EVOLUTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF 1960-1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP03B01495R000100250001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1980
• Content Type: MISC

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Evolution of the Intelligence Community Staff
1960-1980
A significant early step in the evolution of a coherent National Foreign
Intelligence Community occurred in 1961 when President EiseDhower, by Executive
Order, institutionalized the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB)' and formally
established the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). Refinement
of the USIB concept--that it be chaired by the DCI--was formalized by President
Kennedy on 16 January 1962 by memorandum to DCI McCone, the same year in which
NSA became a USIB member. This instruction also directed Mr. McCone to
delegate the day-to-day operations of CIA to his deputy, who would also become
the CIA representative to the USIB, so that the DCI could devote more of his
time to Community matters.
? As successive steps were taken toward a Community which would more fully
integrate National Foreign Intelligence activities, the DCI became aware of a
growing need for a supporting staff which would focus exclusively on Community
concerns. In 1963, Director McCone created a National Intelligence Programs
Evaluation (NIPE) Staff for this purpose and placed it under his Deputy for
Coordination.
On 4 March 1964, the NSC revised its first formal intelligence directive,
NSCID No. 1, to assign the DCI (then Admiral Raborn) primary responsibility for
guiding the total U.S. intelligence effort.2 Three years later, under the
leadership of DCI Richard Helms, the Intelligence Community may be said to have
reached figurative maturity--21 years since Congress first enuciated the
principle of a Director Central Intelligence.
On 20_January 1969 John Bross, then Director of the NIPE Staff, submitted
a comprehensive report to the DCI on the organization of the CIA and the
Intelligence Community which set the stage for Community development in the
1970's.
2
The DCI's Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) was created in 1947 to
coordinate intelligence requirements among Departments. Chaired by the
DCI, it included representatives from State, Army, Navy, Air Force, JCS,
the Atomic Energy Commission, and others the DCI might invite.
NSCID No. I was first issued on 12 December 1947. It established the
duties and responsibilities of the DCI and prescribed the relationship
between the CIA and the intelligence organizations concerning which the
IAC (see footnote I) advised him.
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Focusing on the Community, the report addressed the Community's relationship to
the DCI's coordinating responsibility under three headings:
? Coordination of the production and dissemination of substantive
intelligence;
? Machinery for allocating jurisdictional responsibility among
Community components; and
? Guidance and coordination for allocation and use of resources.
While Bross said little on the subject of allocating tasks among Community
components, except to note that the National Security Council was the
allocating authority, he focused on resource management, noting the DCI's
primary responsibility for resource management was to ensure that resources
used in the overall U.S. intelligence effort produced intelligence which
responded, insofar as possible, to the real needs of policymakers. Given a
variety of expensive and sophisticated technical collection options, and the
ability to collect enormous amounts of data--some of which was redundant or of
marginal interest--and limited numbers of operating dollars, Bross saw as
primary questions: How would the DCI determine how much information was
enough, and how would he know whether sufficient effort was being applied
against the most essential intelligence targets.
These questions remained unanswered despite the efforts of the National
Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB) which had been created to establish bases
for independent judgments by the DCI concerning the need for individual
activities or programs3. Not designed for routine program review, the NIRB
advised the DCI on collection programs in light of cost, alternative methods
and gaps in collection coverage of critical areas and possible risks to
national security. The Board was authorized to draw on all Community
components to assist in its assessments. Like the USIB, it was another forum
for management by negotiation in the absence of DCI directive authority
commensurate with the responsibilities which he was assigned. The NIRB drew on
the NIPE Staff and USIB committees for program review and staffing.
In commenting on the DCI's ability to carry out these tasks the DCI's
Deputy for Coordination and the NIPE Staff--then numbering about a dozen
professionals-- pointed out that their lack of authority to deal directly with
either CIA resource elements and other Community components was a serious
tm-odiment.
3 The NIRB was established by Director Helms in 1968. His de tyl-Agiral 06*
Taylor, was appointed chairman. Other members r representatives
from the Departments of Defense and State. A and NSAkwere excluded from 1
membership becauseras Program Managers, it was their resources which the
NIRB would consider-for trade-off and adjustment3ttxp a4A 0-(1-61- 2b1
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DCI Helms and his advisors believed that: A Community staff should
support the filRB, maintain the Target Oriented Display (a consolidated
presentation of National Fortign Intelligence Resources showing geotopic focus
and functional composition);" represent the DCI in reviewing Dor) and other
departmental intelligence programs; refine objectives and priorities for the
overall intelligence effort; and develop a long-range planning capability.
There was a recognition that such a staff should maintain a competence in
systems and operations analysis and perform Community liaison functigns,
including support to the President's Foreign Advisory Board (PFIAB).D
In a letter to Director Helms on 1 November 1971,6 President Nixon noted
the urgent need for increased efficiency in the allocation of.resources devoted
to the intelligence effort. The President directed changes designed to enhance
the status of the DCI and to provide him with the support needed to strengthen
his position as leader of the Community. He instructed the DCI to focus his
primary attention on community leadership tasks -- to plan and review all U.S.
foreign intelligence activities, including tactical intelligence, and the
allocation of all U.S. foreign intelligence resources. To implement these
directives, the President mandated a group of specific management actions,
based on a study of tional Foreign Intelligence management needs by the
staffs of the NSC, 0MB FIAB, the President's Science Advisor, and the
Intelligence Communi y i.e..
? An enhanced leadership role for the DCI in planning, reviewing,
coordinating, and evaluating all intelligence programs and
activities, and in the production of national intelligence.
a Establishment of an NSC Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) to give
direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and provide for
a continuing evaluation of intelligence products; and of an NSC Net
Assessment Group to evaluate all intelligence products and to produce
gr..
net assessments. 4v4( ;..14.15c *14,4 ..... staq Ito
i
4
5-
6
The Target Oriented Display is known today as the Consolidated
Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS); it is maintained by the
IC Staff.
President Eisenhower founded the President's Board of Consultants on
Foreign Intelligence Activities in 1956. It was an appointive body
composed of a group of private citizens who advised the President, but had
no authority over the DCI or the Intelligence Community. President
Kennedy renamed the group the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board. It functioned as the PFIAB from 1962 until 4 May 1977, when
President Carter dissolved it.
A following memorandum, dated 5 November 1971, detailed the President's
instructions. It is not cited here because of its restricting security
classification.
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? Establishment of an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC),
chaired by the DCI and including senior members from State, Defense,
OMB, and CIA, to advise the QCI on the preparation of a consolidated
intelligence program budget./
e Retention of the USIB (naming the Deputy DCI vice chairman) to advise
and assist the DCI with respect to production of national
intelligence and establishment of national intelligence requirements
and priorities.
In providing this directive, the President noted that the DCI would
require an increased and restructured staff to allow him to discharge his
augmented responsibilities. Recognizing that these actions would not provide
ultimate solutions, the President stated that he expected additional changes in
the Community, consistent with the attainment of prescribed national
objectives.
Reflecting these broader responsibilities, Director Helms created the
Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) on 1 March 1972 to deal with the Community
aspects of his expanded mission, and named Bronson Tweedy as its Director.
When Dr. Schlesinger became DCI in early 1973, he reorganized the IC Staff to
make it more representative of the entire Community, it having previously been
manned by a preponderance of CIA officers.
Under It. Gen. Lew Allen who succeeded Bronson Tweedy as Director, the IC
Staff reflected the focus of the DCI on his Community management
responsibilities. Organizationally, the IC Staff included:
? A Community Comptroller Group
? A Product Review Group
? A Planning and Evaluation Group1,7
? A Data Support Group
The "Product Review Division" (PRD) had the task of regularly appraising
intelligence articles and studies, "testing them for objectivity, balance and
responsiveness."
Sr
7 The IRAC superseded the NiRB and perpetuated the intent to provide a
Community forum which would address critical intelligence resources matters.
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The CIA's Intelligence Directorate had no formal or independent system for
quality control, depending instead upon its regular review and coordination
process. Most of PRD's attention during the period was directed to the conduct
of community-wide post mortems on particular crises -- for example, the 1973 '
Middle East war, the Cyprus crisis in 1974, the Indian nuclear detonation and
the Mayaguez incident. The Division was involved in changing the daily Central
Intelligence Bulletin from a CIA publication into a community publication (now
called the National Intelligence Bulletin). PRD participated in discussions
leading to the transformation of the old Watch Committee into the DCI's Special
Assistant for Warning, with a Strategic Warning Staff.
PRD was not significantly involved in the development of new analytic
methods, in resource allocation for production elements, or in training or
recruitment issues. Contact with consumers of intelligence products was on an
irregular basis (mostly for post mortems), although PRD was at work, through
other CIA organizations, collecting consumer reactions on particular papers of
concern to the USIB. The Division had no authority to order changes in the
management of production which might affect the quality of the product, rather
it was in the position of making recommendations to the USIB and encouraging
their implementation.
The National Intelligence Officer (Nb) organization,_which was created
about a year later under DCI Colby, replaced the previous office of National
Estimates, and extended the DCI's role and presence throughout the intelligence
production process. Each NIO had a specific area of geographic, or topical,
responsibility. The NIO concept was an answer to the continuing problem of
finding ways to concentrate Community capabilities on substantive problems of
major interest to consumers without incurring the costs and dislocations of
continual reorganization. The NI05, given no line authority over any Community
component, were authorized by the DCI to draw on all Community entities. Their
mission was to view their respective areas of responsibility, and the
Community's total performance, thereto just as the DCI would view them if he
had the full time and expertise to devote to the particular subject area.8
Collaboration of the IC Staff and NIOs under DCI Colby's direction, for
example, led to the development of Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) and an
attempt to eyaluate the Community's performance in addressing/satisfying these
questions.V'The KIQs were the Community's response to a national requirement
for a single system by which NSCIC members could specify their most important
immediate intelligence needs and thereby provide definitive guidance to the DCI
ae to managers of national intelligence programs. The K personnel
ev Jations, KEP, was a joint ICS/NIO attempt to meas and evaluate IC
performance with respect to annually defined KIQs
8
The NIOs replaced the Board of National Estimates (BNE) had been created
in 1950 to provide a forum in which senior experts from outside the
Community might review estimates drafted by CIA's Office of National
Estimates (ONE) Staff. Over time BNE membership was dominated by senior
CIA analysts, creating an insular BNE-ONE relationship and diminishing the
_objectivity which was its charter. Director Colby abolished both the BNE
and ONE and created the NI05.
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Responding to the White House guidance of late 1971, which called for the
DCI to develop and submit a consolidated intelligence program budget (including
tactical intelligence) to OMB, the Community Comptroller Group of the DCI's IC
Staff prepared a National Intelligence Presidential Memorandum (NIPM) as a
start in the direction of disciplined substantive analysis of the National
Intelligence Program.
The process of development of the 1972 NIPM served to underscore the DCI's
coordination problem. Nearly every working-level element in, or related to,
the Intelligence Community became involved at one or more points in the lengthy
process: The IC Staff, the USIB and USIB Committees, State, CIA, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), the IRAC and IRD&C, DIA, NSA, the DDS&T,
the Services, Special Reconnaissance offices, the NSC Staff, the OMB Staff,
Program Managers and most senior officials in State, CIA and Defense. Despite
thousands of hours of review and coordination, the NIPM had virtually no impact
on final budget decisions. From the DCI's viewpoint--tasked as he was to
embrace the responsibility for allocation of intelligence resources--he found
once again that the collegial management mechanisms of the Community were
inadequate. The effort was constricted by Defense policies which limited DCI
staff access to review processes within Defense. (Intelligence Community
elements within DoD were obliged to deal with the IC Staff through the office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), thereby limiting the
organizational interface and freedom of discussion).
In a memorandum to all heads of governmental agencies on 18 April 1973,
President Nixon directed the preparation of major goals and objectives to be
accomplished during the upcoming year for each organization. The Director of
OWB interpreted the directive to pertain to the Intelligence Community as an
entity--not merely CIA--emphasizing that objectives should be clearly of
Presidential significance. As a consequence, Director Colby established as his
Community objective the assurance of authoritative and responsible leadership
for the Community as a whole.
Toward that end, the USIB became more active as an advisory body to the
DCI. The Treasury member of USIB became a regular participant as economic
intelligence requirements increased. The ASD(I) and the Under Secretary of the
Air Force, both of whom had large resource responsibilities for major
intelligence efforts, were invited to particpate at the USIB when matters
affecting their interests were involved. Similarly, on other occasions, the
Di.v.intor of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Director of Defense
Re.. arch and Engineering were to devOop active relations with USIB.
Cooperation at the USIB was apparent and important. It permitted open
treatment of consumer requirements and constructive discourse on the
implications of resource constraints. It also elicited important substantive
and procedural commentary on such matters as the KIOs, structural adjustments
to improve the family of intelligence products, and the means to improve what
was .beginning to be called the intelligence "nervous system," information
handling for crisis management.
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(-1; )
Also that yearNthe Intelligence Community Staff, under the leadership of
Lt.Gen Dan Graham, USA, later replaced by Lt.Gen Sam Wilson, USA, focused on
the need to develop resource packages showing relationships between costs and.
outputs. The Staff set a course for FY 1975 aimed at the development of a
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) developed around a five-year
projection of needs for all national activities, grouping national assets
Irrespective of parent agency or source of appropriation.
In a year-end report to the President in 1974, the DCI noted that the
Community "requirements machinery" still needed more attention. His intention
was to work through the USIB to fashion better ways of making judgments on
requirements, and for setting collection priorities within budgetary
constraints. He noted as well that using manpower reductions as a trade-off
for increasing program costs and inflationary pressures had attenuated program
flexibility. In the meanwhile, there was Do diminution in expectations of the
DCI's role in the Community. A memorandum' from President Ford reaffirmed his
charge.
You should continue to exercise leadership in maintaining a proper
balance among intelligence activities by planning and reviewing all
intelligence programs and resources. Your views on intelligence
activities, including tactical intelligence, should be incorporated
in an annual consolidated program budget which considers the
comparative effectiveness of collection programs and relative
priorities among intelligence targets.
The following year witnessed a series of investigations and public.
exposure of questionable practices of the past. Four separate investigations
of intelligence activities, by the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions and by
the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence stimulated considerable
internal review of Community management, organization, and methods of resource
allocation.
On 13 October 1975, Director Colby sent the President a CIA study of the
organization of intelligence which he believed offered special insights into
contemporary intelligence problems. The study, in concentrating on basic
issues to be considered in a reorganization of American intelligence,
recognized a need for the structure to be made more efficient and effective.
In addressing issues, options, and recommtepdations for the reorganization and
management of the Intelligence Communitytudy noted that the 1971
litozsidential directive gave the DCI resource review responsibility for the
entire Community, but did not provide directive or fiscal authority to enable
him to meet such responsibility. Arguments were developed for centralization
of intelligence functions, based upon the growing resource management task, the
DCI's lack of real authority, the Community's increasing reliance upon
expensive collection systems, and the need to serve a growing range of
intelligence consumers. The study group, anticipating that the Congressional
Select Committees would be making proposals for reorganization, suggested that
the President would be well advised to set forth his own proposals "which could
be useful as guides for Congress in its deliberations."
Memorandum, 9 October 1974, to DCI Colby, subject:" Leadership and
::lanacnt of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Cor-lunity."
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In commenting on the study, Director Colby observed that the selection of
any reorganization option would depend upon a presidential willingness to make
major changes. He noted that Congress appeared to be moving toward proposing.
eventual change, but doubted that the disruption of effort resulting from an
organizational initiative by the Administration would be justified by the
results. He proposed, therefore, that a move be made to achieve better
management of the Community in a way that would not require lengthy
congressional debate. The Colby view came to be known as "Option 4 Modified,"
or "Collective Management," which could be achieved with minimal legislative
change. In essence it held:
The DCI would continue to be advisor to the President, coordinator of
the Community, and Director of CIA. The existing structure of
committees and boards would be consolidated into two, both chaired by
the DCI: An NSC executive committee at the Deputy Secretary level
responsible for all Community management and policy matters, and a
national intelligence board at the USIB Principals level responsible
for substantive production. To enable the DCI to give full attention
to his Community responsibilities, he would be provided with a second
deputy.
Presidential Executive Order No. 11905, issued on 18 February 1976,
entitled "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities" in taking cognizance
of the DCI's recommendation clarified the authority and responsibilities of
intelligence departments and agencies and established effective oversight to
assure compliance with law in the management and direction of intelligence
organizations of the national Government. One of the most important provisions
of E.O. 11905 was the creation of an NSC Committee on Foreign Intelligence
(CFI), chaired by the DCI and including as other members the Deputy Secretary
of Defense responsible for intelligence matters and the Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs.10 The CFI, for the first time, gave
the Community leadership a formal arena in which it might exercise resource
control over all elements of the NFIP. In theory, the CFI would receive
guidance on the formulation of national intelligence policies from the NSC and
would be empowered to control budget preparation and resource allocation for
the NFIP--a decision-making mechanism which would rule on resource questions.
While the detailed process of identification, study, and negotiation of
resource issues in the CFI was considered to be a major improvement, past
problems persisted.
The CFI met 19 times in 1976, devoting its primary attention to
formulation of the FY 1978 NFIP budget which was forwarded to the President in
November. Differing interpretations within the Community of CFI
responsibilities made this an ardios task because the authority of the CFI was
ambiguous where it appeared to conflict with statues governing Defense
Department midget authority. Since Defense-managed programs still represented
about 80 percent of the NFIP resources, differences among CFI members were
predictable and unavoidable. Progress was made toward central review and
1C DCI George Bush served as CFI chairman from its inception until near the
end of the Ford Administration. Other members were Robert F. Ellsworth,
DoD, an:, William G. Hyland, NSC.
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rationalization of a consolidated NFIP budget, but this depended upon a
protracted process of negotiation and persuasion. In late 1976, the State
Department entered an informal petition to add the Deputy Secretary of State to
CFI membership, reasoning that the allocation of national intelligence
resources should not be divorced from foreign policy considerations and the
Interests of that Department.
The stature and duties of the DCI's Community Staff increased
significantly following Executive Order 11905, which charged the IC Staff to
provide support to the CFI, as well as to the DCI. The Staff continued under
the direction of a Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, and an
active duty military officer of four-star rank was eventually appointed to the
job.11 Broadened duties required an increase in the size of the Staff and a
realignment of its major functions. It was restructured to support the DCI in
his Community role in three areas: Resources management (CFI support);
collection assessment, product evaluation and improvement; and coordination and
planning. The IC Staff included the Executive Secretary to the CFI, who also
served as Executive Secretary to the National Foreign Intelligence Board
(NFIB), the successor to the USIB. The DCI named his Community Deputy (instead
of his "CIA Deputy") to be Vice Chairman of the NFIB and full voting member.
An early move in President Carter's administration was to reassign the
duties of the CFI to one of the two new NSC committees (all others were
abolished). HenceforthA the CFI would be known as the NSC Policy Review
Committee Intelligence14 and would include a State Department member.
On 20 January 1977, President Carter issued instructions establishing the
instrumentalities which would direct the work of the NSC and participating
agencies during his administration. Among these were the Policy Review
Memoranda (PRM/NSC), to be used to direct the reviews and analyses to be
undertaken by departments and agencies in the Executive Branch.
PRM/NSC-11 was issued on 22 February 1977. It ordered a comprehensive
review of major foreign intelligence activities and the organizational
structure and functioning of the Intelligence Community. The review was
designed to lead to options for dealing with, inter alia, the following:
? Preserving and improving the arrangements of E.O. No. 11905.
? Adding to the line authority of the DCI over national intelligence
collection programs.
a-
11
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, U.S. Navy, who served as Deputy to the DCI for
the Intelligence Community during the period April 1976 - June 1977. This
position had, since 1972, been authorized to be held by a military officer
of three-star rank, or civilian equivalent.
12 The other NSC comittee, known as the NSC Special Coordinating Committee
(SCC) was established on 20 January 1977 by Presidential directive to deal
with "specific cross-cutting issues requiring coordination in the
development of options and the implementation of presidential decisions."
Chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
:he SC: in:luded the statutory members of the !:SC or ':!IEir
.,e cpninr nfficals as ;LT:r-...=r7:e.
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? Reducing ambiguities in the dual role of the DCI as Community Manager
and as Director of the CIA.
? Ensuring the independence of CIA analysis and production from policy
considerations and possibly separating them from collection,
operational and intelligence-related research and development
activities.
President Carter added a hand-written note to PRM/NSC-11 which directed
the NSC Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) to assess the inter-relationships
among the various intelligence agencies and to make appropriate recommendations
to him.
The PRM contained three principal "tasks." Task I pertained to the
propriety and legality of intelligence operations. (The Attorney General
chaired an interdepartmental group to address those issues.) Task 2, for which
the DCI was directed to chair an interagency group, was to analyze the role,
responsibilities and authorities of the DCI. Task 3 entailed the development
of principles and alternatives. The Task 2 report was largely drafted in the
IC Staff, after several interagency meetings, and was widely circulated for
comment in the Community. The final report acknowledged that it might "be
judged biased by an ICS point of view" and, indeed, contained several
dissenting footnotes provided by the Department of Defense. Footnotes,
notwithstanding, the report captured the essence of the Community coordination
problem. It said (without apparent dissent):
Historical
decentralized,
Defense, where
the process of
increasing for
11905.
ly, U.S. intelligence resource management has been largely
both in the Community as a whole and in the Department of
most of the resources reside. But pressures to centralize
managing those resources labeled "national" have been
several years, culminating last year inExecutive Order
7?
-- Refinement of the programming and budget process created by
that Order is one way of enhancing the integrity of national
intelligence resource management in the future; it has the
significant virtue of an evolutionary approach that builds on
existing organizations and accumulated experience.
As it now stands, however, the present system gives the DCI
responsibilities that extend beyond his pure management authority to
fulfill.
-- It obliges him to proceed on most matters by persuasion and
negotiation. This means, that, to a great extent, initiative in the
process lies with program elements and outside critics. As a -
by-product, this structure places significant strain on the DCI in
discharging his dual roles as head of CIA and as Community leader.
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The report also observed that the DCI's role as producer of national
Intelligence is central to his entire function, but noted that:
One major ingredient of the present national intelligence process ?
that (the) Community structure places largely beyond the DCI's influence
is the quality of departmental participation in that process. While he
can enlarge, strengthen, or reorganize the analytical elements of CIA, he
has little power, in practice, over the major departmental producers who
also contribute to national intelligence analysis and production. He
reviews their budgets in the NFIP process and can undertake to evaluate
their performance. But he has no authority to compel the departments to
make changes to meet his own criteria of improvement.
After 80 pages of discussion, the Task 2 report identified the central
issues by asking these questions:
? If there is to be a national intelligence manager, with special
emphasis on and responsibility for resource management, who should he
be and to whom should he report?
? Over what elements should he have line authority, collegial
influence, or some advisory responsibility?
Meanwhile, the Task 3 report was developed within a special working.
group13 and was forwarded to the SCC on 31 May 1977. Among the several
principles postulated in the report, the principle of efficient management was
treated with greatest elaboration. The report observed that there must be
sufficient centralizing authority to force painful choice where it is needed on
a rational basis, to compel programs to be justified on the basis of their
ultimate contribution to intelligence, and to preclude resource allocation
purely on the basis of organizational ownership and "clout." The decision-
making power of this central authority, the report continued, must be
commensurate with the responsibility it has to assure efficient resource
management.
The DCI, Admiral Stansfield Turner, noted in his Notes from the Director
of 13 June that the SCC would meet on 15 June 1977 to consider the results of
NSC/PRM-11 and to begin to formulate recommendations to be presented to the
President. Admiral Turner observed that the study presented a wide range of
options which primarily addressed the Intelligence Community and the
xnsponsibilities of the DCI as director of that Community, and identified the
k issue as being the authority of the DCI over other elements of the National
Foreign Intelligence Program. Thus Director Turner joined former DCIs Bush,
Colby, Schlesinger, Helms and McCone in expressing concern for the effective
management of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort, absent some greater measure
of budgeting and operational control of the Community.
13
Samuel Hoskinson, NSC Staff, Chairman; Vice Admiral Bobby Inman, DIA;
Wheaton Byers, former Executive Secretary of the PFIAB; Arnold Donohue,
OMB; and Fritz Ermarth, IC Staff.
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The NSC's Special Coordinating Committee met in mid-June to consider the
studies and options resulting from NSC/PRM-11. The first session got quickly.
to the central issue, on which the interests of the DCI and the Secretary of
Defense were divided: Control of the assets and resources of NSA and overhead
reconnaissance. Both DoD and DCI representatives were asked to develop
positions which, discounting all the variants and middle-of-the-road options,
would clearly articulate opposing views.
The SCC met for the second time on 28 July 1977. In addition to the
recommendations submitted by Defense and Community representatives, OMB
presented a separate proposal. The OMB proposal suggested creation of a
"Foreign Assessment Agency," drawn from the NIOs and the CIA's Directorate of
Intelligence, and the transfer of CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology
to the Department of Defense.
The "Presidential Directive on Reorganization of the Intelligence
Community" (PD-17) was signed on 4 August 1977. On that date President Carter
announced a number of major decisions designed to effect needed changes while
retaining the structural continuity of the Intelligence Community. The purpose
of the changes was to provide for strong direction by the President and the
National Security Council (NSC), and to centralize the most critical national
intelligence management functions under the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI). The reorganization built on the experience of the past by strengthening
the roles of both the NSC system and the DCI. Changes were designed to enhance
responsiveness to both the intelligence requirements of major national-level
consumers and the operational needs of Federal departments and the military
services.
These measures, now set forth in Executive Order 12036, were taken to help
close a critical gap--which had been widening over a period of many
years--between the growing responsibilities assigned to the DCI and his
authority to fulfill those responsibilities.
The DCI outlined in his Notes from the Director of February 1978 the
following:
"I want to clarify some of the organizational changes that have taken
place as a result of Executive Order 12036.
As you know, the Executive Order was promulgated on 26 January 1978
and assigned the DCI significantly increased responsibilities:
- For tasking of all Intelligence Community collection assets and
dissemination of the results;
- For formulating the national intelligence budget; and
- For ensuring the production of national intelligence estimates.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/23 CIA-RDP03B01495R000100250001-1
To meet the first two of these responsibilities, tasking and
budgeting, I have elected to split the existing Intelligence Community ?
Staff: One-half under a new Deputy for Collection Tasking, the other
under a Deputy for Resource Management. The former will manage the
existing collection committees; in addition, he will establish a National
Intelligence tasking Center. This Center will attempt to ensure that for
any given collection problem we utilize the full resources of the
Intelligence Community and do so in a coordinated manner. The Deputy for
Resource Management will be responsible for supporting we in my new 'full
and exclusive" responsibility for preparing the National Foreign
Intelligence Program Budget and submitting it to the Office of Management
and Budget and the President. The division of the IC Staff into these two
components is subject to congressional approval which we hope for shortly.
The third new responsibility above is simply a somewhat more explicit
statement of the DCI's traditional role in producing National Intelligence
Estimates. Under the new Executive Order, I am empowered to require
participation of other agencies in developing National Estimates, but not
to interfere with their normal analytic work. We want separate and
independent centers of analysis in our Intelligence Community. In order
to carry out the national estimating role in a more coordinated manner, we
have, as you know, merged the old NIO and DDI structures into the National
Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC). Those two organizations always worked
very closely together.
The following chart depicts this planned new organization, including
those components under the direct jurisdiction of the DCI and the
components of the CIA, and briefly describes the major responsibilities of
each."
DIRECTOR OW.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/04/23 : CIA-RDP03B01495R000100250001-1