PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL CONTROLS OVER OPIATE TRAFFICKING IN ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89M00699R002201800007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Trafficking in Asia
Prospects for Regional
Controls Over Opiate
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Secret
NI JIM 87-10011
August 1987
Copy 3 6 6
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NI I IM 87-10011
PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL
CONTROLS OVER OPIATE
TRAFFICKING IN ASIA
Information available as of 31 July 1987 was used
in the preparation of this Memorandum, approved
for publication by the Chairman of the National
Intelligence Council on that date.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
International Cooperation Needed for Interdiction ........................... 7
Factors Affecting Cooperation ............................................................. 7
Thailand-Burma .................................................................................... 9
The Setting: Heartland of the Golden Triangle ............................. 9
Bilateral Relations: Old Antagonists ................................................ 9
Evidence of Past Narcotics Cooperation: Little To Show ............. 9
Potential US Role: Possible Catalyst ................................................ 9
International Role: Nebulous Possibilities ....................................... 9
Prospects for Cooperation: Fundamentally Bleak .......................... 11
Thailand-Laos ....................................................................................... 13
The Setting: Deterioration on Display ............................................ 13
Bilateral Relations: Cool ................................................................... 13
Evidence of Past Narcotics Cooperation: None Apparent ............ 13
Potential US Role: Little Chance ..................................................... 13
International Role ............................................................................. 13
Prospects for Cooperation: Not Good ............................................. 13
Thailand-Malaysia ................................................................................ 15
The Setting: A Heroin Mainline ...................................................... 15
Bilateral Relations: Gradual Improvement ..................................... 15
Evidence of Past Narcotics Cooperation: Increasingly Evident.... 15
Potential US Role: Available and Willing ....................................... 15
International Role: ASEAN Has a Real Impact ............................. 16
Prospects for Cooperation: Continued Improvement is Likely..... 16
Pakistan-India ....................................................................................... 17
Setting: Burgeoning Heroin Trade .................................................. 17
Bilateral Relations: Intrinsic Antagonism ........................................ 17
Evidence of Past Narcotics Cooperation: Some Words, But No
Action ............................................................................................. 17
Potential US Role: Dealing With Indian Aloofness ........................ 17
International Organizations: Potentially Useful ............................. 19
Prospects for Cooperation: Possible But Not Yet Likely ............... 19
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Pakistan-Afghanistan ............................................................................ 21
Setting: A Strong and Established Drug Trade .............................. 21
Bilateral Relations: Always Strained, Now Hostile ........................ 21
Evidence of Past Narcotics Cooperation: Afghan War Blocks
Bilateral Contacts .......................................................................... 21
US Role: Little Opportunity ............................................................ 21
International Organizations: Afghan Policy Deters Help .............. 21
Prospects for Cooperation: Virtually Nil Without Political
Change ........................................................................................... 22
Pakistan-Iran ......................................................................................... 23
Setting: Opiate Symbiosis ................................................................. 23
Bilateral Relations: Iran Radicalism Stymies Cooperation ............ 23
Evidence of Past Narcotics Cooperation: Some Talk,
No Action ...................................................................................... 23
Potential US Role: None Foreseeable .............................................. 23
International Role: Possible, But Unlikely ...................................... 23
Prospects for Cooperation: Alive, But Barely ................................. 23
Other Key Border Areas ....................................................................... 25
Prospects for Third Country Involvement ...................................... 25
Conclusion ............................................................................................. 27
ANNEX A: Opiate Trafficking in Southeast Asia ............................... 29
ANNEX B: Opiate Trafficking in Southwest Asia .............................. 31
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SCOPE NOTE
This study constitutes the Intelligence Community's initial attempt
to assess the near-term prospects for international cooperation to
interdict the flow of opiates within Southeast and Southwest Asia. It
focuses on the outlook over the next two years for bilateral cooperation
at key border areas and discusses such cooperation as the most effective
method for fostering drug interdiction. Political, economic, social, and
ethnic/religious considerations will be the primary dimensions em-
ployed to analyze these bilateral relationships. Secondary assessments of
potential multinational, key third country, and US roles in promoting
bilateral cooperation programs also will be presented.
This study recognizes the resilience and ingenuity of the opiate
trafficking trade and the inevitability that effective interdiction at any
key border in Asia will be met by new trafficker responses including en-
hanced drug flows across other borders. Accordingly, this study must be
viewed as a probable precursor of future papers that will examine other
border dynamics.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Southeast and Southwest Asia supply about 60 to 65 percent of the
heroin consumed in the United States. The prospects for opium/heroin
interdiction in Asia is largely a function of cooperation in six key
bilateral relationships: Thailand-Burma; Thailand-Laos; Thailand-Ma-
laysia; Pakistan-India; Pakistan-Afghanistan; and Pakistan-Iran. We
judge that the extent of ingrained rivalries and hostilities seen in these
country pairings will generally limit the extent of cooperation possible
on drug interdiction in Southeast and Southwest Asia. This, together
with the increase in opiate cultivation and heroin production now in ev-
idence in Asia, makes the future for counternarcotics efforts in the area
bleak in the near term
Regional organizations may have some, though limited, impact on
the prospects for progress on drug interdiction. The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has exerted a positive influence on
antinarcotics matters and produced some concrete results. In contrast,
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is of
more recent vintage than ASEAN and has had much less impact on its
members. More important, the isolation of the major opiate production
areas of Southeast and Southwest Asia-Burma, Afghanistan, and
Laos-from the political mainstream places fundamental constraints on
the prospects for significant area interdiction efforts.
Thailand and Burma are unlikely to cooperate with each other
significantly and lastingly on opiate interdiction, despite some seemingly
hopeful signs this year. The continued absence of Thai-Burma cooperation
in turn seriously undermines prospects for total regional cooperation on
drug interdiction as these two neighbors are the largest opiate producer
(Burma) and trafficker (Thailand) nations in Southeast Asia.
There is little possibility over the near term of effective cooperation
between Thailand and Laos. An ideological chasm currently separates
these two ethnolinguistic cousins, exacerbated by poor relations between
Thailand and Laos's mentor: Vietnam. The Laos Government also refuses
to acknowledge an indigenous opiate industry, while evidence is growing
that their officials use the drug trade as a source of revenue. The United
States has little leverage with Vientiane, and the United Nation's
potential effectiveness in this field is questionable. As for a third country
involvement in the matter, only Vietnam or the USSR appear to possess
sufficient leverage to spur Vientiane to active narcotics suppression at this
time. However, for a variety of reasons, prospects that either government
would be willing to exert such pressure are not bright.
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The Thai-Malaysian relationship in the past contains evidence of
some effective cooperation on drug interdiction, and continued im-
provement is likely. A confluence of national interests has enabled these
two essentially dissimilar neighbors to work jointly to try to control
opiate trafficking. This cooperation has been predominantly informal
but is becoming increasingly institutionalized. Both the United States
and ASEAN have contributed constructively to this cooperation.
India and Pakistan hold the key to effective Southwest Asian opiate
interdiction, but these rivals are unlikely to cooperate significantly in
this matter in the foreseeable future. Although there have been cyclical
rapprochements between the two governments, which have included
limited agreements on narcotics, the effects have been modest. Genuine
concerns over domestic drug problems and the desire to find noncontro-
versial issues to maintain lines of communication, however, have fueled
recent bilateral talks on narcotics between these two nations. Border
discussions, encouraged by the SAARC, have generated some positive
exchanges, but effective implementation seems distant. Indian suspi-
cions probably will inhibit a US or other third country role in promoting
cooperation here. The United Nations could be a stimulus to such
cooperation eventually as it works on narcotics aid programs in the two
countries
There is virtually no chance of interdiction cooperation between
Pakistan and Afghanistan until the Afghan war ends and a regime
acceptable to Islamabad is established in Kabul. The two governments
do not communicate directly, as Pakistan prefers to deal with Moscow.
Furthermore, Kabul does not take responsibility for its large domestic
opiate production-blaming the drug problem entirely on Pakistan and
on Afghan resistance forces. Tribal groups in the Pakistani-Afghan
border area dominate the opiate trade and operate with relative
impunity as neither side wants to antagonize them.
The Pakistani-Iranian relationship appears to hold some long-range
promise for interdiction cooperation, although there has been scant
evidence of such productive joint efforts thus far. Both regimes would
like to control the untamed border region but they are deterred by
rugged topography and rebellious local tribes, which operate the drug
trade. As in the Pakistani-Afghan border, the opiate trafficking is an
entrenched component of traditional smuggling activities. Pakistan is
less willing to provoke the tribes in Iran, however, and the radical,
capricious nature of the Tehran regime discourages effective coopera-
tion programs. The United States and international organizations have
little influence on Iran and thus on any potential border cooperation
scenarios.
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Third countries, other than the United States and possibly the
USSR, do not have sufficient leverage or interest to boost international
cooperation in Southwest and Southeast Asia. Several Western nations
provide some antinarcotics assistance, but it is not sufficient to forge
cooperative efforts on interdiction in these regions. Although the United
Kingdom was the former colonial power in several key narcotics
countries, these nations are no longer responsive to British influence.
The Soviet Union is a pivotal player in certain key opiate-
producing nations like Afghanistan and Laos, however. While it is
conceivable that the Soviets could seek to exploit this situation, there is
no substantial evidence to confirm, and there is some to deny, any
scheme to subvert Western society by promoting the drug trade. In fact,
the USSR has exhibited an unprecedented interest in antinarcotics
matters during the past year and could conceivably become an agent for
positive change in key opiate-producing nations in which they have
influence. Further, in view of the USSR's apparent concern over
domestic drug abuse, it is also conceivable that Moscow could play a
positive role in encouraging cooperation on interdiction between the
Communist states and their neighbors.
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DISCUSSION
1. Southeast and Southwest Asia supply about 60 to
65 percent of the heroin consumed in the United
States. Hence, the prospects for local cooperation in
interdicting the flow of raw and finished opiates to the
international market are of direct and major interest to
the United States. Six key border areas, three within
each region, have been selected to focus this discus-
sion: Thailand-Burma; Thailand-Laos; Thailand-Ma-
laysia; Pakistan-India; Pakistan-Afghanistan; and Paki-
stan-Iran. A portion of the frontiers linking each of
these pairs is a major conduit for the trafficking of
opiates to the international market. Any attempt to
interdict the flow of opiates in Southwest and South-
east Asia, through international cooperation, therefore,
must attack trafficking operations along these strategic
borders
authorization of search and seizure or control of the
production of precursor chemicals. Some arrange-
ments may be formal or informal as in agreements to
allow "hot pursuit" privileges or the rotational station-
ing of liaison officers in neighboring countries.
4. Differentiation between multilateral and bilater-
al cooperation is vital to considering prospects for
antinarcotics efforts in Southeast and Southwest Asia.
Neither, however, is without its disadvantages. Multi-
lateral cooperation is highly desirable in that such
agreements would be more widely sanctioned and
theoretically have the greatest impact. But these
agreements are the most difficult to reach since they
involve the acquiescence of a number of sovereign,
sometimes antagonistic, nations. Bilateral cooperation,
on the other hand, is more limited and more narrowly
2. Increased opium crop cultivation in Asia together
with the changing dynamics of drug trafficking in the
area are outdistancing drug control efforts and the
enforcement capabilities of producer and transit na-
tions. This strongly suggests that the problem is likely
to grow worse rather than better.
International Cooperation Needed
for Interdiction
3. International cooperation is essential in the inter-
diction of narcotics since major drug trafficking routes
normally traverse international boundaries. Unilateral
efforts, such as eradicating opium poppies and other
crops, are an important element in the global fight
against illegal drugs but are of limited value. Enforce-
ment officials need the cooperation of counterparts in
other nations along given trafficking routes to fight the
well-financed drug organizations. This cooperation
can be informal, particularly in the routine aspects of
law enforcement. Exchanges of intelligence informa-
tion and complementary movements of narcotics sup-
pression forces are examples of effective types of
informal cooperation. Written agreements such as
extradition treaties are required for more formal
cooperative efforts in arresting and prosecuting traf-
fickers; so are laws restricting trafficking through
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focused but is achieved more easily.
Factors Affecting Cooperation
5. Four factors generally determine the prospects
for international cooperation on opiate interdiction in
the strategic border areas of Southeast and Southwest
Asia:
Ethnic/religious influences play a significant role
in antinarcotics cooperation. Ethnic animosities
between some nations under review have tradi-
tionally discouraged bilateral cooperation in any
sphere.
Social attitudes toward minority groups involved
in the drug trade may affect a government's will
to suppress illicit activities or offend a neighbor-
ing state that is inhabited largely by the same
ethnic groups.
Political factors also affect prospects for interna-
tional cooperation on interdiction. Ideological
gaps or traditional political rivalries may pre-
clude meaningful antidrug cooperation. On the
other hand, there may be compelling political
reasons that could facilitate cooperative anti-
narcotics effects. Narcotics may be the type of
noncontroversial issue on which to build im-
proved international relationships. In addition,
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antinarcotics efforts may coincide well with
other national imperatives, such as counterinsur-
gency campaigns.
- Finally, economic considerations can influence
narcotics policy. If drug trafficking represents a
traditional and important source of income in a
region, the government will be less willing to
suppress this activity, desiring to avoid negative
political fallout as well as the pressure to provide
alternative income sources.
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Thailand-Burma
The Setting: Heartland of the Golden Triangle
6. Thailand and Burma are the largest opium/
heroin trafficking and producing nations, respectively,
in the Golden Triangle region of Southeast Asia, which
is focused roughly on the triborder area of Laos,
Thailand and Burma. According to Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) estimates, the Golden Triangle
region supplies about 17 to 20 percent of the heroin
consumed in the United States. The Thailand/Burma
relationship is pivotal to attempts to interdict heroin
supplies throughout the region. Burma produced 700
to 1,100 metric tons of opium in 1986, mostly in the
northern Shan State where the numerous trafficking
organizations convert the opium to heroin. About 80
percent of the heroin leaves the country through
Thailand, especially across the northern Thailand
frontier bounded by Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and
Mae Hong Son Provinces. Once in Thailand, the drug
smugglers take advantage of the relatively advanced
Thai transportation system to ship the contraband to
Europe and the United States via Malaysia, Singapore,
trafficking groups to fight Communist insurgents.
Bangkok once openly supported these groups as a
buffer against subversion from China. Similarly, Ran-
goon, in the 1960s, armed some of the groups as anti-
Communist militia. Most important in terms of bilat-
eral cooperation, however, is the absence of effective
Burmese control in the border region. This has forced
the Thai to deal with the traffickers and insurgents
alone and precluded effective joint narcotics suppres-
sion operations.
10. Periodically, positive signs have emerged in
Thai-Burmese relations, which could lead to optimism
about cooperation in drug interdiction, but nothing
substantive has occurred thus far. In June 1986, Thai
Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila returned from a
meeting in Rangoon believing that a breakthrough had
occurred on border cooperation. Followup discussions
designed to formalize these changes, however, proved
Nepal, and/or Hong Kong
Bilateral Relations: Old Antagonists
7. Thailand and Burma are traditional foes with an
antagonism dating back to a series of bloody wars in
the 18th and 19th centuries. Distrust still characterizes
their relations, rendering cooperation difficult in any
sphere. Several current and imposing policy differ-
ences compound traditional strains: Burma is a social-
ist nation that follows a rigid nonaligned foreign policy
and discourages close bilateral ties of any sort; Thai-
land is a pro-Western, constitutional monarchy.
8. The two nations also have had some serious
border disputes, particularly involving Burmese insur-
gent groups. Burma believes that Thailand supports
insurgents who control the bulk of the common bor-
der. While Bangkok denies giving any official support
to these groups, many Thai openly sympathize and
collaborate with some of the insurgent organizations,
especially the Karen National Union
Evidence of Past Narcotics Cooperation:
Little To Show
9. Narcotics interdiction cooperation between Thai-
land and Burma has been minimal. Part of the
problem stems from their history showing that both
countries have occasionally collaborated with major
Potential US Role: Possible Catalyst
11. The United States is well-positioned to promote
antinarcotics cooperation between Thailand and Bur-
ma since Washington is the largest supplier of money
and equipment for antidrug programs in both coun-
tries. The US presence in the two countries includes
DEA and State representatives. Attitudes toward
American assistance are favorable in both countries. At
the same time, the United States has been unable to
generate cooperation on interdiction because of mutu-
al distrust between the Thai and Burmese officials,
especially the latter who see the Thai as insensitive to
Burmese internal security concerns. (s NF NC)
International Role: Nebulous Possibilities
12. The United Nations has been an active anti-
narcotics donor in both countries but is not involved
directly in enforcement activities. In addition, UN aid
programs are not large enough to provide the leverage
needed to compel cooperation. The United Nations
may be useful at some point, however, as a neutral
umbrella that could mollify Burmese concerns and
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apjtta !~l V~ ( C h i n a
*BANGKOK
Gulf of
Thailand
ilaysia
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Indian
Ocean
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Andaman tdp
-Sea
0 200 400 Miles
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Gulf of
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(Port.)
South
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Sea
BANDAR SERI
BAGAWAN
'Brunei
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Laos
gle
Thailand
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produce some cooperative agreements. Barring a ma-
jor shift in Burma's isolationist stance, Rangoon is
unlikely to join the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), which sponsors counternarcotics
cooperation activities.
Prospects for Cooperation: Fundamentally Bleak
13. Despite recent improvements in Thai-Burmese
relations and some hopeful indicators, the prospects
for significant and lasting cooperation on opiate inter-
diction are dim. Traditional animosity between Thai-
land and Burma and the latter's isolationist foreign
policy suggest continued noncooperation. Neverthe-
less, the emergence of the Burma Communist Party
(BCP) as a major heroin trafficker could be a catalyst
for change. Previously, the BCP grew opium and sold
it to border heroin refiners, but the deployment of
BCP troop contingents and installation of several
refineries in the border region have changed the
equation. There now exists a slim possibility that the
anti-Communist governments in Rangoon and Bang-
kok might wish to collaborate at least to defeat this
particular trafficker/insurgent menace. The more
likely course, however, is continued independent Bur-
mese suppression operations against the BCP and Thai
manipulation of other border trafficking groups to
counter BCP influence.
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Thailand-Laos
The Setting: Deterioration on Display
14. Small quantities of opium always have trickled
out of Laos into Thailand. This trafficking route had
been relatively dormant under the current Communist
regime in Laos. However, over the past three years
opium production has increased dramatically with the
connivance of army and local government officials.
Vientiane's attitude has apparently shifted from be-
nign indifference to active encouragement of opium
production as a needed source of revenue. The opium
crop consequently increased from 50/100 tons (1984-
85) to 150/290 tons (1985-86), and heroin refineries
began sprouting on Lao territory. Most of the heroin
and other narcotics now flowing out of Laos are
traversing Thailand, landlocked Laos's traditional out-
let to the world. In fact, there reportedly has been
open collaboration between Lao authorities and Thai
and Burmese traffickers, many of whom are shifting
operations to Laos to avoid Thai drug suppression
campaigns
15. Relations have been strained between these two
neighbors since the Vietnamese-dominated Commu-
nist government came to power in Laos in 1975.
Ideological differences and the Vietnamese presence
have distorted what had been a relatively compatible
relationship based on traditional trade patterns and
close ethnolinguistic bonds. Officially, there has been
periodic and restrained cooperation on border matters,
especially on trade and refugee affairs. Mutual distrust
and hostility, sometimes Vietnamese instigated, how-
ever, have limited interaction. Border tensions and
low-level support for insurgencies by both armies are
constant. The Thai have a fear of Lao-based Vietnam-
ese subversion in impoverished Northeast Thailand,
while Vientiane accuses Bangkok of sending rightist
insurgents into loosely controlled territory. Meanwhile,
Thai officials' public accusations that the Lao regime
promotes narcotics trafficking only irritates Vientiane
sensitivities
Evidence of Past Narcotics Cooperation:
None Apparent
16. There has never been perceptible cooperation
between Laos and Thailand on opiate interdiction.
The two governments now have contrasting attitudes
toward narcotics. The Lao Government denies having
any large-scale drug crops on its territory while the
evidence indicates that Lao authorities encourage pro-
duction, processing, and trafficking of opiates and
marijuana. On the other hand, Bangkok has become
increasingly active in suppressing the drug trade,
though corruption remains a nagging hindrance.
Potential US Role: Little Chance
17. Strained US-Lao relations give Washington too
little leverage in securing Lao antinarcotics coopera-
tion. In addition, Lao ability to improve relations with
Washington are limited by the state of US-Vietnamese
relations, which are not expected to be normalized in
the foreseeable future. The current disingenuous Lao
line of denying large-scale opiate production further
undercuts possible US effectiveness on the matter; a
recent US overture to Laos offering aid to reduce the
opium crop was rebuffed for this reason. It may be
possible for the United States in the future to persuade
countries that have aid programs in Laos, that is, Japan
and Australia, to stress the narcotics issue.
18. Vientiane's current disclaimer policy regarding
illegal drugs also will discourage attempts by the
United Nations or other international organizations to
help in opiate interdiction. The Communist nation
may be more willing to accept a neutralist United
Nations in an intermediary role at the appropriate
time, however, than to rely on Western assistance.
Prospects for Cooperation: Not Good
19. Only Vietnam or the USSR appear to possess
sufficient leverage to spur Vientiane to active narcotics
suppression at this time. Hanoi may be reluctant to
play a role in reducing Laotian drug activity because
of preoccupation with its own economic reform efforts
and its lack of resources. The same could be said of the
USSR although evidence that Gorbachev is now em-
phasizing an antidrug policy at home may offer a faint
glimmer of hope.
20. The chances of Lao cooperation with Thailand
on opiate interdiction appear to be remote. It is most
likely that the cash-poor Lao will continue active
involvement in the drug trade for as long as possible,
regardless of the impact on Vientiane's international
image.
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Thailand-Malaysia
The Setting: A Heroin Mainline
21. Heroin refined in the Thai/Burmese border
area has been flowing increasingly through southern
Thailand and across Malaysia to the international
market. Convenient air, road, sea, and rail transporta-
tion and corruption among enforcement officials have
encouraged this trafficking route. Dramatic increases
in heroin seizures and in the local heroin addict
population in Malaysia help attest to the heavy flow.
Refineries have also appeared increasingly inside Ma-
laysia, though the heroin produced is consumed locally
for the most part. Heroin headed for the United States
and Canada normally moves via Singapore, Hong
Kong, and the Malaysian island of Pinang.
Bilateral Relations: Gradual Improvement
22. Occasional strains and frigidity have character-
ized relations between the Thai/Buddhist administra-
tion in Bangkok and the Malay/Muslim government in
Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia often has been disappointed
with the Thais not doing enough to suppress the
Malaysian Communist Party within Thai borders and
to govern fairly the Malay Muslim minority in south-
ern Thailand. Bangkok, on the other hand, has been
miffed by Kuala Lumpur's reluctance to engage in
joint operations against border-dwelling Thai Muslim
separatists who are still an annoyance even though
they have declined in influence recently in Malaysia.
Thai-Malaysian antidrug efforts represent the most
effective and promising form of counternarcotics co-
operation seen in either Southeast or Southwest Asia.
25. A primary aspect of Thai-Malaysian coopera-
tion involves the exchange of intelligence information
on opiate trafficking. Most of this intelligence flows
south from Thailand to Malaysia in parallel with the
direction of the narcotics trade. In another sphere,
Thai officials often attempt to have Malaysian authori-
ties arrest and prosecute drug offenders under the
stricter Malaysian antinarcotics laws. In still another
area, police officers from both countries travel fre-
quently across the border to confer on drug cases.
There is also informal cooperation on the extradition
of narcotics offenders from one country to another,
with authorities simply transferring individuals on
request rather than waiting for the formal extradition
transactions
26. This significant, though mostly informal, Thai-
Malaysian cooperation has been bolstered by periodic
high-level meetings between Thai, Malaysian, and
Singaporean enforcement officials. The lower fre-
quency of these meetings recently reflects the resolu-
tion of earlier problems rather than flagging interest. A
further step toward institutionalizing informal cooper-
ation is a plan to station Malaysian and Singaporean
narcotics officers on a rotational basis in southern
Thailand.
23. During the past five years, however, relations
between Thailand and Malaysia have been warming,
and there has been increased cooperation in dealing
with border problems. Regular high-level meetings
have taken place designed to avoid misunderstandings
and sustain cooperation. A confluence of national
interests on several issues, including opposition to
Vietnamese expansionist behavior, has encouraged im-
proved relations. An undercurrent of distrust remains,
however, which could reemerge with a change of
circumstances.
Evidence of Past Narcotics Cooperation:
Increasingly Evident
24. The general improvement in Thai-Malaysian
relations and Kuala Lumpur's avid interest in antinar-
cotics matters have yielded significant benefits for
bilateral cooperation on drug suppression matters.
Although limited and predominantly informal, current
27. Lingering distrust between these two culturally
dissimilar neighbors is to blame for some remaining
impediments to the new cooperation. Thai officials,
for example, complain that Malaysian counterparts are
not forthcoming either with intelligence or on details
of enforcement activities. Conversely, Malaysian po-
lice are wary of sharing some information due to an
inherent fear of corruption among Thai enforcement
agencies. This distrust has been diminishing, however,
as the positive results from cooperation have increased
and been more evident.
Potential US Role: Available and Willing
28. Washington's antinarcotics cooperation with
both Thailand and Malaysia affords the United States
an opportunity to promote further bilateral efforts on
opiate interdiction. DEA representatives in southern
Thailand and Malaysia already have been a key link in
establishing exchanges of intelligence between Thai
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and Malaysian authorities. Much of the useful infor-
mation involved in the exchanges emanates from DEA
operations. Prior to the thaw in Thai-Malaysian rela-
tions five years ago, DEA often was virtually the only
communication link between narcotics officials on
both sides.
29. Current antinarcotics programs are, perhaps,
already the strongest component of US-Malaysian
relations and are getting better. Kuala Lumpur be-
lieves that US support for Prime Minister Mahathir's
successful effort to become president of the Interna-
tional Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Traffick-
ing will enhance this bond. Strong US-Malaysian
antidrug ties and Washington's preeminent role in
Thailand's drug enforcement program allow the United
States to encourage and facilitate cooperation between
the two nations. In truth, however, joint efforts be-
tween Thailand and Malaysia on interdiction have
been progressing independently of US involvement.
International Role: ASEAN Has a Real Impact
30. The Thai-Malaysian situation also offers a para-
digm for the role of international organizations in
promoting cooperation on opiate interdiction. In this
case, both parties are members of ASEAN and have
been active proponents of that organization's gradually
expanding antidrug programs. ASEAN has embarked
on a long-range plan under which each of the six
member-states provides centralized training for drug
officials of the other members. The United Nations has
provided most of the funding for these activities.
Thailand has hosted an annual training exercise for
ASEAN drug enforcement officers since 1980, and
Malaysia embarked on a similar program for drug
rehabilitation workers last year
31. Narcotics is also an important component of
annual meetings of ASEAN police officials (ASEAN-
POL). These conferences are useful for exchanging
information and, most important, establishing the
personal contacts that stimulate informal cooperation
among regional police officials. The principal weak-
ness in ASEAN's antidrug role is the lack of any formal
mechanisms for coordinating and promoting drug
enforcement cooperation. While currently staffed by
only one official, the ASEAN narcotics desk in Jakarta
does function as a medium for exchanging information
and potentially could provide the framework for more
institutionalized ASEAN drug suppression programs.
ASEAN eventually may develop the type of regular-
ized cooperation on counternarcotics that has already
been achieved on key regional security issues. Political
and ethnic rivalries, however, are likely to impede or
even derail this movement toward a more institution-
alized system, making informal cooperation more the
norm.
Prospects for Cooperation: Continued
Improvement Is Likely
32. Thai-Malaysian drug interdiction cooperation
will probably progress as long as overall bilateral
relations remain good. More institutionalized arrange-
ments involving such sensitive issues as "hot pursuit"
rights-formerly granted for anti-Communist cam-
paigns-also may be possible with continued joint
antidrug collaboration. Prolonged and effective drug
interdiction cooperation should restrict, though not
totally shut off, opiate trafficking through the area.
Limited enforcement resources, geographic factors
(mountainous terrain, long coastlines), and corruption,
especially in Thailand, will serve to diminish the
potential impact of these cooperative ventures. Success
achieved in interdiction, however, at least may force
traffickers to shift routes into other more costly and
less convenient approaches.
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Pakistan-India
Setting: Burgeoning Heroin Trade
33. Long an opium producer, Pakistan has also
become a major heroin trafficking and refining coun-
try during the last eight years as a result of political
upheavals in the other "Golden Crescent" nations of
Iran and Afghanistan that disrupted traditional smug-
gling patterns. The total region now accounts for about
40 percent of US heroin according to recent DEA
figures. With the new influx of heroin through Paki-
stan, that nation's traditional opium consumers began
using heroin No. 3 (smokable). There are now an
estimated 500,000 heroin addicts in Pakistan.
34. Another byproduct of the shift in "Golden
Crescent" trafficking patterns has been the emergence
of Pakistan's eastern neighbor, India, as a major drug-
transit nation. Many of the routes from Afghanistan
across Pakistan to India follow traditional commercial
and contraband patterns with heroin representing an
additional black-market item. Symptoms of the ex-
panding heroin flow through India include a growing
addiction problem in India (250,000 to 350,000) and
the diversion of increasing amounts of India's large
licit opium crop (800 tons in 1986) for use in the heroin
trade, with most of this diverted opium still consumed
locally
Bilateral Relations: Intrinsic Antagonism
35. Despite cyclical warming trends, visceral dis-
trust and hostility have characterized Pakistani-Indian
relations since the creation of Muslim Pakistan in
1947. Acute ethno/religious differences and concomi-
tant political conflicts have resulted in three wars
between Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India.
36. Both India and Pakistan view each other as
security threats. The Indians object to Pakistan's close
security links to the United States and China, and
believe their Muslim neighbor encourages and sup-
ports Sikh separatists and Islamic elements in northern
Kashmir. Meanwhile, Islamabad shares a fear-held
by all South Asian countries-of Indian domination.
The loss of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, to an
Indian-backed indigenous revolt in 1971, deep-seated
fears of Indian meddling in Sind Province, and the
occupation of Afghanistan by India's close friend, the
USSR, have been particularly disturbing to Pakistan.
Evidence of Past Narcotics Cooperation: Some
Words, But No Action
37. Until recently Indo-Pakistani antagonism and
the slow recognition of domestic drug problems in
both countries have precluded concrete interdiction
collaborations. Indian officials previously denied an
indigenous drug problem and preferred to blame the
trafficking situation on Pakistan. Such accusations
have become enmeshed in Indian-Pakistani political
polemics. Islamabad in turn has become predictably
offended and the narcotics issue is now another irri-
tant in already tense relations.
38. India's increasing heroin addiction problem and
emergence as a major heroin transit center, however,
have forced New Delhi to change its traditional stance
on the drug issue. The Indian Government now ac-
knowledges its large heroin addiction problem and also
Indian involvement in heroin trafficking. Narcotics
enforcement agencies have been established in India
to counter the drug trade. More important for inter-
diction cooperation, New Delhi has made some ap-
proaches to Pakistan and other neighbors to discuss the
narcotics problem. In December 1986, officials from
India and Pakistan established a border committee to
attempt to control opiate trafficking by exchanging
intelligence and taking appropriate border security
measures. In February 1987, New Delhi agreed to
exchange information with Islamabad through DEA
auspices.
39. In these instances of drug-related cooperation,
each government was apparently hoping to use narcot-
ics as a low-risk issue to help ease the generally
heightened political tensions. It remains to be seen,
however, whether any concrete action springs from
these recent agreements. Even if the two sides commit
themselves to antidrug cooperation, rampant official
corruption, a long, porous frontier, and the involve-
ment in drug trafficking by dissident groups on both
sides of the border will continue to hamper interdic-
tion efforts
Potential US Role: Dealing With Indian Aloofness
40. The US probably will have difficulty in promot-
ing cooperation on interdiction on the Pakistani-Indian
border due to Washington's limited leverage with New
Delhi. Indian officials did show unusual interest in
consulting US narcotics officials last year on new
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Indian drug programs. An Indo-US working group held
productive talks in September 1986, which resulted in
the stationing of DEA agents outside of New Delhi, in
Bombay, for the first time. Indian authorities may view
cooperation with the US on narcotics as harmless and as
a necessary step in dealing with Pakistan on the issue,
but the deep-seated suspicion of perceived US ambi-
tions in South Asia will probably circumscribe direct US
43. Substantive SAARC impact on opiate interdic-
tion in South Asia and other regional issues depends
largely on the active involvement and cooperation of
its two principal members, India and Pakistan. Al-
though both nations have been active supporters of
SAARC narcotics initiatives thus far, chronic hostility
between the two neighbors is likely to blunt SAARC
drug initiatives in the long run.
influence in the near term.
International Organizations: Potentially Useful
41. India generally prefers to exclude third parties
from bilateral issues and would be unlikely to allow an
international organization to influence its policies.
Moreover, India probably would like to deal directly
with Pakistan on narcotics interdiction. Yet, New
Delhi has shown an interest in using the United
Nations as a supplement for Western antinarcotics aid
and the SAARC as a forum for maintaining contacts
with Pakistan. In fact, the recent Indo-Pakistan border
negotiations on narcotics were inspired in part by
SAARC drug initiatives. In addition the UN Fund for
Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) plans to provide India
in 1988 with substantial antinarcotics assistance (over
$30 million) for the first time.
42. SAARC has made some recent noteworthy prog-
ress on the narcotics problem. The issue was upgraded
to a major agenda item at a November SAARC summit
and technical committees chaired by Pakistan have
been established to coordinate regional drug programs.
SAARC pressure reportedly prompted Nepal to sign the
Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs
Prospects for Cooperation: Possible But
Not Yet Likely
44. Pakistani-Indian cooperation on opiate interdic-
tion may come as a byproduct of the two governments'
desire to find some benign ground in their bilateral
relationship. Given their growing appreciation of do-
mestic drug problems, narcotics interdiction may be
one of the few areas in which there is a convergence of
national interests. Furthermore, India is anxious to
gain greater control over the Punjab State border with
Pakistan, a prime heroin trafficking route.
45. An encouraging sign is the decision of India and
Pakistan in December 1986 to establish a joint narcot-
ics committee to deal with common trafficking prob-
lems. Subsequent meetings will measure the effective-
ness of the organization in producing cooperation on
interdiction. Despite such positive indicators, the near
absence of effective bilateral cooperation between
Pakistan and India on other major issues does not
auger well for long-range joint drug interdiction en-
deavors
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Pakistan-Afghanistan
Setting: A Strong and Established Drug Trade
46. Afghanistan is the largest opium producer (400
to 500 tons in 1986) in the "Golden Crescent" region
of Southwest Asia. Since the Soviet occupation in 1979,
the bulk of Afghani opium has flowed to the Pakistan
border where increasingly it has been refined into
heroin. Pakistani opium (140 to 160 tons in 1986) also
is processed in this area. The refined heroin is trans-
ported out of the border region to escalating addict
populations in India and Pakistan, to traditional re-
gional markets like Iran and, especially, to the West
47. The drug trade is an integral facet of the
Pakistani-Afghan border economy and it uses tradi-
tional trafficking routes. The large-scale heroin pro-
duction, on the other hand, stems from the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. Tribal groups dominating the
narcotics business have taken advantage of the politi-
cal disruptions in the area. While opium always has
appealed to farmers as a lucrative cash crop, the
opium poppy harvests have jumped dramatically in
war-torn Afghanistan due to a lack of effective gov-
ernment control in rural areas and the demands of
greatly expanded heroin production facilities.
Bilateral Relations: Always Strained, Now Hostile
48. The historically strained relations between Paki-
stan and Afghanistan have degenerated completely
since the Soviet invasion. Islamabad does not recognize
the Moscow-backed regime in Kabul and provides
sanctuary and material assistance for Afghan resis-
tance forces opposing the Soviet occupation. There
have been no official contacts between the two nations
in any sphere for the past eight years. The situation is
not likely to change until a government more accept-
able to Pakistan emerges in Afghanistan. It is uncertain
when, if ever, this change in circumstances will occur.
tribal groups heavily involved in the drug trade com-
pounds the problem. These groups extend into both
countries using family/ethnic ties to facilitate drug
trafficking, especially in areas of marginal government
influence]
50. The Afghan war has discouraged attempts to
exert control over the border tribes-allowing them to
play one government against the other to protect their
drug interests. Islamabad would like to exert more
direct influence in the key North-West Frontier Prov-
ince and on autonomous tribal areas near the Afghan
border where the drug organizations are focused. They
are afraid, however, of alienating the tribes to the
benefit of Afghanistan. Kabul and Moscow have recog-
nized this dilemma and reportedly have countered
unpopular Pakistani drug suppression programs by
permitting and, on Kabul's side, perhaps even encour-
aging narcotics operations to continue in Afghanistan.
51. In recent years Kabul has denied any responsi-
bility for narcotic activity in Afghanistan, thereby
virtually precluding discussion of cooperative antidrug
ventures with other countries. Instead, the Communist
regime has accused Pakistan and the Afghan resistance
forces of promoting local opium and heroin produc-
tion. A more objective approach to the narcotics
situation will be needed to breed international cooper-
ation.
US Role: Little Opportunity
52. The United States cannot intervene effectively
to promote drug interdiction until the Afghan war is
settled. Currently, Washington exerts no influence in
Kabul and provides no aid to the Afghan regime.
Perhaps, the most appropriate American narcotics
initiatives could be channeled through Moscow since
the Soviets' recent emphasis on antinarcotics matters
may indicate some receptivity to cooperative drug
Evidence of Past Narcotics Cooperation: Afghan
War Blocks Bilateral Contacts
49. Even if Pakistan and Afghanistan were to devel-
op good relations, efforts at opiate interdiction would
be complicated by geographic and social factors. The
rugged, ill-defined border makes interdiction difficult
under any circumstances and neither country possesses
the manpower and technological resources required to
meet the challenge. The presence of semiautonomous
interdiction efforts.
International Organizations: Afghan Policy
Deters Help
53. Although Kabul is a signatory to international
narcotics agreements, it has not participated actively
in international antidrug efforts. The United Nations
has exerted some pressure on Afghanistan to embark
on narcotics suppression programs, but Kabul cannot
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be expected to accept approaches from the United
Nations until Afghanistan acknowledges its own drug
problems. Even if the regime solicited antinarcotics
assistance, the United Nations might have difficulty in
dealing with a government of such questionable legiti-
macy.
has promoted an appearance of flexibility on Afghani-
stan recently in an attempt to bring the war to an
acceptable negotiated settlement. It is conceivable,
though perhaps unlikely, that the Soviets may wish to
improve Kabul's image and ease its international
isolation by fostering antinarcotics cooperation at some
point.
Prospects for Cooperation: Virtually Nil Without
Political Change
54. Almost certainly, there will not be perceptible
cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan until
the Afghan war is ended. Indeed, Soviet/Afghan cross-
border raids on Afghan resistance bases in Pakistan in
mid-1987 have even further diminished prospects for
joint border efforts.
55. The most promising possibility for interdiction
cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan proba-
bly lies in intervention from the Soviet Union. Moscow
56. Given Pakistan's hostility toward the Afghan
regime, however, approaches for drug cooperation
from Kabul probably would be rebuffed. In addition,
the Afghan Government does not have sufficient
resources, even with Soviet military support, to sup-
press border narcotics activities and is preoccupied
thoroughly with counterinsurgency matters. It would
seem more beneficial for Kabul to humor tribal
traffickers with an indifferent or prodrug policy. In
sum, the unfavorable drug situation at the Pakistani-
Afghan border is likely to continue for the foreseeable
future.
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Pakistan-Iran
Setting: Opiate Symbiosis
57. Iran traditionally has been a major opiate pro-
ducer, consumer, and transit nation. The Iranian
opiate addiction problem worsened immediately after
the fall of the Shah in 1979 due to the disruption of
anti-narcotics agencies and generally uneven govern-
ment controls nationwide. Although there are no
accurate statistics on Iranian addiction, a 1986 CIA
study calculates that there are more than 100,000
heroin addicts and over 800,000 opium addicts in the
country. Opium production in Iran is about 400 to 600
tons annually.
58. Since the 1950s, Iran has imported opium from
Afghanistan and Pakistan to compensate for domestic
shortfalls. Tribal groups straddling both sides of Iran's
border with those eastern neighbors control the drug
trade, using ethnic ties and traditional marketing
techniques to facilitate the trafficking of opiates.
Narcotics are a staple product of the long-established
local smuggling routes, which have been rejuvenated
by a lively black-market trade in revolutionary Iran.
though Pakistan carries on a lively trade, including
military materiel, with Iran.
Evidence of Past Narcotics Cooperation: Some
Talk, No Action
61. The Iranian Government has made some ap-
proaches to Islamabad in an apparent effort to control
border trafficking. The primary Iranian initiative has
been a proposal to erect a border fence to prevent the
movement of seminomadic tribesman, primarily
Baluch, who control the drug trade. Pakistan has
rebuffed this suggestion as impractical and most likely
to provoke the rebellious border tribes. Discussions
among local officials on both sides is said to occur
regularly on the border situation but without measur-
able impact on trafficking nor on bilateral coopera-
tion.
Potential US Role: None Foreseeable
62. The United States is unlikely to take part in any
antinarcotics efforts involving the hostile government
in Tehran. In fact, a perceived US role probably would
be counterproductive by discouraging Iranian partici-
pation. As noted above, Iranian anti-US propaganda
lists the narcotics trade as one of the many evils
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59. The political and economic upheaval, which has
rocked Iran since 1978, has diminished somewhat
Iran's role as a transit point for opiates headed over-
land through Turkey to the West. The Iran-Iraq war
has produced heightened security and heavy troop
concentrations along the border and this has blocked
some traditional trafficking routes. Enough opiates
continue to penetrate this frontier, however, to main-
tain large-scale overland trafficking operations.
Bilateral Relations: Iran Radicalism Stymies
Cooperation
60. The relations between Shiite Muslim Iran and
predominantly Sunni Muslim Pakistan traditionally
have been cool and have worsened since the revolution
in Iran. Tehran has attempted to divert responsibility
for its lingering drug problems by blaming Pakistan
and Afghanistan. Iranian leaders have asserted disin-
genuously that, not only do all opiates consumed in the
country come from their eastern neighbors, but that,
somehow, this problem is a US plot to undermine
Iranian society. Iran also fears that Pakistan may be
aiding Baluchi tribal groups who raid Iranian territory
periodically. Such accusations and Iranian xenophobia
have inhibited official bilateral relations generally,
perpetrated by the "Great Satan."
International Role: Possible, But Unlikely
63. Although the United Nations certainly would be
more likely than the United States to promote Iranian-
Pakistani cooperation on drug interdiction, Iranian
caprice, chauvinism, and isolationism would hamper
UN efforts. Tehran claims to play a leading role in
international drug fora, exaggerating its accomplish-
ments in narcotics enforcement. This bravado and the
tendency to assign responsibility for Iran's drug prob-
lems to other countries are likely to discourage con-
structive outside intervention on opiate interdiction.
Even the possibility of a neutral Islamic country
assisting the Iranians and Pakistanis to reach anti-
narcotics agreements seems remote. Iran has cool
relations with all but the most radical, least responsible
Arab governments.
Prospects for Cooperation: Alive, But Barely
64. The general outlook for Pakistani-Iranian anti-
narcotics cooperation is mixed. Historic frictions exist
between Islamabad and Tehran and the Iranians are
suspicious of the large American presence in Pakistan.
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There have been negotiations, albeit unproductive,
between the two neighbors on the subject, however,
and such open channels of communications have the
potential to bear fruit eventually. Both governments
are determined to fight the drug menace, but are
inhibited by a lack of resources for narcotics suppres-
sion. Both countries have major political and military
problems facing them and international narcotics in-
terdiction will be low on their priority scale for some
time to come. Corruption and the long, rugged, un-
evenly controlled border also contribute to the pessi-
mistic prognosis.
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Other Key Border Areas
65. While the preceding six border regions repre-
sent the current most important opiate trafficking
zones in Southwest and Southeast Asia, other borders
may become prominent in the future. As long as
sufficient demand for opiate products exists in the
world market, traffickers will respond to interdiction
pressure by shifting transit routes to safer areas. Such
activity already has begun in the regions under study
here. Narcotics suppression operations along the Thai-
Burmese border have resulted in a gradually increased
amount of Burmese opiates (perhaps 20 percent) being
shipped across the Burmese-Indian border in recent
years. India already is a principal source of acetic
anhydride, an important precursor chemical, for Bur-
mese heroin labs. Thai-Burmese border heroin refin-
ing operations also are being moved slowly into safer
locations either in northern Burma or into nearby
Laos, increasingly a safehaven for the drug trade.
Nepal is a probable alternative transit country for
Southwest Asian heroin. The Himalayan kingdom
already is a significant trafficking point for local
hashish and for Southeast Asian heroin. These alterna-
tive trafficking routes are unlikely to supplant the
leading transit areas in the near future, however, due
to the superior transportation networks and imperfect
interdiction programs of current opiate trafficking
centers.
Prospects for Third Country Involvement
66. There appear to be only limited opportunities
for countries other than those already mentioned in
the text to promote effectively international antinarco-
tics cooperation in Southeast and Southwest Asia.
Several Western nations provide some assistance for
local narcotics programs, especially for crop substitu-
tion and demand reduction efforts. These countries
include: West Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands,
France, Australia, and Italy. In addition, some nations,
like Australia, Germany and England, have stationed
law enforcement officers in these regions to facilitate
antinarcotics cooperation between their respective
countries.
67. The relatively low levels of antinarcotics aid
provided by these nations and their limited overall
influence generally does not provide them with suffi-
cient leverage to help forge bilateral cooperation on
opiate interdiction in Southeast and Southwest Asia.
There are some situations in which third countries
possess political or economic influence but have not
dabbled in narcotics matters. West Germany and
Japan probably are the two nations most favored by
the reclusive government of Burma, but the United
States and UNFDAC are the only third parties that
have shown significant interest in Burma's narcotics
problem. Similarly, Laos's principal source of Western
aid, Sweden, has not yet provided any antidrug assist-
ance to Vientiane.
68. Despite its own domestic drug problem and
pervasive cultural influence in these regions, the Unit-
ed Kingdom has provided only token antinarcotics
assistance to area countries. The insignificant British
role in local drug programs results in part from
perennial budgetary constraints, which have forced a
long-term reduction in the British presence throughout
its former colonial dominions. In addition, most of the
former British colonies under consideration, that is,
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Burma, prefer to main-
tain a distance between themselves and the former
colonial power for political reasons.
69. Although the United States appears to be the
only Western nation positioned to boost international
cooperation on drug interdiction within the foresee-
able future, the USSR may have a similar opportunity
in some of the nations examined in this study. As
mentioned earlier, Moscow is an important, if not
dominant, foreign influence in Afghanistan, India, and
Laos. The USSR conceivably could utilize this position
to promote cooperation between those key narcotics
countries and neighboring states. In fact, a positive
Soviet role in narcotics interdiction has become in-
creasingly plausible during the past year. Moscow has
demonstrated an unprecedented amount of concern
about narcotics and has indicated a willingness to join
international antinarcotics programs. A gradually ex-
panding domestic drug addiction problem, increased
trafficking of Southwest Asian narcotics across Soviet
territory and Gorbachev's apparent willingness to ac-
knowledge and take on domestic social problems make
it more likely that the USSR will move toward a more
responsive international counternarcotics policy.
70. There is no credible evidence that the USSR has
been masterminding a global Communist effort to
promote the drug trade as a means of undercutting
Western society. Some observers have taken the pro-
drug policy of Laos and the permissive attitude of the
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Soviet client state in Afghanistan toward narcotics as
evidence of such a Communist conspiracy. Economic
and political objectives, however, appear to be inspir-
ing Communist drug activities in Southwest and
Southeast Asia. Impoverished Laos desperately needs
the foreign exchange generated by the illegal narcotics
industry. Parenthetically, Vientiane's former non-
Communist rulers also were reported to have been
involved in the drug trade. The Communist regime in
Afghanistan has little effective control over most of the
country and is unable to enforce an antinarcotics
policy. The other prominent example of Communist
involvement in narcotics is the BCP-the Golden
Triangle's largest drug trafficking organization. Dur-
ing the early 1980s the BCP began to compensate for a
dramatic cut in Chinese material aid to the group. The
BCP's turn to narcotics for sustenance, in fact, follows
a familiar local pattern in which several Burmese
insurgencies have converted to drug trafficking as
their revolutions waned.
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Conclusion
71. The prospects for international cooperation on
opiate interdiction are limited in Southwest and South-
east Asia. Political differences and ingrained ethnic
rivalries are the principal barriers. Comparatively
speaking, there appears to be more potential for
progress on interdiction in Southeast Asia than in
Southwest Asia. ASEAN has exerted a positive influ-
ence on antinarcotics matters and, more important,
produced some concrete results. Member states use
ASEAN meetings to enhance informal bilateral coop-
eration and the informal approach appears to be the
most effective avenue to achieve cooperation on inter-
diction.
72. More important than the ASEAN influence,
however, has been the example set by effective Thai-
Malaysian cooperation. This relationship is likely to
expand on drug interdiction matters and possibly to
attract other ASEAN partners. Singapore, the ASEAN
member most affected by trafficking after Malaysia
and Thailand, already is becoming more involved in
Thai-Malaysian interdiction programs.
73. In contrast, the South Asian regional organiza-
tion SAARC, is of more recent vintage than ASEAN
and has had much less impact on its members. SAARC
does possess some hopeful antidrug proposals on its
agenda, but the inability of key members Pakistan and
India historically to cooperate and the untested nature
of the organization create doubts about the ultimate
success of SAARC programs. In addition, the bilateral
relationships critical for effective interdiction of major
opiate trafficking routes in South Asia are essentially
hostile.
74. The isolation of the major opiate production
areas of both regions from the political mainstream
places fundamental constraints on the prospects for
significant area interdiction efforts. These countries,
Burma, Afghanistan and, secondarily, Laos, have not
been approachable on cooperation with key traffick-
ing nations, namely Thailand and Pakistan. Hence,
traffickers refine opium and ship heroin with relative
impunity in locations requiring maximum suppression
efforts. The overall prospects for opiate interdiction in
Southwest and Southeast Asia are likely to remain dim
until breakthroughs can be achieved in the relations of
these essential source and trafficking nations
Opium Production
(metric tons)
Heroin Production
(metric tons)
Opiate Abusers
25
1-3 a
100,000 to 500,000
Burma
790 to 1470
20-25
300,000 to 400,000 b
Laos
100 to 290
3-5 C
Unknown
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ANNEX A
Opiate Trafficking in Southeast Asia
The Golden Triangle-Burma, Thailand, and
Laos-continues to be a major opiate source for
international heroin consumption, accounting for
about 20 percent of the US and West European
markets. The heroin trafficking chain connects opium
growers in northern Burma to ethnic Chinese whole-
salers in Thailand, who market the highest purity
heroin in the world. Heroin production in the Golden
Triangle has held steady since the early 1980s at 20 to
25 metric tons annually.
Geography, lack of government control over key
growing areas, and the strength of various warlord
armies virtually guarantee that the heroin flow will
continue. The 200-mile-wide band extending north-
ward from the Thai-Burmese border through the Shan
State to the Chinese-Burmese border is the core of
opium poppy cultivation and heroin refining in the
region. Insurgent groups in eastern Burma, primarily
the Burma Communist Party, buy raw opium from
hilltribe growers who cultivate small plots using slash-
and-burn techniques
Heavily guarded caravans of porters and pack
animals move the opium to refineries along the Thai-
Burmese border for processing.
Traffickers operating along the border-including
the powerful Shan United Army (SUA), which has
historically claimed a major share of the traffic within
the Golden Traingle-find refuge from government
attacks in the rugged terrain. They control the major
smuggling routes. Once heroin and heroin base-an
intermediate product-are refined, they are stored at
border villages and then smuggled to rendezvous
points just inside Thailand. Chinese-Thai wholesalers
arrange heroin sales to international traffickers
through outlets near Bangkok and increasingly at the
Thai-Malaysian border. They frequently organize
shipments of processing chemicals back to the border.
Corrupt government officials provide protection for
virtually each link in the trafficking chain
Heroin refining and smuggling prosper because of
the remote and rugged terrain in Burma and the
modern transportation system in northern Thailand.
Neither government has the ability to do more than
make sporadic forays into the area along the Thai-
Burmese border. Bangkok conducts military sweeps
that bring Thai villages under its control temporarily,
but it lacks the resources to seal off the border or
prevent villages from serving as smuggling gateways.
When Thai vigilance over its side of the border is lax,
the resident warlord armies reassert their influence.
Burmese Army forces enter the region as outsiders
and, in most cases, move quickly through villages and
then return to a handful of secure bases at larger
towns. Burmese operations focus on blocking caravans
and striking at refining sites. Rangoon lacks the re-
sources to establish political control.
Information is fragmentary, but it appears that once
the heroin leaves the Golden Triangle it enters a very
competitive market, significantly different from the
rigidly organized trade of the producing areas. The
warlord armies sometimes maintain control of the
drugs until they enter the international trade. It is
more common, however, for small amounts of heroin
to be smuggled from border refineries to Bangkok
where independent ethnic Chinese brokers run dozens
of tightly knit organizations that distribute heroin
throughout Southeast Asia, to Europe, and to the
United States. The route through Thailand is appeal-
ing to the drug traffickers because of the great variety
of available smuggling routes and methods to assure
ample flexibility to counter interdiction operations.
The well-developed highway system and heavy flow
of vehicles in Thailand make it relatively easy for
traffickers to conceal narcotics in private automobiles
and trucks. Traffickers also use domestic airline flights
to move narcotics to Bangkok or other international
transit points on the Gulf of Thailand coast.
Over the past few years, there has been a growing
reliance on alternate smuggling routes as conflict
among trafficking groups and intensified government
drug control efforts have made smuggling from the
border area more risky and costly. A route connnecting
Burma to India, long used to bring drug processing
chemicals into the Golden Triangle, is being increasing-
ly used to send processed drugs the other way. Histori-
cally, most traffickers who dealt through India sold
their narcotics to brokers in Mandalay, Burma, but at
least three major trafficking groups are known to be
building links directly to the Indian heroin market.
Traffickers are developing networks traversing Laos
that move narcotics into northeastern Thailand, bypass-
ing the focus of the enforcement effort at the Thai-
Burmese border. Some traffickers are circumventing
Bangkok and increasingly sending their drugs to south-
ern Thailand for export by way of Malaysia.
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ANNEX B
Opiate Trafficking in Southwest Asia
From the poppy fields in the remote mountains of
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran, Southwest Asian nar-
cotics are moved through intricate webs of handlers
and routes before arriving in the major European and
North American markets
Production of opiate drugs in Afghanistan and
Pakistan is not highly organized. It starts each year
with thousands of farmers deciding to grow poppies
based on prevailing and anticipated market demands.
Their decisions are made independently, without coer-
cion or persuasion from the tribal leaders of trafficking
organizations. This has probably contributed to the
wide yearly swings in cultivation that have been
recorded recently in some areas of Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Sometimes there is forward contracting by
brokers who guarantee farmers a price for their opium
in advance of planting. Even during periods of slack
demand,. many farmers will continue producing opi-
um, holding on to their stocks as a form of cash and as
a hedge against hard times.
Opium is initially purchased in the cultivation areas
either by a local dealer, who may himself be a grower,
or by a dealer from a nearby town. The dealer then
takes the opium to a marketing center or bazaar where
it changes hands by being sold directly to traffickers or
to opium brokers who will stockpile it. Most of the
opium produced in the border area ultimately appears
in the opium bazaars on the Pakistani side of the
border. Landi Kotal, Bara, and Shahabuddin Mela
Darra are major transaction centers. In the past couple
of years Jalalabad and Towr Khan have also become
important brokering centers in Afghanistan.
In addition to growing opium sales, Afghanistan has
seen expanded heroin production in recent years.
Evidence indicates that trafficking organizations in
Afghanistan have had the capability to process opium
into morphine and heroin since the early 1970s, but it
was not until 1983 that heroin processing increased
significantly. For the most part, Afghan refineries are
producing heroin base; that portion of the product line
destined for Western heroin markets is usually smug-
gled to Pakistan for further processing. According to
Pakistani officials, the rise in Afghan heroin produc-
tion is partially a consequence of traffickers from
Pakistan's tribal areas moving to Afghanistan to avoid
antinarcotics pressure from Islamabad. The recent
growth in Afghan refining is also due to increased
opium production in Afghanistan, the decrease in
Pakistani cultivation in the early 1980s, a growing
Afghan drug market including Soviet troops sta-
tioned there, and the increasing profitability of heroin.
Pakistan and Afghan heroin manufacturers appear
to conduct their trade through a small band of asso-
ciates. indicate that typically there
are few people on the manufacturer's payroll: a
chemist and a handful of associates at most. The
manufacturers prefer to leave marketing in the inter-
national and domestic arenas to professional wholesal-
ers and dealers. Many heroin traffickers are powerful
members of Pakistani society, including venerable
elders who are influential in shaping the attitudes of
the tribes. By charging that antinarcotics operations
are an infringement on tribal sovereignty, they have
been able to enlist widespread tribal backing to frus-
trate drug control efforts. Government raids on major
heroin refining centers have often resulted in standoffs
between hundreds of troops and thousands of better-
armed tribesmen.
Both opium and heroin are smuggled out of the
tribal areas to markets in Pakistan and neighboring
countries. Substantial quantities of opium travel by
vehicle and pack train along the Pakistani-Afghan
border into eastern Iran for consumption by the
massive Iranian market. A portion of this opium
undoubtedly transits Iran, probably being converted
into morphine or heroin along the way, and eventually
ends up with Turkish, Syrian, or other trafficking
networks that comprise the western flank of the
Southwest Asian trade. Some heroin also follows this
route, but the most lucrative trade is the shipment of
heroin to international brokers in Karachi, Lahore,
Rawalpindi, and Peshawar who direct smuggling oper-
ations to the West.
The brokers in Pakistan's major cities are a pivotal
link in the Southwest Asian heroin trade because they
connect the isolated, reclusive heroin manufacturers in
the tribal areas with the important distribution organi-
zations in the lucrative Western markets. Brokers with
long and trusted relationships to manufacturers will be
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supplied large amounts of heroin on demand for only from this trade flow back to Pakistan and Afghanistan,
a small downpayment. Fronting their operations but evidence from criminal investigations increasingly
through businesses such as import/export companies, indicates that the proceeds are being laundered
brokers then arrange heroin shipments to distributors through Persian Gulf banks presumably for reinvest-
in the United States and Europe. Some of the earnings ment in the United States and Europe.
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