MEETING OF 6 MAY BETWEEN A/DCI AND REPS STOKES AND HYDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000400110003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 6, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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iv I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Director of Congressional Affairs
6 May 1987
NOTE FOR: The Acting Director
FROM: Dave Gries
SUBJECT: MFR for Last Stokes/Hyde Meeting
Attached is my MFR for the meeting.
Attachment
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6 May 1987
OCA 87-1979
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting of 6 May Between A/DCI and Reps. Stokes
and Hyde
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Stokes commented that all other matters between the
Committee and the Agency appeared up to date.
The A/DCI provided a copy of our letter objecting to public
testimony by Agency employees. Stokes and Hyde listened
sympathetically. Stokes asked whether the A/DCI meant to
protect senior officials such as George and Clarridge. After
learning that he did, Stokes indicated understanding, but did
not tip his hand on what he would do about it.
The A/DCI also handed over a copy of his letter to Senators
Boren and Cohen regarding GAO's interest in auditing the Agency
and a possible SSCI response of setting up its own independent
auditing capability. Stokes read the letter and listened
without comment.
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t ? 7
The A/DCI also noted the personnel reduction coming out of
HPSCI mark up. He said the 1/3 cut in requested CIA slots might
have an impact on our effort to improve security, since many of
those positions were for security personnel. Stokes said that
the Committee did not want to cut into security requirements
provided they were justified. He would take a close look at it
during conference.
The A/DCI drew their attention to recent analytical items
about the possibility of hostilities between India and China.
The A/DCI next discussed the verification issue and the
position he had laid out to the SSCI and the policy community
that the Administration was oversimplifying the verification
issue somewhat.
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Tom Latimer and Tom Smeeton also attended ?the meeting for
the Committee. I was also present.
ries
Director o ngressional Affairs
NOTE: #1 (on page 2): D/OCA wrote MFR on
#2 : has called Tom this date (13 May 87) to offer
to furnish the Estimate. Tom is to get back with her.
The ball is in Tam's court.
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STAT
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STAT
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LK I? ?/
6 May 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting with Reps. Stokes and Hyde (6May87)
The following subjects were discussed:
?
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1.
We reviewed recent correspondence and agreed that
to date. I again explained why I was holding off
their 4 March letter on counterterrorism reprogramming.
everything was up
on a response to
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2.
I raised the question of the appearance in public
session of DO
officers and gave them a copy of the letter to Chairman Hamilton.
Stokes seemed amenable but asked if that would include Clair George
and Dewey Clarridge. When I said yes,
his enthusiasm noticeably
faded.
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3.
I brought them up to date on action
in CIA and shared with them my lette
on the Hill on LAO investigations
n Boren. I read
their reaction as still supportive.
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4.
I raised two budget issues -- cutting
the reserve
and a cut in our
request for additional personnel. I
don't think we will get much on
either issue.
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5.
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6.
7.
I reviewed our concerns about India
and China.
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8.
I briefly described our aftview of monitoring
an
INF agreement.
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CC: .D/OCA
Robert . Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Cl By Signer
nrrT AATID
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DISTRIBUTION BY ES/7 May 87
Orig - Dir, DCl/DDCI Exec Staff
I - A/DCI
I - 0/DCI
1 - EXDIR
I - DDI
I - DDO
I - D/OCA
Other Dissem
Para 1 - COMPT
Para 2 - OGC
Para 3 - IG
Para 4 - COMPT & DDA
Para S - DDA
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? ?
4 May 1987
OCA 87-1829
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Di
FROM: David D. Grie
Director of Cong essional Affairs
SUBJECT: Your Meeting on 6 May with Representatives
Stokes and Hyde
Your regular meeting with Representatives Stokes (D., OH)
and Hyde (R., IL) of HPSCI is set for 6 May at 0900 in H 405,
The Capitol. Their principal staffers, Tom Latimer and Tom
Smeeton, will accompany them; I will be with you.
Suggested agenda topics include:
-- Agency objection to the appearance of officers
other than the DCI or DDCI, as public witnesses
at the Iran/Contra hearings. See the attached letter
for talking points.
GAO. You could update them on the SSCI's efforts to re-
sist GAO audits of the Agency and be sure they are still
on board. Attached is your recent letter to Boren and
Cohen, which I suggest you furnish to Stokes and Hyde
(Sven has no objection). Since it was Stokes who
obtained Gray's agreement not to act on his GAO request
until we had a chance to brief him, you could tell him
that the briefing is scheduled this week. See item from
Weekly Report.
Counterterrorism reprogramming requests. You could
remind Stokes that we are deliberately delaying our
response to the Committee's 4 March letter on counter-
terrorism reprogramming. You determined that our
response should await the confirmation of the new
Director, since it is imperative that the new Director
be comfortable with the policy.
Personnel policies. As you know, the Committee staff,
and at least some Members, remain skeptical of the
sweeping nature of the proposed changes. You might
wish to update Stokes and Hyde on the exploratory
nature of our studies.
-- Facility visits. The four new Members (Wilson, Kennelly,
Lunoren, and Shuster) are scheduled to tour
We welcome--and encourage--such
, visits here and abroad and wish more Members would
participate.
. CONNitiTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
Public hearings on HR 1013 (Stokes/Boland Bill to
mandate 48 hour notice of Findings) are scheduled to
resume on 3 or 4 June. The Administration's witness is
yet to be determined, but in view of the above princi-
pal, you might be tapped. You should be prepared to
respond on this subject if they raise it; there is
nothing' to gain in raising it ydurself. Draft testimony
is attached.
-- Cut of the Reserve by 60%. HPSCI accepted Kastenmeier's
amendment cutting the Reserve. You could again stress
the importance of the Reserve to the Agency and to any
administration. We understand Stokes supported
Kastenmeier and Hyde opposed him.
Distribution:
Original - Addressee (w/atch)
1 - ExDir (w/atch)
1 - ER (w/atch)
(1- OCA Record (w/atch)
)- D/OCA Chrono (w/atch)
- OCARead Library
1 - OCA Chrono (w/o atch)
D/OCA:DDGries:mdo (4 May 1987)
? enNFIDENTIAL
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(.01(1:flimclivmc,\!..
WashingWAICIOSOS''
4 May 1987
The Honorable Lee H. _Hamilton, Chairman
Select Committee to Investigate Covert,"
Arms Transactions with Iran
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Press reports continue to circulate that the House and
Senate Select Committees on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
and the Nicaraguan Opposition may ask employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency's clandestine services to testify under oath
in public hearings. While I and other Agency officials in
discussions with your staff have already outlined the serious
problems this would pose for us, I believe this issue is so
critical that I want to make our great concern and the reasons
for objecting to public testimony absolutely clear. I also want
to apprise the Committee that I have consulted with National
Security Adviser Carlucci, and he has informed me that this is a
matter of importance to the President.
Let me emphasize at the outset that any Agency employee is
available to the Select Committees to testify under oath in a
closed session. As you know, CIA personnel have already given
sworn depositions to Committee staff. The Agency is fully
prepared to work with the Committees to produce expeditiously
for public release a declassified version of any such
testimony. Indeed, I am prepared to commit all necessary
resources to ensure that testimony taken in executive session is
sanitized and declassified for public use within 24 hours.
Accordingly, the issue is not whether information from Agency
employees can be put before the public, but whether it is
necessary or appropriate for CIA clandestine services employees
to appear in open Committee proceedings.
First, there is the issue of precedent. As far as I can
determine, no active duty member of the CIA clandestine service
has ever testified under oath in a public hearing before the
Congress. Although the question of public testimony was
considered during the Church and Pike Committee hearings of the
1970s, both those Committees accepted the Agency's argument
against public exposure of its employees other than the
Director. Both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees
have also respected this principle through the years.
?
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It is also important to keep in mind that virtually any.
staff employee the Committee may wish to call as a witness must
travel or live abroad to carry out his or her duties. Public
exposure could eliminate the possibility of future service
abroad because of personal and operational security problems and
reluctance of foreign governments to allow known Agency
employees to be stationed in their countries. Although it is
true that the names of some of these employees may have appeared
in the media, this does not necessarily confirm affiliation with
the Agency. On the other hand, public testimony before Congress
would confirm official CIA affiliation, and when linked with
photographs appearing in the media, would confirm identity as
well. I appreciate plans-apparently under consideration by
Committee staff to prohibit television and still photography of'
Agency employees, but I question whether these plans are
workable or seemly for an Agency official.
Apart from the public disclosure of the identities of our
personnel, we are deeply concerned about the kinds of
information our witnesses may be asked to furnish in open
session. Even with detailed advance preparation and
negotiations with staff, there is no way to ensure that a Member
will not press for an answer that would require the revelation
of highly sensitive information. In short, there would be no
way to control the course of an interrogation being played out
in public. In this regard, there are rules and safeguards built
into the Resolutions establishing the Committees themselves
(especially on the Senate side) that require Congressional
compliance with detailed procedures in connection with any
demand for open session disclosure of classified identities
and/or information.
Finally, the appearance of clandestine service employees in
public hearings would risk serious consequences for our
relationships overseas and our ability to conduct clandestine
operations.
For all these reasons, I urge your careful consideration of
this issue. I know that the Congress shares with the Executive
Branch the goal of making U.S. intelligence as strong as
possible. We also share the belief that U.S. intelligence
should operate under vigorous Congressional scrutiny. At the
same time, an effective secret intelligence agency must remain
secret. I ask the Committees to join us in keeping it that way
and request an opportunity to discuss this matter further before
any final decision is made to call as a witness any member of
the Agency's clandestine service. A copy of this letter is also
being provided to Ranking Minority Member Cheney.
erely,
aLA:b/g.44
bert M. tes
Acting Director of Cen al Intelligence
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antrailMcilynmAguy
WashoportDC20505
The Honorable David L. Boren, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
i 0 APR 198/
OCA 8./-1246
I am writing in response to your letter of 26 March on the
need for effective oversighC of covert action programs. We are
prepared to work with the Committee on a mutually agreeable
approach to achieve your objective, recognizing that care must
be taken to ensure the confidentiality of these very sensitive
activities is protected from compromise.
We believe your suggestion on the creation of a special
audit and investigations unit, integral to the Committee staff,
is a particularly promising approach. Our experience with
selected special investigations undertaken by the oversight
committees has generally been positive. Such a unit would
provide a credible independent arm for Committee review of
covert action programs, and would have the added advantage of
working at the exclusive direction of the Committee which would
ensure the appropriate security safeguards for these sensitive
activities.
I suggest our staffs jointly examine such an approach in
more depth and develop appropriate recommendations and
guidelines for our consideration. Carroll Hauver, our
Inspector General, and Dan Childs, our Comptroller, are
prepared to work with your staff on this matter.
A copy of this letter is also being sent to Vice Chairman
Cohen.
Sincerely,
y
I.
Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Onv
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OCA 87-1665
24 April 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director
FROM: Dave Gries
SUBJECT: Weekly Report
HPSCI Markup: HPSCI finished its markup. We took
slightly less than a 4% cut.
Arms Control: The SSCI staff is raising with the
Chairman and Vice Chairman the possibility of sequential
referral of all arms control legislation. The objective is
to make the SSCI a more active player, allowing the Committee
to provide "thoughtful advice" and to consider fully the
intelligence implications of such legislation. If the Senate
leadership agrees, the SSCI will be asking for more support
from us in the future.
Status of Planned Hearings on Stokes/Boland (H.R. 1013):
HPSCI informs us that no plans exist to have any further
public hearings on Stokes/Boland--the bill which would set a
48-hour reporting limit on covert action Findings--until the
first week of June. CIA will probably be asked to supply a
witness.
More on GAO: The staff of the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee has completed drafting legislation that
would require GAO auditing of the Agency. Prior to
finalizing the draft the staffers plan to hold consultations
with SSCI and with us. We are working in concert with SSCI
to block harmful provisions. Committee staffers say that
impetus for the bill comes from Senator Glenn, not from
staff. Senator Glenn has told us the opposite.
SEC
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Actin
FROM: Dave Gries
SUBJECT: Weekly Re ort
3 April 1987
OCA 87-1292
Confirmation Hearing: The FBI informed us that the White
House murder board for Webster is set for Monday afternoon in
the Ward Room. There will also be a walk through on the Hill
on Tuesday at 2 p.m. Whether a murder board will be held
over the weekend remains to be decided. We continue to
supply information as required. The interrogatory on Iran is
apparently approaching completion, and we expect to be
furnished with a copy on Monday. We are told that Specter
has his prosecutorial hat on again.
House Hearing on HR 1013 (Stokes/Boland Bill): The
Legislation Subcommittee of HPSCI held a public hearing on
the Stokes/Boland Bill on Wednesday, 1 April. Witnesses
included former DCIs Colby and Turner and former DDI Cline.
All of them opposed the Bill's key feature which would
require the President to report all Findings in writing to
the Congress within 48 hours of signature. Majority Leader
Wright strongly supported the Bill, and Minority Leader
Michel opposed it--pointing out that the effort to notify key
Members could in itself provide a tip off that something was
in the works.
GAO Again: We have drafted responses to two recent GAO
probes. On the House side, we wrote the GAO Associate
Director repeating our traditional position. In addition, we
have learned that both Stokes and Wilson have contacted Gray
and asked to put a hold on his efforts regarding GAO until
CIA has an opportunity to brief him On the
Senate side, we spoke to Glenn, who is chairman of the
pertinent Government Affairs Subcommittee, and arranged to
meet with his staff director regarding Glenn's sponsorship of
legislation forcing us under the GAO umbrella. Concurrently,
we have drafted a letter to Boren and Cohen for your
signature that describes steps that SSCI could take to
strengthen its capabilities to perform audits.
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STATEMENT OF DAVID GRIES
DIRECTOR OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee. The CIA
supports the Administration's opposition to H.R. 1013. The
Agency believes the present system is working well and that
additional legislative remedies are not necessary.
Let me first briefly describe the current system. As you know,
the Agency has an informal agreement with your committee and
the SSCI to provide notification of Presidential findings
within 48 hours of the Agency receiving a signed copy of the
finding.
--The committee has received advance word of every
Presidential finding but for the two involving the
attempted rescue of our hostages in Iran in 1979-1980
STAT
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In addition, your committee and the SSCI are furnished with the
full text of each Presidential finding and an advisory that
further explains the scope of the finding. The Agency also
answers numerous questions submitted for the record regarding
covert actions and conducts an annual review of covert action
programs for your committee and the SSCI. Finally, the Agency
has a written agreement with the SSCI that provides for
notification of certain activities implementing an already
approved covert action. The HPSCI is, of course, notified of
any activity that requires notification of the SSCI.
H.R. 1013 would attempt to formalize the process by requiring
that: 1) Presidential Findings be in writing; 2) copies of all
findings be provided to the HPSCI, SSCI, Vice-President,
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the DCI; and
deferral of notice of significant intelligence activities
(covert actions) be limited to 48 hours after a finding is
signed. Let me address each point separately.
CIA agrees that as a matter of policy Presidential findings
should be reduced to writing, and as a practical matter it has
been our experience that findings are reduced to writing. I
know of no exceptions.
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--Nonetheless, we join the Administration in opposing
a provision that would prevent the President from
taking immediate action in a crisis unless and until
his decision was in writing.
However, in such a situation where it is necessary to make a
decision quickly to save life, we would certainly support the
establishment of a system whereby any oral finding made by the
President is reduced to writing within 24 hours.
With respect to dissemination of copies of findings, the
current practice is to provide State, Defense, HPSCI, and SSCI
with the full text of the finding, albeit not the actual signed
copy of the finding.
--H.R. 1013 would require that the President make the
signed copy available. It is not apparent to us what
additional benefits would be gained by requiring the
dissemination of signed copies of all findings.
Furthermore, since directing the President to provide copies of
findings ?to other executive branch officials also raises
concerns with respect to erosion of executive prerogatives we,
? therefore, also must defer to the White House on this
provision.
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Finally, the requirement that notice of Presidential findings
be deferred no latter than 48 hours after the finding is signed
is the most troublesome provision in the proposed bill. As I
have stated, our current practice is to provide notification of
a Presidential finding prior to its implementation and within
48 hours of our receiving the signed copy of the finding. In
most instances, the requirement in H.R. 1013 that notice be
provided within 48 hours of signing as opposed to within 48
hours of our receiving the signed copy would be acceptable.
--However, there might be a situation someday where the
President may deem it necessary or appropriate to delay
notification for more than 48 hours.
--Moreover, the rigid 48-hour requirement in the bill
poses a number of practical problems for us; for example,
in instances when the President signs a finding while
travelling outside Washington, the 48-hour notification
requirement of H.R. 1013 would force the Agency to notify
the committees of a finding which the Agency did not have
in its physical possession.
We would be very reluctant to do this, given the circumstances
that the wording of findings sometimes change right before the
time of the signing. We have always considered it prudent to
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make a determination ourselves on whether the wording of the
finding has been changed in order to ensure that the Congress
receives a complete and accurate text.
In summary, rather than restrict the authority of the President
to delay notification and place a requirement on the Agency
which would be difficult if not impossible to meet if the
President signs a finding while travelling, I would urge the
Committee to work with the Agency and White House to establish
general standards under which decisions to delay notice will be
made. These standards must reflect the principle that
notification cannot be delayed except in rare instances and for
only a very short period of time without placing in jeopardy
the relationship of trust which we are trying to establish with
the committee.
Let me also suggest that a procedure should be instituted
within the Executive Branch which would require periodic review
on the record of findings for which a decision to delay notice
has been made. The purpose of the review would be to determine
whether the circumstances that required a delay in notice to
the oversight committees are still present. I also recommend
:that in those very rare Situations requiring that knowledge of
-a covert activity be kept to an absolute minimum because
5
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disclosure will result in loss of life, we should strive to
make greater use of the limited notification procedure provided
in section 501 of the Oversight Act. This is a more
satisfactory option than delaying notification.
This concludes my statement.
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;STAT
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12.
7 May 1987
15.
STAT
FYI - Mr. Gries briefed
Mr. Gates oral y on this;
he did not giv him the
memo.
FORM dunes' petvio.
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4 May 1987
OCA 87-1877
NOTE FOR: The Acting Director
VIA:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Dave Gries
Addendum to Your Agenda for Your Meeting
with Representatives Stokes and Hyde
When you meet with HPSCI Chairman Louis Stokes (D., OH) and
Ranking Republican Henry Hyde (R., IL) on 6 May at 0900, you
may want to sound them out on language the Committee has
included in its version of the Authorization Bill that directs
that a three-member Commission on Intelligence Personnel
Systems be established to conduct a comprehensive review and
analysis of all personnel management and compensation systems
affecting the Intelligence Community. The Commission would be
composed of three persons from outside Government--one
appointed by the President, one by House Speaker Wright, and
one by Senate Majority Leader Byrd. They would have nine
months to complete their report.
You may want to express your concern that such a Commission
is premature in view of the fact that the Agency is already
embarked on consultations with DIA and NSA as we progress on
our own internal personnel study and identify areas of concern
that we believe are generic within the Community. We believe
that we are moving in a careful and consistent fashion to
develop a wise personnel strategy that will identify our needs
and create innovative steps to meet them. We have been
consulting regularly with Committee staff as well, and you
expect to be returning to the Committee with a report on our
findings, to seek their views, and to consult on any
legislation that may be needed.
For your information, we have been told that the SSCI finds
the HPSCI suggestion wpernicious, " and you need to gauge
whether the Committee Members (or only staff) are really
committed to derailing our personnel plans.
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Note that 1102(b)(1) of the legislation directs DOD to exclude 01A and
DMA non-headquarters personnel from the reductions directed in ihe 1986 Ps0
Reorganization Act. It would also seem to exclude the headquaters persoemel ,
of these two agencies from those mandated reductions, but that is n
us an opinion on this. ;1::11
clear from the way the langauge has been crafted -- suggest
The legislation also incorporates the HPSCI's annual language (1 104)
barring the use of NFIP funds and personnel for the Nicaraguan Assistance
effort in FY 1988, unless specifically authorized by this or subsequent
legislation; the final chapter on that issue will be written later this summer
when the Administration formally submits its request for continued aid to the
Contras..
Section 105 is real "legalese" - clearly an effort to retroactively
close the books on last year's battle with the HAC over the $125 million Issue
and appropriations for "unauthorized" projects, but there must be an easier
way!:
The "Commission on Intelligence Personnel Systems", which I mentioned
In a previous note, makes its appearance in Title VI of the legislation at
page 15. The Commission will consist of 3 people from outside Government --
one appointed by the President (who will be the Chairperson), one by the
Speaker of the House (Rep. Wright), and one by the Majority leader of the
Senate (Sen. Byrd). The bill provides for an Executive Director and
Commission staff, and authorizes the detail of staff to the Commission from
the Intelligence Community. It will be funded with $5001( from the IC Staff
budget for FY 88, and its charter is to
'conduct a comprehensive review and comparative analysis of all
personnel management and compensation systems affecting civilian
personnel of agencies and other entities of the intelligence
community with a view to determining the adequacy of existing
personnel systems and any changes that should be made in such
systems.'
The bill requires a report no later than 9 months from the date of its
enactment, setting forth the Commission's findings, conclusions, and any
recommendations (including legislation).
STAT
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15
1 TITLE VI?STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE
2 PERSONNEL SYSTEMS
3 COMMISSION ON INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SYSTEMS
4 SEC. 601. (a) ESTABLISHMENT; PUBPOSIL?There
5 hereby established a commission to be known as the Commis-
6 sion on Intelligence Personnel Systems. The Commission
7 shall conduct a comprehensive review and comparative anal-
8 pis of all personnel management and compensation systems
9 affecting civilian personnel of agencies and other entities of
10 the intelligence community with a view to determining the
11 adequacy of existing personnel systems and any changes that
12 should be made in such systems.
13 (b) MEMBERS.?(1) The Commission shall consist el
14 three members. The President, the Speaker of the House of
15 Representatives (after consultation with the minority leader
16 of the House), and the majority leader of the Senate (after
17 consultation with the minority leader of the Senate) shell
18 each appoint one member. The member appointed by the
19 President shall be the chairman of the Commission.
20 (2) Members of the Commission shall be appointed from
21 among persons outside the Government who by reason a
22 training, background, education, and experience in iota&
23 gence matters and personnel systems are highly qualified to
24 study the matters described in subsection (a).
Wit JIM DI
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16
1 (5) Members of the Commission shall be paid at the
2 day equivalent of the rate of basic pay payable for level IV
8 of the Executive Schedule for each day (including traveltime)
4 that they are engaged in the business of the Commission.
5 (4) A member of the Commission shall not be considered
6 to be a Federal employee except for purposes of-
7 (A) chapter 81 of title 5, United States Code, re-
8 !sting to compensation for work-related injuries; and
9 (B) chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code,
10 relating to tort claims.
11 (C) STAFF.?(1) The Commission may (without regard
12 to section 5311(b) of title 5, United States Code) appoint an
13 executive director, who shall be paid at a rate not to exceed
14 the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive
15 Schedule.
16 (2) The Commission may appoint such additional staff as
17 it considers appropriate. Such personnel shall be paid at a
18 rate not to exceed the rate of basic pay payable for grade
19 08-18 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5,
20 United States Code.
21 (3) The executive director and staff of the Commission
22 may be appointed without regard to the provisions of titiE 5,
28 United States Code, governing appointments in the executive
24 branch and may be paid without regard to the provisions of
11111 2112 1N
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1
17
1 chapter 51 and subchapter ni of chapter 53 of such tide
2 relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates.
3 (4) The Cornmission may procure temporary and inter-
4 rnittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United
5 States Code.
6 (d) StrPP9wr.?Upon request of the Commission, the
7 Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the lateIli-
8 gence Community Staff, and the heads of the elements of the
9 intelligence community may detail personnel under their ju-
10 risdiction to the Commission to assist the Commission in car-
11 rying out its duties under this section and may provide to the
12 Commission such administrative support services as the
13 Commission may require.
14 (e) FUNDING.?Of the amount available to the
inelli-
15 gence Community Staff for fiscal year 1988 under section
16 201, $500,000 shall be available for the Commission.
17 (f) REPORT.?Not later than nine months after the date
18 of the enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to
19 the President and to Congress a report setting forth its find-
20 ings and conclusions and such recommendation lincluding
21 recommendations for legislation) as the Commission considers
22 appropriate.
0
HE 2112 Dl
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CUR 10.
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&CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
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?-?
OFFICE OF COIGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
,_-.--
. 11 111filb
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2. ? D/Legislation
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3. DD/Senate Affairs
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4. Ch/Senate Affairs
5. DD/House Affairs
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6. Ch/House Affairs
7. Admin Officer
8. Executive Officer
9. FOIA Officer
10* 0Coffniscteitruent Inquiries
11.
12.
SUSPENSE
Date
Action Officer:
Remarks:
S J 4 MAY 87
Name/Date
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11 1706
CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD ? HOUSE March 31, 198
ma during my trip to the Soviet Union in Octo-
ber 1985 and his son Alexander resides in the
Philadelphia area.
Vladimir and his wife, Many& have been
trying to emigrate for some 17 years, but have
been refused because of Vladimir's supposed
access to Soviet national secrets. His alleged
exposure to secrets stems from is work 17
years ago as head of the Moscow Television
Research Institute. Despite the fact that his
knowledge of Soviet television technology is
17 years old, that such knowledge was only
arguably tied to any military matter, and that
others who worked with him on the same
projects have been allowed to emigrate, he
has been listed as ineligible to emigrate.
Clearly, the Soviet position on this case is un-
tenable, and it suggests that the other denials
are equally supportable.
Last Friday, Vladimir's son Alexander initiat-
ed a 17-day hunger strike on behalf of his par-
ents. The 17 days are symbolic of the 17
years of refusal that his parents have en-
dured. The ? deprivation that Alexander is now
inflicting on himself symbolizes the 17 years
of' deprivation of freedom that his parents
have suffered?including periods of exile and
imprisonment. When Vladimir learned of his
son's plans, he too started a 17-day fast. Al-
exander is carrying out his hunger strike by
the fountains on the east side of the Capitol,
and I heartily encourage my colleagues to
show their support by visiting with him.
Mr. Speaker, General Secretary Gorbachev
may have moved forward a few steps with
some of his recent actions. It remains to be
seen just how far he will go. What is clear,
however, is that the distance he must ulti-
mately travel to dispel all doubts and demon-
strate true change is far. far indeed.
Mrs. SCHROEDER, I join my distinguished
colleagues today in calling on the Soviet
Union to put substance into their Glasnost
policy. I am especially concerned with the
continued refusal by the U.S.S.R. to grant an
exit visa to Ida Nudel.
For 15 years Ms. Nudel has been seeking
an exit visa so that she may join her sister,
liana Fridman, in Israel. She has assisted
other refuseniks and their families. For her
forts, she has been denied an exit visa repe
edly, treated violently, arrested, tried and se
tenced to exile in Siberia, where she lived f
4 years. While there, she was beaten an
then housed in a barrack lacking electrici
water, and heat at a time when temperatures
dropped to 40 degrees below zero.
When Ms. Nudel returned to Moscow, she
was not allowed to live in her home. It is often
difficult for refuseniks to find a place to stay, so
it took her several months to find a place in
Bendery. Moldavia.
I am very concerned about the conditions
under which Ms. Nudel is living now. Recent
reports indicate she has been harassed in her
efforts to obtain medical care. Her sister has
told us that people are afraid to be her friend
and that she is very lonely.
I hope that the Soviet Union will take the
humanitarian route and give Ms. Nudel an exit
visa soon so that she may be reunited with
her family.
Mr. LENT. Mr. Speaker, the American public
has recently become aware of a new trend in
Soviet policy known as Glasnost or the de-
mocratization of Soviet society. Initiated by the
Soviet Union's General Secretary Mikhail Gor-
bachev, Glasnost has been widely hailed as a
demonstration of Soviet commitment to
human rights and freedom.
In truth, Glasnost could prove the most sig-
nificant threat yet to human rights and free-
doms in the Soviet Union. I am concerned
that Gorbachev's call for openness may lull us
into a false sense of complacency regarding
the need for continued action on behalf of the
Soviet Jews. I understand that the March
figure for Soviet emigration of Jews was the
highest monthly figure in 5 years. That is en-
couraging. However, the 400 visas given out
in March are only the tip of the iceberg. We
cannot forget that there are hundreds of thou-
sands of Soviet Jews still desperately seeking
to emigrate.
In addition, we must not forget the persecu-
tion and vicious anti-Semitism which prevades
Soviet society. Indeed, even now?during this
so-called demoncratization?Hebrew teach
ers in the U.S.S.R. are routinely arrested, har-
assed and sent to prison, as are the many
prisoners-of-conscience who vigorously pro-
test human rights Violations in that country.
There are also the refuseniks who are relent-
lessly persecuted and whose only crime is
their sincere desire to emigrate from the
Soviet Union.
We must not relax our efforts to secure
human rights and freedom for the hundreds of
thousands of Soviet Jews wishig to leave the
Soviet Union. As long as these individuals are
living under such oppression and persecution,
Glasnost is nothing but an empty promise.
GENERAL LEAVE
Mr. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker. I ask
unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days in which to
revise and extend their remarks and to
include extraneous matter on the sub-
ject of my special order today.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
ERDREICH). Is there objection to the re-
quest of the gentlewoman from Mary-
land?
There was no objection.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
IN SPACE: ENHANCING THE
WORLD'S COMMON SECURITY
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
a previous order of the House. the gen-
tleman from California (Mr. BROWN)
Is recognized for 60 minutes.
Mr. BROWN of California. Mr.
Speaker, over the past 2 months, in a
series of special order speeches. I have
addressed various aspects of the Na-
tion's space program. On February 26,
I provided a detailed analysis of how
the Nation's overall space effort has
become increasingly controlled by the
military, and how it is being diverted
toward the goal of developing instru-
ments for space warfare. Today, I will
carry my discussion one step further,
by exploring security-enhancing alter-
natives to an arms race in space.
As a starting point, I would like to
focus quickly on the concept of nation-
al security. Doing so seems only fitting
in any discussion of programs aimed at
contributing to America's security in-
terests.
Fundamentally, we all have a sens
of what national security is. The terr
implies protection of the Nation f rot
external threats while maintaining tli
health, integrity and economic wel
being of our society. Justifiably. th
term could be applied to any numbe
of programs aimed at ensuring th
continued vigor and prosperity o
America. Practically speaking, howen
er, the term "national security" is ger.
erally used in a much more limite.
fashion.
In its most common usage, nations
security is the catchall phrase used ti
defend the need for new weapons sys
tems. A quick search through th.
annals of this political institutioi
would show the term "national securi
ty" affixed to more weapons system.
than to any other program or activity
Weapons systems such as the Minute
man, Pershing, and MX missiles: thi
B-I, B-52, and Stealth bombers: thi
Polaris, Poseidon, and Trident subma.
lines; these?and many, many more-
have been advanced by the Pentagor
and then advocated by politicians a:
being "essential" in order to maintair
the national security of the Unite(
States.
Throughout the period of develop
ing and deploying these weapons, how
ever, little attention has been given t(
whether our investments are actual13
making us feel more secure. Whit(
many argue that our nuclear arsena:
has, indeed, brought security benefits
and others argue that it is the Soviet
Union's defense buildup that has pre
vented us from meeting our securit3
objectives. I think most of us realia
that the past 40 years of pursuing na.
tional security has left us less securt
at each new turn of the United States.
Soviet arms race.
Despite the hundreds of billions of
dollars invested in defense programu
year after year, national security re-
mains an illusive goal; indeed, it has
become an increasingly unreachable
goal as new weapons?once deployed
by both superpowers?have simply
spawned new insecurities. Increasingly
accurate land-based nuclear missiles
with multiple warheads, cruise missiles
small enough to be carried on any sur-
face vessel, strategic bombers increas-
ingly invisible to radar detection?
these developments, on both sides of
the Iron Curtain, are not allowing any
of us to sleep better at night.
Although people are reluctant to
admit it?given the enormous invest-
ments we have made in building our
nuclear arsenal?we live today in a
world which has made traditional no-
tions of security obsolete, in which the
continued development and refine-
ment of our nuclear arsenal is simply
Irrational. Whereas the weapons of
yesteryear had limited capabilities and
limited implications when used, today.
the entire firepower of World War Il
can be unleashed by a single nuclear
bomb. That firepower can be delivered
to essentially any spot on the globe in
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? March .11, 1.987 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? I 10t ISE
a matter of minutes. And there are
mmileh nuclear weapons in the world
to recreate the explosive power of
more than 6.000 World War I l's.
"Fliese weapons of global scale, deliv-
erable in a brutally short timeframe.
have foteed us into an era in which we
simply cannot. continue to think ac-
cording to the conventional terms of
national security. Those terms have
suggested that a single nation's securi-
ty can be maintained independent of
the security of other nations. We must
now think in terms of common securi-
ty. For we live in a time when U.S. se-
curity is inextricably linked to the se-
curity of nations around the globe. If
world war III comes, regardless of
where it starts and who starts it, it
could well determine the fate of all
159 nations on this planet.
All nations thus share the same
desire to prevent such a war. All na-
tions face a common threat to their
continued survival. This is an unprece-
dented reality that must be reflected
in our security planning.
And it's not simply the nuclear
threat that is melding the security of
all nations into one. The possibility of
environmental crises of global dimen-
sions also has a grasp on the world's
collective destiny. A warming up of
the atmosphere due to the continued
burning of fossil fuels, depletion of the
ozone layer as a result of fluorocarbon
interactions, changes in the climate
due to population stresses on the envi-
ronment?these and other environ-
mental threats are of real and immedi-
ate concern. Within the next 50 to 100
years?a minuscule time period in
terms of human history?environmen-
tal crises could have devastating im-
pacts on the security of the United
States, and the security of nations
around the world. Here again, security
must be seen in global, and not simply
national, terms.
With this said, let me now turn to
the space program, which I am con-
vinced could play a vital role in help-
ing the world move away from its out-
dated; nationalistic notions of security.
and toward the fundamental require-
ments of common security.
At the present time, the Nation's
space program, unfortunately, is being
carried by the currents of thought
that have dominated U.S. "security"
planning over the past 40 years. Prep-
aration for space warfare has become
one of the top "national security" pri-
orities of this administration. The de-
velopment of antisatellite fASATI
weapons and the strategic defense ini-
tiative [SDI] are the means to that
end. Yet, the putative benefits of such
developments are likely to be just as
evanescent as have been the avowed
benefits of so many weapons programs
paid for by the American public in the
past. As explained in my February 26
special order address, preparing for
space warfare will simply bring greater
and greater insecurity, at higher and
higher costs.
Our space program could take a dif-
ferent path, however. It could forge a
path that truly did enhance our secu-
rity, and also provided security divi-
dends for people living far beyond our
Nat ion's borders. Such a path is what
I would like to explore today.
In my view, there are three distinct
and necessary areas of space activity
that should be pursued to enhance
global security. One would be aimed at
global peacekeeping, through the de-
velopment of an international satel-
lite-based arms control verification
and crisis management system. A
second would be aimed at global re-
source analysis and inanagement,
through the creation of an array of
space observatories designed to moni-
tor environmental change on the
planet and study the Earth as a uni-
fied system. And a third would be
aimed at breaking new ground in the
United States-Soviet relationship
through international cooperative ef-
forts in space of an unprecedented
nature, including a manned mission to
the planet Mars.
Let me elaborate on these three pro-
posals, starting with the use of space
activities for peacekeeping purposes.
The role of space technologies in
contributing to enhanced security ar-
rangements has been clear since the
first nuclear detection satellite was
placed in orbit by the United States on
October 17, 1963. Seven days later, the
United States signed the Limited Test
Ban Treaty with the Soviet Union and
Britain, with the knowledge that it
had just launched into space the
means of ensuring compliance with
the treaty. This development, in many
ways, was foreshadowed by President
Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal
made nearly a decade earlier.
It was in 1955 that Eisenhower,
speaking at a Geneva Disarmament
Convention, proposed that the United
States and the Soviet Union allow
aerial photography of each other's
nation so as to help reduce the possi-
bility of nuclear war stemming from
either miscalculation or misguided
fears about the other's military capa-
bilities. Eisenhower offered use of the
U-2 reconnaissance plane as a means
of helping create the record of this in-
formation, but Soviet Premier Khru-
shchev rejected the proposal as a dis-
guised plan to spy on the Soviet
Union.
Overtime, however, both nations
mounted extensive satellite photore-
connaissance systems that lead, de
facto, to a partial realization of Eisen-
hower's "open skies" initiative. While
Eisenhower had proposed that the
United Nations be the coordinating
agency for the analysis of information
about each other's military capabili-
ties and facilities, both nations instead
developed agencies of their own to
conduct such activities.
Over the past 25 years, photorecon-
naissance from space has advanced to
an incredible degree. The first spy sat-
ellites were not very precise, failing to
1707
meat the Qmility of images taken from
the U? 2 sey plane. Indeed, it took a
numbar of and numerous sat
tiles to itch I he captbility of the U-2
everthrlits ,t1 t1;e Soviet Union. xvhicii
stopped iti 19ti0 ill) the shooting
dokun of Gary l'ower:;.
The NH 1E.eyhi2lel-8
latnIcticd iii August 1966. reportedly
had a rrsoltit ion of 6 inches. sufficient
to detect objects as small as a paper-
back book bun 145 miles in space.
With tins capability in place. Presi-
dent Jot union in 1966 approached.
Soviet of about negotiating
limits on strategic nuclear weapons.
The SALT I talks began 2 years later.
By the time those talks concluded in
1972. the United States had launched
its KII-9 satellite, which added fur-
ther capabilities for monitoring com-
pliance with the SALT I and Anti-Bal-
listic Missile Treaties.
In contrast to the KR-8 satellite, de-
signed to provide imagery at very high
resolutions, the KH-9, also called Big
Bird, was designed for taking area sur-
veillance images of larger areas with a
resolution measured in feet, not
inches. In 1976. the United States
launched the KH-11 satellite, which
combined both close-look and area sur-
veillance on a single satellite, and also
introduced digital imagery technolo-
gy?an entirely new method of photo'
reconnaissance and interpretation.
Rather than involving the ejection of
film canisters by the satellite, and
their subsequent capture in the atmos-
phere by aircraft, the KH-11 collects
images electronically and transmits
them directly to the ground via a com-
munications relay satellite. And it does
this in near real time, providing
Images of events virtually while they
occur. The KH-11 technology repre-
sented a revolutionary advance in pho-
toreconnaissance from space.
The newest addition to the U.S. spy
satellite inventory will be the KH-12.
which some say will render even the
KH-11 obsolete. According to press ac-
counts, the KH-12, scheduled for one
of the first space shuttle launches in
1988, will have a resolution of less
than 4 inches. This might be sufficient
to determine whether a person sitting
in Red Square was reading the news-
paper Pravda or Izestia. The KH-I2
will also be able to see in the dark
using (hernial infrared sensors.
Future photoreconnaissance satel-
lites will possess even better capabili-
ties. For instance, sensors are being de-
veloped that would collect. simultane-
ous images in as many as 200 or more
contiguous spectral bands along the
electromagnetic spectrum. A multi-
spectral scanner of this form, enor-
mously more sophisticated than any in
use today, would represent an incredi-
ble breakthrough in the identification
and characterization of Earth objects
from space, since every substance has
slightly different radiation character-
istics.
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? . 11 1708 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE Murch iJ. 1.9,S;
Applications for such sensors will be
enormous. For example, sensors of
this sort might enable determinations
of the precise metals?whether titani-
um. aluminum. or steel?out of which
Soviet weapons are built. Such infor-
mation would provide insight into the
performance of those weapons. The
sensors might also enable the charac-
terization of gaseous emissions from
Soviet, factories to determine whether
they are involved in chemical weapons
production
Also under development for future
reconnaissance satellites are radar sen-
sors that could take images at night
and through cloud cover. Radar imag-
ing satellites will also be able to pro-
vide subsurface iniormation, since
radar transmissions can penetrate a
certain distance into soils and water.
And while these and other advances in
sensor development are underway.
great breakthroughs in computer en-
hancement and manipulation tech-
niques can be expected, which will
enable the extraction of even more in-
formation from collected images.
What I have provided here is simply
a cursory look at the evolving capabili-
ties of some of the Nation's photore-
connaissance satellite systems, based
on accounts taken from books avail-
able to the public, the New York
Times and magazines such as IEEE
Spectrum. The full details of these
satellites remain highly classified.
Indeed, even of the office that designs,
builds, and operates these satellites is
officially classified, although anyone
can read about the National Recon-
naissance Office (NRO] in various un-
classified articles, reports and books.
One can also read about Soviet pho-
toreconnaissance satellites in unclassi-
fied literatrue. What becomes appar-
ent from reviewing both the United
States and Soviet spy satellite net-
works is that these highly secret
spacecraft have had a major stabiliz-
ing effect on the superpower relation-
ship. They have helped reduce surpris-
es and eliminate exaggerated, worst-
case fears. They have made arms con-
trol agreements possible and have cre-
ated a situation where surprise attacks
resulting from the mobilization of con-
ventional forces would be impossible.
In sum, these satellites have helped
keep the peace between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
Satellites such as these could help
keep the peace between many more
nations if they were not under the ex-
clusive control of the United States
and the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is this
realization that gave rise to initial pro-
posals in the late 1970's for an Inter-
national Satellite Monitoring Agency.
which would carry the existing bipo-
lar. United States-Soviet open skies ar-
rangement to its next logical step, an
era of gloval open skies.
In 1978, the French Government
proposed the creation of an interna-
tional system of surveillance satellites
to monitor arms control agreements
and help safeguard against military
crises. The proposal was quickly re-
jected by both the United States and
the Soviet Union, with United States
officials claiming such a system would
be unworkable and too costly. But
that rejection made at a time when
the superpowers maintained a clear
monopoly on high-resolution remote
sensing satellites, and that monopoly
no longer exists.
In February 1986. the French
launched their SPOT satellite, with a
10-meter resolution, and they have
plans for four more civilian remote
sensing satellites. The Japanese, Cana-
dians, Indians, and the European
Space Agency also are in th process
of developing earth observation satel-
lites. The news media has a growing
interest in high resolution photos
from space as well, and may launch a
remote sensing satellite of their own
in the not too distant future. What
this means is that, just as Soviet oppo-
sition to Eisenhower's open skies pro-
posal was overcome by the passage of
time so too will the superpowers' rejec-
tion of an international open skies era
be overtaken by events.
An international satellite-based veri-
fication system is, de facto, coming
into being. Within a decade, most the
pieces for such a system will be in
place. A multinational array of satel-
lites capable of providing high resolu-
tion images will be in orbit within the
next 10 to 15 years. Ground receiving
stations for these satellites will be lo-
cated around the globe. The technolo-
gy for image processing will also be
widely available. The only missing ele-
ment will be the organizational frame-
work for utilizing the information for
peacekeeping purposes, and this is
where the United States should
assume a leadership role.
The United States should recognize
that the era of United States-Soviet
control over remote sensing from
space has ended. Moreover, it should
realize that this is a constructive de-
velopment in terms of global security.
A global information network, provid-
ing near real time high resolution
images of the entire planet to anyone
interested in such information, could
help create the foundation for new
ways of preventing conflict. It could
help preclude wars brought on by mis-
understanding or miscalculation. The
information gathered by such a
system could provide the basis for
monitoring border disputes, cease-fire
agreements, peacekeeping arrange-
ments. and demilitarized zones. It
could provide the conditions for new
International legal protections for the
security of all nations. Quite simply, it
would enhance the world's common se-
curity.
To help facilitate a global peace-
keeping system such as this, a number
of actions by the United States are
necessary. The United States should
stop pretending that Its system for
taking high resolution Images from
space is something that nobody knows
about: and instead, become an aggres-
sive international promoter of remote
sensing as a means of helping enhance
global security and international sta-
bility. It could do this in a variety of
ways.
First, by relaxing existing regula-
tions on the allowable resolution levels
for civilian-launched remote sensing
satellites. This limit, presently at 10
meters. will be bypassed anyway by
other countries in the near future.
Second, by initiating discussions
within the Government and with
other nations on how best to set up an
international agency responsible for
verifying arms control agreements and
managing military conflicts. And
third, by lowering the veil of secrecy
that has been draped for far too long
over the National Reconnaissance
Office and its operations.
The original circumstances that lead
to establishing such a tight security
blanket around our space photorecon-
naissance systems are simply no longer
valid. A transparency revolution has
been well underway for years, making
objects and actions on the face of the
Earth increasingly observable to
anyone interested. Yet, those in con-
trol of the Nation's space reconnais-
sance program seem eternally locked
into an ancient era, an era when the
public couldn't go to their corner
bookstores or local libraries to pick up
a dozen books with information about
photoreconnaissance and the NRO.
The stealth and secrecy attached to
their efforts has reached almost comi-
cal proportions.
For more than 20 years, it has been
widely known that the United States
operates reconnaissance satellites. Yet.
it wasn't until 1978 when President
Carter made the first public admission
of this fact. Today, more than a
decade after the first flight of the
KH-11. United States officials still
refuse to acknowledge the existence of
the satellite, even though since 1977
the Soviet Union has owned a KH-11
operator's manual?complete wit.h in-
formation about the satellite's charac-
teristics. capabilities and limitations.
The manual was purchased for $3,000
from a former CIA officer.
The NRO has filled warehouses with
images of the planet from space, yet
access to these images is tightly con-
strained to only those intelligence offi-
cers with a "need to know." Yet, this
"need to know" restriction is artificial-
ly constraining access to what, to a
considerable degree, should be a public
resource. The American public has as
much "need to know" about military.
economic and agricultural develop-
ments around the world?as revealed
in high resolution remote sensing
images?as does anyone within the in-
telligence communities. Not only do
they have a "need to know," they have
a right to know. They are the ones
who have spent tens of billions of dol-
lars on this information-gathering
system.
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The American public should be al-
ll)'.. td to learn of the powerful peace-
keeping activities of the NRO. They
should have t he opportunity to incor-
porate into their understanding of the
world real images of the Soviet Union.
in the place of the speculative concep-
tions presently governing the public's
view of that country and its people.
The images archived by the NRO also
would have substantial economic and
historical value if made available to
the public and to industry for analysis.
Those images are loaded with informa-
tion of commercial value. And while
all the details of the NRO's activities?
and everything with their archives?
certainly need not be revealed, wider
knowledge of them would help rebuild
support for the arms control process
and help lead to an international ap-
preciation for the peacekeeping contri-
butions of remote sensing satellites.
One can be sure that those who have
helped maintain secrecy and control
over intelligence gathering satellites
during the past two decades?both in
the United States and the Soviet
Union?will be reluctant to forfeit that
control now. A clear demonstration of
that reluctance was recently seen
when the Pentagon voiced strong ob-
jections to proposed regulations that
would increase the media's access to
remotely sensed data. But it should be
emphasized once again that the mo-
nopoly which once existed over these
technologies, exists no more.
Stansfield Turner, former Director
of the CIA. predicts that, -it will not
be long before we reach the point
where all satellite photography will be
so good that the differences between
various models?from different coun-
tries ? ? ? will be insignificant."
Turner. who participated in the
United States decision to reject the
1978 French open skies proposal, now
feels the decision was a mistake. He
thinks the United States should move
promptly to help establish such a
system.
So. too, does another former high-
ranking- CIA official, Ray Cline, who
has written recently that an interna-
tional satellite monitoring system
would be highly beneficial for United
States and global security, as well as
for helping provide information for
the economic advancement of the de-
veloping world.
As time goes on. the case for an
international network of peacekeeping
satellites will only get stronger. Tech-
nical, political and market forces are
all pushing in the direction of opening
up the remote sensing field. Faced
with these conditions, it is in the best
interests of the United States--a
Nation premised on the free flow of in.
step forward now and
provide leadership In creating a global
-open skies" system. A 1981 United
Nations study of the French proposal
estimated the cost to be $2.5 billion
(1980 dollars) over a 10-year period for
the launch and operation of a three-
satellite system. While this might
seem expensive, it would represent a
drop in the bucket compared to what
the two superpowers already spend on
intelligence-gathering satellites in the
name of national security. A modest
evolution from this system would give
the capability for essentially continu-
ous coverage of every spot on the face
of the globe.
Let me now turn from the topic of
peacekeeping from space, to the topic
of environmental management from
space.
As I mentioned earlier, the world's
communal destiny is not simply
threatened by the potential outbreak
of nuclear war, it is also threLtened by
the possibility of environmental crises
of global and dimensions.
As the world's population has
pressed beyond 5 billion, on its way to
6 billion by the year 2000, there are
growing indications that human activi-
ties are creating major and potentially
hazardous changes on the Earth.
oceans and atmosphere. These
changes could reach catastrophic pro-
portions within the next century. Evi-
dence of such change can be seen in
all directions.
For example, we already know that
acid rain caused by the combustion of
fossil fuels in automobiles and power
plants is having a devastating impact
on the forests of central Europe. Stud-
ies have shown that more than one-
third of the trees of West Germany
have suffered damage from airborne
pollutants According to some scien-
tists, vast regions of European forest-
land will become wasteland within the
next few decades as a result of these
pollutants.
Fossil fuel combustion also is releas-
ing carbon dioxide into the atmos-
phere on a scale likely to cause dra-
matic shifts in the Earth's climate.
Measurements taken over the past few
decades have shown a steady, annual
increase in atinostpheric carbon diox-
ide levels. If this trend continues,
some scientists predict a warming of
the Earth by 3 degrees to 8 degrees fa-
henheit over the next 50 years. This
could lead to a melting of the polar ice
caps and the subsequent flooding of
coastal regions around the globe.
Recent studies of the upper atmos-
phere over Antarctica indicate that
the Earth's ozone layer is being deplet-
ed on a seasonal basis. Whether this is
the consequence of using fluorocar-
bons in the atmosphere, as many sci-
entists have predicted, is not known.
Nor is it known whether population
pressures in Africa?which have led to
the desertification of vast regions?
may be having a direct, and adverse
impact on the climatic conditions of
that continent, although theories sup-
port this view. While a link between
population growth and climate change
has been discounted by scientists in
the past, a recent study of the ques-
tion lead a Canadian meteorologist.
Kenneth Hare, to conclude: -We seem
to have arrived at a critical moment in
the history of mankind's relation to
11 1709
climate. For the first time we may be
on the threshold of man-induced cli-
mate change." If this is true, the im-
pacts could be momentous. affectir:g
the Earths ecosystems in a fashion
that we simply cannot presently pre-
dict.
Our inability to forecast the implica-
tions of human-induced global change
stems from our vast ignorance of how
in fact we are disturbing our surround-
ings. Yet, knowledge about such issues
could be absolutely vital for our secu-
rity and our survival in the 21st centu-
ry. Increasingly, this fact is being rec-
ognized by scientists throughout the
United States and the world, scientists
who are now calling for an interna-
tional study of the Earth through the
use of a network of permanent satel-
lite observatories in space, as well as
through ground-based instrumenta-
tion around the globe. Satellites pro-
vide a unique ability to study and
monitor the Earth as never before.
Scientists at the National Science
Foundation, National Academy of Sci-
ences. and NASA have endorsed a
study of the Earth from space, a study
which goes by a variety of names, in-
cluding the International Geosphere-
Biosphere Program, Global Change.
and Global Geosciences. A report
issued recently by the Space Science
Board of the National Academy of Sci-
ences refers to such a study as a mis-
sion to planet Earth, and outlines the
project as including five to six plat-
forms in geostationary orbit and two
in low-Earth polar orbits for continu-
ous observations of the entire Earth.
Through the use of space-based sen-
sors of a variety of kinds, scientists
could conduct a simultaneous study of
the Earth's climate, the oceans, the
biosphere, the dynamics of the conti-
nents, and the geochemical cycles of
all the major nutrients?in short, a
study of the entire planet as an inte-
grated whole. Such a study would re-
quire cooperation among scientists
from every part of the world, and
would no doubt be one of the largest
cooperative endeavors in the history
of science. The benefits from such an
effort could be enormous. As stated in
one NASA document endorsing the
global change research effort, "If pur-
sued with resolve and commitment,
this research program will bring us re-
wards of knowledge as dramatic. and
as relevant to humankind, as any in
scientific history."
Such a prediction seems entirely
warranted. The information emerging
from such a study would enable the
world's decisionmakers to get a solid
grasp on how humans are disturbing
their lifesupport system: planet Earth.
Such information might enable us to
predict with confidence environmental
problems in advance, allowing the for-
mulation of policies to head off or
blunt impending cata-strophies. A
project that provided such opportuni-
ties would, without question, be a se-
curd y-enhancing endeavor for the
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II 1710 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE
entire world. It would provide security
against threats that are certain to
loom larger and larger in the future
unless we act soon to confront them in
an international, multidisciplinary and
large-scale fashion. Now is the time to
start such a study, while we still have
time to respond.
The building blocks for a global
change project are certainly available.
NASA has operated Earth observing
satellites since the early 1960's. An
international network of weather
monitoring satellites are in place. A
joint United States-French ocean ob-
servation satellite will be launched in
1990, and other ocean observation
spacecraft will soon be operated by the
Japanese and the European Space
Agency. Satellites that measure the
Earth's radiation budget and the dy-
namics of the upper atmosphere will
also be flying soon. And there are
other satellites under development
that will provide data essential for
modeling interactions among all the
Earth's many components. As these
programs progress, sophisticated com-
puter systems and software will be
needed to assimilate the data. Interna-
tional agreements will be required in
order to manage the flow of informa-
tion and the interaction of scientists.
And a substantial investment will be
needed in order to launch and operate
the sort of Earth observation plat-
forms that will be critical to the suc-
cess of the program over an extended
period.
By the turn of the century, the
global change project could involve a
large-scale infrastructure in space
comprised of multisensor platforms in
both low-earth and geostationary
orbit. These platforms could house not
only the sensors for monitoring envi-
ronmental characteristics of the
planet, they could also contain sensors
for the international satellite-based
verification system outlined above.
The space shuttle could routinely dock
with these platforms in order to repair
or replace aging sensors, or to mount
.new, more sophisticated devices. A
multinational network of sensors clus-
tered on a number of these space plat-
forms would be the most sensible and
cost-effective means of proceeding
with Earth observations from space.
In order to achieve such a system. U.S.
leadership will be invaluable.
The United States should strongly
urge the international community to
adopt the Global Change Program,
and it should match this aggressive
stance with substantial funding com-
mitments which. in and of themselves,
make a statement that the United
States is eager to work with nations
around the world in developing,
through the use of space-based sen-
sors, models of environmental change
on the planet so as to help avert
human-induced environmental catas-
trophes in the next century.
This leads to the final topic I would
like to discuss today, which is the secu-
rity-enhancing role of a broad and am-
bitious agenda of international coop-
eration in space, including high-profile
United States-Soviet space coopera-
tion.
International cooperation in the
planning and execution of activities in
space is certainly nothing new. Over
the past 30 years. the United States
ha-s signed more than 1.000 agree-
ments with more than 100 countries
for international space activities.
These cooperative efforts have ranged
from sharing data from space experi-
ments, to the cooperative development
of satellites, to the hooking-up of
manned spacecraft in orbit, as oc-
curred in 1975 with the Apollo-Soyuz
handshake in space involving Ameri-
can astronauts and Soviet cosmonauts.
Cooperative space projects such as
these, however, hardly compare to the
ones that will be available in the
future. This is because a number of de-
velopments are working together to
create opportunities for space coopera-
tion on a much broader and more am-
bitious scale than ever before.
The most obvious of these develop-
ments is the rapid maturity of space
programs around the world. Whereas
30 years ago the United States and the
Soviet Union were the only major
players In space, today impressive
space programs are taking form world-
wide. For example, China. India,
Japan and the European Space
Agency have all developed the ability
to launch satellites. Canada. France
and West Germany have developed
substantial aerospace industries. Eng-
land is forming its own space agency.
Brazil is developing its own remote-
sensing satellite. All told, more than
125 nations are involved in space ex-
ploration in some fashion. As the
number and sophistication of these
space programs has increased, cross-
fertilization among them has also
grown. This development will only ac-
celerate as the world's many space
programs set ever-more ambitious
goals.
A second factor contributing to
greater space cooperation is the in-
creased cost of major space projects.
Advances in space technology have
lead to the development of increasing-
ly complex space systems, which are
heavier, have higher power require-
ments, and produce data at enormous
rates. These factors all contribute to
growing costs. By sharing the costs of
such projects, each participating
nation carries a smaller economic
burden while maintaining access to
the data of interest. For example, the
U.S. space station. spacelab. Hubble
Space Telescope, and Infrared Astron-
omy Satellite have all involved inter-
national cooperation in terms of fund-
ing, planning and hardware develop-
ment. Last year's mission to Halley's
Comet, involving collaboration be-
tween the Soviet Union, United States.
European Space Agency and Japan
was a prime example of cost sharing in
an endeavor that might have seemed
March .11. 19S;
prohibitively expensive if pursued 1)3
any single nation alone.
A third major development in inter
national space cooperation has beet'
growing openness in the Soviet spaci
program. Up until very recently, ttu
entire Soviet space program wa)
shrouded in extreme secrecy, which
made space cooperation with the Sovi?
ets enormously difficult. However, the
policy of "glasnost." or openness,
which is being pursued throughout
Soviet society under the leadership of
Mikhail Gorbachev, has extended to
I he space program as well. Last
summer, the Soviet Union established
for the first time a separate agency for
the operation of civilian space activi-
ties. Previously, civilian and military
space programs were tightly covered
by the same security veil. With this
new agency?called Glavcosmos?in
place, the Soviet Union is assuming an
aggressive stance in? promoting its ci-
vilian space program, seeking custom-
ers for its space launch vehicles, part-
ners for space science missions, and
passengers for its space station. And
given the ambitious space plans of the
Soviet Union. space scientists around
the world have become increasingly in-
terested in working with the Soviets.
Finally, the advance of technology is
increasing opportunities for space co-
operation. Developments around the
world in areas such as space propul-
sion, power sources, advanced materi-
als, artificial intelligence and robotics
are leading to a future in which space
travel will become routine, and space
science and exploration will advance
beyond many of our wildest dreams.
As stated in "Pioneering the Space
Frontier." the May 1986 report to the
President from the National Commis-
sion on Space. "space technology has
freed humankind to move outward
from Earth as a species destined to
expand to other worlds." As this ex-
pansion into the solar system occurs.
people from around the globe will be
interested in participating, and will be
technically capable of doing so.
With these developments all under-
way, it should be incumbent of the
United States, as the world's most ad-
vanced space-faring Nation, to help
lead the world in the development of
an agenda for international space ac-
tivities to take us into the 21st centu-
ry. Two of the top items on that
agenda should be the two I have al-
ready explored, an international satel-
lite-based verification system and the
global change program. A third priori-
ty should be an ambitious effort aimed
at the exploration of Mars.
Over the past year, leading scientists
from around the Nation have endorsed
a Mars exploration program as a top
priority. This summer, the third in a
series of "Case for Mars" conferences
will be held in Boulder. CO, with spon-
sorship coming from NASA, the Amer-
ican Astronomical Society and the
Planetary Society. At the present
time. the Soviet Union is the pi irrie
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 11 1711
nne.,?r in charting out the exploration
of Mirs, wit h two unmanned space-
craft sihiNIoted to explore the red
planet oxer the next 6 years. The
Sot i7;11O:1 has proposed a joint
Slat CS-Soviet mission to obtain
and sample inateral from
Mar-, oint NASA. without a similar
pro it , iii iderway. has been I orced to
deeli!-: I he offer. However, momen-
tum lor a United States-Soviet Mars
sampic return mission is building, as
suggested by the recent endorsement
of such an effort by Dr. Lew Allen, Di-
rector of the Jet Propulsion Laborato-
ry, the Nation's premier laboratory for
the unmanned es.ploration of the solar
system.
Exploration of Mars was also the
central thrust of a new United States-
Soviet Union space cooperation agree-
ment negotiated in October 1986. and
awaiting enactment at a superpower
summit. Out of 16 agreed cooperative
projects that comprise the new agree-
ment, the first 4 in the list involve co-
ordination of United States and Soviet
Mars missions. These developments
are all leading in the direction of an
eventual joint United States-Soviet
manned mission to Mars.
A manned Mars mission is certainly
feasible, according to the National
Commission on Space. Indeed, some
scientists say that the technical basis
for a manned Mars trip is stronger
than was the technical basis for Presi-
dent John F'. Kennedy's 1961 decision
to land a man on the Moon.
Not only is it feasible, a manned trip
to Mars seems highly probable. The
Soviets have announced their interest
in such a trip. Their long-duration
space flights and development of a
massive launch vehicle are important
components of such a plan. American
scientists have shown a similar inter-
est in a journey to Mars, which stands
out as the most alluring next chal-
lenge for manned space flight. Per-
haps the most important question is
whether such a venture will be done in
cooperation or competition between
the superpowers.
Realistically, a manned trip to Mars
only makes sense if done in a coopera-
tive fashion involving not only the
United States and the Soviet Union,
but also countries around the world.
An international manned Mars
effort--led by the two superpowers-
would be the most challenging and ex-
citing space mission ever pursued.
The cost of a manned trip to Mars
has been estimated at $40 billion, a
price that, if shared by a number of
nations. would cost the United States
much less than was spent to go to the
Moon.
And while some observers would
question the value of such an expendi-
ture, in my view, the benefits are com-
pelling. Such a project would pot some
badly needed direction back into the
U.S. Spare Program. It would do this
by giving high priority to a series of
increasingly demanding projects that
would serve as the technological step-
ping stones toward Mars. Moreover,
such a mission could help lead to a
fundamental reshaping of superpower
rebut ions.
Recall, if you will, the moment when
Apollo II landed on the Moon in 1969.
Nearly everyone on the planet within
range of a television was watching.
Imagine how much more symbolic it
would have been if it had not resulted
from a lengthy United States-Soviet
space race, but rather if it had been
the crowning accomplishment of a col-
laborative effort involving some of the
best scientific and engineering minds
in the world. A manned trip to Mars
could be just such an effort.
And while such a project, in and of
itself, could never eliminate the seri-
ous and difficult political tensions be-
tween the United States and the
Soviet Union. it could play an enor-
mously valuable role in helping the su-
perpowers see their relationship in
new terms. It could do this by helping
demonstrate the Unassailable, yet con-
stantly ignored fact, that the super-
powers have no choice but to coexist
on spaceship Earth.
The President of the United States
should announce that a manned mis-
sion to Mars is a fundamental priority
for our space program, and that such a
mission will be pursued in collabora-
tion with as many nations as are inter-
ested. The formal inauguration of
such a project could be made in 1992,
which has been designated as the
international space year. At the time
of launching the effort, the United
States could initiate work on a Mars
sample return mission to be matched
with a companion Soviet effort. By
1992. the Soviet Union will have sent
two additional spacecraft to Mars, and
the United States will have launched
its Mars Observer. These develop-
ments would provide the foundation
for marshaling the energies, resources
and advanced technologies of many
nations in a peaceful enterprise in
space of an unprecedented scale. The
international space year could not be
celebrated in a more triumphant
manner.
Mr. Speaker, this essentially con-
cludes my discussion today. What I
have tried to do is identify three areas
of space activity that, in combination,
could serve as an alternative to spend-
ing a larger and larger share of our
space budget on deve1oping space-
based and space-directed weapons. The
administration's strategic defenr,e ini-
tiative and antisatellite weapons pro-
grams are justified in terms of nation-
al security, but. as I have argued here
and elsewhere, such weapons, once de-
ployed by both superpowers, would
simply bring new insecurities, and at a
cost far beyond that of the projects I
VP proposed. What I have outlined
are space endeavors that seek to break
from the antiquated conceptions that
now govern our security planning.
Those outmoded ways of thinking.
characterized by the constant pursuit
of weapons as a means toward enhanc-
ing security. could well turn space into
yet a not her battleground for the
United Slates-Soviet arms race. We
can do bet ter than that.
Space is the common heritage of all
he nations of the world. As such, it
should be utilized and explored in a
manner that adds to the world's
common security. As John Foster
Dulles once said, "As we reach beyond
the planet, we should move as truly
unit ed nations." Opportunities for
doing so await our attention. The time
to focus on them is now.
Thank you. Mr. Speaker.
As a final note. I would like to have
printed in the RECORD a partial bibli-
ography on reconnaissance satellites
and the National Reconnaissance
Office. Since I mentioned that the ma-
terial used in my statement was all
available from bookstores and librar-
ies. I thought it might be. useful to list
the titles of those resources.
PARTIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY ON RECONNAISSANCE
SATELLITES AND NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE
Adams. John et el. "Verification: Peace-
keeping by Technical Means." IEEE Spec-
truni, June 1986. pp. 42-80.
Ball. Desmond. A Suitable Piece of Real
Estate: American Installations in Australia.
Sydney. Australia: Hale & Iremonger. 1980.
Stamford. James. The Puzzle Palace: A
Report on NSA. America's Most Secret
Agency. Boston: Houghton Mif tin. 1982.
Burrows, William. Deep Black: Space Espi-
onage and National Security, New York:
Random House. 1986.
Canan. James. War in Space. New York:
Harper & Row. 1982.
Colby. William and Peter Fm-bath. Honor-
able Men: My Life in the CIA. New York:
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11 1712
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE March .11.
That Make It Possible, Elmsford, NY: Perga-
mon. 1985.
Yost. Graham. Spy-Tech, New York: Pacts
on Pile. 1985.
0 1850
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
ERDREICH). Under a previous order of
the House, the gentleman from Arizo-
na [Mr. Kt] is recognized for 60 min-
utes.
[Mr. KYL addressed the House. His
remarks will appear hereafter in the
Extensions of Remarks.)
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
a previous order of the House, the gen-
tleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.
GAYDOS] is recognized for 60 minutes.
[Mr. GAYDOS addressed the House.
His remarks will appear hereafter in
the Extensions of Remarks.]
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
a previous order of the House, the gen-
tleman from California [Mr. LUNGREN]
is recognized for 60 minutes.
[Mr. LUNGREN addressed the
House. His remarks will appear hereaf-
ter in the Extensions of Remarks.]
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
a previous order of the House, the gen-
tleman from New York [Mr. LAFALcz)
Is recognized for 10 minutes.
[Mr. LAFALCE addressed the
House. His remarks will appear hereaf-
ter in the Extensions of Remarks.]
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House. the gen-
tleman from Virginia [Mr. PARRIS) is
recognized for 60 minutes.
[Mr. PARRIS addressed the House.
His remarks will appear hereafter in
the Extensions of Remarks.]
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
' The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gen-
tleman from Connecticut [Mr. MORRI-
soN) is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut. Mr. Speak-
er, I was unavoidably absent earlier today
when the House considered overriding the
President's veto of H.R. 2, the Surface Trans-
portation and Uniform Relocation Act. Had I
been present. I would have voted in favor of
passage notwithstanding the President's ob-
jections.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House. the gen-
tleman from Florida [Mr. MACK) is
recognized for 60 minutes.
[Mr. MACK addressed the House.
His remarks will appear hereafter in
the Extensions of Remarks.]
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House. the gen-
tleman from California [Mr. McCAND-
LEss] is recognized for 80 minutes.
[Mr. McCANDLESS addressed the
House. His remarks will appear hereaf-
ter in the Extensions of Remarks.]
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gen-
tleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH] is
recognized for 60 minutes.
(Mr. ROTH addressed the House.
His remarks will appear hereafter in
the Extensions of Remarks.)
STEPS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD
CHAIRED BY FORMER SENA-
TOR JOHN TOWER?MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO.
100-58)
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
ERDREICH) laid before the House the
following message from the President
of the United States: which was read
and, together with the accompanying
papers, without objection, referred to
the Committee on Armed Services, the
Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
ligence, the Committee on Rules, and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and
ordered to be printed:
(For message, see proceedings of the
Senate of today, Tuesday, March 31.
1987.)
SUBMISSION OF AN AMEND-
MENT TO THE RULES OF THE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, FI-
NANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS
OF THE HOUSE FOR THE 100TH
CONGRESS
(Mr. ST GERMAIN asked and was
given permission to extend his re-
marks at this point in the RECORD and
to include extraneous matter.)
Mr. ST GERMAIN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to
rule XI, clause 2(a), the rules of the Commit-
tee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs for
the 100th Congress were printed in the
REcoRo on February 5, 1987. The following is
an amendment to those rules:
In rule 15. at the end of the description of
the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs and
Coinage, add the following:
The Subcommittee shall not schedule a
hearing on any commemorative medal legis-
lation unless the legislation is cosponsored
by at least 218 Members of the House.
In considering legislation authorizing Con-
gressional gold medals, the Subcommittee
shall apply the following standards:
(1) The recipient shall be a natural
person:
(2) The recipient shall have performed an
achievement that has an impact on Ameri-
can history and culture that is likely to be
recognized as a major achievement in the
recipient's field long after the achievement:
(3) The recipient shall not have received a
medal previously for the same or substan-
tially the same achievement:
(4) The recipient shall be living or. if de-
ceased. shall have been deceased for not less
than 5 years and not more than 25 years:
and
(5) The achievements were performed in
the recipient's field of endeavor, and repre-
sent either a lifetime of continuous superior
achievements or a single achievement so sig
nificant that the recipient is recognized ane
arclaimed by others in the same field, as evi
(fence by the recipient having received tin
highest honors in the field.
LEAVE OF' ABSENCE
By unanimous consent, leave of ab-
sence was granted to:
Mr. ANNUNZIO (at the request of Mr.
FOLEY). through April 30. on account
of illness.
Mr. DANIEL (at the request of Mr.
FOLEY), for the balance of the week,
on account. of illness.
SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED
By unanimous consent, permission
to address the House, following the
legislative program and any special
orders heretofore' entered, was granted
to:
(The following Members (at the re-
quest of Mr. GALLO) to revise and
extend their remarks and include ex-
traneous material:)
Mr. ROGERS, for 60 minutes. on
April 7.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER, for 5 minutes,
today.
Mr. MACK, for 60 minutes, today.
Mr. MCCANDLESS, for 60 minutes,
today.
Mr. MCCANDLESS, for 60 minutes, on
April 1.
Mr. MCCANDLESS, for 60 minutes, on
April 2.
Mr. Rom. for 60 minutes, on April 1.
Mr. Rom, for 60 minutes, on April 2.
Mr. Rom. for 60 minutes, today.
Mr. MOLINARI, for 60 minutes. on
April 1.
Mrs. BENTLEY, for 60 minutes, on
April 7.
Mrs. BErrn.zy, for 30 minutes, on
April 2.
Mr. HASTERT. for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. MOLINARI, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. SHAW. for 5 minutes, today.
(The following Members (at the re-
quest Of Mr. ERDREICH) to revise and
extend their remarks and include ex-
traneous material:)
Mr. PANETTA, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. CONYERS, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. LAFALCE. for 10 minutes, today.
Mr. ESPY, for 15 minutes. on April
20.
(The following Members (at the re-
quest of Mr. LEWIS of Georgia) to
revise and extend their remarks and
include extraneous material:)
Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, for 5
minutes, today.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
By unanimous consent, permission
to revise and extend remarks was
granted to:
(The following Members (at the re-
quest of Mr. GALLO) and to include ex-
traneous matter:)
Mr. CONTE.
Mr. Gitiviarg in two instances.
Mr. SCHAEFER.
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