THIRD WORLD HUNGER RELIEF STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 10, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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/ , ? uintea tate vepartment or ztate
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UNCLASSIFIED
With 1=3,7*ZSQZ.Attachment
'Interagency Group No. 45
NSC
Agriculture
AID
--Commerce
Defense
OMB
OPD
Peace Corps
Transportation
Treasury.
USIA
USTR
IMshington, D.C. 20520
May 10, 1984
!Y 1O P946
Mr. Donald P. Gregg
- Mr. Robert Kimnitt
- Mr. Raymond Lett
- Mr. Malcolm Butler
A Mr. William Viskanen
- Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
- Ms. Helen Robbins
- COL John Stanford
- Mr. Alton Keel
Mr. John Svahn
- Mr. Lon Randall
- Mr. Logan H. Sallada
- Mr. Christopher Hicks
- Ms. Teresa Collins
- Mr. Dennis Whitfield
Executve Ragistry
84- 7E2777--7
SUBJECT.,: Third World Hunger Relief Study
Attached is a memorandum-froth Ambassador Robert
Keating, Chairman of the Steering Group for the Third
World Hunger Study. The memorandum announces the next
meeting of the Steering Group and encloses recommendations
for improving U.S. response to emergency hunger problems.
cc,
Charles Fill
Executive Secretary
?Attachments:
As stated.
UNCLASSIFIED
With-nritR-g- Attachment
L-11 8
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?
?
.N
101shington, D.C. 20520
?
SECRET 'With ?Attachments)
MEMORANDUM
TO
FROM
SUBJECT
May 8, 1984
Sibering Group, Third World-Hunger-Study.
Robert B. Keating, Chairman
Recommendations for for Emergency Hunger Problems
The. next meeting of the Steering Group will be held in
Room 208, Old Executive Office 'Building on Tuesday,
May 15, 1984 from 10100 a.m. to 12:00 noon.
Attached for Steering Groupapproval are our specific
recommendations for improving U.S. response to emergency
hunger .problems. They have been summarized in one or two
pages and have been reviewed by our Composite Working .Group.
If you are unable to attend the May 15 meeting, please notify
my office at 632-4040 by close of business Friday, May 11.
Since space is at a premium, we ask that Steering Group
members and Working Group chairmen only attend the meeting.
Attachment:
Distribution:
As stated
'steering Group Members
Working Group chairmen
? SECRET
DECL: OADR
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F..xece.
_
Robert B. n-.eating
Malcolm Butler
Richard Levine
Robert Bostick
Donald F. Hart
Alexanaer F. Holser
Members
NSSD 1-84 Steering Group
Chairman
Room 3335, Department of Sta
Washington 20320
p_e_puty Chairman
NSC Coordinator
National Security Council
Washington, D. C. 20506
NSC Assistant Coordinator
State Department Consultant
rnterior Department Consultant
632-4040
632-1800
395-7351
632-4041
632-0702
632-4042
Daniel Amstutz Under Secretary for International 447-3111
Affairs and Commodity Programs
Department o:E_Agriculture
Roo la Mminisratinn -H-ildnq
14th & Jefferson,
Washington DC 20250
David Smit-n Acting Director, Office of Research 485-2965
United States Information Agency
Room 352
301 4th Street SW
Washington 20547
Julia Chang Bloch Assistant Administrator for Food for 235-1800
Peace and Voluntary Assistance,
Agency for International Develop-
ment
Washington, D. C. 20523
Peter A. C7llman Acting Dee:)uty Assistant Secretary 377-2175
for AErLea, the Neal and
Southeast Asia
Department of Commerce
Washington, D. C. 20230
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Bill Eckert
S:ele Farrar
George Hoguet
Burleigh Leonard
David Cohen
Richard McCormack
Lon Randall
Matthew Scocozza
David Shilling
UNCLASSIFIED
NSSD 1-84 Steering Group (cont'd)
Office of the Vice-President
Room 294
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20501
Chief, Economic Affairs Branch
International Affairs Division
Office of .Manaaement and Budget
Washington, D. C. 20301
395-4223
395-4944
Deputy Assistant Secretary for 566-9756
International Affairs
Department of the Treasurz
Room 3221 Main Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220
Office of Policy Development
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20500
Deputy Director of Global Issues
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 3G00 Healquarter3
Washington, D. C. 20505
Assistant Secretary for Economic
and Business Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
456-2273
351-7113
632-0396
Assistant Director for Inter- 254-3294
national Operations
Peace Corps
806 Connecticut Ave NW, Room 801
Washington 20526
Assistant Secretary for Policy
and International Affairs
Department of Transportation
Washington, D. C. 20590
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Policy Analysis
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C., 20301
Page 2 of 3
426-4544
697-1802
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Paul B. Simmons
UNCLASSIFIED
NSSD 1-84 Steering Group (cont'd)
:Special Assistant to the president 456."2884
for Policy Development
',Office of Policy Development
Room 213- Old-Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20500
Robert
Pred Wetter ing
Senior Staff Economist
Council of Economic Advisors
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20500
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20506
Im????
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United States Department of State
shingthrt, D.C. 20520
May 9, 1984
MEMORAN-Z.V4 FOR THE STEERING GROUP OF THE THIRD HUNGER STUDY
SECRET
? . .
? 'Three months ago, President Reagan asked that we
? examine the.problems ?of hunger and starvation in the Third
Worlde and thee"5. *response to them. The President was
particularly concerned about starvation in poor countries
Suffering from drought or other natural disasters, although
-ehe asked that we review-non-emergency food problems as well.
This is the first time that we have looked at Third World
'food problems from this perspective.
This memorandum reports on the first part of our
work, acute food ?crisis situ.ations where emergency food aid? ?
can prevent starvation. We have analyzed our emergency food
'aid processes from beginning to end, reviewing the adequacy
of USG operations and _mechanisms, the extent of distribution
constraints., the quality of food supply and demand data, and
the degree to which we have received in cooperation
our ?re1 f rflorts.
Our findings reveal that starvation continues to be a
real threat to rural populations in the poorest countries
of the Third 'World. It is especially acute in sub-Saharan
Afca where niltions live in-absolute poverty. The United
t-stretponse to Third'Agorld hunger has always been
generous--unrivaled in the world. For example, the Reagan
Admnistration doubled emergency food aid over fiscal years
1982 to 1984 to $343 million. This year we are providing
663,000 metric tons of emergency food aid, amounting to 45
percent ?of all donor financing. Almost 60 percent -of our
emergency food aid is going to 24 sub-Saharan African,
countries hard hit by a drought that this time affects not
only the vast Sahelian area in the north, but also the
usually fertile savannah and livestock plains as far as the
southern African veldt.
Generally:, Congressional support for regular appropria-
? tions for 1)1. 480 programs (supplemental funds to meet
extraordinary ?emergency needs) is excellent. This is a
reflection of our humanitarian concerns, and the existence of
U.S fm'Ism ? surpluses and the 'many interests served by the
PL 480 program. Bowever, the time required to obtain approval
of additional funds to meet emergency needs is regarded as
unacceptably long in view of the human suffering associated
with delays in food shipments.
? SECRET
DECL: OARD
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SECRET
. The most demanding task of emergency food relief
programs begins at the port of entry in. the Third World.
There the effort- to distribute foodstuffs inland to remote
areas- can be very difficult, and sometimes impossible in
countries -where :military violence either disrupts or prevents
access to hungry people. In combination with badly rutted
or noneexiStent roads, and beaten-up trucks, the job of food
delivery is indeed expensive, time-consuming, and dangerous.
Thefield workers of the private voluntary organizations and
other international programs who have long been in, the
vanguard in carrying out this responsibility are to be
commended for -4eir valiant efforts.
'Unfortunately, poor countries suffering from. food
-shortage 'emergencies have been increasingly unable to share
the burden of the internal distribution costs of free food.
They were once able to meet the extra expense (both local
currency and foreign exchange), but their Worsening- balance,
of payments positions increasingly compel them to turn to
donors and international organizations to.pay these costs.
Asea consequence, the financing of the complete emergency
food aid delivery system, from farmer to port of entry to
hungry people, is likely to fall on donors if more lives are
to be saved.'
The timely provision and accuracy of food supply and
demand data are other areas of concern. Various studies
suggest that the margin of safety for coping with sudden
drops in local food production is shrinking in many Third
World countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. They
are prone to acute food crises because of irrational govern-
ment policies which have caused a structural deterioration
of their agricultural sectors and a severe decline in food
production. While we expect an increase in emergency food
requests over the next five years, we are not entirely
comfortable with the analytical models now used to estimate
demand.
In carrying out emergency food aid programs, cooperation
from other donor countries and international organizations
can increase the effectiveness of our bilateral assistance
and lead to a greater total food aid effort. The United
States contributes 25 percent of the resources for the FAO
and WFP, but with regard to the FAO we are dissatisfied with
its leadership-and management. Moreover, FAO interpretations
of emergency food requirements often do not square with
? those of major donors. Our, own expectations with regard to
other donor governments and international food organizations
have not been entirely cleat; an uncertainty that constrains
us in seeking improvements in international emergency food
aid cooperation and coordination.
SECRET
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A final area where improvement is needed concerns
cooperation between the public and private sectors on Third
World hunger problems. In spite of the United States'
tremendous food aid efforts over the past three decades, the
general public is still largely unaware of what we have done
and are doing. The media have tended to focus, perhaps
disproportionately,' on the severity of the hunger problem
rather than on the many positive actions the Administration
has taken to meet the challenge. In addition, the potential
of the business community to provide government decision-
makers with unique regional perspectives and expertise for
Third World hunger problems has gone mostly untapped.
Our findings suggest that if we are to reduce loss
of life caused by acute food crises, we must 1) respond
more rapidly; 2) deliver food more effectively; 3) improve
food data analysis; 4) cooperate more closely with the
private sectors, and 5) seek improvements in international
cooperation and coordination. We have made ten specific
recommendations to reach these objectives.
We have also considered the budgetary implications of
our recommendations (attached), proposing small budget
increases only in cases where, in our judgement, additional
funding (provided in a timely and flexible way) could break
critical bottlenecks and help maintain the integrity of our
emergency food aid programs. Amended legislation would be
necessary for three of our recommendations.
We are continuing to* work on the second part of our
report, the non-emergency food problems, and will shortly
submit recommendations to the Steering Group.
I look forward to your participation at the Steering
Group meeting on May 15.
Attachments: As stated
1,t-C
Ambassador Robert B. eating
Chairman, Third World Ringer Study
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PART I
How can we..imorove our resoonse to emer_gency hunger problems?
RECOMMENDATIONS_
(more rapid response)
?o Special Presidential fund to permit timely response to acute food
crises in the Third World
o Prepositioning of P14480 Title II food in selected Third World
regions or immediate use in initial stages of acute food crises
(more effective delivery)
o Pay in-country distribution costs of emergency food for poorest
Third World countries from 2L480 Title II ocean transportation
account
et Amortize ocean freight charges for PL480 Title I food shipments for
certain Third World countries encountering increasingly severe
balance of payment difficulties because of acute food emergencies
(more effective research and analysis)
o Improve forecasting of Third World emergency food needs through
further development of USDA and OFDA analytical Models
o Inter-agency research working group to develop better Third World
food data and analyses
(more effective U.S. public and private-sector cooperation)
o White House-directed public relations program to increase public
awareness of Administration efforts to meet Third World food needs
.o Regionally-organized advisory groups chaired by business leaders to
increase private sector involvement in Third World food problems
(more effective international cooperation)
o Clarify what U.S. seeks from other donors and international food
organizations in responding to Third World food emergencies
o Subsequently, a high-level donors meeting to discuss U.S.
recommendations for improving international cooperation and coordi-
nation
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more rapid response) #1
RECOMMENDATION: Special 'Presidential fund to permit timely response
to acute food crises in the Third World ?
Policy considerations:
o Normal response time for emergency food requests is three to six
months frpm receipt of request to actual delivery in the field.
o Further delays of up to three months can occur when the dimensions
Of a major food crksis exceed PL480 Title II emergency reserve
funds obliging AID to submit a request for a supplemental
appropriation.
O In acute food crises, these response times in providing relief
call into question our emergency food aid policies.
Rationale for recommendation:
A special Presidential fund, based on a $50 million, no?year
appropriation, would serve the President in expediting emergency
relief measures for acute Third World food crises where lack of
rapid action would endanger many lives. The special fund would be
used only in circumstances where PL480 Title II emekgency reserve
funds are insufficient for the acute hunger crises, and where
supplemental appropriations cannot be made in time to meet urgent
needs. It would finance commodities,'transportation t and
distribution costs of emergency food donations. We do not expect
that the fund would require replenishment every year.
Pro:
o The special Presidential fund would underscore the President's
personal concern about Third World hunger and starvation.
o Its use would halve the time required to respond to acute food
crises and thus help save many lives.
o Its use would motivate government agencies to accelerate
emergency relief procedures.
o Its use would reduce the need to disrupt And divert food
shipments from regular PL480 Title II programs for acute food
crises.
Con:
4, Despite the special Presidential fund, Congress will still be
under pressure to appropriate an increased PL480 Title II
emergency reserve on the order of the 1984 Title II emergency
supplemental of $150 million.
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(more rapid response) #2
RECOMMENDATION: Prepositioning of PL480 Title II grain in selected
Third World regions for immediate use in the initial
stages of an acute food crisis
Policy consideration:
It takes too long to deliver PL480 Title II emergency food to
acute crfsis areas -- three to six months.
Rationale for Recommendation:
In order to respond more quickly to an urgent food emergency and
yet offer effective assistance at reasonable cost, it is recommended
that P14480 Title II grain be stored in Third World regions
vulnerable to food emergencies. Under U.S. ownership and control,
these prepositioned grain stocks would be drawn down only in the
event of an acute food emergency. The grain would be available for
emergency response in a wide area, not only to the people of the
country where the grain is stored. This quick-response capability
could be in place by the end of the year.
Initially, four grain storage sites would be considered in
western, southwestern, eastern and southeastern Sub-Saharan Africa.
Each site would contain about 15,000 metric tons of grain stored in
a woven, nylon-fabric container. The total cost of containers for
prepositioning about 60,000 metric tons of grain would be
approximately $2 million. The initial grain stocks would be funded
within Title II FY 84-85 expected appropriations. As these stocks
are drawn down, they would be replenished using Title II emergency
reserve funds.
In view of the likelihood that 1985 may be another disastrous
year of drought in sub-Saharan Africa, this prepositioning approach
is deemed prudent and cost-effective. Having 60,000 tons of grain
'strategically located in sub-Saharan Africa (representing perhaps 10
to '20 percent of likely FY85 U.S. emergency food shipments to the
region) would allow us to act expeditiously when an acute food
crisis is in its initial stage, rather than later when the famine
situation has taken hold.
Pro:
e Prepositioning of grain would permit immediate response to an
urgent food emergency as compared to 3 to 6 months delivery
times for U.S. emergency food shipments.
o It would dramatize and underscore U.S. concern for the hungry
and starving peoples of the Third World, and our intent to
reduce their suffering as quickly as possible.
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.141,0 ameft Nor I"1 5ssee 0
-1) Security woad b. better in U,,S.-controlled, sealed grain
storage containers than in rented commercial facilities used for
current emerTencv food''programs.
? e It would-encourage ?greater regional cooperation and coordination
for food emergencies.
o The four sites in sub-Saharan Africa could serve as protypes for
tiosstble instalZation of similar low-cost/high-benefit
facil'Ities in other Third World regions.
-Con:
The_prepositioning of grain stocks in a country may subject the
U.S. to pressures from the host government to draw down grain
for purposes other than urgent food emergencies.
o Making the grain stocks available to neighboring countries for
urgent food emergencies could in certain circumstances create
problems with the host government.
* The sealed grain ?storage containers may be difficult to protect
in the event of severe civil disorders.
o This approach may be viewed as a first step toward a buffer food
security scheme.
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(more effective delivery) #3
RECOMME "TION: Pay in -country distribution costs of emergency food
for poorest Third World countries from PL480 Title II
ocean transportation account
Policy considerations:
e The poorest Third World countries often lack foreign exchange for
the fuel, spare parts, replacements and tires to support their
delivery of food in-country. Also lacking is local currency to pay
for inland transportation, storageland distribution of emergency
food to the people, who need it most in the rural areas.
* For lack of a better way to deal with local costs of distribution,
the U.S. is now agreeing to ?the sale in urban markets (i.e., to
people with means) of most of our emergency food aid donations to
sub-Saharan African countries.
Rationale for Recommendation:
The key to effective emergency food aid is timely delivery and
distribution to the most destitute populations, usually far from
urban areas and living outside the market economy. Problems of
storage and delivery loom largest between the ports of discharge and
the ultimate destinations upcountry. It sometimes costs as much as
the landed value of the donated emergency food to move it to the
point of use.
Given these circumstances, the Administration should ask Congress
to amend PL480 Section 203 to permit U.S. payment of inland
transportation and distribution costs of emergency food aid provided
to the poorest Third World countries. This nev authority would be
implemented sparingly, only in the most severe cases and then for
partial payment of these costs.
Pro:
?o The new authority would makeour emergency food aid far more
effective in some of the poorest Third World countries.
* It would reduce excessive recourse to selling emergency food
which does not then reach starving people.
? It would make Private Voluntary Organizations CPV0z) far mace
willing to undertake certain emergency distribution programs.
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Con:
The ?new authority 'would have little appeal to U.S. producer,
processor and shipper interests as they compete for limited
Title II funds.
4, It would imply either higher Title II budget requests or a
squeeze on funds appropriated for commodities and international
freight.
e It would be difficult to control and monitor these expenditures
in the field.
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(more effective delivery) #4
RECOMMENDATION: Amortize ocean freight Charges for PL480 Title I
- food shipments for certain Third World countries
encountering increasingly severe balance of payment
difficulties because of acute food emergencies.
Policy considerations:
o Many Third World countries utilize Title I concessional food aid to
keep urban markets supplied with food. Some countries find
themselves strapped for up-front foreign exchange to pay the ocean
? freight charges ofiPL480 Title I concessional shipments (as our law
requireS), especially at times when they are also dealing with
acute food emergencies brought on by drought and other disasters.
o Sometimes we are unable to provide a food program because of the
recipient's lack of foreign exchange. At other times, we get
around this problem by shifting countries that cannot pay ocean
freight costs to PL 480 Title II programs because our law allows us
to pay Title II freight charges.
Rationale for recommendation:
Amortizing the international freight charges of PL480 Title I
food would make it possible to finance ocean freight in instances
where we-have been unable to provide a food program in countries that
cannot afford ocean freight, or where we have been forced to use
PL480 Title Il because of lack of foreign exchange.
Given these circumstances, the Administration should request
Congress to authorize PL480 Title I long-term eoncessional credit for
ocean freight, in addition to commodities.
Pro:
?o The new authority would help rationalize the PL480 program by
providing food-for-sale primarily through Title I, and
food-for-donation through Title II.
e It would free Title II's 500,000 ton emergency reserve for its
intended use of feeding people threatened by starvation.
e It could be funded initially within the t175 million FY84 PL480
Title I appropriation request for FY85, now pending in Congress.
New funding would mot be meeded until FY86.
Con:
o The new authority would result in a PL480 Title I budget increase
to cover freight costs and commodities.
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(More effective research and analysis) #5
RECOMMEN?ATIONS: 1) Improve forecasting of Third World emergency
? food needs through further development of USDA
? and OFDA analytical models
':2) For inter-agency research group to develop
better methodology for estimating Third World
?,e0ergency food needs
Policy considerations:
o Current analyses o Third World emergency food needs are based on
inadequate and incomplete data.
o Third World emergency food needs are defined in different ways by
the U.S. and international food organizations which further
complicate demand and supply estimations.
Rationale for recommendations:
The lack of an adequate data base and agreed-upon methodology for
estimating emergency food requirements have lent uncertainty to
conclusions reached with respect to the magnitudes of Third World
food emergencies. Greater efforts must be made to improve
evaluations of Third World agricultural demand and supply. Further
refinement of the USDA and -OFDA analytical models (in intial stages
of development) should be pursued. Additionally, an inter-agency
Emergency Food Needs Research Working Group should be formed to-
provide guidance on development of a better data base and analytical
techniques. This group could improve our coordination with other
donor governments and international food organizations in the
assessment of Third World emergency food needs.
Pro:
e With an improved data base and methodology for estimating Third
World emergency food needs, the U.S. would enhance its,
capabilities to respond to acute food crises in a timely manner.
e The research working group would facilitate the exchange of
essential information for improving the data base and analytical
techniques.
Con:
?e U.S. taking the lead in improving the data base and methodology
for estimating Third World emergency food needs might be viewed
unfavorably by FAO.
rar rt
L. 2:: ?
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(more effective a.S. public and private sector cooperation) #6
RECOMMENDATION: White House-directed public relations program to
increase public awareness of Administration efforts
to meet Third World food needs
Policy considerations:
* Private citizens have heard through the media about the current
acute food emergencies in the Third World. They are concerned
- about the Administration's response.
e The public, perception is that more could, be done easily and without
cost with our agricultural surpluses to meet Third World hunger
needs.:
Rationale for recommendation:
The general public is largely unaware of the following facts:
--the United States provides more total food aid to the Third
world than all other donors combined (nearly 60% of total donor
contributiOns);
--the Reagan Administration has doubled total emergency food aid
over fiscal years 1982 to 1984 to $343 million. This year, the
majority of our emergency food shipments is concentrated in sub-
Saharan Africa (this includes a $90 million supplemental
approved in March of this year for sub-Saharan Africa, and a
t60 million supplemental that is pending).
These and other facts concerning U.S. emergency food aid to the
Third World are not well known to the general public. What is needed
is a White House-directed public relations program that will increase
public awareness of and support for the Administration's efforts to
meet Third World food needs; a program that should be started
immediately.
Pro:
o A public relations program on the Administration's response to
Third World hunger and starvation would address the public
concern that the United States be caring and responsive to Third
World hunger needs.
o It would encourageprivate citizens- to support the Administration
in its emergency and non-emergency food aid programs.
e It would build greater public understanding of the fundamental
causes of food shortages in the Third World, the costs and
constraints in meeting food emergencies, and what can be done
over the long-run to overcome hunger and starvation.
Ar-t
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-TOn:
?o A public.:relations prograp. eo ld result in public pressures to
increase.U.S. food assistance levels beyond realistic budget
limits, and the absorptive capacity of recipient countries.
may revive criticism of Administration on domestic hunger
question.
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L.
(more effective U.r..; public and private sector cooperation) t7
RECOMMENDATION: Regionally-organized advisory groups chaired by
business leaders to increase private sector
involvement in Third World food problems
Policy considerations:
? The perspective and regional interests of U.S. business leaders
represent 'a largely untapped resource in dealing with Third World
food aid problems.
o Private volunteer organizations tPVO) are brought into the decision-
making process through a formal AID advisory mechanism. The broad
business community, however, is only brought in on an ad hoc basis.
Rationale for recommendation:
The considerable expertise of the business community which might be
brought to bear on Third World food problems is largely untapped
because of the lack of an adequate mechanism for presenting its views
to the Administration. AID, through its Advisory Committee on
Voluntary Foreign Aid, effectively involves the PV0s on an on-going
basis in its food aid programs. From time to time, this committee
calls upon certain segments of the broader business community, but
there exists no channel for continuous high-level input. Bringing the
perspective and interests of members of the broader business community
into our process on a regional basis could improve the effectiveness.of
our foreign food aid programs. The regional approach would spare the
members from a committment to frequent Washington meetings and would
take into account our regional strengths. For example, the mid-western
group is especially well-suited to contribute to our understanding of
international commodity and production issues, the eastern group to
advise on export financing issues, the southern region to comment on
transportation and shipping, and the western region to bring a
particular orientation toward Asia.
Pro:
? o Regional advisory groups could provide an opportunity for a larger
cross-section of influential U.S. business interests to exchange
views on foreign food aid policy matters directly to the Executive
Branch.
imo They would enable local businessmen to gain visibility and prestige
associated with playing a direct role in helping the Administration
on Third World hunger problems.
40-?:* r*. rr
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0 They may provide new, innovative ideas on how the private secLo
? might better participate in and help solve some of the Third
World hunger.
Con:
0 Regional advisory groups can further complicate the existing
foreign food aid policy-making process.
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- ? It7:31:?.. /C,?
. (more effective international cooperation) #8
RECOMMENDATIONS: l) Clarify what the U.S. seeks from other donor
governments and international food organizations
in responding to international food emergencies
2) Subsequently, a high-level donors meeting to
?discuss U.S. recommendations for improving inter-
'hational cooperation and coordination
Policx considerations:
o Problems of international emergency food cooperation and coordination
are numerous. Because they arise in many forms and at many levels,
they do not lend themselves to a single, specific solution.
41 FAO data on emergency food requirements often do not square with the
appraisals of major donors. Moreover, the FAO allocates its own
emergency food aid without prior consultation with other donors.
o While significant progress has been made over the past decade, our
objective of examining food aid burden sharing by other donor
governments has not been fulfilled. Exchanges of information among
donors on emergency food commitments and shipments are incomplete.
o The degree of in-country coordination among donors and international
food organizations varies considerably, and depends heavily on the
calibre of the representatives of the international food organi-
zations.
Rationale for recommendations:
In order to achieve an effective and efficient global response to
Third World food emergencies, the U.S. must take the initiative to
define the specific improvements needed and desired from the community
of donor governments and international food organizations.
The intensified efforts we are making to meet current food
emergencies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, could position the
U.S. to propose a high-level donors meeting in the fall at which we
should be prepared to seek specific improvements to the system and
examine burden Sharing.
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Attachment
..-
Eptimated costs of emergency response recommendations
Recommendations:
Budget Impact (Est)
(5 in millions)
1984 1985 1986-1988
o Special Presidential Fund
50
50
63
o Prepositioning Title II food
24
22
12
o Pay in-country food distribution
cost for some Title II program
o Amortize Title I ocean freight
costs for some programs
80*
50**
320*
150**
74
202
545
New budget authority
110,
330*
All other recommendations should be financed from on-going agency
programs.
*Represents the U.S. contribution toward estimated in-country
distribution costs, recipients will finance the balance.
**Repayments that begin 3 to 4 years after delivery will finance
additional grain exports and reduce budget costs.
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