NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 2 MARCH 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00091R000400150001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 2, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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.EF Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
2 March 1987
Tog) Secret
CPAS NID 87-049JX
2 March 1987
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Contents
USSR-Western Europe: INF Accord Expectations Raised ......... 1
France-Lebanon: Impact of Abdallah Sentence .......................... 3
South Korea: Bracing for Antigovernment March ...................... 4
Sudan-Egypt: Results of Sadiq's Visit ........................................ 5
Pakistan-Afghanistan: Military's View of the War ...................... 6
EC: Budget Dispute ...................................................................... 7
Lebanon: Army Reacts to Syrians in West Beirut ........................ 8
Zimbabwe-USSR: Renewed Arms Talks .................................... 8
Albania: No Letup in Criticisms of US, USSR .............................. 9
Honduras: Tensions Over Military Restructuring ........................ 10
Afghanistan: Precipitation Adequate for Crops .......................... 10
Special Analyses
USSR-Southeast Asia: Shevardnadze's Tour ............................ 12
Colombia: Insurgents' Strategy .................................................... 14
Sweden: New Foreign Policy Tack .............................................. 15
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2 March 1987
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USSR- INF Accord Expectations Raised
WESTERN EUROPE:
General Secretary Gorbachev's proposal for an INF accord
separate from agreement on offensive and space arms suggests
that Moscow believes an accord can be concluded during the
final two years of the Reagan administration and that
Gorbachev's arms control agenda is strongly supported by his
Politburo colleagues. The West Europeans are likely to find
Gorbachev's proposal attractive, and Washington can expect
pressure from basing country governments to conclude an
Gorbachev's statement released by TASS on Saturday was previewed
to Ambassador Kampelman by Ambassador Vorontsov in Geneva
several hours earlier. Vorontsov stated Moscow is willing to conclude
an INF accord independent of agreement on strategic offensive and
space arms. He proposed that the INF negotiators remain in Geneva
past the scheduled closing date on Wednesday for the purpose of
working out an accord. Vorontsov added the Soviets will formally
present their proposal at a specially requested plenary session in
Geneva today.
Comment: Moscow's decision to drop linkage and revert to its pre-
Reykjavik proposal for a separate INF agreement appears to reflect a
Soviet assessment an arms control la reement that could lead to
another summit is still possible. some Soviets have voiced 25X1
the opinion that the US may be receptive to an arms accord as a
means of demonstrating that, despite domestic political problems,
major policy initiatives can be successfully pursued. The Soviets are
also aware the US has plans for presenting a draft INF treaty in the
near future, and they may intend to upstage such a move in the hope
of focusing the negotiations on Moscow's agenda. 25X1
The Soviet INF initiative appears to underscore Gorbachev's authority
among his colleagues on arms control questions. His statement bore
the clear imprimatur of collective Politburo support, and, for the first
time in print, Gorbachev cites his position as Chairman of the Defense
Council, a striking allusion to his authority on political-military
decisions. 25X1
In framing their latest proposal, the Soviets appear to be seeking to
address West European concerns-voiced in the wake of the
Reykjavik summit-that a zero-zero INF outcome in Europe would
accentuate Soviet advantages in theater nuclear and conventional
weapons. Most significantly, Gorbachev stated that Moscow was
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prepared to begin talks on theater missiles "immediately." This
appears to represent a shift from Moscow's previous position that
talks on shorter range missiles should begin only after the
implementation of an INF agreement.
West European governments will publicly welcome Gorbachev's latest
move. Leaders of the five basing countries all are publicly on record
as favoring the zero-zero outcome for Europe and have indicated
privately to US officials that they are prepared to live with this
outcome. Many officials, however, believe the complete withdrawal of
US INF systems from Western Europe would harm their security
interests.
The West European public probably will anticipate that an INF accord
is imminent because their governments have portrayed Moscow's
linkage of an INF accord to agreement on SDI as the key obstacle. As
a result, West European governments probably will come under
greater public pressure to push Washington for progress on an
agreement.
Such pressures on the US are likely to be particularly strong if the
only obstacles to an accord are perceived to be verification issues
and the US insistence on the right to convert withdrawn Pershing Its
to shorter range Pershing IBs. The onset of negotiations to reduce
Soviet shorter range nuclear missiles will permit West European
leaders to claim the US did not ignore their concerns about Soviet
shorter range systems in an INF agreement. At the same time, West
European leaders realize that NATO has very little leverage to force
Soviet reductions because it has few comparable systems and the key
country-West Germany-appears unwilling to consider
counterdeployments to build such leverage.
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FRANCE-LEBANON: Impact of Abdallah Sentence
Abdallah's trial on Saturday.
France is bracing for violence in the wake of the outcome of
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction leader Georges
o_the US Embassy, the judges chose to ignore the political
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of terrorist attacks.
Abdallah will be eligible for parole in as few as 15 years, but only the
President can pardon him. In relaying Abdallah's decision not to
appeal, his lawyer warned that militant Arabs everywhere would see
the sentence as a declaration of war. While French officials have
hailed the tough sentence, they are warning the public of the high risk
for Abdallah.
Comment: President Mitterrand is unlikely to pardon Abdallah and
risk accusations of being soft on terrorism. Abdallah still has until
next week to reconsider an appeal, and a reduction in the sentence
cannot be ruled out. The government of Prime Minister Chirac will
probably decide to accept the outcome, however, and try to salvage
some credit for toughness despite its maladroit attempts at leniency
Abdallah's brother, the current head of LARF in Lebanon, has vowed
swift retaliation for any conviction and will try to move quickly to make
France-and possibly the US-pay for the sentence. The group's
ability to stage spectacular bombings like those of last September
cannot be assessed; however, it has been under considerable Syrian
pressure not to attack French interests. If LARF or its allies-notably
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command
and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia-are
unable to take revenge in France, they may target French or US
interests in Lebanon or elsewhere in the Middle East. Although public
opinion initially would probably support the government in the face of
renewed terrorism, any prolonged campaign could provoke an
outbreak of anti-Americanism because of the high US profile during
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SOUTH KOREA: Bracing for Antigovernment March
The return of Seoul's large student population to campuses this
week increases the chances for violent conflict at a human rights
march tomorrow.
Students, opposition politicians, and religious groups will march
tomorrow to mark the 49th day-religiously significant for
Buddhists-since the death of a student in police custody.
student organizers intend to demonstrate
peacefully in hopes of winning support from students who oppose
Chun but want to avoid confronting the government.
leftist students are particularly anxious to attract new recruits-a
government crackdown depleted radical ranks last fall-to swell the
turnout at rallies later this spring,
Despite the radical's strategy, some extreme elements are
threatening to use gasoline bombs if security services deal harshly
with marchers. For its part, Seoul will prevent the march by
deploying thousands of riot police to cordon off the proposed route.
Comment: Seoul's plan to keep demonstrators from reaching the
march's starting point probably lessens the chances for widespread
violence, but increased student participation in the event will make it
harder to prevent scuffles.
In addition, the government's tough tactics may cause a backlash that
would fuel the human rights issue. Such a reaction would complicate
efforts by ruling party hardliners to push the constitutional revision
proposal through the National Assembly this spring. It would also
place party moderates, who have lobbied for a more tolerant
approach to human rights rallies, in a stronger position to delay the
revision until Chun's term ends next year.
For their part, Chun's political opponents will point to harsh measures
as more evidence that Seoul is not interested in political reform.
Tough tactics may also provide the recruits the radicals hope to
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SUDAN-EGYPT: Results of Sadiq's Visit
Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq's recent visit to Cairo has
partially repaired Egyptian-Sudanese relations, but mutual
suspicions and differences remain.
Both. Sadiq and Egypt's President Mubarak appeared determined to
reassure the other of good intentions and to ease strains that have
characterized relations since Sadiq came to power last year.
pet4i . {Sadiq did not raise the sensitive
accorded Sadiq red-carpet treatment during his five-day stay.
The visit produced a "Brotherhood Chapter" providing a more
flexible framework for bilateral relations. The Sudanese accepted
Egypt's bid of its good offices to bring Khartoum and Addis Ababa
together. They also expressed willingness to pursue diplomatic
solutions to the southern insurgency. Sadiq requested-but got no
promise of-Egyptian weapons to thwart Ethiopian aerial supply of
southern Sudanese rebels and to counter Ethiopian air attacks into
Sadiq and Mubarak failed to agree on other regional issues, however.
Egyptian officials criticized Sadiq's rapprochement with Libya,
disagreed with his neutral stance on Chad, and disparaged his
overtures toward Iran. Sadiq questioned Egypt's support for the
Camp David accords, but Egyptian officials stood firm on the benefits
of disengagement with Israel
Comment: Sadiq's warm reception in Cairo should stifle complaints
from key Sudanese military officers and opposition leaders that he
was allowing bilateral relations to deteriorate. The Prime Minister's
willingness to endorse an Egyptian role in resolving Sudan's conflicts
with Ethiopia allows Mubarak to satisfy a similar request from Addis
Ababa and may enhance Egypt's credentials as a regional
peacemaker. Personal relations between the two leaders improved
considerably,
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5 2 March 1987
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PAKISTAN- Military's View of the War
AFGHANISTAN:
Lower level Pakistani military authorities-departing from
Islamabad's official view-believe that the Soviets and the
Afghan regime pursued the war against the Afghan insurgents
more aggressively last year than in the past, but they claim that
the Communists' tactics are flawed and that neither side is
winning the war.
say a major flaw in Soviet tactics is an
aggressiveness and effectiveness.
unwillingness to use airmobile troops to envelop the enemy from
behind. The Pakistanis criticize the insurgents for tactical inflexibility
and for relying too much on standoff weapons-such as 107-mm
rockets-a practice that they believe has led to a decrease in
apart from raids and ambushes by special-purpose forces.
ground and airmobile forces have not operated more aggressively,
Comment: Neither the Soviets and Afghans nor the insurgents
significantly improved their military position last year, although both
sides added new weaponry. The Afghan army may have marginally
improved its performance, but it remains plagued by manpower
shortages, factionalism, and poor morale. Soviet forces were more
effective last year in their use of air and artillery support, but Soviet
The resistance has begun to use sophisticated weapons, such as
surface-to-air missiles and multiple rocket launchers, more
effectively. These weapons have enhanced the rebels' ability to mount
ground operations.
Pakistani negotiating positions.
The official Pakistani assessment is less pessimistic than the opinion
of field-grade officers, and Islamabad's view is reflected in current
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Budget Dispute
members and the poorer Mediterranean members.
A plan proposed by EC Commission President Delors to solve the
Community's long-term funding problem by linking budget
contributions to member states' gross domestic product is likely
to cause a long, debilitating dispute between the rich northern
Delors has proposed changing the formula for member-state
contributions from the current 1.4 percent of value-added tax
collections to 1.4 percent of GDP, which may result in a potential
50-percent increase in EC funding over the next five years. He also
has proposed doubling economic development expenditures for
depressed regions, and greater discipline over agricultural spending.
The proposal is intended to address the $22 billion in unfunded
commitments the EC has accumulated in recent years, partly because
of increasing agricultural spending.
present form.
Comment: The proposed increase in regional spending would largely
benefit the poorer southern members of the Community, which favor
the plan. The three net contributors to the EC-the UK, West
Germany, and France-probably will not agree to the proposal in its
Bonn and Paris generally support tightening controls on expenditures
but will continue to back agricultural spending to placate their
farmers. Prime Minister Thatcher has threatened to withhold the
British share of any spending increase until the EC has made
substantial savings in agricultural ing-this year amounting to
63 percent of the EC budget.
out significant cuts in farm spending this year.
EC farm ministers have had little success in stemming agricultural
overproduction. Member-state political pressures will probably rule
in the current budget.
A protracted deadlock between northern and southern members is
probable. Neither side will be willing to make any concessions until
later this year, when the Community begins planning for next year's
budget and will be forced to deal with an estimated $4 billion shortfall
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LEBANON: Army Reacts to Syrians in West Beirut
Tensions between Christian Lebanese Army officers and the Christian
Lebanese Forces militia are risin in the wake of the Syrian tro
deployment in West Beirut
Leb ese Forces Comman er Sa 'r Jaja is increasingly concerned
about L anese Army efforts to take c I of the Christian enclave.
of Hizballah and the Palestinians.
Comment: Christian tensions will intensify further when Lebanese-
Syrian negotiations on a plan for political reform resume this week.
The Army leadership probably will use force only as a last resort to
control the militia, however, especially because Jaja's supporters
have succeeded in infiltrating key Lebanese Army posts-a
disturbing development for Awn. Christian apprehension about the
Syrian threat is exaggerated; the new Syrian forces are still
consolidating their grip on the western sector against the opposition
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close to a major arms-supply relationship with the Soviets.
Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe's decision to send a high-level
military delegation to Moscow this month suggests Harare may be
The Zimbabweans reportedly are seeking MIG-29s and a
modern air defense system to use against possible South African'
attacks. T4ey-a~e-014asemeonv
-ope atlons-ag'ai:ns ? A'M{ g 'd-how
rv+tien-wirer ,
concessionary terms.
Comment: Moscow, despite traditionally cool relations with Harare,
has courted Mugabe by proposing arms sales ever since he visited
the USSR in late 1985. Nonetheless, the Soviets almost certainly will
not sell Zimbabwe MIG-29s, which have been exported only to India
and Iraq and whose sale could provoke a strong South African
response. Harare would have difficulty paying for such weapons and
operating them without a substantial Soviet military presence-
something Mugabe would prefer to avoid. As a result, Harare
ultimately may buy less advanced Soviet aircraft and air defense
equipment, particularly if Moscow is willin to provide them on
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ALBANIA: No Letup in Criticisms of US, USSR
Tirane has not softened its hostility toward the US and USSR while
seeking other international contacts. In a recent speech, party leader
Alia ruled out reconciliation or relations of any kind with Washington 25X1
or Moscow. Premier Carcani added that Tirane will continue to
expand ties to its Balkan neighbors and other countries. The local
press, meanwhile, has attacked Soviet leader Gorbachev's openness
campaign as further abandoning Communism and dismissed US-
Soviet arms control talks as cynical and meaningless. 25X1
Comment: Albanian leaders are probably trying to demonstrate to
the US and USSR that there has been no policy change since Enver
Hoxha's death two years ago. The attacks on Moscow add weight to
Tirane's recent rejections of high-level Soviet overtures. Tirane
realizes that increased contact with Western states is crucial to
expanding imports needed for economic modernization. Alia next
may increase efforts to establish ties to West Germany and to
increase contacts with the UK-two countries with which Albania
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lacks formal relations.
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HONDURAS: Tensions Over Military Restructuring
Proposals by Armed Forces Chief Regalado to restructure the high
command are heightening ten
midlevel officers
sions in the military.
oppose Regalado's plan to create five new general officer positions
because they believe this would benefit a rival faction of more senior
officers. leaders of the
disgruntled officers also believe some members of the senior group
are plotting to remove them from their commands. They reportedly
think Regalado will help them fend off reassignments if they continue
Comment: Regalado's efforts to rely on a more traditional chain of
command in the military probably are intended to undercut ambitious
midlevel officers who are eager to expand their power now in order to
ensure that they will assume top military positions in 1990. Regalado
is unlikely to restructure his commands without the support of a
majority of military leaders. He probably fears that any precipitous
action on his part could spark a backlash similar to the one that led to
the ouster of Armed Forces Chief Alvarez in 1983.
AFGHANISTAN: Precipitation Adequate for Crops
Afghan crop conditions appear normal for this time of year, but tight
food supplies are expected to persist in the cities-as compared with
the farm areas-because they are dependent on shi ments from rural
areas and outside the country
major rivers-feeding
irrigated croplands-are flowing at levels equal to those of 1985 ansi_.~
farming areas, w ere about percent of the annual wheat-crop-the
staple of the Afghan diet-is grown.
Comment: The food balance in Afghanistan remains precarious
because of the tendency to draw down food stocks during the winter
months. Despite normal conditions in many areas, this year's harvest
will depend on precipitation between now and May. Food supplies are
likely to be tighter in the cities than in the countryside, except possibly
in the north. Shortages have been reported in major cities-Kabul
and Qandahar in particular. The major cities are heavily dependent on
supplies shipped from farm areas and abroad, which are susceptible
to interruption because of the fighting and damage to the road
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Middle East - Iran and Iraq separately claim to have inflicted substantial
casualties in renewed fighting near Al Basrah Saturday ... Tehran
says it captured major fortifications following Iraqi attack ... 25X1
Baghdad says Iranian attack repulsed ... no confirmation. F_- 25X1
against him unlikely.
Febres-Cordero over scandal concerning sales of official cars ...
opposition will continue to attack Febres-Cordero, but legal action
- Leftist-controlled Ecuadorean congress has censured President
should facilitate drug crackdown efforts.
Interior Minister ... ruling party politician ... US Embassy says he
is free of narcotics taint, unlike predecessor ... appointment
Bolivian President Paz has named chief of staff, Juan Carlo Duran,
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Asia - Vietnam claiming oil production this year will reach only 5,600 b/d
clearly dependent on Soviet oil.
Europe
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shows progress on democratization. F__1 25X1
aid to Surinamese refugees ... amount authorized last fall almost
- Netherlands seeking foreign donors to supplement humanitarian
France has sent Army brigadier general to command all service
units in French Guiana ... reflects French concerns about securii
at Kourou space launch center and along border with Suriname.
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11 2 March 1987
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Special Analysis
USSR- Shevardnadze's Tour
SOUTHEAST ASIA:
Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze travels to Southeast Asia
and Australia beginning today. He probably hopes to persuade
his non-Communist hosts to expand relations with the USSR
despite Moscow's support for the Vietnamese occupation of
Cambodia. Shevardnadze will reassure the USSR's Indochinese
allies that their interests will not be harmed by Soviet
approaches to ASEAN and China.
The Cambodian issue remains the primary obstacle to better Soviet
relations with ASEAN states and Australia. Shevardnadze presumably
will try to portray the Vietnamese as flexible on the terms of a
settlement, play down Moscow's ability to influence Hanoi, and
reiterate that increased dialogue between ASEAN and the
Indochinese states and direct Sino-Vietnamese talks are keys to
resolving the issue.
Shevardnadze's public comments in Phnom Penh and Hanoi are likely
to highlight alleged Vietnamese flexibility.
but there is no reliable indicator to suggest
that Moscow is pressing Hanoi to withdraw from Cambodia.
Shevardnadze probably will urge Bangkok and Jakarta to endorse
Moscow's recent call for official contacts between ASEAN and CEMA
and will seek expanded bilateral economic ties to all three of the non-
Communist states he visits. He is also likely to solicit their support for
Soviet efforts to participate in regional economic groupings such as
the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference and the Asian
Development Bank. In Bangkok, Foreign Minister Siddhi's planned
visit to Moscow in May will be a primary topic of discussion.
The Soviet Foreign Minister is certain-particularly in Australia-to
contrast the USSR's recent adherence to the South Pacific Nuclear-
Free-Zone Treaty with the US refusal to do so. He may put in a good
word for ASEAN's efforts to formulate a Southeast Asia Nuclear-
Weapons-Free Zone, especially in Indonesia, which is spearheading
the idea. The Soviets claim that such regional treaties pave the way
for General Secretary Gorbachev's proposed conference on Asian
security, but Shevardnadze is not likely to be able to persuade
Thailand, Indonesia, and Australia to endorse such a conference as
long as Vietnamese military operations continue in Cambodia.
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12 2 March 1987
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Shevardnadze's trip will signify to China that the Soviets intend to
play a greater role in Southeast Asia and Oceania. His stops in
Indochina will remind Beijing that, although Moscow wants to improve
Sino-Soviet relations, it will not pursue that goal at the expense of
Soviet allies.
The visit to Hanoi will give the Soviets the opportunity to assess
recent leadership changes there and to prod the Vietnamese gently to
get their economic and political houses in order. Shevardnadze's trips
to Laos and Cambodia will remind Hanoi of the Soviets' intention to
deal directly with Vietnam's Indochinese clients.
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Special Analysis
Insurgents' Strategy
The leftist Patriotic Union, the political front of Colombia's
largest insurgent group, has declared its independence from the
guerrillas in order to strengthen its political position. Meanwhile,
the insurgents may forge an alliance of all major rebel groups to
attack the country's key oil facilities.
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election last year.
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maneuvers for greater legitimacy, the FARC may be mob)Jlizixa -rya-
joint offensive with the Cuban-backed-National Guerrilla Coordinator,
an alliance of-Colornbi-a's fhr ee other major insurgent arougs. A
Leaders of the Patriotic Union have denied responsibility for recent
insurgent actions, including increased attacks on government troops,
`by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The
dissociation is aimed at protecting the Patriotic Union's political
gains-particularly its role in Congress-even if the insurgents' three-
year-old truce with the government breaks down. It is not likely,
however, to placate Colombians angered by the recent attacks,
because the rebels' political leaders are closely identified with the
guerrillas and used armed intimidation to muster votes in the national
rlta" orces near he-CUUfit y s-largest oil refinery.
nation's . ajor oil pipeline repeatedly since last March
political and--military accord wit -FARC--= o-m bed gas and oil lines
earlier this month. _T.he-National Liberation Army has attacked the
alliance's National Liberation Army-which is trir to
cTh refinP~v is located near FARO 1?erri or~~>,~ .n an area i
retains political credibility.
The FARC will continue to build its military power and demonstrate
solidarity with other rebel groups, but it is unlikely to declare a formal
end to the truce with the government as long as the Patriotic Union-
already preparing for nationwide mayoral elections in March 1988-
action against the insurgents.
Growing tension and distrust will continue to strain FARC's relations
with the government during the next several months, and President
Barco has accelerated efforts to improve his government's limited
counterinsurgency capabilities. Systematic, coordinated attacks on
major oil facilities-and particularly on the refinery-would strongly
test the security forces but could prompt Barco to widen military
Top Secret
14 2 March 1987
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/04: CIA-RDP88T00091 R000400150001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/04: CIA-RDP88T00091 R000400150001-7
Top Secret
Special Analysis
SWEDEN: New Foreign Policy Tack
In the year since Olof Palme's assassination, Prime Minister
ingvar Carlsson has attempted to reinvigorate Sweden's
traditional policy of "armed neutrality" by playing down
differences with the US and the USSR and by avoiding
controversial international socialist causes in favor of national
and regional issues. His renewed emphasis on neutrality enjoys
broad public support and is likely to be the cornerstone of
Swedish foreign policy even if the Social Democrats relinquish
power following a national election next year.
Carlsson appears to be convinced that Palme's aggressive
involvement in international socialist causes and his disputes with the
US over Vietnam, Third World issues, and East-West relations had
caused strains in Sweden's peacetime policy of neutrality. Tensions
with the USSR in the early 1980s over alleged submarine incursions
and espionage had also shaken the Swedes' image of nonalignment.
Palme's frequent public criticism of the US has been dropped by
Carlsson in favor of what US diplomats characterize as a constructive
private dialogue. He has also played down differences with Moscow in
an effort to keep Soviet-Swedish relations on an even keel.
Carlsson is not as active internationally as was Palme. He declined to
participate in the "Palme Commission" on disarmament and has
played only a minor role in the Socialist International. Although
Sweden has provided steadily increasing amounts of aid to Nicaragua
and has been involved in promoting human rights in Central America
it has done so in a relatively nonconfrontational manner
The Prime Minister has concentrated on national and regional issues
such as the Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone. Balanced neutrality
and Nordic issues will probably continue to be Sweden's top foreign
policy priorities after the election next year. Opposition leaders
generally support Carlsson's new look but differ on the extent of aid
to countries like Nicaragua and on how hard Stockholm should push
for a nuclear-free zone.
Top Secret
15 2 March 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/04: CIA-RDP88T00091 R000400150001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/04: CIA-RDP88T00091 R000400150001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/04: CIA-RDP88T00091 R000400150001-7