THE RADICALIZATION OF DISSENT IN SOUTH KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89M00699R002201800006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
The Radicalization of
Dissent in South Korea
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
cret
NI JIM 87-10013
September 1987
Copy 296
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NI I IM 87-10013
THE RADICALIZATION OF
DISSENT IN SOUTH KOREA
Information available as of 27 August 1987 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum,
approved for publication by the Chairman of the
National Intelligence Council on that date.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 5
Out of the Shadows ...................................................................... 5
Radicalism: Some Yardsticks ........................................................ 6
Rhetoric ................................................................................. 6
Numbers ................................................................................ 6
Incidents and Arrests ............................................................ 6
Radical Ideology ................................................................... 7
New Radical Groups ............................................................. 8
The Radicals: How Cohesive a Movement? ............................... 8
Linkages to Labor Activists .................................................. 9
North Korean Connections Are Tenuous ............................ 11
Roots in the Mainstream .............................................................. 11
The Dissident Counterculture .............................................. 12
More Violence Ahead? ................................................................. 14
Implications for the United States ............................................... 15
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SCOPE NOTE
The surprisingly rapid growth of radical dissent in South Korea has
increased concern that proponents of revolutionary ideology and violent
political change will play a disruptive role in the forthcoming political
transition. This paper
examines the emergence of radicalism, the
potential for its growth, and its influence on moderate elements of
Korean society. The paper also evaluates the ability of radicals to tap
and exploit nationalistic and anti-US sentiments, which could lead
conditions that seriously affect US interests on the peninsula.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We fully expect radical students to foment violent protests again in
September, when the school year begins, but it is difficult to predict the
level and scale. Much will depend on the degree of flexibility and
dexterity the government displays. If Seoul tries to backpedal on
reforms, or if negotiations on constitutional and electoral reform sour-
especially if the government is chiefly blamed-we can envision large
numbers of mainstream students and others joining the radicals in the
streets.
Although the appeal of some radical themes suggests the movement
is no longer confined to an insignificant fringe element of students or
dissidents, we see only a limited possibility that radical protest actions
will escalate to insurrection. At this time, we see.little public support for
radical demands for a "mass democracy" constitution, a socialist
restructuring of the economy, and withdrawal of US troops from Korea.
These issues do not have the appeal of the anti-Chun campaign the
radicals conducted during the spring and early summer.
For the organized political opposition, the prospect of capitalizing
on new demonstrations to push demands for reform would be tempting.
Nonetheless, Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, and other politicians
almost certainly would think long and hard before either actively
allying with student radicals or openly encouraging their actions. Both
Kims almost certainly recognize that the government could use evi-
dence of such direct ties to avowedly leftist radicals as grounds for
prosecuting the opposition party's leaders. We also assume the two Kims
recognize that the radicals would prove difficult, if not impossible, to
control.
The number of students categorized by the South Korean Govern-
ment (ROK) as "hardcore radicals" has increased steadily.
Moreover, many of
South Korea's 1 million university and college students-nearly half of
them in the Seoul region-along with the recent graduates and high
school upperclassmen, are influenced by counterculture values and
perspectives. Indeed, we suspect that through churches, contact with
students, and other channels, most of the urban population is regularly
exposed to news and ideas from dissident circles.
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We believe South Korean officials have exaggerated the cohesive-
ness of the radical network and the degree to which a centralized
leadership exists. Student radicals have had limited success in linking
their organizations to workers' groups, which generally distrust campus
dissidents. Although the street protests in June probably had a demon-
stration effect on the subsequent wave of labor unrest, striking workers
have focused on the right to unionize, and on wage and benefit issues,
not broader political themes.
Also, only a few, generally tenuous links exist between radical
groups and North Korean agents. Radicals regularly have adopted
North Korean themes and arguments, however, and may be unwittingly
influenced and supported by North Korean and perhaps even Soviet
front organizations.
The support radicals receive from the South Korean public, in our
view, stems from the Chun government's perceived lack of legitimacy.
Brought to power by a military coup and sustained by a stacked
election, and tarnished by recurring scandals, the government has not
enjoyed backing from the vast majority of respected South Korean
intellectual, social, or religious leaders, including those who are politi-
cally conservative.
Chun's successor is virtually certain to face a radical challenge
from the beginning of his term-either as an attack on the legitimacy of
a ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) victory or as agitation for
drastic reforms by an opposition winner. Even a more liberal leader
might well have to consider shelving reform in favor of the time-tested
controls of his predecessors.
Despite the prospect that radical dissent and related anti-Ameri-
canism will continue to grow, the United States does not appear likely to
become the immediate target for a campaign of terrorist attacks. Only a
small minority approve of such tactics, and we do not believe commit-
ted and well-organized groups that can carry out a terrorist course of ac-
tion now exist or are preparing to emerge.
Over the longer term, the consequences of radical dissent could
become increasingly significant for US interests. Themes raised by
radicals-US economic "imperialism," racism, the use of South Korea as
a "nuclear platform," and others-will remain part of South Korea's
intellectual mainstream well into the 1990s. Moreover, the radicals
could complicate the management of US-ROK relations by stirring up
public sentiment on nationalistic issues such as: the creation of a nuclear
free zone on the Korean peninsula, and the presence and role of the US
military contingent in Korea-for example, the large US military
contingent in Seoul and US dominance of the combined command
structure
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DISCUSSION
1. Despite intensified police crackdowns and harsh
sentences for radical leaders in South Korea over the
past few years, South Korean authorities have been
unable to break the back of radical dissent. In fact,
government actions have increased sympathy for
groups advocating extreme and sometimes violent
forms of political expression. Even before the latest
and largest demonstrations in June 1987, security
service officials were pessimistic about prospects for
controlling radical violence. Their concern has grown
since then, particularly with the release of all but the
hardest core dissident leaders, the restoration of politi-
cal rights to opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, the
uncertainties raised by constitutional reform talks, and
the possibility of a freewheeling presidential cam-
paign
2. When the spring 1987 semester began, the radi-
cal students began changing their tactics. Dissident
leaders recognized the need to attract to their cause
more moderate students, who had been alienated by
their earlier deliberate use of violent protests. As a
result, activists focused on campus issues and broader
3. We believe that the demonstrations in June and
early July point out the growing ability of radical
activists to draw others into violent protest when they
have a o ular issue.
many apparently main-
stream students joined in, and that the demonstrators
enjoyed widespread, active popular backing:
when the ruling party
held its presidential nominating convention on
10 June, demonstrations on campus, and in Seoul
and other cities, drew over 50,000 participants,
with perhaps half this number actively skirmish-
ing with riot police.
Public sympathy-and growing anger over the
government's use of tear gas to disperse
crowds-fueled the daily demonstrations over
the next two weeks. Estimates on participation
varied widely, but the crowds totaled several
hundred thousand nationwide on the peak days,
amounting to possibly the most extensive protests
since the founding of the republic in 1948.
Moreover, despite the ruling camp's acceptance
of the opposition's reform demands on 29 June,
student and dissident leaders were still able to
draw an estimated 500,000 or more participants
in Seoul alone on 9 July, when demonstrations
commemorated the death of an injured student
protester
dissidents
4. Notwithstanding the government's promises of
reform and its relaxation of deeply hated campus
controls, we fully expect radical students to foment
violent protests again in September when the school
year begins again. It is difficult, however, to predict
the level and scale of the protest activity that will
ensue. If the mood on the campuses is volatile when
students return, activists would have little difficulty in
organizing further violent protest actions. Indeed, the
appeal and following of political radicalism in South
Korea suggest the movement is no longer the province
of an insignificant fringe element of students or
Out of the Shadows
5. Over the past several years, the impact of revolu-
tionary political thought-specifically the overthrow
of the current system in favor of a democracy of the
masses-and the growing number of its proponents
have emerged as a major concern among South Korean
officials, academics, and political observers. No single
event in the last several years better dramatized the
upswing in radicalism and extremist behavior than the
violent demonstrations that disrupted an opposition
party political rally in the industrial port city of
Inchon in May 1986.
6. _]claimed that 3,000 radicals were
involved, portraying the incident as an effort by
students and local labor activists to link up in order to
trigger a popular uprising and make blue-collar In-
chon a "liberation district." It seems clear that govern-
ment-controlled TV coverage exaggerated the number
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of protesters and the intensity of the violence
ven so,
the episode shocked most South Koreans, focusing
public attention on the extremist dissidents.
7. The Inchon riots also jolted opposition party
members who saw it first hand. They were especially
taken aback by the radicals' verbal attacks on their
leaders, such as Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam, as
political accommodationists. Even journalists sympa-
thetic to the government's critics publicly cautioned
the opposition party against trying to use radical
violence to its political advantage. Statements by the
two Kims after the incident distanced them from
political extremism, albeit without explicitly con-
demning the radicals or disavowing their basic de-
mands for political reform
Radicalism: Some Yardsticks
8. Developments since Inchon have highlighted sev-
eral aggressive and worrisome elements in the politics
of dissent. Many South Koreans see an increasingly
radical ideological cant in antigovernment rhetoric, as
well as the wider use of violence as an instrument of
protest, some of which is directed at the United States.
The trends admittedly are difficult to quantify, but,
we too, believe there is reason to worry about the
movement's statements, as well as its actions
9. Rhetoric. Over the past two years, the most
extreme dissident groups in South Korea have become
increasingly explicit about their revolutionary beliefs.
Since President Chun Doo Hwan took power in 1980,
radical solutions to South Korea's political "underdeve-
lopment" have become staples in dissident slogans and
publications. Translations of neo-Marxist analysis as
well as the previously banned writings of South Kore-
an dissenters became more accessible in 1983-84,
when Seoul experimented with a liberal policy toward
campus political activity and looser controls on publi-
cation. The government has tightened up since then,
but many radical works, along with tracts on revolu-
tionary strategy and tactics, remain in circulation.
Korean observ-
ers have reported an increasingly virulent and sophisti-
cated content in protest leaflets. Despite new ideologi-
cal twists in the radicals' slogans-P'yongyang's call
for a "national liberation people's democratic revolu-
tion," for example, was widely mimicked by the most
radical groups this spring-much of the radicals'
thinking continues to draw on three basic concepts:
"democracy," "the nation," and "the masses" (see
inset). Over the years, nationalists, intellectuals, and
political dissidents have modified these themes to fit
Korea's history as a nation caught between the Japa-
nese and Chinese empires before World War II, and
dominated and divided since then by the conflict
between the superpowers.
11. Numbers. Any effort to identify and count the
"radical" fringe is highly subjective at best. Security
service estimates of the number of students catego-
rized as "hardcore radicals" have steadily increased.
During 1982-84, South Korean security personnel told
US officials that the number of radicals ranged from
3,000 to 5,000-roughly one-half of 1 percent of the
student population. Recently,
upped the "radical" share of South Korean university
students to 5 percent-roughly 50,000 activists out of a
student population of 1 million. said the
figure included 0.3 percent-about 3,000-who were
dedicated Communists. He estimated that dissident
leaders could mobilize another 40 percent of the
student body under the right circumstances. Professors
in Seoul, for their part, told
that ideological radicals account for perhaps 10 per-
cent of their students, but that a large student majority
generally sympathize with the radicals' motivations.
12. Incidents and Arrests. According to published
government statistics, 1,697 student demonstrations
and protest actions occurred during January-October
1986, compared with 1,014 during all of 1985, and 826
in 1984. The number of violent protests in particular
rose rapidly over the level experienced during the
period of looser campus controls in 1983-84. As a
result, persons detained and formally arrested in con-
nection with student unrest increased from only 35 in
1984, to 594 in 1985, and 4,610 in 1986, according to
official figures. The number of students rounded up
by police but later released with an admonition or
dealt with in summary proceedings also rose steadily.
13. Indictments for antistate acts under the tough
National Security Law (NSL)-another measure of
radical activity-rather than other less severe statutes
also increased dramatically after the Inchon riots.
Official statistics indicate 666 people were formally
arrested for National Security Law offenses in 1986,
up from some 270 arrests in 1985, and only a handful
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Most radical writings are a pastiche of weakly con-
nected ideas, but three core themes surface repeatedly:
- Minju: democracy-specifically the replacement
of military-spawned government with a popular
(and populist) civilian government.
- Minjok: the "national race"-the ideal of a uni-
fied Korean nation, restored to its historical terri-
tory and a position of influence and respect in the
world.
- Minjung: the masses-the notion of a shared
spirit, will and destiny of the oppressed masses,
and their emancipation from exploitation by a
ruling elite
These themes have deep roots in modern Korean
intellectual history and are used to legitimize radical
thought as part of a respected nationalistic tradition.
Radicals also borrow freely from liberation theology
and new Marxism in weaving these themes into an
ideological whole.
The call for "democracy"-minju-echoes a tradi-
tion of post-World War II student protests against
authoritarian government, including the 1960 student
revolution that brought down President Syngman Rhee,
the seasonal campus turmoil during Park Chung Hee's
tenure, and large-scale student demonstrations against
President Chun's rise to power in 1980. In radical
writings, min' vertones of a socialistic
egalitarianism
The concept of "nation"-minjok-evokes the emo-
tion associated with Korea's traditional subordination to
China, its subjugation under Japanese colonial rule, and
in 1984. We judge that arrests for NSL violations
continued at or above this pace through May 1987.
14. Radical Ideology. Even sympathetic observers
have characterized radical thinking as more sloganeer-
ing than reasoned political philisophy. The radical
political agenda covers a broad spectrum of issues,
ranging from guarantees for civil and labor rights,
social welfare programs, freedom of expression, uni-
versity autonomy, military noninvolvement in govern-
ment, and free democratic elections; to removal of
nuclear weapons, withdrawal of US troops, economic
self-sufficiency, the revolutionary creation of an inter-
im government followed by a peoples' constitutional
convention and unconditional reunification with
North Korea. Most radicals also use a hodgepodge of
neo-Marxian arguments against the present political
and economic arrangements, as well as of the whole
its later division as a result of the US-Soviet rivalry. The
twin notions of reunification and national restoration
have permeated literary, philosophical, and cultural
thought in the 20th century, as well as in the constitu-
tions and official ideologies of each postwar Korean
government. Official textbooks on national history de-
vote chapters to the Korean people's traditional devel-
opment and constant struggle for independence against
stronger, predatory neighbors. The 20th century itself is
handled briefly, focusing on the anti-Japanese liberation
struggle, colonial exploitation, Korea's division, Com-
munist atrocities during the Korean war, and the
South's up-by-the-bootstraps development since the
mid-1960s.
"The masses"-minjung-reflects both Marxist-Le-
ninist notions and owes a particular debt to Korean
minjung theology. A highly nationalistic view, minjung
theology has evolved over the past two decades. A form
of liberation theology, it has been indigenized by
dissident Korean Christian clergy, theologians, and phi-
losophers. In many cases, these figures have been
blacklisted from regular seminary and university posi-
tions since the mid-1970s because of their antigovern-
ment activities. The theology draws an allegorical paral-
lel between the trials of the ancient Hebrews and the
suffering of the downtrodden Korean masses under a
series of domestic and foreign oppressors. For minjung
theologians, the Koreans are a chosen people, marked
for both extreme suffering and, with emancipation,
extreme exaltation. Minjung theology sees suffering as
the instrument of liberation that unifies the masses,
producing struggle, emancipation, and justice.
range of US-South Korean ties, but few appear willing
or able to articulate well reasoned arguments in
support of their own positions:
- In part, this probably reflects the strongly emo-
tional and "ethical" grounding that typifies po-
litical dissent in the Korean cultural context
generally, and most intensely among student
dissenters.
The ideological fuzziness also serves, by design
or subconsciously, to insulate radicals from
clear-cut identification as Communists-still
anathema to most South Koreans. Indeed, while
most radicals staunchly deny being pro-Commu-
nist, the seemingly disjointed collection of
themes espoused by more extreme groups
amounts to a revolutionary political agenda
without a Leninist ideological framework.
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15. New Radical Groups. The occupation of the
USIS library in Seoul in May 1985 by the "Sammint-
'u," the Struggle Committee for the Three People's
Principles, marked the debut of several new, self-
proclaimed and better organized radical student "ac-
tion" groups. A wave of attacks on government and
US-identified facilities followed, and in November
1985 nearly 200 radical students vandalized the train-
ing institute of the ruling Democratic Justice Party.
16. Although police ferreted out senior Sammint'u
leaders and their older mentors, the claims of South
Korean security officials that they had neutralized the
core of this radical movement proved ill-founded.
Younger radical leaders, chiefly former student activ-
ists and expelled students in their early twenties,
quickly filled the gap. Offshoots of the Seoul Sam-
mint'u and new groups using similar names surfaced
on campuses in late 1985. By early 1986, several new
groups with even more radical rhetoric and intentions
emerged, taking leading roles in the Inchon incident:
- The "Minmint'u," the Anti-Imperialist, Antifas-
cist National Democratic Struggle Committee,
advocates a united front with other dissident
groups. It seeks to establish provisional revolu-
tionary governments and to convene a people's
constituent assembly to rewrite the Constitution
as a steppingstone to socialist revolution and
national reunification.
- The more radical "Chamint'u," the Anti-US
Self-Reliance, Antifascist Democratization
Struggle Committee, gives highest priority to the
expulsion of the United States from South Korea.
It seeks a peninsula-wide social revolution led by
the exploited classes, setting the stage for Korean
unification. Unlike the Minmint'u, however, it
supports direct elections as a first step.
17. The government crackdown on the Chamint'u
and the Minmint'u after Inchon caused these loose
networks to fragment, metastasize and frequently
reemerge with new leaders and new names but much
of the same core agenda. Numerous small groups still
identify themselves as Minmint'u or Chamint'u, while
the Anti-Imperialist League, Constituent Assembly
group, and the National Liberation People's Demo-
cratic Revolution that have emerged since last fall
closely echo Minmint'u or Chamint'u core themes.
18. So far, universities in Seoul, including South
Korea's three most prestigious institutions-Seoul Na-
tional University, Korea University, and Yonsei Uni-
versity-have been hothouses of radicalism. There are
70-odd underground student circles in the capital
according to recent press reports, and similar groups
have sprung up in other cities.
are notably thin on evidence. For example, we
ave not found information n
shared funding or extensive intergroup planning meet-
ings. We believe such ties would be more evident if
the radical opposition were a nationwide, tightly knit
network.
20. Independent action appears to be the rule:
- The seizure of the American Consulate in Pusan
by Chamint'u and Minmint'u members from
Seoul in 1986 was not coordinated with sister
groups in Pusan.
- The Chamint'u students from Pusan National
University who attacked the Consulate in De-
cember 1986 apparently did not inform their
counterparts in Seoul-even though their attack
took two weeks to plan.
Radical groups in Seoul, however, appear to cooperate
better than most outside the capital-sharing informa-
tion and coordinating demonstrations on major protest
days. Seoul groups also took the lead in organizing a
pan-national student leadership meeting in Taejon on
19 June, which drew some 6,000 mostly radical stu-
dents from 83 universities. The daylong gathering to
plan a fall strategy appears to have produced little
more than an amorphous agreement to form a national
coordinating organization, and an affirmation of the
goals of establishing an interim revolutionary govern-
ment and convening a people's constitutional conven-
tion.
broad-based cooperation.
21. Fear of police infiltration and informants al-
most certainly explains some of the inhibitions against
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radicals regularly use pseudonyms or first
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university professors say
that competition for recruits, one-upmanship in orga-
nizing demonstrations, personal rivalries, and ideologi-
cal and tactical disputes also keep ties weak.
22. Even in the broader spectrum of dissident
organizations, beyond hardcore student activists, coop-
eration is limited. Such groups as: the proscribed
Federation for Mass Movement for Democratic Unifi-
cation, the Catholic Farmers Association and the
Catholic Young Workers, and the Human Rights
Committee of the Korean National Council of
Churches or the Catholic Priests for Peace and Justice
have sometimes worked in loose alliance. But such
combinations as the Council for the Promotion of
Democracy (CPD)-a dissident coalition closely tied to
the main opposition party-and the National Coalition
for a Democratic Constitution-a somewhat broader
umbrella organization-have served chiefly as nodes
for communication and liaison rather than as cohesive
groups. Even under the freer political climate since
June, these organizations have not emerged as a
unifying institutional voice with a focused program for
societal reform. As in most other nongovernmental
organizations in South Korea, institutional sinews ap-
pear too weak to control competing interpersonal ties
"political motivations" of this group, although the
government has also urged employers to find white-
collar jobs for "disguised" students, suggesting that
often the students' motivations may have been chiefly
25.I 'claim that many of the small
radical groups rolled up after the Konkuk University
episode were giving high priority to politicizing work-
ers (see inset). Given the apparent success of the police
in disrupting such groups, their direct influence is
hard to gauge.
suggests that student activists have been
more committed to building such ties than have
dissident labor leaders, who generally appear ambiva-
lent about a linkup with student radicals:
- Activist workers at times seem to welcome stu-
dent support and publicity for such demands as
free unions, collective bargaining, improved
working conditions, and workers' rights.
- In other instances, protesting workers have
viewed student involvement as a liability, entail-
ing an ideological taint and increased risk of
violence.
and parochial factional interests.
23. Linkages to Labor Activists. The possibility of
close cooperation among student radicals, other dissi-
dents, and worker activists has concerned President
Chun, as it did his predecessor, Park Chung Hee.
Indeed, the spread of unrest to young unemployed
workers raised the Pusan-Masan riots in 1979 to the
crisis stage, triggering policy arguments over strategy
that led to Park's assassination by his security chief.
Accordingly, ensuring that students and labor are
divided-as well as separated from Christian dissi-
dents and the leading political opposition party-has
been a cornerstone of Seoul's strategy to check dissent.
24. Seoul has been especially tough against dissident
efforts to bridge this gap. For example, many incidents
of alleged brutality or torture by police interrogators
reported by uman rights groups
have involved dissidents accused of trying to organize
a united front. The government also has tried hard to
weed former student activists out of the blue-collar
work force. Last year police officials claimed some 600
so-called disguised workers had misrepresented their
educational background to get factory jobs; of these,
162 were formally arrested for trying to organize and
influence workers. have stressed the
ists are leery of campus dissidents.
Qabor activists in 1986 were becoming disil-
lusioned with student radicals, who saw basic
worker concerns as tactical issues, rather than
ends in themselves.
26. Although factory workers participated in the
June demonstrations, they did not walk off the job or
otherwise act in concert to support the protests.
Moreover, we believe that many young workers may
envy the student radicals' educational opportunities
and even despise students for wasting these advantages
through feckless protest activities.
27. Indeed, while the widespread labor unrest this
summer clearly was sparked in part by the June
demonstrations-and by signs that the government
was prepared to capitulate on longstanding labor rights
issues to avert economic and political chaos-workers
have focused almost exclusively on wage and benefit
issues, along with the right to unionize. Even the
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Social, Psychological, and Economic Factors
Bridging Class Lines.
Evidence suggests participation in radical antigovern-
ment activities cuts across all social classes. Of those
arrested in the 1986 Konkuk University incident-one
of the few cases in which information on the social
background of student activists is available-53 percent
were judged by investigators to be from middle-class
backgrounds, while 40 percent were from lower income
families and 7 percent from upper income households,
according to press reports.F___~
Some claim impoverished fam-
ilies produce most ar core dissident leaders, but there is
little evidence that as a group working-class South Koreans
have radical sympathies:
Police have even arrested sons and daughters of senior
military officers, bureaucrats, and ruling party offi-
cials for protest activitie
Other protesters have been offspring of lower
Demographic Factors
High birth rates during 1955-70 created a bulge in the
number of adolescents and young adults, the 15 to 29 age
group, who are now passing through the universities and into
the labor force. Massive cityward migration has magnified
the impact of the group in urban areas during the past two
decades:
- In Seoul, 31 percent of the population is age 15 to 29-
with Pusan and other major cities showing a similar
pattern.
- Migration for work and school has exposed the major-
ity of South Korean youths to city life and lights,
implanting tastes and expectations that provincial ar-
eas cannot satisfy.
The urban-centered youth bulge generates extra pressure
on the economy to provide employment opportunities. Until
the demographic surge dissipates in the 1990s-falling birth
and migration rates should take their toll-economic policy-
makers need to accommodate a 4- to 5-percent annual
increase in the demand for nonagricultural employment.
Politically, the problem of absorbing growing numbers of
university graduates is particularly sensitive:
- President Chun's decision to nearly double university
enrollments early in his term-raising attendance rates
to 28 percent, among the world's highest-has made it
difficult for many new graduates to find employment
that meets their expectations.
- According to government figures, the 156,000 gradu-
ates in February 1987 represented a 32-percent in-
crease over 1985; last October, government statistics
indicated that perhaps half of the 1986 male college
graduates were still unemployed several months after
commencement-excluding those who had entered
the Army or graduate school.
South Korea's current economic surge will help the
labor-absorption problem, but it still may not wipe out
the backlog as well as accommodate the forthcoing
large graduating classes.
Education Policy
South Korean educators almost unanimously agree that
Seoul's educational policies have exacerbated student alien-
ation. Educational reforms introduced early in President
Chun's terms, including a ban on private tutoring and the
expansion of freshman enrollments-with mandatory offset-
ting expulsions of poor academic performers-had the effect
of eliminating a major source of financial support for poor
students and creating an unpopular and ultimately unenfor-
cible regime of academic sanctions. The dismissal of dissi-
dent leaders for academic failure and their induction into
the Army-where some dissidents reportedly died from
corporal punishment-further discredited the government's
campus policies. Indeed, professors say that the govern-
ment's efforts to force the universities to police and punish
student activists have seriously undermined faculty-student
relations. lackluster and
unintereste students, tor their part, otten prefer expulsion
"with honor" for antigovernment activities to dismissal for
Psychological Pressures
In explaining recent political suicides-five students and
four workers have set themselves on fire or jumped to their
deaths during antigovernment protests over the past 18
months-South Korean observers credit the effects of frus-
trated ambitions, or peer and family pressure, more than
ideology. In two student suicide cases where background
information has been reported, professors who knew the
students paint a picture of social maladjustment or deep
anxiety over failure to meet family expectations leading the
individual to seek recognition and respect through martyr-
dom. A professor familiar with both cases
that radical leaders deliberately instigate suchh
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opposition Reunification Democratic Party's proposal
for constitutional provisions on worker participation in
management and an equal sharing of profits has not
caught on with workers
28. North Korean Connections Are Tenuous. De-
spite intense investigations, South Korean security
services appear to have uncovered only a few, general-
ly tenuous links between radical groups and North
Korean agents. Although many groups draw on North
Korea for ideas and rhetoric, P'yongyang, in our
judgment, appears to have done poorly in winning the
affections of South Korean radicals. Only a few radi-
cals-most often individuals, not groups-have specif-
ically praised the North Korean system, leadership, or
ideology. The Voice of National Salvation (VNS),
North Korea's clandestine radio, which masquerades
as an indigenous South Korean revolutionary broad-
cast, has generally criticized the radicals' infighting
and parochialism, urging them to build a united front
among "all democratic forces"-including opposition
politicians such as Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam,
workers, and human rights activists.
29. There is fragmentary evidence that domestic
radicals may be unwittingly influenced and supported
by North Korean and perhaps even Soviet front
organizations:
- Several spy rings exposed by Seoul over the past
few years have included former students recruit-
ed by North Korean agents while studying in
Japan or the United States, or students from
Japan-mainly ethnic Koreans-who have en-
rolled in universities in South Korea. North
Korean recruits have attempted to build ties to
local dissidents, and radicals reportedly have
received radical literature via such channels.
However, the security services have yet to find a
"smoking gun" that directly ties the purported
spies to the activities of radical groups.
bragged last year that the
Christian Conference of Asia, a Soviet front, had
successfully exploited the Urban Industrial Mis-
sion (UIM) movement in South Korea-an out-
growth of an international evangelical and wor-
kers' rights movement begun in the 1960s by the
United Methodist Church
Roots in the Mainstream
30. The largely indigenous origin of radical dissent
in South Korea has contributed, in our judgment, to
the popular tolerance accorded the movement (see
inset).
South Korea's modern radicals reflect the factional-
ism and confrontational style characteristic of Korea's
traditional political culture. The roots of such behavior
lie in the patrimonial structure of Korean society,
reinforced by its Confucian heritage. Like the establish-
ment they challenge, radicals see their legitimacy resid-
ing in intellectual and moral superiority. Even within
sharing or tolerance of criticism.
power
Today's radicals, however, also advocate a funda-
mental restructuring of the sociopolitical system, rather
than the purification of an established order. We see
this perspective as a significant change from the past. In
turn, the ruling elites' fear of radical dissent has helped
keep the political system frozen in authoritarian pat-
terns. With authority highly centralized, the growth of
autonomous nongovernment institutions has been stunt-
ed, leaving South Korean political culture few institu-
tions that can effectively mediate between conflicting
social and economic claims. The absence of indepen-
dent brokering mechanisms is a recurring dilemma in
Korea's modern development. In the past, pressures for
change have mounted without the benefit of safety
valves. As a result, when change has come, it has
frequently been disruptive. It remains to be seen wheth-
er the government's delivery of recently promised
reforms will be sufficient to ameliorate current pressure
for change
after the Sammint'u seizure of the USIS library in
Seoul in May 1985 (but before the Inchon riots) found
that less than 30 percent of the adult respondents
viewed the Sammint'u as clearly leftist.' The statistics
accord with others that suggest most South Koreans
regard the present crop of campus activists as part of a
student protest tradition, a perception once evident in
Japan as well as in other Asian cultures
31. Public tolerance and sympathy for the stu-
dents-clearly evident during the June demonstra-
tions-have helped radical groups expand their scope
of operations, despite the government's effort to con-
tain them:
- Dissident tracts and leaflets are regularly read,
discussed, and shared by nonactivist students.
Over the past several years, students on many
' The extensive poll was one of a series by the progovernment
Kyunghyang Sinmun-apparently with government support, judg-
ing from information from other sources. A bootleg copy of the
research report-which we believe to be genuine-was published
last fall in an antigovernment expatriate paper.
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campuses have elected avowed radicals to lead
their associations.
Religious and social organizations have housed
and funded youth groups, such as the Young
Catholic Workers and the Ecumenical Youth
Council, that have large activist contingents.
harge that many evening schools for
factory workers using church facilities combine
academic tutoring with political indoctrination.
Church-affiliated organizations apparently hire
dissident students and workers blacklisted by the
government. In addition, shopkeepers have
helped protesters eluding police escape into back
alleys
32. Beyond the accepted tradition of student pro-
test, the "understanding" many South Koreans express
toward even radical dissent, in our view, reflects the
Chun government's perceived lack of legitimacy.
Brought to power by a military coup, sustained by a
stacked election, and tarnished by recurring scandals,
the government has not enjoyed backing from the vast
majority of South Korean intellectual, social, or reli-
gious leaders, even including those who are politically
conservative. Only in the wake of ruling party chair-
man Roh Tae Woo's promised political reforms on 29
June South Koreans
promises of liberalization.
33. The intense and unremitting dislike for Presi-
dent Chun has fostered a political atmosphere in
which radical notions can flourish. In particular, antip-
athy toward military interference in politics has be-
come so strong that many military leaders believe the
Army's image as an institution has been badly blem-
ished. Antiestablishment sentiments in general have
also increased, resulting in profound public cynicism
toward government motives and accomplishments in
virtually any sphere-including the 1988 Seoul Olym-
pics and South Korea's enormous economic growth
during Chun's tenure. Because of the widespread
perception that the United States bears responsibility
for Chun's rise to power and his regime's political
abuses, anti-US sentiment has intensified and spread in
all strata of Korean society
34. Moreover, many in the general public accept
the radicals' message that South Korea is moving
toward another undemocratic political transition forc-
ibly imposed by an unpopular political elite intent on
preserving its own power and perks. At the same time,
the man-in-the-street shares with the dissidents a
deep-seated feeling that fate and external pressures
have repeatedly kept Korea from achieving its histori-
cal and cultural destiny. We believe most South
Koreans are ambivalent about their own national
history, and accordingly are susceptible to emotional
appeals focusing on the realization of a new, proud,
Korean national identity-a driving sentiment with
parallels to the American "pioneer spirit."
35. The Dissident Counterculture. For disgrun-
tled students and young workers of the "Kwangju
generation" (see inset) who have rejected the govern-
ment's view of the world, dissident writers present a
sharp alternative to the simplistic picture of South
Korea found in official high school textbooks. Like
President Park, Chun has punished and muzzled many
of his most articulate critics:
Roh Tae Woo's democratization initiative has
paved the way for several hundred blacklisted
university professors, journalists, writers, and
social and religious leaders to emerge from
professional limbo. Some, we believe, have been
hardened and, even radicalized by their experi-
ences, and as well-known members in their
fields are likely to give radical dissent greater
authority.
The return to campus this fall of many formerly
banned student activists, as well as the possible
reinstatement of hundreds of blacklisted workers
and illegal unionists, also increases the likelihood
of intense outbursts of discontent
36. Dubbed yawei, or "out-outs," by the Koreans,
blacklisted professionals and activists are the core of an
emerging dissident counterculture. Barred professors
have continued to publish through small-scale printers
and in dissident publications. Their writings, and
translations of foreign works, provide a counterpoint to
the government's official interpretation of modern
Korean history, noting the key role of leftists in the
independence struggle, exploring perceived inequities
in US-South Korean relations, and highlighting the
way in which successive authoritarian governments
have manipulated the issue of relations with the North
for domestic purposes. Ironically, many dissident intel-
lectuals are US-educated, and their degrees from US
institutions help give their revisionist views particular
authority.
37
banned texts are widely read in informal study circles.
For many students who have few electives, the pro-
scribed literature provides virtually their only expo-
sure to analysis of contemporary historical, political,
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The Kwangju Generation
The political and social views of this generation of
South Korean university students reflect experiences
that are dramatically different from those of their
parents
Today's typical 20-year-old student was born after
South Korea's economy had already taken off. He
reached middle-school age during the period of political
discontent that marked the last years of President Park
Chung Hee's rule; as a young teenager, he witnessed
President Chun's seizure of power; and during high
school he was exposed almost daily to new anti-Chun
stories and contemptuous jokes about the President's
family-especially the First Lady:
- For this generation, the primary political event-
analogous to the Vietnam experience for US
college students of the 1960s-is the suppression
of anti-Chun rioters in Kwangju in May 1980
(thus, the "Kwangju generation"). Korea's libera-
tion from Japan, the Korean war, and the Student
Revolution in 1960, all of which have shaped the
attitudes of older Koreans, pale by comparison.
- The "Kwangju generation" came of age political-
ly under unpopular military-spawned govern-
ments relying on repressive laws, censorship, and
a pervasive, frequently brutal, internal security
network to maintain control.
- Today's students have no memory of the carnage,
dislocation, and uncertainty of the Korean war.
They are also largely ignorant of the bitter ideo-
logical divisions and violent infighting among-
Koreans during the colonial period and postliber-
and economic issues. In addition, campus newspa-
pers-which have been less tightly censored than the
commercial press-have carried opinion pieces that
reflect such analysis
38. Even those university professors who have
stopped short of flaunting their antigovernment views
occasionally stand up for the radical dissenters. At
many schools they have thwarted government efforts
to use academic sanctions against student dissidents.
Earlier this year, scores of academics also signed
statements opposing police torture. In the weeks pre-
ceding the June demonstrations, more than 1,400
academics had identified themselves with dissidents'
demands that President Chun rescind his 13 April
announcement that suspended negotiations over con-
stitutional reform
39. The dissident community has roots beyond the
campuses as well. Small print shops, theater and art
groups, and churches provide a loose network:
- Printing shops and bookstores, run by former
student activists, reprint and distribute banned
ation years. Those who grew up poor saw their
situation, not as the universal condition, but juxta-
posed to prosperity and even luxury in which
they did not share.
Finally, all young Koreans have been exposed to
nationalistic "boosterism," which gives little rec-
ognition to the US contribution to South Korea's
postwar reconstruction and economic takeoff.
The "Kwangju generation" has experienced enor-
mous social change and flux:
- More than half of this generation had migrated
from village to city by the time they were 20,
according to demographers. The dislocation has
limited their ties to adults other than parents and
strengthened the impact of the school peer group
on their attitudes. For many who have migrated
by themselves for schooling and employment,
there is little day-to-day adult guidance.
Student anxieties and alienation are exacerbated by
the fiercely competitive college entrance system. Most
university students have passed through a grueling three
years of virtually nonstop cramming for the entrance
examinations. Many have spent another one to two
years at private academies after coming up short on
their first attempts. According to South Korean educa-
tors, many-perhaps most-university students have
little interest in their field of study, having selected it
chiefly to increase their chances of getting into a
prestige school
texts and print newsletters and leaflets. These
often detail protest activities, arrests, and trial
proceedings censored from the regular press.
During 1986 and early 1987, numerous small
publishers were arrested for printing allegedly
seditious literature,
The government has sought to suppress art that
expresses dissident views. Police last year shut
down one major exhibit focusing on the "masses'
struggle." Small drama and dance groups pro-
duce thinly veiled critical dramas or satirical
masked dances-a traditional folk art with
strong antiestablishment overtones that dissi-
dents have adopted as a symbol of the minjung
(the "masses") spirit.
Dissident clergy lead congregations that bring
antigovernment elements together
in industrial districts some
congregations consist largely of young activist
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government.
workers, permitting ministers, laity, and foreign
missionaries associated with the Urban Industrial
Mission (UIM) to continue their labor organizing
despite being banned from worksites by the
quently overlaps.
40. The government has had difficulty producing a
solid estimate of the dissident community's strength.
Most obviously, membership in dissident groups fre-
some 100 registered social and
news and ideas from dissident circles
41. Moreover, it is hard to assess the impact of
dissidents on popular attitudes and emotions. In our
view, even the size of an organization is not necessarily
a good indicator of the dissidents' appeal. Many,
perhaps even a majority, among South Korea's 1
million university and college students-nearly half
concentrated in the Seoul region-together with the
large numbers of recent graduates and high school
upperclassmen, are influenced by counterculture val-
ues and perspectives. Indeed we suspect that, through
churches, contact with students, and other channels,
most of the urban population is regularly exposed to
groups or the formal political opposition
the full array of radical "underground" campus
religious organizations, which are alleged to have
nearly 35,000 members, as threats to stability. The
tally lists some youth groups, but it does not include
42. It is difficult to predict the level and scale of
protest activity this fall. Occasional reports or rumors
that radicals are arming themselves with explosives or
firearms have not proved accurate,
the possibility that violence by radicals-for example,
on the fringe of basically nonviolent demonstrations-
could occur, even with a heavy police presence in the
vicinity. We see only a limited possibility, however,
that radical protest actions this fall will escalate to
insurrection)
onetheless, the events of June and July y underscore
We are not optimistic, however, that radical
dissent will abate even if the government continues
apace on its new reform-oriented political tack:
- The government's capitulation to major political
and economic demands in the face of protests
and strikes since June has set a precedent for
"people power" tactics that some dissident ele-
ments will find irresistable. Key interest groups,
including students and workers, have no political
party to call their own, and may see public
protests as the most effective means of influenc-
ing the political agenda.
There is no convincing evidence that govern-
ment-sponsored political reindoctrination
courses or pledges of good behavior by protesters
and their parents have much effect on students
who are arrested. The most effective deterrent
has come from parents who have warned their
children against ruining their own and their
families' future, or being tortured by the securi-
ty services-sanctions that may appear less of a
threat now that the government is clearly trying
to cultivate a new image.
Harsh government treatment also has alienated
entire families, with younger brothers and sisters
following students into dissident activities. Par-
ents increasingly have been drawn into the fold
as they seek help for their children's legal
defense from human rights and legal aid com-
mittees, and emotional support from various
groups. With more freedom to speak out, pres-
sure to release dissidents still in jail-and to
compensate the victims of past human rights
violations-could gain momentum. =
44. Student radicals are likely to press the political
opposition to demand more and greater concessions
from the government. It is not clear how much
support the radicals can mobilize among other stu-
dents, workers, and farmers. Demands for a constitu-
ent assembly to draft a "mass democracy" constitu-
tion, a socialist restructuring of the economy, and the
withdrawal of US troops from Korea will probably cost
support among the broader public.
45. We believe that dissident zealots, including
radical students, are potentially capable of setting the
spark to a generally volatile political situation, but are
not yet in a position to create their own opportunities.
The relaxation of controls on many dissident activities
under the government's new democratization program
does not appear to have led to closer cooperation
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among radicals and other dissident groups. Genera-
tional as well as idological differences separate young
radicals from older dissident leaders. While the latter
may respect the students' sincerity and the "purity" of
their protests, we doubt they are prepared to subordi-
nate themselves or their agenda to student leadership.
Moreover, the trend toward increasingly extreme radi-
cal ideology over the past several years argues against
the likelihood that disparate radical groups will soon
coalesce around an ideology and concrete political
agenda that would appeal to large numbers of more
moderate dissident elements or workers.
46. If negotiations on constitutional and electoral
reform run into snags, however-especially if the
government is held chiefly responsible-violent pro-
test could win public sympathy. Under these circum-
stances, we can envision large numbers of mainstream
students and others joining the radicals in the streets.
47. For the organized political opposition, the pros-
pects of capitalizing on such demonstrations to push
demands for reform would be tempting.
48. Nonetheless, Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam,
and other politicians almost certainly would think long
and hard before actively allying with student radicals
or openly encouraging their actions. Both Kims almost
certainly recognize the pitfalls of any formal "allian-
ce." Most obviously, the government could use evi-
dence of such direct ties to avowedly leftist radicals as
grounds for moving against the opposition party and
its leaders.
49. We also assume that the two Kims know the
limits of their control and recognize that the radicals
would prove difficult, if not impossible, to direct.
n e i t h e r t h e ost
students have great regard for either Kim. The ab-
sence during the June demonstrations of visible sup-
port for the Kims or the opposition party appear to
support this judgment. Hardcore radicals have criti-
cized the political opposition as bourgeois reformers
and even political opportunists, and a direct solicita-
tion of radical support could bring more criticism or
incur political debts the radicals would be quick to call
due in the event of an opposition victory.
50. Chun's successor is virtually certain to face
radical challenge from the beginning of his term-
either as an attack on the legitimacy of a DJP victory,
or as agitation for drastic reforms by an opposition
winner. Even if the election results are accepted by
South Koreans on both sides, radical dissidents could
make it difficult to keep reforms on course. The result,
in the worst case, could test even a liberal new leader,
who would need to address whether to shelve reform
in favor of the-time-tested controls of his predecessors.
Implications for the United States
51. Despite the prospect that radical dissent will
continue to grow, the United States does not appear
likely to become the immediate target for systematic
terrorist attack. Grumbling about US "meddling" in
South Korean internal affairs persists, but independent
journalists and opinion leaders have reacted positively
to recent US support for democratic reforms. Their
influence could well lead radicals to conclude they
have little to gain from greater verbal attacks on the
United States:
- In view of the upsurge of attacks on US facilities
in recent years, we cannot downplay the signifi-
cance of threats against US officials and Ameri-
can citizens
But other
evidence, including public opinion polls, leads us
to conclude that only an extreme minority
would approve of such tactics. In short, we do
not believe committed and well-organized
groups that can carry out a terrorist course of
action now exist or are preparing to emerge.
52. Even so, there are other threats. Specifically, we
believe the radicalization of dissent creates an atmo-
sphere in which disgruntled or disturbed individuals
may be more likely than in the past to carry out a solo
attack on US persons or property. And, given P'yon-
gyang's interest and access to South Korea via agent
infiltration, we would not rule out the possibility of
North Korean terrorism against Americans disguised as
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53. We believe that anti-US sentiment is too deeply
ingrained in the ideology of most extreme radicals for
their attitudes-or their interest in pilloring the Unit-
ed States-to change fundamentally. Indeed, the
cheers that greeted the lowering of the US and
Japanese flags during the mammoth rally in Seoul on 9
July suggest radicals can easily tap anti-US emotions
even when public opinion toward US actions is favor-
able.
54. Over the longer term, the consequences of
radical dissent could become increasingly significant
for US interests. Themes raised by radicals-US eco-
nomic "imperialism," racism, the use of South Korea
as a "nuclear platform," and others-will remain part
of South Korea's intellectual mainstream well into the
1990s. The US-South Korean military alliance, which
is the cornerstone of the broader relationship, will be a
major focus of radical protest and anti-US sentiment.
It is unlikely that radical ideology will make deep
inroads within the next few years in the perception of
the large majority of South Koreans that the military
alliance and the US troop presence is vital to their own
national security.' Even well-informed South Koreans
have a poor understanding of how the combined
command structure operates, much less of the institu-
tional history and political-military rationale behind
the current arrangements. The radicals could compli-
cate the management of US-ROK relations by stirring
up public sentiment on such nationalist issues as the
creation of a nuclear free zone on the Korean peninsu-
la and the presence and role of the US military
contingent in Korea-for example, the large US mili-
tary contingent in Seoul and dominance of the com-
bined command structure.
55. Some of the factors that contribute to radicalism
in South Korea, such as the youth bulge-a source of
demographic pressures and socioeconomic competition
that fosters youthful discontent-will wane in the
early 1990s. But others that are the result of economic
development, such as the creation of a large industrial
work force that has only begun to assert its economic
and political interests, are certain to grow. Like other
newly important constituencies-students and white-
collar office workers, for example-factory workers,
have no national political party to call their own. How
these groups organize themselves and bring pressure to
bear through the political process are major unknowns
for South Korea's development over the next decade.
56. Under these circumstances, measuring changes
in the popular outlook is difficult at best, but we
believe radical notions have helped redefine basic
perceptions of the US relationship, particularly for
many younger Koreans. Several radical perspectives
are helping to shape the public's views:
- A freer press and media coverage of local con-
ferences and roundtable discussions on US-
South Korean relations reflect an increasing
preoccupation with conflicts and inequities in
the relationship that need to be redressed in
Korea's favor.
Research topics by university professors and
graduate students, as evidenced by articles in
university social science journals, suggest a
heightened interest in "surplus value," the influ-
ence of multinational corporations, and other
topics closely associated with anticapitalist de-
pendency theory.
In the past year there has been a flurry of
publications touching on the negative side of the
United States' four-decade involvement in South
Korea-for example, Culture of Death, a cri-
tique of US commercialism. Mainstream South
Korean academics have also reappraised US-
South Korean political and economic relations.
57. In itself, the emergence of revisionist viewpoints
comes as no surprise, given the widely noted rise in
nationalistic and even xenophobic sentiments in South
Korea. Nonetheless, we believe the trend is worrisome:
it works to polarize the political atmosphere and
impedes dialogue and compromise between the gov-
ernment and the opposition, which could help amelio-
rate the impact of radical influence. In the current
debate, proponents of a more balanced viewpoint also
run the risk of being painted as antinationalist. Indeed,
even the government has frequently found it conve-
nient to let anti-US sentiments draw fire from itself.
58. Experience also suggests that the current gener-
ation of South Korean adolescents and young adults
will carry many of their basic perceptions toward
domestic and international political and economic
structures into adulthood. If so, far more than in their
parents' generation, their roles in business and govern-
ment, as well as the decisions they make on issues
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involving the United States, are likely to be shaped by will arise between the practical need for South Kore-
political, social, and philosophical perspectives that ans to internationalize politically and economically
have been colored by radicalized indigenous Korean and the nationalistic impulse to create a more purely
thought. We foresee no easy solution to tensions that "Korean" society.
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