
N.A.
N.A.
Industrial and
Plant Cars
90
90 ?
1,000
700
1,300
900
2,400
2,100
2,900
2,900
2,800
2,700
2,560
2,400
Passenger Cars
N.A.
N.A.
100
Negligible
N.A.
10
350
215
670
600
650
670
615
620
a. Range of error, plus or minus 15 percent.
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Table 3
Estimated Total Value of Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock
in East Germany 21
1948-52
Thousand DME 2/
Item
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
Locomotives
Main-Line Locomotives
0
0
0
o
o
Mining Locomotives
Negligible
10,000
1,500
5,000
8,000
Industrial and
Plant Locomotives
4,500
11,750
15,000
8,250
13,950
Total Locomotives
4,500
21,750
16,500
13,250
21,950
Rolling Stock
Freight Cars
85,920
151,020
212,190
231,857
270,765
Mining Cars
840
930
1,330
1,200
Industrial and
Plant Cars -
18,000
42,000
58,000
54,000
48,000
Passenger Cars
2,750
59,125
165,000
184,250
170,500
Total Rolling Stock
107,510
253,075
1436,520
471,307
489,265
_.-..--
Total Locomotives
and Rolling Stock
112,010
274,825
1453,020
4814,557
511,215
a. Range of error, plus or minus 20 percent. In order to estimate total values, where
actual physical production estimates were not available, plan figures were accepted as
approximating actual production and were therefore used.
b. Deutsche Mark East, January 1952
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Table 4
Planned Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock
in East Germany 12/
1953
Units
Item Amount
Locomotives
Main-Line Locomotives 26
Mining Locomotives Negligible
Industrial and
Plant Locomotives 234
Total Locomotives
Rolling Stock
Freight Cars
260
Boxcars 172
Flatcars 2,000
Tank Cars 0
Hopper Cars 1,109
Refrigerator Cars 1,505
Other Freight Cars .741
Total Freight Cars 5,527
Mining Cars N.A.
Industrial and
Plant Cars N.A.
Passenger Cars 943
Total Rolling Stock 6,470
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The total value of production as listed in Table 4 is
a little less than 586 million DME.* This figure represents a
15-percent increase over the total value of production in 1952.
Planned production in 1955 has been reported as 179 per-
cent of 1950 production in freight cars and 231 percent of 1950 pro-
duction in passenger cars. 1.6./ This level of production would put
freight car production in 1955 at about 9,000 units and passenger
car production at about 1,400 units. These figures are not unreason-
able, particularly because passenger car production is being stressed
increasingly and because freight car production by that time probably
will consist of a larger number of 2-axle cars for use on the Reichs-
balm and of only a few of the larger 4-axle cars which are currently
found in the reparations deliveries to the USSR.
When Babelsberg resumes production in 1955, after spend-
ing 2 years repairing main-line locomotives, the plant may be in a
position to produce some main-line steam locomotives. The extent
of this production cannot be reliably estimated, but it may reach
the 1952 Plan figure of 30 locomotives. 12/
In terms of possible product mix the future production
status of the railroad equipment plants in East Germany is fluid,
and in view of (a) the conversion of two plants to motor vehicle
production, (b) the probable conversion of a third to either tractor
or aircraft production, and (c) the possible conversion of still a
fourth to aircraft production, a firm estimate of trends is not
possible. It is probable that, as obligatory exports to the USSR
decrease, the production of locomotives and rolling stock will de-
crease to a level where production is just sufficient to meet the
demand for new equipment needed to replace depreciated stock and to
increase net inventories. Surplus productive capacity under these
conditions probably will be turned toward the motor vehicle industry
* The same values per unit were used in making this calculation as
were used in arriving at Table 3. In the case of mining cars the
value of production of the 6,000 cars produced in 1951 was used, and
in the case of industrial and plant cars the value of production of
the 2,400 cars produced in 1952 was used. These assumptions affect
only 8-1/2 percent of the total of 586 million DME, so that even a
50-percent error in the rate of production assumed, which is not
likely, would affect the end result by only about 4 percent.
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and perhaps toward the aircraft industry. At what time such equi-
librium conditions will be reached is speculative, but it probably
will be after 1955.
B. Imports.
1. Soviet Bloc.
a. Locomotives and Rolling Stock.
(1) New Equipment.
Only one instance of the import of new railroad
equipment by East Germany from Soviet Bloc countries has been dis-
covered. Under terms of an over-all trade agreement East Germany
is to import from Hungary a total of 12 diesel train sets during
the period 1952755. 1?./ These train sets are probably similar to,
if not identical with, diesel train sets produced by the Hungarian
Ganz Electrical Equipment Factory in Budapest for export to Argen-
tina and possibly to other Western countries as well as to the
USSR. These are 3- or 4-car train sets, the first car of which is
powered with a diesel engine of 600 horsepower. 12/ Negotiations
reached the point where three train sets were to be delivered by
the end of 1953, and, if they proved satisfactory, the remaining
train sets were to be ordered. In view of the troubles the Ganz
factory is having in producing train sets satisfactory to Argentina
and the USSR, it is quite possible that delivery to East Germany
was not made in 1953 or, if it was made, that East Germany refused
to accept the train setis without rigorous inspection and testing. 22/
(2) Return of Equipment from the USSR.
It is estimated that during the Soviet advances
near the end of World War II and the subsequent looting by the
Russians, some 45,000 2-axle freight cars, 2,500 4-ax1e freight cars,
2,000 main-line steam locomotives, and 180 electric locomotives
belonging to Germany were acquired by the USSR. 21/ It has been
reported that in 1951 about 20,000 freight cars were returned by the
Russians and that in .1952 20,000 more were returned, together with
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the 180 main-line electric locomotives.* The freight.cars are re-
ferred to as "damaged cars," and repairs were needed on all of them
to permit further operation. Of the first group of 20,000, some
4o percent needed only gage changing and minor repairs, 20 percent
required capital repairs, and the remaining 4o percent were useless
and had to be scrapped.** There is no reason to expect that the
second group was in any better condition. The electric locomotives
are to beefused in the re-electrification of portions of the Reichs-
bahn, but an estimated 50,000 DME each are required for repairs.
It is reported that the Russians did not make a gift of these cars
but exacted a price of 3,000 DME each for the freight cars and an
unknown price for the locomotives.
b. Raw Materials and Component Parts.
Statistical information on imports of raw materials
and component parts by the locomotive and rolling stock industry in
East Germany is widely scattered chronologically and is lacking in
detail. ?There is enough information, however, to indicate that
East Germany is dependent upon the Soviet Bloc for imports of raw
materials and component parts in order to fulfill its production
plans. Reported examples of such imports are as follows:
(1) From the USSR: welding electrodes steel,
axles, boiler tubes, and tires.
products.
(2) From Czechoslovakia: wheel sets and axles.
(3) From Poland: boiler tubes and rolled steel
(4) From Rumania: axles.
The degree of East German dependence on these
ports cannot be ascertained, but
im-
* The returned freight cars were probably 2-axle cars, as the
Russians would be likely to retain the more modern 4-axle units.
steam locomotives were also converted to Soviet gage
The
** Presumably, when the cars were scrapped, salvageable parts were
removed for further use.
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_ _
it appears that imports from the other Satellites and the
USSR play a significant role in East German ability to produce
railroad equipment. E.V
2. Non-Soviet Bloc.
a. Locomotives and Rolling Stock.
Because as discussed
in C, below, there has been a continual need for the acquisition of
new main-line steam locomotives and freight cars it is likely that
the lack of imports from the West is the result of the export con-
trols imposed by COCOM (Coordinating Committee on East-West Trade).
Shipments of locomotives and rolling stock are now illegal, and
size and weight discourage clandestine shipments.
b. Raw Materials and Component Parts.
In the early postwar years, shipments of component
parts and raw materials from Western Europe to East Germany were
not uncommon. During 1950 the imposition of export controls on
non-Soviet Bloc. countries eliminated these, except for some clan-
destine shipments which apparently continue. The disruption in
the unrestricted flow of goods from the West has meant an increase
in the supply from the other Bloc countries. The loss to East
Germany has not been so much in terms of the quantity of units
produced as it has been in terms of the probable drop in the
quality of these units. Following are quotations
refer to this situation
(1) "Most serious bottleneck is a shortage of high-
grade welding electrodes. The supply from West Germany terminated
in August 1950. USSR grades are brittle and break easily."
(2) 'Until February 1950, axles came from Western
Zone. There was a bottleneck until July 1950, when they were
supplied from Czechoslovakia."
(3) "Since January 1949, axles are received from
Russia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Upper Silesia. They do not
compare qualitywise with those made in Ruhr Valley, Westphalia, or
Belgium."
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(4) "Stoppage of supplies of tools and spare parts
from Western Zones has caused special difficulties."
Although an estimate of imports of raw materials
and component parts cannot be made quantitatively, qualitatively,
at least, these imports were of considerable importance prior to
their being cut off by export control, and adjustment to this
situation has not been easy for the industry. Some adjustment had
been made by imports from the rest of the Soviet Bloc, but a lowered
quality of output appears to be a contingent condition. The extent
of the effect of this decrease in quality cannot be accurately evalu-
ated. Indeed, all that can be said is that the effect undoubtedly
has been felt.
C. Inventories.
1. Locomotives.
a. Main-Line Locomotives.
statistics of actual main-line
locomotive inventories in East Germany are available from the end
of 1949 through the end of 1952. End-of-year figures for these 4
years are given in Table 5.* The three main categories shown are
(1) Reichsbahn locomotives, which are steam locomotives owned by
and operated under the control of the East German Ministry of Rail-
roads; (2) column locomotives, which are steam locomotives owned
by the East German Ministry of Railroads but placed at the disposal
of. the Soviet Control Commission for hauling special reparations
trains; and (3) foreign-owned locomotives, which are steam locomo-
tives owned by other countries but were in East Germany at the end
of the war. Control of these locomotives appears to be under the
East German Ministry of Railroads. The vast majority of them are
damaged. No effort has been made, and apparently no effort will
be made, to return them to their original owners.
Analysis of Table 5 leads to several significant
conclusions. Considering the grand total, it can be seen that during
the 4-year period covered the total inventory has decreased by 510
locomotives. The number of damaged locomotives has decreased by a
total of 689, and the total operating inventory has increased by 179
* Table 5 follows on p. 19.
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Table 5
Estimated End-of-Year Inventories of Main-Line Locomotives
in East Germany 22/
1949-52
Units
Item
1949
1950
1951
1952
Reichsbahn-Owned Locomotives
Serviceable
Under Repair, BW 12/
Under Repair, RAW 2/
Awaiting Repair, RAW
3,202
497
484
464
3,275
517
497
434
3,130
415
498
789
3,031
305
913
630
Total Operating
Inventory
4,647
4,723
4 832
4,879
Damaged
1,095
960
620
590
Total Inventory
5,742
5,683
5,452
5,469
Column Locomotives
Serviceable
321
332
308
305
Under Repair, BW
33
29
19
14
Under Repair, RAW
21
14
25
38
Awaiting Repair, RAW
1
1
18
14
Total Operating
Inventory 376 3.1.. 370 371
Damaged
0
0
0
0
Total Inventory
376
376
370
371
Foreign-Owned Locomotives
Serviceable
59
32
13
21
Under Repair, BW
11
3
1
1
Under Repair, RAW
14
2
0
3
Footnotes for Table 5 follow on p. 20.
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Table 5
Estimated End-of-Year Inventories of Main-Line Locomotives
in East Germany 22/
1949-52
(Continued)
Units
Item
1949
1950
1951
1952
Foreign-Owned Locomotives
(Continued)
Awaiting Repair
Total Operating
Inventory
7
81
3
40
3
17
8
33
Damaged
1,066
1,057-
986
882
Total Inventory
1,1117
1,097
1,003
915
Grand Total, Al]
Steam Locomotives
Serviceable
3,582
3,639
3,451
3,357
Under Repair, BW
541
549
435
320
Under Repair, RAW
509
513
523
954
Awaiting Repair, RAW
472
438
810
652
Total Operating
Inventory
5,101+
5,139
5,219
5,283
Damaged
2,161
2,017
1,606
1,472
Total Inventory
7,265
7,156,
6,825
6,755
a. These main-line locomotives are exclusively steam.
b. BW is the abbreviationfor Bahnbetriebswerk (Railroad Maintenance
Shop).
c. RAW is the abbreviation for Reichsbahnbesserungswerk (East German
Railway Repair Plant).
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locomotives. Thus out of every 3.85 locomotives removed from the
damaged inventoryponly 1 was made operable and 2.85 were scrapped.
During this same period the net decrease in serviceable locomotives
was 225, and the number of units either under or awaiting repair in-
creased by 404 units, over 26 percent.
It is undoubtedly this 26-percent increase in un-
serviceable units which prompted East Germany to terminate production
at the Babelsberg locomotive plant for a period of 2 Years and con-
centrate on repair work.
In attempting to estimate the possible condition of
the inventory at the end of 1954 (when the period of work concen-
tration on repair will be terminated), the following assumptions are
made: (1) the number of locomotives under or awaiting repair in BW's
and RAW's will drop to the percentage level of 1949, (2) the reduction
in the damaged locomotive inventory will be at the same annual rate
as during the average of the preceding 4 years (172 locomotives per
year), and (3) the resulting net increase in the operating inventory
will bear the same ratio to the reduction in the damaged locomotive
inventory as during this same 4-year period (1 locomotive out of every
3.85 removed from the damaged inventory will become operable). The
end-of-year inventory in 1954 then becomes as given in Table 6.*
In summary, the East German main-line locomotive inven-
tory may not be in as critical a condition 50X1
The effect of concentrating on repair at the plant at Babelsberg for
a period of 2 years may well increase the serviceable inventory by an
amount large enough to provide at least the required minimum service
for some time to come.
b. Mining Locomotives.
Information on the number of mining locomotives in
use in East Germany is not available in statistical form. Any
attempt to determine the actual inventory would involve a:lengthy
study of the mining activities of the country, and such a study is
beyond the scope of this report.
* Table 6 follows on p. 22.
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Table 6
Estimated End-of-Year Inventories of Main-Line Locomotives
in East Germany
1954
Grand Total, All Main-Line
Steam Locomotives
Number of Locomotives
Serviceable
3,762
2/
Under or Awaiting Repair
1,610
Total Operating Inventory
5,372
Damaged Locomotives
1,128
Total Inventory
6,500
a. Of this 3,762 it is assumed that 316 will be column
locomotives and 31 will be foreign-owned locomotives,
leaving a total of 3,415 in the Reichsbahn Locomotive
category -- a net increase of just under 13 percent in the
2-year period.
c. Industrial and Plant Locomotives.
narrow-gage and shall locomotive in-
ventories. It is believed that these two categories correspond
to the category of Industrial and Plant Locomotives as used in this
text. At the end of 1949 the total inventory of these 2 categories
was 689 units, of which only 349 were serviceable. At the end of
1950 the total inventory was 694 units, of which 366 were service-
able. End-of-year totals for 1951 and 1952 which include both
narrow-gage and small locomotives are not available. The number of
narrow-gage locomotives, however, increased from 213 at the end of
1950 to 215 and 218 at the end of 1951 and 1952, respectively. El/
Although, in terms of physical units, industrial
and plant locomotives accounted for an additional 9-1/2 percent
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over and above the inventory of 7,265 road locomotives at the end
of 1949, in terms of total power (that is, tractive effort*), this
category shrank to almost negligible proportions and can be omitted
when considering East German railroad transportation capabilities.
2. Rolling Stock.
a. Freight Cars.
End-of-year inventories of freight cars in East
Germany are given in Table 7.** The total freight car inventory
in early 1952 can be broken down as follows:
Percent
Boxcars
24.1
Flatcars
17.4
Tank Cars
Hopper Cars
43.2
Refrigerator Cars
0.7
Other Cars
9.O***
22/
This percentage breakdown can probably be applied to any of the
above years with only minor differences.
In 1951, slightly under 4 percent of the total freight
car inventory were cars with 4 or more axles. The remainder of the
cars were 2-axle freight cars similar to standard Western European
freight cars. 22/ Of this group of cars with 4 or more axles, slightly
more than half were, heavy-duty flatcars and well-type cars. ]1/ The
addition of nearly 2,000 6-axle flatcars in 1952 at the demand of the
* Tractive effort is a term which takes into consideration both the
power and the weight of a locomotive. It is a measure of the "pulling"
ability of a locomotive.
** Table 7 follows on p. 24.
*** Not included under tank cars but included under other cars are
about 5,800 privately owned tank cars. If included under tank cars,
the percentage would go up to 11.0 percent, and the figure for other
cars would become 3.6 percent. ZY
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Table 7
Estimated End-of-Year Inventories of Freight Cars
in East Germany 2/ 32/
1949-52
Units
1952
Item 12/
1949
1950
1951
June
December
Operating Freight Cars
Loaded
47,323
49,455
45,373
52,360
N.A.
Empty
31,427
32,866
35,790
36,894
N.A.
Total Operating
Freight Cars
78,750
82,321
81,163
89,254
101L 46o
Nonoperating Freight Cars
------
Damaged
14,460
6,476))
11,837
12,904
10,968
Deadlined
195
0
N.A.
Special Use
11,477
11,510
4,272
(12,370)
N.A.
Reserve
1,629
958
6,092
1,793
N.A.
Total Nonoperating
Freight Cars
27,761
18,944
22,201
27,067
N.A.
Total, All
Freight Cars
106,511
1-21.165
103,364
116,E1
N.A.
a. Includes R11 standard-gage freight cars owned by, and in use in, East Germany.
b. The damaged and deadlined cars include cars under or awaiting repair. Cars for
special use are cars used by the Soviet Control Commission for the carrying of goods
in special reparations trains. Reserve cars are cars in operating condition held for
troop movements and the like.
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Soviet Control Commission raises the percentage of cars with 4 or
more axles to about 6 percent, of which about two-thirds are flat-
cars and well-type cars.* The net result is to increase East German
capabilities for transporting heavy equipment, particularly of the
military types (such as tanks and artillery)7
the total of all
freight cars as given in Table 7 does not include about 13,000 freight
cars of East German ownership which are out of the country at any
given time but does include about 6,400 foreign-owned freight cars
which are in operation in East Germany at any given time. 33/ Thus
about 6,600 cars can be added to the total freight car figure to show
the net addition resulting from intercountry use of freight cars.
For efficient operation a quota of 100,000 operational
freight cars has been set by the East German Ministry of Railroads. 2L/
As can be seen in Table 7, this quota was reached in December 1952.
There is no reason to expect it to drop below this figure. The return
of the second group of 20,000 cars from the USSR is continuing, and
this fact alone would keep the operating inventory at or above the
minimum quota. In addition to this, the continuing production of
flatcars at the Niesky plant in 1953 will add to the qperating inven-
tory if these cars are for internal East German use.
A statistical prediction of freight car inventories
at the end of 1954 is not possible. The number of freight cars which
will have to be retired because of old age cannot be determined,
although undoubtedly it will be kept to a minimum through cannibaliza-
tion of cars from the damaged inventory. An estimate of freight car
inventories at the end of 1953, all factors considered, puts the
total inventory at about 130,000 cars with an operating inventory of
almost 110,000 cars.
b. Mining Cars.
The same difficulties which are present in attempting
to make an estimate of mining locomotive inventories in East Germany
are also present in making any estimate of mining car inventories.
A study of the mining industries in East Germany would be required,
and such a study is beyond the scope of this report. In addition,
although such an estimate would have intelligence value as far as
* See Table 2, p. 11, above.
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the mining industry of East Germany is concerned, it would be of no
particular value in this report.
c. Industrial and Plant Cars.
As defined in I, A, above, industrial and plant
cars include narrow-gage cars used in timbering and similar opera-
tions as well as industrial cars used in metallurgical and other
plants.
the inventory of narrow-gage industrial and plant cars is approxi-
mately 3,600 units. 22/ The number of cars of standard gage which
are classed as industrial or plant cars is not known. Because these
cars are engaged wholly in intraplant transfer of materials, they
are not significant as a measure of East German railroad capabilities.
An estimate of the total inventory of this category, as in the case
of mining cars and locomotives, would depend upon commodity and
industry studies beyond the scope of this report.
d. Passenger Cars.
Considering only the first 7 items given in Table 8
as strictly passenger cars, it can be said that out of a total of
7,509 there were, at the end of January 1952, 6,079 passenger cars
in serviceable condition. According to the current Plat, the
passenger car inventory is to increase by 1,000 units between 1950
and 1955. 3..W Assuming the inventory at the end of 1950 to be
about 6,000 serviceable units, the end-of-1955 inventory would then
be 7,000 serviceable units. Such an increase in inventory does not
seem unreasonable in the light of the productive capacity of the
industry.
III. Demand.
A. Consumption by Major Industries.
The studies of individual production at each of the plants
(see VI, below) make it possible to break down the total production
of railroad equipment into the following three categories: (1) equip-
ment for internal East German consumption, (2) reparations shipments
* Table 8 follows on p. 27.
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Table 8
Estimated Inventories of Passenger Cars in East Germany
15 July 1951 and 31 January 1952 22/
Units
Item
Serviceable
Under Repair
Beyond Repair
Total
July 1951
January 1952
July 1951
January 1952
July 1951
January 1952
July 1951
January 1952
Express Train (D-Zug)
429
457
104
127
53
98
.586
682
Limited Stop Train (E-Zug)
233
199
35
44
13
lo
281
253
Local Train
5,370
5,400
924
894
142
179
6,436
6,473
ISG Sleeping
5
0
o
o
23
38
28
38
ISG Dining
5
0
0
0
30
39
35
39
Mitropa Sleeping)/
N.A.
10
N.A.
1
N.A.
0
N.A.
11
Mitropa Dininga
N.A.
13
N.A.
0
N.A.
0
N.A.
13
Baggage Cars
1,749
1,767
434
390
32
230
2,215
2,387
Berlin S-Balm 12/
1,094
1,018
10
111
228
179
1,332
1,308
Narrow-Gage
637
636
0
118
182
98
819
852
Mail
566
656
16
154
12
11
594
821
Service 2/
1,301
1,344
120
153
5
1
1,426
1,498
Total, All Passenger Cars
11,389
11,500,
1,643
1,992
720
883
13,752
14,375
a. Cars used exclusively on international runs.
b. Berlin area interurban cars.
c. Such as railroad crew cars, maintenance cars, tool cars, and crane cars.
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to the USSR, and (3) equipment exported to the European Satellites.
There has been no reported instance of exports to any non-Soviet Bloc
country. Tables 9, lO, and 11* give the distribution of production
under these three categories. Since railroad equipment is by its
very nature an end product for the railroad systems of the country
to which it is shipped, the consuming industry in each of the three
categories is the rail transportation industry.**
The values of production were calculated in the same manner
as the values in Table 3.xxx The last line
in each of the three tables which follow shows the percentage of the
total value of production of railroad equipment represented by the
particular category covered by that table.
1. Equipcent for East German Internal Consumption.
Table 8 shows that East Germany has been receiving only
about 10 to 20 percent of its production of railroad equipment for
its own use. This fact alone explains the many reports of shortages
of all types of equipment.
2. Reparations Shipments to the USSR.
The data in Table 10 make it clear that the Russians
have placed a tremendous burden on the Reichsbahn by demanding
over 80 percent of the production of new railroad equipment during
the postwar years. The years 1951 and 1952 show a very slight down-
ward trend which can be expected to continue in view of the proposed
conversion of several of the manufacturing plants to activities other
than the production of railroad equipment. Just how far the Russians
will allow this trend to go is difficult to estimate. It is quite
possible, however, that reparations deliveries will be cut in the
Tables 9, 10, and 11 follow on pp. 29, 30, and 32, respectively.
** This statement must be qualified to the extent that mining cars
and perhaps mining locomotives should be considered as being consumed
by the mining industries and that industrial and plant cars should be
considered as being consumed by a variety of industries. . For the
purposes of this report, however, classifying the consumption under
the heading of the railroad transportation industry is acceptable.
xxx P. 12, above.
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Estimated Production
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Table 9
of Locomotives and Rolling Stock for
in East Germany a/
1946-52
Internal Consumption
Item
Units
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
.1952
Industrial and Plant
Locomotives
number
0
40
52
79
86
43
43
Boxcars
number
0
325
300
0
530
700
Negligible
Flatcars
number
0
0
0
0
275
1,930
Hopper Cars
number
0
250
250
390
550
500
0
Tank Cars
number
0
0
0
0
600
600
Refrigerator Cars
number
0
0
0
50
176
220
Mining Cars 12/
Industrial and Plant
Cars
number
0
250
0
100
120
65
65
Passenger Care
number
0
0
0
0
0
50
50
Total Value
million DME
0
25
15
22
36
82
107
Percent of Total Value
of All Production of
Locomotives and Roll-
ing Stock
percent
0
21 2/
13.5
8
21
a. Range of error, plus or minus 20 percent.
b. See footnote c, Table 10, below.
c. The total value of production of locomotives and
It is estimated to be approximately 120 million DME.
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Table 10
Estimated Production of Locomotives and Rolling Stock as Reparations
in East Germany 2,/
1946-52
Item
Units
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
Mining Locomotives 12/
Industrial and Plant
Locomotives
Boxcars
Flatcars
Hopper Cars
Tank Cars
Refrigerator Cars
Other Freight Cars
Mining Cars 2/
Industrial and Plant
Cars
Passenger Cars
Total Value
Percent of Total Value
of All Production of
Locomotives and Roll-
ing Stock
number
number
number
number
number
number
number
number
number
number
number
million DME
percent
N.A..A
100
N.A.
1,200
0
0
50
900
N.A.
90
N.A.
N.A.
loo
.
N .N.A.
32
0
1,450
0
0
75
,8000
4 oo
45o
Negligible
93
77.5

31
1+00
1,320
0
0
loo
530
4,200
900
10
95
84.5
200
101
300
1,770
0
0
530
810
4,650
2,000
215
245
89
30
118
200
250
500
0
1,440
980
6,650
2,780
600
398
88
0
64
400
0
0
0
1,992
235
6,000
2,635
620
383
79
161
102
Negligible
0
800
0
00
50
2,:A.
2,335
570
402
78.5
a. Range of error, plus or minus 20 percent.
b. plan figures. Assumed to be actual production for the purposes of this table. These. figures include
some main-line electric locomotives to be used in open-pit mining.
C. It is not certain that these mining cars were all produced as reparations. At a value of only 200 DME
each, however, it would have little effect on the accuracy of the last two lines of Tables 8 and 9, above,
whether they were carried in one table or the other. Since it is felt that they are more likely to be
reparations than anything else, they are carried in Table 10.
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near future as a combined result of the physical changes in output
of some of the plants, the need for new equipment by the Reichsbahn,
and the propaganda value such a reduction would have.*
3. Exports to Other Soviet Bloc Countries.
Exports of railroad equipment from East Germany to the
other Satellite members of the Soviet Bloc during the postwar years
have been small. Exports are, however, a little larger than imports.
Table 10 gives the estimated exports to the Satellites, 1946-52. A
continued policy of exporting about 3 to 5 percent of total production
of railroad equipment to other Satellite countries for the next few
years is not unlikely.
B. Importance of the Industry.
1. Position in the Economy.
East Germany provides an excellent case in point for a
discussion of the relative essentiality of production of locomotives
and rolling stock, particularly as applied to one of the European
Satellite countries. East Germany is a country, artificially created
as the result of war, with a well-developed industrial and agricultural
economy and with an extensive rail transportation network. The end
of the war has left it with a considerably lowered industrial output
and with a smaller-than-normal inventory of operational railroad equip-
ment. It has, however, a sizable inventory of nonoperational equip-
ment in the form of damaged locomotives and rolling stock of both
its own origin and foreign origin.
As the scope of this report does not include a deter-
mination of the requirements for railroad equipment to move a given
number of ton-kilometers of freight in a given period, the discussion
of essentiality of production of such equipment takes on a special
frame of reference. It becomes a study of the total amount of equip-
ment produced and an evaluation of the amount of this production which
was required for internal use.
* It was announced in the Soviet Press on 23 August 1953 that as of
1 January 1954 East Germany is released from any further reparations
payments to the USSR. It is probable, however, that shipments of rail-
road equipment will taper off gradually with the USSR, after 1 January,
paying for these items, whereas their value previously had been applied
against the reparations accounts.
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Table 11
Estimated Exports of Locomotives and Rolling Stock to the Other European Satellites 2./
1946-52
Item
Units
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
Mining Locomotives (to
Czechoslovakia)
number
0
0
0
0
0
100 12/
0
Industrial and Plant Loco-
motives (to Hungary,
Poland, Rumania, and
Czechoslovakia)
number
o
68
87
95
146
73
73
Flatcars (to Poland)
number
0
0
0
200
300
0
0
Hopper Cars (to Poland)
number
0
0
0
0
200
300
0
Refrigerator Cars (to
Hungary)
number
0
Q
0
0
0
22
0
Total Value
million DME
0
2
2
8
19
20
2
Percent of Total Value
of All Production of
Locomotives and Roll-
ing Stock
percent
1.5
2.0
4.o
4.5
4.o
o.4
a. Range of error, plus or minus 20 percent.
b. Plan figure. Assumed to be actual production for the purposes
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In the light of the production statistics in II and
A, above, the conclusion may be drawn that, as over 80 percent of the
total production during the potwar years has not been made avail-
able to the Reichsbahn, the production of locomotives and rolling
stock has not been essential to the East German economy. Properly
qualified, this statement is true.
The qualification must be made clear, however. There
exists at present a sufficient supply of damaged equipment which can ,
be repaired., in whole or in part, and which has been used to meet,
operating inventory retirements resulting from age and accident and
to provide net additions required for traffic increases.
When the supply of equipment in the damaged class is
wholly exploited by repairing all that is capable of repair, a
supply of new equipment becomes essential if the inventory is to be
maintained at a given level or is to be increased.*
To date, the qualification has been met by East Germany.
In the locomotive inventory the terms fit the qualification precisely.
In the rolling stock inventory the terms have been met but on a basis
slightly different in that the return of captured freight cars from
the USSR amounts to the same thing. When this qualification will no
longer apply is a matter of conjecture. It seems only logical, how-
ever, that both Soviet and East German planners realize the fact
that new equipment will eventually have to replace the old when it
is worn out and incapable of repair. The facts that some new equip-
ment has been made available and that there are indications that
larger proportions of the total output will be made available for
East German consumption support this assumption.
In summary, new** railroad equipment in an amount suffi-
cient to replace retired equipment and to meet additional traffic
requirements is essential to the efficient operation of the rail-
roads of East Germany. Whether the supply will be provided through
* Imports can be considered as production because payment for
them eventually can be reduced to labor, capital, and raw materials
which must be consumed to produce a comparable value in goods for
export.
** The term new as used here is intended to include not only new
equipment but also such net additions as may be made to the inven-
tory through cannibalization of damaged inventories.
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the production of new equipment or through the methods indicated
above depends upon the conditions existing at any given time.
2. Substitutes.
There are no substitutes for the production of railroad
equipment. For the operation of a rail transportation network,
production of railroad equipment is essential.* It should be pointed
out here, however, that the scope of this report does not include a
discussion of the possibilities of substituting other forms of trans-
portation (road, water, or air) for rail transportation. Only the
fact that the operation of a railroad system requires a supply of
railroad equiPment for which there is no substitute is considered
here.
IV. Expansibility.
A. Existing Capacity.
In a planned economy such as has been imposed upon East Ger-
many by the Russians, the assumption that capacity production and
planned production are, to all intents and purposes, one and the
same thing cannot be much in error. The fact that planned produc-
tion of railroad equipment is often somewhat in excess of actual
production in East Germany seems to be the result not of a lack of
sufficient capacity but rather of a shortage of raw materials and,
perhaps, of too many "adjustments" in planning. This assumption of
"planned equals capacity production" is undoubtedly more valid when
applied to short periods of time rather than to periods of 5 years
as in the case of a Five Year Plan. Thus the planned production for
1953 as stated in late 1952 was probably an accurate indicator of
1953 capacity, whereas the planned production for 1955 as stated in
1950 would be subject to considerable examination before it could
be assumed to be a statement of actual 1955 capacity.
Table 44-* gives the production capacity for 1953. The total
value of that year's production (capacity, not actual) is approxi-
mately 586 million DME.
* For a definition of the term essential, as used in this context,
see III, B, 1, above.
** P. 13, above.
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B. Growth of Normal Production and Capacity through 1955.
Predictions of normal production and capacity growth in
future years are subject to several handicaps. Not the least of
these is the Uncertainty of the future of reparations deliveries,
and directly allied to this is the problem of the possible conversion
of at least part of the production facilities to the output of goods
other than railroad equipment. These two unknowns prevent any really
firm estimate of future production.
In order to make an estimate, it will be assumed that in
1954 and 1955 the additional conversion of railroad equipment plants
to other production will be at a relatively slow rate and therefore
will not materially affect production capacity. In terms of total
value, production in 1951 was about 107 percent of that of 1950, and
1952 production was about 105 percent of that of 1951. Planned pro-
ductidn for 1953 was about 115 percent of 1952 actual production.*
On this basis it is estimated that the average total value of actual
production in 1953, 1954, and 1955 will be 110 percent of actual
production of each preceding year (using 1952 estimated actual pro-
duction as the base year).
On the same premise, 1954 and 1955 capacity (planned produc-
tion) is estimated at a rate 115 percent of actual production in
1953 and 1954 respectively. The results of these calculations are
given in Table 12.**
Table 12 gives estimated actual production and production
capacity for 1953-55 in terms of total value of production. It does
not purport to indicate what the product mix of this total value will
be. As is obvious from Table 2, XXX any such prediction of product
mix would be sheer guesswork since the mix can vary, and has varied,
from year to year.
C. Expansion Possibilities.
As has been previously pointed out, a discussion of expan-
sion possibilities from the point of view of this report takes on
* These percentage -values are calculated from the information pre-
sented in II.
** Table 12 follows on p. 36.
xxx P. 11, above.
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Table 12
Estimated Capacity and Probable Actual Production
of Locomotives and Rolling Stock
in East Germany
1953-55
Year
Total Value
of Production
(Million DME)
Percentage of P;an
Fulfillment 2/
1953
96
Capacity
586
Actual Production
562
1954
96
Capacity
646
Actual Production
619
1955
96
Capacity
711
Actual Production
68o
a. Based upon Actual Total Value of Production divided by
Capacity Total Value of Production times 100. '
a negative approach. A reduction in facilities, rather than an
expansion, seems probable.
* Whether or not plants such
as those at Gotha, Dessau, and Weimar will actually cease producing
railroad equipment is not yet certain.
such a reduction is most probable, and the contraction
of the locomotive and rolling stock industry to the point where it
serves only the needs of the Reichsbahn for new equipment, with little
or no reparations or export production, is to be expected in the future.
* See I, D, above, for a discussion of possible changes.
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What the final situation will be with regard to production and/or
capacity will depend upon the demands which the Reichsbahn will
make upon the industry. These demands will not become measureable
until more information on the status of the remaining "damaged"
inventories, coupled with estimates of rail traffic growth and
equipment retirement rates, is available.
V. Inputs.
Table 13* is a tabulation of direct inputs into several selected
types of railroad equipment produced in East Germany.
Several
important items of input, however, are missing from this information,
notably, energy, transportation, and capital equipment.
This earlier schedule of inputs was developed by a method
which used an analogy between US and Soviet practice developed from
the US Census of Manufactures, 1947, and statistical information
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
in Table 14.** As can be seen
from this table, the inputs derived by the analogy method vary from 65
percent to 200 percent of the inputs given in Table 13. Because these
variations are both above and below the inputs in Table 13, it is be-
lieved that little value would be added to this repOrt in attempting
to estimate the inputs lacking in Table 13 by the use of the input
schedule derived by the analogy method, and for this reason such
estimates are purposely omitted. Future work in the field of inputs
into railroad equipment is scheduled, and until such work can be com-
pleted there is no point in adding to this report an input estimate
which may well be both unrealistic and inaccurate.
* Table 13 follows on p. 38.
** Table 14 follows on p. 39.
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Table 13
Estimated'Input Requirements per Unit of Production of Selected Items
of Locomotives and Rolling Stock in East Germany 22/
30 March 1950
Input Items
Units
Industrial
Locomotives
(50-HP-Steam)
Boxcars
(2-Axle)
Flatcars
(4-Ax1e)
Hopper
Cars
(4-Ax1e)
Refrigerator
Cars
(4-Axle)
Mining
Cars
Passenger
Cars
(4-Axle)
Steel (Rolled)
mt
8.120
5.800
18.410
19.500
29.136
0.350
32.880
Steel (Forged)
mt
0.920
0.330
0
4.550
Steel (Cast)
mt
2.000
0.480
0.740
0.450
2.726
0.100
0.620
Iron (Cast)
mt
1.070
0.160
0.270
0.480
0.738
0.120
0.160
Nonferrous Metals
mt
0.410
0.001
0.020
0.040
0.624
1.690
Wood
cu m
1.670
5.400
6.300
0.300
10.479
35.000
Paint
mt
0.060
0.120
0.150
0.150
? 0.386
1.210
Glass
sq m
1.500
0
0
0.200
70.000
Labor
man-hours
2,457.0
715.0
1,722.0
1,893.0
N.A.
6.o
21,697.0
Machine Time
hours
1,593.0
375.0
390.0
1,262.0
12.0
5,061.0
Weight
Gross
mt
18.340
12.440
30.771
30.157
43.932
0.547
92.789
Finished
mt
N.A.
11.000
N.A.
N.A.
32.160
N.A.
N.A.
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Table 14
Comparison of Statistics on East German Items of Input per Unit of Production of Rolling Stock
with Statistics as Calculated from the US Census of Manufactures, 1947 50X1
Item
Freight Cars Passenger Cars
1947 "Census"
From Data as Per- From
Intelliggnce From cent of Intelli- Intelliggnce
Units Data 2/ 1947 "Census" gence Data Data 2/
From
1947 "Census"
1947 "Census"
Data as Per-
cent of Intelli-
gence Data
Steel (Raw) 12/
mt
14.560
9.527
65
46.664
47.635
102
Nonferrous Metals
mt
0.015
0.030
200
1.690
1.500
89
Wood
cu m
2.285
3.710
163
35.000
42.890
123
Labor
man-hours
863
625
72
N.A.
3,125
N.A.
a. A weighted average of boxcars, flatcars, hopper cars, and refrigerator cars from Table 13 was used to calculate the
values for this column.
b. Rolled steel is converted into raw steel-by multiplying by 1,39. Forged steel, cast iron, and cast steel are con-
verted by multiplying by 1.08. These conversion factors are standards previously developed by CIA analysts.
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VI. Plant Information.*
Estimates of production at the plants producing locomotives and
rolling stock in East Germany have been made. For the geographical
location of these plants, see the accompanying map.** Estimates of
total employment at each of these plants are also included wherever
possible. Caution must be exercised in using these employment figures,
however, as most of the plants produce items other than, and in addi-
tion to, railroad equipment, and it has not been possible to deter-
mine that proportion of the total employment engaged only in production
of locomotives and rolling stock.
A. Ammendorf. LT/
Proper Name: Waggonfabrik Ammendorf.
Former Name: Gottfried Linder AG.
Employment: 1946: 2,000
1947: 2,500
1948: 3,000
1949: 4,000
1950: 5,000
1951: 5,800
1952: 7,000
1953: 7,000
In addition to the items shown in Table 15, XXX: this plant. has
produced, since the end of World War II, the following items:
Three- and 5-ton truck trailers for the Soviet Army of
Occupation (SAO).
Armored diesel locomotives for the USSR (the application of
the armor, not the production of the locomotive).
** Following p. 50.
xxx Table 15 follows on p. 41.
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Table 15
Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonfabrik Ammendorf 2/
1946-52
Units
Item
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
Flatcars
300
850
1,320
1,770
0
0
0
Industrial and
Plant Cars
90
340
500
600
600
1,250
2,200
Passenger Cars
0
0
4
150
330
400
500
a. All items were produced as reparations goods for the USSR.
Superstructures for radio stations to be mounted on ZIS
trucks for the USSR.
Tractor trailers.
A special train with electronics equipment for the USSR.
Automotive workshops for the SAO.
B. Babelsberg.* Lli
Proper Name:
Former Name:
Employment:
C. Bautzen. LY
Karl Marx Werke. -
Orenstein und Koppel.
1946:
1947:
1948:
1949:
1950:
,1951:
1952:
1953:
N.A.
800
1,300
1,900
2,000
2,000
2,000
2,000
Proper Name: Waggonbau Bautzen.
Former Name: Busch Waggonbau.
See Table 16, p. 42, below.
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Table 16
Estimated Production of Locomotives at the Karl Marx Werke, Babelsberg
1946-52
Units
Item
Consumer
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
Industrial and
Plant Locomotives
USSR
100
32
31.
101
68
34
34
East Germany
40
52
40
86
43
43
Other European
Satellites
68
87
95
146
73
73
Mining Locomotives
USSR
8
C. Bautzen.112/ (Continued).
Employment: 1946: 1,100
1947: 1,100
1948: 1,600
1949: 2,000
1950: 2,400
1951: 3,000
1952: 3,100
1953: 3,600
In addition to the items shown in Table 17,* this plant has
produced, since the end of World War II, the following items;
Interurban motor cars.
Hospi,tal cars converted from passenger and freight cars.
Superstructures for radio trucks.
Railroad passenger and freight car buffers.
D. Dessau. /1_V
Proper Name: Waggonfabrik Dessau.
Employment: 1946: 1,600
1947: 1,600
Table 17 follows on p. 43.
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Table 17
Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonbau Bautzen
1946-52
Units
Item Consumer
1946
1947
1948
1949 1950
1951
1952
2/
Boxcars East Germany
Industrial and
Plant Cars East Germany
USSR
Passenger Cars East Germany
USSR
260
250
110
Negligible
300
6
N.A. 530
35 55
400
50
25 '
55
65
a.. Waggonbau Bautzen was to be wholly converted to the production of
tractors by the end of 1952.
D. Dessau.ill/ (Continued).
Employment: 1948: 2,000
1949: 2,500
1950: 2,800
1951: 3,000
1952: 3,500
1953: 4,000
In addition to the items shown in Table 18,* this plant has
produced, since the end of World War II, the following items:
A communications train for the USSR.
Two-axle freight car bogies.
Superstructures for radio trucks for the USSR.
Bus bodies.
E. Goerlitz. 21/
Proper Name: Waggonbau Goerlitz.
Former Name: WUmag Waggon und Maschinen Werke.
Table 18 follows on p. 44.
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Table 18
Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonfabrik Dessau
1946-52
Units
Item ?
Consumer
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
Flatcars
USSR
900
600
Refrigerator
Cars
USSR
50
75
loo
530
990
1,298
1,500
Hungary
22
Industrial and
Plant Cars
East Germany
100
120
30
Other Freight
Cars
USSR
900
800
530
810
980
235
250
Passenger Cars
USSR
55
45
E. Goerlitz./1V (Continued).
Employment: 1946: N.A.
1947: N.A.
1948: 2,400
1949: 3,200
1950: 4,100
1951: 4,500
1952: 5,800
1953: 6,000
In addition to the items shown in Table 19,* this plant has
produced, since the end of World War II, the following items:
Hospital cars converted from passenger and freight cars.
Bogies.
Screw couplings.
Three-car automotive trains for Poland.
Trolley bus trailers.
* Table 19 follows on p. 45.
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Table 19
Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonbau Goerlitz
1946-52
Units
Item
Hopper Cars
Flatcars
Passenger Cars
Consumer 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
USSR 500 0 400
Poland 200 300
East Germany 140 300 300
USSR 250
East Germany 235 700
USSR Negligible N.A. 30 160 120 70
East Germany 40
F. Gotha.112/
Proper Name: Waggonbau Gotha.'
Former Name: Gothaer Waggonfabrik.
Employment: 1946: N.A.
1947: N.A.
1948: 1,800
1949: 1,900
1950: 2,000
1951: 2,100
1952: 2,500
1953: 3,000
In addition to the items shown in Table 20,* this plant has
produced, since the end of World War II, the following items;
Special cars for V-2 trains.
Grunau Baby II gliders.
Heavy automotive trucks for the movement of freight cars
oyer highways.
Tractors (reported in 1952).
* Table 20 follows on p. 46.
se
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Table 20
Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonbau Gotha
1946-52
Units
Item
Consumer
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
2/
Hopper Cars
Flatcars
Boxcars
Industrial and
Plant Cars
East Germany
Poland
East Germany
East Germany
250
250
250
200
250
300
200
300
35
a. No longer producing railroad equipment after the end of 1951.
G. Hennigsdorf./ly
Proper Name: Lokanotivenbau Elektrotechnische Werke
Former Name: AEG Borsig Lokomotivbau.
Employment: 1946: N.A.
1947: N.A.
1948: 3,400
1949: 4,100
1950: 4,864
1951: 5,500
1952: 6,234
1953: 6,970
( aw)
In addition to the items shown in Table 21,* this plant has
produced, since the end of World War II, a wide variety of electrical
equipment as follows:
Electric lift trucks.
Electric ovens of all types.
Welding sets of 15 KVA/5KW, 21 KVA/6.5KW, and 0.4IgA.
Insulation paper and insulators of all types.
Mobile transmitters and amplifiers.
Axiometers (rudder controls for large ships).
Railway traction motors.
Table 21 follows on p. 47.
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Table 21
Estimated Production of Locomotives
at the Lokomotivenbau Elektrotechnische Werke (LEW), Hennigsdorf
1946-52
Units
Item Consumer 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Mining Loco-
motives , USSR N.A. N.A. N.A. 200 (Plan) 30 (Plan) 153
Czechoslovakia 100 (Plan)
Industrial and
Plant Loco-
motives USSR motives 50 30 68
East Germany 39
Main-Line Steam
Locomotives East Germany 2 (Plan) 30 (Plan)
H. Loessnitz. 1E/
Proper Name: LOWA Preaswerk.
Employment: 1951: 400 (only figure available).
Production: No production has been credited to this plant
up to 1950, when 2,800 mining cars were built, presumably for the
USSR.* Production in 1951 was 3,000 mining cars. No information is
available on 1952 production.
I. Niesky.** 2.31
.Proper Name: Waggon- mid Stahlbau. Nietky.
Former Name: Christoph und Unmack.
Employment: 1951: 1,200 (only estimate available).
* See footnote b, Table 10, p. 30, above.
** See Table 22, p. 48, below.
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Table 22
Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggon- und Stahlbau Niesky
1946-52
Units
Item
Consumer
1946-50
1951
1952
Flatcars
Passenger Cars
East Germany
East Germany
0
0
4o
25
1,230
10
at
In
J. Vetschau. )12/
Proper Name:
Employment:
Production:
this plant is for
addition, five ste
K. Weimar. 22/
Proper Name:
Former Name:
Employment:
LOVA Geraetebau.
1951: 350 (only estimate available).
The only report of railroad equipment production
1951 when some 3,000 mining cars were produced.
am tractors were reportedly produced in 1951.
Waggonbau Weimar.
Fritz Saukel Werke.
1946: N.A.
1947: N.A.
1948: N.A.
1949: N.A.
1950: 2,800
1951: 3,000
1952: 3,500
1953: N.A.
In addition to the
produced, since the end of
items shown in Table 23,* this plant has
World War II, the following items:
* Table 23 follows on p. 49.
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Table 23
Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonbau Weimar
1946-52
Units
Item
Consumer
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
Mining Cars
Industrial and
Plant Cars
Refrigerator
Cars
Tank Cars
Hopper Cars
USSR
USSR
USSR
East Germany
USSR
4,000
4,200
400
4,650
1,100
3,850
1,680
450
1,335
694
600
135
650
600
400
Wheel sets.
Various cast railroad equipment parts.
Wooden packing cases for electrical equipment shipments.
L. Werdau. 21/
Proper Name:
Former Name:
Employment:
In addition
produced, since the
Waggonbau Werdau
Schumann Werke.
1946-48:
1949:
1950:
1951:
1952-53:
N.A.
1,700
2,400
3,000
N.A.
to the items shown in Table 24,* this plant has
end of World War II, the following items:
Automobile trailers.
Truck cabs.
Bus bodies.
Trolley buses and trolley bus trailers.
Automotive X-ray cars.
Automotive dental surgery cars.
H-6 and G-5 trucks (1952 and thereafter).
Table 24 follows on p. 50.
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Table 24
Estimated Production of Rolling Stock at Waggonbau Werdau
1946-52
Units
Item Consumer 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 2/
Boxcars
Industrial and
Plant Cars
Refrigerator
Cars
USSR
East Germany
65
400 300 200 400
USSR 300 500
USSR , 50
East Germany 50 176 220
a. Converted wholly to motor vehicle production by the end of 1952.
VII. Conclusions.
A. Capabilities.
When its capabilities are evaluated the East German railroad
equipment industry presents something of a paradox. In the rolling
stock segment of the industry, facilities currently in operation are
fully capable of supplying the Reichsbahn with sufficient numbers of
freight and passenger cars to maintain efficient levels of operating
inventories.* In the locomotive segment of the industry, however,
East Germany's production capabilities are almost nonexistent. No
main-line steam locomotives have been built since the end of World
War II. Facilities for the production of diesel locomotives do not
* This statement presupposes that the announcement of the cancellation
of reparations as of 1 January 1954 will mean a rdaterial increase in
the amounts of production designated for internal Reichgbahn use.
Should the USSR maintain, through some pretext, its past level of im-
ports of East German railroad equipment production, then the esti-
mate of capabilities above should be qualified to indicate that
East Germany is not receiving the benefit of its production capabili-
ty.
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Locomotive and Rolling Stock Plants
? Rolling-stock plant ? Locomotive plant
Some boundaries shown on this mop ore de facto bound-
aries 0954), not necessarily recognized as definitive by the
United States Government; the Unked States Governmem 0 20 40 60 80 100 Miles
does not recognize as hnal thede facto western limit of Polish
Administration in Germany (the OdeoNeisse Line). 0 20 40 60 80 100 Kilometers
12957 CIA, 1-54
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exist, and, although the electric locomotive plant at Hennigsdorf has
the facilities for main-line electric locomotive production, no such
production for East German use has occurred since the end of the war.
Insofar as current capabilities are concerned, it can be
said thatlwith the possible exception of a few main-line electric
locomotives,* East Germany is presently incapable of producing any
new main-line locomotives. The need for more main-line steam locomo-
tives in serviceable condition is so. great that it has been reported
that during the 2 years. 1953-54 production of mining and industrial
and plant locomotives, steam and diesel, at the Babelsberg plant will
cease in order that the plant may concentrate on the repair of main-
line steam locomotives in the present operating inventory and on the
rebuilding of some of the locomotives in the damaged inventory.**
Thus even the capability of East Germany to produce Small mining and
industrial and plant locomotives is being reduced because of serious
inability to produce the main-line steam locomotives needed to main-
tain operating efficiency.
B. Vulnerabilities.
Two points, however, are of particular importance and worth re-
stressing here..
The first is made earlier in this report.xxx It is the fact
that the serviceable inventory of main-line steam locomotives has
undergone a steady decline in the past few years and that, lacking
production facilities', East Germany has been literally forced into
an extensive repair and rebuilding program in order to build up this
inventory. Thus any action, either under cold or hot-war conditions,
which tends to deter the program would exploit this vulnerability.
The second point is related to the first. It is concerned
with the import of raw materials and component parts.**** There is
* The number of these which could be used even if produced is,
of course, restricted by the available electrified trackage.
** See II, C, 1, a, above, for further details on this program.
xxx See II, C, 1, a and VII, A, above.
See II, B, 1, b and II, B, 2, b, above.
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program is
items such
high-grade
receipt of
to exploit
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?
evidence to indicate that the locomotive rehabilitation
dependent, at least in part, on the importation of certain
as boiler tubes, wheels and axles, welding electrodes, and
rolled Steel products. Thus any interference with the
such imports, such as tightened COCOM controls, would serve
this vulnerability.
C. Intentions.-
1. Over-All Summary.
Current activities in the locomotive and rolling stock
industry in East Germany indicate the intention to continue at an
increasing rate the task of supplying the Reichsbahn with new equip-
ment to increase the size and efficiency of the operational inven-
tories.* This program is in keOping with the general objective of
increasing the economic potential of the country.
How much the demands of the USSR for imports of rail-
road equipment on a trade basis in lieu of reparations will affect
this over-all program is, to date, speculative.
It does not appear logical that the USSR
will allow its concession insofar as formal reparations are concerned
to affect its planned program of railroad equipment acquisitions from
East Germany.** In fact, the recent announcements of increased pro-
duction of consumer goods could well mean greater drains on capital
goods of the Satellite economies.
It is believed that the trend of the past few years will
continue. That is, East Germany will be in a position to retain for
its own use a gradually increasing percentage of its total produc-
tion of railroad equipment.
* Included here as new equipment is the program of rebuilding
damaged locomotives instead of new production.
** It must be made clear here that such a planned program is assumed
to exist as a counterpart to over-all economic planning.
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2. Indicators.
a. Six-Axle Flatcar Program, 1952-53.
In May 1952 a program for the building of 2,300
6-axle flatcars of European gage was announced. The plants at
Goerlitz and Niesky were to be responsible for the production of
these cars, of which 1,600 were to be produced at the plant at
Niesky and 700 at the plant at Goerlitz. It has been estimated
that, by the end of 1952, the plant at Goerlitz had produced its
quota of 700, and the plant at Niesky had produced some 1,230 cars.
No evidence of 1953 production of these cars at the plant at Goer-
litz has been received, but the plant at Niesky reportedly turned
out its 1,750th car in July 1953 (total of 1952-53 production at,
Niesky).
Total planned production of this type of car is
hot accurately known, but reports place it at between 3,600 and
4,200. It was first thought that these cars were to be used for
East German commercial traffic,* but
the Soviet Control Commission (SCC) has ol-dered them to be made
available for use on SCC orders only and tliat\ in the future they
are not to be used for commercial traffic. '
The cars are 6-axle flatcars with\low sides held
in place by stakes. Their load capacity is 50 to 80 metric tons,
thus making them suitable for use in hauling tanks or\other heavy
military goods.
construction are of low grade and
and wooden sides have been common
produced.
the materials used in their
that failures of bumpers, end plates,
in perhaps 20 percent of the cars
Considering that large numbers of these cars are
being built, that they are suitable for military use, and that their
use is presently restricted In spite of East German needs leads to
speculation as to the intentions underlying the whole program. The
most logical conclusion i is that these cars are part of a program of
preparedness for future hostilities. Certainly a reserve inventory
of several thousand cars capable of transporting heavy military
A number of them were actually Observed in such use.
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equipment provides a capability to move such equipment in large
amounts and is an indication of intention to use it at some future
time. Sudden unexplained movements of these cars to marshalling
areas or loadings of military equipment might well provide a more
specific indicator of immediate intentions.
Assuming for purposes of analysis that there is no
possibility of hostile action, the estimation of intentions behind
the program becomes more subtle. The only, apparently logical
hypothesis is that the USSR, at some unspecified time and for reasons
not presently obvious, may intend a wholesale movement of heavy
industrial equipment. Since these cars are of European gage and
can be used on any of the Satellite railroad lines, any speculations
as to what heavy industrial equipment would be moved where would be
nothing but pure guesswork and should not be attempted until some
further indicators are received. 22/
b., Coal-Dust Locomotive Program.
as late as March 1953 only three such locomotives were
still in service and that the Reichsbahn had refused to order more
of them as they had proved entirely unsuccessful. 2.3./ It seems prob-
able that until such time as East Germany has a sufficient supply of
copper for the installation of the copper fireboXes necessary .in this
type of locomotive the conversion program will be held in abeyance. -
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