LETTER TO RAE M. HUFFSTUTLER FROM ERNEST R. MAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92G00017R001100190008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 13, 1989
• Content Type: LETTER

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Deputy Director for Administration
20 MARCH 1989
RAE:
YOUR CALENDAR THIS DATE IS AS FOLLOWS:
0800 - DDCI
1430 - DEPART HOS FOR C OF C
1500 - ADDRESS MIDCAREER COURSE
1700
OPTIONS REGARDING THE ATTACHED LETTER
(1/()#1 Do YOU WISH TO DRIVE YOUR CAR
TO C OF C AND THEN HOME
WILL PICK YOU UP FROM HWSTAT
AND TAKE YOU TO STAT
( )#2
( )#3 I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ATTEND.
STAT
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IDD/A Registry
ERNEST R. MAY
Charles Warren Professor
of History
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138
March 13, 1989
Mr. Rae M. Huffstutler
Deputy Director for Administration
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Dear Mr. Huffstutler:
John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 Kennedy Street
Tel.: [phone]
There will be a dinner meeting of the Steering Committee of the
Intelligence Assessment and Policy Project on Wednesday evening, April 5, and I
would like very much to have you join us that evening for the dinner and
discussion of the research efforts of the Project.
Judge Webster and Dean Graham Allison of the Kennedy School of Government
will talk briefly about the Project, which, as you may know, is a joint Central
Intelligence Agency-Harvard University effort. I am planning to follow up with
a description of progress in our research, case writing, and the seminars for
intelligence analysts and will ask the Committee members for suggestions of new
avenues of research. I would welcome your participation in this discussion and
am enclosing copies of our two progress reports and a list of the current
Steering Committee members.
The dinner meeting will be held atDacor Bacon House, 1801 F Street, NW, at7
0 p.m.. I hope that you will be free that evening and-lot-k-foTward to seeing'
-yo-LL- Ward you please ask a member of your staff to call Nancy Huntington at
[phone] to let us know if you will be able to join us.
Enclosures
Sincerely yours,
Ernest R. Mfa).yllA-Al
7/L
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8/3/88
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT AND POLICY: Progress Report
This report is divided into two parts: the first sets out where we stand
with respect to cases in progress and other activities; the second then steps
back to revisit how we now think about the task, what categories we now find
useful. Needless to say, all this remains preliminary; the rough edges are, we
trust, apparent, and thus serve as goads to do better.
This report does not discuss the three-week-long executive seminars we have
held so far in Cambridge; the fourth session is set for Dec. 4-10 of this
year. Nor does it treat in any detail the three sessions of the working group
we have run in Washington. Participants in the executive seminars can speak
for themselves (and have); we have learned a lot from those seminars and think
the participants have as well.
The working group sessions -- one to inaugurate the program, and one each
around cases on the fall of the Shah of Iran and the departure of Marcos in the
Philippines -- have been exactly as we hoped: a chance to use the case, in the
presence of intelligence officers, policy people and outsiders, to address the
more general question of how intelligence relates, or does not, to policy.
Several ideas for cases have emerged from these sessions.
I. Cases in Progress
a) Fall of the Shah of Iran. Here the problem was double: intelligence
officers and policy officials shared mind-sets that made it hard for both to
imagine the Shah could be in trouble -- And from mullahs to boot! -- and even
had intelligence been better, there is little reason to believe that busy,
distracted policy-makers would have paid attention to "bad news" in time. The
case is being revised on the basis of the first working group session.
(Treverton)
b) Fall of Marcos in the Philippines. This case, so far a success,
provides a sequel to Iran. It describes the change in United States policy
from full support for Marcos to his helicopter flight from Manila in February
1986. It discusses key intelligence judgments at various point, and it focuses
on the pattern of policy-making, particularly including the role of Congress
and the media, very different from Iran. A draft is now circulating for
comment after the second working group session. (Kline)
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c) Soviet Gas Pipeline. This rich story, now being drafted, looks at the
role of intelligence at three junctures: the imposition of the original
embargo in the wake of martial law in Poland, the decision to extend that
embargo in June 1982, and, more briefly, at the process leading to its
rescission. It will be ready in draft by autumn. (Treverton, with Goodman)
d) The Toshiba Affair. This case was suggested in one working group
session. It describes a sequence of, first, intelligence without a market and,
then, a non-traditional consumer using intelligence in new ways. When the CIA
acquired evidence that Toshiba and a Norwegian associate were violating COCOM
rules, it first had difficulty persuading the Executive to take the evidence
seriously. However, once that evidence began to seep into public -- from the
edges of a COCOM meeting and through Congressional involvement -- a major
ruckus ensued. This, too, will be ready by autumn. (Treverton, with Warrock)
e) Germany - 1940. The first case concerns Germany, where military
intelligence analysts seem to have contributed significantly to the
politico-military assessment underpinning the German offensive of 1940. In
1939, when Hitler ordered an attack against France, German generals were
aghast. They judged their military forces inferior to those of the Western
allies not only in numbers but in training and in quality of equipment.
(Except with regard to tactical aviation, this was an accurate judgment.)
Unable to change Hitler's mind, they bought delay during the autumn and winter
on the pretext of bad weather. Meanwhile, they racked their minds for possible
ways of making the venture something other than suicidal. By the spring of
1940 they had settled on the so-called "Manstein Plan," calling for a fast
armor-led attack through the forests of the Ardennes. If successful, forward
French and British units in the low countries would be cut off from reserves
and resupply. Crucial to adoption of this plan were several assumptions which
seem to have been contributed or at least endorsed by professional intelligence
officers in the Army General Staff -- for example, that the French high command
would suppose the Ardennes impenetrable and would leave it lightly defended;
that the routines of the French government and army were such as to make
difficult any rapid revisions of planned operations; and that personal
relationships among French leaders, together with weaknesses in physical
communications systems, would complicate decision-making in face of surprise.
These were not only something other than technical military judgments of enemy
capabilities; they exemplify a rare type of analtyic judgment about another
government's habits of mind and processes of decision. We hope to be able to
identify conditions other than those peculiar to the particular period and
regime that would explain how the intelligence analysts came so clearly to
understand and respond to the needs of planners and decision makers.
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f) France - 1940. The second, related case concerns France. There, the
Army's deuxieme bureau was the chief national intelligence agency, virtually
monopolizing all collection and analysis. Postwar testimony and memoir
literature indicates that French intelligence officers acquired accurate
information about German planning and reported to their superiors both the
character of "the Manstein Plan" and the probable date of the German attack.
Their warnings were not heeded. We are currently trying to locate documentary
evidence in order to determine how well it bears out the intelligence officers'
claims to prescience. (We suspect that they hedged their estimates rather more
than they remembered in retrospect.) We hope, in the end, to be able to
generalize about why assessment worked less well in France than in Germany,
even though the French had the benefit of a much freer political system and a
much more efficient intelligence organization.
g) Britain - 1940. The third case concerns Britain after the fall of
France. Churchill replaced Chamberlain. He committed Britain to continuing
the war, "if need be, alone." He did so on the basis of assessments, most of
which were implausible at the time and many of which were quite wrong. He
assumed that the United States would come into the war. In fact, he predicted
that Roosevelt would declare war in June 1940! He assumed that the German
economy had been strained to the utmost by the campaign against France. (In
fact, Germany was not even to be fully mobilized until 1943.) He assumed
further that Germany could be defeated by strategic bombing. The question we
hope to answer concerns the role of intelligence analysis in this set of
assessments. Did analysts recognize Churchill's presumptions? Did they share
them? Did they have doubts but decide to be quiet? How did Britain in the
summer of 1940 resemble -- and not resemble -- other countries where policy
decisions were based on presumptions that objective analysts might have
challenged as wishful illusions -- Russia and Japan in 1941, for example?
h) Middle East Wars, 1967, 1973. We have been working on this sequence for
much of the last year. The idea is to assemble the evidence about the role of
intelligence that is available on the public record and, in particular, to look
at the contrast between the two wars. Then, we plan to hold a day-long working
group sessions to test the case and ideas derived from it against participants
and others with relevant interest and experience. (Treverton, with Whitaker)
i) Lebanon, 1982-3. This case, to be done in draft by mid-August, comes
out of another Lebanon case done at the School for another, though related
purpose. To sharpen the discussion of the role of intelligence, this case will
focus on one celebrated estimate
and ask why, despite such agreement within the intelligence community, the
estimate had so little impact without that community. (Treverton, with D.
Kennedy)
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j) Vietnam, 1965. We are currently investigating U.S. decision-making
concerning Vietnam in the spring of 1965. During that period, President
Johnson seems to have acted on erroneous assessments. In particular, he seems
to have assumed that, if he combined deliberately controlled military pressures
with conditional promises of large-scale development aid, he could induce North
Vietnam to change its basic policies. The then DCI, John McCone, challenged
this assessment, but to no effect. McCone was replaced. By reviewing in close
detail the exchanges between the intelligence community on one hand and the
President and his advisers on the other, we hope to be able at least to raise
sensible questions about whether and how the assessment process might have
produced other outcomes.
II. Other Activities and Products
For discussion purposes, here are a set of other cases, products and ideas
that have developed in the Project. Work in most instances is not yet
underway. These strike us as interesting dimensions to pursue in the fall.
-- Discussion paper on Congressional relationships and the intelligence
community, which might serve as the basis for a half-day seminar in Cambridge.
One specific piece will be interviews to spell out exactly how intelligence
flows to Congress. (Treverton and Kline)
-- A case on the Soviet SS-9 and the ABM
would focus on the role of Melvin Laird and,
intelligence assessments as picked up by the
-- A case on one of the economic "shocks"
1971. We are now collecting case materials.
negotiations of 1970-71. This
in particular, the part played by
media. (May)
in U.S.-Japanese relations after
(Neustadt)
-- A Grenada case, based on one already done at the School. There are
intriguing questions about the relationships among policy officials, defense
planners and intelligence analysts before and during the intervention.
(Treverton)
-- A Panama case, as a part of the Iran-Philippines series. This is
tempting but the time is not yet; we are collecting materials. (Treverton)
-- A series of looks at the role(s) of the DCI, something that has come up
in each executive seminar. William Casey's role in the Iran-Contra affair is
the most recent, notable case, but other episodes across several DCIs might be
instructive: Dulles and the missile gap; McCone and the Cuban missile crises;
McCone's "firing" over Vietnam; Helms and Chile; Helms and Vietnam; Colby and
the Congressional committees; and so on.
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-- A case note (or notes) on the role of particular institutional
arrangements. One example might look at the role of national intelligence
officers; in theory the NIO is supposed to bridge between analysts and policy
makers. In fact, competitive pressures among analysts and NIO's abound, roles
are less well defined and interaction with the policy community can often leave
much to be desired.
-- We are also planning to launch an informal faculty seminar at Harvard to
extend the circle of those who might critique and contribute to our work. We
expect to meet together 4-6 times over the coming academic year.
-- Finally, we are planning two additional working group meetings in
Washington for the fall. One will likely focus on the Soviet Pipeline case in
late October, the second may be devoted to discussion about the Mid-East cases
or Toshiba.
III. Analytic Approach
In hope of learning how this interactive relationship might be made more
efficient and effective, we are analyzing a variety of cases in which
assessment played, or should have played, an important role in policy
decisions.
The cases have been chosen on the basis of potential for helping to answer
the question, "What makes for assessments that are better than usual?" Partly
for sound logical reasons but also because the existing literature consists so
largely of post-mortems on supposed failures, some cases answer better the
question, "What makes for assessments that are worse than usual?" (The key
test, we should emphasize, is not whether the policy was a success or failure.
It is whether, in retrospect, the experts' analysis of the other government
seems to have been communicated to and understood by the decision makers. The
fall of Marcos may or may not be a policy success. Only time will tell. It is
surely an assessment success, for American decision makers appear to have had a
clear understanding of the probable effects of their alternative choices. The
fall of the Shah was even more surely an assessment failure, for the reverse
seems to have been true.)
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We started with a hypothesis that, in analyzing cases, it would be useful
to make two distinctions. The first concerned the character of the foreign
government. Was it, from the standpoint of the decision makers, familiar or
unfamiliar -- like Britain or like Japan? Was it friend or foe -- Israel or
Iran? The second set of distinctions concerned the analysts' produce and the
decision-makers' situation. Was the analysts' news likely to be unwelcome or
too welcome -- challenging existing policy or reinforcing it? Were there
decision makers working the problem the analysts perceived? Or did the
decision makers perceive problems that the analysts had not worked?
As our research progressed and especially as we had opportunity to discuss
cases with experienced analysts and with current and former decision makers, we
came increasingly to focus on an alternative hypothesis, namely that the
crucial variable may not be the situation, either abroad or at home, but may
instead be the degree of mutual understanding between analysts and decision
makers.
In cases already under investigation and in new cases suggested by this
hypothesis, we are seeking to understand what accounted for differences in
analyst-decision maker relationships. How much was due to individual chemistry
probably not to be replicated? How much was due to characteristics of
particular analysts or decision makers which, if well understood, could be
reproduced or at least identified in others? How much was due to differences
in process or structure? We hope, in the end, to be able to suggest questions,
routines, procedures, perhaps even organizational arrangements with some
promise of increasing the frequency of assessment successes. First, however,
we must concentrate on understanding accurately the specifics of the cases from
which generalizations will be drawn.
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HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138
January 7, 1989
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSEMENT AND POLICY: Progress Report
This report updates the Progress Report of August 3, 1988.
Week-Long Executive Seminar
This is, on the whole, going well and well received. We might nudge
it in several directions:
1. The Group exercises seem to have run out of steam in their
current form, disappointing both participants and us, and suggesting that
the participants need more wherewithal to enlighten their own experience.
We might, for instance, pass out Ernest's models, then have one session
with them alone, a second with each of us meeting with the smaller groups.
2. This year's second exercise got off to a bad start with their
fighting it--a tactical blunder--and never quite recovered. We could try
something else next time, or perhaps drop the exercise in favor of more
time for more cases/discussions--Congress could use another session; ditto
Lebanon.
Washington Seminar
We will hold a steering group session , in late February or March.
This will be a chance for us to report on where we stand, let some new
players hear what we're about and get suggestions for what we might do.
The next working session, later in the spring, will use the Toshiba
case.
Harvard Faculty Seminars
To backstop the Project, in addition to the Washington seminars, we
started in November a series of Cambridge-based faculty seminars on cases
or issues. The first of those, in an expanded form, dealt with the role
of Congress in intelligence, with Messrs. Helgerson, Holmes, Tenet and
Latimer joining us from Washington. We will hold smaller meetings
periodically around cases and other emerging products.
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In addition, this spring we will run, in conjunction with Marvin
Kalb's Center on Press, Politics and Policy, a day-long session on
Intelligence and the Press. The idea for this first session is to bring a
half dozen reporters together with a similar number of intelligence
officials in an off-the-record meeting about the issues raised in the
intersection of their two worlds. Later, and depending on how this
session goes, we might think of a more public event--a discussion at the
School's forum for instance.
Cases and Other Products
This will not repeat the notes in our August memo. Here is an update:
Germany, 1940.
France, 1940.
Britain, 1940. For this trio of cases, for which drafts already
exist, our primary current activity is collecting archival material in
Europe. The results--for instance, full drafts of intelligence appraisals
of which we had only snippets--are fascinating if not always encouraging:
it turns out that German analysts were willing to imagine the risky attack
on France in part because France was a democracy, hence likely to be slow
to react! (May)
Fall of the Shah. This is complete in a draft that can be circulated
and taught. Like other cases, it is subject to continuous revision,
particularly in light of last spring's Washington seminar meeting around
it. (Treverton)
Fall of Marcos. This has gone through several drafts, was discussed
at a Washington meeting and has been taught. Bill Kline is working on an
addendum, focusing on intelligence still more specifically and at least
posing the question whether the actions of government elements with
operational stakes, including intelligence, played a part in the case.
(Kline)
Embargoing the Soviet Gas Pipeline. A rough draft of this was the
center of Washington seminar in November and was used in the December
executive seminar. Suitably revised, it has the advantage of containing
plenty of tracks of intelligence analysis, yet those tracks seemed to
march across or fail to dent the pattern of policy-making: therein the
issues. (Treverton)
Taking Toshiba Public. In this case, essentially done, CIA analysis
first finds no market, then finds perhaps a too-eager market in the
Congress, then becomes public. The story provides a sharp example of the
tensions involved for analysts in seeking markets and trafficking with
Congress, still more so with the press. This sequence of cases lets us
examine the role of Congress as a consumer--absent in Iran and pipeline,
perhaps central in the Philippines, surely so in Toshiba. (Treverton,
with Warrock)
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Intelligence and Lebanon. This case, a supplement to a previously-
done case on U.S. policy in Lebanon, 1982-3, takes up specifically the
role of intelligence. It uses, slightly artificially, a SNIE as the
focus, but it thus provides the vehicle for asking why an intelligence
community that was so united and so "right" could have had so little
apparent influence. (Treverton, with Kennedy)
INF. The current draft of this case, nearly complete, takes the story
from the "zero option" of November 1981 through the ratification of the
treaty. It may need to be compressed or focused, but the bottom line is
vivid for our purposes: technical intelligence, though debated, was
generally on the mark, but political estimates, stuck in an older
mind-set, were very slow to recognize how venturesome Gorbachev might be.
(Kline)
SS-9 and ABM. In March 1969 Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
testified in public to Congress that the Soviet SS-9 was MIRVed and thus a
first-strike threat that justified American construction of an
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. That cast the CIA and Director Helms
in two dilemmas: how hard to press his analysts' dissent from Laird's
view, especially given that other senior officials wanted ABM for their
own reasons--Henry Kissinger as a bargaining chip, for example; and what
to do when the CIA dissent became public, in a June New York Times
article. The case is being researched. (May, with Lundberg)
U.S.-Japan Textiles, 1969-70. Mindful of the need for Japanese cases
in our portfolio, we have explored a number, provisionally settling on
this one. Its defect in distance in time, to a U.S.-Japan relationship
that Washington dominated (and probably misunderstood) much more than
now. Its advantages are previous work done on it, enough distance not to
be too sensitive, plus interesting connections to policy (the possible
link to Okinawa through Nixon, for example). This is next on our agenda.
(Neustadt, with Lundberg)
The Carter Administration and Korea. Early in its tenure, the
Administration determined that it could safely draw down U.S. ground
forces in Korea, not changing the American commitment to the South but
shifting to it more of the burden of its defense. Then, however, new
intelligence appreciations indicated a North Korean build-up, and after a
storm of criticism, the Administration dropped its plans. This case,
which has come up several times in seminars, will give us the chance to
look at the apparently direct effect of new information on policy, and it
will afford an interesting comparison with 1950. (May)
Several other cases remain on the back-burner as starts to be worked
on if and as we have researchers to work on them and time to supervise:
for instance, starts on both the 1967 and 1973 Middle East wars, and on
the London and Bonn "economic" summits of 1977 and 1978.
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We are also seeking to gather insights into usable forms. One will be
teaching materials, such as Ernest's draft model. Another is a topical
case note; both Kline and Treverton have been working on the relationship
between Congress and intelligence, using cases to give life to
propositions suggested by interviews. Next candidates for similar
combinations of interviewing and examining cases are the role of the DCI
or of NIOs as different potential bridges between the worlds of
intelligence and policy.
Analytic Approaches
As we have moved through seminars and cases, we have come to focus
more directly on the nature of the relationship between intelligence
analysts and decision makers. In looking at past cases of success or
failure--where "success" is defined in terms of assessment, not policy;
did decision-makers get and understand a clear picture of the probable
effects of their actions on other governments?--we seek for what might be
replicated in process, approach or organization.
The most striking change is the role of Congress, as both a
decision-maker in its own right and an influence of intelligence's
connection to its ostensible masters in the executive branch. And so we
have sought cases to display that role. A number of analytic categories
are relevant to understanding the intelligence-decision relationship.
Two, our recent focus, are inherent:
--the cycle of issues. Are there points at which what decision-makers
want is what analysts are prepared to provide? We see many examples when
that is not the case. What makes for those in which it is?
--decision-makers vs. analysts. This difference comes up all the
time: it is partly psychological, partly a matter of stakes, partly
operational. Decision-makers come to Washington to signify in a short
period; theirs is an oral culture dominated by the need to act. Analysts
contract in almost every way. So, what does it mean to encourage analysts
to be entrepreneurs? What changes when the decision-makers are
"ideologues"?
Two other categories were our original focus:
--the nature of the foreign government being assessed. Does the task
differ, in somewhat predictable ways, depending on whether the foreign
government is friend or enemy, familiar or strange? Certainly the task of
estimating does. But this dimension seems less important in the
intelligence-policy relationship than we thought.
--intelligence product in relation to decision-maker situation. Was
intelligence unwelcome or too welcome--because it cut across existing
policy or reinforced it? Were analysts and decision-makers working on the
same problem?
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At least three other categories may also be illuminating.
--the nature of the issue. Analysts often report that it is easier to
get decision-makers to pay attention to technical analysis than
political: decision-makers deem themselves expert in the latter.
--institutional perspectives. The intelligence-policy connection
looks different from different institutions. Certainly, INR's task is
different than CIA's. But analysts in executive seminars have begun to
convey a richer sense of organizational stakes within intelligence as
well. Those of clandestine operators are obvious if not always apparent:
witness the Philippines. But that ostensibly "analytic" units can have
"operational" st-akes seem evident especially in arms control.
--the cycle of administrations. The connection seems likely to
change, perhaps in predictable ways, across the life of an
administration. Decision-makers come to know (or dismiss) intelligence;
people may move more forth from intelligence to policy than back; and so
on.
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HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138
Intelligence Assessment and Policy Project
Steering Committee
February 28, 1989
Co-Chairmen
Dean Graham Allison, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Judge William H. Webster, Director of Central Intelligence
Membership
Morton I. Abramowitz, Assistant Secretary of State, Intelligence and Research
Bureau
Senator Bill Bradley, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Congressman Richard Cheney, House Select Committee on Intelligence
Robert Gates, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Edward Heinz, Director of Intelligence Community Staff
Admiral Bobby Inman, Westmark Systems, Inc.
Professor Robert Jervis, Columbia University
General David Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Richard Kerr, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Congressman Dave McCurdy, House Select Committee on Intelligence
Lt. Gen. William Odom, former Director of the National Security Agency
Lt. General Leonard Perroots, former Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency
James Schlesinger, Counsel, Center for Strategic and International Studies
General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense
James Woolsey, former Undersecretary of the Navy
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