NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00091R000500180001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 3, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/16: CIA-RDP88T00091 R000500180001-3
Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
3 April 1987
Top secrut
CPAS NID 87-077JX
3 April 1987
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Top Secret
Contents
Kuwait: Looking for Alternatives to US Offer .............................. 1
Portugal: Early Election in Prospect ............................................ 2
USSR-Mozambique: Exchange of Delegations .......................... 3
USSR: Possible Changes in Policies Toward Jews ...................... 4
Nicaragua: Informal Rebel Talks Continue .................................. 6
Arab States: Foreign Ministers Meeting... ........ .. ..................
Libya: Petroleum Exports Down .................................................. 7
Yugoslavia: Debt Rescheduling Agreement ................................
Angola: Diplomatic Activity .......................................................... 9
Afghanistan-USSR: Moscow Condemns Insurgents' Raid ....... 10
Special Analyses
Jordan-US: Prime Minister Rifai's Visit ........................................ 12
USSR-Czechoslovakia: Visit by Gorbachev ................................ 14
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KUWAIT: Looking for Alternatives to US Offer
Kuwait apparently is reassessing the US offer to protect its
oil tankers and is seeking alternatives to avoid increasing the
visibility of its relationship with the US.
Kuwait would like the UK to play a role in protecting its shipping and
probably would welcome an offer from London to provide a military
escort, according to the US Embassy. Kuwait has asked to hire four
British merchant ships but has not explicitly requested UK naval
support.
Soviet naval ships in the Persian Gulf.
The Kuwaitis have also decided to lease three tankers from the USSR,
although they remain cautious about Soviet participation in protecting
their tankers, according to the Embassy. Moscow told Kuwait that
such an agreement would not require an increase in the number of
the threat to them
The smaller Gulf states support the US offer to protect Kuwaiti
tankers. The US Embassy in Doha reports that other Gulf Cooperation
Council states considered asking the US to protect their ships but
decided that any association with US warships would only increase
in a naval escort
Comment: Kuwait may wait to announce its decision on the US offer
until after the departure today of the Soviet commercial delegation
that has been visiting Kuwait. Kuwait apparently believes that recent
press reports about its request for protection have increased the
visibility of US-Kuwaiti ties to an unacceptable level. An agreement
with the British would balance the agreement with the USSR without
angering those in the Kuwaiti Government who oppose closer ties to
the US. London would probably be reluctant, however, to participate
increase in the Soviet presence in the region.
Regardless of Kuwait's decision, the willingness of the US to help
Kuwait has impressed the smaller Gulf states. They apparently believe
US protection would be the best deterrent to Iranian attacks and
probably hope a Kuwaiti-US agreement can be reached to prevent an
Top Secret
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PORTUGAL: Early Election in Prospect
JPV
The minority Social Democratic government of conservative
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva is likely to fall tonight on a motion of
censure by former President Eanes's Democratic Renewal Party.
If the government falls, the initiative will shift to President Soares,
a Socialist, who must either appoint someone to forma new
government or call an election.
alternative.
Comment: Democratic Renewal and the Communists clearly prefer
formation of a new government to an election. Democratic Renewal's
eroding public support, aggravated by voter resentment of its role in
provoking the crisis, would probably mean the loss of a substantial
number of seats in an election. The Communists' readiness to bring
down the government reflects their hope of being included in a leftist
Democratic Renewal would probably try to exploit any cooperation.
Socialist leader Constancio had called for his party to abstain on the
censure motion, but strong rank-and-file support for it prevailed. The
Socialists are divided over whether to push for an early election or to
try to govern with the support of Eanes's party. Constancio remains
reluctant to support a coalition with Democratic Renewal because
that party cut into Socialist support in the past and because
Soares will be inclined to call an election because of his strong
opposition to a government formed with Communist support and
because an election might seriously hurt his longtime political enemy,
Eanes. The Social Democrats are likely to emerge from the crisis as
the only clear winners, capitalizing on their increased popularity.
Top Secret
2 3 April 1987
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USSR-
MOZAMBIQUE:
Exchange of Delegations
In celebrating this week the 10th anniversary of the Soviet-
Mozambican Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Moscow has
shown concern about Maputo's economic and military weakness
and its commitment to Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
Secretary Gorbachev to Mozambican President Chissano.
consumer goods, and Talyzin passed a message from General
Soviet Politburo candidate-member Nikolay Talyzin led a delegation
to Maputo, while Mozambican Politburo member Jorge Rebelo
headed a contingent to Moscow. The, two countries signed an
agreement on party links and a cultural and scientific rotocol,
according-to-press reports. The Soviets 'ivered $30 million in
cooperation.
Although Soviet press coverage of the talks in Maputo mentioned a
"friendly exchange of views," it did not refer to Mozambique's
Marxist orientation. In a radio interview, Soviet Prime Minister
Ryzhkov affirmed the Soviet commitment to Mozambique and other
Frontline States but noted the existence of problems in bilateral
Last month, a Soviet official in Maputo expressed pessimism about
Mozambique's military and economic prospects and, in discussions
with his US counterparts, emphasized that talks between the ruling
FRELIMO party and the RENAMO insurgents could not be ruled out.
commitment.
Comment: The Soviets have been uneasy for some time about
Maputo's interest in developing ties to the West. The Soviet
10th-anniversary representation in Maputo was at a lower level than
for past visits and, along with the uneven tone of Soviet press
coverage, makes clear Moscow's doubt about Maputo's ideological
The mention of negotiations with RENAMO probably reflects Soviet
concern with Maputo's military and economic weakness. Moscow
would almost certainly oppose any power-sharing arrangement that
would not ensure FRELIMO dominance and continued Soviet
influence, but it is not prepared to raise its level of economic and
military assistance enough to improve Mozambique's economic or
military situation significantly.
Moscow meanwhile will rely on Mozambique's military dependence to
ensure a continuing Soviet role in Mozambique. It will continue to use
party-to-party links and stress FRELIMO's role to strengthen
Mozambique's Marxist orientation
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Top Secret
USSR: Jewish Emigration, 1973-86
Ten thousand emigrants
0 1973 75 80 85
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Top Secret
Possible Changes in Policies Toward Jews
While publicly equivocating, Moscow privately is holding out the
prospect of increased Jewish emigration and better treatment of
Jews remaining in the USSR to persuade Jewish leaders to press
for better US-Soviet and Israeli-Soviet relations.]
ease restrictions on the practice of Judaism.
After meetings last week in Moscoo-s~#-t-~laed-gropa
Moscow will permit thousands of refuseniks
to fly directly to Israel-a move favored by Israel to stem the nearly
80-percent loss of immigrants in Europe-in return for relaxation of
US trade restrictions on the USSR. The Soviets also hinted they may
consular delegation to Tel Aviv.
A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, however, publicly played down
the firmness of Soviet commitments and denied that a reciprocal
Israeli visit would follow the planned late April visit of a Soviet
contacts with Israel to avoid alienating Arab allies.
Comment: In the past, Jewish leaders have reported Soviet
concessions that did not materialize, and the Soviets are publicly
waffling already. To avoid the appearance of bowing to Western
pressure on human rights issues, the Kremlin will publicly play down
Emigration is apparently increasing, however, and movement on this
issue would be consistent with Gorbachev's efforts to be seen as a
reformer seeking to liberalize the system and improve East-West
relations. Gorbachev may believe that his initiatives on arms control
and human rights have softened Western public opinion and that
Jewish leaders can push for a loosening of US restrictions on trade.
been some improvement in professional opportunities.
authorities are allowing more Jewish cultural works to appear-
although anti-Semitic diatribes are still published-and there has
Gorbachev may be willing to tolerate a marginal increase in religious
activities while coming down hard on underground groups. Soviet
increase over 1986, when a total of 943 emigrated.
year-a small fraction of the rate in the late 1970s but a significant
These modest steps, and a stepped-up propaganda campaign
defaming life in the West, may reflect an effort to discourage a large
increase in emigration applications. About 700 Jews emigrated this
Gorbachev intends a one-time review of cases involving longstanding
refuseniks rather than an opening of the floodgates; a judgment
reinforced by the continued arbitrary denial of some applicants
purportedly for knowing "state secrets."
Top Secret
4 3 April 1987
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Top Secret
leadership needs to reach an agreement soon. Meanwhile
X
Contra leaders have continued to meet informally since the
suspension of negotiations last week, but progress on unifying
the rebel factions remains elusive. Following a recent meeting in
Honduras between Alfonso Robelo and Enrique Bermudez,
commander of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, Robelo indicated
he would allow the FDN to play a dominant role in an expanded
political organization, Robelo
said he was prepared to step down from the Directorate of a
restructured Unified Nicaraguan Opposition because the rebel
Southern Opposition Bloc leader
negotiations because he is concerned that the Socialist International
is no longer considering financial and public support for the Bloc.
Alfredo Cesar will be more cooperative in the next round of
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restructured coalition.
Comment: By offering to step down, Robelo may be trying to revive
the negotiations. He seems increasingly frustrated with the pace of
the talks and concerned that any agreement reached will be
short lived unless all the participants make concessions. Cesar
probably will keep pressing to gain a position of strength in a
Top Secret
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Top Secret
ARAB STATES: Foreign Ministers Meeting
Arab interests.
Arab League Foreign Ministers, after two delays, now plan to meet
tomorrow in Tunis to discuss an agenda likely to include the UN
initiative on the Iran-Iraq war, the EC proposal for a Middle East
peace conference, Arab-African cooperation, and resumption of the
European-Arab dialogue. The US Embassy in Tunis reports there is
likely to be heightened criticism of the US-Israeli special relationship
in light of League Secretary General Klibi's recent comments about
the dangers that both this relationship and the Pollard affair pose to
condemnations of French and US support to Chad.
month in Burkina, where Tripoli probably will press for
Comment: There will be the usual criticism of US Middle East policies
with or without a review of the Pollard issue. Moderate Arabs
probably will gain League support for a UN initiative to end the
Persian Gulf war but not specific UN sanctions as a means to a cease-
fire. A resolution backing the EC's proposal for an international peace
conference is likely, although the EC's apparent refusal to remove
sanctions imposed last year against Syria over terrorism will prevent
movement on the Euro-Arab dialogue. Libya will try to lay the
groundwork for a joint Arab League-OAU meeting planned this
LIBYA: Petroleum Exports Down
Libyan petroleum exports in February and March fell to around
800,000 b/d, about 20 percent below the January level,
Tripoli also has cut back heavily on
the oil the Soviets use primarily for reexport.
the current dispute.
Comment: Oil prices have firmed in recent weeks-substantially
narrowing the disparity between prices for crude and refined
products-and this should allow Libya to boost exports to Europe in
the second quarter. In addition, demand for Libya's lighter crudes,
which yield a higher proportion of gasoline, increases with the arrival
of the summer driving season. The importance of the Libyan-Soviet
oil-for-arms arrangement to both countries-especially in view of
Libya's severe equipment losses in Chad-should facilitate resolving
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Top Secret
YUGOSLAVIA: Debt Rescheduling Agreement
J/ 721&J
Western governments on day approved in principle the second
phase of Yugoslavia's current rescheduling agreement, although
formal approval awaits a forthcoming IMF assessment of Yugoslav
economic policies. The accord reschedules $475 million in official
debt, falling due between next month and March 1988, and clears the
way for banks to activate the second stage of a multiyear refinancing
agreement later this month. The Yugoslav media have portrayed the
agreement after lengthy and heated talks as a victory.
Comment: The accord strikes a compromise between Belgrade's
demands for an automatic, unconditional refinancing and some
governments' insistence on more explicit policy and performance
guidelines. Creditors, who previously favored a tougher stand,
probably were influenced by recent labor unrest and wished to
minimize any threats to Yugoslavia's stability. Belgrade's victory may
be short lived; a negative IMF evaluation could set up another
confrontation as early as next month. Moreover, liquidity problems
not addressed by the current agreement will probably force Belgrade
into another grueling round of negotiations later this year.
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8 3 April 1987
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Top Secret
ANGOLA: Diplomatic Activity
Angola is trying to induce the US to resume bilateral talks and to gain
the reopening of the Benguela railroad but without concessions by
Luanda on such key issues as a withdrawal of Cuban troops or
recognition of UNITA. Angolan officials have indicated over the past
month they are ready to resume talks with the US that have been
suspended for more than a year
enter a dialogue with the US.
Comment: Angola's efforts I to secure
external aid for the railroad indicate that Luanda wants to open
the Benguela without talking to UNITA. Despite the government's
apparent willingness to talk with the US, dos Santos-buoyed by
increased confidence about the military situation-is likely to remain
inflexible on key issues. Luanda probably believes it can avoid being
viewed as obstructing attempts at a regional settlement and can
undermine UNITA's campaign for Western support if it agrees to
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Too. Secret
Bound. y representation is
not neoesaarily authoritstive.
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3 April 1987
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settlement a
Genev
ad~rPC~c?r~t Id~Frrl
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Pravda reported yesteray that insurgents in Afghanistan rocketed a
town in the Soviet Tajik SSR early last month, killing one and
wounding two. It claimed that the "bandits" had been surrounded
immediately and had suffered dozens of casualties. The account
accused insurgent leader Gulbuddin of trying at]behest to wreck
Kabul's national reconciliation program and to prevent a political
-
Tot) Secret
AFGHANISTAN-USSR: Moscow Condemns Insurgents' Raid
O-/,t 02 Gam d "`'C
ree1s-iR#e-ti
Soviet border areas.
concerned that the growing effectiveness of Masood-led insurgent
groups in northeastern Afghanistan might affect the attitudes in
commanders such as Gulbuddin for not allowing Pakistan to conclude
a political settlement. It may have also been designed to offset
international criticism of recent air attacks inside Pakistan. It is
unusual for Moscow to acknowledge the vulnerability of its southern
border, but the account stressed that no insurgents entered the
USSR and that retaliation was swift. Moscow nevertheless may be
Comment: The article apparent) was 'ntfed to support recent
Soviet propaganda blaming th ?J& and fundamentalist insurgent
X
Top Secret
TCS 2777/87
3 April 1987
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Tot) Secret
A12
- US trade deficit with Taiwan $2.3 billion first two months this year
. could reach $20 billion by yearend if trend continues-up by
more than one-third from 1986 ... trade talks starting this month
not likely to bring improvement
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Middle East - USSR Ground Forces chief arrived in South Yemen Wednesday 6,'
... most senior military visit since 1982 ... may discuss arms
sales, South Yemeni security situation.
Europe
- West German Greens excluded from Bundestag intelligence oversight committee ... not likely to challenge decision in courts, /X11
similar appeal denied in 1983 ... in coming state elections, will
accuse government of antidemocratic tactics. 25X1
- Sweden banning arms sales to Singapore following reports
manufacturer reexported arms to Iran ... shipments circumvented
Swedish law forbidding arms sales to belligerents ... investigation
may reveal Stockholm complicity in diversion.
recent talks ... Albanians continue to reduce isolation.
- Albania, West Germany to establish diplomatic relations,
probably in next few months ... Bonn's representative at NATO
(7 says Tirane dropped demands for World War II reparations at
Zimbabwe this week established diplomatic relations with
Afghanistan ... reflects gradual warming toward USSR .. .
significant for Kabul because Prime Minister Mugabe chairs NAM
but few other countries likely to follow suit.
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Top Secret
Jordan
Zayd Al-Rifai
Prime Minister
Age 50 ... Prime Minister (for second time),
Minister of Defense since April 1985 ... longtime
friend, political confidant of King Hussein ... has
significantly influenced Hussein's policies on Syria,
the West Bank, PLO ... previously Ambassador to
UK, Chief of Royal Court ... politically astute,
confident, aggressive ... understands US political
system, has numerous contacts among US officials,
prominent businessmen ... studied at Columbia
and under Henry Kissinger at Harvard.
Tog) Secret
3 April 1987
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Special Analysis
JORDAN-US: Prime Minister Rifai's Visit
P/ During his visit to the US next week, Prime Minister Rifai is likely
to focus on King Hussein's continuing efforts to find a framework
for an international peace conference on the Middle East. Rifai's
visit-in Hussein's place-is intended to signal the latter's
displeasure with US policy in the region, including arms sales to
Iran, and to make clear to US officials that a future visit by the
King will depend upon US flexibility on regional issues. Rifai
would like to return to Jordan with a foreign policy success-
which he needs for domestic political reasons-but his hopes for
quick progress toward an international conference are almost
certainly unrealistic. 25X1
Rifai is not expected to bring new formulas on the peace process
despite Hussein's recent discussions with Egypt's President Mubarak,
who had met with Israeli Foreign Minister Peres. He is more likely to
seek clarification of the US position on Soviet and Palestinian
participation at an international conference and on related issues.
Soviet participation
Jordan has hosted several Soviet delegations to discuss the matter,
and, according to the US Embassy in Amman, Moscow appears to
accept Israel's demand that an international conference include
bilateral negotiations in some form. The Jordanians probably hope
that recent Soviet overtures to Israel will ease Israeli objections to
Strategy Toward the Palestinians
The US Embassy says Hussein plans to intensify his search for an
independent West Bank leadership that would be willing to join in
peace talks, despite public assurances that Jordan will not enter into
negotiations without PLO representation.
To help Amman develop the leverage it seeks on the West Bank, Rifai
probably will ask the US to increase its $17 million commitment to
Jordan's West Bank development plan for this year and to encourage
Israel to follow through on its proposed programs to improve the
quality of life in the West Bank. The King's ability to buy West Bank
support through his costly and ambitious plan is diminishing,
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however, because of Palestinian frustration over Jordanian delays in
handing out promised funds and a growing cynicism over prospects
for future international aid. Even longtime West Bank supporters of
Hussein, such as Bethlehem's mayor, Elias Freij, have expressed
anger over Jordan's bureaucratic mishandling of the development
plan.
Despite bitterness about US arms sales to Iran, Hussein wants to
preserve his military and political relationship with the US. Rifai is
unlikely to raise the issue of US arms for Jordan directly but probably
will talk about US-Jordanian regional security concerns, particularly
the Iran-Iraq war. He may express concern about US Congressional
action on the administration's request for security assistance for
Jordan in 1988
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Special Analysis
USSR- Visit by Gorbachev
CZECHOSLOVAKIA:
to discuss his reform programs in the USSR. His visit may
increase tensions within Prague's leadership, which is already
General Secretary Gorbachev will probably use his coming visit
to Prague to publicize his peace initiatives, to press the
Czechoslovaks on trade and economic cooperation, and perhaps
divided over the need for reform in Czechoslovakia.
conventional arms control negotiations.
Gorbachev probably sees Czechoslovakia as another forum for
restating his INF proposal position. The Soviets have based an SS-12
missile brigade in the country since 1982. Rumors in Moscow suggest
that Gorbachev will announce the withdrawal of some Soviet units
from Czechoslovakia in an effort to put pressure on the West in
science and technology throughout Eastern Europe
goods, closer integration of CEMA, and faster development of
In keeping with his goal of obtaining East European help to revitalize
the Soviet economy, Gorbachev will also stress the need for
increased deliveries of better quality Czechoslovak-manufactured
pushing for political changes that might lead to instability.
Moscow thinks it is performing relatively well. Moscow is wary of
Gorbachev may want to discuss his reforms with the Czechoslovak
Presidium, but he probably will not push the Czechoslovaks to
implement major internal economic or political changes. The absence
of Soviet complaints about the Czechoslovak economy implies that
approach to dissent.
Czechoslovak leader Husak tried to sweeten the atmosphere for
Gorbachev's visit at a plenum of the Czechoslovak party's Central
Committee last month by indicating his receptivity to Gorbachev-style
innovations. He endorsed limited economic changes and declared the
party's willingness to discuss steps toward party democracy. The
regime has postponed the trials of dissidents, possibly to avoid
embarrassing Gorbachev, who recently signaled a more lenient
occasionally in public clashes.
Despite Husak's conciliatory gestures, Gorbachev will find the
Czechoslovak leadership divided over the wisdom of his reform ideas
and their applicability to Czechoslovak conditions. Pragmatists led by
Premier Strougal and party economics secretary Jakes are pitted
against antireform hardliners led by party ideologue Bilak,
continued
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3 April 1987
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Tog) Secret
The pragmatists, emboldened by Gorbachev's example, seem to be
on the offensive and are pressing for economic reform. The
hardliners, fearing a loss of power and political instability, have tried
to equate reform with counterrevolution
The anticipation created by Gorbachev's initiatives has prompted
rumors that Jakes will replace Husak as party leader shortly before
Gorbachev's visit. There have been similar rumors before, however.
Husak appears to be firmly in control, especially since the plenum
reaffirmed him as party leader.
Gorbachev's reforms have sparked increased interest in politics
among some elements of Czechoslovak society, but it is unlikely that
he will evoke a public display of enthusiasm. Although Gorbachev's
own program in the USSR gives an implicit endorsement of reform in
Czechoslovakia, he probably wants to avoid giving the impression of
actively interfering in Czechoslovak affairs
The pragmatists in the Czechoslovak Presidium will probably look for
a signal of support from Gorbachev, however. They might claim his
favor even if he gives them no obvious sign. Indeed, unless he does
something to dampen their hopes, the chances are good that his visit
will cause further clashes within the Czechoslovak leadership
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i op secret
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