LETTER TO MR. JOHN H. WRIGHT FROM ARTHUR E. FAJANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R001000040020-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2014
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: October 31, 1989
• Content Type: LETTER

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POLICY
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000
31 October 1989
Mr. John H. Wright
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Wright:
We appreciate your 4 October 1989 letter wherein suggested
revisions were enclosed concerning Department of Defense (DoD)
Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic Declassification
Review of Classified Information in Permanently Valuable DoD
Records."
Enclosed is a proposed revision to DoD Directive 5200.30
that contains your revisions and those from other agencies both
within and outside of DoD.
Please provide us with your concurrence or comments by 29
December 1989.
My point of contact is Mr. Fred Cook, telephone [phone].
Arthur E. Faja
Director
Security Plans and P rams
Enclosure
As stated
C33
CO
LCD
STAT
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Department of Defense
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER
SUBJECT: Guidelines for Systematic Declassification Review of Classified
Information in Permanently Valuable DoD Records
References: (a) DoD Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic Declassif-
cation Review of Classified Information in Permanently
Valuable DoD Records," March 21, 1983 (hereby canceled)
(b) Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information,"
April 2, 1982
(c) Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1
Concerning National Security Information, June 23,
1982
(d) through (h), see enclosure 1
A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE
This Directive reissues reference (a); establishes procedures and assigns
responsibilities for the systematic declassification review of information
classified under references (b) and (c), DoD Directive 5200.1 and DoD 5200.1-R
(references (d) and (e)), and prior orders, directives, and regulations
governing security classification; and implements section 3.3 of reference (b).
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B. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
1. This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
and to activities assigned to the OSD for administrative support, the Military
Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and
Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to collectively
as "DoD Components").
2. This Directive applies to the systematic review of permanently valuable
classified information, developed by or for the Department of Defense and its
Components, or its predecessor components and activities, that is under the
exclusive or final original classification jurisdiction of the Department of
Defense, and reference (f).
3. Its provisions do not cover Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted
Data under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (reference (g)) or information in
nonpermanent records.
4. Systematic declassification review of records pertaining to intelli-
gence activities (including special activities) or intelligence sources or
methods shall ensure that all such records also be referred to the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) for its determination, as the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) is the sole statutory authority enjoined to protect
intelligence sources and methods.
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C. DEFINITIONS
1. Cryptologic Information. Information pertaining to or resulting from
the activities and operations involved in the production of signals intelligence
(SIGINT) or to the maintenance of information systems security (INFOSYSSEC).
2. Foreign Government Information. Information that is provided to the
United States by a foreign government or governments, an international organi-
zation of governments, or any element thereof with the expectation, expressed
or implied, that the information, the source of the information, or both are
to be held in confidence; or produced by the United States pursuant to or as
a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments,
an international organization of governments, or any element thereof requiring
that the information, the arrangement, or both are to be held in confidence.
3. Intelligence Method. Any process, mode of analysis, means of gathering
data, or processing system or equipment used to produce intelligence.
4. Intelligence Source. A person or technical means that provides intel-
ligence.
D. POLICY
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to assure that information
that warrants protection against unauthorized disclosure is properly classified
and safeguarded as well as to facilitate the flow of unclassified information
about DoD operations to the public.
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E. PROCEDURES
1. DoD classified information that is permanently valuable, as defined
by 44 U.S.C. 2103 (reference (h)), that has been accessioned into the National
--
Archives of the United States, will be reviewed systematically for declassifi-
cation by the Archivist of the United States, with the assistance of the DoD
personnel designated for that purpose, as it becomes 30 years old; however,
file series concerning intelligence activities (including special activities)
created after 1945, intelligence sources or methods created after 1945, and
cryptology records created after 1945 will be reviewed as they become 50
years old. Any review of files concerning intelligence activities, sources,
or methods shall include referral to the CIA.
2. All other DoD classified information and foreign government information
that is permanently valuable and in the possession or control of DoD Components,
including that held in federal records centers or other storage areas, may be
reviewed systematically for declassification by the DoD Component exercising
control of such information.
3. DoD classified information and foreign government information in the
possession or control of DoD Components shall be declassified when they become
30 years old, or 50 years old in the case of DoD intelligence activities
(including special activities) created after 1945, or cryptology created after
1945, if they are not within one of the categories specified in enclosure 2
or reference (f).
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4. Systematic review for declassification shall be in accordance with
procedures contained in DoD 5200.1-R (reference (e)). Information that falls
within any of the categories in enclosure 2 and reference (f) shall be declas-
sified if the designated DoD reviewer determines, in light of the declassifi-
cation considerations contained in enclosure 3, that classification no longer
is required. In the absence of such a declassification determination, the
classification of the information shall continue as long as required by
national security considerations.
5. Before any declassification or downgrading action, DoD information
under review should be coordinated with the Department of State on subjects
cited in enclosure 4, and with the CIA on subjects cited in enclosure 5.
F. RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Security Policy shall:
a. Exercise oversight and policy supervision over the implementation
of this Directive.
b. Request DoD Components to review enclosures 2 and 3 of this
Directive every 5 years.
c. Revise enclosures 2 and 3 to ensure they meet DoD needs.
d. Authorize, when appropriate, other federal agencies to apply
this Directive to DoD information in their possession.
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2. The Head of each DoD Component shall:
a. Recommend changes to the enclosures of this Directive.
b. Propose, with respect to specific programs, projects, and systems
under his or her classification jurisdiction, supplements to enclosures 2 and
3 of this Directive.
c. Provide advice and designate experienced personnel to provide
timely assistance to the Archivist of the United States in the systematic
review of records under this Directive.
3. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service
(NSA/CSS), shall develop, for approval by the Secretary of Defense, special
procedures for systematic review and declassification of classified cryptologic
information.
4. The Archivist of the United States is authorized to apply this Directive
when reviewing DoD classified information that has been accessioned into the
Archives of the United States.
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G. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Directive is effective immediately.
Enclosures - 5
1. References
2. Categories of Information That Require Review Before
Declassification
3. Declassification Considerations
4. Department of State Areas of Interest
5. Central Intelligence Agency Subjects of Special Concern
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REFERENCES, continued
(d) DoD Directive 5200.1, "DoD Information Security Program," June 7, 1982
(e) DoD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program RegulatioA," June 1986,
authorized by DoD Directive 5200.1, June 7, 1982
Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2002, Information Security
Oversight Office, "National Security Information; General Guidelines
for Systematic Declassification Review of Foreign Government Information"
(g) Public Law 83-703, Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(h) Title 44, United States Code, Section 2103
(f)
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5200.30 (Encl. 2)
CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
The following categories of information shall be reviewed systematically for
declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this Directive:
1. Nuclear propulsion information.
2. Information concerning the establishment, operation, and support of the
U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System.
3. Information concerning the safeguarding of nuclear materials or facilities.
4. Information that could affect the conduct of current or future U.S. for-
eign relations. (Also see enclosure 4.)
5. Information that could affect the current or future military usefulness of
policies, programs, weapon systems, operations, or plans when such information
would reveal courses of action, concepts, tactics, or techniques that are used
in current operations plans.
6. Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of chemical and biolog-
ical weapons and defensive systems; specific identification of chemical and
biological agents and munitions; chemical and biological warfare plans; and U.S.
-???????
vulnerability to chemical or biological warfare attack.
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5200.30 (Enc.]. 2)
7. Information about capabilities, installations, exercises, research, develop-
ment, testing andzevaluation, plans, operations, procedures, techniques, organi-
zation, training, sensitive liaison and relationships, and equipment concerning
psychological operations; escape, evasion, rescue and recovery, insertion, and
infiltration and exfiltration; cover and support; deception; unconventional
warfare and special operations; and the personnel assigned to or engaged in
these activities.
8. Information that reveals sources or methods of intelligence or counter-
intelligence, counterintelligence activities, special activities, identities of
clandestine human agents, methods of special operations, analytical techniques
for the interpretation of intelligence data, and foreign intelligence reporting.
This includes information that reveals the overall scope, processing rates, time-
liness, and accuracy of intelligence systems and networks, including the means of
interconnecting such systems and networks and their vulnerabilities.
9. Information that relates to intelligence activities conducted jointly by
the Department of Defense with other federal agencies or to intelligence
activities conducted by other federal agencies in which the Department of
Defense has provided support. (Also see enclosure 5.)
10. Airborne radar and infrared imagery.
11. Information that reveals space system:
a. Design features, capabilities, and limitations (such as antijam charac-
teristics, physical survivability features, command and control design details,
design vulnerabilities, or vital parameters).
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.7'200.30 (End l 2)
b. Concepts of operation, orbital characteristics, orbital support meth-
ods, network.: configurations, deployments, ground support facility locations,
and force structure.
12. Information that reveals operational communications equipment and systems:
a. Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) design features or performance
capabilities.
b. Vulnerability and susceptibility to any or all types of electronic warfare.
13. Information concerning electronic intelligence, telemetry intelligence, and
electronic warfare (electronic warfare support measures, electronic counter-
measures (ECM), and ECCM) or related activities, including:
a. Information concerning or revealing nomenclatures, functions, technical
characteristics, or descriptions of foreign communications and electronic
equipment, its employment or deployment, and its association with weapon systems
or military operations.
b. Information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, opera-
tions, or scope of activities involved in acquiring, analyzing, and evaluating
the above information, and the degree of success obtained.
14. Information concerning Department of the Army systems listed in attachment 1.
15. Information concerning Department of the Navy systems listed in attachment 2.
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16. Information concerning Department of the Air Force systems listed in attach-
ment 3.
17. Information concerning Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Programs
listed in attachment 4.
18. Cryptologic information (including cryptologic sources and methods). This
includes information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, opera-
tions, and scope of SIGINT comprising communications intelligence, electronics
intelligence, and telemetry intelligence; and the cryptosecurity and emission
security components of INFOSYSSEC, including the communications portion of cover
and deception plans.
a. Recognition of cryptologic information may not always be an easy task.
There are several broad classes of cryptologic information, as follows:
(1) Those that relate to COMSEC. In documentary form, they provide
COMSEC guidance or information. Many COMSEC documents and materials are
accountable under the Communications Security Material Control System. Examples
are items bearing transmission security (TSEC) nomenclature and crypto keying
material for use in enciphering communications and other COMSEC documentation
such as National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Instructions,
National COMSEC/Emanations Security (EMSEC) Information Memoranda, National
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Policies, COMSEC Resources
Program documents, COMSEC Equipment Engineering Bulletins, COMSEC Equipment
System Descriptions, and COMSEC Technical Bulletins.
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1 5200.30 (End l 2)
(2) Those that relate to SIGINT. These appear as reports in various
formats that bearsecurity classifications, sometimes followed by five-letter
codewords (World War II's ULTRA, for example) and often carrying warning caveats
such as 'This document contains codeword material" and "Utmost secrecy is neces-
sary..." Formats may appear as messages having addressees, "from" and "to"
sections, and as summaries with SIGINT content with or without other kinds of
intelligence and comment.
(3) RDT&E reports and information that relate to either COMSEC or SIGINT.
b. Commonly used words that may help in identification of cryptologic
documents and materials are "cipher," "code," "codeword," "communications in-
telligence" or "COMINT," "communications security" or "COMSEC," "cryptanalysis,"
crypto," "cryptography," "cryptosystem," "decipher," "decode," "decrypt,"
"direction finding," "electronic intelligence" or "ELINT," "electronic security,"
"encipher," "encode," "encrypt," "intercept," "key book," "signals intelligence"
or "SIGINT," "signal security," and "TEMPEST."
Attachments - 3
1. Department of the Army Systems
2. Department of the Navy Systems
3. Department of the Air Force Systems
4. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Programs
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CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SYSTEMS
The following categories of Army information shall be reviewed systematically
for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this Direc-
tive.
1. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) missile information, including the princi-
ple of operation of warheads (fuzing, arming, firing, and destruct operations);
quality or reliability requirements; threat data; vulnerability; ECM and ECCM;
details of design, assembly, and construction; and principle of operations.
2. BMD systems data, including the concept definition (tentative roles, threat
definition, and analysis and effectiveness); detailed quantitative technical
system description-revealing capabilities or unique weaknesses that are exploit-
able; overall assessment of specific threat-revealing vulnerability or capabil-
ity; discrimination technology; and details of operational concepts.
3. BMD optics information that may provide signature characteristics of U.S.
and United Kingdom ballistic weapons.
4. Shaped-charge technology.
5. Fleshettes.
6. M380 Beehive round.
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7. Electromagnetic propulsion technology.
8. Space weapons concepts.
9. Radar-fuzing programs.
10. Guided projectiles technology.
11. ECM and ECCM to weapons systems.
12. Armor materials concepts, designs, or research.
13. 2.75-inch Rocket System.
14. Air Defense Command and Coordination System (AN/TSQ-51).
15. Airborne Target Acquisition and Fire Control System.
16. Chaparral Missile System.
17. Dragon Guided Missile System Surface Attack, M47.
18. Forward Area Alerting Radar (FAAR) System.
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I , 5200.3U (Att i to trICI Z)
19. Ground laser designators.
20. Hawk Guided Missile System.
21. Heliborne, Laser, Air Defense Suppression and Fire and Forget Guided
Missile System (HELLFIRE).
22. Honest John Missile System.
23. Lance Field Artillery Missile System.
24. Land Combat Support System (LCSS).
25. M22 (SS-11 ATGM) Guided Missile System, Helicopter Armament Subsystem.
26. Guided Missile System, Air Defense (NIKE HERCULES with Improved Capabili-
ties with HIPAR and ANTIJAM Improvement).
27. Patriot Air Defense Missile System.
28. Pershing IA Guided Missile System.
29. Pershing II Guided Missile System.
30. Guided Missile System, Intercept Aerial 1141 (REDEYE) and Associated Equip-
ment.
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5200.30 (Att 1 to End l 2)
31. U.S. Roland Missile System.
32. Sergeant Missile System (less warhead) (as pertains to electronics and
penetration aids only).
33. Shillelagh Missile System.
34. Stinger/Stinger-Post Guided Missile System (FIM-92A).
35. Terminally Guided Warhead (TWG) for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).
36. TOW Heavy Antitank Weapon System.
37. Viper Light Antitank/Assault Weapon System.
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' 5200.30 (Att 2 to End l 2)
CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE SYSTEMATIC BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION:
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
The following categories of Navy and Marine Corps information require review
by the cognizant Department of the Navy Original Classification Authority
(OCA), or by authorized officials of the DoD or National Archives of the
United States using approved Department of the Navy detailed guidelines for
continued security protection of classified information beyond 30 years:
A. Scientific, Technological, or Economic Matters Relating to the National
Security:
1. Space systems.
2. Airborne radar and infrared imagery.
B. Military Weapons; the Vulnerabilities or Capabilities of Systems,
Installations, or Projects Relating to the National Security; and United
States Government Programs for Safeguarding Nuclear Materials or Facilities:
1. Naval nuclear propulsion information (NNPI). (Note: Unclassified
NNPI also requires case-by-case review by the OCA prior to public release.)
2. All information that is uniquely applicable to nuclear-powered
surface ships and submarines.
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pLuu.iu (att 2 to End l 2)
Information concerning the vulnerabilities of conventional surface
ships protective systems; ship-silencing; operational characteristics
related to performance; and all static electricity (SE), alternating
magnetic (AM), and underwater electric potential (UEP) data.
4. Information concerning diesel submarines dealing with ship silencing;
acoustic warfare systems data; details of operational assignments; general
arrangements, drawings, and plans (SS-563 class hulls only); and SE, All, and
UEP data.
5. Information concerning mine warfare, mine performance, mine
characteristics, mine sweeping, and mine countermeasures, including strategic
and tactical minelaying and tactics and techniques against specific types
of mines.
6. Information concerning the performance, doctrine, employment, and
vulnerability to countermeasures of specified torpedoes and the SUBROC and
ASROC missiles; and the radiated output of specified torpedo countermeasure
devices.
7. Information concerning specified submarine and surface ship sonars.
8. Design performance and functional characteristics of specified guided
missiles and projectiles, radars, acoustic equipments, and fire control
systems.
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LU LUC.L )
C. Intelligence Activities (including special activities) or Intelligence
Sources and Methods, Confidential Sources, and Related Matters:
1. Information that reveals sources or methods of intelligence or
counterintelligence and related matters.
2. Information about intelligence capabilities, installations,
exercises, research, development, testing and evaluation, plans, operations,
procedures, techniques, organization, training, and related matters.
3. Information that deals with escape, evasion, rescue and recovery,
insertion, and infiltration and exfiltration.
4. Information relating to intelligence activities conducted jointly
within the Department of Defense and with other U.S. organizations or other
countries.
5. Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) data.
D. Communications and Electronics:
1. Operational communications equipment and systems.
2. Current electronic intelligence, telemetry intelligence, and
electronic warfare or related matters.
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3. The electronic countermeasures and electronic counter-countermeasures
features and capabilities of any operational electronic equipments and
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electronic warfare systems still in service.
E. Crypotology:
1. Communications security (COMSEC) documents and cryptographic
materials.
2. Signals intelligence (SIGINT).
3. Research, development, test, and evaluation information about
tOMSEC and SIGINT.
F. Forel
Relations or Forei?n Activities of the United States Militar
Plans and Operations, and Vulnerabilities or Capabilities of Plans Relating
to the National Security:
1. Information which is internationally-sensitive and has been
determined to affect adversely the current or future military usefulness
of Department policies; plans, or operations when such information would
reveal courses of action, concepts, tactics, or techniques that are used
in current operations plans.
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2. Information concerning Department of the Navy operations security
countermeasures; unconventional warfare and special operations; psychological
operations; long-term cover plans; special deception devices, techniques,
and classified tactics; wartime reserve modes of Department of the Navy
electronic and acoustic systems; and special warfare ordnance and vehicles
having classified characteristics.
3. Military plans or operations dealing with the research, development,
test and evaluation of chemical and biological weapons and defensive
systems; the specific identification of chemical and biological agents and
munitions; chemical and biological warfare plans; and U.S. vulnerability to
chemical or biological warfare attack.
"Eel
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5200.30 (Att 3 to End l 2)
CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE SYSTEMS
The Department of the Air Force has determined that the categories identified
in enclosure 2 of this Directive shall apply to Air Force information.
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CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY PROGRAMS .
The following categories of DARPA information shall be reviewed systematically
for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this
Directive.
Basic and advanced research, exploratory development and test and
evaluation information concerning:
a. Aerospace and strategic technology
b. Materials sciences
c. Electronic sciences
d. Directed energy systems
e. Information sciences and technology
f. Nuclear monitoring research
g. Tactical technology
h. Smart weapons and sensors
i. Armor/anti-armor technology
j. Defense advanced manufacturing technology
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DECLASSIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS
1. Technological developments; widespread public knowledge of the subject
matter; changes in military plans, operations, systems, or equipment; changes
in the foreign relations or defense commitments of the United States; and similar
events may bear upon the determination of whether information should be declas-
sified. If the responsible DoD reviewer decides that, in view of such circum-
stances, the public disclosure of the information being reviewed no longer would
result in damage to the national security, the information shall be declassified.
2. The following are examples of considerations that may be appropriate in
deciding whether information in the categories listed in enclosure 2 may be
declassified when it is reviewed:
a. The information no longer provides the United States a scientific,
engineering, technical, operational, intelligence, strategic, or tactical
advantage over other nations.
b. The operational military capability of the United States revealed by
the information no longer constitutes a limitation on the effectiveness of the
Armed Forces.
c. The information is pertinent to a system that no longer is used or
relied on for the defense of the United States or its allies and does ?not
disclose the capabilities or vulnerabilities of existing operational systems.
d. The program, project, or system information no longer reveals a current
weakness or vulnerability.
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e. The information pertains to a diplomatic initiative that has been
abandoned or achieved and will no longer damage the foreign relations of the
United States.
f. The information concerns foreign relations matters whose disclosure
can no longer be expected to cause or increase international tension to
the detriment of the national security of the United States.
3. Declassification of information which reveals the fact of or identity
of a U.S. intelligence source, method, or capability, even when such source,
method, or capability is no longer employed and even when disclosure of
such source, method, or capability might appear not to cause damage to the
national security or place a person in immediate jeopardy, shall be carried
out only by the CIA. All such material shall be referred to CIA for its
determination. The DCI is the sole statutory authority enjoined to protect
intelligence sources and methods.
4. Declassification of information that may reveal the identities of clandestine
human agents shall be accomplished only through referral of said information
to the CIA for its determination.
5. The NSA/CSS is the sole authority for the review and declassification of
classified cryptologic information. The procedures established by the NSA/CSS
to facilitate the review and declassification of classified cryptologic in-
formation are:
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DLVV.JU
a. COMSEC Documents and Materials
(1) If records or materials in this category are found in agency
files that are not under COMSEC control, refer them to the senior COMSEC
authority of the agency concerned or by appropriate channels to the following
address:
Director
National Security Agency
ATTN: Director of Policy (Q4)
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755
(2) If the COMSEC information has been incorporated into other
documents by the receiving agency, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary
before declassification.
b. SIGINT Information
(1) If the SIGINT information is contained in a document or record
originated by a DoD cryptologic organization, such as the NSA/CSS, and is in
the files of a noncryptologic agency, such material will not be declassified
if retained in accordance with an approved records disposition schedule. If
the material must be retained, it shall be referred to the NSA/CSS for systematic
review for declassification.
(2) If the SIGINT information has been incorporated by the receiving
agency into documents it produces, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary before
any declassification.
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.)LUU.JU (tnci 4)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AREAS OF INTEREST
1. All messages in which the Department of State is either the originator or
addressee.
2. Foreign government or international organization documents, except for
communications on military subjects between U.S. military authorities and
their counterparts.
3. Other documents which include:
a. Statements of U.S. intent to defend, or not to defend, identifiable
areas, or along identifiable lines, in any foreign country or region.
b. Statements of U.S. intent militarily to attack in stated contingencies
identifiable areas in any foreign country or region.
c. Statements of U.S. policies or initiatives within collective security
organizations (for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and Organization of American States (OAS)).
d. Agreements with foreign countries for the use of, or access to,
military facilities.
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DLUU.JV kr.nci 4)
e Contingency plans insofar as they involve other countries the use of
foreign bases, territory or airspace, or the use of chemical,.
_
biological, or nuclear weapons.
f. Defense surveys of foreign territories for purposes of basing or use
g.
in contingencies.
Reports documenting conversations with foreign officials, that is,
foreign government information, which includes all information
provided to the U.S. Government by a foreign nation or international
body of nations, with the expectation that the U.S. Government will
protect its confidentiality.
h. Additional guidance on foreign government information is contained
in attachment 1.
i. Additional guidance on foreign government documents is contained in
attachment 2.
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FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
This section relates to information obtained in conversations with foreign
government officials as distinct from foreign government document. An
important responsibility in reviewing is to preserve our information
gathering ability by protecting sources and by ensuring that information
entrusted to us is held in confidence. Hence, it is usually preferable that
material not be released quoting officials of other governments as the
release might make them or others leery of entering into discussions with
U.S. officials in the future. Examples of how this is used are:
Reports of statements and comments by foreign government officials,
government policy positions expressed in confidence, second hand
comments (i.e., "The French Ambassador told me that Turkish Ambassador
said ...") and the like would not normally be released unless they are:
a) purely banal, (e.g., introductory remarkds, social coversation),
b) non-sensitive, (e.g., speeches and discussions in public places,
arrangements for meetings, travel plans),
c) subjects are not or are no longer sensitive and release would have
no impact on current issues and relations or on living persons and
would not deter others from providing information.
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-- An official's views might, be releasable if incorporated into
U.S. reporting without named attribution, and the subject
matter is no longer considered protectable.
-- If an official's comments are quoted in the public press, or
in memoirs and such documents, there is no problem with their
release. However, it is not feasbile for the reviewers to
. do complete research jobs.
The release of information might have an impact on the
individual who gave it even though the material itself
is not longer sensitive. In such cases, the material can
be released and the source protected.
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FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
The general rule is not to release foreign government documents provided in
confidence unless such documents have since been released by the originating
government or included in such published works as memoirs of senior
officials of that government. It is not simply the substance of the document
that is important but the process of communications. Other governments
cannot be expected to respect the confidentiality of our communications if
the U.S. is not willing to extend them the same respect. Even those
governments which have Freedom of Information and historical document
release programs, such as the U.K. and Canada, expect us to preserve the
confidentiality of their documents until they make the decision to release
them to their own public. Unless otherwise indicated, it should be assumed
that every foreign government document is privileged even if the document
does not bear a classification marking, and that unauthorized release
reasonably could be expected to have a damaging effect on the foreign relations
of the United States.
A gray area exists in the case of papers of defunct regimes, e.g., the
Government of Vietnam, the Royal Laotian Government, the Imperial Government
of Iran. If such documents are found in material that is being reviewed,
consult the Department of State.
There may on occasion be exceptional circumstances, such as a court order
to compel, in which the release of a foreign government document will be
considered if the government which originated the document is consulted.
In these cases, the Department of State should be requested to ask permission
from the government involved.
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Foreign government documents which have been transferred to and accessioned
by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) are the responsi-
bility of that agency.
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DLUV...)V krmci J)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY--SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL CONCERN
1. Information that identifies CIA operational organizations, installations,
agents, sources, or methods.
2. Information that could identify CIA personnel under official or nonofficial
cover, or could reveal a cover arrangement.
3. Intelligence reports that could have come from covert sources, or
information derived from them, which could divulge intelligence sources
or methods.
4. Information the release of which could place an individual in jeopardy.
5. Information that could divulge intelligence interests, intelligence
requirements, the value of intelligence information, or the extent of
Intelligence Community knowledge on a subject.
6. Names of CIA staff personnel or agents.
7. Information divulging U.S. intelligence collection and assessment
capabilities.
8. Information on technical systems for the collection or production of
intelligence.
9.. Methods or procedures used to acquire or produce intelligence or support
intelligence activities.
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- kralc.1 J)
10. Information on the structure, size, budget, foreign and domestic
installations, security, or objectives of CIA.
11. Training provided to or by CIA personnel that would indicate CIA's
capabilities or identify its personnel or agents.
12. CIA's personnel recruiting, hiring, training, assignment, and/or
evaluation policies.
13. Any reports or publications by CIA, particularly NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATES, other finished intelligence analysis, raw (field) intelligence
reports, and related documents.
14. Special access programs used by CIA.
15. Information on CIA's counterintelligence policies, practices, and
capabilities.
16. Information on secret writing, including, e.g., specific chemicals,
reagents, developers, and microdots.
17. Contractual relationships entered into by CIA, especially those which
reveal specific interests and expertise.
.?
18. Any CIA information or publication including or derived from SIGINT
(COMINT, ELINT, etc.). [Material in this category should also be referred
to NSA.]
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(tnci D)
19. Any CIA information or publication including or derived from overhead
imagery.
20. Information on foreign nuclear programs, facilities, capabilities, or
intentions.
21. Diplomatic or economic activities affecting the national security
or international security negotiations.
22. Information related to political or economic instabilities in a foreign
country, the divulgence of which could endanger American lives or
installations in that country.
23. Covert activities conducted abroad in support of U.S. foreign policy.
24. Information on the surreptitious collection of information in a
foreign nation by U.S. intelligence, especially when its disclosure
could affect relations with that country.
. 25. Covert relationship with international organizations or foreign
governments, especially liaison arrangements with foreign intelligence
services and information derived from that liaison.
?1
26. Information on the defense plans and capabilities of the U.S. or its
allies, exposure of which could enable an adversary to develop counter-
measures.
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? 5200.30 (Enc]. 5)
27. Information tending to disclose U.S. systems and weapons capabilities
or deployment:
28. Information affecting U.S. plans to meet diplomatic contingencies
affecting the national security.
29. Information the disclosure of which could lead to foreign political,
economic, or military action against the United States of its allies.
. 30. Information on U.S. nuclear programs and facilities.
31. Information on research, development, and engineering that enables the
United States to maintain an advantage of value to national security.
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