MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

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• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1987
• Content Type: NIE

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence organizations of the
Departments of State, the Treasury, and Energy.
Also Participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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NIE 11-12-87/11
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
OF SOVIET MILITARY TECHNOLOGY (S)
VOLUME II-SUMMARY
Information available as of 1 July 1987 was used
in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on 23 July 1987.
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NOTE
This Estimate is issued in three volumes:
Volume I contains the Key Judgments.
Volume II contains the Summary.
Volume III is the Estimate and contains:
Chapter I Soviet Management of Technology and
Military Systems Development.
Chapter II Key Soviet Military Technologies.
Chapter III Influence of Technology on Possible Major
Soviet Military Systems, 1995-2010.
This information is Secret
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OUTLINE OF THE
SUMMARY
1. Soviet Management of Technology and Military Systems Development
The Soviets have instituted several management initiatives to
increase the pace of technology development over the next 20 years.
To compete more effectively with the West in critical high-
technology areas or to advance in technology areas not emphasized in
the West, the Soviets have established centrally managed, goal-oriented
programs to oversee technology development.
The Soviets make national forecasts of the expected progress of
technological developments to support their long-term weapon research
planning
The Soviets will continue for the foreseeable future their low-risk
management approach by selecting technology early in the system
acquisition process
To improve technology development, the Soviet leadership has
been pushing Academy of Sciences personnel into more applied
research work.
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Western technology has helped the Soviets considerably.
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Systems Management
The USSR uses a schedule-dominant management approach to
conduct the engineering development and test phases of the military
system acquisition process
The Soviet system for management of weapons and space system
planning and acquisition has evolved several advantages which allow
them to compete at the system rather than the technology level and
pose a continuing challenge to US planners
We see the Soviets taking more concurrent steps in managing
military system development, and we believe they have moved to the
use of less-than-mature technology (feasible but not yet proven produc-
ible) in system planning. When successful, this results in shortening the
transition time from technology development to system development.
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Even though the Soviets designate some military system develop-
ment programs to be a high priority, they do not appear to reduce the
time it takes to conduct the program.
The military and space systems the Soviets will deploy between the
early 1990s and the early 2000s will be based largely on technology de-
veloped indigenously or obtained from the West between 1978 and
1990.
Technology and Systems Management
The number of Soviet military and space development programs
and the supporting technology programs is higher than we previously
believed.
Data continue to show the Soviets are continuing to increase the re-
sources allocated to support military technology and system develop-
ment programs in the USSR
The Soviets have two major technology problems, even though
their use of innovative design solutions and compensatory technologies
allows them to make good systems.
II. Key Soviet Military Technologies
Comparison of the technology levels achieved in the United States
and the USSR clearly shows the United States is leading in most
technology areas.
Comparison of the United States and the USSR in technology alone
is not only inadequate but could be misleading for US military system
planning purposes.
The Soviets have successfully built significant numbers of weapon
systems competitive with advanced Western systems despite the many
technology areas where they lag the West.
In many technology areas, such as directed energy and optical
computing, the Soviets are emphasizing development.
The Soviets continue to develop technologies and systems currently
not pursued in the West, and this practice is expected to continue
Technology transfer from the West continues to provide the Soviets
with an expanding technology base. It has allowed the Soviets to
truncate indigenous research projects earlier than originally planned
and the Soviets were able to begin military system development earlier
than they would have originally planned if they had relied solely on
their indigenous effort.
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The Soviets conduct feasibility tests of new military technology
before they decide to use the technology to develop a military weapon
system.
Soviet laser technologies will progress and production capabilities
will grow throughout the 1990s
The USSR will continue to pursue technology development in
many strategic defense areas
A design bureau and production infrastructure associated with
explosive MHD and explosive MCG power sources probably were
established in the early 1980s
The Soviets have an extensive research effort in hypervelocity
kinetic energy impact supported by a very large organizational infra-
structure.
The Soviets have made limited applications to military systems,
with mixed results, of composite materials-an area where significant
gains are being made in the West.
Ill. Influence of Technology on Possible Major Soviet Military Systems 1995-
2010
For systems reaching operational forces in the mid-1990s and later,
the Soviets will use the strong and sizable base of military technology
advances they have made since the late 1970s.
Soviet industry should, in the mid-1990s, after 20 years of modern-
ization, retooling, and management shifts, be capable of more rapidly
assimilating high-technology military products into production.
Production and deployment rates observed for new high-technol-
ogy military equipment show a trend towards fewer but better
individual systems
Soviet Technology Surprise
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SUMMARY
1. Soviet Management of Technology
and Military Systems Development
The Soviets have instituted several management initiatives to
increase the pace of technology development over the next 20 years.
The most significant trend for Soviet weapons acquisition for the
remainder of the century will be a continuation of the concerted effort
the Soviets are making to upgrade their management of technology
development; we believe their performance will continue to improve.
To compete more effectively with the West in critical high-
technology areas or to advance in technology areas not emphasized
in the West, the Soviets have established centrally managed, goal-
oriented programs to oversee technology development. The Soviets
have had such programs for critical military systems or production
technology since at least the early 1960s. Examples of programs in
critical areas include: lasers, particle beams, millimeter waves, and
computers, as well as important production technologies including
robots and industrial lasers. These goal-oriented programs tend to be
narrow in focus and may lead to a lack of commitment in basic sciences
today, which is essential to innovations that would evolve in the future.
The aim of a technology development program, which the Soviets
call Scientific Research Work (NIR), is to bring the technology involved
to the level of producibility necessary to support full-scale engineering
development, which the Soviets call Experimental Design Work (OKR),
of a military system. Extensive feasibility demonstration testing, how-
ever, may occur with system-like models during technology develop-
ment. The technology development phase of a goal-oriented program
may last five to 15 years or even longer before technological maturity
sufficient to support system development occurs. Another five to 15
years would be required for system development before operational use.
Thus, for a program conducted with the goal-oriented management
style, up to 30 years may pass from the formation of a management
structure to oversee a technology development until the initial weapon
system completes state trials and is ready for deployment
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The Soviets make national forecasts of the expected progress of
technological developments to support their long-term weapon re-
search planning. Outlooks for 20 and 30 years are intended to guide
current planning to ensure that no long-term, major technology require-
ments are overlooked. The Soviets believe that formal planning and
forecasting will make them more competitive with the West and will
leave them less vulnerable to major Western technology advances.
The Soviets apparently assume they can eventually produce any
technologies already produced in the West. They will, therefore,
include such technologies in their forecasts for system planning even
though they have not yet demonstrated the capability to produce the
technology. For example, Soviet industrial ministry forecasting of
microelectronics development and production for the late 1970s and
throughout the 1980s was completed in the mid-1970s. Where Soviet
technology lags, planning well in advance is used to focus research,
development, production, and, when applicable, technology transfer to
keep the lag within manageable bounds.
The Soviets will continue for the foreseeable future their low-
risk management approach by selecting technology early in the
system acquisition process. The Soviets believe their basic manage-
ment approach to be effective. Moreover, their long-range technology
development plans, supported with focused research commitments and
technology transfer, should keep them relatively close to Western
developments in areas of technology where they now lag. As long as the
Soviets continue to receive early knowledge and specific details of new
Western military programs, they will be able to choose the least
demanding technical approach necessary to field effective countering
systems.
In cases where they are pursuing systems programs not being
undertaken by the West, they can pace their technology development
according to their own internal scheduling factors. For example, the
Soviets are considering a manned mission to Mars shortly after the turn
of the century, which would probably employ nuclear propulsion and
nuclear power supply subsystems. Projects such as these-many of
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which are not being pursued in the West-if successful, allow them to
portray themselves as innovators despite adherence to a conservative
development schedule.
To improve technology development, the Soviet leadership has
been pushing Academy of Sciences personnel into more applied
research work. The formation of Interbranch S&T complexes (MNTKs)
are a national-level effort to better manage the transition from research
to production of multiuse technologies under Academy leadership. To
move more academy researchers into applied projects, state funding for
basic research has been cut, and academy institute members are being
selected to head joint academy/ministry technology /product develop-
ment programs. Soviet sources indicate that about 30 percent of
academy research is now conducted under contract funding. Despite
the pressure to conduct more applied research, many academicians are
resisting the rush into more applied research work.
Western technology has helped the Soviets considerably. The
Soviets' well-organized national program for acquiring and assimilating
Western technology has been a major factor in many advances they
have made since the early 1970s, especially those essential to the
development of modern military systems, such as microelectronics and
computers.
Technology transfer from the West continues to provide the Soviets
with an expanding technology base. There are two ways the Soviets
supplement their indigenous technology needed for weapon systems: (a)
by free-world market volume acquisition through illegal trade diversion
of manufacturing and test equipment for direct use in production lines
and (b) by acquisition of one-of-a-kind hardware and blueprints
primarily through the espionage program for design through reverse
engineering and copying and overcoming technical obstacles that were
slowing down their progress by learning from Western design solutions.
Characteristics of these programs overlap.
Western technology is used to supplement indigenous technology
in both design and production /testing of weapon systems. Analysis of
available Soviet technology transfer requirements shows that about 75
percent is for acquisitions of production and test equipment and that
about 20 percent is for design and basic technology. To apply Western
technology that will affect the performance of a new weapon system
would require the Soviets to assimilate the technology before their
earliest design phase begins. To apply Western production technology
the Soviets plan for acquisitions before decisions to begin engineering
development, but acquisitions and installation may occur up to the time
of production line startup.
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Technology transfer from the West has allowed the Soviets to
shorten technology development programs. Applying Western technol-
ogy to their military programs yields significant savings in program
costs, frees indigenous R&D resources for efforts in other areas, and
enables the Soviets to develop and produce more capable military
systems at earlier dates than would otherwise be possible. Given the
length of full-scale development and test programs, the time required
for foreign technology acquisitions that affect military system perfor-
mance to impact deployed military capability probably ranges from
five to 15 years. New systems would be closer to the high end of this
range and modernizations of existing systems would typically be toward
the low end.
Reliance on the technology transfer from the West has a downside,
in that it tends to impede indigenous development. The USSR's practice
of reverse engineering may cause the Soviets problems, as US and
Japanese integrated circuits, for example, become more complex.
The tightening pinch in Soviet labor, capital, and natural resources
and the accelerating advance of leading Western technologies are
causing the Soviets continual problems. These larger problems ensure
that the Soviets will continue to require substantial amounts of Western
technology and equipment. The Soviet drive to acquire and assimilate
technology, therefore, almost certainly will intensify through the re-
mainder of the 1980s, as will its efforts to improve the mechanisms
involved.
The USSR uses a schedule-dominant management approach to
conduct the engineering development and test phases of the military
system acquisition process. We have examined the schedules of over
1,000 military and space programs conducted by the Soviets since the
1950s to determine patterns in the development process. The scheduling
of Soviet programs, we found, was based on system complexity and the
amount of technical innovation required. We found program schedules
falling into three general time frames for systems development:
- Five to seven years for minor improved and converted systems.
- Eight to 10 years for major improved or converted systems.
- Twelve to 15 years for new, complex systems with several major
technology upgrades.
Figure 1 relates the weapon development schedules nology
maturation date
Technology selection occurs early in a schedule-dominant manage-
ment style before the full-scale engineering phase. The approach used
by the Soviets for program management and technology selection is
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Figure 1
Technology Maturity for Soviet Military Designs
System IOCs for programs
beginning in the early
1980s with technology
mature between 1978-82.
System IOCs for programs
beginning in the mid
1980s with technology
mature between 1983-86.
System IOCs for programs
beginning in the early
1990s with technology
mature between 1987-91.
System IOCs for programs
beginning in the mid
1990s with technology
mature between 1992-96.
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Technology development, system requirements,
and preliminary design.
their present management approach in the late 1960s.
The Soviet schedule-dominant style of management has resulted in
highly successful weapon programs. We believe that more than 90
percent of Soviet weapon programs starting the engineering develop-
ment phase of acquisition are completed and the systems deployed. For
a period under Khrushchev, the Soviets began the engineering develop-
ment for some programs without proven technology; they had some
costly and significant program setbacks-such as the solid-propellant
ICBM program, the Tu-144 supersonic transport, T-64 tank, A-class
submarine, and their lunar landing program. The Soviets changed to
of the initial version.
much like that used in US commercial development programs (for
example, IBM computers, AT&T toll switches, and Boeing commercial
airliners). The Soviets evidently believe that a stable engineering
development phase using technologies proven to be feasible limits the
risks in new programs. They routinely plan for product improvement
and begin pacing technology development for follow-on versions of the
system and its subsystems when they authorize full-scale development
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The Soviet system for management of weapons and space
system planning and acquisition has evolved several advantages that
allow them to compete at the system rather than the technology level
and pose a continuing challenge to US military planners:
- By assigning top priority to assimilating the best available
technology, indigenous and externally obtained, into their mili-
tary systems and doing this incrementally with a regular stream
of new and improved weapons, the Soviets are able to reduce
the qualitative gap with many US weapon systems.
- By exploiting the open discussion of many of our weapon
programs, they are able to postpone their own weapon develop-
ment decisions until the United States has committed to engi-
neering development
We believe the chances are better than even for Soviet military and
space systems to improve technically-relative to Western systems-
over the next 20 years. The Soviets have successfully built significant
numbers of weapon systems competitive with advanced Western
systems despite the many technology areas where they lag the West.
Military advantage is not achieved through technology advances alone.
Others include: material equipment (its numbers, technology, design,
and purpose); organizational structure, doctrine; tactics; understanding
its optimum utilization in combat and the training and morale of the
troops
The USSR appears to be following a number of research strategies
to bring to maturity technologies needed for new system starts. They do
not attempt to compete with the West at the technology level except in
a few areas. Overall, they have not pursued a "first-to-market" strategy
across the board, as has the United States. Rather, the Soviets have opted
for using "follower" or "copycat" research strategies in many areas.
These research strategies utilize technologies developed by others and
generally result in lower overall costs. The "follower" strategy in
research sometimes stifles the development of indigenous technical
capabilities in areas where they are weak.
In those areas where the Soviets believe their technology base is
good, they attempt to compete with the West in a first-to-market
research strategy. They are then often quite innovative in their systems
designs and have produced some weapons superior to those of the West,
especially armor/antiarmor systems for their ground forces
The Soviets have been able to use their development infrastruc-
tures to accommodate new requirements. Changes in design team
product specialties have occurred, and weapons design teams have
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managed technology development projects. They have authorized new
organizational infrastructures for emerging technologies when shifting
organizational specialties was not adequate. But, when a new need
required a wholly new technology, development, and production
infrastructure, it has taken them a long time to achieve production rates
and qualities competitive with similar Western military systems. Lead-
ership commitment has not often wavered once a goal is set, and
resource allocations are increased to meet the pace of accomplishment.
The growth rate in the directed energy area, for example, has been
steadily upward since work began in the 1960s.
We see the Soviets taking more concurrent steps in managing
military system development, and we believe they have moved to the
use of less-than-mature technology (feasible but not yet proven
producible) in system planning. When successful, this results in
shortening the transition time from technology development to
system development. For many years, we have seen production
activities (production preparation, capital investment, and trial produc-
tion) taking place at the same time system design and development are
occurring. Production line models are tested during latter phases of
military system qualification. Recently, we have found the Soviets
planning system requirements and preliminary design based on fore-
casts of production capabilities and successful feasibility demonstration
of technology. This was allowed by a change in state standards for
system planning in the late 1960s. The Soviets are now allowed to begin
system development programs about two to three years earlier than
they could in the 1960s. The Soviets in the 1950s began preliminary sys-
tem designs only when the technology had been proven producible-
the so-called off-the-shelf approach
While the Soviets appear to be taking more risks during the early
design phase, they still adhere to their conservative style for the system
full-scale engineering phase of development. They apparently will not
enter system development, however, without the successful demonstra-
tion of component pilot production. Moreover, the Soviets will often try
to use proven components already in production when system prelimi-
nary designs begin to keep costs as low as possible. The use of goal-ori-
ented programing also has allowed the Soviets to speed up technology
development.
Even though the Soviets designate some military system devel-
opment programs to be a high priority, they do not appear to reduce
the time it takes to conduct the program. Analysis of 1,050 Soviet
system programs conducted over the last 25 years shows Soviet adher-
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ence to a consistent set of military program schedules. These program
schedules are established by the system complexity and the technical
level required of new components. High priority allows early access to
materials, the best personnel, first call on facility construction crews,
and speedup of materials shipments in the transportation system. Thus,
priority allows the Soviets to achieve results within these standard
program schedules rather than to suffer slippages and delays that would
be encountered without this priority
Our data base for indigenous Soviet research for technology
development is not as extensive as that for system programs, but we
have found difficult technical developments taking long periods to
complete despite high priority. Examples of pacing technologies and
subsequent system developments, which will take the Soviets about 30
years to complete, include wing-in-ground-effect vehicles, space nucle-
ar power reactors using thermionic power conversion, liquid fluorine
rocket engines, and modern solid-state lasers.
The military and space systems the Soviets will deploy between
the early 1990s and the early 2000s will be based largely on
technology developed to maturity between 1978 and 1990 (see figure
I'he number of Soviet military and space development programs
and the supporting technology development programs is higher than
we previously believed. The Soviets have made a commitment to
maintain a large military research, development, and industrial base
and to support a large number of simultaneous weapon programs. As a
result, the United States will continue to be confronted by a steady
stream of new and improved military equipment emerging from Soviet
industry for the foreseeable future.
The Soviets' weapons procurement process can be divided into
three general categories: technology development, system planning, and
weapon development. At present, we believe the Soviets have under
way: about 5,000 research projects (3,500 to 4,000 for technology
development and 500 to 1,000 for system planning, see table 1) each
year for military-sponsored technology development and about 350 to
375 development programs (200 new or major improved or converted
system development programs and about 150 program for minor
modifications or conversions of existing operational systems) per decade.
About 50 Soviet design bureaus are involved with program management
for complete weapon systems. The number of full-scale engineering
programs has been maintained by the Soviets for over 25 years. The level
of research projects for military-related technology development was
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Table 1
Categories of Soviet Military Technology
Projects and Weapon Development Programs
3,500 to 4,000 Technology to improve mission performance.
per year Technology to improve production.
500 to 1,000 Technology for evaluation/selection of projected
per year systems.
Preliminary designs.
Planning and production technology for specific
systems.
350 to 375 Systems design, engineering, pilot production,
per decade and testing.
attained in the early 1980s; it was somewhat lower in the 1970s. The
large effort in weapons development has not been affected by changes
in Soviet leadership, arms agreements with the United States, rises and
cutbacks in Western military budgets, major technical failures, program
cancellations, and industrial reorganizations.
We believe that the large number of improved systems that the
Soviets are developing will cause more US military concern than any
single weapon that might result from a major technology breakthrough.
The Soviets reassign design teams to new programs when one program is
complete rather than dissolve the team. This practice, in combination
with an improving technology base, has a cumulative effect that will be
hard for the United States to overcome in areas where the Soviets are
already superior or close to the United States. The Soviet approach to
systems development has been characterized by gradual, but
continuous, improvements to weapon systems and has compensated
somewhat for Soviet production weaknesses as well as for the lag in the
Soviet technology base relative to that of the West. The Soviets have had
in excess of 300 different production programs for military systems
under way in any given year since the mid-1970s. To support this effort,
the Soviets have about 150 assembly plants for series production of
military equipment.
The number of system development programs we have identified
in the 1980s indicates that the Soviets are continuing at the same high
level they reached in the 1960s. The expansion of facilities at design
bureaus in the early-to-mid-1980s indicates the Soviets will continue to
support a high level of system developments for the foreseeable future.
To sustain a constant, large number of programs, as the Soviets have
been doing, has required an increasing commitment of funds and
resources as systems become more complex.
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Table 2
Soviet Military Systems: Development Programs Per Decade,
1961-1990-
Program Type
Total
Since 1960
1971-80 1981
-90 b
Average Expectedc
Programs Per Decade
Strategic Offense
Systems
106
Strategic Defense
Systems
104
General Purpose
Ground Systems
156
General Purpose Land-
Based Air Forces and Air
Mobility Systems
220
General Purpose Naval
Combat and Support
Systems
334
National Command,
Control, Communications,
Intelligence and
Electronic Warfare
5
Space Support Systems
125
43
29, 53
50 ?
Totals
1,050
381
347 322+
350 to 375
a Includes those programs that completed state trials or were
canceled during the decade.
b We expect evidence of as many as 50 additional programs
completing state trials-and some currently operational but as yet
unidentified systems-to be identified later in the decade.
c The expected numbers are not a mathematical average of previous
decades but reflect recent trends and reallocations of defense
industry design resources. (See Soviet Design and Development
Reallocations Section of Chapter I, Volume III.)
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Any increase in projects in the 1980s, we believe, would be in the
technology development category. About 1,100 Soviet organizations
have been identified as conducting technology, component, or
subsystem development.
Table 2 shows the overall program level-of-effort by decade.
Programs are included in the decade in which they were completed.
Programs canceled before they were completed are included in the
decade in which they were terminated. The slightly lower numbers in
the 1970s, we believe, would be higher if we knew all the spacecraft
programs the Soviets canceled as a result of their failures in
development of the large SL-X-15 space booster, liquid hydrogen upper
stages for the SL-12, and in their manned lunar program
Examination of evidence related to the 50-or-so major design
bureaus that are responsible for system development in the USSR shows
no reduction of effort through the mid-1980s. We, thus, expect the
Soviets to again complete about 350 programs by 1990, and this will
continue through the 1990s.
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of additional organizations associated with military research.
1986. Moreover, we have associated about 1,100 Soviet organizations
with military developments. We now believe about 3 million people
work in military research or development projects. The number of
institutes and people associated with military developments has in-
creased since our last Estimate in 1983 due mostly to our identification
have continued
Soviet military-related institutes, design bureaus, and test facilities
about 20 percent of Soviet defense expenditures
Data continue to show the Soviets are continuing to increase the
resources allocated to support military technology and system devel-
opment programs in the USSR. We believe that in 1984, the Soviets
spent between 18 and 27 billion (constant 1982) rubles on military
RDT & E-about 50 percent of all Soviet RDT & E outlays. Overall, we
believe military RDT & E outlays in 1984 as measured in rubles were
New analysis has changed our insights into the dollar value of
Soviet military-related research, for technology development, and
system development, test, and evaluation (RDT & E). A new method-
ology, stressing inputs, has been developed and shows greater uncer-
tainty bounds in our estimates of the dollar value of Soviet RDT & E
activities. Our best estimate is about a third higher, on average, than
comparable expenditures of the United States, although they are lower
than we previously estimated (see figure 2). The uncertainties in these
estimates, however, are such that the lower bound is not significantly
greater than US military RDT & E expenditures but the upper bound is
half again as much
spending to military technology and system development.
Our view of how much the Soviets spend on military technology
and system developments as a share of all defense spending has
changed. Estimates based on the new methodology show the Soviets'
share is about 20 percent of total defense spending as opposed to about
12 percent for the United States. In the previous Estimate we judged
that the Soviets were devoting about 25 percent of total military
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Figure 2
US and Estimated Soviet Military RDT&E Expenditures, 1965-86
i i I I I I i i i I i i i i I i I I i I i
0 1965 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
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Some portion of the difference between US and Soviet military
RDT & E expenditures can be attributed, we believe, to differences in
productivity and defense program management approaches. In the
United States, RDT & E has been characterized by the extensive use of
computers, development of better test equipment, and more efficient
pilot production of prototypes. In the USSR, greater numbers of people
and facilities must be devoted to RDT & E because of the slower Soviet
transition to functions now automated in the United States; for example,
preparation of blueprints and design approaches by hand in the USSR
versus by using CAD/CAM in the United States.
Since 1975 the Soviets have significantly expanded their large and
very costly space program. Considerable portions of that effort are now
in the full-scale engineering phase-the most ex ensive preproduction
phase-of the acquisition cycle. their engineering
development costs are about 60 percent of all RDT & E costs.
The Soviets have two major technology problems even though
their use of innovative design solutions and compensatory technol-
ogies allows them to make good systems. First, they generally lag the
West in technology development. A major reason for this lag is their
weakness in technological innovation and in transferring technologies
developed in one sector of the economy to another. Second, their
production base (particularly in microelectronics, computers and tele-
communications, composite materials, and high-performance guidance
and navigation subsystems) limits their ability to produce higher
technology products and quickly move new designs into full production.
They hope that their investments for developing technology at a faster
pace and for an improved production base will pay off in major
economic and military dividends by the year 2000.
For the near term, many high-technology components and materi-
als will be used only in the highest priority military programs.
Production problems often prevent more extensive utilization of new
technology in other system designs. This problem is most apparent in
microelectronics and electro-optics.
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II. Key Soviet Military Technologies
Comparison of the technology levels in the United States and
the USSR clearly shows the United States is leading in most
technology areas. Overall, however, our research over the past three
years has shown the Soviets to be much more capable than we believed
in some vital areas. Moreover, they have not fallen further behind the
United States in as many areas as we estimated. The number of
technology areas where the Soviets lead or are equal to the United States
has increased since our last estimate, but much of this is due to the in-
creased numbers of technologies covered this year.
Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have moved to make technological
progress a linchpin of their economic and military strategy. Soviet
political leaders recognize that technology plays a major role in
developing military capabilities that would be competitive with the
West. They apparently believe incorporation of new technologies into
military systems and an improved military industrial base are the keys
to accelerating the growth of military capabilities. The Soviets are
working hard to improve the pace of technology development and to
modernize their industrial base for the production of new technological
products-especially those for the military. Because the quality and
depth of engineering and, particularly, industrial capability change
slowly, the Soviet areas of weakness will probably persist over the next
10 to 15 years. Furthermore, the accelerating pace of Western advances
in such areas as microelectronics and computing will probably frustrate
their efforts to achieve self-reliance.
Key technology areas where the USSR continues to lag the United
States are microelectronics, signal processing, communications, ASW,
electro-optics, infrared sensors, manufacturing, and genetic engineering
technologies. We see the Soviets falling further behind in digital
computers, computer software and in some integrated circuit re-
search-for example, gallium arsenide-in spite of the high priority and
often large resource commitments given to these areas. See table 3 for a
comparison of US and Soviet technologies
Some areas where the USSR currently leads the United States
include optical processing, liquid fluorine and nuclear rocket propul-
sion, chemical warfare, explosives, high-power-density liquid metal
reactors for nuclear submarines and for possible space applications,
titanium metallurgy and welding, some high-energy lasers, some areas
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Table 3
Technologies Mature for Application
to Military Systems: A Comparison of
Selected Areas
IR/EO/UV
Radar
ASW
Signature reduction
Microelectronics
Computing hardware
Computing software
Signal processing
Communications
Guidance and navigation
Power
Materials-metallic
Materials-nonmetallic
Rocket propulsion-liquid
Rocket propulsion-solid
United States
United States/equal b
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States
United States/USSR a
United States/USSR b
United States
USSR
United States
a There are important areas where the United States is ahead and
important areas where the USSR is ahead.
Turbine engine propulsion
Naval propulsion
Ground propulsion
Lasers
Radiofrequency power generation
Charged particle beams
Neutral particle beams
Nuclear
Conventional explosives
Chemical/biological warfare
Kinetic energy-armor/antiarmor
Kinetic energy-hypervelocity
Life sciences
Ocean sciences
Production
United States
Equal
United States/equal b
Equal
USSR
United States/USSR a
United States/USSR a
United States/USSR a
USSR
USSR
USSR
USSR
United States
United States
United States
of charged and neutral particle beam-related theory and technology,
millimeter wave (radiofreauency) power sources, and possibly vacuum
integrated circuits.
The Soviets have made substantial progress in explosive and some
prime power technologies. Until recently, we considered the United
States to be equal or superior to the Soviets in deployed armor/anti-
armor technology, but we now find that the US R&D technology
applications are only about equal to technology the Soviets have already
incorporated in deployed systems. In the explosives technologies, the
Soviets have synthesized many new compounds and they have a large
program on these technologies. They have developed enhanced blast
munitions technologies that use a powered aluminum wrap (reactive
surround) around a high-blast explosive, have continued to advance
fuel-air explosives technology and have begun a research program for
new advanced types of explosives.
They surpassed the United States by the 1970s and have
continued to maintain a clear lead in hypervelocity impact research-
an area of importance to nonnuclear kinetic energy weapons. They
could be on a par with the United States in various nonnuclear kill
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devices, including light gas guns and electromagnetic rail guns. They
are ahead in magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) and magnetocumulative
generator (MCG) power sources; such power sources that have potential
applications in directed energy systems.
In a number of areas where the Soviets are lagging in the
development of technology, they are attempting to use an alternate
technology to make up for the shortfalls. In some of these alternate
technology areas, the Soviets have established technical leadership.
Some examples include: development of storable liquid propulsion vice
solid propellants for ballistic missiles; optical processing to help make up
for an overall lag in signal processing; and development of stellar sensors
and hydrostatic gyroscopes to make up for their lag in other guidance
and navigation technology areas
In 1983 the Soviets began a research program intended to produce
by the early 1990s a supercomputer based on optical processing
technology. We do not know its current status. This computer project
may be an attempt by the Soviets to close some of the gap with Western
computers that are based on digital electronic processing. We do not ex-
pect the Soviets to overcome the US lead in computers, but they will
make major strides forward as new generation digital devices continue
to be produced.
Since the last Estimate we have become aware of Soviet work in
several areas that have a major impact on their military systems
applications. Analysis of Soviet research in polymers for drag reduction
shows advanced work applicable to burst speed capability for torpedoes
and submarines. The Soviets began to research and test blue-green lasers
in the 1970s for application to aircraft- and space-to-submarine laser
communications systems. Support appears to have continued in the
early 1980s and may be related to spacecraft applications. They have
also begun titanium-doped sapphire laser research, which may also
support spacecraf t-to-submarine communication system development.
we have noted several efforts that could be in-
dicative of significant emerging Soviet technical capabilities. For
example, the Soviets have made a multibillion-dollar investment in
research facilities for hypersonic aerodynamics, developed a high-purity
beryllium metal processing technique, and have conducted extensive
research in laser radar technology
We have also found some technologies where the Soviet work was
sufficiently advanced for the United States to begin research or make
significant strides in existing work as the result of using Soviet published
theoretical work. Most notable was the US use of Soviet theory in
particle beams, hypervelocity accelerators, and X-ray lasers.
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Comparison of the United States and the USSR in technology
alone is not only inadequate but could be misleading for US military
system planning purposes. There are three key features to support the
above conclusion. First, the Soviets supplement their indigenous tech-
nology base by free world market acquisitions and by inputs from their
large technology espionage program. Once an acquired technology has
been reverse engineered and proven producible, it can be selected for a
program. They will continue to pursue external technology in areas
where they lag in order to achieve system performance goals.
Second, the frequency of Soviet system modernization and early
knowledge of Western system characteristics allow the Soviets to
undertake competitive system designs on schedules responsive to the
United States. To fill these operational requirements, Soviet designs do
not always require the same level of technology as the United States to
be competitive and often larger Soviet force levels to some extent
compensate for technological disparities. A gradual growth in technol-
ogy advances allows Soviet designers to increase technology levels
incrementally during their frequent system upgrades.
Third, the achievement of a specific performance level in a
technology does not automatically mean that the technology is available
for Soviet military systems development. Laboratory test results are not
considered demonstrations of military system performance levels. More-
over, not all technologies producible in highly capable institutes or lead
plants are easily translated into the Soviet production base. The Soviet
production base has difficulty in beginning to produce new high-
technology products and often, even after they do so, product quality is
not up to Western standards.
The Soviets have successfully built significant numbers of
weapon systems competitive with advanced Western systems despite
the many technology areas where they lag the West. The Soviets are
able to begin development of military systems shortly after the required
technologies mature. For example, in 1977 the Soviets conducted a
feasibility demonstration of a rib-truss space antenna (the KRT-10) and
by 1980/81 had authorized a space system using this antenna technol-
ogy. Also, they completed research for gallium arsenide space solar cells
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in the mid-1970s and used them on the MIR space station that entered
development in the mid-1970s. They also reportedly conducted feasibil-
ity tests with an analog fly-by-wire aircraft avionics subsystem in 1973
and authorized its use in the AN-124 transport in 1977 when it was
qualified for design application.
When a country other than the United States is the world leader in
a technology, the USSR attempts to procure technology there as well as
in the United States. For example, the Soviets are now obtaining some
communications technologies from both Japan and the United States. In
such cases, the USSR might apply a technology development to a
weapon system design at the same time or before the United States,
even if they lagged the United States in that technology.
In many technology areas, such as directed energy and optical
computing, the Soviets are emphasizing development. Areas of
priority Soviet technology development are manifested in several ways:
increased program authorizations, growing research infrastructures,
increased capital investment, and application of goal-oriented manage-
ment.
The Soviets continue to develop technologies and systems not
currently pursued in the West, and this practice is expected to
continue. Some technologies once actively pursued in the United States
are major research areas in the USSR. The Soviets undoubtedly saw
merit in the use of such technologies for their requirements, while the
United States made other program and requirement choices. The
Soviets have been developing nuclear rocket propulsion technology for
spacecraft applications since the early 1960s with a hiatus in the late
1960s to early 1970s, while the United States abandoned it about 15
years ago. Both the United States and the USSR researched automatic
loaders for tank guns in the 1950s. The United States dropped its effort
in the late 1950s, but all Soviet tanks entering development beginning
with the T-64 in 1958 have used such loaders.
The Soviets are also developing liquid fluorine rocket engines for
space missions. Moreover, they continued to develop nuclear power
reactors for space applications while the United States discontinued its
efforts between 1973 and 1985.' The USSR continued an active
chemical warfare program after the United States cut back. The United
States was an early developer of fuel-air explosives and conducted
research in enhanced blast munitions. Today these are areas where the
Soviets are very active and the United States is not rapidly pursuing de-
velopment.
SP-100 nuclear space power supply
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The Soviets have pursued development of mobile strategic missiles
since the late 1950s. While many early programs were canceled, most
programs begun since the 1970s are being completed-the SS-20 IRBM;
the SS-25 ICBM; and the SS-X-24 ICBM programs, for example. The
United States has several times investigated mobile strategic missiles but
has only deployed the Pershing II.
Although the Soviets have reduced the number of liquid-propellant
missiles in development, they continue to pursue development of
storable liquid propellants-significantly reduced by the United States
when the Titan II program ended. Throughout the 1970s, they contin-
ued research to develop gel propellant technology for missiles (gels were
dropped by the United States in the late 1960s).
The Soviets continue to develop technologies and system programs
for strategic defense. The ABM program in the USSR continues, and the
Soviet air defense system is being upgraded.
We also see areas where the Soviets are reducing system develop-
ments-liquid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, for example. While
continuing to modernize their ballistic missile forces they have reduced
the number of new liquid-propellant missile types per generation since
the early 1970s and shifted some design assets into space and cruise
missile programs. The technology is nearly available and they seemed
on the verge of a new generation of boosters-using gel propellants
Technology transfer from the West continues to provide the
Soviets with an expanding technology base. It has allowed the
Soviets to truncate indigenous research projects earlier than original-
ly planned and the Soviets were able to begin military system
development earlier than they would have originally planned if they
had relied solely on their indigenous effort. System development
would then follow a normal schedule. The system involved reaches the
field with performance that could not have been achieved with
indigenous Soviet technology at that time.
The Soviets have continued to reverse engineer or buy Western
products where they lag the West. For example, the Soviets have
reverse engineered and placed into limited production many Western
memory chips and microprocessors, and have begun to acquire fiber
optics and switching technology for designing new communications
systems. Specifically in the area of microelectronics there is sharp
disagreement in the Intelligence Community over whether the Soviets
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have successfully reverse engineered recent generation chips-256k
DRAMs, for example.2 Moreover, they are supplementing their weak
production base with purchases both legally and illegally of high-
technology production equipment from the West. Examples of this
production equipment include advanced automated assembly lines,
robotics, and autoclaves for producing composite structural materials.
The USSR's practice of reverse engineering, however, may soon
run into problems. As US and Japanese integrated circuits, for example,
become more complex, reverse engineering will require: (a) tracking
hundreds of thousands of connections, (b) understanding how they all fit
together, and (c) mastering the complex process steps used in produc-
tion. Thus, copying such circuits will require not only much more
sophisticated Western equipment but also much more effort to dupli-
cate each circuit. We do not know if this will cause the microelectronics
gap with the West to widen.
Our analysis of actual Soviet projects that benefited from foreign
technology acquisitions in 1979 and 1980 indicates that only about 20
percent were projects related to the design or development of specific
weapon systems. Of these, the largest single group of projects were
related to the generation of technological concepts and the evaluation of
their feasibility and producibility. Another smaller group of projects for
developing components, devices, and production equipment were for
specific system programs. It appears that the largest portion of the
acquisitions is applied in the Soviet equivalent of the US "advanced
technology development" (the 6.3A stage of the acquisition process),
which precedes full-scale development. On the basis of our analysis of
these inputs and the Soviet military research and weapon development
process for major systems, we believe that it takes the Soviets about one
to five years to incorporate foreign acquisitions into their own full-scale
development programs. Given the length of full-scale development and
test programs, the time required for technology to impact deployed
military capability probably ranges from five to about 15 years. New
systems would be closer to the high end of this range and moderniza-
tions of existing systems would tynically be toward the low end
The Soviets have reacted to improved Western control of technol-
ogy by trying new tactics to acquire data or equipment. Recently, they
declared they had completed building an operational supercomputer,
hoping the West would drop controls when, in fact, the program was
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ogy.
still in trouble. Also, another ploy has been to invite Western scientists to
participate in science projects on space missions. The science projects
solicited would require use of embargoed instrumentation or technol-
programs.
Technology transfer for multiuse components, such as microelec-
tronics, is incorporated in ongoing research work or is used as the
rationale for new research projects. The Soviets will still bring such
components devices to pilot maturity before making them available for
use in the preliminary design phase of military system development
in full-scale engineering development.
There is no indication that foreign technology acquisitions have
reduced the time required for Soviet weapon development programs.
But it is extensively used in program planning, especially for technology
selection; in justification of design approaches; and in threat determina-
tion. We do not believe the Soviets plan to use foreign parts extensively
in weapons. We believe technology transfer cannot change the level of
feasible technology in an ongoing authorized military system program
The Soviets conduct feasibility tests of new military technology
before they decide to use the technology to develop a military
weapon system. The range of technology feasibility testing we have
noted includes items from the size of components, such as a silicon-on-
sapphire microcircuits, to subsystems such as liquid-propellant rocket
engines for spacecraft, to those to test the feasibility of complete system
configurations-such as the FAITHLESS V/STOL aircraft, which
roved technology for the FORGER fighter aircraft.
Feasibility test devices are built to applications standards, not
production and military operational standards. If such devices are
successfully tested, it does not mean the Soviets have achieved a
military capability.
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The Soviet laser technologies will progress and production
capabilities will grow throughout the 1990s. The large tactical laser
effort now involves major portions of at least three directorates of the
Ministry of Defense Industry (MOP). They will be producing increased
numbers of solid-state lasers for the ground and air forces with
applications for range finding, detection, target designation, and de-
fense suppression. New tunable solid-state laser technologies are expect-
ed to be available for applications to systems in the late 1980s or earl
measure. The integration of technologies available for use with lasers for
radar applications will continue to improve.
For strategic applications, initial use of lasers probably will include
air defense and ABM radars, identification of space targets or ballistic
missile reentry vehicles, and for use in aircraft and satellite-to-subma-
The availability of improved lasers for industrial purposes will
allow their uses to expand and to satisfy more requirements for a variety
of new generation materials and components. The newly formed
MNTK goal-oriented program structure under the Academy of Sciences
at Shatura should be a driving force in applying lasers to industry
Soviet technology, we believe, is available to begin development of
high-energy laser damage systems in the 1980s: 100- kW class laser
technology became available in the early 1980s and low (1 to 2)
megawatt class laser technology by the mid-1980s. There is another
view that believes that the Soviets attained maturity for 10 to 100 kW
CO and CO2 EDL lasers in 1973-78 period and for 0.1 to 1.0 MW CO2
EDL during 1977-80.3 Additionally, they believe military capability
8 This view is held by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency,
and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy.
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that a ground-based ASAT device provides should not be overlooked,
even if it has not reached its full potential.
By 1980 the Soviets had technology development under way on
Free Electron Lasers (FELs). FEL technology for application to system
designs is not expected to mature in the 10 to 100 kW class until the
early-to-mid 1990s and in the 100 kW to 1 MW class until the late
The USSR will continue to pursue technology development in
many strategic defense areas. We expect they will closely monitor US
technical developments to acquire additional insights into our progress
and conduct their own research to offset US lines of research. It is
unlikely they will forge into any weapon system development program
not previously planned for their own military needs, until the United
States begins engineering development. They already have instituted
research projects to gain insight into ways to counter US technical paths.
The USSR began major research programs in the mid-1960s to
provide the technology base eventually to build high-power directed
energy weapon systems. Most work through the present has been
research and testing for feasibility demonstration of technologies appli-
cable to weapons. Allocation of resources for development of research,
test, and a pilot production industrial infrastructure has been steady,
though costly, since then.
A key problem, as the Soviet laser program has expanded, has been
to determine when the Soviet technology matured for them to begin
weapon system designs. Some believe there is direct evidence to support
system development under way in the Soviet Union and some do not
believe we yet have direct evidence of a system development program.
We believe many of the test devices and in
laboratory physics experiments are feasibility demonstrators. There is
another view that believes that not all devices re fea-
sibility demonstrators, but some could be system prototypes. A itional-
ly, the holders of this view believe the military capability that a ground
based ASAT feasibility demonstration device provides should not be
overlooked, even if it has not reached its full potential." We have not
found direct evidence of a Soviet high-power directed energy laser
weapon system in full-scale engineering development. But we believe
the Soviets could have initiated system development in the 100 kW class
4 This view is held by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
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in the early 1980s and low megawatt class lasers in the mid-1980s.
Development beginning in the early-to-mid-1980s probably would not
reach IOC for 12 to 15 years after a decision to develop was made-and
then if no test problems are encountered. Additional system specific
technology development may yet be necessary before development can
begin in some weapons-related areas. There is another view which
believes that the Soviets launched full-scale development of some high-
energy laser weapons programs as early as the mid-to-late 1970s.5
A design bureau and production infrastructure associated with
explosive MHD and explosive MCG power sources probably were
established in the early 1980s. Explosive MHD and MCG technology is
available for use as early power source subsystems for directed energy
and hypervelocity kinetic energy systems. The work may be directed by
the Institute of Hydrodynamics in Novosibirsk. Nonexplosive power
sources for MHD devices are widely available and will continue to be
used for a variety of both military and civil applications.
The Soviets have an extensive research effort in hypervelocity
kinetic energy impact supported by a very large organizational
infrastructure. Extensive work has been under way on light gas guns,
rail guns, macroparticle streams, and magnetohydrodynamic hyperve-
locity electrocannons since the 1960s. After 1983 Soviet hypervelocity
impact work became centrally managed.
The Soviets have made limited applications to military systems,
with mixed results, of composite materials-an area where signifi-
cant gains are being made in the West. The USSR has lagged the Unit-
ed States significantly in the use of composites. The reason for the Soviet
lag may be related as much to policy choices as it is to technical factors.
The USSR has a very strong, long established, metallurgical technology
and production base. They also have extensive raw material resources in
many metallic materials not available in quantity in the West. A major
Soviet national commitment was made in the early 1970s to establish a
polymer composite materials industrial base and, while the develop-
ment of technology has progressed, manufacturing has been a problem.
Thus, the Soviets have tended to continue to select metallic materials for
many design solutions. Moreover, they have bought significant amounts
of composite materials production machinery from the West instead of
creating a design base for their own equipment. As polymeric compos-
ites demonstrate the capability to provide significant strength-to-weight
gains over metallic counterparts, the traditional bias toward selecting
metallic design solutions may change. However, a major aircraft
accident in the early 1980s may have set back the application of
metallic composite materials. A structural member constructed of metal
matrix composites failed during the test of an unidentified aircraft. F_
' This view is held by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency,
and the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
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III. Influence of Technology on Possible Major Soviet Military
Systems 1995-2010
For systems reaching operational forces in the mid-1990s and
later, the Soviets will use the strong and sizable base of military
technology advances they have made since the late 1970s. Soviet
military equipment has been characterized by designs for weapons they
believe can be produced and procured in quantity at the time a
program is initiated. The major portion of Soviet systems projected for
the 1990s and early 2000s will involve evolutionary improvements in
the types of systems now in service. The capability of many systems
may improve significantly as the enabling technology base provides the
basis for higher performance increments per generation.
A small portion of the new systems will provide capabilities new to
the Soviets. For example, Soviet directed energy and kinetic energy
weapons-related research had considerable momentum well before the
United States announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program.
If proven feasible, these technologies will eventually allow them to
begin weapon programs to meet their own strategic defense require-
ments. This extensive work is likely to proceed regardless of US
advances in SDI.
Our analysis leads us to conclude that the performance levels of
any weapons scheduled to enter full-scale deployment by the turn of
the century will be based on technology either now available to the
Soviets or that will be by 1990.
Technology available to the Soviets between the late 1970s and
early 1990s will allow them to achieve significant performance up-
grades in many mission areas. A steady stream of new and improved So-
viet military technology developments will be available to Soviet
planners and design engineers throughout this period. These new and
improved technologies will allow military systems completing state
trials between 1995-2010 to be more capable than their predecessors
even though in individual areas of technical achievement the Soviets
may lag the West. We believe the levels of technical achievement
attained plus their large and continuous systems development effort will
allow them to compete effectively in overall capability with US systems
over the next 10 to 25 years.
Figure 3 shows
the time lines for some o the major system programs and for the key
technology developments that preceeded the system programs.
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Figure 3
Possible Soviet Military System Developments
for the 1990s and Early 2000s-Selected Projections
Strategic Offensive Systems
New SSBN
Solid SLBM
Liquid SLBM
Solid ICBM
Peripheral attack bomber
Small LRCM
Strategic Defensive Systems
Long-range interceptor
Long-range air-to-air missile
New ground laser (100-200 kW)
Surface-to-air missile
AWACS
Short-range SAM
Ground laser (MW range)
New orbital laser (MW CO/CO2
Airborne laser (MW range)
General Purpose Ground Systems
Chemical warfare agent
Attack helicopter
Helicopter launched missile
Main battle tank
Infantry fighting vehicle
General Purpose Land-Based Air Force and Air Mobility Systems
Tilt-rotor aircraft
Peripheral attack aircraft
Air-to-air missile
Air superiority fighter
Intermediate transport
General Purpose Naval Systems
Point defense SAM
Cruiser, including weapons and support systems
Amphibious assault helicopter
Shipbome laser (kW class)
VSTOL fighter
CTOL aircraft carrier
Airborne submarine wake detectors (limited area)
Spacebome submarine wake detectors (limited area)
Shipborne laser (MW class)
Command and control for air defense
Command and control for ASAT and BMD
Mobile command and control systems
Ionospheric modification system
Imaging satellite (strategic)
Radar imaging satellite (synthetic aperature radar)
HF jamming systems
Satellite jammer
Phased array jamming system
Space Support Systems
Space station
Space tug
Space plane
Research/technology development
System tem development t based on n laboratory demonstration
System development based on standard processes
71
2000
7
2010
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ment schedule based on their availability for weapons planning.
We have attempted to project some representative Soviet systems,
which they could choose to develop in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
based on potential for improvement, identified completed research
programs, established system trends, and the maturity of the pacing key
military technologies. Particular weight is given to firm evidence of
pacing technology for systems. We have concentrated on those systems
that would depend on the availability of particular key technologies to
achieve their performance, and have tried to anticipate their develop-
launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).
Advances We Expect In Specific Missions Areas
Technologies for Strategic Offensive Systems
The Soviet Union has continued to have a vigorous effort in
research, technology development, system development, and deploy-
ment for strategic forces. It is the result of an unswerving commitment
for the past two decades to build up and improve their strategic force
capabilities. Since the mid-1960s, there has been substantial growth in
Soviet strategic attack forces; intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), bombers, and air-
Strategic nuclear attack capabilities will improve significantly as a
result of incorporating higher levels of Soviet microelectronics, propul-
sion, guidance and navigation (G & N), structural materials, communica-
tions, signature reduction/low observables, sensors, and sensing technol-
ogy levels than they attained in previous generations:
- Signature reduction technologies would have allowed the Soviets
in the early 1980s to begin development of bombers and cruise
missiles with reduced radar cross sections. Designs of the early
1980s attained 5 square meters and 0.1 square meter radar cross
sections (RCSs) respectively. The Soviets will probably be
capable of achieving respective RCSs of 1 square meter and 0.01
square meter in the early 1990s.
- Propulsion, G & N, and materials technologies will allow accura-
cy, payload weight, and range capabilities to improve so that the
Soviets could significantly increase the lethality of deployed
individual ballistic missiles against the US target set.
- Penetration aids, sensors for maneuvering reentry vehicles,
structural materials and propulsion technology research is now
being geared to provide the Soviets in the 1990s with the
technological capability to begin designs of ballistic missiles
reentry packages designed to evade or overwhelm US BMD
systems.
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- Improved communications technologies will allow the Soviet
NCA to improve their ability to coordinate strategic integrated
operations retargeting and ensure continuity of authority, but
retargeting of long-range assets against mobile targets will
remain beyond their technical abilities to begin designs until the
mid-1990s.
Technologies for Strategic Defensive Systems
We expect that the Soviets will have the technology available to ex-
tend and intensify their already existing strategic defense capabilities. A
variety of new technologies for orbital, ground-based, and airborne
systems are in research, or are being developed with established
technologies such as propulsion, materials, aerodynamics, radar, and
computers. Some will require mastery and integration of new technol-
ogies such as lasers, particle beam propagation, and associated pointing
and tracking systems.
Strategic defense capabilities will improve with advances in radar,
signal processing sensors, laser radar, laser pointing and tracking, laser
power source, and directed energy technology research programs,
which have received significant resources over the past 10 to 20 years:
- Early 1980s radar moving target indicator and signal processing
technologies will allow development of systems with improved
detection of low-altitude aerodynamic targets with large radar
cross sections, but technologies to allow design of systems to
detect aerodynamic targets with reduced radar cross sections
will not be available until the early 1990s. Systems based on
these technologies should be ready for deployment 10 to 15
years after design is begun.
- Significant portions of the directed energy effort in the USSR
can now be identified as technology development rather than
military system development. We expect further research ef-
forts to produce laser airborne and space feasibility demonstra-
tions by the mid-1990s, before system development programs
are authorized. Initial ground-based laser ASAT capabilities
may be in test by the turn of the century, but other directed en-
ergy damage systems are not likely to be available until much
later for ASAT, BMD, and air defense applications.
Another view believes there is evidence that the Soviets may
have started some high-energy laser weapon system develop-
ment programs. Moreover, the holders of this view believe that,
for some high-energy laser defensive weapon systems, comple-
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tion of test devices-whether they are prototypes or feasibility
demonstrators-could be considered a limited military capa-
bility.6
There is an alternative view that holds that there is insufficient
evidence to determine that Soviet high-energy laser research has
transitioned from technology development (NIR) to systems
development (OKR), or to determine dates for Soviet achieve-
ment of such technology maturity.7
Technologies for General Purpose Ground Systems
Tactical Ground Warfare capabilities will continue to be an area
where Soviet systems will excel as the result of structural material,
conventional explosives, microelectronics, laser ranging and designation,
and BW/CW technologies available for new designs entering the
engineering phase of the acquisition cycle in the 1980s and early 1990s:
- Soviet structural materials and explosives technology develop-
ments continue to provide tank and antitank missile designers
with the capabilities to offset emerging US developments that
are made known to Soviet planners by early open-source and
intelligence collection.
- Explosives technology advances continue to provide Soviet
munitions designers with improved lethality in conventional
strike weapons for artillery and SRBMs.
- Lethality of conventional strike weapons will be significantly
improved by the application of LSI/VLSI microelectronics to
fire control systems and the introduction of solid state tunable
lasers for target designation, ranging, and countermeasures for
damage limitation.
- Development of third-generation chemical agents and toxins
along with genetic engineering to produce new biological agents
will continue to pose a significant threat.
- Propulsion, structural materials, and sensoring technologies will
enable the Soviets to develop new helicopters including those for
improved air-to-air warfare. Tilt-rotor aircraft are already
under development based on technologies available in the early
1980s.
Technologies for General Purpose Land Based Air Force and Air Mobility
Systems
The majority of the improvements in aircraft will come from
evolutionary technological developments. Emphasis will be on aircraft
survivability and weapon system efficiency. We do not foresee signifi-
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cant expansions in the overall flight envelopes for combat aircraft;
however, it is likely that survivability will be attained through improve-
ments in aircraft performance and application of signature reduction
technologies. We can expect to see innovations in such areas as tilt-
rotors and reduced signatures. Future radars coupled with upgraded
infrared search and track systems and laser rangefinders will further
improve air-to-air capabilities. Advances in radar signal processing will
allow designs of improved all-aspect, lookdown/shootdown capability.
Finally, the maturity of analog fly-by-wire avionics technology in the
late 1970s should allow application to new tactical air programs in the
early-to-mid-1980s that will be deployed in the 1990s.
Technologies for General Purpose Naval Systems
The Soviet Navy will continue to improve the capability of its
general purpose forces to protect its SSBNs, counter-Western naval
forces, provide support for ground operations, and disrupt enemy sea
lines of communications. The Soviets will attempt to expand the areas in
which they can conduct sea denial, improve the combat capabilities of
modern principle surface combatants for operations well beyond the
range of land-based fighter aircraft protection, and develop increased
operational capability for combined arms tasks.
Technologies for National Command and Control, Communications, Intelli-
gence, and Radioelectronic Combat
Forthcoming improvements in operational command and control
capabilities will continue to stress the national command authority's
more rapid and survivable control of forces and weapons. Command,
control, and communications for the next decade will be limited by
microelectronic and power supply technologies that are either now
mature or will be in the near future. Technology available in the 1980s
will lead to decisions on systems that will allow the Soviet leadership
command and control systems that have improved technical capability
to more rapidly executive ICBM strikes on tactical warning, or preemp-
tively. Real-time crisis management systems may become possible
through integrated intelligence displays and automated decisionmaking
aids fed by a network of strategic sensors and weapons status monitors
in the strategic forces. The Soviets will have the necessary technology to
implement automated centralized battle management functions at
theater, front, and fleet command centers. Technology to make com-
munications and signal-processing terminals more survivable will be
available in the mid-to-late 1980s for new system designs. Technology
now available for new designs will allow for the extended use of coding
for error correction, adaptive routing with packet switching, adaptive
high frequency (HF), spread-spectrum, exotic frequencies (including
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millimeter wave and optical bands), and intersatellite links to increase
the survivability and reliability of communications circuits. Technology
Technologies for Space Support Systems
We expect the Soviets to make improvements to the new space
boosters they are now developing throughout the 1990s. The increased
lift capabilities of these vehicles over predecessor SLVs will result in
many new missions and improved capabilities over the next 20 years.
The Soviets may have a far-term goal to develop a completely reusable,
horizontal takeoff-and-landing, hypersonic two-stage vehicle for earth-
to-space transport. Mature propulsion and guidance technologies will
allow the Soviets to begin design of a space tug in the late 1980s.
Soviet industry should, in the mid-1990s, after 20 years of
modernization, retooling, and management shifts, be capable of
more rapidly assimilating high-technology military products into
production. The defense industrial production sector should also be less
restrictive on technology choices for new designs entering develop-
ment-perhaps as soon as the mid-1990s. Payoff for the Soviets in high-
volume, high-productivity output even if modernization is successful is
not likely until the 2005-2010 time frame. Moreover, the improved
management of technology development will have further increased the
pace of technology maturation. A more efficient design base probably
will no longer require significant expansion to conduct more complex
product development programs. We do not know at this point in the
modernization-due to present difficulties-whether they can keep up
with the steady pace of modernization that is continuous in the West.
Production and deployment rates observed for new high-tech-
nology military equipment show a trend toward fewer but better
individual systems. We expect this trend to continue into the 1990s and
beyond. During unit modernization the Soviets have been replacing
more than one older system with a more capable single new system.
This has resulted in, for example, smaller numbers of aircraft in a
regiment and lower submarine force replacements as old units are
retired. The Soviets face difficult choices in deciding whether to replace
equipment on a one-to-one basis for a more powerful force capability or
on a less than one-to-one replacement rate that would allow growth in
force capability at a reasonable cost.
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If the Soviets somewhat accelerate the pace of technological devel-
opment and still supplement their indigenous efforts with Western
advanced technology, they would be in a better position to effectively re-
spond to US high-technology systems developments-SDI, for example.
How the Soviets maintain their capabilities over the longer term would
depend on the pace of high-technology systems development established
by whomever seizes the lead. If the United States set a high rate of SDI
system modernization, for example, after attaining a lead it would still be
difficult for the Soviets to develop competitive systems without major
changes in commitments to existing types of programs, reallocation of
design assets, and/or an increased overall military effort
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