THE USSR'S CRUDE OIL PIPELINE NETWORK

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• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Scoret
Intelligence
The USSR's Crude Oil
Pipeline Network
A Research Paper
?Seefet?_
SOV 83-10059
May 1983
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The USSR's Crude Oil
Pipeline Network
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Soviet
Economy Division, SOYA
Secret
SOV 83-10059
May 1983
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Summary
Information available
as 01 10 March 1983
was used in this report.
t
The USSR's Crude Oil
Pipeline Network
The Soviet crude oil pipeline system transports over 90 percent of the crude
oil produced in the USSR. Analysis of the system's current status reveals
the possibility of a temporary but costly constraint on crude oil production,
depending on whether a new pipeline (now under construction) is completed
in time to handle the projected increase in West Siberian oil production in
1984. In West Siberia?the one major region where oil production is
expanding?rail and inland waterway transport will be operating near
capacity and will offer little prospect for accommodating additional oil
tonnage. With respect to the longer run, the deceleration of oil pipeline
construction evident in Soviet plans suggests that Moscow foresees a
leveling off in West Siberian crude oil output later in the decade.
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Most of the Soviet oil pipeline network is relatively new. Its growth has
been dramatic?from 4,000 kilometers in length at the end of World War
II to about 60,000 km in length in 1981?with half of the growth occurring
between 1970 and 1981. During the 1970s, the Soviets began to lay
1,020-mm and 1,220-mm crude oil pipelines on a large scale. By the end of
1980 they had about 20,000 km of these large-diameter lines, nearly 80
percent of which were built during 1971-80.
The plan to construct 9,200 km of crude oil pipelines in 1981-85 is modest
compared with the 22,000 km planned for 1971-75 and 15,000 km for
1976-80. The reduction undoubtedly reflects in part the priority Moscow is
giving to allocation of construction funds and equipment for the gas
pipeline program. Even this lower goal may not be met: in view of likely
Soviet allocational decisions and perception of oil production leveling off
(and taking account of chronic lags in the completion of pipelines), we
believe that during 1981-85 the Soviets may construct no more than
8,000 km-1,200 km below plan.
The only new major oil transmission pipeline planned to originate in the
West Siberian oil region is one being built to carry a combination of crude
oil and condensate to the Volga-Urals region. Judging from the pace of
construction, we estimate that the new pipeline will not become operational
until late 1984 or early 1985. If that is the case, the existing West Siberian
network, with a usable throughput capacity of nearly 361 million tons per
year, may be unable to handle all the production planned for 1984 (385
million tons). Even temporary loss of production would not be trivial. For
example, an oil production shortfall of 5 million tons could mean a loss
equivalent to about $1 billion (in 1983 prices).
iii
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SOV 83-10059
May 1983
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Because the inland waterways are frozen for more than six months out of
the year and the single-track railroad extending into the oil-producing area
is already being used to capacity, there is little prospect of transporting
more West Siberian crude oil by rail and water. If, however, construction
activity accelerates and the new oil pipeline becomes operational early in
1984, the pipeline constraint on meeting the 1984 oil production target and
the target for 1985 (399 million tons) will be removed.
Our analysis indicates that the slow pace of oil pipeline construction
planned for 1981-85 is not the result of inability to obtain Western
equipment. In contrast to the situation in gas pipeline construction, the
Soviet Union can manufacture nearly all of the pipe and equipment it
needs for crude oil pipeline construction. However, without Western
pipelayers, bulldozers, surge-control valves, and insulating materials, con-
struction takes longer, the pipelines operate less efficiently, and their
economic life is shorter.
Although Soviet pipelines currently carry vast quantities of oil, the average
quality of pipeline construction is below Western standards, according to
Western observers and Soviet emigres. Welding and insulating procedures
are often carelessly done in haste to meet deadlines. Because shoddy work
of this kind facilitates corrosion, large amounts of corroded and damaged
pipeline may have to be replaced in the next 10 to 15 years. In 1980, only
20 percent (12,000 km) of the USSR's oil pipeline network was 20 years old
or older. In contrast, by 1995, roughly 75 percent (46,000 km) of the
present network will be at least 20 years old. Replacement of some of these
pipelines will not be required because they are located in regions where oil
production is declining. Nevertheless, to keep the network operating
satisfactorily, the Soviets will have to step up their replacement program.
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Contents
Page
Summary
iii
Introduction
1
Eight Decades of Oil Pipeline Construction
1
The Soviet Oil Pipeline System Today
3
West Siberia
3
The Caucasus
3
The Friendship Pipeline
4
Moscow-Leningrad Region
5
Ukraine?South Central Region
5
East Siberia
6
Soviet Far East
6
Planned Expansion Through 1985
7
Interregional Lines
7
Competing Claims on Pipeline Construction Capacity
8
Likelihood of Success
10
Emerging Problems
11
Adequacy of West Siberian Pipelines in 1983
12
Possible West Siberian Transport Bottleneck
12
Rail and Water Shipment
14
Construction Practices and Pipeline Serviceability
14
Seasonal Construction in West Siberia
16
Appendixes
A. USSR: Pipeline Network
19
B. Throughput for Two Siberian Oil Pipelines
25
C. The Role of Western Equipment in Soviet Oil Pipeline Construction
27
Figures
1. USSR: Pipeline Transport of Crude Oil?Average Distance
2
2. USSR: Length of Crude Oil Pipeline Network, by Diameter of Pipe
3
3. Crude Oil Pipelines From West Siberia
4
4. Crude Oil Pipelines in the Caucasus Region
5
5. The Friendship Pipeline System
6
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6.
Crude Oil Pipelines in the Moscow-Leningrad Region
7
7.
Crude Oil Pipelines in the Ukraine?South Central Region
8
8.
Crude Oil Pipelines in East Siberia
9
9.
Crude Oil Pipelines in the Soviet Far East
10
10.
Completion of Crude Oil Pipelines, by Plan Period
11
11.
Crude Oil Pipelines in West Siberia
14
12.
USSR: Length of Crude Oil Pipeline Network at Least
20 Years Old
16
13.
Major Crude Oil Pipelines in the Soviet Union
31
Tables
1.
USSR: Crude Oil Pipeline Transportation Costs
3
2.
USSR: Crude Oil Pipelines Scheduled for Construction
During 1981-85
11
3.
USSR: Pipeline Construction, Planned and Achieved
12
4.
USSR: Crude Oil Pipelines Constructed During 1981-82
12
5.
Usable Throughput of the West Siberian Pipeline Network
13
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The USSR's Crude Oil
Pipeline Network
Introduction
About 58,000 kilometers of the Soviet Union's 70,000
km of oil pipelines transport crude oil.' The remaining
12,000 km transport oil products from the refineries.
In 1980, 92 percent of the country's crude oil produc-
tion was transported to refineries by pipelines from
gathering points near the producing areas. In con-
trast, only 10 percent of the output of oil products is
moved from refineries by pipeline. This paper de-
scribes the existing crude oil pipeline network, how it
developed, Soviet plans for its expansion, and some
emerging problems
Eight Decades of Oil Pipeline Construction
The first oil pipeline in the USSR was designed as an
export line to carry kerosene from the refineries at
Baku on the Caspian Sea to the export base at Batumi
on the Black Sea. This pipeline, 883 km in length and
200 mm in diameter, was begun in 1896 and complet-
ed in 1906. The second and third pipelines, con-
structed during 1926-30, also were export lines to
terminals on the Black Sea. The only other major oil
pipeline completed before World War II was a
235-mm pipeline to move crude oil 709 km, from the
Emba oilfields in western Kazakhstan to a refinery at
Orsk.
Nearly all the oil pipelines in the Caucasus region
were destroyed during World War II and later re-
built. The only new construction during World War II
was the completion of a line to carry crude from Okha
on Sakhalin Island to Sofiysk on the Soviet mainland.
During the first Five-Year Plan after the war
(1946-50), only 1,400 km of oil pipeline were con-
structed; they were limited to linking refineries with
local oilfields. At the end of 1950, the Soviet network
totaled more than 5,400 km. During the 1951-55 ?
Plan, the length of the crude oil pipeline network
' The data on Soviet pipeline distances, diameters, capacities, and
costs used in this paper are drawn largely from Soviet industry
journals and monographs
1
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almost doubled, to about 9,300 km. The major con-
struction effort was the 1,149-km pipeline from Ufa
to Omsk. I 25X1
During 1956-65 an accelerated pace in pipeline con-
struction followed the sharp increase in oil production
in the Volga-Urals region:
? Numerous short lines were built from gathering
points near producing fields to the major transfer
stations at Al'met'yevsk, Kuybyshev, and Ufa.
? Major long-distance pipelines were built to trans-
port crude oil to refineries at Gorkiy, Ryazan', 25X1
Moscow, and Yaroslavl'.
? The Friendship Pipeline was laid from Kuybyshev to
Uzhgorod and onward to Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, and East Germany
Largely as the result of pipeline construction from the
Volga-Urals fields, the length of the crude oil pipeline
network more than doubled during 1956-65, reaching
22,300 km in 1965. Moreover, according to Soviet oil
industry monographs, as oilfield development and
pipeline construction proceeded, the share of crude oil
output transported by pipeline increased as follows (in
percent):
1950
33
1955
64
1960
78
1965
85
(u)
The linking of the Volga-Urals oilfields with the
refineries in the Moscow region by pipeline during the
1950s and 1960s was a logical development. According
to Soviet statistics, operating costs for oil pipeline
transport per ton-kilometer are one-third the costs for
rail transport and three-fourths of the costs for water
transport. Pipelines are also cheaper to build than
railroads: in the late 1970s, construction of 1,220-mm
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Figure 1
USSR: Pipeline Transport of Crude Oil?
Average Distance
Kilometers
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1950 55 60 65 70 75 80
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pipeline in good terrain cost 350,000 rubles per
kilometer, whereas the cost was 500,000 rubles per
kilometer for railroad construction. When compared
with transport on waterways, the flexibility of pipeline
transport is an even more important advantage than
the lower cost. Pipeline routes are not as seriously
constrained as waterways by terrain and are not
affected by the long winter freezes that halt traffic on
the waterways in much of the Soviet Union
During 1966-80, the network's rapid expansion con-
tinued, although the focus of activity gradually shift-
ed to West Siberia. The first oil pipeline in West
Siberia was built in 1965 and ran from Shaim to
Tyumen'. The major long-distance pipelines out of
West Siberia were laid in 1971-80. During these 10
years, more than 26,000 km of oil pipelines were
constructed, again nearly doubling the length of the
total system. By 1980 crude oil pipelines in service in
the USSR totaled 57,800 km in length (see foldout
map, figure 13, page 31.
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With the discovery of new oilfields progressively
farther east, first in the Volga-Urals area and then in
West Siberia, the requirements for moving crude oil
from the oilfields to the refineries or export terminals
increased sharply. The average distance for transport-
ing 1 ton of crude oil was 350 km in 1960, but by
1980 it had increased to almost 1,900 km (figure 1).
As the pipeline network expanded during the 1970s,
operating costs per ton-kilometer fell. The lower
average costs resulted mainly from adding large-
diameter pipelines-1,020 mm (40 inches) and 1,220
mm (48 inches) in diameter, which transport oil more
efficiently than smaller lines. In 1965 only 1,300 km
of 1,020-mm-diameter pipeline were operational, but
by 1980 the total length of large-diameter pipeline
had increased to about 20,000 km (figure 2). Accord-
ing to Soviet technical monographs, in 1977, for
example, the price per ton-kilometer for transporting
crude oil via 1,220-mm pipeline was 52 percent less
than via 530-mm pipeline. The average cost for
transporting a ton of crude oil the average distance of
1,875 km is shown in table 1.
Assuming that the average ton of crude oil is trans-
ported the first half of this distance by 1,020-mm or
1,220-mm pipelines and the second half by smaller
diameter lines, the average pipeline transportation
cost in 1980 was about 3 rubles per ton.
Despite a trend toward reduction in the cost per unit
of oil transported, the total expenditure has increased.
The average transmission distance more than tripled
between 1965 and 1980, and oil production increased
from 243 million tons to 603 million tons. Total
outlays for crude oil shipments by pipeline are esti-
mated to have increased from 259 million rubles in
1965 to 1.7 billion rubles in 1980
The Soviet Oil Pipeline System Today
West Siberia and the Volga-Urals region currently
account for more than 80 percent of USSR oil
production. West Siberia alone has 55 percent of the
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Figure 2
USSR: Length of Crude Oil Pipeline Network,
by Diameter of Pipe
Total kilometers
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
1955
Diameters (mm)
El 1,020-1,220
LI 530-820
El Less than 530
75 80
Table 1
USSR: Crude Oil Pipeline Transportation Costs
Pipeline Diameter Transportation Cost Per Ton
(in 1977 rubles)
530 mm 4.3
630 mm
720 mm
1,020 mm
3.3
2.8
2.2
1,220 mm 2.1
Note: For this calculation we have used (a) the 1977 ruble prices
given in Soviet sources, (b) oil pipeline distances and diameters in use
in 1980, and (c) the average distance each ton of crude oil was
transported in 1980-1,874 kilometers.
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total. The following sections, based largely on Soviet
media and emigre reporting, discuss in detail:
? The pipeline network in individual regions.
? The directional flow of oil from producing fields to
these regions.
? Some regional pipeline network problems.
In each section, the capacity of the regional pipeline
networks is compared to the refinery requirements for
crude oil
Individual pipelines, with data on diameter,
length, capacity, and year of completion, are listed in
appendix A.
3
West Siberia. Five large-diameter pipelines transport
crude oil from the West Siberian oilfields (see fig-
ure 3). One extends eastward to Anzhero-Sudzhensk
and East Siberia; a second, southward to Omsk and
Central Asia; and three, westward to Kuybyshev,
Al'met'yevsk, and Polotsk. From Kuybyshev and
Al'met'yevsk, West Siberian crude oil can be moved
through other large-diameter pipelines to the Ukraine
and Eastern Europe, to the Caucasus, and to the
Moscow-Leningrad region. The West Siberian pipe-
line network will be discussed more fully (page 11) in
a section that analyzes the usable throughput of the
network.
The Caucasus. The Caucasus region, at one time the
center of the Soviet oil industry, today is a net
importer of crude oil from other regions of the USSR
(figure 4). The Soviet media have reported that the
region's oil production has declined (from 55 million
tons in 1970 to 37 million tons in 1980)
In order to
operate the refineries at Baku and Groznyy at the
desired level, the region must now import crude oil
from West Siberian and Volga-Urals fields.
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Figure 3
Crude Oil Pipelines From West Siberia
Pipeline diameter
............. 1,020-1,220 Mm
530-820 mm
Aleksandrovskoye
To Polotsk
To Arineryevsk
Anzhero-
Sudzhensk
To Kuybyshev
----
To Achinsk
and Angarsk
To Ufa
To Central Asia
The two major pipelines in the Caucasus are between
Tikhoretsk and Groznyy, transporting West Siberian
and Volga-Urals crude oil to the regional refineries.
Four small-diameter pipelines transport crude to re-
fineries and export terminals on the Black Sea.
Although the first pipeline between Tikhoretsk and
Groznyy was built to move crude oil northward from
Groznyy, the flow has been reversed in order to
provide more crude oil for the refineries at Baku. The
second Tikhoretsk-Groznyy pipeline was completed in
1980, and an extension of this new line to Baku was
recently completed. According to reporting in Soviet
media, Baku will be able to receive 14-18 million tons
of crude oil annually through the pipeline when the
extension is operating at full capacity. In addition, it
will have access to 14 million tons of crude oil from
local Azerbaijan production and 3 million tons from
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Turkmen production (via tanker), bringing the total to
31-35 million tons. Refinery capacity in Baku is about
31 million tons. If Azerbaijan production continues to
decline, oil may have to be shipped by railroad from
elsewhere in the Soviet Union?or the Baku refineries
may operate at less than full capacity.
The Friendship Pipeline. The Friendship Pipeline
System consists of two parallel sets of pipelines that
transport crude oil from the Volga-Urals region
through the Ukraine and onward to Eastern Europe
(figure 5). One set was built in the early 1960s and the
other in the early 1970s. New pumping stations were
added in the late 1970s. On the basis of known
exports to Eastern Europe and the Soviets' reporting
on the capacity of their oil pipelines, we believe that
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Figure 4
Crude Oil Pipelines in the Caucasus Region
From
Lisichansk
Tikhoretsk
Krasnodara
Novo siysk
Tuapse
Groznyy
Black
Sea
Caspian
Sea
Batumi
Pipeline diameter
530 - 820 mm
Less than 530 mm
ff) Refinery
the current throughput to Eastern Europe is probably
at the system's maximum capacity: 56-68 million tons
per year at the USSR's western border.
Moscow-Leningrad Region. Although the capacity of
the pipeline network in the north-central region
around Moscow and Leningrad (figure 6) appears
adequate for providing crude oil to refineries there,
some shortages have been reported. For example
the Moscow refinery received
too little crude oil to keep it operating at full capacity.
Two pipelines transport crude oil to Moscow, but the
Ryazan'-to-Moscow line (built during the early 1960s)
may be operating at reduced throughput because of
its age.
5
Ukraine-South Central Region. Siberian crude oil
reaches the Ukraine-South Central region via two
pipelines (figure 7). Both come from Kuybyshev?
one through Lisichansk and the other through
Tikhoretsk?and transport oil to refineries in the
Ukraine and to export terminals on the Black Sea.
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The region may have excess crude oil pipeline capaci- 25x1
ty large product storage zoX1
tanks were built at Michurinsk in the late 1970s. This 25X14
I
could indicate that after the completion of the
Kuybyshev-to-Lisichansk pipeline in 1977, the
Michurinsk-to-Kremenchug pipeline was converted
from crude oil to the transport of refinery products.
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Figure 5
The Friendship Pipeline System
Baltic Sea
To Poland and the
German Democratic
Republic
To Czechoslovakia
and Hungary
Brest
Mozyr'
Uzhgorod
Pipeline diameter
.1113 1,020-1,220 mm
530-820 mm
al Refinery
633999 4-83
East Siberia. The pipeline network in East Siberia
(figure 8) is more than adequate to meet the needs of
refineries in operation and under construction
the existing refinery
at Angarsk and the refinery under construction at
Achinsk were to have a combined crude oil require-
ment of 24 million tons at the end of 1982. According
to Soviet data, two crude oil pipelines from Anzhero-
Sudzhensk to Irkutsk (one 720 mm and the other
1,020 mm in diameter) could together deliver 56-68
million tons annually. Because there is so much excess
crude oil pipeline capacity, the 720-mm pipeline
(which is about 20 years old) may be taken out of
service or converted to transport refined products.
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Soviet Far East. The pipeline system in the Soviet Far
East consists of two small-diameter lines that run
from Okha on Sakhalin Island to Komsomol'sk on the
Soviet mainland (figure 9). During the 1970s the oil
prodiction on Sakhalin Island 2-3 million tons Der
year
was sufficient to meet the crude oil
requirements of the refineries at Komsomol'sk and
Khabarovsk. In 1981, however, a new unit began
operations at Komsomol'sk, with a refining capacity
of 6 million tons per year. This brought the refinery's
crude oil requirement to 9 million tons, 7.5 million
tons of which will have to be transported by railroad
from Irkutsk
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Figure 6
Crude Oil Pipelines in the Moscow-Leningrad Region
Gulf of
Finland
Lake
Ladoga
?
Leningrad
p IotSk
?
Kirishi
Pipeline diameter
Yarosl
wscm.
Volga
r ki
gr
/
Komi
Oilfields
F
0
AI'met'yeysk
1.020 - 1.220
Ryazan'
. a-Urals
ilfields
mm
530 820
[1.
- mm
Refinery
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634000 4-83
The new unit at the Komsomol'sk refinery has been
operating less than half the time
but we are uncertain whether this is
due to a lack of crude oil supply or to technical
problems. In the past the Soviets have talked of
extending the pipeline from Irkutsk to Khabarovsk.
This project has not been mentioned recently, how-
ever, and no action appears to have been taken.
Planned Expansion Through 1985
The program for construction of crude oil pipelines
during the 1981-85 Plan period is considerably small-
er than that achieved in recent plan periods. This
reflects to some extent the slowdown in growth and
possible leveling off of crude oil production. Most of
the planned pipelines are small, intraregional lines
7
providing connection between oil-producing areas and
major transmission lines. Sixteen crude oil pipelines
are scheduled to be built (see table 2).
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The plan for crude oil pipeline construction in 1981- 25X1
85 was reported in February 1981 as 11,500 km. In
August 1981 an authoritative Soviet oil-pipeline jour-
nal gave the goal as about 9,200 km, and this figure is
the one adopted in this paper. (In contrast, 15,000 km25xi
were completed in 1971-75 and 11,200 km in 1976-
80, as shown in figure 10.) 25X1
Interregional Lines. Only two of the lines in the
1981-85 Plan are interregional transmission lines:
these are large-diameter lines, one from Kholmogory
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Figure 7
Crude Oil Pipelines in the Ukraine -South Central Region
Pipeline diameter
- 1.220 mm
- 530 - 820 mm
Refinery
Michurinsk
Saratov
Kremenchu
Lisichansk
Odessa
Kherson
Tikhoretsk
Sea of Azov
Krasn ? dar
Novorossiys
634001 4-83
Black Sea
to Kuybyshev and one from Pavlodar to Chimkent
(undergoing testing in January 1983). During 1976-
80, in contrast, the Soviets laid a number of major
interregional lines: Nizhnevartovsk to Kuybyshev,
Krasnoyarsk to Irkutsk, Kuybyshev to Kremenchug,
and Surgut to Polotsk. All of these lines were 1,020
mm or 1,220 mm.
Competing Claims on Pipeline Construction
Capacity. During the 1971-75 and 1976-80 Five Year
Plans the Soviets approximately fulfilled their con-
struction targets for gas pipelines but met only about
70 percent of those for crude and oil products pipe-
lines (table 3). The 1981-85 FYP calls for the con-
struction of 48,000 km of gas pipelines, including
some 20,000 km of 1,420-mm-diameter line. This is
ambitious, and the priority accorded to it is probably
responsible for some of the current lag in oil pipeline
Secret
Tuapse
construction. Shortages of equipment and labor have
been cited frequently in the Soviet media as major
causes for construction delays. The USSR may simply
not have enough men and equipment allocated to
accommodate the enormous gas pipeline construction
program and the entire oil pipeline construction pro-
gram simultaneously.
Since the early-to-mid-1970s, when major transmis-
sion pipelines were built at a rate of about 115
kilometers per month, the pace of oil pipeline con-
struction in the Soviet Union has slowed. Examples of
construction rates are:
? For the Samotlor-Al'met'yevsk pipeline, completed
in 1973, about 118 km per month.
? For the Samotlor-Kuybyshev pipeline, completed in
1976, 113 km per month.
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Figure 8
Crude Oil Pipelines in East Siberia
From
West Siberia
0-I
Achinsk
Sudzhensk
Angarsk
Pipeline diameter
1,020-1,220 mm
530-820 mm
gI Refinery
Irkutsk
To Komsomol'sk
by rail
634002 4-83
? For the Surgut-Polotsk pipeline, completed in the
spring of 1981, only 80 km per month.
The slow rate of construction on the Surgut-Polotsk
line has been noted and criticized in a CPSU publica-
tion.
Oil pipeline construction schedules slipped frequently
during the last half of the 10th FYP. Soviet press
reports announced that the 401-km Samgori-Batumi
line, construction of which began in 1977, was finally
completed in 1980 after the target dates for its
delivery were adjusted four times. The Krasnoyarsk-
Irkutsk line, begun in 1977, was still not operational
in 1981. In early 1982 the Soviet press noted the
problem, praising the progress in gas pipeline con-
struction while noting "important deficiencies" in oil
pipeline construction. The Krasnoyarsk-Irkutsk,
Kenkiyak-Orsk, and Perm'-Armet'yevsk lines and a
9
number of pumping stations and tank farms were
cited in the article as examples of a "lag in the
construction of important oil industry facilities."
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The number of gas-pipeline compressor stations
planned for the 11th FYP (360) is much greater than
the number reported by the Soviet media as built
during the 10th FYP (209). The labor resources of the
responsible ministry (the Ministry for Constructing
Oil and Gas Enterprises) appear to be inadequate to
build all 360 gas pipeline compressor stations plus the
90 oil-pumping stations that are planned. For exam-
ple, the Soviet pipeline construction ministry journal
reported that only 59 of a planned 99 gas-compressor
and oil-numnina stations were built in 1981
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Figure 9
Crude Oil Pipelines in the Soviet Far East
Pipeline diameter
Not available
Okha
Komsomol'sk
Sea
of
Okhotsk
Tatar
Strait
Khabarovsk
634003 4-83
to assist the ministry and alleviate its
labor shortage, the Central Committee decided in a
November 1981 plenum that 100 compressor stations
would have to be built by other construction minis-
tries.
Likelihood of Success. In order to meet the 1981-85
target for crude oil Pipeline construction, nearly 1,900
km will have to be completed annually. During 1981-
82 the Soviets completed an average of about 1,500
km per year (see table 4). Over the past two decades,
the Soviets have fallen short of oil pipeline construc-
tion targets, as follows (shortfall as percent of plan):
1966-70 55
1971-75 32
1976-80 25
Secret
The priority and resources currently being accorded
to gas pipeline construction lead us to estimate that
the 11th FYP target for oil pipelines will not be met.
In an article in Ekonomicheskaya gazeta discussing
plans for pipeline construction in 1983, the Soviets
stated that of a total of 11,000 km planned for all
types of transmission pipeline, 9,300 km were to be for
gas and only 1,700 km for oil (both crude and refined).
If, as is likely, the USSR misses the current 9,200-km
goal by a proportion somewhat lower than in 1976-80,
we can expect oil and gas-condensate pipeline con-
struction to total about 8,000 km.
10
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Table 2
USSR: Crude Oil Pipelines Scheduled
for Construction During 1981-85 a
Figure 10
Completion of Crude Oil Pipelines,
by Plan Period
Kilometers
Origin
Terminus
Length
(kilometers)
16,000
Pavlodar
Chimkent b
1,642
14,000
Kholmogory
Kuybyshev b
2,400
Severnyy Vozey
Usinsk
57
Yaroslavl'
Kirishi
520
12,000
Tyumen'
Yurgamysh
250
Verkhne-Tarskoye
Parabel'
180
10,000
Perm'
AI'met'yevsk
450
Chimkent
Chardzhou
700
8,000
Groznyy
Baku
620
Prorva
Gur'yev
275
Kenkiyak
Orsk
300
6,000
i
Krasnoleninsky Svod
Shaim
200
11
Usinsk
Ukhta
400
4,000
Oymasha
Zhetibay
50
Vengapur
Nizhnevartovsk d
250
2,000
Berezniki
Perm'
200
a Information is compiled from Soviet media sources.
b Large-diameter pipeline.
1946-50 51-55 56-58 59-65 66-70 71-75 76-80
c This line will carry both crude oil and condensate.
d This line probably will carry condensate only.
Emerging Problems
The Soviet crude oil pipeline network has grown
rapidly, but serious problems appear to be developing.
The West Siberian network is operating at a high rate
of utilization and, if the new Kholmogory-to-Kuyby-
shev pipeline is not completed expeditiously, may not
have sufficient Capacity to transport the oil production
planned for 1984. If inadequate pipeline capacity
constrains crude oil production for as much as a year
pending completion of the new pipeline, a crude oil
production shortfall of 5-10 million tons could result.
At 1983 prices, the lost oil production would be
equivalent to about $1-2 billion.
The high oil-pipeline-capacity utilization in West
Siberia has further implications. In 1977, when the
Surgut-to-Polotsk pipeline was begun, the West Sibe-
rian oil pipeline network had about 60 million tons of
unused capacity. Construction of a new line therefore
11
589260 4-83
indicated that the Soviets were counting on rapid and
large increases in West Siberian oil production. Now
there is very little unused capacity?we estimate that
more than 90 percent of the pipeline network in West
Siberia is currently being used. The relatively small
oil pipeline program now scheduled, taken together
with the high utilization rate, lead us to conclude that
the Soviets probably foresee smaller increases in West
Siberian oil production.
An additional costly problem will overtake the Soviet
oil industry in 10 years or so. Much of the Soviet oil
pipeline network will then require substantial mainte-
nance or replacement. A large part of the need for
replacement will stem from corrosion?a problem
aggravated by shoddy construction practices, the
harsh climate, and soil salinity.
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Table 3
USSR: Pipeline Construction,
Planned and Achieved
Kilometers
1971-75
1976-80
Planned Achieved Planned Achieved
Gas
30,000
31,700
35,000
30,500
Oil a
27,000
18,600
18,500
12,800
a Figures include pipelines for both crude oil and refinery products.
Adequacy of West Siberian Pipelines in 1983. Our
analysis indicates that at present there are four major
West Siberian pipelines operating at or above design
capacity. The fifth, the Aleksandrovsk?Anzhero-
Sudzhensk pipeline, operates below design capacity.
There is also a minor (530-mm) crude oil pipeline that
runs from Shaim to Yurgamysh. These six lines are
described in table 5 and figure 11
Soviet press reports have already announced plans to
increase West Siberian oil production from 354 mil-
lion tons in 1982 to 372 million tons in 1983. We
believe that the Soviets can move this amount of
crude oil out of West Siberia if they supplement the
pipelines with rail and water shipment. (Past Soviet
press reporting indicates that a total of about 10
million tons can be transported by rail and water.) But
the situation will be tight: there is no surplus pipeline
capacity to compensate for interruptions of service. If
any major pipeline were damaged and had to be taken
out of service for even a month or two in 1983,
production probably would be constrained
Possible West Siberian Transport Bottleneck For
crude oil production in West Siberia to increase to a
scheduled 399 million tons in 1985, output in 1984
would have to be about 385 million tons. These
amounts would substantially exceed the present
361-million-ton capacity of the pipelines there.' The
Our estimate of the usable throughput for the six pipelines
currently transporting oil from the West Siberian fi
d of the range (361-383 million tons per year)
riclwlf the Tobol'sk petrochemical plant becomes operational
before 1985, the Soviets could begin using the condensate pipeline
from Nizhnevartovsk to Tobol'sk, and pipeline capacity would
increase to 369 million tons.
Secret
Table 4
USSR: Crude Oil Pipelines Constructed
During 1981-82
Pipeline
Kilometers
Total
2,987
Oymasha-Zhetibay
50
Tyumen'-Yurgamysh
50
Perm'-Armet'yevsk
500
Berezniki-Perm'
200
Severnyy Vozey?Usinsk
57
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Groznyy-Baku
700
Krasnoleninsky Svod?Shaim
200
Vengapur-Nizhnevartovsk
250
Verkhne-Tarskoye?Parabel'
180
Pavoldar-Chimkent a
800
a Construction of this pipeline (1,642 km in length) began in 1978. It
was originally scheduled for completion in 1980, but by that time
only about 800 km had been laid, leaving approximately 800 km for
construction in the 1981-82 period.
Soviets could realize some gain in capacity by con-
structing an additional pipeline westward from
Anzhero-Sudzhensk to increase the use of the
1,220-mm pipeline from Aleksandrovsk to Anzhero-
Sudzhensk, but there are no indications that they plan
such a link. We estimate that up to a year of
construction time would be required to build this
linking pipeline.
Soviet media have reported the beginning of construc-
tion work on a large-diameter crude-oil/gas-conden-
sate line from Kholmogory to Kuybyshev. If it be-
comes operational in the first half of 1984 the Soviets
will have no trouble in transporting the oil planned for
production in 1984 and 1985. However, the line may
not be operational until late 1984 or early 1985?and
it may not reach full capacity until late 1985. This
could constrain West Siberian oil production. In order
to reach the 1985 target of 399 million tons in West
Siberia, production in 1984 would have to be about
385 million tons. At this level, West Siberian oil
production will exceed the available pipeline capacity
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Table 5
Usable Throughput of the
West Siberian Pipeline Network a
Million tons per year
Usable
Throughput
Nameplate
Throughput b
Surgut to Polotsk (1,220 mm)
83
70-78
Samotlor to Al'met'yevsk
(1,220 mm)
83
70-78
Samotlor to Kuybyshev
(1,220 mm)
83
70-78
Ust Balyk to Omsk (1,020 mm)
55
42-50
Aleksandrovsk to Anzhero-
Sudzhensk
48.5
70-78
Shaim to Yurgamysh (530 mm)
8
6-8
Total d
360.5
328-370
a Our estimate of the usable throughput for the six pipelines
transporting oil from the West Siberian fields is at the low end of the
361-383-million-ton- er- ear ran e In discus-
their belief that three of the
four 1,220-mm pipelines in the West Siberian system could possibly
operate at 15 to 20 percent above design capacity (that is, at 86-90
million tons per year each). We consider that the throughput of these
pipelines is constrained by pump capacity. Soviet technical mono-
graphs on pipeline construction list the maximum allowable through-
put for their largest pump, the HM-10,000, at 83.3 million tons per
year. This limit, which we have used in our estimate, is only 11
percent above the design capacity of a 1,220-mm pipeline. Addition-
al considerations affecting capacity estimates are discussed in
appendix B.
b "Nameplate" throughput represents the expected or normal range
for throughput reported by the Soviets.
c We estimate the usable throughput capacity of this pipeline at 48.5
million tons because at Anzhero-Sudzhensk there is not enough exit
pipeline capacity westward toward Omsk and refinery capacity to
the east to accommodate more than 48.5 million tons per year.
If the Soviets built another pipeline between Anzhero-Sudzhensk
and Omsk, they could increase the usable throughput for the
Aleksandrovsk?Anzhero-Sudzhensk pipeline. To date, however,
Soviet press reports and oil pipeline maps do not indicate such
construction A recent Soviet press
article indicates that a pipeline for refinery products exists from Ufa
as far as Novosibirsk
d In addition, a small-diameter condensate pipeline runs from
Nizhnevartovsk to Surgut and then to Tobol'sk. Some press reports
indicate that this pipeline is not operational because of delays in the
construction of the petrochemical facility at Tobol'sk. These reports
indicate that from Surgut the condensate is either mixed with the
crude in the major crude oil pipelines or transported out of West
Siberia by railcar. Seven million tons of condensate were produced
from the Middle Ob' oilfields in 1981. The other West Siberian
pipelines shown in appendix A are intraregional lines that do not
transport oil out of West Siberia.
13
of nearly 361 million tons if the Kholmogory-to-
Kuybyshev pipeline is not completed. Having ab-
sorbed the increment to capacity gained from building
the Surgut-to-Polotsk pipeline and needing more, the
Soviets would again be in a position similar to that in
1979. At that time, according to a Soviet newspaper
statement by a high-ranking pipeline official, the
West Siberian pipeline network was not adequate to
transport increasing oil output and production was
thereby constrained. 25X1
No new pipeline construction originating from Khol-
mogory is evident
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Recent Soviet media 25X1
reports indicate that some new pumping stations have
been added to the existing Surgut-Polotsk pipeline
between Surgut and Perm'.
25X1
If construction began in earnest this winter and a 25X1
construction rate of 80 km per month (the average for
the Surgut-to-Polotsk pipeline, 1977-81) is achieved,
the pipeline probably could not be operational before
late 1984 or early 1985. Full throughput capacity will
not be attained until all of the pumping stations are
completed?probably not before the end of 1985.4
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' Soviet media reporting on the new pipeline has been inconsist-
ent. Most of the evidence, however, indicates that it will terminate
somewhere in the Volga-Urals region, either at Kuybyshev or at
Kuznetsk, west of Kuybyshev along the Friendship Oil Pipeline.
Some Soviet press reports indicate that the pipeline will transport
crude oil; some indicate condensate. Other Soviet media reports2-6x-sil
have mentioned plans to extend the new pipeline to Urengoy.
Reports in Planovoye khozyaystvo indicate that Urengoy conden- 9
sate production could reach 40-50 million tons a year. The Minister 25x1
of the Petroleum Industry has stressed the importance of using this
condensate and the necessity of building a condensate pipeline.F7
Soviet press reporting on construction progress has been unusu-
ally sparse. In the past, the Soviet press has highlighted the
construction of major West Siberian oil pipelines as evidence of the
region's rapidly increasing production possibilities. The latest Sovi-
et media report indicated that the new pipeline was being built
"slowly." All of this is in contrast with the enormous media
attention that is currently being given to the gas pipeline construc-
tion program.
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Figure 11
Crude Oil Pipelines in West Siberia
Pipeline diameter
??,1,020-1,220 mm
-530-820 mm
Shaim b'
To Perm'
and Po/otsk
- To Perm'
Yurgamysh
?To Omer evsk
- To Kuybyshev
To Ufa
0
Surgut
Major
West Siberian
Oilfields
Sainotlor
N hnevartovsk
condensate
pipeline
Tobol'sk
Omsk
To Central Asia
Aleksandrovskoye
Novosibirsk
Anzhero-
Sudzhensk
To Achinsk
and Angarsk
634004 4-83
Rail and Water Shipment. West Siberian rail and
water shipments probably could provide only limited
help in the event of a shortfall in pipeline carrying
capacity. The Soviets have already announced that
the volume of crude oil to be transported by rail for
the USSR as a whole will decline from 35 million tons
per year in 1980 to 25-28 million tons per year in
1985. In the oil-producing areas of West Siberia there
is only one rail line, which connects Surgut and
Tobol'sk. It is already heavily taxed, carrying supplies
to the Middle Ob' oilfields and the developing
Urengoy gasfields. By 1984 the railroad probably will
have little or no excess capacity for hauling oil out of
West Siberia. Because the rivers are frozen over for
more than half the year, water transport would
provide only limited help. In 1981, for the USSR as a
whole, only 12 million tons of oil were transported by
river transport.
Secret
Construction Practices and
Pipeline Serviceability
The quality of Soviet pipeline construction is below
Western standards. Proper welding and insulating
procedures are often sacrificed to simply getting the
pipe laid and moving on to the next section.
Soviet
performance in pipe cleaning, taping, and backfilling
is unacceptable by Western standards, and the overall
job would be rejected by an average pipeline company
in the West. Nonetheless, Soviet pipelines carry vast
amounts of oil?albeit with more frequent repair and
shorter operating life than is common in the West.
The increasing age of Soviet pipelines and the effects
of shoddy construction may force the USSR to re-
place significant lengths of pipeline in the next 10
years.
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A Miscalculation?
The Aleksandrovsk?Anzhero-Sudzhensk pipeline,
which is 1,220 mm in diameter and has been extend-
ed to Irkutsk, serves an area with a refining capacity
of 31.5 million tons per year-24 million tons for the
refineries at Achinsk and Angarsk, and about 7.5
million tons (by rail transshipment)for the refinery at
Komsomol'sk. Another 17 million tons are transport-
ed westward to Omsk through a 720-mm pipeline.
Thus, the currently usable throughput capacity for
the Aleksandovsk?Anzhero-Sudzhensk line is 48.5
million tons per year?only about 60 percent of the
maximum for a 1,220-mm pipeline.
This pipeline, which went into service in 1972, proba-
bly has never operated at full capacity.
by 1979 only four of a
planned 10 pumping stations had been built; in 1981,
six stations were operational. Additional pumping
stations are still being planned for this pipeline, 10
years after it began operation.
When the Aleksandrovsk?Anzhero-Sudzhensk pipe-
line was completed in 1972, Soviet press reports
announced plans?not subsequently implemented?
to extend it to the Pacific port of Nakhodka and to
build a refinery there. Long-range plans for producing
500-800 million tons of crude oil per year in West
Siberia had surfaced before 1972, and the pipeline
extension may have been intended to permit the
export of surplus crude oil to countries in the Far
East. (In 1980, India imported only 1.7 million tons
of Soviet crude oil, 1.2 million tons of which were
shipped from the Black Sea ports. Japan imported
only 500,000 tons, probably from Sakhalin Island.)
These earlier hopes may explain why the Soviets
built a large-diameter pipeline leading to an area that
by 1982 had only 48.5 million tons per year of outlet
capacity via pipeline.
Unlike large-diameter gas pipeline construction, for
which Western pipe, ball valves, and pipelayers have
been essential, oil pipeline construction in the Soviet
Union does not depend on Western equipment and
15
materials. Soviet and East European industries have
been able to furnish minimum requirements for these
items and have been striving to upgrade the capabili-
ties and quality of their products. The Soviets, never-
theless, still prefer quality Western products for many 25X1
uses. (See appendix C for comments on selected
categories of equipment and materials.)
Despite the intrinsic quality difference between Soviet
and Western products, when the Soviets use Western
products the difference in effectiveness is seldom as
great as might be expected. For example, if the
superior Western pipe coating and wrapping materials
are applied incorrectly, they will do little more to
prevent corrosion than lower quality Soviet materials.
Western welding equipment may be capable of mak-
ing perfect welds on pipe quickly and with minimum
consumption of welding rod; but by using more
manpower and welding rod, crews can make service-
able welds with Soviet equipment.
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Deficiencies in Soviet pipeline construction are widely
noted by Soviet observers; many examples can be 25X1
cited. In 1978, a 30-km pipeline being tested with
water in the Mangyshlak region of Central Asia burst
in 39 places. A Soviet emigre, an engineer, reported
that, on the average, one or two welded joints out of
10 had a leak that required rewelding. The Surgut-to-
Perm' section of the Surgut-to-Polotsk pipeline was
operating in July 1979 but in November still had not
been accepted by the State Commission for Accepting
Final Projects as completed?because of "defects in
the welding operations." In the same section, river 25X1
crossings were made with one pipeline rather than the
required two?the second being left "for later."
In regard to insulation, B. Shcherbina, Minister of
Construction of Oil and Gas Industry Enterprises, 25X1
noted in a Soviet journal article that it "was no secret 25)(1
that corrosion inflicts more losses on the nation 1
economy than any other natural consequence."
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On many of the pipelines in Central Asia, where the
relatively high conductance of saline soils aggravates
corrosion, insulating coating and wrapping material
were not applied uniformly and completely. Cathodic
protection, consequently, was not very effective.' For
example, the crude oil pipeline between Uzen',
Gur'yev, and Kuybyshev (1,020 mm in diameter and
1,500 km in length) lasted less than 10 years, and a
replacement line had to be built in 1977. A study
made in 1977 of the durability of pipeline insulation
in Central Asia showed insulation failure in 34 per-
cent of the places examined, after only five to six
years of the pipeline's operation. Of these failures,
12 percent were directly attributable to improper
application of insulation
In view of the relatively low technical quality of
Soviet pipe; welding, coating, and wrapping opera-
tions; and pipelaying practices, we believe the service
life of oil pipelines is shorter in the USSR than in the
United States, where pipelines are built with a life
expectancy of 20 years. According to a 1982 Petro-
Studies report, the actual service life for steel pipe in
temperate areas of the USSR is 11 years when coated
with bituminous coating and 17 years when field-
wrapped with tape. In the harsher climate of West
Siberia and Central Asia, the service life would be
less.
At the end of 1980 only about 22 percent of the
USSR pipeline system (some 13,000 km) was 20 years
old or older. Some of this pipe has undoubtedly been
replaced. By 1995, roughly 75 percent of the present
pipeline system (about 46,000 km) will be 20 years old
or older (figure 12). Replacement of some of these
pipelines will not be required, because they are
located in regions where oil production is declining.
Some pipe will require replacement, however, and the
investment for reconstruction could be substantial if
sufficient new oil formations are developed, necessi-
tating continued use of these pipelines.
The likelihood of corrosion is increased if there is a difference in
electrical charge between the pipe and ground, because this leads to
a current flow and an ion exchange. Cathodic protection, which
reverses the current flow by creating a higher electric potential at
various points alongside the pipeline route through induced current,
can afford protection from corrosion?if the pipe is well insulated.
If any surface is left exposed, however, the corrosion that would
have occurred along the pipe is concentrated at one place, and
failure occurs more quickly.
Secret
Figure 12
USSR: Length of Crude Oil Pipeline Network
at Least 20 Years Old
Kilometers
1975
80
589261 4-83
85
90
95
2000
Seasonal Construction in West Siberia
The Soviet press has emphasized the necessity of
year-round pipeline construction in-West Siberia, but
in general it is still limited to about eight months.6
Construction in swampy areas during the summer has
been achieved only on a small scale. Summer pipeline
construction in West Siberia is mostly limited to
construction in hard ground. According to Soviet
newspaper reports, most pipelaying will continue to
occur when the ground is frozen during October
through May.
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Since 1972, pipeline construction during the summer
constituted roughly 4 percent of the annual total in
West Siberia. Expenses for summer construction are
three to four times as great as for winter construction.
The Soviets still use the summer season primarily for
building settlements and bases, for welding linepipe
into jointed lengths, and for repair and maintenance
of pipelaying equipment. The construction rates
achieved in the winter season depend partly on how
well they performed the summer tasks.
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Appendix A
USSR: Pipeline Network
Origin
Terminus
Diameter
(millimeters)
Length
(kilometers)
Capacity
(million tons
per year)
Year
Completed
(approximate)
Caucasus Region
Baku
Batumi.
200
883
2
1906
Khadyzhensk
Krasnodar
200
108
2
Pre-1917
Maykop
Khadyzhensk
NA
50
NA
Pre-1917
Makhachkala
Groznyy #1
200
162
2
1914
Kaluzhskaya
Afipskaya
125
25
?
Pre-1917
Patara Shiraki
Kukheti
250
64
2
Pre-1927
Mozdok
Malgobek
250
25
2
1935
Khadyzhensk
Tuapse
273
50
2
1928
Makhachkala
Groznyy *2
300
162
3
1936
Malgobek
Groznyy
250
120
2
1940
Patara Shiraki
Kachreti
200
50
2
1940
Izerbash
Makhachkala
200
63
2
1952
Keslerovo
Krymsh
NA
24
NA
1953
Goragorskiy
Groznyy
200
63
2
1940
Ostrov Peschanyy
Baku
305
7
3
1957
Ostrov Artema
Baku
305
43
3
1957
Ostrov Artema
Zyrya
375
20
3
1961
Karabulak
Groznyy #1
NA
90
NA
NA
Karabulak
Groznyy #2
NA
90
NA
NA
Ali-Bayramly
Baku
NA
134
NA
NA
Neftyanyye Kamni
Baku #1
250
100
2
1961
Neftyanyye Kamni
Baku #2
NA
100
2
1961
Neftyanyye Kamni
Ostrov Zhiloy
375
20
3
1962
Ostrov Zhiloy
Zyrya
250
20
2
1962
Ozek Suat
Groznyy #1
305
200
3
1955
Ozek Suat
Groznyy #2
530
200
6-8
1961
Tikhoretsk
Tuapse
530
240
6-8
1962
Tikhoretsk
Novorossiysk #1
530
236
6-8
1963
Kashuri
Batumi
720
234
14-18
1968
Tikhoretsk
Malgobek b
530
600
6-8
1969
Tikhoretsk
Novorossiysk #2
NA
236
NA
NA
Tikhoretsk
Novorossiysk #3
820
236
22-26
1974
Samgori
Batumi
NA
401
NA
1980
Tikhoretsk
Groznyy
820
600
22-26
1980
Ozek Suat
Groznyy #3
530
150
6-8
1968
Keslerovo
Krymsk
NA
40
NA
NA
Karskoye
Novorossiysk
NA
75
NA
NA
Krymsk
Novorossiysk
NA
15
NA
NA
A fipskiy
Novorossiysk
NA
80
NA
NA
a Pipeline was reported by Soviet press article as operating at one-
third capacity.
b Flow was reversed in the late 1970s.
19 Secret
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP08501350R000401170002-3
Secret
Origin
Terminus
Diameter
(millimeters)
Length
(kilometers)
Capacity
(million tons
per year)
Year
Completed
(approximate)
Friendship Pipeline System
Stryy
L'vov
150
65
1
Pre-WW II
Stryy
Drogobych
150
25
1
Pre-WW II
Dolina
Drogobych
250
60
2.5
1962
Ostashkovichi
Rechitsa
325
34
3
NA
Rechitsa
Mozyr'
325
200
3
NA
Kuybyshev
Unecha #1
1,020
1,275
42-50
1964
Unecha
Mozyr' #1
820
289
22-26
1964
Mozyr'
Brest #1
630
475
10-12
1963
Mozyr'
Uzhgorod #1
630
726
10-12
1963
Unecha
Polotsk #1
720
375
14-18
1965
Polotsk
Ventspils
630
473
10-22
1967
Kuybyshev
Unecha #2
1,220
1,275
70-78
1972
Unecha
Mozyr' #2
1,020
289
42-50
1972
Mozyr'
Brest #2
820
475
22-26
1971
Mozyr'
Uzhgorod #2
720
14-18
14-18
1971
Unecha
Polotsk #2
530
450
6-8
1973
Polotsk
Mazeikiai
720
726
14-18
1978
Ukraine?South Central Region
Astrakhan
Saratov c
273
655
3
1944
Glinsk
Kremenchug
NA
125
NA
NA
Kuybyshev
Saratov
530
443
6-8
1955
Zhirnovsk
Volgograd
300
300
3
1957
Kuybyshev
Tikhoretsk
820
1,280
22-26
1974
Kremenchug
Khersen
NA
355
NA
1972
Michurinsk
Kremenchug
530
753
6-8
1974
Lisichansk
Tikhoretsk
630
472
10-12
1974
Kuybyshev
Lisichansk
1,020
1,089
42-50
1977
Lisichansk
Kremenchug
NA
400
NA
1977
Snigirevka
Odessa
NA
227
NA
1977
Moscow-Leningrad Region
AI'met'yevsk
Gorkiy #1
530
577
6-8
1961
AI'met'yevsk
Gorkiy #2
720
577
14-18
1961
Gorkiy
Ryazan' #1
720
394
14-18
1961
Ryazan'
Moscow
530
198
6-8
1961
Gorkiy
Yaroslavl' #1
720
358
22-26
1962
Yaroslavl'
Kirishi
720
524
14-18
1969
Usinsk
Ukhta
720
410
14-18
1972
Verkhne Gluboshchorskoye
Usinsk
NA
165
NA
NA
Dzer field
Ukhta
NA
NA
NA
1976
Gorkiy
Ryazan' #2
NA
394
NA
1970
AI'met'yevsk
Gorkiy #3
1,020
577
22-26
1970
Ukhta
Yaroslavl'
820
1,130
22-26
1973
Yaroslavl'
Moscow
720
245
14-18
1975
Perm'
Gorkiy
1,220
820
70-78
1981
c Pipeline reported in Soviet press article as out of service.
Secret 20
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP08501350R000401170002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP08501350R000401170002-3
Secret
Origin
Terminus
Diameter
(millimeters)
Length
(kilometers)
Capacity
(million tons
per year)
Year
Completed
(approximate)
Gorkiy
Yaroslavl' #2
1,020
358
42-50
1980
Yaroslavl'
Polotsk
1,020
800
42-50
1981
Volga-Urals
Naryshevo
Buguruslan (RR)
NA
NA
NA
1949
Romashkino
Kuybyshev
530
241
6-8
1954
Karabash
Romashkino #1
250
20
2
NA
Karabash
Romashkino #2
350
20
3
NA
AI'met'yevsk
Klyavlino (RR)
250
98
2
1963
AI'met'yevsk
Klyavlino #2 (RR)
350
98
3
1956
Minibayevo
AI'met'yevsk
350
25
3
NA
Minibayevo
AI'met'yevsk #2
500
25
6-8
NA
Minibayevo
Karabash
350
20
3
NA
Krotovka
Kuybyshev
530
86
6-8
1953
Pilyugino
Buguruslan
NA
30
NA
1953
Karabash
Bavly #1
350
58
3
1953
Bavly
Kuybyshev #1
530
314
6-8
1953
Bulgul'ma
Subkhankulovo
NA
65
NA
1954
Subkhankulovo
Ufa #1
350
156
3
1947
Subkhankulovo
Ufa #2
350
156
3
1953
Subkhankulovo
Ufa #3
529
156
6-8
1954
Zol'noye
Kuybyshev
NA
43
NA
1947
Yablonovo
Kuybyshev
NA
35
NA
1949
AI'met'yevsk
Aznakayevo #1
530
45
6-8
1956
Armeeyevsk
Aznakayevo #2
720
45
14-18
1960
Aznakayevo
Subkhankulovo #1
530
50
14-18
1956
Naryshevo
Subkhankulovo
NA
NA
NA
1953
Naryshevo
Bavly
NA
NA
NA
1953
Bavly
Kuybyshev #2
300
314
1
1950
Subkhankulovo
Ufa #4
530
156
6-8
1954
Aznakayevo
Subkhankulovo #2
500
50
6-8
1960
Perm'
AI'met'yevsk
377
500
4
1955
Loba novo
Perm'
NA
22
NA
NA
Alkeyevo
Sulezevo
NA
12
NA
1957
Suleyevo
AI'met'yevsk
NA
16
NA
1957
Chubovka
Krasny Yar
NA
25
NA
1957
Krasny Yar
Zolnoye
NA
52
NA
1957
Ala kayevka
Chubovka
NA
12
NA
1956
Sosnovka
Pokhvistnevo
NA
40
NA
1957
Bavly
Subkhankulovo #1
350
40
4
1957
Karabash
Bavly #2
530
58
6-8
1957
Naryshevo
Urussu
NA
15
NA
1954
Subkhankulovo
Ufa #5
720
156
14-18
1957
Subkhankulovo
Shkapovo
530
96
6-8
1956
Shkapovo
Salavat
530
146
6-8
1955
Tanypskoye
Chernuska
NA
30
NA
1958
21 Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP08501350R000401170002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP08501350R000401170002-3
Secret
Origin
Terminus
Diameter
(millimeters)
Length
(kilometers)
Capacity
(million tons
per year)
Year
Completed
(approximate)
Bavly
Subkhankulovo #2
820
40
22-26
1957
Bavly
Kuybyshev #3
300
314
3
1965
Pokrovka
Kuybyshev
NA
75
NA
1962
Pokrovka
Syzran' #1
350
100
3
1962
Kaleshobka
Kuybyshev
529
100
6-8
1963
Mukhanovo
Kuybyshev #1
NA
115
NA
1963
Mukhanovo
Kuybyshev #2
NA
115
NA
1963
Chernushka
Osa
NA
100
NA
1963
Ishimbay
Orsk
530
333
6-8
1960
Kaltasy
Salavat
700
324
14-18
1961
Kaltasy
Ufa
300
280
3
1958
Naberezhnyy Chelny
AI'met'yevsk #1
350
100
4
1963
Naberezhnyy Chelny
AI'met'yevsk #2
530
108
6-8
NA
Chekmagush
Aznakayevo
NA
134
NA
, 1968
Chernushka
Kaltasy
NA
75
NA
1967
Osa
Perm'
530
108
6-8
1968
Severokamsk
Perm'
NA
60
NA
1963
Subkhankulovo
Ufa #6
800
156
14-18
1962
Krasnokamsk
Perm'
NA
42
NA
1963
Yarino
Perm'
NA
66
NA
1963
Kamenyy Log
Perm' #1
NA
70
NA
1963
Buguruslan
Kuybyshev
530
200
6-8
1968
Subkhankulovo
Kuybyshev
820
350
22-26
1974
Pokrovka
Syzran' #2
350
100
4
1974
Kaltasy
Ufa
NA
110
NA
1976
Naberezhnyy Chelny
AI'met'yevsk #3
NA
100
NA
1971
Kaltasy
AI'met'yevsk #1
NA
240
NA
1971
Kaltasy
AI'met'yevsk #2
NA
240
NA
1975
Kiyengop
Naberezhnyy Chelny
NA
NA
NA
1978
Kamenyy Log
Perm' #2
NA
70
NA
1971
Ishevsk
Gremikhino
NA
60
NA
1980
West Siberia
Omsk
Ufa #1
530
1,149
6-8
1955
Omsk
Ufa #2
720
1,149
14-18
1960
Shaim
Tyumen'
530
410
6-8
1965
Ust'-Balyk
Omsk
1,020
1,026
42-50
1967
Nizhnevartovsk
Surgut
720
252
14-18
1969
Aleksandrovsk
Anzhero-Sudzhensk
1,220
850
70-78
1972
Nizhnevartovsk
Aleksandrovsk #1
NA
40
NA
NA
Nizhnevartovsk
AI'met'yevsk
1,220
2,119
70-78
1973
Nizhnevartovsk
Aleksandrovsk #2
NA
40
NA
1974
Secret 22
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP08501350R000401170002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP08501350R000401170002-3
Secret
Origin
Terminus
Diameter
(millimeters)
Length
(kilometers)
Capacity
(million tons
per year)
Year
Completed
(approximate)
Var-yegan
Nizhnevartovsk
NA
150
NA
NA
Vat-yegan
Lokosov
NA
100
NA
NA
Vakh
Nizhnevartovsk
NA
98
NA
1975
Agan
Vatinsk # 1
NA
50
NA
1975
Agan
Vatinsk # 2
NA
50
NA
NA
Belozerskoye
Nizhnevartovsk
NA
65
NA
1976
Kholmogory
Surgut
NA
250
NA
1976
Nizhnevartovsk
Kuybyshev
1,220
2,263
70-78
1976
Sovetskoye
Nizhnevartovsk
NA
61
NA
NA
Vasyugan
Raskino
NA
150
NA
1978
Surgut
Perm'
1,220
1,250
70-78
1979
Ur'yevskiye
Yuzhnyy Balyk
NA
180
NA
1980
Lyantor
Ust'-Balyk
NA
150
NA
NA
Tyumen'
Yurgamysh
530
250
6-8
1981
East Siberia
Omsk
Irkutsk
720
2,295
14-18
1964
Anzhero-Sudzhensk
Irkutsk
1,020
1,478
42-50
1980
Soviet Far East
Okha
Moskalvo
300
29
2
1942
Okha
Zaliv Urkt
250
20
2
1937
Ekhabi
Okha
150
15
1
1937
Okha
Sofiysk
325
300
3
1947
Sofiysk
Komsomol'sk
325
324
3
1955
Sabo
Okha
NA
52
NA
1962
Ekhabi
Zaliv Urkt
150
14
1
1937
Mongi
Pogobi
NA
NA
NA
1978
Okha
Komsomol'sk
NA
630
NA
1978
Central Asia
Koschagyl
Makat #1
250
120
2
1934
Kulsary
Koschagyl
200
20
2
1935
Makat
Orsk
235
709
2
1936
Koschagyl
Makat #2
NA
120
NA
1957
Prorva
Koschagyl
305
125
3
NA
Munaly
Koschagyl
NA
60
NA
1962
Barsa Gelmes
Vyshka
305
25
3
NA
Kum Dag
Vyshka
305
25
3
NA '
Vyshka
Belek #1
305
100
3
NA
Okarem
Okarem Sea Terminal
305
20
3
NA
Kotur-Tepe
Cheleken
305
100
3
NA
Kotur-Tepe
Belek #1
305
100
3
NA
Kotur-Tepe
Belek #2
305
100
3
NA
Belek
Krasnovodsk #1
305
100
3
NA
Belek
Krasnovodsk #2
305
100
3
NA
23 Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP08501350R000401170002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP08501350R000401170002-3
Secret
Origin Terminus Diameter Length Capacity Year
(millimeters) (kilometers) (million tons Completed
per year) (approximate)
Belek Krasnovodsk #3 305 100 3 NA
Uzen' Shevchenko 530 142 6-8 1966
Kenkiyak Bayganin NA 20 NA 1967
Uzen'
Uzen'
Vyshka
Kuybyshev #1 a
Kuybyshev #2
Belek #2
1,020
1,020
NA
1,506
1,506
100
60
50
NA
1970
1978
1976
Omsk
Pavlodar
1,020 456 42-50 1977
Tauchik
Shevchenko
NA 80 NA 1979
d This pipeline is now out of service or it is being used to transport
water.
Secret 24
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP08501350R000401170002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP08501350R000401170002-3
Secret
Appendix B
Throughput for Two
Siberian Oil Pipelines
We estimate that the maximum throughput for the
1,220-mm pipelines from Samotlor to AI'met'yevsk
and from Samotlor to Kuybyshev is about 86 million
tons per year.' This is based on 70-km spacing
between pumping stations (the average observed over
the first 900 km of their routes) and a maximum
allowable operating pressure (MAOP) for the pipe of
about 54 atmospheres (atm).
The 54-atmosphere estimate is based on:
? Soviet monographs on oil pipeline transport, which
list the operating pressure for 1,220-mm oil pipe-
lines as between 42.5 and 51 atm.
? An article in a Soviet oil pipeline journal, which
stated that the steel (17G1S) used for these pipelines
would permit an operating pressure of 48 atm.
? A US estimate that such steel could operate at 63
atm with good welding and at 50 atm with poor
welding. With about average welding, the MAOP
would be about 56 atm.
? Comparison of the test pressure for 17G1S steel
with that for Sumitomo pipe, which is designed to
operate at 75 atm but is tested at 100 atm. If the
'The estimate of 86 million tons per year does not take into account
the constraint imposed by Soviet pumps-11,450 cubic meters per
hour, or 83 million tons per year.
? Yield strength is that force per unit area at which plastic
deformation begins; tensile strength is that at which failure or
rupture occurs.
25
Sumitomo ratio (.75) between operating pressure
and test pressure is applied to the cited 17G1S test
pressure of 67 atm, the safe operating pressure is
approximately 50 atm.
? The fact that one pipeline is already 10 years old
and the other seven.
Secret
25X1
25X1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDP08501350R000401170002-3
Secret
Appendix C
The Role of Western Equipment
in Soviet Oil Pipeline Construction
For the construction of crude oil pipelines, there is no
single piece of imported equipment that the USSR
absolutely needs. But without Western pipelayers,
bulldozers, surge-control valves, and insulating mate-
rials, the pipelines' construction would take longer
(especially in West Siberia), their operation would be
less efficient, and their economic life would be
shorter.
Pipelayers
Emigres have said that Western pipelayers are one of
the items most necessary in Soviet pipeline construc-
tion. A pipelayer is usually a crawler tractor with a
side-boom for lifting pipe. Under Soviet operating
conditions, attrition rates for pipelayers and bulldoz-
ers are higher than in the West. Poor operating and
maintenance practices, and the use of less skilled
personnel as operators, generally shorten their operat-
ing life. Difficult climate and terrain also take a
severe toll, especially in the northern areas. Soviet
pipelayers have had a limited load-handling capacity,
which has limited their effectiveness for handling
large-diameter pipe (a Soviet official once commented
that it took three Soviet pipelayers to do the job of one
US machine). However, a new Soviet pipelayer, which
is said to have load-handling capability comparable to
that of Western machines, has recently been placed in
service. We have no information on its efficiency and
durability.
To meet the needs of the past decade's massive oil and
gas pipeline programs, Moscow has purchased large
numbers of pipelayers from the West since 1972.
Caterpillar has shipped nearly 2,300 pipelayers and
tractors to the Soviet Union, and International Har-
vester and Fiat Allis together have sold perhaps half
that number. The Japanese Komatsu firm has sold
more than 2,300 tractors and pipelayers, of which
nearly 1,400 were for 1981-82 delivery.
With pipes of 1,020-mm and 1,220-mm diameter,
older Soviet pipelayers supposedly have sufficient lift
capacity, but they have not been able to maintain the
required chassis stability. To remedy this situation,
27
the Soviets are producing a more powerful and stable
pipelayer at the Sterlitamak assembly plant in the
Bashkir ASSR. The new unit (TG-502) is designed for
laying 1,220-mm- and 1,420-mm-diameter pipe. Se-
ries production began in 1980, and by 1982 more than
450 units were to have been produced. By the end of
1985, the Soviets plan to have produced about 1,700
of the TG-502s. 25X1
The Soviets have reported that the TG-502 has a 25X1
nominal lift capacity of 50 tons, which is greater than
that of the Caterpillar 594 but considerably less than
that of the Fiat-Allis FP-120. For greater stability,
they have increased the chassis width and the width of
the caterpillar tracks to dimensions comparable to
those of the FP-120. The TG-502's height (measured
from the ground to the top of the cabin) is less than
the height of either the Caterpillar 594 or the Ko-
matsu D-355. With its low center of gravity and wider
frame, the TG-502 should have both the lift capacity
and the stability to handle 1,220-mm- and 1,420-mm-
diameter pipe. 25X1
Soviet pipelayers have broken down much more fre-
quently than Western pipelayers when used in West
Siberia, primarily because:
? The metallurgy for critical engine parts (pistons,
cylinders, bearings) is inadequate and leads to high25x1
engine wear. High wear shortens engine life and
causes undependable performance.
the Soviets do not produce adequate 25X1
quantities of "Arctic lubricants" with pour points
low enough to flow in extreme cold. To compensate,
they thin some of their oils with kerosene. This
procedure is somewhat effective until the kerosene
evaporates and the oil begins to congeal, resulting in
poor lubrication and accelerated wear
Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/04: CIA-RDPO8S01350R000401170002-3
Secret
Excavators
For digging the pipeline trench, the Soviets use both
rotary excavators and backhoes. Their excavating and
bucket capacities are comparable to those of Western
equipment.
the Soviets produce well-
designed excavators that work well in non-Arctic
conditions. In Siberia, however, these excavators have
the same basic problem as Soviet pipelayers: engine
failure due to poor-quality metallurgy and lubricants.
To compensate, the Soviets usually assign 14 excava-
tors to each large-diameter pipelaying brigade?about
twice the number assigned to a Western pipelaying
crew.
The Soviets have developed two excavators for large-
diameter pipe: the ETR-231 for 1,220-mm pipe and
the ETR-253 for 1,420-mm pipe. They say that the
ETR-253 is capable of excavating rocky and perma-
frost soils. The Soviet press has recently announced
the development and production of a new rotary
excavator, the ETR-254, which is supposedly even
more capable than the ETR-253.
For excavation in swampy areas, the Soviets use
single-bucket backhoes. The Soviet backhoes have
bucket capacities almost comparable to those of the
Caterpillar Model 235 and Komatsu PC-300 (1.25
and 1.54 m3, respectively).
Where the ground is frozen to such a depth that it
cannot be broken by a ripper moving ahead of the
excavator, the Soviets plan to use an excavator, the
ETTs-208D, that cuts slits into the ground for explo-
sive charges. Serial production of this excavator has
begun, and the Soviets plan to be producing about 100
of these excavators per year by 1984.
Insulating Materials
Soviet insulating materials for pipelines and the tech-
nology used for applying the materials do not satisfac-
torily protect the pipe from corrosion. This deficiency
does not delay construction or affect initial operation
of pipelines, but it will increase the cost of mainte-
nance and the requirements for pipeline repair and
replacement in the future.
Secret
When insulating pipe at the factory, the Soviets use a
polyethylene coating mixed with an epoxy resin.
When insulating pipe in the field, the Soviets primari-
ly use a polymer tape. They are unable, however, to
produce a tape with the adhesive tension characteris-
tics necessary to withstand extreme heat and cold.
The Soviets have used Japanese-manufactured tape
but were dissatisfied. They would prefer to use
US-produced tape, which adheres well under tension,
and have taken steps to acquire it.
Pipe Requirements
The total large-diameter pipe requirements for the
Pavlodar-to-Chimkent and Kholmogory-to-Kuyby-
shev pipelines (the only large-diameter oil pipelines
planned for 1981-85) would be about 1.5 million tons.
This requirement is relatively small?because pipe
used for oil transmission does not need to be as high in
quality as pipe used for gas transmission?and the
USSR should have no problem producing enough.
28
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,
Pumping Stations
The Soviet Union appears to have few problems in
constructing pumping stations for its crude oil pipe-
lines and keeping them supplied. A minor problem
may. exist in the construction of surge-control valve
systems.
To build the pumping stations more quickly, the
Soviets have begun using prefabricated modular units.
Reductions in construction time from three years to
six months have been reported. These are isolated
examples, however. Soviet oil industry monographs
list the norm for construction of a head pumping
station with a yearly throughput capacity of 28
million tons of crude oil as 24 months; for an interme-
diate pumping station with a yearly throughput ca-
pacity of 13 million tons, it is 14 months.
Analysis of Soviet technical journals shows that the
Soviets use centrifugal pumps with electric motor
drives. They manufacture a series of pumps with
throughputs ranging from 125 in3 per hour (the
HM-125) to 10,000 m3 per hour (the HM-10,000).
The HM-10,000 is large enough to propel the maxi-
mum throughput of a 1,220-mm-diameter pipeline, 83
million tons per year.
Attempts are being made to develop pumps with an
even greater throughput capacity. In 1981 the Sumy
Pump Plant manufactured, on a trial basis, four
pumps with throughput capacities of 12,500 m3 per
hour. Serial production of these pumps could enable
the Soviets to increase the operating capacity of their
1,220-mm pipeline. The pipeline at the discharge side
of the pump, however, would require greater strength
in order to cope with the greater internal pressures
In 1979 the Soviets purchased 40 surge-control valve
systems from a US manufacturer, and in 1980 they
were seeking to purchase seven more. These devices
are usually located at the output side of pumping
stations or at low elevations where the internal line
pressures increase.
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Figure 13
Major Crude Oil Pipelines in the Soviet Union
NORWAY
DENMA
FED. REP.
of GERMANY
SWEDEN
Baltic Sea
Ventspils c1,1
Mazet
Cfsr) East Siberian
Sea
Figure
Barents Sea
LAND
Figu
Brest
Kara Sea
Laptev Sea
slack
IFigure 7the
06'
remenchug
Moscow
Ryazan
.Noril'sk
Magadan
Michurins
11.arlym
.Urengoy
'met yevs
OVOrOSSly
rals
fields
West Siberian
Oilfields
izhnevartovsk
Yakutsk
Sea of Okhotsk
Tikhor
olgogra
Tyumen'
Tehorsk
Stavropol'
Orenburg
Yurgamysh.
Figures
3andll
Figure
TURKEY
Batumi
-Suet
trakhan'
oznyy
Makhachkate
Caspian
Sea
Anzhero-
Sudzhens
Achtnsk
Figure 8
vchen o
rtodar
Karaganda
Astara
Krasnovods
Yenisey
Lake
Angarak Baika
Irkutsk
MONGOLIA
Latin
Balkhash
CHINA
? Ashkhabad
ChimkeM
Chardzhou
Tashkent
Sea of Japan
Major crude oil pipeline
The United States Government has not recognized
e incorporation of Estonia. Latvia. and Lithuania
o the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
not necessarily authoritative.
CHINA
North
Korea
500 Kilometers
0 500 Miles
634066 4-83
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