NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100010017-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: June 14, 1979
• Content Type: MEMO

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14 June 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : NIOs
1. Attached is the draft study I did for Bush. Marginal comments
in black are his as of March 1976. Those in red are Stan's in early
1977. Much of it is still relevant (there ain't much new under the
bureaucratic sun) and I am thinking my way through a memo for you on
how these observations have been affected by developments, since.
2. After considerable debate, Bush was inclined toward another
model yet, one in which the NIOs were subordinated to the DDI. (The
present situation is precisely the reverse.) He was finally persuaded
to defer this in favor of Model I, but was determined to do it even-
tually. Incidentally, in the brief period Ted-Sorenson had when he was
not fighting for his life, he told me he could not understand why he
would have two substantive organizations reporting to him.
3. Also attached is Colby's original terms of reference for the
NIOs. Note the emphasis on inter-Agency work. The trouble was that
he later took the position that CIA was his staff as DCI (as had Helms)
but that the NIOs were the instrument through which he would run DDI
production. Also, he involved them in an incredible management exercise
(KIQ-KEP) that I had the pleasure of killing; they simply couldn't do
it all.
Richard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer
for Warning
Attachment
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
kor
.0 . 40 0ej
01
y
fe vv-"" 4( .'
"'Ir
SUBJECT : National Intelligence Production
Background
V- WV
1. In 1973 the Director of Central Intelligence abolished
the Board and Office of National Estimates and set up the National
Intelligence Officers in their place. This action began a debate
on the relative merits of the two institutions that continues both
inside and outside the Community. In 1976, as a .result of E.O.
11905, the DCI must again address the question of national esti-
mative intelligence. This memorandum analyzes the strengths and
weaknesses of each system as they have emerged from the debate,
and suggests ways which the stronger elements of each might be
combined.
2. The Office of National Estimates consisted of a Board
of generalists supported by a drafting staff of specialists. The
NIO's are themselves area or functional specialists, and are
charged with drawing their draftinn assistance from the analytic
elements of the Community. On the other hand, the NIO's have
greater responsibilities than did 0/NE. Not only do they produce
a broader. range of national intelligence than did 0/lIE, but they
also serve individually as staff officers to the DCI in their areas
of specialization.
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3. There are at least seven identifiable functions that
have been performed by one or both of these institutions. Both
were concerned with the management and review of national pro-
duction, and 0/NE with production itself. The NIO's are directly
charged with consumer liaison, with liaison across Community col-
lection and production, and with serving as an energizer of the
intelligence effort in new ways and directions; 0/NE played a much
larger role in these activities in its earlier years than it did
in its later ones. The Board collectively advised the DCI on
major subs~antive issues; as noted, the NI0's serve individually
as his substantive staff. The next few paragraphs discuss each
of these functions and how it has been handled.
Functions of a National Intelligence Staff
4. nsumer liaison: active measures to maintain close
contact with the consumer; definition of his needs for intelli-
gence; transmission of those needs to the production manager and
the analyst, including the policy context in which they occur;
facilitating policy-intelligence dialogue; securing consumer reac-
tion to intelligence assessments.
Comment: There is virtually uni-
versal agreement that the NI0's have been
successful in consumer liaison, far more
so than any previous effort. A much closer
link has been established-between the pro-
ducer and the consumer, and the product is
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c,_arly more responsive. They have
not been any more systematic than their
predecessors, however, in general assess-
ment of consumer acceptance. 0/NE, par-
ticularly in its later years, was severely
criticized for an "ivory tower" attitude.
It waited for the tasks to come to it
and insisted on answering the questions
it thought worth answering; as a result,
few questions were asked and fewer answers
were relevant.
5. Management of production: development of terms of
reference; assignment of tasks; arrangements for assembly, co-
ordination and review; editing and mechanical aspects"of pro-
duction.
Comment: 0/NE managed production
efficiently, largely because it was itself
responsible for the production it was man-
aging and because it had a structured system
for the process. The NIO's are less efficient.
This is partly because the range of pro-
duction tasks is broader, but it is also
because their arrangements tend to be ad hoc
and because these arrangements often run
athwart the lines of command of the pre!
ducing agencies. The analyst must serve two
masters.
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6. Pr-suction itself: organization; Ofting; assembly
and synthesis of contributions; defense of drafts under coordi-
nation
and review; preparation of resulting final drafts.
Comment: Under 0/WE, production was
carried out by the 0/WE staff. As noted
above, this was a relatively efficient process,
but the staff was to some extent isolated
from and aloof from the working analysts.
The result was a product that was smooth and
literate, but which sometimes did not face
up to the facts or to the hard analytic
questions. Under the 1110's, the production
is done by the analysts responsible. This
has paid great dividends in a product
soundly based on analysis and data, as
well as in analyst morale. Analysts in all
disciplines feel the need to participate much
more directly in preparation of intelligence
assessments for senior policy officers. The
product tends, however, to be somewhat row
than under the previous system.
7. Review:
a. Internal for: organization; coherence;
accuracy; completeness; vigor of argu-
ment; validity of judgment; responsive-
ness to stated requirement.
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o: External for: relevance to policy
concerns; responsiveness to ques-
tions that should have been asked;
broad topics not addressed; counter-
arguments not considered; wisdom
of judgment; the "experience fac-
tor"; general quality in the"sense
of the factors listed under internal
review.
Comment: Internal review should be
integral to the managerent of production.
Under 0/NE, this was the case. Under the
NI0's, it is often not clear whether the NIO
or the production organization is responsible,
in a further distortion of the chain-of-co.n and;
and the product suffers accordingly. The pro-
duction manager at branch or division level
loses control of his analysts when they are
doing a task for an NIO. Such a paper will
receive considerably less management attention
than would one for which the manager is fully
responsible. The NIO is usually too busy and
sometimes not qualified to give drafts the
intensive review they require. The NI0's so-
lution is sometimes to draft a reviewer from
among the production managers. This results
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the extreme case, it can keep -'senior line
officer away from his assigned job for as much
as six months at a time.
The Board of tJational Estimates was at
its strongest in providing external review.
Because it worked collegially, it was able
to provide the broadly-based overview that
NI0's acting individually cannot. In addition,
it was able to contribute an additional dimen-
sion drawn from its collective experience and
wisdom. The NIO's, on the other hand, have
been criticized for the unevenness of pro-
duction and for a fall-off in quality. In
effect
beca
,
use of NIO specialization, the
broader overview can now be provided only by
the DCI himself.
8. The "stimulus" function: examination of the nation and
the world to identify new questions for intelligence; review of
intelligence product to identify weaknesses and gaps in collection
and production; identification of new sources, approaches, and
methodologies; advice to the DCI on how to deal with the above.
Comment: 0/NE was more active in
energizing the intelligence aAnaratus in
the 1950's than in later years. This is
more a criticism of the way the system was
,manned than of the system itself. The
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-for mance of the 11I0's in this knction
has been spotty. Some have been active in
-collection, and others in identifying gaps
in production. Generally, however, the
absence of generalists among them and
their focus on short-range policy support
has meant that the broader
t
ques
ions have
received less attention than narrow ones.
9. Community liaison: action across organizational,function-
al, and disciplinary lines to focus analysts and organizations on
priority problems; maintenance of cross-Community contact and
knowledge among intelligence offices in the same or related fields;
similar activities in relation to external expertise, private or
academic.
Comment: 0/NE, as a closed society,
was relatively inactive in Community liaisQn
It drew on various organizations for con-
tributions (which it often ignored) but
made little attempt to draw together
analysts of various agencies and disciplines
or collectors and producers. In sharp con-
trast, this has been an area where the NIO's
have done outstandingly well. They have
made the individual analysts, and par-
ticularly those in obscure fields and
peripheral functions, feel much more a part
of the team. They have encouraged discussion
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a oss functions and disciplines, and
have brought the analysts themselves
more into the substantive debate on
estimative issues. In the past, this
debate tended to be conducted by rep-
resentatives two or three echelons re-
moved from the working analyst. -
10. Substantive staff for the DCI: advising him on consumer
needs and intelligence capabilities; ensuring that his own sub-
stantive needs are met; representing him in certain fora; focusing
Community attention on*special projects that cross functional lines;
trouble-shooting.
Comment: Except in a very limited
sense, (e.g., on National Estimates) the
members of the Board of National Estimates
d?c+ not serve as advisers to the DCI. In
fact, until the NIO system was created,
DCPs did without any substantive staff
bridging directorates, much less bridging
agencies of the Community. The usefulness
of such a function was demonstrated by the
coordinating activities of the Special
Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, and it
was on that pattern that the staff role of
the individual NI0's was designed. Here
again, they have made a substantial con-
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.bution. It should be noted, however,
that their utility in this capacity de-
pends to a great extent on the way each
DCI chooses to do business.
Evaluation of the NIO S
stem
U. It is clear from this review that the great strength
of the NIO system is that it involves the consumers at one end of
the process and the analysts at the other end more directly in
shaping the product. It has also provided for the DCI valuable
services not previously available to him. On the other hand, while
the product has been improved in the sense of relevance and in ad-
dressing difficult analytic issues, it has suffered in other ways.
The responsibility for review has been fragmented by the operation
of the NIO's across organizational command lines, and the advantages
of a collegial review have been lost. Similarly, while the NIO's
have been effective as energizers of the Community on short-range
questions, their preoccupation with immediate policy support and
the lack of collegial interaction means less attention given to
the loner
12. It would therefore appear that the problem areas lie
in the relationships between the NIO's and the line production
organiizations, and in. the absence of the broader view provide
a collegial board. There are, however, additional problems that
are not directly brought out in the analysis above.
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1
-- The duties assigned to the individual
NIO are so broad that no one individual can
do them all well. In fact, on the more active
accounts'that involve large elements of the
Community, it is difficult for an NIO and an
assistant to do them at all. The result has
been a great unevenness of performance. Each
tends to specialize in those functions to
which he is most comfortable. Moreover,
since each acts as an individual, no common
discipline is imposed upon them.
-- Production resources are not infinite.
When one tracks down through the structure, one
often finds that the entire resources of the
CIA or DIA on a specialized subject of some
importance are the part-time efforts of one
man. The -M's have first call nn fhfcr're-
sources, but have no responsibility for Justi-
fying them or mana,ina m. There is no reg-
ulating mechanism to protect the long-range
plans of the production manager who must think
in terms of research to answer next year's
questions as well as quick response to those
of this year.
-- Related to this problem is the ten-
of of some NIO's to over-sell the product.
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Pro
iey will volunteer. to have papees pre-
pared that the consumer would agree would
be "nice" for theca to have, as well as those
that are truly required. It is difficult
for the production manager to identify and
to resist this kind of task.
-- Some NI0's.are responsible for
problems, such as strategic weapons, which
involve all agencies and a large commitment
of resources across the Community. Others,
however, work on problems that have a low
%riority in Community resource terms. The
.former have ..a genuine Community role to
perform. The latter find that the only
resources upon which they can draw are
those of CIA. In effect, they duplicate
the responsibilities of the corresponding
CIA officer. This raises the question as
to whether all NIO's should be full-tie.
osals for Chanqe
13. A number of suggestions have been made of ways to im-
provelor change the present system. They break into three cate-
gories,-under each of which a broad range of suggestions have been
made. These are: ways of providing better review of production,
centering around the establishment of some sort of collegial board;
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changes in tt system for managing production to provide clearer
lines of authority; changes in the responsibilities of the NIO's
themselves. While these categories overlap, they can be con-
sidered, and changes can be made, independently of one another.
14. Collegial Review
-- Restoration of the Board of National
Estimates. Under this approach, the Board
would consist of, perhaps, eight or nine
generalists chosen largely from outside the
Intelligence Community. It would be advisory
to the DCI, and would review national pro-
duction for him and provide the stimulus
function for: the Community. The NIO's would
continue in their present role; the -Board
would be a level of review imposed above
then. The advantages of such an arrangement
utation of the Board and its members. Such a
Board would also be useful to him in resisting
are that it provides the maximum of indepen- I
dent advice to the DCI and provides his product z
with a certain
prestige deriving from the rep-
external pressures of a political or policy
nature. The practical disadvantages of this
approach, however, are very great. It inter-
poses another layer in an already complex pro-
cess. The Board's relations with the NIO's
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CQlle9ial1ev pn major p p rs.
involvement of USIB in national estimates is
really a proposal that USIB be Board of
National Estimates. In theory, this is an
attractive idea. In practice, USIB members
have neither the time nor, in some cases, the
On the other
hand, it would not help much. The individual
NIO's are already too busy to pay a great
deal of attention to other NIO's papers.
Moreover, as specialists themselves, the
added insights they can provide are limited.
-- Hal Saunders' proposal for a greater
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ai... with the production elements OT the
Community would be difficult to manage. In
effect, there would be too many senior officers
answering to the DCI and stumbling over each
other to get at production resources. Another
practical consideration is that the NIO's al-
ready have more GS-18 positions than the entire
CIA production apparatus. Imposing a Board
in addition to the MO's would make the system
top-heavy indeed.
-- A second approach is to create a
'Board composed of the NIO's. This by far is
the simplest approach, in that it would re-
quire only that the present gr u ac
W %J _4L_1
A,dj
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this kind of independent reviewaohe
-'rsonal characteristics require. for
NIO System would continue as before, but
these officers as a group would be asked
to review a paper before it was transmitted
to the DCI. This again is a relatively
simple fix, one that has the advantage
sheer volume of national production is
such that detailed review at the USIB
level would have to be reserved for only
the most important of papers. It is,
however, something that can be experi-
mented with in particular cases without
disturbing any other changes that might
be made.
-- Yet another suggestion is for a
part-time Board consisting of the senior
officers at, say, the Office Chief level
in the various producing agencies. The
JS
of involving the officers whose analysts
1,i vp p -Pp'red the paper and who themselves
are substantively capable of reviewing it.
On the other hand, this is hardly in- f. VIP
dependent review, and the production
Office Chiefs are busy men already.
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-- A fifth suggestion we.. id be to charge
the NIO's with assembly of an appropriate
panel of reviewers for each paper. This sug-
gestion has considerable merit.
The reviewers
could be chosen with regard to the content
of the paper, and could include senior officers
of the intelligence agencies, individual analysts
or outside experts. The disadvantage is that a
large-scale assembly of such panelists from
among officers who have other commitments might
prove difficult, especially when the novelty
wore off.
Finally, there is an idea of combining
a group of NIO's acting collegially with a few
generalists. Such a Board might combine the
best of the'generalists' and specialists' worlds.
An independent review could be provided, and
there would be some Board members who could give
attention to longer-range and cross-disciplinary
problems. A disadvantage, however, is that the
addition of generalists to the present dozen NI0's
would make the Board unwieldy in size and, as
noted earlier, top-heavy in relation to the pro-
duction structure. It would be necessary to
reduce the number of NIO's serving on the Board
in order to accommodate generalists.
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P'O
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product. It creates an element of elitism
and causes unnecessary resentment in the pro-
duction organizations. In addition, the exis-
tence of a drafting staff tends to create
drafts, whether they are needed or not.
-- Another solution, this one extreme,
is to make the production elements themselves
into a national drafting staff fur the fu11-
15. oduction Managemen'tt
-- One possibility, strongly advocated
by those who served in the Office of National
Estimates and strongly opposed by virtually
everyone else, is the restoration of a draf-
ting staff similar to that O(NE. The argu-
ments in favor of this are largely that most
analysts do not have the required drafting
skills and all analysts are too busy analyzing
to give the proper attention to an estimate.
The disadvantages are that the system places
a layer between the analyst who is at grips
with the problem and the national intelligence
range of national intelligence from the most
current to the longer-range estimative. In
practical terms, this would involve redesig-
nating OCI as the Office of National Intel-
ligence and incorporating in it economic and
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military elements able to draw on the
research components of CIA, DIA, and State.
_.Q
This Office of National Intelligence would,
to the extent possible, be jointly manned'
by the three agencies. The NIO's would
become the component chiefs within the
office. A chief advantage here would be
the consideration of one "national" office
under the DCI of a large proportion of the
resources needed to meet national production
needs across their full range. A disadvantage
would be that it would sharply change th,
character of the NIO's; it would improve their 11t
ability to manage production, where there are
now problems, but at the cost of weakening them
in what they do best, if only from the demands
on their time. The change would be disruptive,
particularly for the structure of DIA, and it
would be difficult to maintain smooth relations
between the Office of National Intelligence and
the Community research organizations upon which
it would have to depend.
-- In contrast, the least radical change
would be simply to add additional assistant's
for a few of. the busier NIO's,. or a small pool
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duction manager. Rather, it would be seen
as the first step back toward an O/NE-style
drafting staff and would be bitterly resisted
by the production offices. In fact, once the
p anj sway to resolve the con-: ~l
flicts between the NIO system and the pro-'rix
u
relieve some of the pressures on the system,
and in some cases provide better drafts, it
would not hel in
line was breached, it would be very difficult
to resist pressures for future additions.
-- It would also be possible to return
to the system that was used for the military
estimates in' the last years of 0/NE. Under
..f this system, the NIO's would request the D I
and DDT to prepare a draft, but would not
be responsible for its production. Rather,
the production offices would be responsible
for organizing Community inputs for drafting
and for Community coordination. This system
worked well, and solved the problem of keeping
responsibility for the quality of production
clearly in the hands of the production'manager..
It would be seen today, however, as a step
back toward CIA domination of the production
process.
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of generalist drafters. While is wo
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-- Lastly, the previous suggestion could
be adapted to broader, the Community's role.
Again, the NI0's would give up the production
management function. A "National Intelligence
Steering Group" would be established under NFIB,
chaired by the DDI and with his opposite members
from DIA and INR as members. This Committee
would be responsible for production management.
It would allocate tasks and develop terms of
reference in consultation with the NI0's, but
it would be responsible to the DCI, for the quality
of the product. Such a device would lessen the
burden on the NI0's, leaving them free to do what
I
they dr`bt, while pacing the responsibility
for production clearly within the chain-of-command.
The disadvantages are that the Steering Group
becomes another layer in the process, and that
it might place inordinate demands on the time of
its membership.
16. Changes in the NI0's the selves. Implicit in a number
of the suggestions above are changes in the character of the NI0
system. Some of these could be made independently of other changes,
howeveb and it seems useful to analyze them separately.
-- A suggestion has been made simply
to abolish the system. .Sentiment through-
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out the Community, however, is over-
whelmingly in favor of its retention in
some form, and there seems little need. to
discuss this further.
-- A more realistic idea, and one
that is built into some of the suggestions
for production management, is that of re-
lieving the NI0's of this management func-
tion. As noted earlier, this would give
the NIO's more time for their staff re-
sponsibilities to the DCI and their con-'
suer and Community liaison functions.
It would relieve the pressure to provide
them more staff and might make-it possible
to reduce their number. Most important, it
-- It has been pointed out that some
NIO's are much busier than others, that some
have broad Community responsibilities while
others are more narrowly focused and have
would resclve the conflict between them
and the line production managers. Or. the
other hand, it would vitiate the original
concept of the NI0's, and might weaken the
ability to serve the DCI.
few Community resources to support them.
This raises the possibility that-some NIO's
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should be full-time and others not. Coupled
with this is the thought that some generalists
might then be added-to the NIO group. Part-
time NI0's would combine their NIO responsi-
bilities with management of appropriate pro-
duction elements. In practice, however, these
would have to be CIA officers, and the Community
aspect of the NIO's would be correspondingly
weakened.
-- Finally, it would be possible to go
one step further and wake all the.NlO's heads
of corresponding oduction organizations If
these organizations are those of CIA, this
suggestion amounts to abolition of the system
and return to the concept of CIA as the DCI's
coordinating Staff. If they are those of the
Office of National Intelligence proposed above,
the Community aspect is retained, but NIO's who
are organization managers will have little time
for their staff or liaison roles. _
Some Possible Approaches
f
P
J7. On the basis of this analysis, it is now possible to
assemble the parts into models of working systems. We have developed
five such models, ranging from something resembling the present NIO
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It would establish a better balance a NIA t ti
mo
authority. "IV 0' 41r,
20. Model II addresses itself specifically to this problem.
The NI0's would be relieved of any responsibility for production
would not however d
go-
, o anything about the key problem of divided
I
ng responsfbl lIties. It
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emphasize the production of National Estimates. A separate. set
system to. a rather radical change in the way the Community does
business. These models are illustrative only; features of one could,
in many cases, be adapted to another. For simplicity, the diagrams
shows how current intelligence would be produced.
18. Model I is the present system with minor modifications.
A external review process would be added either by requiring a
collegial review of estimates by several NIO's or by the formation
and South Asia, and one for Africa and Latin America. Each of the
three might be provided an additional assistant and the generalists
of ad hoc review panels. Three positions for generalists recruited
externally might be created by e.imination of the NI0's for Special
Project (however useful, is this an NIO function?) and for Economics .
(duplicates D/OER) and a consolidation of five assignments to pro-
'
vide one NIO for East Asia (i
di
l
nc
u
ng Southeast), one for Near East , P
an assistant apiece without increasing the size of the NIO organi-
zation.
19. Model I would require little disruption of present
activities. It would meet some of the felt weaknesses of the NIO.
system, especially in regard to external review and broad projection. 1
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N. k
I
management. (s responsibility would be placed in a sub-committee
of NFIB consisting of CIA/DDI, Chairman, and corresponding DIA and
INR members. All requests for inter-agency oroductign would be
_ ddres oup, and it would decide whether the
=task was to be undertaken, by whom it was to be drafted, and how it
was to be managed and coordinated. Terms of reference would be
worked out in consultation with the appropriate-NlO. Thus line
managers would again become fully responsible for their product.
At the same time the valuable staff and liaison services performed
by the NIO's would continue. The present "production committees"
of USIB would report to the Steering Group.
21. Under this arrangement the NIO's might be reorganized
as in Model I, but with a reduced supporting staff. Their total
number might be reduced by further consolidation or by a system
under which only those with major Community coordinating roles
trat P
egic rograms, Conventional Forces, USSR, China, Middle East)
would be full-time. CIA officers in appropriate substantive line
l~.
positions would assume the duties of the others.
22. Model II meets most criticisms of the present system
and provides the means for a significantly better product. It
F4?T-+Rc-S V/1
preserves the best f. r or of the NIO system, notably a substantive V
staff directly under the DCI to monitor the full range of Community
activities. Its major disadvantage would appear to be uncertainty
as to whether the RIO-Steering Group-producing element linkages I '
would work efficiently.
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23. el III is the simplest and moss, efficient of those 5L to
presented. It would attach to the DCI an advisory Board (of NIO's "
of .aer, ner l4sts, of a combination), but return to CIA the produc jbn
mean that CIA would be preparing them. The DCI would have to be 7 A.t
management and coordinating function. 24. As compared with Model II, Model III would provide
roughly the same degree of review.- The "Board" could be consti-
tuted in any of the ways suggested. The NIO's could be retained
and could do everything they now do except produ_c_tton maow. n~nt.
The change would place the basic responsibility for drafting with
those elements dedicated exclusively to national intelligence.
This would in general produce better drafts, but it would also
willing to defend the concept that CIA is his staff if he wants to
take this route.
25. Model IV is the Board/Staff of National Estimates as it
of Current Intelligence would be used as the framework for an Office
of National Intelligence answering to the DCI. Such an office,
Jointly managed and manned by CIA, DIA, and INR, would be responsible
used to operate. The Senate Select Committee apparently wants a
return to this structure. It would be very difficult to do so,
especially after analysts throughout the Community have been more
deeply involved in production. The consensus is that there are
advantages to a collegial board but that the staff has been over-
taken by the ;.iaturing of line analysts. This solution, as noted
above, no longer is a valid one.
26. Model V is the radical solution. In it CIA's Office
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for the full ige of intelligence production ror policy support,
from the most current intelligence to national estimates. It
would be organized regionally, with the bulk of its analysts
political, but each regional division would have strong. economic
and military. staffs. These would in turn draw on the research
elements of DIA, CIA and INR. The latter would no longer deal
with current support matters, and the new office would be solely
responsible, not only to the DCI, but also to the Secretaries of
State and Defense.
27. 'A generalist Board of Review might well continue ad-
visory to the DCI, but under thosconcept the NIO's would become
the line officers responsible for production in their areas of
interest, e.g., the Chief, Western Hemisphere, of the Office of
National Intelligence would also be the NIO for the Western Hemis-
phere.
28. Model y would be a real departure in the direction of
Congress' original intent in 1947. It, in effect, reinvents CIA.
It would also be extremely difficult to administer well. In par-
ticular, joint manning could be a problem. The core would have to
be CIA, but neither DIA nor State would readily come forward with
personnel of comparable quality. If they did not, and if the
organization could not be managed as a cooperative enterprise, then
the DC9 would have given up effective CIA mechanisms for even more
cumbersome Community coordination.
29. On the other hand, Model V would provide a single source
for intelligence in support of national policy. Thus the same
analysts, using the same sources, would be producing current Intel-
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l
ligence, natic. .1 estimates, and all the forms in between. This
would provide a greater coherence to national reporting. Model V
would provide the maximum centralization of the production functl6
under the DCI. It also would have the disadvantages of Model IV
in spades: potential elitism, isolation of analysts from drafters,
and drafters from hard facts; NIO's limited in their cross-functional
roles.
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h
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.OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN Tab A UO
3 October 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS
SUBJECT- : National Intelligence Officers
1. Effective 1 October 1973, Mr. George A. Carver, Jr. is
appointed Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National'
Intelligence Officers (1)/DCI/NIO).. National Intelligence Officers
will be appointed by the DCI for such geographical areas or func-
tional subjects as the DCI may deem necessary from time to time.
Each National Intelligence Officer will be the Director's personal -
representative and will report directly to t'ie DCI on 'iis area of
responsibility. Any tasking the NIOs levy on other elements of the
Intelligence Con tunity:wiU be subject to the DCI's approval and will
pass through the normal command channels of USIB member agencies.
It is my hope, however, that the NIOs will maintain extensive informal.
direct contacts with the elements of USIB member agencies and others
in the official and private sectors cognizant of the NIO's area of respon-
sibility.
2. The primary function of an NIO will be to provide contact
laterally on his subject across the functionally organized Intelligence
Community and with customers and outside consultants as required-
Each NIO will be responsible to the Director for providing Intelligence
Cornrnunity coot inated products (using such panels of experts or
ad hoc committees and arranging USIB consideration as may be needed)
to satisfy requirements for NIEs, NSSM responses, DCI briefings,
etc. Each NIO will assist the Director in identifying customer -needs
for National Intelligence, evaluations of product and program effective-
ness, uncertainties requiring collection guidance, analysis or production,
Exempt from general declassification
schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption =
category 5B (2). Automatically
declassified on: date impossible to
determine.
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aril national policy problems on which national Intelligence might
offer assistance. Each NIO will maintain close personal contact with
the NSC Staff and other principal intelligence consumers and contri-
butor s at-the department level. Every NIO will be charged with
presen~ir_o for the Director's review fully objective presentations of
i
ons.
alternate views and interpretat
. 3. The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the
National Intelligence Officers (D/DCI/NIO) is assigned administrative
meetings
and coordinating authority over the NIOs and will chair schedules,
of of. the MOs for discussion of production standards,
quality control, and product review.
4. The MOs will replace the present Board and Office of National .
Estimates, the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, and other
units as appropriate..
- r ?s? E'T f r, W T T A Teo
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