WEEKLY SUMMARY #97

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002300170001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 7, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY NO.
97
I] WEEKLY SUMMARY
C.
Number 9 7
cri APR 1950
Document Ea. 0 Of
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R,D3CIA3.57.22.27.
Class. 0E1 '72:20 `22. T3 S
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Auth: :r7: 7.
Date: 31-1? 7 a By: 013
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the. Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an. unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
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UNITED NATIONS,a ?Oa a 0000000 0
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-WESTERN EUROPE. o.aa
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EASTERN EUROPE...as ....?...
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FAR EASTO-W;O.O.
ARTICLE
? Communist African Campaign
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HIGHLIGHTS
In the fluctuating East-West conflict, temporary
gains and losses were registered by both sides during
the past week. In the United Nations, the continuing Soviet
boycott was largely responsible for bringing UN prestige
to its lowest point, and the over-all Soviet attitude toward
the UN makes it increasingly difficult for that body to
serve as an instrument for bridging the gap between East
and West (see page 2). In the struggle for Germany, the
USSR has been placed on the propaganda defensive by
Western proposals favoring all-German and all-Berlin
elections (see pages 6 and 7), but the stimulus which
German participation in the Council of Europe might have
given the cause of Western European integration will be
weakened by anticipated delay in German acceptance of
the Councils offer (see page 4).
Meanwhile, on the Western European labor front,
the Communist offensive, particularly in France, con-
centrated on propaganda and political demonstrations
rather than on concerted strike activity (see page 6), and
the recently organized Free Trade Union Confederation
reached a stage which will permit it to exert increased
influence on. the East-West conflict by combatting the
Soviet-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (see
page 5).
In the Far East, the Chinese Communists reportedly
completed preparations for the early resumption of their
military offensive and may soon launch an attack on the
Nationalist-held Chou Shan Islands, near Shanghai (see page 9).
Meanwhile, the issue of a federal vs. a unitary state has pro-
voked armed conflict in East Indonesia and has delayed the
development of a stable government of Indonesia .(see page 10).
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UNITED NATIONS
UN Effectiveness The Soviet boycott of the United Nations,
coupled with the continued failure of the
UN to make substantial contributions either toward easing
? East-West tension or toward solving other major disputes,
has brought the prestige of the UN to its lowest point. As
UN officials search desperately for a formula which will
increase the effectiveness of _the UN, it is almost certain
that the USSR will refuse to participate in the UN until the
Chinese Communist regime is. seated. Moreover, it is
apparent that: (1) the USSR, though not yet ready to with-
draw from the UN, is adopting an attitude which makes it
increasingly difficult for the UN to serve as an instrument
for bridging the gap between East and West; and (2) the
Soviet Satellites will persist in the present policy of with-
drawing gradually from specialized UN organizations.
Meanwhile, as the nations involved take matters increasingly
into their own hands, the UN is making little progress toward
a permanent settlement of the Palestine case, and some
complications have arisen in the Libyan affair.
Palestine Issue New efforts by the UN Palestine Com-
mission (PCC) to reach a Palestine-
settlement are threatened by the recent Arab League
decision to expel any member state which negotiates a
separate agreement with Israel, as well as by pressure by
Israel to publish its recent note to the PCC sharply de-
nouncing the Arabs. The PCC, which once again has immediate
responsibility for the Arab-Israeli issue, will urge all parties
to accept a new procedure, combining PCC mediation as ad-
vocated by the Arabs and direct negotiations as requested
by the Israelis. Although Jordan may see in such an apprioach
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a means of avoiding the Arab League ban on negotiations
with Israel, King Abdullah is apparently unwilling to
flout Arab opinion at this time and will move cautiously,
probably waiting till after the 11 April elections to show
his hand. It is evident that the Arabs do not want peace
and normal relations with Israel. They continue to fear
Israeli expansionism, both military and economic, and
apparently believe their best defense is to isolate Israel.
Although neither Israel nor the Arab states are contem-
plating aggression (at least for the next few years), mutual
recriminations concerning their respective re-arming
programs and occasional border "incidents" sustain sus-
picion and fear and prevent dissipation of the "cold war"
atmosphere in the area.
The Libyan Case In Libya, meanwhile, British efforts
to protect their strategic interests
in Cyrenaica are being opposed by UN Commissioner
Pelt, who is charged with working out a formula for the
future Libyan state. The British desire to grant early
independence to Cyrenalca; Pelt fears that some members
of the UN Advisory Council for Libya will regard such a
British act as a unilateral infraction of the General As-
sembly decision to create an independent unified Libya
by January 1952. The British, on the other hand, fear that
by waiting for a UN decision they-may lose the opportunity
to conclude a treaty assuring them of access to strategic
bases in Cyrenaica. The lines are not yet drawn so
tightly, however, as to prevent a compromise which will
protect British (and US) strategic interests and simultane-
ously avoid General Assembly criticism.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Council of Europe Except for its invitation to Western
Germany, the recent session of the
Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers in Strasbourg
did little to advance the cause of Western European integra-
tion and watered down proposals which would strengthen the
Council itself as an instrument for achieving European unity.
Although West Germany and the Saar were offered associate
membership in the Council, the stimulus Mitch German
participation might have given the cause of Western European
integration was weakened both by strong German reaction to
the ill-timed French:-Saar agreements and by the anticipated
delay in German acceptance of the offer and the sharp criticism
expected in the Bundestag. Overshadowing this one positive
achievement was the failure of the cautious nationally-minded
Ministers to grant any real concessions to the Council's Con-
sultative Assembly7 which has adopted a bolder "European"
approich. Assembly impatience with the inaction of the
Ministers crystallized in a proposal by the Assembly's
General Affairs Committee for the creation of an Executive
Committee composed of representatives of the members
and the Assembly empowered to make decisions binfiing on
member governments in a limited field. This attempt to grant
the Council actual though limited powers met the expected
frosty reception in the Committee of Ministers, although as
a sop to Assembly sentiments, the Ministers proposed a, mixed
advisory committee to study methods of improving cooperation
between the two. This minimal concession to Assembly desires
will not head off bitter Assembly criticism and increasingly
insistent demands for a larger role.
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Western Labor The Western-oriented Free Trade Union
Confederation (ICFTU), now representing
53 countries and an estimated 48 million workers, has
successfully overcome its principal organizational problems
and is now in a position to exert increased influence in the
East-West conflict. It is actively combatting the influence
of the Soviet-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU) in Western Europe and is giving aid to non-Com-
munist workers resisting the Communist labor offensive
In Italy and France. In these efforts the ICFTU, unlike
its predecessors, will work closely with the powerful
International Trade Secretariats (international organizations
of miners, metal workers, etc.) representing an additional
2-1 million workers.
In addition, the ICFTU has belatedly taken steps to
develop and strengthen the nascent non-Communist trade
union movement in Southeast Asia. An ICFTU delegation
will be sent to the area and limited financial and organiza-
tional aid may be granted to non-Communist unions in
Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia, as well as to the still
embryonic Asian Labor Federation in Calcutta. Although
the ICFTU may thus prove of increasing importance in
the struggle to strengthen anti-Communist resistance in
this area, it will face serious obstacles, including: (1) the
ICFTU ruling against admitting government-dominated
unions, such as those in India and Thailand; (2) the anti-
colonial and hence anti-Western feeling of the majority of
workers; and (3) the depressed economy of the area which
makes it susceptible to Communist exploitation.
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FRANCE
Communist Offensive The current Communist offensive
in France continues to concentrate
on propaganda and political demonstrations rather than on .
widespread strikes to rectify legitimate economic griev?
ances. The apathy of the workers during the recent un-
successful strike wave has led the Communists to the belief
that the most profitable tactics for the present would be to:
(1) persuade the workers of the futility Of military prepara-
tions directed against the USSR; (2) stage demonstrations
against the delivery of US arms; and (3) promote occasional
work stoppages and sabotage in plants manufacturing war
materials. Meanwhile, all organized labor unions are taking
advantage of worker disappointment with the recent strike
effort to increase:their membershths. The Communist-led
General Confederation of Labor may, however, sacrifice
its present advantage in this drive both by inciting purely
political demonstrations and by adopting in harmony with
Kremlin policy a more openly militant and anti-nationalist
position.
GERMANY
All-German Elections Initial treatment in Soviet pro-
paganda media of US and West
German statements favoring all-German elections in-
dicates that the USSR does not intend to make a formal pro-
posal of its own; at least until the Western Powers approach
the USSR officially. Realizing that all :German elections
under Conditions acceptable to the West would gain nothing
for the USSR and would jeopardize Communist control of East
Germany, the Kremlin considers it more profitable to temporize
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GERMANY
by: (1) branding the Western proposals a "diversionist"
maneuver stemming from Western fear of the growing
success of the National Front campaign for German.
unity; and (2) countering the effect of the proposals in
Germany by constant references to the "truly free"
elections to be held inast Germany in October 1950.
Having committed itself to a propaganda line advocating
German unity, however, the USSR, if approached Officially
by the West on the all-German elettion.issue, will probably
feel it necessary to make a formal counter proposal. Such
a counter proposal would embody conditions Clearly un-
acceptable to the West and ;would simultaneouSly attempt
to convince West Germans that the USSR was the only true
champion of German unity. .
Berlin Morale Recent West German and Western Power
decisions and actions will improve the
economic situation somewhat in the Western sectors of
Berlin, bolster popular morale, and strengthen popular re-
sistance to Communist pressure. In the economic field,
Berlin will benefit temporarily from recent ECA grants of
counterpart funds, additional allocation of funds from the
Bonn Government, and special trading privileges granted
to West Berlin business concerns.. Various propaganda
proposals now being considered will further improve morale.
A Western: proposal for all-Berlin elections would counter-
act current Soviet propaganda by: (1) exposing the insincerity
of the forthcoming Berlin Youth Rally if the USSR rejects the
proposal; or (2) paving the way for complete freedom of cam-
paigning throughout Berlin and the establishment of the Berlin
Kommandatura (with the veto power eliminated) if the USSR ?
accepts the proposal. Such proposed moves as the West Berlin
-Freedom Fair, the moving of some Federal Republic offices to
Berlin, and Adenauer's April visit to the city will momentarily
? encourage Vkst Berliners. Basically, however, Berlin will re-
main a deficit area particularly vulnerable tO Soviet harassment.
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EASTERN EUROPE
GREECE
Continuing Confusion Despite widespread realization in
Greece of the necessity for a stable
and popularly supported government, replacement of the
shaky one-party Cabinet of Sophocles Venizelos with a
broad centrist coalition continues to be delayed by political
maneuvering in which the Palace is deeply involved, Although
the door is still open to the reconstitution of the Plastiras-
Venizelos -Papandreou coalition set up immediately after the
elections, the vacillation of Venizelos and his attempt to run
the government single-handed provide major grounds for
future dissension among the center parties. The situation
has now drifted to such an extent that the coalition will prob-
ably not be formed before the Cabinet faces a showdown in
Parliament in mithaprilt even if the coalition can be recon-
stituted thereafter, its cohesiveness and staying power will
be doubtful. Moreover, the King, who intensely dislikes
PlaStiras and yet has no real confidence in Venizelos, will
continue to exploit the situation in order to keep the centrist
majority divided, with the ultimate aim of bringing into power
a monarchist party under Marshal Papagos.
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FAR EAST
CHINA
Chou Shan Invasion There are a number of indications
? that the Chinese Communists are
about to open a new offensive phase in the Chinese civil
?
war by launching a major attackagainst the Chou Shan
Islands in the near future. The Communists have reportedly
completed preparations'for throwing forces of overwhelm-
ing numerical superiority, with air support, against these
Nationalist bases. The imminence of the attack is suggested
by reports that it will occur on about 15 April, that more
.than 50 Communist military aircraft are based at Shanghai,
that Communist troops are massing in the adjacent mainland
area, and that junks are concentrated in Hangchow Bay,
where a few Communist aircraft have reportedly attacked
Nationalist planes: Loss of the Chou Shan Islands to the
Communists would eliminate an advance staging base for
Nationalist air and sea operations against the mainland and
would virtually eliminate the sea blockade of the Yangtze
estuary. Such a loss, coupled with the appearance of i
.ChineSe Communist air force, would have an adverse psycho-
logical effect on the Nationalists in Taiwan.
Communist Problems The Communist regime continues
to face serious economic and poli-
tical problems throughout China. The disastrous North
China famine will not be relieved until harvesting of the
winter crops in May and June. Although the Peiping govern-
ment claims its relief campaign has been partially successful,
at least several millions of the forty million distressed North
Chinese will die of starvation. The Communists have, managed
to supply the large cities of East and North China, but in the
rural areas of the coastal plain north of the Yangtze River the
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CHINA
famine has assumed major proportions. Meanwhile, in
South China, economic disruption and popular resistance
to the new regime will militate against the Communist
program of land reform and political consolidation.
Successful Nationalist air and naval attacks on Canton-
Hong Kong communications and continued guerrilla
harassment may cause the removal of certain govern-
ment functions from Canton to Kukong. Communist
attempts, to condition the South China populace to the use
of Communist currency have been unsuccessful. More-
over, oppressive taxes, levied to defray the cost of con-
tinued Communist military operations, have aroused
widespread resentment. Although the June rice harvest
will ease the local food shortage, the Nationalist blockade
? and maintenance of the Communist military machine will
continue to arouse economic and political unrest in South
China,
INDONESIA
Armed Revolt The campaign of the principal Indonesian
state, the former Republic of Indonesia,
to transform the federated United States of Indonesia(USI)
into a unitary nation by absorbing all other constituent
units, has met with armed resistance in the iniportant state
of East Indonesia. Officials there have felt that immediate
and forceful absorption by the Republic Would mean domina-
tivn by Javanese, who differ ethnically and culturally from
the East Indonesians, and a consequent breakdown of pres-
ent conservative traditions. Although the armed revolt at
Makassar, capital of East Indonesia, may have no official
connection with the policies of the East Indonesian Govern-
ment, it has dimmed prospects for successful conclusion
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.INDONESIA
of the USI-Republic -East Indonesian conference originally
scheduled for 8 April to settle the entire problem of absorp-
tion. The USI faces a difficult choice: a decision not to
absorb East Indonesia would cause a loss of prestige in the
eyesplif.Repithlican ektremists, while a decision to occupy
Makassar could precipitate strong resistance by some 9,000
still mobilized and well-armed soldiers in East Indonesia.
Republican pressures for a unitary Indonesia, in the face of
continued East Indonesian advocacy of federalism, have thus
created one of the most serious problems yet to confront the
new USI Government.
Union Conference Although agreement was reached on
several major issues at the recent
Dutch-Indonesian Union Conference, some of the most contro-
versial issues remain unsolved and will continue to make
close cooperation between the Dutch and Indonesians diffi-
cult. joint commissions were appointed, however, to study
these remaining issues--the question of New Guinea and the
employment of Dutch citizens in the Indonesian Government.
Agreement was reached on a Dutch loan of 200 million guilders
to Indonesia and on the establishment of a temporary Dutch
military mission (later to be replaced by a permanent mission)
to advise the Indonesians on the development of their armed
forces. Although- relations at the Conference-were cordial,
the trend of future relations between the two countries will
be determined largely by how successfully working-level gov-
.ernment and business officials can cooperate in their day-to-
day contacts.
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THE PHILIPPINES
Huk Campaign Recent well-coordinated Huk raids through-
out the island of Luzon reflect more efficient
Communist leadership in the face of the continued ineffective
? 0 security measures of the Philippine Government. The? maraud-
ing forays on arms and food stocks in central Luzon, where?
over 80 persons were killed and scores wounded, were appar-
fl
ently timed to take advantage of confusion in the Philippine
armed forces resulting from current reorganization plans to
separate police and military functions. The reorganization
intended to prepare for an anti-Huk offensive, has been hal?
ed
temporarily by Huk violence. The successful Huk attacks have
U caused a further reduction of the people's confidence in the
government's strength and have replenished Huk supplies in
? preparation for sustained resistance. The reorganization of
fl the armed forces under more efficient command may result
in the restriction of Huk activity to a smaller area but the
establishment of effective government control over the situ-
)) ation within the foreseeable future is not likely.
KOREA
?
Election Plans President Rhee's proposal that general
elections be postponed from May until
November was made primarily in the hope of gaining time ?
to strengthen his political position rather than to force the
Assembly to take action on the 1950 budget. Although
0fl Assembly action on the budget is critically important in the
fight against inflation, it is doubtful that Rhee as yet fully
appreciates the seriousness of the inflationary threat. Rhee
is fully aware, however, of the strong prospect that the
opposition Democratic-Nationalist Party would win a large
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KOREA
majority if elections were held in May. Rhee's proposal
has already met strong opposition not only from the Demo-
cratic-Nationalists, but from the UN Commission on Korea?
and from the US. Rhee may therefore withdraw his request,
particularly if the Assembly takes early action on the budget
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COMMUNIST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN
In French West Africa, Communists are intensifying
their efforts to penetrate and gain control of a strip of land
stretching 1600 miles between souther Niger and Dakar.
Organized Communist activity? has heretofore been con-
centrated in the Ivory Coast, a center of some commercial
activity, but the Communists have now apparently turned
their attention to this strategically located strip, where the
northern limit of fully habitable west Africa merges with
the southern reaches of the high arid plateau of the Sahara.
The natives living in this strategic strip of land must
struggle hard fof existence and may le easilypersuaded
by Communist agitators to blame all their troubles on the
French. North-south movement across the desert by land,
as well as sustained air operations, would be largely dependent
on the facilities of this strip. The strip would also be the
most feasible route for troop movement between the interior
and Dakar.
The assistant chief of the African section of the '
French Communist Party recently visited Zinder, Niger,
the most important military, trading, and communications
center at the eastern end of this fringe zone, where he un-
doubtedly gave instructions for increasing subversive acti-
vities among troops and prison guards. Farther west, at
Niamey, capital of Niger, Communist sympathizers are
being energetically recruited. At smaller outposts and
communications relay points, Communist Party leaders
already occupy key spots and are in a position to take
control of communications in an emergency. Communist
ofganization and agitation meetings have also been held
recently at Theis, rail and road center near Dakar; and
the western part of Upper Volta, located in the middle
region of the strategic strip, has been a hotbed of Com-
munist activities for some time.
- 14 -
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013;02/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300170001-7
SECRET
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The President.
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), US Air Force
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
4. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
4. Director of Naval Intelligence
72,
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF
Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
0 a ? a Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
52,53,54,55,56. Chief, Acquisition & Distribution Div., OCD, State
57 Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Secretary of State (Attention: Policy Reports Staff)
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
US Air Force Representative of joint Strategic
.Survey Committee ?
68 ...... . . Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
60 .....
61
62,63. . . .
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SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300170001-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300170001-7
Doeutrit ta. --Se)
110 CX1173:3
Fetcc:::5:71773
Clacs? TO: T3 S C
4 Apr 77
Auth: "C. 77
Date: 3.(7: ( le. By:
11
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300170001-7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300170001-7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2631-7S-1948
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/21 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300170001-7