IG REPORT ON FBIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94-00798R000200170002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 61
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 26, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND TRANOAITTAL SUP 11111. 3 Dec 80
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B. Ret. to 0/C/Ops for file.
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Approval
For Clearance
Per emanation
/As Requested
For Correction
Prepare Reply
Circulate
For Your Information
See Me
Comment
Investigate
Signature
----
Coordination
- - -
Justify
The attached will be retained in O/C/Ops
files. No additional copies are to be made.
DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
clearances, and similar actions
FROM: (Name, ore. symbol, Agency/Post)
C/Ops
Room No.?Bldg.
Phone No.
5041-102
*U. S. GPO 1978-0 -261-647 3354
OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribod kt GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.205
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ROUTING AND TRANSFAfr ust?
3 Dec 80
Tik (Name, office symbol, room number,
building, Agency/Post)
1. sent to all field bureaus
Initials
Date
except Al,
1s'bad
2.
3.
4.
B.
Action
File
Note and Return
Approval
For Clearance
Per Conversation
As Requested
For Correction
Prepare Reply
Circulate
For Your Information
See Me
Comment
Investigate
Signature
Coordination
Justify
REMARKS
The attached copy of the Executive Summary
of the IG Report may be shown to all Staff
employees but as soon as everyone who wants to
read it has done so, please destroy.
SECRET
DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
clearances, and similar actions
FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)
C/Ops
Room No.?Bldg.
Phone No.
6041-102
U. SA:PO:1978-0-261-647 3354
OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMS (41 CFR) 101-11.206
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/Akir Fla
_ /e-Jtt /--
26 November 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: tAief, Operations Group
Chief, Production Group
Chief, Analysis Group
Chief, Executive and Planning Staff
Chief, Administrative Staff
FROM:
Deputy Director, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service
SUBJECT: IG Report on FBIS
Attached is a copy of the Executive Summary of the IG Report
on FBIS, based on an inspection conducted in the summer of 1979. I
have deleted portions that criticize personnel. This copy may be
shown to employees who wish to read it. Readers should keep in mind
that the report, only recently received by FBIS, is based on data
_
gathered more than a year ago, and that recommendations are not auto-
_
matically implemented. FBIS is responding to the recommendations.
Attachment:
As stated
RFC:RFT
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Executive Summary
I. Background
A. Mission
The principal functions of FBIS are to:
- Conduct, as a service of common concern,
the monitoring of foreign radio, television and
press broadcasts and foreign publications, and the
dissemination [in English] of the collected infor-
mation to United States Government components.
- Provide translation support to CIA compo-
nents and, when appropriate, to other U.S. Govern-
ment agencies.
- Analyze the content, volume, and audience
targeting of Communist broadcast and published
media for indications of Communist objectives,
intentions, and problems, and report regularly the
results of this analysis.
- Collect, collate, and publish technical
and programming information on the world's broad-
casting stations.
The functions of FBIS derive primarily from para-
graphs 8 and 9 of NSCID No. 2, revised 17 February 1972.
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OCID No. 2/4, effective 18 May 1976, restates FBIS' tasks
essentially as defined in NSCID No. 2. The basic Head-
quarters Regulation on FBIS
B. History, Organization, Budget and Product
U.S. Government (USG) monitoring of foreign broadcasts
commenced in 1941 when FBIS was established as a part of the
Federal Communications Commission. During World War II,
FBIS developed a collaborative relationship with its British
counterpart in the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
which endures to date. After World War II, the monitoring
function was transferred to the Central Intelligence Group
(CIG), CIA's predecessor organization. At that time,
another World War II unit, the U.S. Army's Military Docu-
ments Center, which translated captured enemy material, was
also merged with CIG. Later, under CIA, these two compo-
nents--as the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the
Foreign Documents Division (FDD)--plus the overt Contacts
Division formed CIA's Office of Operations in the Director-
ate of Intelligence (DI). In 1963,- FDD became part of 'the
Central Reference Service, now the Office of Central Refer-
ence. In 1967, FBIS and FDD were merged in an effort to
ensure increased efficiency and speed by consolidating the
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Foreign Broadcast Information Service
'
Administrative Staff
?
DIRECTOR
? .
Executive and
Planning Staff
Liaison and
Requirements Branch
PRODUCTION
GROUP
ANALYSIS
GROUP
? Asia/Africa
? Middle East
Europe
Latin America
? USSR/
Eastern Europe
? China
Joint Publications
Research Service
Europe/Latin
America Division
Research
Branch
USSR
Division
In
Contract
Translators
Near East/Asia/
Africa Division
Translation
Services Staff,
Foreign Language
Service Center
HConsolidated
Translation Survey
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MAY 1979
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OPERATIONS
GROUP
Field
Coverage Staff
Engineering Design
& Support Staff
Daily Reporting
Division
? Eastern Europe
? USSR
? Western Europe
? PRC
? Asia and Pacific
Wire Services
Staff
Comm Center
? Middle East/North Africa
? Sub?Saharan Arica .
...Latin America
FIELD BUREAUS
? London
? BBC
? Abidjan
? Austrian
? Key West
? Panama
? Paraguay
? Okinawa
? Hong Kong
? Bangkok
? Seoul
? Nicosia
? Tel Aviv
? ? Jordan
? Athens
a Gulf
STAT
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exploitation of oral and published news media and by perfor-
ming overseas work that could be done at lower cost by
foreign nationals with a consequent saving in staff posi-
tions at home. When the DI was reorganized in early 1976,
FBIS was transferred, as part of a trade of components, to
the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T), its
current location. Today FBIS is a separate element of the
DS&T and the FBIS Director reports directly to the Deputy
Director for Science and Technology (DDS&T) and participates
regularly in DS&T staff meetings.
The organization of FBIS is shown on the chart facing
this page. FBIS' principal components are the Office of the
Director and the three-functional groups. The Operations
Group collects information overseas from foreign radio and
television broadcasts and articles of immediate interest
appearing in foreign publications and disseminates the
product abroad and in Washington through its wire services
and its Daily Report publications. The Production Group in
Washington does special translations and selects less
time-sensitive articles from foreign newspapers and journals
for translation and publication by the Joint Publications
Research Service (JPRS). The Analysis Group analyzes
Communist radio and television broadcasts and publishes
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its findings in Trends in .Communist Media and special
reports. The mission, staffing, budget and performance of
the groups, including the field bureaus, are detailed in the
. separate sections of this report.
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)
?
C. Between Inspections '
The last full inspection of FBIS took place in 1968.
An eight-day abbreviated survey was conducted in the Head-
quarters area in 1976 and at two domestic installations in
1977, primarily to ensure compliance with the laws and
regulations governing Agency activities. While these
inspections found that FBIS was a productive, low-cost, and
well managed Agency component, the reports contained a
number of recommendations on a variety of topics. Our
inspection established that the changes which were suggested
then have been implemented and that there were no hold-over
problems we needed to address.
We did, however, encounter some objections to an
IG recommendation in 1968 that FBIS stop all editing of
texts that originate in English. Editors tell us that this
often leads to awkward and in some cases misleading phrase-
ology. We therefore suggest that FBIS use its good judgment
in processing such texts.
The 11 years which have elapsed since the 1968 inspec-
tion have been momentous ones for FBIS. One major change
resulting from the reorganizations of the Directorate of
Intelligence and the Directorate of Science and Technology
in late 1976 was the transfer of FBIS to the DS&T. Since
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FBIS had comprised a large Tart of the DI and the then
DDI had drawn from it the resources to staff and maintain
newly established DI components, FBIS anticipated that the
DS&T, with its larger resources, would feel little need to
intrude upon it for manpower and funds and would be better
able to support its desire to automate portions of its work
and assist in developing more technically advanced collec-
tion systems. The change did benefit FBIS in that it
was no longer looked upon as the resource cornucopia for its
parent component and it was pleased that the DS&T left it
alone to manage its own affairs. However, FBIS believes
that it has derived few of the anticipated technical bene-
fits from its association with the DS&T, and the DS&T's
focus on higher priority programs has resulted, in FBIS'
view, in a less than ideal understanding of FBIS and its
problems. Moreover, the change has attenuated FBIS ties
with the rest of the Agency and has lessened some of the
close relationships which formerly prevailed between FBIS
officers and DI (later NFAC) analysts. Even so, on balance,
almost all senior FBIS officers believe the shift from the
DI to the DS&T has been helpful from a resources standpoint.
International events since 1968 and expanding and
changing collection requirements have also impacted signifi-
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cantly on the FBIS overseas bureau structure and have
required the constant attention of FBIS management; indeed,
FBIS' overseas operations have been its major preoccupation.
The following events, which are not all inclusive, illus-
trate some of the problems with which FBIS has had to
cope.
- The Caribbean Bureau in Puerto Rico, which opened
in 1965, closed in 1973 after proving unable to fulfill
its expectations. This bureau has become known in FBIS
as an expensive mistake.
- New collection requirements on the Southern
Cone of Latin American necessitated the opening of a
new bureau at Asuncion, Paraguay in 1973.
- FBIS' large Cyprus-based Mediterranean Bureau
(Medbureau), which provided centralized coverage of the
Middle East, was overrun by the Turkish invasion of
Cyprus in 1974. This impelled FBIS to diversify its
overseas operations (which included moving many of its
foreign national monitors) into smaller units capable
of providing some redundant coverage. In the case. of
the Mediterranean, the Medbureau collection tasks were
assumed by TDY units at Athens, Beirut, and Tel Aviv.
In 1975, events in Lebanon required forced closure of
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the facility there and permanent bureaus were estab-
lished in Amman, Nicosia, and Tel Aviv. FBIS continues
to maintain a TDY team at Athens, having been unable to
date to obtain permission for a permanent facility.
- The Saigon Bureau was closed in 1975 when Saigon
was overrun and coverage of Southeast Asia was assumed
by the Bangkok Bureau, which had been established as a
contingency back-up unit.
- The Hokkaido unit was also closed in 1975 and
the Tokyo Bureau in 1976. Collection was diverted to
the Okinawa Bureau and the newly formed Hong Kong and
Seoul Bureaus.
- In 1976, the Kaduna, Nigeria Bureau was closed
at the request of the Nigerian Government and FBIS
coverage of West Africa was only resumed in 1979 when
the Abidjan, Ivory Coast Bureau, was formed.
- The small unit in Cologne, Germany, which is
subordinated to the London Bureau, was closed in 1973
and reactivated in 1979.
- During 1978 and 1979, intensified requirements
for coverage of South Africa, Central Asia, Afghani-
stan, and Iran precipated extensive efforts by FBIS to
open new bureaus to cover these areas. After a number
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of abortive attempts detailed in the section of this
report dealing with the Operations Group, the new
Gulf Bureau on Bahrain was established in mid-1979.
- Reductions in the number of FBIS staff positions
overseas coupled with the constantly increasing number
of bureaus, required the conversion of staff admini-
strative and engineering slots to foreign national
positions.
- FBIS communications were updated through tie-ins
to the Agency and Defense Department's satellite
systems.
During the- 11-year interval between major inspections,
FBIS also gave attention -to its Headquarters components.
Among the problems it attempted to address were:
- integrating the former Foreign Documents Division
(which is now FBIS' Production Group) into the rest of
FBIS, improving career opportunities for linguists, and
obtaining greater productivity from sub-components
without additional personnel resources,
- ? improving the Joint Publications Research
Service (JPRS) products,
- automating the Daily Report (the FBIS vehicle
for publishing the information collected by the over-
seas bureaus),
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- ensuring that equal career opportunities were
available to all employees and that there were more
open communications between FBIS management and its
personnel,
- handling new compliance, grievance, Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act requirements.
How FBIS has coped with these and other challenges
abroad and at home is treated in the various sections of
this report.
II. Effectiveness
During our inspection of FBIS, we found it to be a
unique U.S. Government "service of common concern" which
provides foreign, open source information effectively,
rapidly, and in quantity to U.S. Government (USG) policy-
makers, analysts and researchers, as well as to non-govern-
ment subscribers and even some foreign governments. FBIS'
products are indispensable to a number of its Intelligence
Community (IC) customers and of considerable utility to many
others.
FBIS output is large. Printed and typescript produc-
tion in an average month is approximately 30,000 pages, in
addition to thousands of biographic, economic, and technical
abstract cards. The 16 field bureaus and units wire-file to
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FBIS Headquarters about 231,000 publishable words a day;
of these, approximately 40,000 are disseminated by the Wire
Services Staff and about 137,000 are published in the Daily
Report (DR). The field bureaus also provide directly many
services to a host of "lateral consumers"--mostly U.S.
diplomatic and military installations--around the world,,
as well as to U.S. delegations to SALT, MBFR, and other
negotiations. Ad hoc arrangements are also made to service
the President and other high U.S. officials during visits
abroad, as well as U.S. negotiators at international confer-
ences. Most of the FBIS product is unclassified. The July
1979 "Bibliography" of FBIS publications lists 56 regular
issuances, ranging in periodicity from daily to quarterly,
with considerable in-between variations. About six percent
of the total printed and typescript output consists of
classified translations for Agency components.
FBIS is justifiably proud of its ability to meet
the increasingly numerous Community requirements on a
timely basis and to manage its affairs economically. Even
in these .days of troublesome inflation, it remain,s a
cost-effective bargain.
There are, however, factors--some external to FBIS
and some deriving from its leadership and management--which
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impact adversely on FBIS' ability to maintain, expand and
improve its services. These include:
- Its separation from the rest of CIA. Histori-
cally, FBIS has been not only physically located at a
distance from CIA Headquarters, it has been separated
psychologically as well. FBIS employees tend to see
their work with open sources as sharply differentiating
them from those in the Agency who deal with classified
data.
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FBIS
is left to "do its own thing." The effects on FBIS and
the Agency of this isolation are found in this inspec-
tion report. .While FBIS management has been aware?of
this separateness problem and has taken a number of
steps to bridge the gap, greater intercourse--more
natural and closer relationships--between FBIS and its
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parent directorate and the rest of the Agency (espe-
cially NFAC) is needed.
- The overt association of FBIS with CIA. Because
of FBIS' open affiliation with CIA, foreign governments
have refused to permit the establishment of new bureaus
on their territory. Additionally, because of concern
that an overt CIA presence will complicate U.S. rela-
tions with host governments or out of reluctance to
expand the U.S. official presence in their areas of
responsibility, U.S. Ambassadors have often slowed down
or frustrated FBIS efforts to create new FBIS facili-
ties to meet new Intelligence Community requirements.
- Lean staffing. The fact that FBIS is a service
of common concern to the U.S. Government, not just to
the Agency, has an impact upon FBIS staffing that may
not be fully perceived. FBIS is constantly responding
to an increasing number of requirements and requests
from such USG entities as the Department of Fisheries
and the Congress, as well as from Intelligence Communi-
ty components, with a staff which has over the years
been reduced considerably. Each requirement or request
for information takes time to service. The reductions
in staff positions in FBIS have strained its ability to
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expand overseas and meet the constantly increasing
requirements and requests being levied upon it from
within the Intelligence Community as well as from
without. At some point--some knowledgeable FBIS
officers say it is already at hand--FBIS will not be
able to continue to accept new demands without shedding
some on-going activities. In short, like others, it
cannot forever do more with less. Something has to
give.
- BBC problem. The BBC monitoring service provides
a substantial portion of the FBIS radio-monitored
product. ? Possible funding cuts and reductions in
levels of BBC effort being considered by the U.K.
government could impact severely on FBIS and require
the development of alternative collection mechanisms at
considerable cost.
- The unattractive nature of overseas service.
The very real personal danger in serving abroad with
FBIS, an acknowledged CIA component, is a source of
concern to many FBIS employees, as is the dislocat?ion
or loss of income to working couples who cannot both be
accommodated in FBIS bureaus overseas. The rising
costs in U.S. dollar terms of living abroad is another
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dampening factor. Overseas service is clearly not as
attractive to FBIS employees as it once was and this
has led FBIS to adopt a directed assignment policy for
editors at grade levels GS-13 and below which is
vigorously enforced and somewhat controversial among
employees.
- Rising costs of overseas operations. FBIS,
as well as other USG and U.S. commercial organizations
must grapple with costs which have grown dramatically
in recent years. In some areas FBIS foreign national
employees' salaries exceed that of their bureau chief.
- Funding problems. Agency budgetary constraints
have resulted in the postponement of FBIS' efforts to
automate the operations of its major production compo-
nent, the Daily Report, a highly desirable objective
for the reasons we note in our report on the DR.
Funding difficulties have also caused the deferment of
other projects designed to modernize and improve FBIS
operations.
- Difficulty in recruiting linguists. FBIS has
had difficulty in recruiting for its Production Group
certain categories of linguists with skills adequate to
meet its needs and those of the Directorate of Opera-
tions. Among the more pressing requirements are
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linguists skilled in Arabic, Farsi, and some of the
East European languages, and Russian, Chinese, and
Japanese linguists with scientific and technical
backgrounds. FBIS has commenced sending its own
recruitment teams to seek out suitable candidates. It
needs to do more of this if Agency and Community needs
are to be met.
A. Effectiveness of Management
We have previously recorded our finding that FBIS is an
important and in some respects an indispensable service of
common concern to the USG and that it has been managed in a
way which makes it a cost-effective bargain even in these
days of high inflation. We have also summarized some of the
problems, especially overseas, with which FBIS management
has had to deal in recent years and with which it has
generally coped well. Much of the credit for this must go
to the Director of FBIS, who at the time of the inspection,
had held his position for six years, as well as to the
number of capable, often highly talented officers, many of
whom were recruited or developed under his aegis, who staff
various FBIS components. Despite this highly positive note,
we also must record that we found a variety of problems in
FBIS, including some of long standing, which need resolu-
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tion. These are detailed in the various component and
bureau reports which comprise this report.
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We also assessed leadership and management skills
at lower levels during our inspection of the field bureaus
and the various FBIS Headquarters components.
We found that field bureau chiefs exhibited commendable
leadership of their staffs and that both U.S. and foreign
national employees responded in kind. Bureau chief manage-
ment skills varied, however. The basic work of the bureaus
--the monitoring, editing and transmission of the product--
and their liaispn relationships were very well handled
and, for the most part, U.S; staff and foreign national
personnel were properly and thoughtfully managed. The
record on the administrative side, especially concerning
financial matters, was uneven. The problems encountered
often were a reflection of inadequate (or no) training at
? ? FBIS Headquarters or lack of interest on the bureau chief's
part.
At FBIS Headquarters we found that while the Director
of FBIS had personally adopted a consensual managerial style
in dealing with major FBIS problems, he had also decen-
tralized the day-to-day management of the staffs, groups,
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and their sub-components, the sole exception being the
Operations Group which in practical terms was run by a
triumvirate consisting of the Director and Deputy Director
of FBIS and the group chief. The inspection disclosed that
staff and group chiefs devoted much of their time to policy
and resource management concerns and to participation in one
?
or more of the numerous FBIS committees studying various
projects and problems, and that their sub-components were
often left to operate essentially on their own. Curiously,
the same situation prevailed downward from level to level,
leaving us with the conclusion that FBIS had many levels
of managers but, few supervisors.
With respect to the various senior Headquarters
components, we found excellent leadership and managerial
ability at the senior staff levels, including the Executive
Planning, Budget and Finance, and Liaison and Requirements
chiefs. The interim chief of the Administrative Staff
had made a commendable start toward solving many of the
problems with which his staff was confronted.
Among. the major Headquarters groups the record vas
mixed.
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Branch chiefs and lower level supervisors varied
greatly in their leadership and managerial capabilities.
Manx were excellent, talented, productive officers, while
some others, especiafly-in the Production Group, were
supervisors in name only and had been placed in their
positions as rewards for long and capable service as lin-
guists rather than for their ability to oversee the work of
others.
B. Effectiveness of Components and Operations
1. Office of the Director
The Office of. the Director of FBIS (D/FBIS) includes
the Director, Deputy Director (both retiring in January
1980) and their secretaries, an Executive and Planning
Staff, and the Administrative Staff. In addition to his
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executive and administrative staffs, the D/FBIS relies
heavily on his Management Committee of senior officers to
study and recommend courses of action on a host of major and
minor policy issues. He also uses such managerial tools as
the Career Panels, the FBIS Advisory Team (FAT), newslet-
ters, and periodic field trips for inputs into his decisions
on operational and personnel matters.
25X1
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the
has
D/FBIS has
achieved,
been forward
for example,
leaning in some areas.
an especially commendable
He
equal
opportunity record.
The Executive and Planning Staff (E&PS) serves as
a broker for the Director and other top managers in prepar-
ing for their meetings, servicing their needs, including
budget and other planning, and screening inputs to them. We
found the staff as a whole to be highly competent. We
believe, however, that the Liaison and Requirements (L&R)
section of E&PS needs to take on a strengthened evaluative
function, and we believe that the L&R Branch needs addi-
tional officers to enable it to conduct more regular,
formal reviews and in-depth evaluations of the FBIS product,
similar to those conducted by the DO and NFAC.
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Our interviews with members of the lean Administra-
tive Staff left us impressed with the many hard-working
people supporting Headquarters personnel and the overseas
bureaus.
? 2. Operations Group and Field Installations
The Operations Group is responsible for the activities
of 13 overseas field bureaus, two small field units located
In Cologne, West Germany and Athens, Greece, and one domes-
tic:bureau at Key West, Florida. It also manages the
Daily Reporting--Divisi-on4DRD),_ which supervises the two
- primary Headquarters vehicles for disseminating the field
bureaus' product?the Wire Service and the Daily Report?and
prepares editors for overseas service. Two staffs, ?the
Field Coverage Staff and the Engineering Design and Support
Staff, facilitate field operations. Ops Group employs some
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Operations Group 4 is capably
led by a veteran FBIS field officer, but he is, by his own
admission, spread too thin. The majority of his effort is
. spent on the problems of the world-wide network of bureaus
and units.
While we agree with the priority on field operations,
we nevertheless found that long-standing problems in con-
nection with Headquarters dissemination of the field product
through the Daily Report are not getting enough attention.
Early resolution of these problems, which have been much
studied for five years without improvement, is one of the
most pressing needs of the Operations Group.
The Wire Service is important to policymakers and
analysts dealing with fast moving developments throughout
the world, but its customers in Washington are limited and
they receive only a selection--the most current or most
newsworthy--of total bureau output world-wide. The printed
and somewhat less timely- Daily Report reaches a far wider
audience and is the "bread and butter" of FBIS. Therefore,
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the existing situation, in which the. Daily Reporting Divi-
sion is unable to publish all of the material its editors
select from the copy monitored by the field is disturbing
and detracts from overall FBIS effectiveness.
The Daily Report problems are basically threefold:
(1) inadequate staffing in terms of numbers and experience;
(2) antiquated and inadequate methods of preparing the Daily
Report for publication; and (3) the need for an automated
field bureau and Daily Report production process.
The first two problems could and should have been
solved by management long ago. It seems obvious that if it
is worthwhile to have a world-wide monitoring and transla-
ting service, it is worth- ensuring that the material col-
lected is, at the very least, typed in a timely manner and
disseminated promptly in the volume desired to Community
customers. One suggestion we believe worth exploring is
that newly recruited Agency clericals awaiting clearance be
used to type the unclassified Daily Report material.
The Chief, Operations Group was instrumental in gaining
approval for a study of the Daily Report done in mid-1979- by
representatives of the Columbia Graduate School of Journa-
lism. The resulting Trump/Conn study focused on alterna-
tives to the present method of producing the Daily Report,
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on editing and publishing .aspects including the rapid
turnover of editorial personnel, and on the need for
modernization of the editing and publishing process.
Given the fact that FBIS lost about 25 percent of its total
editorial complement in 1978, we heartily endorse the
Trump/Conn recommendation that the problems affecting the
Daily Report be addressed promptly.
The third problem--Daily Report automation--was tried
in 1975, but was overly ambitious and failed. No substitute
system has been implemented, although FBIS asked for addi-
tional resources for DR automation in both its 1978 and 1979
budget submissions. We are persuaded that automation would
go far toward resolving many of the editorial, typing, and
communications problems which have existed for so long. It
would also bring FBIS into line with the 60 percent of U.S.
newspapers which have automated their newsrooms. We further
believe that FBIS management might have done more to press
its case for automation. For example, had it included
automation in its FY 1979 budget as an unfunded requirement,
FBIS might have had reason to retain some or all of the
it lost to the DS&T for another component's
needs and to reprogram the money for a start on automation.
Overseas, our inspectors found that field bureau
leadership and morale are generally good, and that bureau
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operations are effective. Staff dedication is high, and in
most bureaus, monitors are skilled and professional. There
are some problems, however. Almost all bureaus, for exam-
ple, express a need for regular feedback on their production
efforts to help them see if they are on the mark. Editors
note a lack of consistency in editorial procedures. Training
programs, especially in supervision and financial management
for new bureau chiefs and in foreign culture and language
for editorial officers posted overseas, need to be improved.
We do applaud the 90-day TOY training program for new
editors at the Okinawa and Panama Bureaus. Despite minor
problems, the program provides a good test of aptitude and
excellent training. We believe it would be beneficial if
this program could be expanded so that all new editors could
be accommodated either at Okinawa, Panama, some other bureau
or, as some bureau chiefs propose, through some form, of
simulated bureau operations at Headquarters.
In Latin America, we found that radio coverage of
Central America is spotty at best. There is a particular
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gap in coverage of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, all
trouble spots. A remoting system that can be used in Chile
needs to be expedited. Key West Bureau would like to lease
housing for its employees on the U.S. naval base but FBIS
approaches to the Base Commander and the Navy Department
have been fruitless. An approach by a higher level of the
Agency to the Department of the Navy appears warranted.
We found no serious problems in East Asia, although
editors at Okinawa Bureau believe that they must work night
shifts too frequently. Bureau management problems concern
mainly the administration of foreign nationals.
In Africa, we found that Abidjan Bureau's coverage was
not of great interest either to the U.S. Embassy there or to
many NFAC analysts at CIA Headquarters; in our opinion, this
subject needs examination. FBIS opened the Ivory Coast
Bureau mainly to fulfill its part of a long-standing agree-
ment with the BBC to share African coverage and because of
an opportunity at hand to replace the former Nigeria Bureau.
Other prior needs for coverage in South Africa and Southwest
Asia were frustrated, however, and coverage needs in Central
America received inadequate attention.
We found that reception surveys have not always been
conducted before new bureaus are authorized and established.
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In Bahrain, where FBIS appears to have moved quickly
under high-level pressure from the Community to set up
the Gulf Bureau, FBIS relied mainly on the results of
reception testing in nearby Qatar. Generally speaking,
other bureaus involved in Middle East coverage--Jordan, Tel
Aviv, and Nicosia bureaus--are performing effectively and
have good mutual back-up arrangements.
We noted, during our survey, that while FBIS has
been looking into adequate back-up facilities for BBC
coverage of Soviet, East European, some Middle East and
African radio broadcasts, nothing has yet been brought into
implementation. The Austrian Bureau, which currently shares
some BBC East European coverage, has a troublesome problem--
the high dollar cost of the foreign staff at the Austrian
Bureau (because of the decline of the dollar in relation to
the Austrian schilling)--which may soon compel FBIS to
consider whether and how to replace bureau monitors as they
retire.
For many of the reasons above, among others, we believe
that FBIS? needs to accelerate the development of remotely
installed collection facilities. Although potentially
feasible within the state of the art, remote automated
monitoring by satellite would entail technical modification
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so far deemed too expensive and of too low priority to
program in the near future.
We found the relationship between the FBIS bureaus and
to be uniformly good and, according to
senior FBIS employees, considerably improved over that which
existed five years ago.
In general, FBIS can take comfort in the fact that its
bureaus maintain good, if not always close, relationships
with U.S. Missions overseas. Our reports note, however, that
a problem area exists in the administration of foreign
employees. This subject is discussed in greater detail
later in this summary and in a special section concerning
management of foreign nationals.
It is a credit to FBIS that the relationships of
its field bureaus with host governments are of a high
order. We found this to be true world-wide. FBIS relations
with the U.K.(BBC) monitor-
ing services are outlined in our report on the London
Bureau. Although not without problems, relationships
are productive, particularly that with the BBC which is
closer and of far greater significance for the FBIS total
product. The relationship with BBC is a solid one, based on
mutual need and shared cost, and we consider it in the
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Agency's interest to continue and encourage this close
cooperation. The relationship, nevertheless, is vulnerable
to such vagaries as British labor demands or U.K. budge-
tary cutbacks. We therefore believe that FBIS management
must decide soon how it will pick up coverage now provided
by the BBC should it be disrupted or terminated because
of strikes, funding problems, or other BBC difficulties.
Despite its problem areas, we found that the Ops Group
field bureaus and units are effectively collecting and
disseminating a product important to customers. The problems
of the Daily Report at Headquarters, however, detract from
overall effectiveness, and need management attention,
particularly as long as this publication represents FBIS to
much of the Intelligence Community and to the world outside.
3. Production Group
The Production Group (Prod Group) at FBIS Headquarters
translates, publishes and disseminates as a service of
common concern selected material of interest to the U.S.
Intelligence Community from foreign publications including
press media.. Prod Group also maintains an index of informa-
tion on unclassified foreign translations available govern-
ment-wide and performs special foreign language services of
a classified or unclassified nature for other components of
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?
CIA and the Community. The Group's staff linguists screen
foreign publications and select material for translation in
response to requirements from the Intelligence Community.
Most of the material selected is farmed out to independent
contractors for translation under the auspices of the Joint
Publications Research Service (JPRS), an off-premises
component of the Production Group, and then disseminated in
unclassified or "Official Use Only" JPRS publications.
On balance, we judge the Production Group to be doing
an effective job. We are concerned, however, that it may
be spread thin in trying to be all things to all people,
and believe it could benefit significantly from a strength-
ened FBIS requirements and evaluation process.
The key supervisory personnel in Production Group are
the program officers, who are the lowest managerial level
and, in our opinion, very uneven in quality. Above them,
Production Group managers at branch and division level seem
almost totally preoccupied with managing resources and
reporting accomplishments and appear very little involved
with what their branches and divisions are actually doing or
how they are doing it. Although many Prod Group members were
confident of their mission and their product, many others--
especially younger officers--questioned their own utility
and expressed a need for greater guidance and feedback.
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We are concerned that unless management takes a more
active role in both the quality of the product and the
quality of supervision in Production Group, FBIS will lose
many of its bright and well-educated younger officers--and
the Agency much of its good language talent. We have there-
fore recommended that FBIS take steps to introduce a
stronger mechanism for conducting regular reviews and
evaluation of the Production Group's requirements and
products, as well as steps to bring about stronger leader-
ship and direction from Production Group branch and division
managers.
4. Analysis Group
The Analysis Group (AG) reads and interprets the media
of Communist countries and publishes the weekly book, Trends
in Communist Media, which analyzes reactions to interna-
tional events and U.S. policy moves as registered in Soviet,
Chinese, Asian, East European and other major Communist
media. It also prepares and publishes studies in greater
depth on Communist trends or reactions based on media
analysis, .and has. the primary responsibility in CIA ;for
compiling world-wide reactions to such events as the fall of
Skylab. It also provides collection guidance to FBIS field
bureaus and participates in the allocation of FBIS coverage
'resources.
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A scholarly atmosphere is found within Analysis
Group, with highly qualified analysts--many at the doctorate
level--preparing high quality intelligence.
^
AG's procedural or conceptual problem involves the
claim by some in FBIS that AG operates with a Cold War
mentality. It has firm requirements for certain material
from Communist media, including the full texts of speeches
by key Communist leaders and full texts of articles and
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editorials from party journals or other official media.
These requirements are called "mandatory texting" and are
the cause of much controversy within FBIS. Some editors,
both in Headquarters and in the field, feel that too much of
the Daily Report is taken up with this material and that it
edges out other items of current interest, especially
material from the non-communist world. Whether or not,
as many editors and foreign documents officers claim,
mandatory texting is a legacy of the Cold War, it places a
heavy burden on some field bureaus and Headquarters compo-
nents and is an issue which FBIS management should contin-
ually reexamine as part of the entire requirements/resources
/evaluation process. As an ancillary problem, we note that
a considerable amount of FBIS manpower (both in Headquarters
and at London and Okinawa bureaus) is tied up in the prepa-
ration of the Soviet and Chinese commentary lists appearing
as a statistical appendix to the Trends.
III. Employee Attitudes and Problems
As might be expected, we found that employee attitudes
and morale vary widely in FBIS, with employees in the field
tending to be more positive. We assess morale in the
bureaus as good in spite of the decreased attractiveness
noted earlier of serving overseas, not the least of which is
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In Headquar-
ters, our assessment is that morale is fair, but we found
enough instances of poor morale to conclude that the subject
still needs management attention. Leadership, or rather
uneven quality of leadership, and the need for more effec-
tive feedback, are contributing factors, in our opinion. We
Overseas employee comments about schooling, health
care, and housing indicated few problems of a significant
nature. Most employees seemed relatively happy in all three
areas. There were the usual complaints about rising
costs--particularly those related to housing.
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?
V. Consumer Usage
U.S. embassies and U.S. military commands overseas
almost uniformly praised the FBIS laterally-disseminated
teletype material they receive. Some termed it "vital"
while many others considered it "useful." There were a few
exceptions, primarily in Okinawa and Abidjan, where interest
was minimal. Reaction to.. the Daily Report books pouched
abroad was uneven, and no overseas customers we interviewed
found JPRS publications useful.
During our inspection, we circulated under the aus-
pices of the Collection Tasking Staff questionnaires
concerning FBIS products to various members of the Washing-
ton Intelligence Community. We found that the Daily Report
books were, regarded as unique, useful, and accurate, .if
somewhat drab, publications. Customers who have a need for
the most up-to-date information are avid customers of FBIS
wire traffic and are deeply appreciative of the service it
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provides. The Analysis Group .publication, Trends in Commu-
nist Media, is well received by Washington analysts--
both civilian and military--involved in Soviet, East
European, and Asian Communist affairs. The Trends also
received some favorable comment from the field, especially
in East Asia.
VI. Compliance
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Our recent survey found few problems of a compliance
nature and noted that FBIS management had been conscien-
tious in its monitoring of areas where problems might
arise. Most FBIS employees interviewed indicated a belief
that FBIS management was highly sensitive to the subject of
compliance. Although not- all FBIS Headquarters employees
knew the specifics of the compliance documents, most indi-
cated that they knew enough to raise questionable matters
with their supervisors. There were some employees, however,
who admitted they knew nothing about compliance. Although
FBIS management had circulated the compliance documents
in FBIS Headquarters prior to our arrival, we found that not
all employees remembered reading them, and a few confused
them with the personal conduct regulation which circulates
yearly.
In the field, we found that some bureaus filed copies
of the compliance documents in reading folders containing
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We suggest that FBIS Headquarters managers and the
field bureau chiefs put_ all of their pertinent compliance
documents in a folder separate from other administrative
matters and circulate it at fixed intervals. We further
suggest that the orientation program for new employees
(including clericals and graduate fellows) include a brief-
ing on compliance and that FBIS Headquarters work out an
unclassified policy guidance statement for associate editors
who work on. field editorial desks.
VII. Personnel Manageinent
Our survey report includes two special sections,
"Personnel Management" and "Management of Foreign National
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Employees," which highlight topics touched on elsewhere in
our report, but which we believe merit centralized, cohesive
treatment. Our findings in these reports are summarized
, below.
A. Personnel Management
Each of the three groups within FBIS--Operations Group,
Production Group, and Analysis Group--has its own identity
and idiosyncrasies. In essence, this means that FBIS has
three separate entities which do not completely mesh. We
believe that this structure contributes to many of FBIS'
personnel management problems, especially with regard to
employee evaluations and assignments.
At the time of the survey, the FBIS evaluation system
for promotion and certain other personnel actions was in the
process of being modified. Memberships of ranking and
evaluation sub-wels were being reduced and restricted to
persons two grades higher than those being ranked. Written
Performance Appraisal Reports, rather than oral input by
supervisors, were to be emphasized as the true guide to
performance. Sub-panels were to continue to make promotion
recommendations to the top level Career Panel for approval.
Within the three FBIS groups, we found that opinions
varied widely about these sub-panel modifications. Some
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employees were pleased that oral inputs no longer would be
as compelling with the sub-panels. Others were concerned
about the emphasis on the fitness reports, claiming that
supervisors would no longer be able to push for recognition
for deserving employees. Still others claimed that fitness
reports were frequently "dishonest" and "oblique." The
latter allegation was particularly prevalent in the Produc-
tion Group where some branch and program chiefs were viewed
by their subordinates as poor managers and poor leaders.
Suffice it to say, both the past evaluation system in FBIS
and the new modification to it came in for their share of
critical comment. In the interests of ensuring a better
personnel evaluation process, we suggest that FBIS place
more emphasis on the writing of fair and impartial fitness
reports, and that these be the primary reference for sub-
panel as well as Career Panel considerations. In addition,
FBIS should consider developing written criteria for promo-
tion at each grade level and consider publishing a handbook
(or some other means of communication) which explains these
criteria 'and the ? procedures of the new panel evaluation
system.
In recent years, FBIS management has attempted to break
down the barriers between the disparate groups by assigning
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middle-level managers to positions outside their parent
groups. For example, the Deputy Chief of the Analysis Group
is from the Operations Group and the three current division
chiefs in the Production Group are from other groups.
Some junior officers from Production and Analysis Groups
have been assigned to the field bureaus for rotational tours
and Ops Group editors occasionally serve in one of the other
two groups.
As might be expected, the practice of ehcouraging
rotational assignments at the middle management level has
not met with uniform acceptance. Some linguists, for
example, opt to stay in Production Group for an entire
career because they enjoy their work and worry about the
erosion of their language skills if they accept rotational
assignments. Moreover, we heard a constant refrain that the
top jobs in FBIS go to those who come up through the edi-
torial ranks, and there appears to be some substance to this
observation. On balance, however, we found that FBIS
management's practice of rotational assignments at the
middle management level was beneficial.
B. Management of Foreign National Employees
Most of the
for'eign nationals employed by FBIS
are hardworking and capable. Many have served with FBIS
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since the 1950s or longer and all but a few appear to enjoy
working for FBIS. There are basically two types of FBIS
foreign national employees: the "local hire" who is gener-
ally but not always a citizen of the country in which
a bureau is located, and the third country national (TCN)
who is neither a citizen of the United States nor of the
country involved.
We are concerned that FBIS has no comprehensive policy
or plan to effect greater standardization of pay, to ensure
uniformity of promotion criteria, or to settle other vexing
problems it encounters in managing its foreign nationals.
Government policy is for agencies operating overseas to
follow local pay scales and practices in establishing pay
and benefits for foreign national employees. In addition,
the Foreign Service Act, Section 444 as amended, calls
for agencies in the same foreign post to establish uniform
wage and employment practices. Although FBIS, strives to
follow this guidance, it has nonconforming wage scales in
stemming largely
from past?practices and local bureau decisions. Moreover,
unique problems resulting from the evacuation and loss of
its Mediterranean and Saigon bureaus have caused it to
treat some problems on an individual basis. In our opinion
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FBIS needs to work toward greater conformity with embassy
practices and toward a more consistent classification and
pay policy for its own foreign nationals--especially its
TCNs--world-wide.
FBIS' tendency to deal with foreign nationals on
an ad hoc basis has had yet another effect: the failure to
establish standard levels of performance for foreign na-
tional employees. In several instances, we found a reluc-
tance to take note of or deal firmly with unsatisfactory
foreign national employee performance. We believe FBIS
should work toward uniform performance and promotion crite-
ria for its alien employees and make these criteria clearly
known.
Resolving problems on an individual basis has also had
the result of encouraging expectations of FBIS paternalism
on the part of foreign nat)onals. Several of those inter-
viewed by the IG team mentioned some new benefit or favor
which they felt FBIS owed them because of their long service
or because employees elsewhere enjoyed the benefit. Many in
FBIS believe that FBIS management has been more liberal and
paternalistic in extending U.S. staff benefits to foreign
national employees than is required by Agency regulations,
particularly with regard to TCNs.
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Third country nationals, (TCNs) present special prob-
lems for FBIS, which is virtually the only U.S. agency to
use such employees. Although it is FBIS policy to hire
locally monitors who can fill all of the language needs of a
particular bureau, frequently qualified personnel must be
recruited in third countries and moved to the bureau site.
These TCNs get many of the overseas benefits of U.S.
staffers and sometimes more since many also get the benefits
of local hires, and pay no local taxes to boot. Because
their own situations vary, some buy homes and spend their
lives at the bureau site while retaining homeland ties;
others lose such ties or are stateless. Their allowances and
situations often vary from. bureau to bureau and TCN to TCN
with no logical or rational pattern.
The disparity of benefits between TCNs and locally
hired employees doing substantially the same kind of work is
a further cause of problems for the field bureaus. A goal of
FBIS is to administer foreign nationals by applying the
principle of equal pay for equal work. This goal is
not being met, since TCNs invariably receive more benefits
than do local hires, with predictable frictions. Although
uniform pay schedules with standard rates of compensation
have been studied through the years, no one within FBIS
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has successfully come to grips with the pay disparity
problems.
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VIII. Recommendations
Following are a number of recommendations applicable to
FBIS as a whole or to a particular Headquarters component or
field bureau. They are identified in brackets as to their
source in the group or bureau reports. Other recommenda-
tions for action by the D/FBIS or his subordinates are
contained in the individual group and bureau reports or
topic papers.
We recommend that:
APPROVED:
Director of Central Intelligence
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DDS&T ACTION
Cl: The DDS&T and D/FBIS continue their efforts
to develop as rapidly as possible a remote automated
monitoring system to provide coverage of areas of
interest to the Intelligence Community which cannot be
met from existing bureau sites. [See Operations
Group]
D/FBIS ACTION
Operational
Dl: The D/FBIS take action to enable the Liaison
and Requirements Branch to conduct regular and effec-
tive evaluations of the FBIS product including JPRS.
[See Office of the Director and Production Group]
D2: The D/FBIS, as part of a regular require-
ments/ evaluation process, review the Analysis Group's
needs for extensive "mandatory texting" and for the
commentary lists (including the role of
the Tabulation Unit-at the London Bureau) and resulting
statistics. [See Analysis Group and London Bureau]
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03: The D/FBIS develop alternative means for
covering those radio broadcasts from the USSR, East
Europe, Middle East and Africa now handled by the BBC.
[See Operations Group]
D4: The D/FBIS establish a policy that reception
surveys be conducted before new FBIS bureaus are
opened. [See Nicosia Bureau and Athens Unit]
D5: The D/FBIS take steps to improve radio
broadcast coverage of Central America (particularly of
El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala) to ensure that
policymaker and analyst needs are met. [See Operations
Group and. Panama Bureau]
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07: The D/FBIS direct a survey of U.S. embassies
in West Africa and customers in Washington to determine
to what extent the Abidjan Bureau's coverage meets or
exceeds their needs and adjust the bureau's require-
ments accordingly. [See Operations Group]
*See Paragraph 3a of FBIS Comments (Tab A)
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D8: The D/FBIS continue to monitor closely the
dollar costs of FBIS operations at the Austrian and
Okinawa Bureaus--especially the costs of foreign
national employees--with a view to determine if some
parts of the bureau mission may be cut back or per-
formed efficiently elsewhere. [See Austrian Bureau and
Okinawa Bureau]
D9: The D/FBIS institute a system for providing
regular feedback to field bureaus on the substantive
and editorial quality of their reporting. [See Opera-
tions Group]
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Personnel
D11: The D/FBIS extend the directed assignment
policy now in effect for FBIS employees below grade
GS-14 to all officers in arades GS-14 and above eligi-
ble for overseas assignment. [See Nicosia Bureau]
D12: The D/FBIS develop training programs to
assist newly appointed bureau chiefs and their deputies
in the areas of supervision and financial management
and to familiarize new editors with field procedures
and area background--and to provide, as required, some
language training for employees and their spouses--
before they depart for overseas service. [See Opera-
tions Group, Panama,- Bangkok, Hong Kong and Paraguay
Bureaus]
014: The D/FBIS consider publishing a handbook
which explains promotion criteria and the procedures of
the new panel evaluation system. [See Personnel
Management]
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D15: The D/FBIS require the C/Production Group to
strengthen the supervisory responsibilities of division
and branch managers within Production Group with regard
to both performance standards of personnel and the
quality of their product. [See Production Group]
D16: The D/FBIS and the C/Production Group
explore ways in which to encourage more effective use
of and greater recognition of the unique talent and
knowledge of some officers in the Production Group.
[See Production Group]
Compliance
D17.: The D/FBIS issue unclassified written
directives defining the authority of foreign national
associate editors, including policy guidance to enable
them to cope with most of the selection and dissemina-
tion problems that may arise while they are exercising
their responsibilities. [See Nicosia and Austrian
Bureaus]
Security
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Foreign National Employees
022: The D/FBIS expand the FBIS Foreign National
Panel to include the Foreign National Coordinator and
invite other appropriate Agency components to appoint
representatives to the panel in order to examine the
status of FBIS foreign national employees world-wide
and to make appropriate recommendations for. change.
[See Management of Foreign National Employees]
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Other
D24: The D/FBIS determine the propriety of
sanitizing Agency regulations for dissemination as FB's
and determine if more effective and efficient options
are available than the duplication of effort now
involved. [See Bangkok Bureau]
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