COMMENTS BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ON "CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS" OF A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-01034R000400110008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 59
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 28, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/19: CIA-REile3:03634-R000400110008-1
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COMMENTS
by
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
on
"CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS"
of
A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
Mr. William H. Jackson
Mr. Mathias F. Correa
Entitled
"THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AND
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE"
February 28, 1949.
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COKTITS
by
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
on ?
"CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS"
or
A REPORT TO ,THE NATIONAL sEcuTurr COUNCIL
by
Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
'Mr. William H. Jackson
Mr. Mathias F. Correa
Entitled
"THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ACENGr.
AND
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE"
February 28, 1949
4P S RE T
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The Committee's report is an admirable eftort to direA the
Central Intelligence AgenCy to fundamentals and is a genu5nely
Constructive effort to improve the production of intelligeade on
which the policy of the United States should be based, rap observa-
tions of the Committee are, in general, accurate, and it objectives
are sound; its conclusions,. however, are, in many respec;s,faulty,
and the recommendations for their attainment are, in mar cased
impracticable.
The larger part of the Report iS concerned with tha amount of
coordination exercised by the Central Intelligence Ageney in regard
to the Other intelligence activities of the Government. It is
realized that an optimum coordination has not yet been reached;
however, not only a start, but considerable progress along the path
of complete coordination has been attained. No gaps 'amain even
though all duplication has not yet been abolished.. On thia subject
of coordination, I am sure the members of the Nationd Security Council
realize the difficulties encountered; particularly, those members
having to do with the unification of the Armed Sereces. A comparable
problem has confronted,the Central Intelligence Ar,ency with the added
obstacle that one additional department is involled.
The Committee states (page 5): "?coordination can most
effectively be achieved by mutual agreement among the various acencies."
4, There is no question as to the validity of that statement. However, to
achieve coordination in such a manner, compromises of wording,
emphasis, etc., have to be accepted.. For example, three months were
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required to secure agreement on most of the present NSCIW.s, while it
required One year to resolve the differences between the Air Force
and the Navy on one NSCID.
The Comdittee begins its discussions on coordination -with the
above-mentioned declaration, but, in numerous cask; thereafter,
throughout the Report, the element of -"direction" in coordination is
intimated and even stressed.. This element of "direction" has usually
been entirely unacceptable to the interested agencies Further, the
Director of Central Intelligence, per se, has no authority to enforce
coordination, and, indeed, the Committee (rage 41) recognizes this
when it says, "The Act does not give the Central Intelligence Agency
independent authority to coordinate intelligenee activities." Yet
many of the Committee's recomMendations hinge upon having such
authority, and many of the alleged shortcomings are due to this lack
of authority. The phrase, "such procedure would violate the chain
of command," gas repeated over and over again in the discussions during
the drawing-up of the present NSCID's.
?
In view of this lack of explicit authority, in view of the
propress made in the relatively short time this activity has been in
operation, and in view of the progress already made in coordination
by mutual agreement if is considered that in not too long 'a period
the continued augmentation of sueh a program will more than justify
any delays incureed.
- A second alleged shortcoming is ,that the Central Intelligence
Agency ip "overOdministered in the sense that administrative
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conditions have been allowed to guide and, on occasion, even control
intelligence policy, to the detriment of the lattera" The adminis-
tration of the Central Intelligence Agency has been developed on
the following pattern:
(1) Budget, personnel, and other support services are
essential to any operation, and are centralized to serve all
components of the Agency.
(2) Control procedures are restricted to keeping within
the budget requirements, insuring that illegal transactionsare.not permitted, avoiding waste and duplication in expendi
tures, and maintaining certain standards required by securitys.
the Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, and the
General Accounting Office. No agency, regardless of its natures
and most emphatically one that handles confidential government
funds, can possibly avoid such controls.
Administration has advised on policy tatters and should continue
to do so, particularly,in the determination of the ability to support
operational proposals and in ihe achievement of greater efficiency with
the means Available for operations. .Administration has no voice in
determining the substance of operational direction, guidance, and
productions nor should- it ever have.
There is a neverending argument on the merits Of administration
versus operations. The operating people wduld like to be given a
lump sum for their operations and camPlete latitude with regard to
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