WEEKLY SUMMARY #113

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002300010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 28, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the' na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
Page
HIGHLIGHTS . . . . 0000 600 0.6 OOOOO
SOVIET/SATELLITE INTENTIONS
Korea . . .? 0????0?.???? 0 . 0 .......
Taiwan
Burma. . . ?000???000?????00?60.?
HongKong 0 0 600?0?0?000???
0
.
?00?
2
3
4
5
Yugoslavia ????00 0????? 600
5
South Asia ?????08 ??????0?
6
WESTERN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
North Atlantic Treaty . 0 ? ? ? 0 ?0000????
7
Italy . . ? . . . . . a . 0 0 0 ????00?0 6 ??0?
7
Turkey ...... ... 00. ?0 o . .......
8
LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS
Peace Partisans Decline.
10
West German Political Strain. . .......
? .
10
Greek Government Weakens
11
Korean Civilian Attitudes . . . ?ip ? . .........
12
Latin American Elections . . . . . . . . .
. .
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HIGHLIGHTS
The USSR's surprise decision to return to the United
Nations Security Council in August came at a time when ten-
sion throughout the world had been increasing as a result of
a steady stream of reports suggesting that the USSR was pre-
paring to initiate further aggressive moves (see page 2). The
USSR's return to the Security Council could be designed to
pave the way either for negotiations leading to a settlement
in Korea or for further aggressive moves; current Soviet
propaganda would support either step. Meanwhile, the USSR
has not yet given any firm indication of its intention to per-
mit an expansion of the Korean conflict, with the possible
exception of continued preparations for an attack on Taiwan
(see page 3). Available evidence points to the possibility of
a reinforcement of North Korean forces with Korean veterans
of the Chinese Communist Army (see page 2), but does not
support growing fears of immediate aggressive Soviet action
in such areas as Burma, Hong Kong, or Yugoslavia (see
pages 4 and 5).
For the first time there is apparent in Western
Europe a real and widespread sense of urgency, heretofore
largely confined to military circles, over the need to
accelerate rearmament plans. Meanwhile, the material
and manpower aid being offered to assist UN forces in
Korea, although significant as an indication of Western
solidarity against Soviet aggression, promises to be over-
shadowed by the impact of the Korean invasion on Western
European efforts to create a collective defensive force (see
page 7).
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SOVIET/SATELLITE INTENTIONS
As the USSR and its Satellites continued to talk loudly
of "peace" and the warlike intentions of the Western "imperi-
alists," there was no slackening of reports that the USSR itself
was preparing to initiate further aggressive moves around the
Soviet perimeter. Although possessing the capability to move
militarily in a number of places with little advance warning, with
the possible exception, of continued preparations for an attack
on Taiwan, the USSR has not yet given any firm indication of its
intention to expand the Korean conflict and increase the risk
of global warfare involving the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Soviet
diplomatic activity was aimed primarily at South Asia and the
Soviet Far East.
Korean Support Although there has been no evidence of troop
movements from Manchuria into northern
Pit Korea since th.e outbreak of hostilities, North Korean forces may
soon be reinforced by Korean veterans of the Chinese Communist
Army. Within the next three weeks, North Korean forces will
probably have made the maximum advance possible with the
troops currently available in Korea. If the USSR desires a quick
? victory before UN forces are further reinforced, it will have
? to call upon additional experienced troops for use in Korea.
Although the North Koreans may have committed practically
all their available organized and trained units merely to achieve
a quick victory regardless of the risk, it seems more probable
that the Northern Command has been assured of reinforcements.
Such reinforcements would at the minimum consist of the 40-
50,000 Koreans believed to be available in Manchuria and would
? be used to replace the heavy casualties resulting from the rapid
North Korean advance, to cover the exposed flanks and rear,
and, if necessary, to provide momentum far the final push against
reinforced UN troops. The USSR could use these "Korean"
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reinforcements with little danger of political repercussions.
There is at present no indication, however, as to whether
the USSR will risk the political disadvantages involved in
committing non-Korean reinforcements should such a step
become necessary.
Taiwan Assault The considerable increase in troop move-
ments in South_ and Southeast China during
the past two months indicates the prdbable concentration of
Chinese Communist troops in assembly areas from which
they could be rapidly moved to embarkation points for an
? hi. assault on Taiwan? Further reports have suggested both
accelerated purchase and movement to the Fukien coastal
area of small boats and junks and th.e concentration of opera-
tional supplies, notably aviation gasoline. There are no
indications that the US pronouncement of 27 June 1950 has
caused the Chinese Communists to abandon these preparations.
Barring effective opposition by US naval units, Chinese Com-
:? munist forces are capable of securing an initial lodgment of
75,000 fully equipped troops on Taiwan and within two or
three weeks of establishing control over the entire island.
An early assault may well be launched. Communist China
is committed to the annexation of Taiwan and so long as
Taiwan remains in Nationalist hands Peiping loses some
political prestige. Although such considerations do not in
themselves require an early invasion attempt, for military
reasons the Communists must attempt an invasion before
Ye, the US strengthens its defensive screen of the island. In
.
addition, a successful assault on Taiwan would: (1) demon-
strate world Communist power; (2) strengthen the Soviet and
Chinese strategic position. in the Far East; and (3) promote
lack of confidence in US commitments and undermine non-
Communist opposition to Soviet aggression. Although an in-
vasion of Taiwan, by enlarging the area of conflict between
Communist and US forces, would increase the risk of global
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war involving the USSR, such an invasion would probably
encounter much less international opposition than would
Chinese Communist military operations against Korea,
Hong Kong, or Southeast Asia. Moreover, in view of the
fact that the Kremlin has permitted North Korean forces
to become directly involved with US forces, it may be
willing to permit the Chinese Communists to become
similarly involved, thereby creating a further drain on
US resources.
Moves on Burma The Burmese are becoming increas-
ingly fearful that the Chinese Commu-
nists are preparing to invade Burma on the pretext of either:
(1) occupying Chinese territory (approximately 200 miles of
Burma's northern border has never been delineated); or
? (2) disarming some 2,000 armed Chinese Nationalist troops
in Kentung Province. There is little evidence, however, to
indicate a Chinese Communist intent to invade Burma at this
time. The deterrents to such an invasion are more political
than military. Because Burma is an independent member of
the UN and has recognized the Peiping regime, it is in a
different position from Malaya or Indochina, and the Chinese
Communists would find it difficult to maintain that they were
fighting for the liberation of Asia from Western militarism.
A Chinese invasion, therefore, would produce repercussions
in non-Communist Asia, particularly India and Pakistan, which
have already been stimulated by the UK to lake a special in-
terest in buttressing the present Burmese Government. Any
0,4 efforts, diplomatic or military, to contain such an invasion
would be made under UN auspices. The British, despite their
present treaty commitments to provide arms and military train-
ing to Burma, probably have neither the capability nor the desire
to intervene unilaterally.
Pm
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Hong Kong Although the possibility of a military attack on
Hong Kong has been increased by the stalemate
in Chinese-British negotiations regarding diplomatic relations,
the stiffening of the British attitude, and the general increase
in Communist militancy in the Far East, it is not likely that
the Chinese Communists will take such a step at least until
there have been further developments in Korea, in the UN, and
in negotiations with the UK. The Chinese Communists are
not likely to risk war with the UK while the Korean conflict
is unresolved. Aggressive action in Hong Kong would further
undermine Chinese Communist efforts to obtain membership
in the UN. Finally, the Chinese Communists probably still
hope for progress in negotiations with the UK. Moreover,
even without resort to aggressive action toward Hong Kong,
the Peiping regime is contributing to the cause of interna-
tional Communism by pinning down British forces in Hong
Kong, thereby reducing British capabilities for suppressing
Communist terrorism in Malaya and assisting UN forces in
Korea.
Yugoslav Concern Although officially calm, Belgrade is
becoming more concerned over the possi-
bility of a Soviet-inspired attack on Yugoslavia and may be
strengthening security troops on the eastern frontiers and
initiating some precautionary civilian defense measures in
the capital. Despite growing Yugoslav concern, however, US
and Western observers have thus far been unable to confirm
the voluminous reports regarding an imminent Soviet-sponsored
attack on Yugoslavia. Satellite military forces, however, are
being strengthened and, with Soviet advice and logistic support,
might be capable of capturing Belgrade and forcing Tito's Army
to withdraw to the mountains. It is doubtful, however, that they
could subjugate the entire country. Prospects of the survival
of the Tito regime, even if it controlled only mountainous west-
ern and southwestern Yugoslavia, may act as a deterrent to a
Soviet-sponsored invasion at this time.
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South Asia On the diplomatic front, the USSR is attempting
to promote friendly relations with both India
and Afghanistan in an effort to prevent these countries from
unequivocally joining the Western camp. The recent exchange
of messages between Stalin and Indian Prime Minister Nehru
is part of this Soviet effort to encourage Indian "neutrality"
and to promote a rift between India and the West. A further
conciliatory move is the change in policy of the Indian Com-
munist Party from tactics of violence and sabotage to a
united front, "agrarian reform" movement. The favorable
terms granted by the USSR to Afghanistan in the recently-
concluded four-year trade treaty are further evidence of
Soviet conciliatory tactics designed to achieve both political
and economic advantages. In addition to boosting Soviet
popularity with Afghanistan, the treaty will increase Afghan
economic dependence on the Soviet orbit, supply propaganda
material to substantiate the avowed Soviet policy of support
through trade of "backward" areas, and possibly encourage
Afghanistan to challenge Pakistan still further, thus promoting
tension and possibly armed outbreaks in South Asia.
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WESTERN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Atlantic Alliance The material and manpower aid being
offered to assist UN forces in Korea,
although significant as an indication of Western solidarity
against Soviet aggression, promises to be overshadowed by
the impact of the Korean invasion on Western European
efforts to create a collective defensive force. For the first
time there is apparent in Western Europe a real and wide-
spread sense of urgency, heretofore largely confined to mili-
tary circles, over the need to accelerate rearmament plans.
France, Italy, and the UK are already planning greater
defense outlays, and the Western Union defense ministers
meeting in France have pledged increases in arms produc-
tion and forces-in-being. Nevertheless, although the Korean
war has created a propitious atmosphere for fulfillment of
US efforts to accelerate the NAT rearmament program, the
European nations will still be confronted with the ever -
present problem of the impact of rearmament on economic
recovery. There will thus still be a strong tendency to keep
arms increases within modest limits and to shift as much of
the financial burden as possible to the US.
Italian Plans Although the Italian Government's immediate
reaction to the Korean invasion was to hasten
the planned expansion of the Italian Army to twelve divisions,
popular support for a strong stand against Soviet aggression
is by no means assured. Concentration on military affairs
would still further delay progress toward social and economic
reforms and weaken the popular position of the government.
F' As international tension increases, a major problem facing
1/4.. the Italian Government will be what to do with the Communist
Party. Outlawing the Party now, as many influential persons
pro
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?
are advocating, would not only be unpopular with a large
segment of the laboring class, but would result in widespread
civil disturbances, although not a full-scale insurrection.
Moreover, although dissolution of the Communist Party would
probably ease Italy's internal security problem in case of
war, it would not prevent the underground Communist organiza-
tion from considerably damaging Italian war efforts. On the
L. other hand, failure to outlaw the Communist Party before the
outbreak of hostilities would increase the government's diffi-
culty in dealing with the Communist problem at a time when
it would be fully occupied with mobilizing for war. The situ-
ation would assume serious proportions in the event of a
Soviet-inspired attack on Yugoslavia. The Communists would
have the capability for seizing control of various northern
industrial facilities and cutting rail and other communications
to northern Italy. Government success in dealing with this
situation would depend both on the rapidity of Soviet advances
in Yugoslavia and the extent to which the US responded to
calls for greater military assistance.
PS Turkish Army The announcement by Premier Menderes
that steps would be taken to reorganize
and strengthen the armed forces suggests that Turkey is
? finally beginning to consider seriously a number of long-
standing recommendations of the US Military Mission, The
ft strained international situation has probably been largely
influential in convincing the Turkish Government that the
reorganization of Turkey's armed forces, which has been
under way for several years, was proceeding at far too slow
a pace. The recent retirement and reassignment of a con-
siderable number of Turkey's more conservative senior
officers and their replacement by younger men eager to
prove their worth may also to some extent account for the
Fs4 more energetic attitude of the government. One indication
t.
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L.d
that the initiative for this new program comes from the
armed forces themselves is the fact that, several days
before the Premier's announcement, the General Staff
approved the US Military Mission's proposals for the re-
organization of the First Army units defending Thrace and
the European approaches to the Straits. Other major steps
which the US Military Mission has recommended and which
the Turkish Government may now be prepared to implement
promptly are: (1) reduction of the number of infantry divi-
sions from 22 to 16, so as to create more compact, more
mobile, and better equipped ground forces; (2) preparation
of effective mobilization plans and a detailed defense plan;
(3) acceleration of current training programs; (4) increased
L.? efforts to solve the serious logistical problems of the
ea Turkish Air Force and to make it more effective, particularly
l in ground support tactics; and (5) steps to improve the effi-
?..?
ciency of the Turkish Navy in supporting ground and air
Ps* forces and resisting an attack on the Straits.
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LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS
Peace Partisans The Communist-sponsored World Peace
Partisans movement is losing non-Com-
munist support, particularly in Western and Northern Europe,
as a result of the North Korean Communist aggression. In
Italy, where "peace" agitation was beginning to win substan-
tial support among non-Communists, there has been a marked
decrease in attendance at peace partisan meetings. In Den-
mark, organized labor has come out strongly in support of
the US-UN action. The Prime Ministers of Norway and Sweden
have publicly disavowed the "Stockholm Peace Appeal"; the
Norwegian Prime Minister called for counteraction by
patriotic groups. The Swiss Red Cross energetically de-
nounced the use of its name by peace partisan groups support-
ing the Stockholm atom bomb appeal. In India, however, ex-
ploitation of the "peace" campaign and Asia-for-Asiatics
sentiment is being increased by Communist-line groups.
Representatives of 25 Indian leftwing organizations, meeting
recently to set up a "Quit Asia" committee, condemned US
"aggression" in Korea and urged the Indian Government to
revoke its Korean stand.
GERMANY
Political Friction Current party disagreements over the
bread-price and economic co-determina-
tion issues emphasize the fact that Chancellor Adenauer, who
is vacationing in Switzerland, is the only German politician
strong enough to exert discipline within the present coalition
government. Tension between the Chancellor's Christian
Democratic Union and the Free Democratic Party is not likely
to lead to a definite break between the two parties, but will
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GERMANY
further increase the difficulty of the government in reaching
agreement on controversial issues, at a time when the power-
ful German Federation of Trade Unions is not only threaten-
ing a general strike on the issue of rising bread prices but
has warned vaguely of severe economic disturbances and
trade union action unless labor is granted representation on
industrial management boards. Although unpopular even in
his own party, Adenauer has in the past been able to prevent
incipient revolts within the government parties from assum-
ing serious proportions. Adenauer has trained no understudy
for his vital role in coordinating the views and interests of
a widely-diversified coalition, nor is any capable successor
as yet in evidence. Although Adenauer's death or retirement
would not cause the early downfall of the present coalition, its
effectiveness would be seriously reduced.
S
GREECE
Cabinet Crisis Although a threatened collapse of the Plass
tiras coalition Cabinet has been averted
this time, the coalition may soon be replaced by a military-
type government, unless somehow Parliament can be induced
to rush through its essential business and adjourn for the
summer. The divisions among Greece's four or five largest
parties, the lack of any real parliamentary leadership, and
current international tensions play into the hands of the King
and other proponents of strong government. Plastiras' post-
tion is weakened not only by continuing external opposition but
a also by the increasing doubts expressed about his leadership
by two of his principal colleagues, Papandreou and Tsouderos,
and the largely uncooperative attitude of the third, Venizelos.
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GREECE
No other combination of elements in the present Parliament
is believed capable of establishing a new Cabinet with major-
ity support, unless perhaps under US pressure for unity, and
should Plastiras fall, the Palame would then find itself in a
position to declare an emergency and give extraordinary powers
to a government under Marshal Papagos. Such a regime would
inevitably acquire some of the features of dictatorship, despite
any initial attempts to give an indirect voice to Parliament
and to satisfy certain political leaders by naming them to the
Cabinet. Sentiment for new elections, the normal solution to
a parliamentary impasse, has thus far been restrained by
apprehensiveness over possible Satellite aggression--an
apprehensiveness which to some extent rightists have been
capitalizing on in their desire to gain power.
KOREA
Civilian Reaction Despite the rapidity of the North Korean
advances, South Koreans are continuing
to demonstrate a will to resist and the majority of people in
both North and South Korea would probably welcome: (1) the
destruction of the Communists by UN forces in Korea; (2) the
return of the South Korean Government to Seoul; and (3) the
eventual unification of North and South Korea by means of a
UN-supervised general election, provided the return is not
delayed by an initial exercise of Communist control over all
of South Korea. The failure of Koreans to harass-or disrupt
the Communist military operations, even though "Communist
liberation" is extremely unpopular, may be due to: (1) the
apathy and fatalism of the peasantry; (2) their lack of arms
and ammunition; and(3) the confusing Communist prbpaganda
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KOREA
which ..describes the war as virtually over and thereby discourages
?e, any organized efforts to disrupt Communist-controlled areas. Until
the forces of the United Nations can build up the necessary supplies,
?
equipment, and personnel to go over to the offensive, little effort
will be made to interfere with Communist occupation forces. Once
? it becomes clear that the UN forces are on the offensive, however,
surviving anti-Communist elements of the population will be en-
couraged to begin guerrilla operations throughout Communist-
occupied territory.
LATIN AMERICA
? Mexican Election Evidence is increasing that President Aleman
may try for reelection in 1952, a step that could
lead to serious civil disturbances and possibly Aleman's assassina-
tion. The constitutional prohibition of reelection has been one of
the cardinal points of Mexican political thinking since the 1910
revolution, and opposition to a bid for reelection by Aleman would
be strong from such groups as: the revolutionary generals, of
whom over a hundred are still in active command; ex-president
Lazaro Cardenas and his followers in the army and among labor
and farm groups; probably ex-presidents Abelardo Rodriguez and
Manuel Avila Camacho; Vicente Lombardo Toledano and his labor
and political following; and the Communists, who would instigate
Lw political disturbances to further their own ends. The current
movement favoring a constitutional amendment to allow Aleman
to succeed himself is believed to have been originated by the
political clique surrounding him, who would like to continue per-
sonal profiteering for another six years and who probably keep
Aleman from knowing the strength of opposing opinion. It is
possible that by not discouraging talk of reelection, Aleman
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LATIN AMERICA
merely wishes to control general electioneering, but it is
also possible that Aleman could become convinced that talk
of reelection is a mandate from the people. Although Aleman
has recently strengthened the security police, whose particular
function is the personal protection of the president, it is doubt-
ful that he is aware of the full risks entailed in a try for re-
election, or of the serious proportions to which tension may
grow if he lets the matter ride without a decision.
Guatemalan Violence Although continued anti-administration
demonstrations in Guatemala, accom-
panied by violence, have caused President Arevalo to declare
martial law, the government is capable of controlling the situ-
ation and preventing further outbreaks. The growing strength
of the opposition, however, evident in the number and tenacity
of the demonstrators, will greatly injure the prospects of the
present pro-government presidential candidates and may.force
pro-government forces to attempt to unite behind a single candi-
date of moderate proclivities and to repudiate extreme leftist-
Communist support.
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DISTRIBUTION
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8,7.0. a . . a a
9,71. a . . .
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25,26,27,28,29,
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57. . . .
58
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The President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations)US Air Force
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence
Director of Navy Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF
Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Comm.
Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
a Chief, Acquisition & Distribution Div., OCD, State
. . . Director. Federal Bureau of Investigation
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
? Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
? . Secretary of State (Att: Policy Reports Staff)
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
0 Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
a ? US Air Force Representative on Joint Strategic
Survey Committee
Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
62,63. . .
66,76,77. .
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300010001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300010001-4
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Detect oi?ot? 7 a By; 0 ( 3
-Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300010001-4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300010001-4
CECRCT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300010001-4