POLITICAL OPINION IN THE SOVIET-OCCUPIED ZONE OF GERMANY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 118
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

RAND RESEARCH MEMORANDUM
POLITICAL OPINION IN THE SOVIET-OCCUPIED
ZONE OF GERMANY
H. Hurwitz, S.O. Crane,
and W.P. Davison
July 1, 1959
tie
STAT
Axe,it
? S TAT
This study is based largely on interviews with refugees from East Germany
and on the judgments of experts on East Germany resident in West Berlin.
Soviet efforts at Geneva to force the West to give greater recognition to
the German Democratic Republic are occasioned somewhat by the current
state of political opinion in East Germany. Political opinion in this
area is of considerable inportance in view of the Berlin crisis.
East Germany is no longer the powder keg it was in 1953) but neither has it
turned into a reliable Soviet satellite. While economic conditions have im-
proved and hope for reunification has receded, most East Germans think of
the current state of affairs as provisional. Although certain aspects of the
socialist system have found wide acceptance, Ulbricht is continunlly threat-
ened by Marxist revisionism and "Titoism" from within his own party, as well
as by lingering hopes among the population that help may still come from the
West. The communist order in East Germany is thus "teetering on the brink
of stability," and it must be assumed that a principal aim of the Soviets
is to strengthen the regime to a point where the Soviet Union can take full
advantage of the East German potential.
If the West recognizes the Ulbricht regime, opposition groups will become
discouraged in their fight for reunification. On the other hand, if the
provisional nature of the German Democratic Republic is given constant em-
phasis, this will prevent the Soviets from stabilizing the existing order.
In the absence of effective help from outside, however, it is apparent that
the East Germans are adjusting to the present system.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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74, n D
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1700 Meln I. ? Soma Menke ? Coillernie
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U.S. AIR FORCE
PROJECT RAND
RESEARCH MEMORANDUM
POLITICAL OPINION IN THE
SOVIET-OCCUPIED ZONE OF GERMANY
Harold Hurwitz
Sibylle Crane
W. P. Davison
July 1, 1959
Assigned to
Not suitable for distribution to industrial contractors
or commercial organizations.
This is a working paper. It may be expanded, modified, or with-
drawn at any time. The views, conclusions, and recommendations
expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views or
policies of the United States Air Force.
61,00144:44
1700 MAIN ST. ? SANTA MONICA ? CALIFORNIA
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
STAT
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STAT
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iii
- SUMMARY
East Germany is no longer the powder keg it was in 1953,
but neither has it turned into a reliable Soviet satellite.
While economic conditions have improved and hope for reunifica-
tion in freedom has receded, most East Germans still think of
the current state of affairs as provisional. The Ulbricht
regime has shown astonishing staying power, and certain aspects
of the socialist system have found wide acceptance, particularly
among young people. Nevertheless, Ulbricht is continually
threatened by Marxist revisionism and "Titoism" from within
his own Party, as well as by lingering hopes among the popula-
tion at large that help may still come from the West. The
communist order in East Germany is thus "teetering on the
brink of stability," and it must be assumed that a principal
aim of the Soviets is to strengthen it to a point where it can
make a more substantial contribution to the over-all strength
of the communist bloc.
Recognition of the "DDR" by the West, even a partial
recognition, would at one stroke increase tremendously the
stability of the existing order in East Germany. Conversely,
constant emphasis on the provisional nature of the "DDR" pend-
ing reunification would keep alive opposition and continue to
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iv
prevent the Soviets from taking full advantage of the East
German potential.
The control system in East Germany, including Party,
judiciary, military, police, and various "mass organizations,"
has been fairly successful in making people conform externally,
but has not been able to reshape their thinking to the extent
desired. One weakness of the controls is that their very
pervasiveness breeds opposition to them. Even convinced
Communists dislike the way that Party and state seek to pene-
trate private spheres and encroach on a person's free time.
Another weakness of the controls is that they have not pene-
trated the family successfully. More and more East Germans,
apparently including some communist functionaries, are using
the family as a refuge from politics.
In examining the political attitudes of East Germans, a
distinction should be made between the regime, which is almost
universally rejected, and the system, parts of which have been
accepted by large groups in the population. The workers, for
example, include the strongest centers of resistance to the
regime, both because they feel indispensable and because their
sense of solidarity gives them additional strength. Most of
them approve some aspects of the system, such as socialization
?
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STAT
of the major means of production and many of the social bene-
fits, but few have swallowed the system as a whole. As the
standard of living has risen in East Germany, the demands of
labor have risen too, and politically-alert workers still
dislike the Soviet Union and regard themselves as exploited
by the communist functionaries. Even among younger workers
the regime has few fanatic supporters. They have adjusted
to the system, but their adjustment is not deep since they
take their older colleagues as examples. Communist ideology
noticeably influences their abstract thinking but has less
influence on their practical behavior. It is estimated that
not more than 7 per cent of all industrial workers in East
Germany are convinced members of the Socialist Unity (Communist)
Party.
White-collar employees have lost prestige under the system
in East Germany, but many of them have received increased
material benefits, especially political functionaries and
economic administrators. Young people are able to advance
rapidly in white-collar jobs, and many of them now have a stake
in the preservation of the system. This is reflected in a very
low refugee rate among young white-collar employees. Although
there are many strong opponents of the regime and of the system
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ttA
vi
in this group, they are for the most part isolated and have
no contact with one another. Furthermore, such people are
likely to conform .outwardly, and even to take an active part
in communist organizations, in order to get ahead in their jobs.
Young white-collar employees show a strong superficial influ-
ence of Marxist ideology, but fundamentally most of them are
politically apathetic. White-collar employees tend to have
more tolerance for opportunism than do workers, although both
groups realize that activity in the Party is not necessarily
an indication that a person is a convinced Communist.
Among independent peasants, shopkeepers, artisans, and
small manufacturers, political opinions are, of course, strongly
anticommunist, but there is little behavioral opposition to
socialization or to the regime. Since these groups are now
relatively small and disunited, they have only a low degree of
bargaining power, and there is no effective way that they can
express opposition. At the present time, they see no alterna-
tive but to co-operate with the regime unenthusiastically,
especially since the pace of collectivization is gradual and
they do not lose everything at once. The traditional German
middle class, and middle-class ways of thought, have thus all but
vanished from the East German scene.
vii
STAT
Students and intellectuals, second only to workers, are
a source of opposition to the regime. As in the case of labor,
these groups feel indispensable, and they also have a greater
sense of solidarity than do the white-collar employees or
the artisans and peasants. Their critical approach to the
regime tends to come from intellectual currents that have devel-
oped in East Germany and Eastern Europe rather than from the
West. Indeed, some intellectuals have complained that the
West offers them no reasonable alternative to the existing
order. Tendencies toward "Titoism" and other forms of Marxist
STAT
revisionism are strong
lectuals in the higher
Both students and
in these groups, and extend to intel-
ranks of the Party.
intellectuals have accounted for an
increasing proportion of refugees from East Germany during
the past months. In spite of the fact that these groups
pampered by the regime, their material privileges do not
to have reconciled them to their lack of freedom. It is
are
appear
the
Marxist revisionists among Party intellectuals, however, who
cause the Ulbricht regime the greatest headachei, since these
people see no future for themselves in the West and conse-
quently try to bring about reform in the East Zone. In recent
411 years, the major threats to Ulbricht's rule have come from
these circles in the Party.
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If the West were able to offer leadership and assistance
(i.e., if the power of the Soviet armed forces in East Germany
could be neutralized), there is little question that a large
majority of all groups in the East German population would
turn against the Ulbricht regime and support some form of
liberal democracy. In the absence of effective help from the
outside, however, accommodation to the existing order is pro-
ceeding, although the system has some built-in contradictions
that slow up this accommodation process.
Even in the absence of large-scale outside assistance
there appears to be some chance that revisionism might make
gradual headway from within -- possibly in the manner of Poland
if the various groups opposing the Ulbricht regime were ever
able to co-ordinate their efforts. Attempts to bring about
changes to date have been sparked either by the workers (1953)
or by the intellectuals (1956-57), but never by a combination
of the two. If both groups were able to work together, some
liberalization of the existing system might be achieved. This
probably would not be possible, however, if opposition groups
were dispirited by Western moves in the direction of recog-
nizing the Ulbricht regime.
This study is based largely on interviews with refugees from
East Germany and on the judgments of experts on East Germany
ix STAT
resident in West Berlin. Material from these sources has beSTAT
cross-checked and supplemented by published information whenever
possible.
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Summary
Introduction
TABLE OF CONTENTS
xi
STAT
Page.
iii
1
I.
Development of Political Attitudes Since 1950
6
Socialization of the Economy
17
III.
The Control System
24
The SED
24
The Mass Organizations
32
Military Controls
34
The Secret Police
44
Judicial Controls
45
Controls in the Universities
47
The Family -- A Refuge From Controls
52
?
IV.
Workers
60
Attitudes toward the Soviet Union
70
Attitudes toward the State, Its Goals and
Its Achievements
71
Solidarity -- Its Causes and Targets
77
Workers' Relations with the SED in Their
Factories
84
Young Workers
89
Labor's Bargaining Power
98
V.
White-Collar Employees
101
Political Attitudes of White-Collar Refugees
112
The Employee's Attitude toward His Work and
Place of Employment
119
Social Contacts within the Plant
121
White-Collar Youth
127
0
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Page.
xii
VI. The Transitionals -- Artisans, Retailers,
and Peasants
The Reactions of Artisans and Retailers ?
?
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129
130
Peasants
135
VII. The Students
141
Control, Indoctrination, and Communication
of Dissent
142
Political Opinion Among Students
148
Ambivalence and Revisionism
155
VIII. The Intellectuals
165
IX. East Germany's Basic Instability
180
Contradictions Within the System
181
The Sense of Impermanence
184
The Significance of Potential Instability
?
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187
Selected Bibliography
191
Appendix
197
11
411.
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xiii STAT
Table 1:
Table 2:
LIST OF TABLES
Workers' Opinions on Whether
Kampfgruppen Would Shoot
Political Thought Patterns of
STAT
.114.1g.t
43
Refugee Workers
72
Table 3:
How Refugee Workers Picture an
"Ideal State"
73
Table 4:
Attitudes on "People's Property"
Reported by Refugee Workers
74
Table 5:
Workers' Personal Attitude Toward Plant
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81
Table 6:
Nature of Refugee Workers' Relations
With SED Members in the Plant
86
Table 7:
Workers' Estimate of True Attitudes
of BPO Members
88
Table 8:
Intellectual Defectors, 1955-1958
167
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Introduction
STAT
Exactly how conditions in Soviet-occupied Germany are
related to the current Soviet and East German threat to West
Berlin has not been definitely established. Nevertheless, it
is abundantly clear that the fate of West Berlin and that of
the Soviet Zone are inextricably linked. Policies followed
by the Western powers in West Berlin have a powerful impact
on the Zone, and the pressure that the Soviets and the
Ulbricht regime have periodically brought on West Berlin has
always been closely co-ordinated with, if not actually
occasioned by, their plans for East Germany. It would,
therefore, appear that a study of political opinion in East
Germany might well contribute to a better understanding of the
current Berlin situation.
This memorandum only partially fills the need that the
authors hoped to satisfy. It cannot do so completely because
it is limited in scope and because it was conceived and
executed in great haste. The authors are well aware of its
unevenness and of many defects in it, and present the material
in this form only because they believe that the memorandum
may be more useful now in a rough state than it would be with
IP greater polish several months from now.
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The basis of this description of political opinion in
East Germany was a draft study prepared very rapidly by
Harold Hurwitz, an American scholar currently working at the
Free University of Berlin. This draft was reorganized by
Sibylle Crane of the RAND Social Science Division, who also
added material from published sources. W. P. Davison of the
RAND staff provided additional material from interviews con-
ducted in Berlin during February and May of this year and
wrote several brief sections.*
Because of the very limited time available for the col-
lectionand analysis of source material, it was necessary for
the authors to restrict themselves to relatively few published
sources and to rely principally on two other categories of
information. One of these consisted of a series of surveys
conducted on behalf of the Ministry of All-German Affairs by
INFRATEST, a market research organization with headquarters
in Munich. Only one of these surveys has been published.
The others were made available in mimeographed form through
the courtesy of officials of the Ministry of All-German
*
Material collected by Messrs. Hurwitz and Davison in
February 1959 provided the basis for pages 59-70 of an
earlier research memorandum, RAND RM-2340, "The German
Crisis: A Field Report," by H. Speier, W. P. Davison,
and L. Gourd, March 20, 1959. See also "Supplementary
Notes on the German Crisis: May-June 1959," by
W. P. Davison, RM-2407, July 1, 1959, pp. 47-66.
?
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3. STAT
Affairs. The other principal source consisted of persons and
agencies in West Berlin who had, over a period of years,
devoted themselves to study of conditions in the Soviet Zone.
Especially valuable material was provided by specialists in
agencies such as the Ministry of All-German Affairs, the
Social Democratic Party, the German Trade Union Federation,
the Christian Democratic Union, the Free University of Berlin,
and the League of Free Jurists*; and also by newsmen who had
followed events in East Germany over a period of years. In
addition, interviews were conducted with approximately twenty
recent refugees from East Germany, most of whom can be
classified as intellectuals.
The assembled material has been organized in such a way
as to present the available information on the state of
opinion of each of the principal population groups in the area:
workers, white-collar employees, independent entrepreneurs,
peasants, and intelligentsia. Sections have also been in-
cluded on the communist control system and on recent trends
in opinion.
This scheme of organization necessarily slights several
important areas of East German life. Economic matters are
See p. 46.
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referred to only tangentially.* Religious life should have
been dealt with in much greater detail, since the churches
are one of the very few remaining institutions not completely
under communist control. Ideally, more attention should also
have been given to the machinery and content of communist
propaganda and indoctrination, as propaganda is clearly one
of the primary instruments of control used by the Soviet Zone
regime.
A word on terminology may be useful. Among West
Berliners, the German territory under Soviet occupation is
commonly referred to as the "Soviet Zone" or just "The Zone."
Foreigners often find it convenient to refer to the area as
"East Germany," to distinguish it from West Germany, although
this designation sometimes meets with strenuous objections on
the grounds that most of East Germany is now under Polish
administration, and that the territory in question should be
referred to as "Central Germany." The Communists, and also
most non-Communists who have lived for some time in the area,
For fuller information on economic life in East Germany
see RM-2305, "Terms of Trade Between the Soviet Union
and Smaller Communist Countries, 1955 to 1957," by
Horst Mendershausen.
?
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usually refer to it by its official Soviet-conferred title STAT
as the "German Democratic Republic" or "DDR." In the present
memorandum it will be referred to variously as the Soviet
Zone, East Germany, or the DDR.
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I. Development of Political Attitudes
Since 1950
For some years after the Berlin Blockade, people from
the Soviet Zone of Germany, when visiting in West Berlin,
were apt to quote the old adage: "Rather a sudden and
terrible end than terror without end."* This is no longer
heard very often. Today, the characteristic reaction to life
under communism is more likely to be: "Not everything in the
West is good; not everything is bad in the East."
In attempting to explain this change in outlook, let us
examine some of the salient developments and characteristics
of the German Democratic Republic in recent years.
(a) As all observers of the East German scene appear to
agree, economic conditions and hence the standard of living
in the DDR have improved markedly, especially in the last two
years. Here, the findings of a survey of housewives may be
illustrative, which was conducted by INFRATEST in 1958, at a
time when the effect of the currency reform and the end of
rationing had already made themselves felt.** According to
* *
"Lieber em n Ende mit Schrecken als em n Schrecken ohne
Ende."
INFRATEST, "Alltagsleben der sowjetzonalen Bev8lkerung:
Alltagsverhalten und politische EinflUsse" (The Daily
Life of People in the Soviet Zone: Everyday Behavior
and Political Influences), 1959 (mimeographed). In
?
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STAT
STAT
the survey, one-half to two-thirds of East German households
consume three meals a day of substantially the same quality
as the meals that are normally eaten by employed people in
West Germany; from 10 to 20 per cent had a poorer diet.
Thirty-six per cent said they were able to save a portion of
their income. Thirty-seven per cent had been able to stock
up on food at least to a modest extent; only 15 per cent had
lacked the means to do so. Nine per cent of households owned
cars (compared with 14 per cent in the Federal Republic);
42 per cent had vacuum cleaners (54 per cent in the Federal
Republic), of which about one-quarter had been bought within
the previous two years. Ninety-one per cent had radios (one-
quarter of these acquired in the previous two years); 10 per
cent owned motorcycles or motor scooters;
sets (as against 9 per cent in the Federal
per cent of the women expressed themselves
5 per cent had TV
Republic). Sixty
satisfied with
their housing in the Zone; 15 per centagned their own homes.
The general picture that emerges from the housewife
survey is comparable to the situation that prevailed in West
evaluating the following figures, however, one should
bear in mind that the sample of 598 housewives did not
include an adequate representation of pensioners and
annuitants, who were hit hardest by the price rise that
followed the lifting of rationing.
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Germany in the first years after currency reform, although,
by comparison, East Germans lack the variety and choice
afforded by a free-market economy; they suffer also from
difficulties in obtaining the "minor" household items (e.g.,
safety pins, can openers) that a planned economy is apt to
ignore, as well as from a poorly-developed distribution
system. There is the seedy and neglected external picture
presented by their daily life, the crude quality and style of
their dress, the marks of wartime damage and of twenty-year
neglect in residential districts where houses have not been
repaired since the outbreak of World War II. People have not
become altogether accustomed to these things, especially
since they know from experience or from hearsay that life has
a very different "feel" and appearance in West Berlin and in
the Federal Republic.
There are indications that Soviet Zone inhabitants, in
drawing comparisons between East and West, no longer find the
material side of life the chief criterion for distinguishing
between the two parts of Germany. This tendency to focus on
other than economic factors is illustrated by reports of
housewives who had taken vacations in West Germany during
1956 and 1957, before the Ulbricht regime radically curtailed
*A survey, compiled by the West German government, comparing
the level of living ot . average consumers in East and West Germany
is reproduced as an appendix at the end of this memorandum.
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9. STAT
STAT
visits to the West.* (Twenty-three per cent of the housewives
interviewed had done so.) When they were asked what they had
especially enjoyed, a majority referred to the "different" or
"free" atmosphere, or the "life in the West in general." By
contrast, material comforts, good quarters, and good food play
an important, although far from dominating, role for those
East Germans who take vacations in the Soviet Zone. People
who travel to West Germany apparently tend to take these
material comforts for granted.**
* *
?
The East German authorities now issue less than one-
quarter the number of passes for visits to the West that
they did before the present severe travel restrictions
were introduced in December 1957.
In reply to a question as to what they had considered
especially good about their vacations, both in the
Federal Republic and in the Soviet Zone, housewives
replied as follows:
Vacations in the DDR:
per cent
Landscape
38
Rest, relaxation
26
Quarters
19
Food
16
Chance to do what one wanted during the day
7
Sightseeing
4
Organization of the trip
2
Other things
2
Vacations in the Federal Republic (note the very
different order and emphasis):
Life in the West in general, the
Being together with relatives
Landscape
Food
The articles offered in the shops (variety)
Quiet and relaxation
Other things
free atmosphere 53
31
16
4
3
2
2
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10.
If consciousness of gradual material improvement in the
Zone is expressed by refugees, it must be assumed to be still
stronger in those who do not flee, and to affect their atti-
tudes toward the communist state in considerable measure.
(b) The Ulbricht regime has made substantial progiess
in transforming the social structure according to the commu-
nist formula, and this has resulted in giving large elements
of the population a vested interest in the system. The
educational opportunities available
to young people, and the
promotion opportunities which the system offers to those who
conform politically, have meant that the social movement of
????
many individuals
collar employees
belonged to that
has been upward. For example, of 128 white-
questioned in 1957, only 34 per cent had
class before 1946, and 24 per cent had
entered it directly upon leaving school. The remainder
(roughly 40 per cent) had become white-collar employees after
some other professional experience: half of them had been
workers, skilled craftsmen, or small tradesmen. Only 4 per
cent of the total could be said to have descended from a
higher status when they became white-collar employees.
By contrast, some evidence of downward mobility between
generations emerged when 18 per cent of the 295 workers
tr.,!
?
11. STAT
STAT
questioned reported that their parents had engaged in occu-
pations which enjoyed higher social status.
(c) Hope for German reunification has receded steadily
over the years, particularly since the mass strike of June 17,
1953, which failed to bring forth Western support in either
military or diplomatic form.* While the desire for reunifi-
cation still remains strong, the feeling of its waning likeli-
hood is bound to increase people's willingness to accommodate
themselves to life under present conditions. By the same
token, the failure of the June 17 revolt has made people
cautious about taking action against the regime.** What
action is taken is likely to be motivated less by hope for
liberation or reunification than by the hope that improvements
can be made within the framework of the system and special
grievances thereby eliminated.
* *
For example, less than one-fourth of the white-collar
workers questioned in 1957, and only 20 per cent of
housewives interviewed in 1958, held firmly to a belief
in the possibility of reunification. Of a cross-section
of refugees interviewed since the beginning of the
present crisis, only 12 per cent thought that reunifi-
cation would "definitely" take place during the next few
years.
For example, in 1952, 43 per cent of the clandestine
readers of a forbidden intellectual magazine shared the
copies they picked up in West Berlin with five or more
persons at home in the Zone. In 1954, one year after
the June uprising had failed, this was true of only 20
per cent.
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r!!'
12.
(d) Since the death of Stalin, the Ulbricht regime has
been more arbitrary and relentless than the regime in almost
any other communist state. Reforms that have been carried
out in the Soviet Union and in other satellite nations in
recent years have not been extended to the DDR, apparently
because the new order is considered especially vulnerable in
the divided country. The regime continues to be unequivocally
committed to a slave-driving "speed-up" system with wage
rates based on piecework; to the principle of exemplary
punishment (that is to say, terror by example rather than mass
persecution);
to a spoils system dependent on Party member-
ship and extraprofessional activity in the political organi-
zations of the totalitarian state; to a control system that
seeks to penetrate the individual's private sphere; and to
an aggressive attempt, through education and propaganda, to
build what is called 'socialist consciousness" and morale.
In part, however, this relentlessness has boomeranged,
since it has tended to limit the pace and degree of people's
accommodation to the system. The willingness and ability of
the individual to accommodate himself vary, of course, in
accordance with his social and professional position in the
system. But all in all, while the social structure has been
transformed radically, people's minds have been influenced
?
STAT
?
STAT
very imperfectly from a communist point of view, and only a
very small minority today identifies itself consciously and
completely with the system in its present form. INFRATEST
and other survey materials reveal, and expert observers are
agreed, that the vast majority of people exhibit ambivalence
and confusion in their thinking. Vestiges of traditional
Western values rest side by side with elements of communist
ideology.* Antagonism against the regime, often accompanied
by withdrawal into the less vulnerable
to be contradicted by pride in visible
only one's own, but those of state and
production, reconstruction, etc.). It
private sphere, seems
accomplishments, not
community (rising
is a curious fact that
such innovations as land reform and the socialization of
industry, which the state counts among its "fundamental
achievements," are widely approved in the abstract (especially
by workers and peasants), but are not credited to the regime.
On the other hand, many so-called "derived," or secondary,
achievements -- such as educational opportunities for youth
and social fringe benefits -- are widely acknowledged as
An INFRATEST survey conducted early in 1959 noted that,
while East Germans overwhelmingly consider themselves
non-Communists, they tend to use communist terminology
in discussing political questions.
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communist accomplishments, without apparent awareness that
they are common practice in West Germany and most other
Western nations.
The condition here described might be regarded as charac-
teristic of any people in the process of transition to
communism. But for the East Germans this transition is pro-
ceeding under atypical circumstances. Most of them retain a
memory of "better times," be it of the higher standard of
living they enjoyed under
more varied cultural fare
over, they are constantly
the Nazis before the war, or of the
during the Weimar Republic. More-
comparing their lot with conditions
in the Federal Republic and Berlin. And the continued
division of the country also no doubt helps to raise the level
of their aspirations by furnishing them with two alternatives
not open to other satellite citizens: (1) they can "change
worlds" within their own country by fleeing to West Berlin;
and (2) they can cling to the dream of reunification. In
addition, they can hope for relaxation of arbitrariness, on
the Polish model, within the existing cbmmunist system.
Constant awareness of these alternatives pervades their
thinking and confounds their attitude vis--vis their totali-
tarian regime. Nevertheless, in the guarded opinion of many
experts questioned, the process of accommodation to the
?
15.
communist order, though far from complete now, is likely to
progress further toward acceptance of the new order as long
as there is no reunification in freedom, or unless strong
measures are taken by the West to inhibit further acceptance
Relatively few of those whose attitudes are colored by
the open alternative of flight actually flee the Zone. For
the remainder, though the East-West comparison may raise
their aspirations and keep them aloof from identification
with communism -- and thus sustain a state of mind favorable
to at least passive resistance -- the continued possibility
of escape can act as a cushion against the kind of despair
that breeds rebellion. Thus, freedom of access to West
Berlin, which has helped to keep alive both the possibility
of flight and the hope of reunification
been an important safety valve for East
presence of the Western show-window has
in freedom, also has
Germans.* The
rendered Ulbricht 'S
efforts at consolidation and stabilization in the DDR more
difficult in many ways, but the existence of an escape hatch
For example, East Berliners who distribute forbidden
publications tend to be less active than dissenters who
live far away and do not enjoy ready and frequent access
to the West Berlin safety valve. It may also be relevant
that the June 17 strikes began in East Berlin, but took
a more mature, deliberate, and organized form in the
more distant industrial cities.
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STAT
STAT
I!
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16.
also haskelped him indirectly by making the lot of Soviet
Zone residents seem more bearable.
?
17. STAT
II. Socialization of the Economy
The following figures may convey something of the di-
rection and the tempo of social transformation in the Soviet
Zone. By October 1, 1958, 88.7 per cent of industrial pro-
duction was conducted in socialized plants (Volkseigene
Betriebe, or VEB's). As of mid-1957, 32.7 per cent of all
productive agricultural farmland belonged to the so-called .
"socialist sector," which consists primarily of agricultural
collectives (LPG's). These collectives, which extended over
24.1 per cent of productive farmland in 1957, now involve
almost half of it. From 30 per cent in 1956, the trade that
passed through what remained of the private sector had
dropped to 15-20 per cent at the last estimate available for
this memorandum. Small handicraft (enterprises with up to
ten employees) remained largely in private hands until 1958.*
In the course of 1958, socialization was stepped up
vigorously. Toward the end of the year, owners of private
industrial plants, pressed by material shortages, taxes, lack
Cf. SBZ von A bis Z, Ein Taschen- und Nachschlagebuch
Uber die Sowjetische Besatzungszone Deutschlands (The
SBZ [Soviet-occupied Zone] from A to Z: A Pocket
Reference Book about the Soviet Zone of Occupation in
Germany), Bonn, 4th edition, 1958; and information
supplied by the Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher
Juristen (Free Jurists).
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STAT
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18.
of credit, and inability to hire workers, were "induced" to
apply for state participation in their enterprises. The
result has been a sudden and striking increase in the number
of "half-socialist enterprises" -- an idea the DDR has borrowed
from China rather than from the Soviet Union. As of January 1,
1959, the gross product from these plants was 4.5 per cent of
the country's total (as compared to only 2.4 per cent the
previous October), and of the 11,600 enterprises that still
remained in private hands, 5,600 had already applied for state
participation. While owners of "half-socialist" plants are
still called capitalists, their principal problems are handled
and solved by the state. Many of these owners are permitted
to withdraw only up to a stated amount from the business each
month, regardless of profits; i.e., they are on what amounts
to a salary. No one doubts that this is but a transition
to full socialization, and that what remains of private
industry will before long be captured by the socialist sector
in this manner, which is more economical for the state than
sudden transfer would be.
Far less subtle has been the treatment of trades and
handicrafts. Up to 1958, the regime had given considerable
freedom to private enterprises of this type, and waning
competition and rising consumer needs had allowed them to
a.
STAT
19.
STAT
flourish, often more so than would have been the case in West
Germany. Beginning in early 1958, however, all establishments
with more than three employees were forced to join production
co-operatives. So aggressively was the new policy pushed
that, within a few months, only 7-8 per cent of all butchers
were still independent (as compared to 90 per cent prior to
1958), and 40 per cent of barbers and hairdressers had been
organized in co-ops. On the other hand, bakers were treated
cautiously for fear that too sudden action would disturb
supply. Otherwise, the effects of the socialization
"onslaught" were so violent that a visiting Soviet commission
called a halt to it in the fall of 1958, and for the moment
the action is on ice.
No recent statistics are available on the rate of
collectivization of retail shops, but observers report that a
large proportion of retailers were forced out of business in
1958. Particularly in June, when rationing was lifted, many
shops were simply confiscated -- usually after thecwners had
been accused of violating regulations governing retail
trade -- and were added to the network of outlets of the
Handelsorganisation, or HO (the state-controlled retail trade
organization). In a few cases, the former proprietors were
allowed to stay on as managers.
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20.
By contrast with other sectors of the population, only a
sizable portion of the peasantry has thus far submitted, or
been forced to submit, to socialization. The land reform
carried out immediately after the war created a class of so-
called "new peasants" (Neubauern), who had been given very
small holdings. In general, the 1945 land reform was a
popular one, and is considered one of the regime's "basic
achievements." It has the approval, at least in principle,
not only of most East Germans, but of many experts and
political leaders in West Germany. However, East German
peasants are aware that they are slated for collectivization;
and anti-regime feeling among them is said to be strong.
In 1952 and 1953, when agricultural collectives were
first established in sizable numbers, there was an immediate
upsurge in
within two
the tide of peasant refugees, and 19,000 fled
years. Since then, the flood has receded (only
2,595 peasants
doubt, because
fled in 1957, and 1,814 in 1958), partly, no
the difficulty of finding new farms in the West
has become apparent to those who might otherwise be inclined
to flee.* At the Fifth Party Congress of the SED**, in July
Dr. Siegfried Friebe, "Die deutsche FlUchtlingsfrage"
(The German Refugee Prbbleml STZ-Archiv, October 20, 1958,
p. 299.
The initials SED stand for Sozialistische Einheituartei
Deutschlands (German Socialist Unity Party), the name of
the communist party in the Soviet Zone.
1
?
STAT
L.
STAT
1958, a step-up in the creation of collectives was announced.
The effects of the intensified drive have become very notice-
able. About three thousand new units have been founded in the
last year. No more than 53 per cent of farmland is now owned
by individual farmers, and the plan to have one-half of-agri-
culture collectivized by 1960 will doubtless be realized.
The "voluntary" development toward collectivization creeps
along steadily under duress in spite of stubborn resistance
by the peasants to governmental pressure in the form of rising
delivery quotas, tax burdens, poor supply of seed and feed,
and other kinds of harassment.
A former Soviet Zone official concerned with agriculture,
who fled to West Berlin early in 1959, predicted that 85 per
cent of all farms would be collectivized within the next three
years. He explained that at the present time it is possible
to keep a family farm in operation only by dint of incredibly
long hours of hard work by members of the family. But, as
the parents die or retire, the younger generation, deprived
of the modern equipment that is available only to the
collectives, tend to give up the fight. Some allow themselves
to be collectivized, some leave the farm and take industrial
employment, and some flee to the West.
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If collectivization were to be sudden and universal, it
might conceivably lead to disorders. Otherwise, it is
important to remember that the peasantry is notoriously slow
to join rebellions that originate in the cities. The ties
between city and country have not been strong in Germany for
generations, and they appear not to have been strengthened
noticeably by the fact that a sizable proportion of today's
working and white-collar population are 01F:children of
peasants. It remains to be seen whether the more and more
frequent forced employment of urban "volunteers" on the farms
at planting and harvesting time will lead to a greater feeling
of solidarity between opposition-minded people in city and
country.
In general, the anticommunism of those who are victimized
or threatened by socialization may be taken for granted.
though a kind of reinsurance through membership and active
Participation in the SED does occur, it is not widespread.
For such opportunists are then commissioned with the lonely
task of spark-plugging socialization in their hostile environ-
ments. However, those in trade, handicraft, and industry who
today are still independent property owners are likely to be
very cautious about expressing their anticommunist attitudes
in view of their material concerns, the precariousness of
Even
ii
STAT
STAT
their situation, and their fundamental lack of real inde-
pendence. Also, the fact that even with their total loss of
independence through socialization they do not stand to lose
their livelihood is bound to act as a brake on oppositionist
reactions, as long as the regime remains stable. Any relax-
ation of controls, however, that seemed to promise greater
liberty within the system or heralded the possibility of
reunification in freedom might release some of the opposition,
now cautiously repressed, by productive property owners who
have been dispossessed or may fear to be. Any genuine
opportunity to realize a common goal of that kind with re-
bellious workers or students, that is, with groups who are
better prepared to sustain and express opposition, might even
encourage those remaining private
in demonstrations, and to seek to
In such a situation, however, the
the decisive, factor would be any
peasants and urban dwellers.
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owners to join spontaneously
provide leadership for them.
most important, and perhaps
act of solidarity between
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?-?
III. The Control System
It could be said that the machinery for keeping the
population under control involves the entire state apparatus
and all the political formations of the Soviet Zone, including
the trade unions.
The most important direct controls,
however, are exercised by the SED, the "mass organizations,"
the judiciary, the military, and the police.
The SED
The deliberate transformation of the SED from a mass
organization into a communist cadre party began about 1948.
Since then, membership has been possible only by way of
"candidacy," with every candidate subject to the most careful
screening, and the growth in membership has been correspond-
ingly slow. As of 1958, the total number of Party members
and candidates stood at 1,473,932, an increase of 59,619 over
the previous year. As to its social composition, the last
official breakdown available (as of the end of 1957) was as
follows:*
Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den V. Parteitag
(Report of the Central Committee to the Fifth Party
Congress), July 1958, p. 154.
Workers (skilled and unskilled)
White-collar employees and members
of the intelligentsia
Peasants in agricultural collectives
Peasants
Others (handicrafts, housewives,
retired persons, etc.)
2 5 . STAT
STAT
per cent
33.8
42.3
2.9
2.1
18.9
Between 1957 and 1958, the proportion of women in the ranks
rose from 20 per cent to 23.5 per cent; that of youth (the
age span included in this category is not known) from 5.4
per cent to 7.7 per cent.
Party functionaries tend largely to be drawn from the
white-collar group. According to the report of the 36th
plenary session of the SED Central Committee in June 1958,
only 29.7 per cent of 310,000 functionaries elected that year
were workers.*
*
According to the "Ostbdro" of the Social Democratic
Party (SPD), the SED has difficulty recruiting function-
aries from among Party members. In one instance, factory
trade union elections had to be postponed by two months
for lack of candidates. Trade union delegates are
exposed to strong pressure from the workers on the one
hand and to the political risk of representing them and
seconding their grievances on the other. Non-Party
workers are equally reluctant to accept delegate
positions, and for the same reasons. The dilemma of the
functionary who is caught between Party directives from
the top and grievance situations at the base is apparent
also in the cultural sphere, in economic planning, and
in civil administration.
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26.
About two years ago, the pyramid form of transmission
of SED controls was replaced by the so-called "instructor
system." Instructors, who are both trouble-shooters and
controllers, are assigned by Party centers at the various
levels. Thus, instructors sent out from the top may suddenly
turn up at the district level to evaluate or supervise the
work there, and in some instances (e.g., Erfurt and Halle)
top-level Party instructors have brought about the removal of
district Party secretaries. The district, in turn, sends
instructors into local country and city organizations
and into the factories.
To the factories, instructors are assigned not individu-
ally but in groups. Their heaviest concentration is in
production areas that are most important for plan fulfillment
and for export, such as the chemical and machine-building
industries. This causes neglect of other industries, and
slows up the functioning of the apparatus in these areas.
Apparently an emergency measure, the instructor system gives
evidence of having been effective at crucial points in the
Party organization and the economy.
The following are assorted impressions and data gathered
from the reports of various East Zone defectors who have had
personal experience of the workings of SED controls and the
STAT
2 7 .
STAT
degree to which they affect, or fail to affect, prevailing
attitudes in factories and administrative departments.
A woman SED functionary, who had worked in one of the
Party's fifteen district headquarters, gave individual
descriptions of all personnel (a total of 200-odd, including
about 70 technical personnel), from which it would be possible
to draw a loyalty sociogram for the entire staff. From her
own vantage point as a section head in the headquarters
organization, she saw leaders at the very top (the secretaries
and the most important division chiefs) as convinced and very
active Communists, but she described them as being polite and
easy to get along with. She thought only a few of them
capable of denouncing anyone.
A considerable number of functionaries on her own level
and just above her, including division chiefs, she called
eager and ambitious. The most ambitious political function-
aries included both the truly dangerous type and the bluffers.
On June 17, 1953, and during the Hungarian uprising in 1956,
the former behaved like fanatics; the latter were confused
and tried to test the way of the wind. She regarded the
instructors, however, as most dangerous. There were a few
individuals, including some section chiefs, with whom one
could discuss political matters frankly and to whom one could
??
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28.
even voice critical judgments. But the most disaffected
element, according to the informant, was to be found among
the technical personnel and chauffeurs, i.e., groups outside
the political advancement hierarchy. By contrast, the
secretaries of leading functionaries were more closely identi-
fied with the Party, either by conviction or through pro-
fessional or personal ambition. There were not many women in
leading positions (none among division chiefs, and only a
few among section heads).
Speaking of the situation as it existed when she fled to
the West in the spring of 1957, the informant
described a
distinct political cleavage within the staff. In the period
of the 1956 thaw, before the Hungarian events, seating in the
canteen had ceased to be according to rank (leading function-
aries at one table, lower echelons and technical personnel at
another). Instead, "from where they were seated you could
tell with whom you could afford to talk reasonably, and who
belonged to the dangerous and fanatic functionaries....The
last type was avoided; one got out of their way....They were
the functionaries of the BPKK [District Party Control
Commission], most members of the Agitprop Division, and so
on."
of-lItIp
A
prov
-
STAT
STAT
Discussion themes in the canteen among those who were
not fanatics were likely to include Gomulka, what happened in
Hungary, Stalin, or the comparative living standards in East
and West Germany. Anyone stupid enough to tell tales of
economic misery in West Germany, and of workers going barefoot
there, would get a hysterical panning. The reporter painted a
picture of one disillusioned Communist whose job it was to
report to the Central Committee in East Berlin on the status
of public opinion. She thought that he took a sadistic
pleasure in piling up the evidence of Ulbricht's great unpopu-
larity.
After June 17, 1953, Party secretaries, division heads,
and county (Kreis) Party secretaries were permitted to carry
pistols. The same informant described how this permission
was extended, after the Hungarian revolt, to a wider circle of
SED members. For example, weapons were given to district
attorneys and judges, but were denied to certain individuals
regardless of their position or formal party status. This
drew attention to them as unreliables.
During the Hungarian crisis, the radio in the district
Party headquarters was on all the time. Groups gathered in
hallways, and there was much conferring behind closed doors
in the security section. Most of the Party personnel, the
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30.
informant thought, were prepared to act in defense of the
regime if the Hungarian revolution spread to Germany. Even
critical people in the Party apparatus were frightened. For
the first time, technical personnel who had maintained a
withdrawn and noncommittal attitude in the past showed their
minds, revealing that they had little love ior the regime but
that they were also worried about their personal safety. In
this they were one with responsible functionaries. The
Budapest lynchings were on everybody's mind. The informant
reports great general relief in Party headquarters when the
Hungarian revolution was crushed. Afterward, there was a
collection for Hungarian relief and everyone contributed
eagerly.
In May 1959 it was learned that Party members would
henceforth be expected to qualify as reservists in the "People's
Army." This is the latest in a series of measures apparently
aimed to prepare the SED for immediate military action in case
of civil war.
A former section head in another SED district headquarters
reported a number of serious weaknesses in her department,
which was responsible for supervising civil administration in
the region. The annual turnover of these Party functionaries,
who were responsible for dealing with the state apparatus, ran
I)
?1+
STAT
3 1 .
STAT
as ugh as 33 per cent, often making effective Party supervision
entirely impossible. Able functionaries working in the Party's
district headquarters tended to seek, and often could obtain,
transfers to better posts in the civil government, economic
administration, or industry. Less capable SED functionaries
from the district headquarters who were sent out to instruct
or supervise the work of civil administration were not taken
seriously by government personnel because they lacked knowledge
of the subject.
In one highly industrial area, 50 per cent of the SED
members were reported to be workers. However, a dispro-
portionately large number of these were older people, formerly
in the Social Democratic Party, who, being too old to flee,
were remaining quiet and inactive while waiting for their
pensions. The recruiting of younger people was said to be slow,
typical reactions being: "We want to remain free," "We want
to work at our professional education," or "Party business
interferes with professional work." The informant also cited
evidence that older workers influenced their younger colleagues
*against taking part in the work of the Party.*
The age pyramid in the SED is, however, gradually becoming
less top-heavy, to judge by the latest available official
statistics cited above.
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The Mass Organizations
Among other vehicles of communist control are the so-
called "mass organizations." Formally the most inclusive but
actually one of the weakest of these is the "National Front,"
which is supposed to organize the entire community for partici-
pation in political life. Thus, it is expected to catch those
sections of the population who manage to evade affiliation
with the trade unions, sport organizations, or movements for
youth, women, and so on. The National Front, however, exists
more on paper than in reality. Although it was founded in
1949, only half of its planned number of village and neighbor-
hood committees are said to have ever reallylnen established;
and most of these now function either very poorly or not at all.
One of its principal remaining tasks is to serve as a vast
agency for reporting on public opinion, but the weakness of the
organization on the neighborhood level has caused the Front to
fail in this mission. The originally-stated objective of the
National Front, to organize an "all-German" and "antifascist"
movement for German reunification in the communist sense, has
all but disappeared from view.
Mass organizations that are much more intimately inter-
woven in the lives of the people show similar weaknesses. In
the Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB), there appears
.44?P'
STAT
qq
STAT
to have been a marked slowing down, especially noticeable
since early 1958, in the response of the apparatus to political
events and in the communication of action directives from
higher to lower levels. For instance, the FDGB leadership was
said to be very slow in reacting to the Soviet note of November
27, 1958, with regard to the status of Berlin.
Former communist officials suggest several reasons for
this slowing down. One is that many members of the FDGB
hierarchy are only nominally Communists and have no real
interest in furthering the objectives of the Soviet Zone rulers.
Another is that trade union officialdom has become more and more
"bourgeois," and most functionaries would rather hurry home to
enjoy their recently-improved standard of living than give
overtime to catching up on their paperwork. A third reason is
that experienced functionaries arc always alive to the possi-
bility that the Party line may suddenly be modified or reversed;
a certain deliberateness in acting on instructions therefore
serves as insurance that one will not later be aCcused of
misinterpretation or overhasty action.
Experts report a similar development within the Free
German Youth (FDJ), but vary in their appraisal of its meaning
and importance. The failure to bind young people to the new
order by organizing their free time and molding their minds
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34.
was reflected in data made public at the Sixth Congress of
the FDJ in May 1959. The organization reported a membership
of 1,760,000, or about one-half of the youth in the Soviet
Zone, and of these members only from 33 to 48 per cent were
paid up on their dues. In 1958 only 83,000 FDJ members applied
to become candidates of the SED. Most of those who join the
FDJ do so to qualify for a job or for a higher education and
later let their membership lapse, although they are encouraged
to remain active until they are 26 years old.
The consensus of expert observers and of refugees is that
these mass organizations fall far short of fulfilling their
stated political missions, and that the women's and sport
organizations are even weaker. However, the significance of
this weakness should not be exaggerated. As long as military
and police support continues strong, the shortcomings of the
political control apparatus cannot seriously endanger the
regime.
Military Controls
The role of the Soviet occupation forces in discouraging
any possible unrest is an obvious one and does not require our
attention here. Though present as before, Soviet forces have
become far less conspicuous in recent years. This is not so
much because their numbers have been reduced, but because
STAT
3 5 .
STAT
they are now concentrated in certain areas and their movements.
have been restricted. Members of the German population thus
rarely see Soviet troops, although nearly everyone is conscious
of their presence.
The German military establishment in the Soviet Zone
includes, according to West German authorities, some 190,000
men under arms, and in addition about 120,000 in the reserves.
Approximately 10 per
are officers, 15 per
for officers and for
cent of the German National People's Army
cent subalterns. There are fourteen schools
specialized training. Numerically, the
190,000-man establishment is broken down as follows: the
ground force numbers 90,000; the navy, 10,000; and the air
force, 11,000. In addition there are 35-40,000 elite troops in
the border guard and 8,000 in military police units regulating
domestic and interzonal traffic. Also included are about
30,000 men in the so-called "alert troops" (Bereitschaften),
which are tined for emergency military police duties. If
one counts paramilitary units as well as these regulars, then
the regime has an armed force of over one million men and women
at its disposal. Such equipment as the Soviets permit the
People's Army to have is of the highest quality.*
(This is,
According to a recent estimate by a spokesman of the Bonn
Ministr)? of Defense, the East German armed forces at present
have 2,000 artillery pieces, 15,000 armored cars, 200 pLanes,
and 100 war ships.
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36.
of course, not the case with paramilitary units.) In the train-
ing of all units, the major emphasis is on action to be taken
in case of domestic unrest.
A majority of the students of the Soviet Zone armed forces
agree that the morale of the DDR's regular military establish-
ment is high and its loyalty to the ruling order strong and
unquestioning. A few observers insist, however, that there is
still room for doubt whether the rank-and-file would actually
fire on West German troops if it came to a showdown. The only
controversy recently mentioned as having been noted within the
armed forces concerned fraternization between officers and men.
This is now being officially condemned as resulting from a
"false view of socialism." Morale follows the familiar pattern
of being highest in the air force, and higher in tank units
than in the infantry. Military personnel are deliberately kept
isolated from contact with the civilian population; no one
below the rank of captain is allowed to wear civilian clothes
while on leave.
A recent program for the creation of so-called "socialist
cadres" aims at overcoming the isolation of the army in the
political system, at furthering a political sense of solidarity
within the army, and at softening some of the antagonism of
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STAT
1/
STAT
the civilian population. Under it, young soldiers pledge them-
selves to contribute to the current five-year plan and to study
the speeches, programs, and classical writings of the Party.
Among other things, the new program provides that general
officers shall serve as common soldiers with units other than
their own for four weeks out of every year, and that contacts
shall take place between soldiers and the workers and employees
of industrial plants in the form of visits and discussions.
The authors of a comprehensive study of the Soviet Zone
armed forces found that tensions among military personnel were
mainly of an organizational nature: adjustment crises among
recruits, the problem of whether or not to promote young officers
who were political appointees but proved to be poor soldiers,
and so on.*
Such things, the authors say, do not cause oppo-
sition against the system, but only against its methods, and
would "hardly seriously endanger the striking power of the
People's Army. Even a severe crisis for the system, like the
June 17 uprising, is not sufficient to endanger the striking
power of this military apparatus." Nearly half the officers
above the rank of major have either been trained in the Soviet
Helmut Bohn et al., Die Aufij:itnnt in der Sowjetischen
Besatzungszone Deutschland; (e.:Irmament in the Soviet Zone
of Occupation of Germany), Bonn, 1953, p. 174. ?
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re"
38.
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Union or were Communists before 1945. The weakness in the
People's Army will become politically significant, these experts
conclude, only when "the whole regime has been caught in a
crisis for which there is no remedy."*
The reliability of the army is due in part to care in
selecting recruits, but appears to be heightened by army life
itself. A good index is the rate of defections from military
units, which dropped sharply from 1,494 in the first nine months
of 1957 to only 686 in all of 1958. The decline was most
noticeable after the outbreak of the Berlin crisis: 86 in
October, 69 in November, and still fewer in December.
Defection by officers is most unusual, and, according to a
newsman well informed on the subject, for several years there
has hardly been a defector above the rank of captain. Remark-
able also is the low rate of defection among the border troops,
where opportunity for escape is particularly good.
Another indication of high morale is the eager response to
the newly-created "reservist associations," a means by which
inactive soldiers maintain friendly social contact.
Refugee interviews have revealed a hostility against the
People's Army on the part of the population in general stronger
Ibid., pp. 112-124.
?
STAT
nn
STAT
than that against the SED. Almost two-thirds of the white-
collar group questioned showed hostility. Of the 37 per cent
who showed none, some allowed that the army was necessary for
"defense" or fulfilled an "educational" function, but only a
few were decidedly favorable to it, arguing that "after all
the Federal Republic has its army." All hostile responses
were directed against the army as an institution rather than
against individuals in it; few of those questioned had any
contact with its members. The impression seemed general that
enlistment, although supposedly voluntary, was promoted by
political pressure, and hostility toward military personnel in
general was occasionally qualified by such apologetic remarks
as "they are forced to be in the army."
An ambitious system of paramilitary training seeks to
involve personnel from youth organizations, schools, univer-
sities, factories, and administrative offices throughout the
DDR. The purpose of this program is sometimes said to be to
compensate for the weakness of the
political control machinery of the
out principally by the Society for
unpopular and ineffectual
Party. Training is carried
Sport and Technical Science
(GST), which provides military instruction for 14- to 24-year-
olds, and the so-called "fighting units" (Kampfgruppen), which
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40.
are paramilitary organizations for older persons.
Probably not more than one-fourth of the Sport Society's
650,000 nominal members are at all active, and the political
reliability of even this minority is questionable. The
Society's organizational strength lies in the schools, where
participation can be compelled most easily; it is weakest in
the universities, where passive intellectual resistance is
widespread. So far it has failed to create an effective militia.
While the Society for Sport and Technical Science is
responsible to the state apparatus, the Kampfgruppen are ex-
plicitly suborganizations of the SED. Recruiting is done by
local Party organizations, although reliable non-Party persons
can be enlisted and military instruction is handled by officers
of the People's Police, who must belong to the SED. Members
include the politically most reliable personnel in socialized
industries, on collective farms and tractor stations, in Party
headquarters, and in state administrations. Their proclaimed
purpose
against
ized in
is to "defend the achievements" of the new order
internal or external "class enemies." They are organ-
companies of one hundred men, wear uniforms during
exercises, and receive four hours of training per week with
light arms. West German authorities estimate the size of the
itized Coov AriDrov
STAT
STAT
Kampfgruppen at 250,000 and consider that one-half could be
put into action in the event of an emergency.
The views of experts differ as to the ultimate reliability
of the Kampfgruppen. Some feel that they could be trusted to
fulfill their prime function of quelling domestic disturbances,
a view that is supported by the report of a district head-
quarters Party functionary already cited. Others
the reliability of these units will depend on the
under which they are expected to act, and on "who
believe that
conditions
shoots first."
According to this view, while most units would probably shoot
agents who landed by parachute, they might not show discipline
in the event of a general strike.
In this connection, the organization and social composi-
tion of the Kampfgruppen are important. There seems to be
little enthusiasm for joining these units, but many of the more
ambitious are moved to join simply by their desire not to seem
lacking in reliability. It was generally reported by refugee
workers that between 5 and 10 per cent of the work force
normally took part in the Kampfgruppen. The proportions are
much higher in state and Party administrations than in industry,
and the proportion of white-collar personnel employed in an
? industrial plant who join the Kampfgruppen is considerably
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*1,
higher than that of workers. Reports from an SED district
Party headquarters and from a number of factories reveal that
it is common for leading personnel, who must belong to the
Kampfgruppen, to avoid active participation in their exercises.
Some doubt about the reliability of the Kampfgruppen has
been indicated by the Ulbricht regime itself. During the
Hungarian revolution, the police collected the weapons that
had been assigned to these units, and since then special pre-
cautions have been taken to prevent the plundering of weapon
stores. Only a very few of the most reliable members of each
unit have access to the storage vaults -- presumably those who
might be expected to turn a machine-gun on strikers if necessary.
The military value of the Kampfgruppen might easily stand or
fall on the reliability of these few in command positions.
When 77 refugee industrial workers were asked in 1956
whether they regarded the members of Kampfgruppen as reliable,
they replied as follows:
most are reliable, dangerous, etc.
not wholly reliable -- many insecure elements
largely unreliable
absolutely unreliable
no opinion -- neither, nor
per cent
19
19
35
10
17
For information on this source, see footnote on p. 60.
STAT
7-1-59
6 n
STAT
Thus, a plurality felt that, from a communist point of view
the Kampfgruppen members were largely or absolutely unreliable.
However, when the same workers were asked, at another point,
whether the Kampfgruppen "would shoot in a serious situation,"
more than half thought that they would, or might, shoot:
Table 1
Workers' Opinions on Whether Kampfgruppen Would Shoot
Depth interviews(76)* Opinion survey(295)
(per cent) (per cent)
"probably" would shoot
might shoot
would not shoot
no opinion,unclassifiable
47
23
27
3
100
57
5
31
7
100
It is possible that the seeming inconsistency in the judgment
that the Kampfgruppen on the whole are not very reliable, but
that they would shoot, can be explained by the fact that the
respondents were thinking of different members of the units
and of different situations when answering the two questions
in such seemingly contradictory fashion. In their answers to
the first, they doubtless remembered the many unreliable persons
The INFRATEST findings based on "depth interviews" with
workers do not always indicate the same number of respond-
ents, since it may happen that an interviewer misses a
question or that he cannot prevent the respondent from
going off on a tangent. The number most frequently given
is 76, but some of the findings were based on 77 inter-
views, and a few on only 74 and 75.
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they knew in the Kampfgruppen; in responding to the second
question, they may have thought of the few true Communists in
positions of command and responsibility who could be counted
on to obey orders, and who would in turn be obeyed simply
because they were in command. This would tally with the wry
self-appraisal that one often hears from Germans, who admit --
at the same time that they criticize -- their own ingrained
obedience.
The Secret Police
In contrast to the uniformed security organizations in
Hungary and in the Soviet Union under Stalin, East German
security police have never become the most despised institution
in the
Soviet
German
country. This is partly because the Red Army and the
military security authorities took the place of domestic
police during the early postwar years, when terror and
physical persecution were most rampant. Especially since 1953,
the East German State Security Service (SSD) has relied more
on brainwashing techniques and less on physical torture. Since
1957 it has been administratively separated from the regular
police and from the "alert troops" mentioned above. The
Ministry for State Security has thus been able to retain a
fairly anonymous and "civilian" presence. Most of its personnel
STAT
STAT
and operations are invisible to the general public. It is, of
course, firmly under Party control. On two occasions, heads
of the SSD have been purged for opposing Ulbricht's intransigent
Stalinist leadership.
The security police operates through an extensive network
of agents, and all SED and FDJ members must pledge it co-
operation. It is thus in a position not only to report on the
Party and military rank-and-file, but also to spy on dissenters
in the general population. It can act as a strong deterrent
through an ominous presence, without being conspicuous enough
to become a prime object for aggressions and hostility.
Judicial Controls
There are no mass persecutions in the DDR, and at present
there are only eight to nine thousand political prisoners --
a small number when one considers the extent of opposition to
the regime. The prevailing consciousness of terror is due,
rather, to the existence of special laws with broad and vague
definitions of political transgressions, and to the Party's
prerogative of arbitrary interference with legal processes.
The situation has been called "terror by example," and involves
holding show trials, publicizing "star" prosecutors, instruct-
ing prosecutors and judges to give proceedings a political
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-^
46.
accent, and imposing exemplary sentences. Relatively few
people are actually arrested, but a great many are liable to
arrest at any moment.
**
Two members of the Association of Free Jurists stressed
the effectiveness of potential arbitrariness as a deterrent to
revolt. Along with several other experts questioned on this
point, however, they felt that, without this threat of terror,
people would accommodate themselves to the regime more quickly
and with fewer reservations. Most residents of the Soviet
Zone are reluctant to accept as permanent a system that keeps
them in a constant state of uneasiness.
The effectiveness of some of the recent DDR legislation
in helping to control the population is generally acknowledged.
The new passport law of December 1957, for example, which pro-
vides a two-year prison sentence for helping a person to escape,
and which forbids the issuance of interzonal passes to the
dependents of persons who have already fled to the West, was
Cf. Otto Kirchheimer, "The Administration of Justice and
the Concept of Legality in East Germany," Yale Law Journal,
Vol. 68:705, 1959, pp. 705-749.
The "Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher Juristen" is a
commission founded in October 1949 in West Berlin to pro-
vide residents of the Soviet Zone with legal guidance and
to investigate and publicize transgressions against civil
liberties under the totalitarian regime.
STAT
47-
STAT
reflected immediately in a lower refugee rate.
If many justice officials in the Zone show a certain
restraint and endeavor to behave "correctly," and if an element
of resistance to the Party line can sometimes be detected in
judicial quarters, this is often attributed partly to the watch-
ful presence of observers in West Berlin, particularly the
Free Jurists. Justice officials are often anxious not to
incriminate themselves too deeply. They know that they, too,
may one day want to flee, and even a vague possibility that
there may eventually be reunification in freedom is added cause
for not co-operating with political arbitrariness too ardently.
Controls in the Universities
The universities provide an example of how a system of
controls may be framed for andapplied against a specific
social group.
The SED regime has been trying in various ways to counter-
act the susceptibility of university students to antiregime and
revisionist ideas. In the last year, these stiffening controls
have manifested themselves particularly in the introduction of
a "year in production," whereby secondary-school graduates must
do a year's practical work in industrial plants before they can
begin university study, and they only can do so then if the
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48.
local trade union gives approval. Other recent signs of
increased pressure have been the frequent arrests and trials of
student opposition groups, and the institution of obligatory
premilitary training for students and younger faculty members.
The year in production may prove to be a double-edged
sword. Even before this was introduced, students had shown
strong resentment at being forced to "volunteer" for industrial
work during their vacations (although even refugee students
often say that the state has a certain right to tell them where
to work once they have finished their education). Thus far,
there has been some evidence of strained relations between
students and workers. The INFRATEST survey of workers showed
that the latter had strong resentments against members of the
IInew intelligentsia." Students, for their part, complain that,
after much SED talk about solidarity with workers, they are
now being warned against letting themselves be influenced by
the "politically immature" workers when they join them for a
year in the plants. If this "year in production" results in
breaking down the workers' antipathy and deprives communist-
educated youths of idealistic illusions, a basis may be laid
for the solidarity between workers and intellectuals which
hitherto has been lacking. A communist regime is most vulnerable
?
?
?
STAT
4 9 .
STAT
to opposition emanating jointly from industrial workers and the
intelligentsia. In East Germany there has been strong opposi-
tion to the regime from within both these groups, but it has
so far remained quite unrelated.
The fact that the very nearness of a large industrial
establishment to a concentration of students can leave its
mark on the latter's attitudes would appear from the remarks,
in 1957, of a Party secretary at the University of Jena. He
was reported to have blamed the waning power of the SED among
teachers and students at the university on the proximity of
the Zeiss works. He claimed that the workers there created an
undercurrent of hostility to the regime, and went on to describe
the situation at the university as follows:
The professors don't bother themselves a bit
about the Party and show not the slightest
tendency of drawing closer to our views.
With the students...it is more and more
difficult to hold our ground.*
As long as premilitary training given through the Society
for Sports and Technology was voluntary, evasion among students
was widespread. Now this training has become obligatory, and
experts on the Zonal universities believe that it is likely
to provoke aggressive resistance.
Report received by the OstbUro of the Social Democratic
Party.
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Within the university, the majorform of control over
students is the compulsory but not altogether unpopular "seminar
group," rather than the Free German Youth, which has proved
ineffectual at the universities. The entire student body is
divided into these seminar groups. An average one comprises
eighteen to twenty-five students studying in the same field and
in the same or adjacent academic years, which means that they
are usually about the same age. Thus, the seminar group offers
a natural center for discussion, study, and social life; it
also provides an ideal setting for political indoctrination
efforts and for recording evidence of opposition. Every group
has its FDJ or SED sparkplugs, and many groups are reported to
include undercover agents of the State Security Service.
Yet, in the brief period of intellectual thaw before the
Hungarian revolution, and also for some time afterward, open
discussions in the seminar groups played a considerable role
in establishing the fear of "revisionism" that caused authorities
to stiffen controls in the universities. Since 1957, open
discussion in the seminars has become rare. While new students
may take the ostensible freedom of the seminar group at face
value and respond to invitations to speak frankly there, they
are likely to be quickly disillusioned when they find that
STAT
STAT
opinions expressed in open discussion lead to reprimands or
even worse. Active student dissenters find the seminar group
a fertile recruiting ground for those who share their opinions.
In the process of differentiation within the group, communist
sparkplugs may be isolated; if, on the other hand, they are
too eager and numerous, the group easily becomes stiff and
formal, and is stripped down to purely academic and propagan-
distic functions. Quite frequently, however, the communist
group leaders reveal themselves as tolerant, and hence harmless,
so long as dissidence does not go too far. In the exceptional
case, a seminar may become a forum for active opposiiion.
More generally, it serves as a training field in political
dialectic.. But this training rarely seems to lead to mature
expressions of resistance; more often it only develops skill
in keeping out of trouble.
Stiffened controls at the universities are, of course,
reflected in the rising numbers of students and faculty members
who flee to the West. But it is worth noting that the campaign
against academic revisionism has led to the exodus of more and
more students who, although obviously discontented, cannot be
called convinced and tnoughtful revisionists. The true
revisionist, since he hopes for an improvement within the
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1
5
framework of the existing system, is likely to flee only when
he is threatened with arrest.
The Fatly -- A Refu e From Controls
The Soviet family has been described as "the institution
*
exercised least effectively."
over which central control is
The same might be said of the family in the Soviet Zone. Despite
the regime's avowed aim to make the "new family" the smallest
collective of the state, Party and mass organizations have
failed to penetrate the home to the extent desired. A survey
**
of refugee housewives conducted in 1958 and the consensus
of East Zone experts confirm this judgment. What is more, they
suggest a picture of more intimate and close-knit family living
in the DDR than, for example, in the Federal Republic. While
this can be explained partly by the Western citizen's more
plentiful distractions from the world of entertainment, the
conclusion is inescapable that to many East Germans the family
represents a welcome refuge from the demands of the communist
state. As one observer has put it, the East German family
"is strengthened not by the policy of the SED but in its
Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, & Clyde Kluckhohn, How
the Soviet S stem Works, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Mass., 1956, p. 60.
** INFRATEST, "Alltagsleben der sowjetzonalen Bevtakerung...."
?
STAT
STAT
defense against that policy." If we accept this as true, the
really important question is whether this community born of
resentment becomes a breeding ground for the further develop-
ment of active dissent, or whether it serves mainly as an
apolitical haven from the political pressures of one's occupa-
tional environment. Unfortunately, available surveys furnish
little statistical evidence of the extent to which politics
enter into the social intercourse of families and intimate
friends.** Hence our estimate of political solidarity in the
private sphere and its bearing on the East German climate of
opinion is based largely on impressions and conjecture
Most observers seemed to think that for many men the
family offered protection from the hostility and tension of
their work surroundings as well as a refuge from politics
altogether. This generalization included even Party function-
aries
increasingly so, said several informants -- and at
least one expert felt that their escapism into the private
sphere was partly responsible for the malfunctioning of the
Party and trade union apparatus. (The distribution habits of
Carola Stern, "Die Familie in der Sowjetzone" (The Family
in the Soviet Zone), SBZ-Archiv, November 10, 1955.
** A much larger percentage of housewives in the Soviet Zone
apparently spend their leisure time visiting with friends
.than is common in West Germany.
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readers of forbidden literature also showed a coincidence of
stronger family ties with greater restraint in the communica-
tion of dissent outside the home. Under certain conditions,
the family would take on the function of satisfying the
dissenter's need for communication and thus sustain him in
his dissidence.)
As for the nonworking housewife, the dominant impression
is of an essentially unpolitical person, who has succeeded
better than members of any other social group, or any other
member of her family, in evading involvement in the organiza-
tions of state or Party. (Observers frequently stressed the
lack of political interest even among wives of high Party
functionaries.) Far fewer housewives than employed women
join mass organizations, and those who do rarely take an active
part in them. The organization likeliest to encroach on their
lives is the "Demokratische Frauenbund Deutschlands" (German
Democratic Federation of Women -- DFD), but the very few
housewives who felt that the DFD interfered with family life
and the many more who had no opinions of any kind are a measure
of how ineffectual that organization has been. Asked about
their personal contacts with apartment house wardens
Or
a
STAT
55.
STAT
(Hausvertrauensleute),* half the housewives interviewed by
INFRATEST had had none, only 3 per cent attributed poor rela-
tions with the wardens to political reasons, and 38 per cent
said that relations with the wardens were satisfactory. Neighbor-
hood relations in general were described as good, with friction
for political reasons playing only an insignificant part.
(This does not necessarily mean that the aggressive champions
of the system are an insignificant minority; it may merely
indicate that they lay aside their aggressiveness for the sake
of neighborliness, or even that they tend to live in separate
communities to which the housewives in our sample had no access.)
According to Die Welt,**a recent innovation is the so-
called Hausgemeinschaft (tenants' community), which appears to
be an arrangement for co-operative management. In many cases,
the state makes it nearly impossible for a landlord to keep
up with repairs, and urges tenants to take over the landlord's
functions. The Hausgemeinschaft then becomes not only a
business arrangement, however, but a social institution, with
propaganda evenings and the like. Although in most cases this
The system of "housewardens," first introduced by the Nazis,
was adopted in 1945 by the Soviet army of occupation. Today
these wardens (most of them members of the SED) work closely
with the National Front.
** February 18, 1959.
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new means of limiting individual privacy seems to be meeting
with little success, it often needs only one busybody in a
building to keep it going.
The critical horizon of the women interviewed tended to
be limited to points in their domestic experience at which
the communist system caused them annoyance and discomfort.
To the extent that such difficulties are material and economic,
they are probably becoming less of a factor with the
steady
rise in the standard of living. The point, however, at which
the state has made its most corrosive inroads on the immunity
of the family is in its struggle for control of the children,
a phenomenon common to all totalitarian societies.
The mass organization for children between the ages of
six and fourteen is the "Young Pioneers." Most children insist
on joining it, often from no more than the desire to play,
and parents have little choice but to let them. The period of
discussion, and conceivably of friction, with parents generally
arrives only when the young high school student must decide
whether to join, or not to join, the Free German Youth, and
especially whether or not to submit to the "Youth Consecration"
(Jugendweihe). In this atheist celebration, which the state
urges on all children of fourteen in place of the Lutheran
STAT
5 STAT
confirmation or the Catholic communion, the young citizen is
introduced into the "active life of society," and must swear
that he will "place all his strength at the disposal of the
great and ndble cause of socialism and that, together with the
Soviet people, he will secure and defend the peace." He is
prepared for this act in a course of instruction filled with
atheist and anticlerical propaganda and communist ideology.
At this point in the children's lives, their innate con-
formism, the desire to assure themselves of admission to a
university and to other social opportunities, and the con-
victions bred in them by the "Young Pioneers" often run afoul
of parents' reluctance to see their young, outwardly at least,
succumb so totally to the influence of the regime. Both children
and parents ordinarily feel strong pressures from their in-
herited Christian values and are exposed to active agitation
by the Churches against the blasphemous Jugendweihe ceremony.
It is at this juncture that one of our experts, formerly a
member of the Free Jurists, sees the first major break in
family solidarity. Children fear that their parents will hold
them back, and parents fear denunciation. Certainly, innumerable
cases of deliberate or inadvertent betrayal by children have
been reported.
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Most frequently, expediency wins out in the dilemma, and
parents tell themselves that acquiescence is "for the good of
the child." It even happens that the adolescent himself is
the one most strongly opposed to the Jugendweihe, and that
his ambitious parents urge him to conform for the sake of his
educational and professional advancement. Parental acquiescence
is most easily compelled in villages and small towns; the
Communists find it far more difficult to exert social pressure
and control in large, heterogeneous communities.
A great many parents, however, continue to be outspoken
in their opposition. They derive considerable moral support
from the churches, which have turned the Youth Consecration
into a major issue. But Christian arguments are not the only
deterrents to conformism here. According to the informant
cited above, workers, for example, have been widely opposed
to the Jugendweihe, apparently not so much for religious
but because they are politically astute enough to see in
added instrument of the state's control over the child.
peculiar spiritual independence of politically-conscious
reasons
it an
The
workers,
about which we shall have more to say presently, leaves them
freer than others to assert parental influence against outward
pressure.
It is difficult to say how deep a wedge the problem of
the children's future has driven into the solidarity of the
family. The very existence of the dilemma, however, in a
certain sense counterbalances the adults' temptation to use
the family as a retreat from all political concerns, for it
forces them to come to grips with questions of ideology and
morality, and to choose between conforming and labeling them-
selves and their children as outsiders.
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. STAT
STAT
STAT
60.
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IV. Workers*
_
2
Experts and interview material consulted for this memo-
randum agree on several points: East German workers, both
skilled and unskilled, provide the strongest potential source
of opposition to the regime. Some groups of workers have
been able to retain a large measure of aloofness and spiritual
independence, and demonstrate a far keener political alert-
ness, than, for example, most white-collar employees. Workers
are, furthermore, distinguished from the white-collar groups
by a stronger sense of solidarity, which, although it does not
necessarily generate dissent, favors its dissemination. On
the other hand, refugee surveys indicate that among workers
without strong political consciousness the slogans of the
Ulbricht regime tend often to be accepted quite uncritically.
As in all analyses of East Zone attitudes toward communism,
it is important to distinguish between resentment toward the
regime and the rejection of the economic and social system as
Where not otherwise stated, survey material reproduced .
and interpreted here was drawn from a survey of workers
conducted by INFRATEST for the Eundesministerium fUr
gesamtdeutsche Fragen in 1957. Most of the survey
findings used in the present study were published by
Dr. Viggo Graf BlUcher in Industriearbeiterschaft in der
Sowjetzone (Stuttgart, 1959). Some data not available
in published form were taken from the original, mimeo-
graphed manuscript prepared by INFRATEST.
a whole. In the case of the industrial working class, with
its inevitable vestiges
tradition, the tendency
of a strong socialist and communist
to reject the regime rather than the
system is likely to be more pronounced than in other sectors
of society.
Although experts are agreed that the workers have stored
up a large reservoir of resentment against the regime and
constitute the greatest potential danger to its survival, and
although the revolt of June 17, 1953, was their work, no
development in the direction of another rebellion has been
noted. As for the opinions of the workers themselves,
INFRATEST reports that, when they were asked in 1956 whether
a 17th of June could recur, 48 per cent of the refugees thought
that it might; 34 per cent denied it; 18 per cent could not
tell.
It should be recalled that the June 1953 strikes broke
out during an acute food crisis, and in spontaneous response
to an unexpected promise of a new deal,
sign that the Ulbricht regime was weak.
hope for reunification as well as
which was taken as a
Even then, although
freedom had helped propel
them into spontaneous action, striking workers in those two
days betrayed their fear of the Soviet Union by astutely, if
vainly, insisting that their revolt was directed against the
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62.
STAT
Ulbricht regime alone, not against the Soviet occupation
power.
Since then, the material lot of workers has improved a
great deal. The Ulbricht regime today is better entrenched
and the Soviet Union more powerful than ever. All these
facts, but particularly the gradual improvement of their
material situation, have affected the workers' attitudes, the
form and direction of their resentment and aggressive actions.
Observers generally point out that workers' interests have
shifted noticeably from the political to the private sphere.
All major demonstrations of unrest in the last few years have
been prompted by specific local grievances; these may be
complaints about wages, premiums, and norms, or about
shortages or low quality of materials that may lead to work
stoppages, which, in turn, may cause a cut-back in wages, for
workers are paid according to the rate of production.*
Currently, vigorous resistance is being reported against
the so-called Seiffert method, a plan for daily, even
hourly, checks in order to overcome the ups and downs of
production that arise in a planned economy when deliveries,
work processes, and actual production are poorly synchro-
nized. But whatever the subjective responses of workers
to this method may have been at the outset, zonal sta-
tistics (possibly doctored) for the first time showed an
unjagged upward line in production during the last
quarter of 1958. Even if the Seiffert method does
result in better-regulated production, resentment against
it might nevertheless continue, especially if it were
also to lead to higherFroduction norms.
63. STAT
Materially, "life has become bearable," as a trade union
official put it. The average skilled worker can afford a
motorcycle and looks forward to the day when he will own a
TV set. To be sure, several experts point out, the demands
of workers also have increased with the rising standard of
living. But they are still primarily directed toward material
things, and workers have learned that they can secure these by
hard work, as well as by stating their
that arouses no political suspicions.
holds little promise of liberty either
grievances in a manner
In an atmosphere that
through change in the
domestic order or through reunification, workers' aspirations
tend to be increasingly particularistic and private. One
observer goes so far as to say that most East German workers
are not interested in politics as such, but are very sensitive
to any developments that may affect their pay enviopes; they
do not care who pays them so long as they can enjoy the things
money can buy. If ever West Germany loses its economic lead
over the East Zone, this observer feels, it will lose most of
its appeal to labor in East Germany
Other experts, stressing the workers' growing demands,
especially in the past year, disagreed as to the. effect of
better living conditions on their attitudes. One specialist
thought that workers were deuioping a "petit-bourgeois,"
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64.
antirevoluticinary outlook; another, while admitting that
active opposition to the regime was growing ever weaker in
general, felt that only the workers were still in a position
to act, and that their growing demands were linked to rising
resentment.
Certainly, material improvements have not given the
workers a positive loyalty to the regime. Credit for the
better life goes to the worker's own effort, not to communism.
Furthermore, there appears to be no doubt that the workers
have become increasingly aware of themselves as a "power," an
indispensable element that the state has to take into account.*
This awareness is believed to make for the rising social
demands, for a stronger sense of solidarity, and for a
relative spiritual independence.
Only two of the experts questioned, although granting
that there were no signs of impending rebellion from the
industrial workers, did not fully rule out such a possibility
under the status quo. However, a number of specialists foresaw
a distinct possibility of a severe response -- in the form of
This feeling, more apparent after the June 17 uprising
than before, has grown steadily since. Thus, a slow-down
in the raising of norms during 1958 is cited by workers
as an example of the concessions that the oppressive
regime has had to make to them.
65. STAT
either rebellion or despair -- to whatever may turn out to be
the solution of the Berlin crisis.
A prognosis by an observer who is particularly well
qualified to draw comparisons between social groups in the
Zone casts an interesting light on the state of mind of the
East German worker, faced as he is today with the possibility
of having to go on living under a communist system.
According
to this expert, material improvements have canalized the
aspirations of industrial workers to such an extent that their
conscious political resistance has reached an all-time low
(although it is still far more common among them than among
white-collar employees). However, this could change if ever
a saturation of material demands were reached and totalitarian
pressure still remained. This, says our observer, is precisely
what has occurred among intellectuals, and for the present has
caused "a transfer of the center of most advanced resistance
from industrial workers to the privileged 'intelligentsia."
The INFRATEST survey, in 1956, had no grounds for such a
prognosis. It found the situation of Zone workers lying on
the margin of subsistence, and poverty a stronger element in
their views than the inroads of communist ideology. For
three-quarters of the refugee workers then questioned, the
reasons for leaving the Zone were not predominantly political.
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Properly speaking, many of them had not fled, but had "moved"
to the West for economic or personal reasons. Though in most
instances political considerations did play a part, they were
decisive for only about one-fourth of the refugees. And in
four out of every five such cases, the defectors had fled at
the spur of the moment, usually without their families. Among
these more explicitly political refugees, the majority were
between 25 and 45 years of age; only few of the workers were
younger.
In looking back over the entire period between 1948 and
1958, we find that workers have been more apt than members of
other groups to leave the Zone. Although, in those ten
years, they constituted slightly less than half of the Zonal
population,* they accounted for about 58 per cent of all
refugees. More striking still is the unrepresentatively large
proportion of young workers among them, the chief factor in
the high incidence of young people among refugees in general.**
Estimates of the proportion of workers in the population
vary. DDR statistics for 1956 give 47 per cent. Some
students feel that even this figure is too high, since it
includes Party functionaries as "workers."
Between 1948 and 1958, 10.9 per cent of the Zonal popu-
lation were between 18 and 25 years old. Yet among
refugees this age group accounted for 22.7 per cent.
This ratio is to be explained chiefly by a very large
element of workers among the younger group, followed
(though to a lesser extent) by students and young people
in academic professions. The phenomenon of disproportion-
ately large numbers of younger emigrants is not found
among the white-collar employees.
67STAT
Of 76 workers interviewed by INFRATEST in 1956, 21 were under
twenty-five years of age. In nine out of ten cases, however,
political considerations had played little or no part in the
young people's decision to move to the West; they had left
in search of material improvement, or simply out of a youthful
desire for adventure and freedom of action.
In 1954, about one-third of industrial workers in the
Soviet Zone belonged to the SED.* The proportion is probably
somewhat lower among refugees. Of 76 workers questioned
intensively in 1956, 24 per cent admitted having been in the
SED, and 17 per cent had been political functionaries. Ninety
per cent had been members of the Soviet Zone trade union
federation (FDGB), and 37 per cent had belonged to additional
mass organizations.
One-half the workers interviewed disclaimed any interest
in exercising Party or other political functions,** though
* *
Carola Stern, Portrat einer bolschewistischen Partei:
Entwicklung, Funktion und Situation der SED (Portrait of
a Bolshevist Party: Development, Function, and Present
Condition of the SED), Verlag flir Politik und Wirtschaft,
Cologne, 1957, p. 283.
Among workers who remain in the Zone, the percentage of
those similarly indifferent to assuming special functions
is no doubt somewhat lower, since their chancesfbr economic
improvement are greatly enhanced if they do. Efforts to
advance by way of political activity seem far more common
among white-collar employees, the group with the largest
number of politically active opportunists who are funda-
mentally indifferent to communism.
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STAT
68.
nearly all of them
better themselves,
failure to advance
IIHrtt - HI-11CC Ccip:L HHHI-,:c\vc( AL-``Ir (0)1111(0)11(0) -1111/111-1)11411110)(111(0)11
STT
said that this was the way for workers to
and quite a few blamed their personal
on "lack of political connections and pull."
Only twelve people admitted that they themselves had had
opportunities for advancement.
At the same time, however, the 1956 survey attested to
the workers' unusual alertness to political affairs in general.
In contrast to the white-collar group questioned in 1957 (of
whom 37 per cent were either explicitly or implicitly
indifferent to political ideas and events), the workers nearly
always took positions. Although the majority (64 per cent)
complained that de Zonal press kept them inadequately informed
about events in the DDR, their second most important reason for
reading newspapers was the desire for (domestic) political
information.*
As suggested earlier, the workers' interest in the
political scene has receded, in recent years, before their
greater preoccupation with private concerns. Many of the
Here a comparison with West German workers is revealing:
In opinion polls of 294 workers in the Zone and 623 in
the Federal Republic, when asked to list the order of
their interests in newspaper reading on a six-point scale,
East German workers put political news second, while West
Germans put them last; by contrast, nonpolitical and
foreign news were listed in first place by Western
workers, and in sixth by the East Germans.
69. STAT
experts consulted confirm this impression. In the face of the
seeming stability of Ulbricht's regime, even politically
mature, resistance-minded workers are becoming less alert to
domestic political developments. For example, there is the
experience of one of the several "ostburos" (eastern bureaus),
which the democratic parties maintain in West Berlin to keep
contact with, and render assistance to, their supporters in
the DDR. When a number of the particular bureau's contacts
(most of whom were workers) were arrested in the Zone, others
first learned of this on casual visits to West Berlin. Yet
the wave of arrests had been freely reported in Neues
Deutschland, the official SED organ. In short, some of these
conscious dissenters were no longer even reading the newspapers
carefully enough for their own protection.*
Early in 1959, a survey conducted by INFRATEST among a
cross-section of refugees showed that on several issues the
East German white-collar employees questioned in 1957
showed a similar lack of interest in domestic happenings.
While many were fairly well informed of what had occurred
in Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union since
the Twentieth Party Congress, they knew relatively little
of communist developments in the DDR itself. To be sure,
there had been scarcely any de-Stalinization at home.
Yet for months prior to the interviews, Party intellectuals
had been furiously attacked by the SED as revisionists.
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STAT
workers as a group were closer to the position of the Soviet
Zone regime than were the white-collar employees. For instance,
half the workers (as opposed to only one in four white-collar
employees) echoed the Ulbricht line that conclusion of a peace
treaty was the first step toward reunification; and twice as
many workers as white-collar employees said that Germany should
be forbidden to possess atomic weapons. No doubt most of these
statements did not come from workers with strong political
attitudes. But to have them occur in such numbers --
especially among refugees, who understandably, and often
opportunistically, show a fairly high degree of "Western"
orientation -- is a measure of how much, in the long run, the
politically less alert element is being affected by communist
propaganda.
Attitudes toward the Soviet Union
The workers who were interviewed intensively in 1956 were
never asked directly how they felt toward the Soviet Union;
yet 63 per cent of them spontaneously expressed some degree of
hostility. Only in 9 per cent, however, did extreme hatred
break through. Hostility was present on all income levels
and among groups of all political colorations -- from workers
with capitalistic attitudes to radical Marxists. Yet there
was a marked correlation between political views and the
degree of hostility, or its absence. In
rather moderate reaction of workers with
moderate-socialist views on property and
often the radical Marxists who expressed
71.
STAT
sharp contrast to the
capitalist and
politics, it was most
strong feeling against
the Soviets. These men were still dedicated to the communist
system, but blamed its failures, or its betrayal, in Germany
on the Russians. Of the twelve radical Marxists in the group,
six revealed themselves as national-Communists, that is to say,
as potential "Titoists."
In the last few years, Soviet troops have been withdrawn
to special areas and are not as conspicuous as they used to be.
It is possible, therefore, that anti-Soviet aggressions may
have receded. But they are probably still strongest among
frustrated national-Communists.
Attitudes toward the State, Its Goals and Its Achievements
Some of the questions asked by INFRATEST in intensive
interviews with 76 refugee workers were couched in abstract
terms. The answers, broken down according to the ideological
influences and tendencies discernible in them, permit the
following estimate:*
BlUcher, Industriearbeiterschaft..., from Table 2,
p. 13.
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Table 2
Political Thought Patterns of Refugee Workers
Workers interviewed
(per cent)
Entirely or predominantly Marxist 35
Marxist attitudes present but not
predominating
Anticommunist, free of Marxist
ideology, Western-influenced,
including the politically
indifferent
Not classifiable
26
35
4
100
A breakdown today, if based on similarly framed questions,
probably would not be substantially different.
However, responses to fifty questions involving personal
experience, and judgments about concrete situations, yielded
a somewhat different picture of the worker's relationship to
the East German state and its principles.
Including convinced Communists and doctrinaire Marxists
(6 per cent); unreflective carriers of communist ideology,
and those with occasional deviations (12 per cent);
persons whose thinking is predominantly Marxist, but who
are not conscious of it (17 per cent).
("Titoists" and reform-Communists opposed to the
Ulbricht regime are included in the first two subgroups.)
??
Table 3
How Refugee Workers Picture an "Ideal State"
STAT
73STAT
Workers interviewed
(per cent)
Communism as the ideal; totalitarianism
condoned; in favor of state inter-
vention and unlimited socialization 7
A planned economy, with extensive pre-
rogatives for the state, but preserving
private as well as "people's" property 33
Partially planned economy; state ownership
of basic industries; but room to be left
for private initiative and freedom of
opinion
Private property, though limited by state
control; state interference only where
necessary
Unlimited freedom of the private sphere;
state as servant of the people
22
26
12
100
It is curious, furthermore, that despite the rather high pro-
portion of workers who would appear to be committed to the
socialization of industry -- as either of the foregoing tables
suggests -- only 7 per cent of those questioned regarded them-
selves as "co-owners" of their factories, 51 per cent thought
of themselves as "paid workers," while 42 per cent actually
felt "exploited." It is doubtful whether today an appreciably
larger proportion of industrial workers would accept the regime's
assertion that they are co-owners of their plants.
*.
BlUcher, Industriearbeiterschaft..., Table 13, pp. 58-,60.
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/4.
When asked specifically how workers in the Zone felt
about "people's property,"* generally advertised as the "major
achievement" of the East German state, the refugees interviewed
in 1956 indicated that workers were critical or reserved:
Table 4
Attitudes on "People's Property" Reported by Refugee Workers
No. of respondents (75)
Most workers give unlimited approval
to official line 3
Most workers favor it in principle,
but criticize practice and abuses
in Soviet Zone
Most workers are undecided, not
interested, "only interested in
earning a living"
Most workers reject "people's property"
but may approve of other "achieve-
ments," state ownership, etc.
13
23
25
Most workers are hostile and negative
toward "people's property" 11
75
A large majority thus are said to have remained critical of
the "people's property" concept after having seen it applied
According to official ideology, private ownership is
being replaced by a "higher"form, the so-called "people's
property," a designation that is applied primarily to the
socialized sector of industry. Workers, being co-owners
of their factories, are expected to have a close personal
interest not only in production output but in the best
possible maintenance of machines and equipment. Above
all, they cannot go on strike, for to do so would be to
strike against "themselves."
STAT
STAT
7s.
in their own environment. All the more striking, therefore,
is the fact that, when asked about their own plants, only 29
of 75 respondents were in favor of reprivatization, even
though 42 of them thought well of the former owners.
Most revealing, perhaps, of their lack of identification
with the present system is the fact that, when workers were
asked what they considered real "achievements" of the communist
state, their immediate thought was only of social-welfare and
leisure-time benefits (though not without some criticism of
their practical administration and complaints about their
political misuse); about 75 per cent of the respondents said
that, in case of reunification, they wanted to retain such
things as paid sick-leave, factory kindergartens, club houses,
and free vacation trips. Not a single worker spontaneously
cited "people's property" or any other "basic" achievement,
whereas 5 per cent of the white-collar group did.
The workers approved in principle certain pseudodemocratic
innovations of the Ulbricht regime, which undoubtedly had been
conceived as safety valves. For example, the so-called
"production consultations" (Produktionsberatungen) were
instituted in 1954-1955, allegedly in order to give workers a
voice in policy. The INFRATEST survey, conducted in the period
of the "thaw," in 1956, discovered that many workers had grown
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76.
to like these meetings, where they could let off steam. At
about that time, supposedly as a much more radical concession,
but actually with a view to controlling aggressions, the East
German Trade Union Federation considered setting up "workers'
councils." But Ulbricht feared their consequence and, after
the Hungarian and Polish events, throttled the plan. In
recent years, the production consultations have been enlisted
more and more in the regime's efforts at regimentation, and,
according to West Berlin trade union observers, the interest
that workers took in them three years ago hardly exists today.
Now as before, however, most workers feel that the principle
of co-determination -- i.e., that the worker should have a
voice in the policy of his plant -- is right. This may once
more illustrate the fact, often noticeable in INFRATEST
findings, that ideological closeness to communism can co-exist,
in the East German worker, with alienation from the regime and
its practical institutions.
Another curious contradiction enters into the workers'
attitude toward the regime, particularly for the roughly 61
per cent who, in 1956, partly or fully subscribed to the
communist idea:
whereas the prestige and social status of
East Zone workers far exceeds that of workers in West Germany,
as might well be expected in any communist state, in material
77.
benefits they are still decidedly below the level of many in
the white-collar group, even though the latter's traditional
status has nearly disintegrated. This fact contributes to
the solidarity of workers against the regime and those of its
organs that seem to favor white-collar and intellectual
circles, and it is reflected in their attitude, for example,
toward the FDGB* and toward the Party itself.**
Solidarity -- Its Causes and Targets
Two distinct groupings and sets of motivations may be
discerned among workers within their factories, each with its
own bearing on solidarity. The first group is the community
of those who conform to communist expectations and seek their
fulfillment. It consists mainly of workers who endorse
communism, either from conviction or opportunistically; they
Only 7 out of 76 workers interviewed in 1956 gave
unlimited approval to the FDGB. Although membership in
it was a safeguard against Party pressure and other
kinds of harassment in the plant, there was a massive
effort to avoid paying union dues. About one-fourth of
the workers interviewed labeled the FDGB an "exploiting
organ of the state." Only 12 per cent had enjoyed the
much-advertised FDGB vacation benefits, as compared to
one-half the white-collar employees interviewed the
following year.
For more detail about the workers' relationship to the
SED, see below.
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may become active in Kampfgruppe, BPO,* or FDJ, and will
usually exhort their colleagues to better performance in the
interest of plan fulfillment. This group may be joined also
by unusually speedy and
exceeding the norms are
elements, however, have
ambitious workers, whose motives for
primarily personal. All these
not as yet coalesced into cadres that
would be large and influential enough to penetrate and
transform a working-class that still is essentially hostile
to the regime.
Next, there is the category composed of those who regard
themselves, not as co-owners of the plant, but as "paid
workers," as well as those who actually feel "exploited."
They, too, are anxious to bring home a full pay envelope, are
willing to work hard for it, and take pride in their work.**
* *
The Betriebsparteiorganisation (BPO) is the organization
of all SED members and candidates within aplant or admin-
istration. The BPO Secretary often devotes full time to
his function of guaranteeing the leading role of the SED
and serving as advisor on all decisions affecting the
plant in general.
This category includes substantial numbers of women.
According to the refugees interviewed by INFRATEST in 1956,
female workers, with or without family, often were among
those who identified most strongly with the factory and
their particular tasks. Most of these women apparently
had no strong political interests, but were attached to
their jobs and often took great pride in their work. But
the more discerning respondents pointed out that those
women who belonged to the first (communist) category were
likely tole especially ambitious, and hence politically
dangerous to their colleagues.
79. STAT
STAT
Thus, they have neither a personal nor a political interest
in slowing down production. But they are united in their
resistance -- mostly by passive, and occasionally by active
means -- to unbearable speed-up methods and quotas, and to
revisions in the piece-rate wage system that may work to
their disadvantage. They also resent the higher wages and
privileged treatment of their white-collar colleagues, and the
unmerited advancement of opportunists (whom they call
"climbers") by way of the political ladder. And they mock
the rhetorical attempts of political "spark plugs" among their
fellow-workers to shame them into greater production effort.
Although, as a well-informed newsman tells us, industrial
norms are "not unbearable" today, most workers are not
"breaking their backs" to meet them. According to a West
Berlin union official, production rates differ widely according
to type of industry. In certain areas, tempo and quality of
production may equal or even surpass those in comparable West
German factories, whereas in machine construction, for
example, East German workers work slowly and production is
lagging.
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80.
The "brigade" system, intended to increase and stabilize
production rates,* is generally favored by the workers, but
not for the reasons for which it was designed. The brigade
provides them with a natural means of social identification
and fosters an easy sense of solidarity. In the long run,
the co-operation engendered by the brigades has no doubt
benefited production, but there is also a great deal of evi-
dence that brigades have collectively resisted exploitative
production methods. It is something of a paradox, however,
that solidarity in "brigades" or in individual plants may
benefit the regime by the very fact that it concentrates the
workers' resentment on the objectionable aspects of their
common daily experience (speed-up, norms, etc.); that is to
say, on the symptom at hand rather than on its political
causes.
The workers in the socialized industrial plants (VEB's)
are organized in small collectives called "work brigades,"
an institution borrowed from the Soviet Union. Headed by
a "brigadier," each brigade has its own production plan,
and every worker in the brigade is personally responsible
for its fulfillment. Wages are based on the total
productive achievement of the brigade, not of the
individual. The system is designed to foster competition
for maximum achievement, to counteract anti-regime soli-
darity, and to provide nuclei for political education and
influence. Intra- as well as inter-factory production
contests among brigades reward the winners with medals
and honorific titles.
r I
I
1
Identification with the plant as a whole is quite a
different matter. As of 1956, it was not very strong.
Table 5
Workers' Personal Attitude Toward Plant*
Plant is "center of life"
STAT
81.STAT
Workers interviewed(74)
(per cent)
12**
Ties to plant exist, but emphasis
is outside 16
Detached "job" attitude; ties
partly there, partly outside 46
No ties; relations in plant dominated
by differences and aggressions 26
411 100
Workers' identification with their plants may be growing
as a result of modernized production methods, improved
equipment, and other inducements that have been introduced in
the most important industries since 1956. Production drives
Extracted from table 29, comparing workers and employees,
in INFRATEST, "Angestellte in der Sowjetzone Deutschlands:
Verhaltungsweisen und gesellschaftliche Einordnung der
mitteldeutschen Angestellten" (Employees in the Soviet
Zone of Germany: Behavior and Social Position of the
Central-German Employees), 1958 (mimeographed).
** This was in contrast to 27 per cent of the white-collar
group who found their lives centered in their place of
employment -- a figure all the more striking in view of
the fact that their job environments were probably less
congenial socially than those of workers (lack of soli-
darity, more Party interference, equally poor relations
with superiors). The explanation may be that white-collar
employees are the more ambitious. It should be noted
that in West German industry, too, their identification
with the plant is much stronger today than that of workers.
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and reorganization have stepped up quotas and norms consider-
ably. But in areas, such as the chemical industry, where this
development has been particularly marked, the discontent that
it has engendered has been largely offset by the satisfaction
of having new and better machinery to work with.
On the other hand, a growing identification with the plant
does not necessarily imply a greater feeling of "co-ownership"
or approval of the present system; most experts report that
workers today credit only themselves and their own efforts
with what material and technical improvements have taken place.
Nor are such improvements likely to weaken the solidarity of
those who feel "exploited," or the antagonism against privi-
leged groups and "class-splitting" climbers. As the workers'
living standard rises, so do their demands, and the majority,
just because it endorses the ruling doctrine, may continue to
feel toward the system the bitterness of a disappointed
legitimate heir.
All this should be kept in mind when one considers some
of INFRATEST's findings on intra-factory relations: Two-
fifths of the workers interviewed recruited their circle of
friends from among their fellow-workers in the plant. Seventy-
eight per cent said they got along well with their colleagues
in the brigade. The following is an attempt to arrange in
categories their replies to all questions
atmosphere in the plant:*
Opinions on factory relationships
Very good co-operation; good
private relations
STAT
STAT
83.
regarding the social
Workers interviewed
(per cent)
6
Fairly good relations, though
disturbed by political require-
ments and occasional friction 21
Good relations predominate, but
there are tensions present 29
Relations variable, "plant spies"
disturbing, co-operation in small
groups only
Bad relations, respondents distrust
people generally; don't get along
well
Very bad relations, respondents
regularly had trouble
22
13
9
Thus, although political interference and pressure were
almost universal, they did not undermine personal relations
sufficiently to prevent the social climate in industry from
being, on the whole, fairly good. Only 1 in 5 refugee workers
questioned in 1956 felt uncomfortable and as an outsiderwhile
on the job. Since that time, political pressures witlin the
Blucher, Die Arbeiterschaft..., table 4, p. 21.
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43.
plants have become somewhat stronger. Yet most experts
believe that, today as before, industrial workers in the Soviet
Zone suffer less harassment and take more liberties than other
occupational groups. And this fact may continue to make their
social environment at work relatively congenial.
It must not be assumed, however, that the exponents of
the Party line, in confronting the solidarity and independence
of the workers' community, meet with a wall of hostile
opposition; our observations on SED membership and on the
relations between Party and non-Party workers will show that
they don't. It would be more accurate to say that efforts at
political pressure tend to grow thin and ineffectual in such
an environment.
Workers' Relations with the SED in Their Factories
Of some interest are the refugee workers' estimates of
how many fellow-workers and white-collar employees in their
factories belonged to the SED. Only 7 per cent of the
respondents said that more than one-half of the labor force at
their place of employment were Party members. (This agrees
with the opinion of those white-collar refugees who had been
in plants where industrial workers predominated; employees
working in primarily white-collar concerns, such as public
works and government administration, testified to a far higher
SED membership.)
STAT
STAT
On the average, workers questioned put the strength of
the SED at about 20 per cent. This, however, referred only
to nominal membership, not to actual convictions. As we
shall see, views on the true political reliability of SED
members in the plants differed widely.*
The workers' feelings toward their SED colleagues, and
their attitudes toward superiors and white-collar employees,
are relevant in this connection.
Three-fourths of the workers expressed hatred of
"climbers" Only 7 per cent admitted to good relations with
them). In
40
employees,
ambivalent
this respect, they contrasted with the white-collar
the vast majority of whom were indifferent or
toward political opportunists. Very apparent also
were workers' aggressions against the better-paid white-collar
employees (a hostility which, as we shall see, was not
reciprocal).
Workers tended to regard the SED as the party of the
white-collar employee, and to a large extent their view is
borne out by statistics and confirmed even by many of the
white-collar refugees. The workers' tendency to dissociate
INFRATEST estimates that only about 7 per cent of
industrial workers may be called "really convinced"
members of the SED. See p. 89.
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themselves from the Party and those it represents does not,
however, prevent many of them from accepting the Party in
their midst. Nor does it preclude even a certain degree of
respect for individual colleagues as Party members.
The following table gives an approximate picture of workers'
opinions and actual experience of the SED in their plants.
Table 6
Nature of Refugee Workers' Relations
With SED Members in the Plant
Largely positive experiences; acceptance
of the SED
Some respect for the Party; no difficulties
or divisions within the plant
Indifference toward Party; some friction
More difficulties than co-operation;
rejection of SED colleagues
Poor co-operation and human relations;
hatred and extreme rejection of
SED colleagues
per cent
22
25
8
21
24
100
The picture varies considerably, of course, for different
industries. In the strategically important chemical industry,
for example, where Party pressures are strongest, the workers'
feelings toward their factories and toward SED colleagues are
very negative. At the same time, an unusually high proportion
of workers in the chemical industry join the FDGB, clearly as
r'IcQifi1- Sanitized Coov AriDrov
STAT
STAT
a cushion against political pressure rather than as an
expression of loyalty. By contrast, the building trades, for
example, are much more impervious to political control, partly
because men in this type of work have to move around so
much. Building workers pay SED members little recognition,
relations among colleagues are unusually good, and membership
in the FDGB is far below average. It is perhaps significant
that the June 17 uprising started among these workers.
When asked about the behavior of individual SED members
in their plants, refugee workers in 1956 inclined to more
? positive views than one might have expected on the basis of
the above table. Thirty-six per cent actually said that SED
colleagues behaved in "exemplary" fashion; the majority were
inclined to label them "just like everybody else." It was
apparent that SED members often had conducted themselves as
agreeable colleagues rathar than as fanatics. By co-operating
with non-Party colleagues, trying to improve shop conditions,
organizing social benefits, and showing understanding for
individual problems, many SED members had won the respect of
the labor force. Of the two possible approaches to their
function, they had thus chosen -- and this may be significant
IP -- the one to which the Party itself pays lip service. In
communist practice, however, this kind of behavior does not
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always accord with what the
may indeed reflect the fact
was still in its transition
Party expects of its cadres and
that, in 1956 at least, the SED
from a mass to a cadre party.
There is no doubt that the conciliatory approach has paid off
in the sense that it has softened the aggressions of non-Party
dissidents. It remains an open question whether this represents
a Party achievement, or whether it reflects the undermining of
the Party through working-class contact.
The acceptable
following skeptical
conduct of SED members may help to explain the
estimate of their political sincerity.*
Table 7
Workers' Estimate of True Attitudes of BPO Members**
Few convinced (207); Party not able
to function in plant
Depth interviews (76)
(per cent)
36
Majority opportunists; 20-407 convinced
15
About 50% convinced and reliable
25
Majority convinced (607 or more);
Party effectively functioning
12
No answer
12
100
BlUcher, Industriearbeiterschaft..., table 11, p. 54.
** White-collar employees, although themselves much more
heavily represented in the SED than workers, revealed
Icifi1a - Sanitized Coov AoIDrov
STAT
? STAT
INFRATEST estimated that, of all industrial workers in
the Soviet Zone, no more than 7 per cent were loyal and
convinced members of the SED.* Even these, however, may
include some who feel resentment against the Soviets, or
sympathize with the lot of exploited workers, or feel that
the system would work much better without Ulbricht and his
severe Party line.
Young Workers
A member of the Free Jurists believes, and his view is
shared by other experts in the field, that the regime has few
4!
fanatic supporters among the youth. Young people, he feels,
master early the technique of "double-think," which permits
themselves as more cynical, and thereby also betrayed
some of their own opportunistic thought habits: of 128
interviewed in 1957, 5 per cent said they did not believe
any of the members of the SED to be convinced Communists
(a view never expressed by refugee workers). And only 18
per cent (as compared to the above total of 37 per cent
among the 76 workers) thought that half or more of the
SED members in their plant were true believers and hence
politically effective.
This figure was based on the following estimates: (a) A
far larger proportion of white-collar employees than
workers in a plant are apt to be members of the SED, (b)
of 76 refugee workers questioned, 5 (or 6.8 per cent) were
convinced Communists, and (c) on the average, about 20
per cent of industrial workers are members of the SED,
O but only about one-third of these are genenily believed
to be reliable Communists.
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them to come to terms with the system without abandoning
their inner reservations and without painful conflict. They
have, in fact, acquired the kind of detachment that allows
them to play their assigned role under the regime and at the
same time laugh at it and
Interviews with very
problems they experienced
their own performance.
young refugees, and the particular
in adjusting to life in West Germany,
revealed the extent to which today's youth in the DDR has come
to take its privileged treatment and protection by the regime
for granted. As a member of the Ministry of All-German Affairs
puts it, "Soviet Zone youth is accustomed to patronage by
father-state and often feels helpless when thrown on its own
resources."
A number of refugee youths were interviewed by INFRATEST
in 1957, at least one year after they had left the Zone. (They
had been between fifteen and twenty-four years old at the time
of their flight.)* Quite generally speaking, prolonged stay
in the Federal Republic had reduced the ideological vestiges
of their communist experience more noticeably than it had the
INFRATEST, "Jugendliche FlUchtlinge aus. der sowjetischen
Besatzungszone" (Young Refugees from the Soviet Zone of
Occupation), May 1957 (mimeographed).
110
STAT
91.
STAT
effects of propaganda. Between 15 and 25 per cent showed no
concern with the political life of the Zone at all. Ten to
15 per cent were still strongly under its ideological impact,
but, although generally agreed that West
behind in the class struggle," they were
their communist attitudes. On the other
Germany was "far
not consistent in
hand, only 15 per
cent could be described as outspoken anti-Communists; but
this did not preclude their favoring certain achievaments of
the DDR. Young respondents, in general, were apt to recall
spontaneously those secondary achievements -- state assistance,
scholarships, sports facilities, and the like -- that had
affected them most intimately, rather than the so-called
"basic" achievements. But when young workers, for example,
were asked, a year or more after their flight, what specifically
they would like to see retained in case of reunification, 28
per cent still felt that factories should remain in the hands of
the state (15 per cent saw no need to compensate former owners);
18 per cent favored a mixed economy; and 42 per cent were for
reprivatization of industry. These answers bespoke only
slightly less of a socialist bias than was found in the
opinions of workers questioned immediately after they fled.
It may be worth asking in what respects and to what
extent the pattern of attitudes and opinions observed among
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workers in general applies to the youngest generation among
them. As already indicated, an unrepresentatively large
number of refugee workers have been between eighteen and
twenty-five years of age, and their motives for defection
have been predominantly unpolitical. (1) As members of a
highly materialistic generation, they have been particularly
susceptible to the lure of economic prospects in West Germany.
And (2)they have followed the characteristic curiosity of
youth about new places and opportunities, and an equally
characteristic desire for maximum freedom Co do as one pleases.
Over the years, with the steady improvement of the Zonal
economy and of the workers' lot in particular, the first of
these motives is bound to have lost much of its power. But as
young workers continue to make up a large percentage of the
defectors (though their actual numbers have decreased along
with the general decline in the total of refugees), we must
assume that curiosity, search for adventure, and a youthful
rebelliousness against all kinds of constraint are, if any-
thing, stronger with them than ever. By the same token, the
desire for independence and freedom to live as one pleases,
while not narrowly or consciously political, does set definite
limits to the regime's influence on the behavior and thought
of these young people. For, the more conscious they are of
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?
46-
?
O
STAT
93.
STAT
wanting to follow their material and other individual
interests, the less of a place in their lives is there for
politics.
It is true that, for lack of the kind of experience that
alone would furnish a basis for comparisons, the abstract
political thinking of young workers has been molded by
communist influences. INFRATEST found younger workers more
inclined toward the ruling ideology, less critical of the
regime and its institutions, and less anxious to see basic
changes than their elders. Asked what changes they would
like to see in the Zone, two-thirds put "greater earning
power" in first place, and the remaining third was divided
between communist revisionists and those who sought a total
change of system.
Also, young workers tended to get along better with SED
colleagues and with white-collar employees in their plants
(though not with the intelligentsia). Moreover, they were
quite apt to take for granted the political strings attached
to life and success in the Zone, and only 20 per cent (as
compared to 50 per cent of the older workers) bothered to
mention them as affecting opportunities for advancement.
Young workers tended to take a more moderate view than older
ones of their economic relationship to the plant; few
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1
considered themselves "exploited." Also, the young were
generally attested to be politically more active, as well as
more readily inclined to volunteer
On the face of it, therefore,
have had considerable influence on
for higher production goals.
the new order would seem to
these younger people. But
the picture is not complete. One must ask: how profound is
this accommodation; how strong are its implications?
Lacking a basis for comparison in past experience, young
workers must rely heavily on examples anievidence supplied by
their immediate environment. Of very great importance,
therefore, are their contacts with older colleagues in the
plants, and their experiences and relations with others of
their own generation.
The 1956 survey revealed little evidence of tension and
no irreconcilable conflict between the generations; the
differences it uncovered were chiefly those of degree. Today,
as one expert sees it, young workers continue to be assimilated
quite easily into the skeptical workers' community and to take
older colleagues as "examples," though they may wonder why the
latter should want to make things unnecessarily difficult for
themselves. The minority of young workers with strong
political interests -- especially reform-Communists or
4,
_
j
1
?
STAT
STAT
"Titoists" -- probably take their critical older colleagues
very seriously indeed.*
In answers to questions involving practical political
problems and judgments affecting the worker's condition in
the DDR, the 1956 survey found little disagreement between the
generations. Almost as common among young workers as among
their elders was the tendency to favor "partial planning" and
a "dual" economy. The only marked difference arose at one
extreme of the spectrum: young workers accounted for the few
cases of complete identification
survey noted, as well as for the
"people's property" was cited as
with the system that the
two instances in which
a commendable achievement,
without critical reference to abuses of this term.
It must be noted, also, that the younger age group
includes an element of "political activists" who are not
likely to be adequately represented in the refugee sample.
These political reliables are apt to assume the leadership of
* A behavior study of a group of active dissenters showed
that, while the young white-collar employees among them
rarely trusted their colleagues enough to collaborate
with them politically, and thus had to become active
without the encouragement of their own professional
group, young workers usually were able to establish
political rapport with colleagues easily, and, conversely,
became really active only when they had found such
rapport.
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96.
FDJ factory units, and in recent years have been used by the
regime in its efforts to promote tensions and drive a wedge
between the generations. In a number of factories, for
example, the FDJ has become more active than the FDGB or the
SED in organizing production drives, making a show of para-
military preparedness, and keeping check on the rate and
quality of production. Older workers are easily embittered,
for instance, at having an FDJ functionary publicly denounce
them for not having cleaned their tools properly.
However, this particular strategy thus far has met with
only isolated success. The regime's effort to form a loyal
community of all young workers has failed because the
communist image of a politically conaious, organized, and
dedicated youth is patently unrealistic and, above all, at
variance with the self-image of most of the young workers.
The majority of those who join the FDJ -- in response to
pressure, for material gain, or to enjoy some of theorgani-
zation's social activities -- remain members in name only,
shunning political responsibilities and voluntary after-hours
work programs wherever possible.
The nominal member's attitude toward the FDJ, therefore,
is often akin to the point of view of those young workers who
refuse to join in the first place, for both are based on an
el
STAT
? STAT
aversion to politics and political drill. (It may be signifi-
cant that, in a recent policy change, the FDJ has promised to
pay closer attention to youth's natural, unpolitical interests.)
The INFRATEST survey of 1956 came to the conclusion that,
whereas communist ideology noticeably, if superficially,
influenced the abstract thinking of young workers, a more
pragmatic approach controlled their behavior. The young
workers' own apparent unawareness of the discrepancy, their
failure to examine contradictions between theory and practice,
may be -- so INFRATEST believes -- a "failure Co adjust thought
to the real world." In our opinion, an even more significant
aspect of the young workers' behavior is the selective
accommodation they manifest, taking only what is useful to
them and rejecting the rest. And the
politics is, at least by implication,
the extent that it consciously defies
very rejection of
a political judgment, to
the communist image of
youth. Also, there seems to be little doubt among experts
that, as compared to others of their generation, young workers
show the highest incidence of manifest opposition to the
regime and to abuses within the system.
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Labor's Bargaining Power
The opposition of industrial workers, young and old,
continues to focus on economic interests and grievances.
Although, theoretically, they are as liable to both ideological
and economic pressure as the white-collar employees, it is
actually the latter who are more easily subjected to political
controls (but not so vulnerable to economic leverage), whereas
the workers can be more effectively harassed by slidirg wage
scales, speed-up methods, inspections, and the like. However,
the regime today is shrewd enough not to press this advantage
over labor unduly, since the present position of the workers,
particularly of skilled workers, gives them a substantial
degree of political power.
According to a student of East Zone labor matters, for
instance, authorities are afraid to raise production norms for
fear of promoting labor unrest. As a result, with new
machinery and improved production techniques, workers axe more
and more frequently able to earn double pay arbetter by
overfulfilling their norms by astronomical percentages. He
cited an automobile factory in Eisenach where, in January 1956
636 workers had achieved 200 per cent of their norm; by the
end of 1957 there were 2,400 workers in this category. Some
of the workers in the synthetic rubber industry were earning
?
STAT
99.
STAT
1,500 marks a month as a result of the system of incentive
pay, premiums, and so on. When, at the end of 1957, the
management of a factory in Magdeburg brought in engineers to
make a time study with a view to revising the norms and pay
scales, the workers laid down their tools and refused to
resume operations until the survey group had left the plant.*
In theory, the Ulbricht regime could take severe measures
against
For one
various
workers such as these, but in practice it is impossible.
thing, skilled labor is in such short supply that
state-owned factories are bidding against each other
for manpower; a worker who is dissatisfied at one plant can
easily walk over to another. As a result, management is
reluctant to bring pressure on labor, since any manpower loss
will mean failure to achieve productialgoals, which in turn
usually means that the management itself will be severely
censured or even replaced. At the present time, a larger share
of total income is going to skilled labor than plans call for,
and the power of the state to exploit the worker has thus been
reduced. Furthermore, any worker who is seriously disaffected
can still flee to West Berlin. (Our informant thought that
one of the principal reasons Ulbricht wished to eliminate the
Cf. Die Welt, January 17, 1958.
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Ii,
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god
100.
West Berlin enclave was to gain better control over East Zone
labor.)
This enviable situation of relative independence and
prosperity applies, however, only to certain favored groups.
Workers who are in categories that are not in demand --
particularly those who are nearly or totally unskilled --
find their economic bargaining position very weak. Of those
unskilled workers from West Germany who have been lured to
the Soviet Zone by promises of good pay and cheaper housing,
a large proportion have returned with the tale that housing
is indeed cheap but impossible to find, and that pay is
considerably worse than in West Germany. It thus appears
that e skilled workman who is established in a community can
live well -- perhaps even better than his opposite number in
West Germany -- but that the unskilled worker who arrives
looking for a job must be prepared to accept very low pay and
to squeeze with his family into one or, at the most, two
rooms.
?
STAT
101.
STAT
V. White-Collar Employees
All generalizations about white-collar employees are
bound to suffer from the fact that, in the communist order,
one is dealing here, not with a single social group, but with a
catch-all category. Such formerly
as trade and craftsmen, free-lance
sional people today are "salaried
independent practitioners
artists, and many profes-
employees." As a result,
the numerical relation of white-collar employees to other social
groups has been radically altered. The majority of intel-
lectuals today are "employees"; the ranks of bureaucrats and
functionaries have been swelled under the system of Party and
governmental controls; the practitioners of independent crafts
and trades are dwindling; and private business is gradually
disappearing. In the communist state, the former
white-collar segment, with its considerable social prestige
and corresponding self-esteem, has become a large, amorphous,
and highly mobile group, with little of its former sense of
cohesion or pride. In keeping with official ideological pre-
cepts, its prestige is
star of the industrial
white-collar employees
waning by comparison with the rising
worker. At the same time, however,
are receiving the lion's share of
material benefits and opportunities, and they therefore have
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the greater stake in the preservation of the system. This
discrepancy between the official prestige order and the system
of material rewards is one of the factors that contribute to
insecurity, ambivalence, hypocrisy, and resentment in the
attitudes of many East Germans.
If, in spite of what has just been said, we attempt to
draw general conclusions about the state of mind of the white-
collar population of the Zone, we can do so only if we remember
that this group runs the gamut from the lowest factory clerk to
the highest government official, from the minor technician to
the university professor. In the pages following, distinctions
have been observed, wherever possible, between the higher and
lower economic and hierarchic levels of the white-collar group
**
whose opinions were studied.
We have already mentioned in passing, especially in com-
parisons with workers, certain of the basic tendencies and
For the purposes of this study university professors will
be treated separately in the section on "Intellectuals."
The same distinction was drawn also by the INFRATEST survey
of white-collar refugees, conducted in 1957 for the
Bundesministerium f?r gesamtdeutsche Fragen, whose find-
ings were embodied in a mimeographed manuscript, "Ange-
stellte in der Sowjetzone Deutschlands, Verhaltensweisen
und gesellschaftliche Einordnung der mitteldeutschen
Angestellten" (Employees in the Soviet Zone of Germany:
Behavior and Social Position of the Central-German Employees),
1958.
The INFRATEST survey does not devote special attention to
the top-level employees earning more than 800.-DM.
?
?
characteristics of white-collar employees noted in refugee
interviews: young people's opportunities for advancement into
and within the white-collar world are reflected in a low
refugee rate, the incidence of "firm" Communists is greater
than among workers, the element of opportunism in political
affiliation and rationalization is more apparent, and solidari-
ty, a safeguard of political independence, is generally lacking.
In evaluating the interviews with white-collar refugees,
however, it is important to remember that, even more than the
workers who have defected, these refugees are not a repre-
sentative cross-section of their class in the Zone. For one
thing, as we have said, the white-collar class contains the
highest proportion of SED members, who are less likely to
flee than non-Party people. Also, it includes a vast number
of administrative officials and Party functionaries with strong
reasons for remaining in the DDR; for, regardless of how insin-
cere their professed communist convictions may be, they have a
vested interest in the present system, which guarantees their
career and, conversely, they have the most to fear from a
radical internal change or from reunification.
The preceding section has already touched on the white-
d, collar employee's place in the communist prestige order, and
his own ambivalent reaction to it. Historically a member of
STAT
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the middle or upper class in the bourgeois framework, he form-
erly possessed a distinctive professional and social pride,
either as a member of the highly respected civil service or as
the employee of an established industrial or commercial "house."
Communism has changed all this. The ideological impact of its
glorification of the proletariat can be seen in the fact that
not a single white-collar refugee rated his own occupational
class above that of the industrial worker. However, not
every white-collar employee manifested the wounded pride of
the "declassed." Those who would have suffered a severe loss
of status in the divided country were apt to have fled to
West Germany soon after the war. Only 4 per cent of the white-
collar refugees questioned by INFRATEST in 1957 had clearly lost
status under the new order; much more apparent was the opposite
trend, that of former workers (20 per cent) who had risen to
white-collar occupations. If one were to add to them the
employees who were children of workers, roughly one-third the
refugee sample could be said to have come up from the working-
class. Only one in every three of those interviewed had been
white-collar employees before 1945. This mobility helps
explain why so little of the tradition of precommunist days is
evident in this class today.
0
0
Individual reaction to the prestige order prescribed by
the official ideology varies considerably. It tends to be
related to economic status, to the new prestige value of one's
profession, and to the status conferred by Party membership.
People in good positions, as well as active Party members, will
often refer to themselves as "toilers" (Werktdtige), a delib-
erately equivocal term by which the reigning ideology tries
to gloss over the differences between the working-class and the
larger community. The self-styled Werktdtige does not mind
descending to the half-fictitious prestige level of the
4, workers, because by this sophistical device he diverts atten-
tion from his own privileges. Significantly, low-level, poorly-
paid white-collar employees do not like to call themselves
"toilers." If they do not have or do not seek opportunities
for advancement, and if they lack the political affiliation
that can bestow status, they are more apt to cling to the
remnants of their employee-consciousness, to harp on the materi-
al disadvantages of their own economic lot, and to count them-
selves -- sometimes in conscious identification with workers --
among the "exploited." Employees have considerable respect
for the morale of workers and for their courage in airing their
STAT
STAT
IP grievances, and they sometimes express envy of the freedom with
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which workers speak their minds.*
It follows, then, that we must distinguish not only between
the old and the new, but between the official and an unofficial
prestige order that has grown out of present conditions. True,
the worker is said to have inherited the state, and he is
given considerable rope by the Party and other control organs,
although partly because he is indispensable. Moreover, his
children enjoy special opportunities for academic and other
training. But in being urged and aided to improve and advance
themselves, workers' children are in fact being invited to
become white-collar employees, and there is no doubt in any-
" movement.
one's mind that this really represents
There are also the indisputable facts, mentioned before, that
many white-collar employees are far better off economically
than even highly-skilled workers, and that great numbers of
Party, the FDGB, and
an "upward
them, by actively participating in the
the mass organizations, reap more state benefits than the
politically more independent worker.
Only 15 per cent of the white-collar employees interviewed
showed a "consciousness of kind" that carried with it
aggressions against the workers. About the same number
appeared not to have thought about the matter of social
position. Almost one-third regarded themselves as WerktRti e.
Much the largest group showed some elements of employee
consciousness, yet without any class aggressions against
workers or the state.
107.
This very independence of the industrial worker, in turn,
contributes to his esteem in the eyes of many white-collar
employees. It may be significant that, when white-collar
refugees were asked to evaluate the prestige of different
prcaessions, SED members accorded workers a lower status than
did non-Party employes. Also, the responses of white-collar
employees to an occupation-rating test bore a clear relation
to the degree of freedom that each occupation enjoys, or takes,
vis-a-vis the regime. Pastors and artists, for example, were
high in this rank order; Party cadrists and other jobholders
411 in the control system were rated at the bottom -- even by many
who were themselves Party members.
Nevertheless, white-collar employees, on the whole, orient
themselves toward the new privileged stratum of the East German
state. This is hardly surprising in the well-paid element and
among active Party members, who adopt the functionaries' hypo-
critical tribute to the workers while actually striving for
a condition that will set them apart from the working-class.
But it is also true of many white-collar employees on lower
income levels, who tend to be politically indifferent and have
no particular resentment toward "climbers." Some of them, when
11 interviewed by INFRATEST, admitted that, at one time, they had
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tried to identify themselves with the new order. Few of them
gave reasons for fleeing that could be classified as manifestly
political.
All in all, the environment of the white-collar employee
tends to generate not the kind of tensions that one associates
with an acute political dilemma, but a strong element of oppor-
tunism, a tendency toward outward conformism, and an effort
to withdraw from facing the contradictions inherent in East
German society.
As we said in our discussion of industrial workers, Party
controls are exercised most strictly and effectively in the
world of offices and commerce. Although the net production of
the average white-collar employee cannot be increased signifi-
cantly by political drives and 'campaigns, the political risk
attached to occupying positions of responsibility is great,
and makes their holders very vulnerable indeed. Moreover, the
occupational mobility so characteristic of the white-collar
world is to the interest of the regime, for it is accompanied
by constant competition for advancement, which adds to a job
insecurity far greater than that of the workers. As a member
of the Free Jurists put it, "white-collar workers feel replace-
able and expendable."
?
STAT
STAT
While only 1 per cent of the workers questioned in 1956
had been moved to flight by what might be called a "dangerous
occupational environment and/or job," one-third of the 128
white-collar employees interviewed in 1957 gave reasons of this
kind. Many of these respondents had occupied positions of
responsibility.
When the refugees were divided by income alone, it ap-
peared that three-fourths of the upper-income white-collar
group in some manner or other related their reasons for de-
fecting to the "system" (not just the occupational environment),
ID as compared to only one-half of the lower-income group. Obvi-
ously, employees in higher-echelon jobs, even though most of
them are members of the SED, are in greater jeopardy than their
less conspicuous colleagues. But job insecurity has certain
political connotations not only for the highly-placed expert
or official, but also for the middle-level employee or expert
who is not a Party member, and hence is in danger of being
replaced by a politically more reliable specialist as soon as
there is an adequate supply of trained personnel.
For the time being, however, there is a labor shortage
in the DDR and the primary source of insecurity for the white-
collar employee is not fear of being out of work, but rather
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the lack of continuity and safety in pursuing a career. This
distinction is illustrated by the fact that only 20 per cent
of the refugees interviewed by INFRATEST said they had feared
for their jobs, whereas a considerably larger group (one-third)
had fled because of political pressures and threats connected
with their work.
Only 13 per cent of these refugees had worked in the same
place for ten or more years; 53 per cent had spent less than
five years in the same establishment. Compared with the labor
turnover of manual workers in industry, this may seem to indi-
cate fairly stable employment conditions. But compared with
West German standards, where employment "for life" is hoped for
by many white-collar workers, it may be a high rate of mobility.
Industrial priority on manpower has resulted in force
reductions, mainly in civil administration, where the consequent
shortages of personnel have made the surviving employees feel
all the safer. For employees in the economic bureaucracy,
competition and danger of displacement by political activists
still exist. Recently, however, more attention has been given
to appointing administrators for local and county government
offices who are not only demonstrably loyal to the regime,
but are also capable and well-trained. One Berliner, who works
STAT
STAT
for the Federal Republic's Ministry of All-German Affairs,
maintains that the time is past when administrative jobs are
given solely on the basis of the Party card:
Persons responsible for administration and for
Party control in it must qualify by taking
correspondence courses, special seminars, etc....
The specialized and responsible white-collar
employee has to study hard. Naturally, his
training is one-sided....Whether it promotes
self-confidence.. .is another question.
This opinion is shared by many observers. One civil admin-
istration expert, although he did not regard the situation as
serious enough to threaten the stability of the regime, pointed
IP out that it was becoming more and more difficult to recruit
students for the civil administration training schools, because
young people preferred to go into the economy or aim for better-
paid government jobs. Also, it is at the middle level of respon-
sibility that one most often finds nuclei of loyal civil
servants who are silently opposed to the system, who retain
some of the traditional civil-service pride, and who are either
not in the SED or are only nominally so. Such people often
are reluctant to advance into the next-higher brackets of civil
administration, to become top administrators on the county
level, mayors in small communities, and the like. In such
? decision-making positions they are more likely to be exposed
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to trouble with the Party or the central administration, and
salaries usually are not high enough to warrant taking a
political risk. The ambitious young Communist who has been
trained as an administrative functionary also tends to avoid
responsible positions "in the field," because of the combination
of political exposure and limited prestige that goes with them.
Most of the above generalizations were corroborated by
INFRATEST, which found the political control system varying
in effectiveness: not only were Party members in general more
vulnerable to pressure than others, but technicians enjoyed
greater freedom than administrators and feared less for their
jobs. Another phenomenon noted was that of the lower-echelon
employee who forgoes advancement and success because of their
concomitant dangers, and who deliberately does not distinguish
himself through performance records or in other ways that might
draw attention to him. His situation and outlook, in certain
respects, gradually come to resemble those of the worker.
Political Attitudes of White-Collar Refugees
The dilemma between ideological opposition to the system
and the practical need for identification with the regime --
the reverse, as it were, of the workers' position -- was
reflected in the white-collar employees' behavior and attitudes
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as recorded by INFRATEST. Generally speaking, its most strik-
ing manifestation was the high degree of political indifference
observed among the refugees, as well as a great superficiality
in what passed for convictions. Though admitting that there
must be "elements who are tied to the communist regime by more
than opportunism," the survey authors conclude that the white-
collar class in general holds many more opportunistic con-
formists than fanatic supporters of the regime. Very little
evidence was found of a third, theoretically-possible, alterna-
tive, that of mock conformism to disguise purposeful opposition.
ID The isolation of the confirmed anti-Communist or revisionist
is apparently much greater in the white-collar world than among
workers or in the intelligentsia. The refugees interviewed
seldom showed evidence of extensive political reflection, and
one suspects that such "unprofiled" attitudes are, in general,
?
very common among white-collar employees in the Zone.* Western
concepts were vaguely present throughout, but, again, rarely
as part of a consistent view of life. And even the misgivings
about the state that some of the respondents expressed often
contained ideological elements of the most contradictory kind.
This generalization does not apply with equal force to
the intellectual professions and their candidates, the
students.
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As for their official political affiliations, 25 per cent
of the 128 refugees interviewed admitted to membership in the
SED, and nearly everybody had joined one or more of the mass
organizations. More than half thought that the SED could justly
be called a party of white-collar workers; and many respondents,
when asked why people joined the Party, put "ambition" and
"opportunism" high on their list of reasons. This was, of
course, consistent with their cynical appraisal of the limited
extent to which Party membership reflects genuine communist
conviction.
Asked about their personal attitudes, slightly more than
half of the white-collar respondents indicated that at one
time or another they had tried to make their peace with the
system, and one in four still thought that it was possible to
do so provided one made concessions. Most of the remaining
respondents (about 40 per cent) said they had not made any
attempt to come to terms with the system inwardly, but only
about one-sixth gave "convictions" as the reason. The other
members of this group that had not tried to come to terms with
the system insisted on their total indifference to all political
matters.
According to the estimate of the survey-takers, only a
very small minority of those interviewed could be regarded as
?
?
STAT
115.
STAT
thoughtful, articulate anti-Communists. More than one-third
were politically indifferent, and as many as 40 per cent were
under some degree of communist influence. Of this last group,
about 15 per cent could be called Communists, the more dedicated
among whom were apt to be the most critical of the Ulbricht
type of regime. They included those who had once been on the
"inside" of the Party machine, but had run into trouble there,
and thus had become at least potential revisionists.
On this last point, the 1957 survey found little evidence
of structured revisionist thought, but a considerable element
*
of "latent" revisionism. When asked about the chances of a
revisionist development in the Zone, three-fourths of the
white-collar employees foresaw no possibility of its happening
from within the DDR, and only 10 per cent saw hope for improve-
ment in the form of liberal communism. Yet there was notable
curiosity and surprisingly wide knowledge about revisionist
movements and conflicts in other satellite countries such as
The whitecollar refugees' estimate of people's reactions
to Walter Ulbricht may be significant here: one-third
said he was "hated"; the rest thought he was "rejected."
Only two refugees felt that Ulbricht was more or less
"accepted into the bargain." These findings must be
appreciated in connection with another part of the survey,
in which two-thirds related the future of the DDR directly
to Ulbricht, and only one-fourth thought that his going
would not affect the regime.
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Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, somewhat slighter interest in
the most powerful communist countries, the Soviet Union and
China, and far less curiosity about internal and SED political
affairs. The white-collar survey noted that most of the
respondents knew relatively little about the controversies
with domestic revisionists, although at the time these employees
left the Zone, the communist press had been quite vocal in its
attacks on intellectual deviationists.
The key to this seeming contradiction probably lies in
the fact that Ulbricht's rule seems so stable, and his efforts
to keep reformist tendencies in check have been so obviously
successful in the past, that people, in their profound skepti-
cism about the likelihood of internal change, have lost their
interest in SED developments. The spectacular events in Poland
and Hungary, on the other hand, are more apt to capture the
imagination; and the warning example of Hungary in a sense
helps to justify the Germans' own failure of June 17. Yet the
captivating picture of Poland and Yugoslavia enjoying a sus-
tained, if limited, independence does not, apparently, suggest
a realizable model for East Germany as long as Ulbricht is so
well entrenched.
In defining their vision of a reunited Germany, many white-
collar refugees inclined toward a political atmosphere resembling
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11"
STAT
Western democracy, but were unwilling to part with some of the
features of Eastern economic organization; their idea was often
that of a capitalist state form modified by certain socialist
"achievements."
More than half the respondents had difficulty deciding
what they would like to see done with their erstwhile superiors
and top functionaries in the event of reunification, and favored
removing only some of them. One-fifth had strong, vindictive
feelings, while 10 per cent, on the contrary, thought that
most of the high functionaries would be useful and hence worth
111 keeping. This is surprising in view of the fact that four-
fifths of the white-collar refugees had had predominantly
negative relations with their superiors, who nearly always
were in the SED. Evidently, personal difficulties on the job
were rarely generalized into inclusive political judgments.
But, with regard to reunification, perhaps the most
significant fact was that, a year before the outbreak of the
Berlin crisis, only a very few still seemed preoccupied with
the problem. Reunification had become more and more academic
with time, a frustrated wish that had receded into the back-
ground.
111 It may be part of the same pattern that all questions
designed to probe the white-collar employee's relationship
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118.
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to the Workers' and Peasants' State received a large number of
indifferent responses. Half the refugees, for instance, did
not even answer when asked how they felt about the socialized
plants -- the VEB's.
There was hardly a respondent, however, who did not use
one or another argument from Marxist doctrine when asked his
views on the disposition of industrial property.* In the course
of mastering the technique of Marxist jargon in order to "pass"
as loyal or to get ahead in their highly competitive profes-
sional environment,
communist ideology,
that do not involve
people easily become influenced by the
especially in their judgments about matters
or conflict with personal considerations
and interests. Yet the principle of "people's property" elicited
a strongly negative and emotional reaction, possibly because
its democratic assertions were so patently ridiculous. Three-
fifths of the white-collar refugees showed such disapproval,
which did not prevent more than half of them from also seeing
certain advantages in the idea. Socialist "achievements" were
On this issue, outspokenly Marxist attitudes were some-
what rarer (17 per cent) than those observed among workers
(25 per cent) in 1956. Conversely, twice as many white-
collar employees as workers (18 per cent as against 9 per
cent) favored unlimited private property. But between
these two extremes, white-collar and labor views did not
differ strikingly.
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119 STAT
less highly valued by white-collar employees than by workers:
fewer of the secondary achievements were cited as worth retain-
ing in case of German reunification, and 29 per cent of the
refugees denied that there were any "achievements" at all in
the DDR.
On the organization of the socialized enterprises, opinions
were fairly evenly distributed: one-third approved both idea
and practice; one-third were altogether critical, their views
having been formed by Western and former German practice; and
other saw advantages as well as drawbacks. Certain communist
innovations in the plants, especially those that appeared to
give employees a consultative voice in pseudodemocratic fashion,
found general approval; premium systems -- a notorious source
of trouble among white-collar employees -- did not.
The Employee's Attitude toward His Work and Place of Employment
Whereas industrial workers nearly always gave economic
necessity as the reason for their particular choice of work,
signs of a work morale that coincided with communist goals
were evident in the answers of many white-collar refugees, who
worked "because they enjoyed it," out of "ambition," or "to
help build the future." Here, however, variations according
to age and economic status may be suggestive: young people
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120.
under twenty-five were more strongly motivated by professional
ambition tha older age groups, while those over fifty most
often worked purely for economic reasons and also included the
very small element whose attitudes toward professional work
clearly reflected bourgeois or Christian values of a traditional
kind. As between lower and higher levels
world, the former tended to have much the
workers, whereas higher-echelon employees
majority of those who cited social ideals
The great differences of background,
opportunity for advancement, and personal
of the white-collar
same motivations as
accounted for the
or personal ambition.
work prestige, salary,
motivation that divide
the body of white-collar employees, especially in the larger
plants, go far toward explaining their lack of the kind of
solidarity that unites workers within the plant or brigade.
Their spiritual isolation at work, together with their commit-
ment to political organizations, makes them all the more
vulnerable to Party and other political pressure. Nevertheless,
Lack of group solidarity, on the other hand, offers a
certain advantage, especially for the dissenter in the
white-collar group, for it allows the individual to main-
tain a surface involvement with system and regime that
camouflages any deviant views he may hold. To this end,
it is far more important for him than for the worker to
separate the occupational from the private sphere,.and,
because of the very nature of his work, he usually finds
it easier to do so than the professional intellectual.
?
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121.
STAT
more than twice as many white-collar refugees as workers de-
clared the plant to have been the focal point of their lives.
A number of them also cited the "profession" as their chief
tie -- a phenomenon not found among industrial workers.
Somewhat surprisingly, the spiritual climate in which the
white-collar employee works, though far less congenial and
secure than that of the workers, breeds less political hostil-
ity than one might expect. Perhaps the dissenters in the
group are too isolated, and their environment is too mobile,
for it to be otherwise. The temptation to withdraw into a
state of political apathy is strong, and white-collar employees
lack the solidarity and opportunities for communication that
could offset it.
Social Contacts within the Plant
Intra-factory relations varied greatly with income and
status. Only about one in four of the INFRATEST respondents
recognized the significance of the split between "higher" and
'lower" white-collar employees, and these drew the dividing line
at the 600-650 Mark salary. While good social rapport was
Workers, in describing their relations as better with
lower- than with higher-echelon white-collar employees,
drew the line at the 400 Mark income.
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STAT
said to predominate among people on the same income level,
refugees often spoke of poor relations with superiors and better-
paid employees. Seldom were there negative comments about
colleagues on levels lower than one's own. It is generally
a matter of pride for the white-collar employee in the DDR
to get along well with a worker, and the 1957 survey revealed
him as far less aggressive toward workers than one might have
expected from the fairly strong animus of the worker against
his white-collar colleague, registered in the workers' survey
the year before. The relatively few (25 per cent) white-collar
employees who reported having had bad relations with workers
tended to come from the highest brackets; most of those in the
low or middle categories described their contact with workers
as "good" or "quite good."
With respect to the "climbers," too, white-collar em-
ployees were more ambivalent than workers. Whereas three-
fourths of the latter hated or rejected "climbers," only about
one-half the employees showed criticism. Of these, however,
few were unconditionally negative in their comments. The
majority qualified their criticism by mentioning contradictory
experiences, citing "exceptions" to the rule, and pointing
to climbers who were nevertheless "good colleagues." Although
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(e*
ambivalence was evident at all levels, the lower income groups
were the more readily critical, while the more favorable
verdicts tended to come from the higher brackets and, of courses
from those who had themselves "climbed" to higher positions.
It is worth noting, also, that 40 per cent of all white-collar
employees interviewed saw nothing unethical in the political
opportunism of "climbing" as such. With industrial workers,
on the other hand, even though they, too, have possibilities
for climbing, group solidarity militates against their con-
doning this practice.
It is next to impossible for the white-collar employeee
to avoid contact with Party members; only 7 out of 128 refugees
had had none. Three-fourths of those who had had dealings with
SED members reported some degree of tension in their relations.
In general, friction appeared to have been more common than
easy rapport; only 40 per cent of the refugees described rela-
tions as having been friendly or largely friendly.
Although lacking in the kind of solidarity that immunizes
the workers against undesirable encroachments by the system,
the majority of the white-collar group sought their social
relations primarily (and in one-third of the cases exclusively)
within the community of fellow-employees. In their armor of
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political indifference, many white-collar employees undoubtedly
have developed a certain skill in masking whatever ambivalence
or insincerity enters into their actions and attitudes, so
that they can afford to seek social rapport with colleagues
without danger to their psychological security.
In some people, perfect control of the mask may even be-
come part of the armament for active dissention, especially
after they have passed the age at which personal ambition and
responsibilities still outweigh other motivations. And here
we owe some attention to that minority of white-collar employees
who must be considered anti-Communits or revisionists. An
occupational environment so subject to political drill and
supervision as theirs, and so little designed to breed trust
among colleagues, does not encourage the lone dissenter to
seek out like-minded persons to whom he might spread his ideas.
For example, a survey of clandestine readers of Western peri-
odicals in the Zone noted that among workers and in the intel-
lectual professions a dissenter
unless he was able to establish
colleagues. For dissenters who
it was, of necessity, different
they centered the communication
tended to remain inactive
good political rapport with
were white-collar employees,
. The social pole around which
of deviant ideas and forbidden
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publications was lodged elsewhere -- either in existing personal
friendships or in the kind of relationships, based on a common
political persuasion, that are found among Western-oriented
SoCial Democrats, liberals, and Christian Democrats.
The constant need for extreme caution provides the dis-
senting white-collar employee with hard but useful training
in self-discipline. He must learn to separate the personal
sphere from professional relationships, to command the language
of communist rhetoric, and not to be ideologically confused
by his own outward manifestations of support for the system.
This process of learning takes time, and it may be
significant that dissenters in typical white-collar jobs, un-
like those among workers and professional intellectuals, are
rarely found among the very young. Also, the relatively few
who are less than twenty-five years old tend to be less active
than dissenters of their age in other occupational groups.
And -- again in contrast to workers, professional people, and
students -- young white-collar employees hardly ever share
forbidden Western literature with their colleagues.
On the other hand, once they have learned the ropes, these
white-collar employees frequently become most active in dis-
seminating their ideas at an age when the dissenting activity
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.1
of others tends to decline. As a study of readers and dis-
tributors of forbidden literature showed, considerations of
career and family cause the majority of dissenters to become
more cautious between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five.
White-collar employees, however, appear to overcome these
demands sooner than do workers and intellectuals, and already
in their early 'thirties often resume their activity as
dissenters.
Finally, it is worth noting that poorly-paid white-collar
employees are far more active communicators of dissent than
those earning a fair or good living. Least active are those
with middle and high incomes who have "climbed" to success
without benefit of a higher education. However, restraint
in political activity does not increase indefinitely with the
degree to which one profits by the present system. Very well-
paid employees (those earning over 800 Marks per month) take
more liberties than do their colleagues in the middle income
group. And especially active are those among them who have
had a university education, and who, therefore, can count on
finding lucrative employment in the West, if one day they
should be forced to flee.
.16
White-Collar Youth
STAT
STAT
Among the youngest group of refugees (those under twenty-
five), white-collar employees are less heavily represented
than either workers or intellectuals (the latter here including
university students). This fact is sometimes explained by
the younger employee's exceptionally good opportunities for
advancement in the East.
Although 21 of the 128 white-collar employees interviewed
by INFRATEST actually were under twenty-five, they probably were
not a representative sample of their age group in the Zone,
and their opinions, therefore, should be weighed with some
caution. Quite uncharacteristically, for example, nearly all
of them had never been anything but white-collar employees.
Unlike their many young colleagues who owe their ascent from
a worker or peasant background to the present regime, the
young people in the sample were not particularly indebted to
the communist system and showed less than the degree of
identification with it that one probably would find in East
Germany. It may be all the more remarkable, therefore, that
the influence of Marxist ideology on even this unrepresentative
group was rather stronger than on the somewhat more typical
sample of older white-collar employees; the percentage of those
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.7
who found nothing to criticize in the system, for example, was
twice as large.
This tendency of the very young to accept the new order
unquestioningly was often mentioned by their older white-collar
colleagues in the course of the INFRATEST interviews. It was
also confirmed by one of the experts consulted for the present
study, who prior to her admission to the bar had served in
twelve administrative offices in East Germany. She attributed
the dearth of critical thought and expressions of dissent among
the young people in civil and economic administration partly
to the large number of opportunists among them, and partly
to the omnipresent controls in their professsional environment.
Although she blind that most people quickly sensed who might or
might not be trustworthy, the atmosphere was one of suspicion
and anxiety, in which private intercourse remained limited to
guarded hints and seemingly innocuous advice, and the critical
beginner would naturally be particularly bewildered and
frustrated. Acceptance of the system in East Germany did not,
of course, necessarily mean that these young people approved
of the Ulbricht regime.
STAT
VI. The Transitionals -- Artisans,
Retailers, and Peasants
There is only a tiny group of "capitalists" left in the
Soviet Zone, most of whom today must "share" their enter-
prises with the communist state. This is at least part of
the reason that as yet no special opinion study has focussed
on independent entrepreneurs. They are too few and, as a
group, too weak to be
As of the middle
mated that there were
prises, whose output,
of total production.*
of primary interest.
of 1958, a West German
newspaper esti-
still 12,000 owners of private enter-
however, accounted for
only one-eighth
The remaining seven-eighths was being
STAT
produced by "co-operatives" or by state-owned enterprises.
Independent ownership today is largely concentrated in
agriculture, in handicraft (which includes private artisans
as well as small-scale industrial enterprises), and, to a
lesser extent, in retail trade. In all three areas, these
independents face pressure to join co-operatives -- frequently,
in communist countries, the first step in the direction of
total socialization.. Private retail trade already has come
Die Welt, June 18, 1958.
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to play only a minor role in the economy, and in handicraft
and agriculture the co-operatives are gradually becoming
dominant.
The trend toward socialization of small producers was
particularly strong during 1958. Whereas there were only 295
of the so-called "handicraft production co-operatives"
(Handwerksproduktionsgenossenschaften) in the Soviet Zone in
January, by the end of the year their number was 2,378, and
their membership 57,000, including 9,700 master-craftsmen.
This rapid advance had been accomplished with the aid of new
legislation, which put craftsmen and small industrial enter-
prises employing more than three people in their shops under
strong economic pressure to join the co-operatives. However,
the excessive enthusiasm which Party functionaries brought
to this campaign caused considerable economic disorganization,
and in the fall of 1958 -- on the advice of a group of Soviet
visiting experts -- the regime called a temporary halt.
The Reactions of Artisans and Retailers
Specialists who have been in touch with artisans and
small businessmen
with strong, open
it was directed;
stress, however, that the drive did not meet
resistance from the private owners at whom
reluctant though they doubtless were, the
attrition of their morale as independents was by then so
?
STAT
advanced that pressure was enough to make them yield quite
STAT
readily. Also, the regime had paved the way for a "spontaneous"
development toward the co-operative by creating conditions in
which, materially, the private businessman or very small
industrial producer often
joining. One sign of the
entrepreneurs is the fact
had more to gain than lose by
acquiescence of most independent
that in 1958, when the pressure was
most acute, only 1,978 owners of handicraft and small industrial
establishments fled to the West, that is to say, fewer than one
for every newly-formed co-operative.
For a variety of reasons, the independent craftsman
usually would rather give up his independence and stay with his
work than seek employment in West Germany. First, he does not
necessarily lose all rights to his property immediately; some
types of co-operatives permit him to withdraw with his equip-
ment if he wishes to do so, as indeed sometimes happens.
Second, the independent artisans and small industrial entre-
preneurs have had to pay for their independence with considerable
harassment. While, on the one hand, they had little competition
and an enormous market for their work, on the other hand,
there was a definite limit to the extent to which they wanted
to expand their workshops. If they hired more than a couple
of additional persons they would jeopardize their status as
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independents; and materials were difficult to procure, so
that they often had to risk obtaining them illegally.
(Private artisans, as well as the co-operatives, have tended
increasingly to turn from production to repairs and services.)
Also, in practice, the differences between socialized and
private plants are becoming smaller all the time. One observer
cited as typical the experience of a friend, an independent
producer of small household appliances, who has to set up a
production plan a year in advance and have it approved; he is
told how many items he may produce, where he can get the raw
materials, and to whom he may sell his output. And, finally,
new tax burdens have erased many of the material advantages of
being an independent earner.
The gamble of remaining independent under communism paid
off until fairly recently, but with hope for reunification
receding and pressures increasing, the odds seem
changed. In the co-operatives, by contrast, the
small operator finds some of the security he has
to have
artisan or
not known
before: health insurance, a pension, vacations with pay, and
regulated hours of work.
The problem is similar, but even more acute, for people
in the retail trade. Here, the private storekeeper has for
years been fighting a losing battle against competition from
?
STAT
the socialized sector. As early as 1956, only 30 per cent STAT
of all retail trade passed across privately-owned counters.
The store owner who submits to socialization by becoming a
commissioner" is no longer troubled by taxes, draws an
income of 6 per cent of his turnover, and has claim to certain
security benefits for his future that he never had before.
The willingness of the independent craftsmen
or store-
keepersto succumb to necessity or expediency does not mean,
however, that they have become less hostile to the communist
system. Their attitude is perhaps most appropriately
described as one of resignation. Over the years, the spirit
of enterprise that earlier may have maintained them in their
often solitary gamble has weakened as the stakes have become
lower, and social solidarity among the private practitioners
of a trade has suffered as more of their number have joined
co-operatives. The break with independence is all the less
radical a step so long as a man, in joining a co-operative,
suffers no grave material loss, and his life, at least
outwardly and at first, does not change very much. The co-op
member does not feel, and is not made to feel, that he is a
worker. Also, the formation of the production co-operative,
and later the function of "representing" it, are often
entrusted not to SED functionaries but to members of such
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bourgeois bloc parties as the LDP and the NDP.* The co-op
member can thus feel that he remains on the periphery of the
system.
This illusion of semi-independence is easily destroyed,
however, when the co-operative, as sometimes happens in urban
centers, has its members work together in one workshop. In
this manner, a co-operative may also grow to the point of self-
liquidation, as has occurred, for example, with some furniture-
making co-ops, which were said to have "matured" sufficiently
to become socialized industrial enterprises.
As of now, the antiregime feeling of those artisans,
small manufacturers, and storekeepers who are still independent
is probably kept In check by their concern for physical safety
and financial profit, and by the fact that the bonds of
solidarity in this class have become very loose. Others, who
have already lost their formal independence, are aware that
their existence has not thereby been threatened, but that,
on the contrary, they have traded nominal freedom for a material
security that is worth protecting. Such considerations also
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the National
Democratic Party (NDP) are middle-class parties permitted
in East Germany as window dressing, but are completely
under communist control.
11)
STAT
tend to act as brakes on their rebellious impulses. As long
STAT
as the regime remains as firmly entrenched as it is today,
their opposition is likely to remain very cautious. Any
relaxation in the political scene, however, might encourage
stronger reactions, whose nature would depend on the direction
that such a change takes. If the outlook were for greater
economic freedom within the present system, this might result
in pressure for the kind of neo-capitalist enterprise that
Russia experienced in the period of the New Economic Policy.
Any prospect of actual libelation conceivably could unleash
stored-up aggressions that would be channeled into political
action.
Peasants
The opinions of experts differ as to the political
significance of the often violent resentment expressed by
peasants who flee to West Berlin or who come there on temporary
visits. Peasants are apt to be loudest in urging West Berlin
radio stations to be more belligerent in broadcasts to the
Zone. On the other hand, the flood of peasant refugees,
which was so high when collectivization began in 1952-53,
subsided quickly when it became evident that there were no
qv farms to be had in the West. The division of large holdings,
carried out so extensively in East Germany after 1945 in the
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so-called "agrarian reform," took place on a very modest
scale in the West. This fact meets with strong disapproval
from the East German refugee peasants, who, although opposed
to collectivization, are all in favor of the land reform that
preceded it, and simply cannot understand why room cannot be
made for them in West Germany by having large estates divided
up in the same manner. Observers also point out that East
German peasants, whatever their resentments, did not go into
action when the workers revolted on June 17, 1953. Most
specialists agree that, at the present time, the attitude of
free peasants in the Soviet Zone is best defined as one of
resignation.
Independent peasants today probably own less than half of
the East German farmland. In the course of 1958, collectivi-
zation progressed at a very fast rate,* though it seems to
have slackened somewhat under the impact of the Berlin crisis.
The pressures used to induce peasants to join collectives
voluntarily have been subtler, and more successful, than in
earlier years. Whereas formerly quotas for compulsory contri-
butions to the state were set at a point beyond the peasant's
See pp. 20-21.
STAT
capacity, the difficulty today is not so much that the quotaFAT
are too high, but that the
enough labor and machinery
enough in addition to give
independent farmer cannot procure
to meet his quotas and produce
him a profit and protect him
against bad years. Farm labor is scarce because the young
either are drawn increasingly into the collective farms or, to
a much greater extent than in West Germany, seek to make a
living in the cities. At [resent, youths under eighteen make
up only 3 per cent of all farm labors Tractor stations, which
in the past could be bribed to provide needed machinery, are
now entirely at the disposal of co-operatives and state farms.
In order to earn a profit, the peasants often have to engage
in somewhat risky transactions -- to obtain more than the
legal allotment of seed, to evade registrations, and so on.
Although such minor transgressions usually don't lead to court
action, they are carefully watched, and, when a co-operative
is organized in the village, they are sometimes used to
blackmail reluctant peasants into joining. Also, the recent
currency reform wiped out most of the peasants' savings, thus
adding to the independent farmer's realization that his
position, in the long run, is untenable.
Although, on the average, the independent peasant may be
better able than the co-operative to make the land pay, and
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although by joining a co-op he has more to lose than, for
instance, the artisan, there is much that encourages him to
do so, including the prospect of being able to work with
improved, mechanized equipment. In joining the co-operative,
the peasant may lose income, but in return he finds security
and freedom from responsibility. For the first time in his
life he may work an eight-hour day, and he receives a
vacation with pay. The first type of co-operative he joins
is limited to field tillage. It does not pool the members'
livestock, and permits them to retain private plots of land,
which naturally receive their owners' preferred attention.
The contract stipulates -- and this serves as an effective
inducement -- that the peasant has not given up hisiroperty.
Withdrawals from co-ops were still quite common in 1954-55,
but have since become less and less frequent.
Collective farms do not have to pay their own way in
order to continue in operation. Indeed, agricultural experts
and certain communist revisionists were severely censured for
suggesting that farms unable to support themselves should be
dissolved. While on some farms the minimum wage of the
peasant may be just enough for him to live on, there are also
well-run co-operatives where profits are substantial.
?
STAT
In explaining the growing willingness of peasants to joiSTAT
co-operatives, one expert said: "Solidarity is at the zero
level. If one or two break ranks in a village, all the rest
follow." Another observer thought this somewhat exaggerated,
but he agreed that the free peasants no longer saw any real
alternative to collectivization. The lack of an attractive
alternative is underlined, these students say, by the fact
that independent and co-operative peasants alike are quite
opposed to an agricultural system such as that in West Germany.
They do not favor free competition in agriculture, and
criticize what they regard as inadequate state protection for
the West German farmer. Furthermore, in every co-operative
there are several elements that have gained both materially
and in status: the formerly landless agricultural workers,
the so-called "new peasants" who received very small parcels
in the land reform of 1945, and those children of peasants who
have taken advanced study in agriculture and are thereupon
assigned to high positions in the collectives, where they
usually prove quite capable.
Observers see no reason why, in time, the agricultural
co-operative should not pay its way and even prosper. A
newly-launched program for merging several co-operatives to
permit broader-scale operations has not yet met with much
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opposition from the farmers. But a projected law, to be
passed in October, which would increase the prerogatives of
the co-op directors and limit the rights of members, is more
likely to meet with a negative reaction.
In a society such as the one in East Germany, close ties
between peasantry and workers are of vital importance if
purposeful and effective resistance to state power is to
crystallize. Thus far, there are no indications that such
ties have developed. Whether the growing mechanization of
agriculture will draw the two elements more closely together
remains tote seen.
?
?
VII. The Students
STAT
STAT
We have already touched briefly on the attitudes of the
very young industrial workers and white-collar employees, as
compared to those of their elders, and have found that,
except in the behavior patterns of active dissenters, the
differences between generations are not very striking. In
the following, we shall examine another segment of East German
youth, the students, and especially those who, upon completing
their secondary schooling (at about the age of nineteen), have
gone on to universities and schools of technology.*
Historically, students have formed reservoirs for
rebellious causes. Under an oppressive system of rule, their
level of culture and articulateness, their easy access to the
professors whose legitimate business is in the realm of ideas
and criticism, the immunity conferred by numbers, the absence
Most of the material following has been drawn from a
variety of sources: a very incisive report by a young
refugee who had himself been an assistant at an East
German university (Gerd Bbttger, "Die politische
Situation an den Hochschulen" [The Political Situation at
the Schools of Higher Learning], SBZ-Archiv, June 25, 1957);
a large number of interviews and conversations with student
refugees conducted recently; a few recent interviews with
persons still in the Zone; a large number of interviews
conducted in 1952 and 1954 with student readers of forbidden
Western publications; reports available in the "OstbUro"
of the SPD; and interviews with persons who are profession-
ally concerned with East German affairs.
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o res ra n s at will later be imposed by career and family
responsibilities, and the opportunity to exchange and
disseminate ideas among themselves all make them particularly
interesting for any inquiry into active or latent dissension.
Control, Indoctrination, and Communication of Dissent
Like any communist regime, the DDR has a far-reaching
organizational program for the young, designed to insure the
loyalty of the next geration. Active membership in the
political organizations open to the young is known to be the
ladder to advancement, and, on the average, young people in
high schools and universities spend more time after hours in
state-connected activities than other members of their families.
The social premium on the kind of success that can be attained
only by way of an education makes East German students hard-
working and ambitious, possibly even more so than their
opposite numbers in West Germany.
Earlier in this study, we quoted the opinion of a member
of the Free Jurists who thought that the number of fanatical
supporters of the regime among young people in general was
quite small. Youth was said to have mastered the technique
of the "double-think," combined with a detachment that
permitted them to understand and transcend their own
opportunism. Among students especially, the solidarity of
?
STAT
STAT
the classroom not infrequently shows how tenuous is the
political loyalty of even conscientious FDJ members.* Indeed,
this solidarity explains many instances of impulsive flight.
In a number of cases, entire school classes have fled in a
body after one student had done or said something that would
have led to his expulsion, and the class refused to give him
away.
Stiffer controls, designed to prevent any spread of
revisionist thought, and increasing demands on the individual
student, including paramilitary training and compulsory labor
service, have brought a sharp rise in the number of university
student refugees, at a period when the general exodus has been
lessening. Thus, 2,522 students fled in 1958, as compared to
1,894 in 1953 and 1,431 in 1956. And the proportion of
university students in the total body of defectors nearly
doubled between 1957 and 1958. While their numbers have
grown, however, the more recent student refugees have included
relatively fewer of the element that is often described as
most dangerous to the Ulbricht regime -- revisionists and
critical Marxists. These adversaries are often least willing
When twenty-one high-school students were questioned
some years ago, a number were regularly circulating
copies of a forbidden Western magazine through their
entire class.
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to leave the Soviet Zone, partly because their training
qualifies them only for agitprop and Party control jobs and
it therefore would be difficult for them to make an adequate
living in the West, and partly because -- much like some
militant Christians -- they tend to have a strong sense of
their responsibility to remain and improve conditions in the
Zone. When such students do turn up among refugees, they are
more apt than others to have fled as a last resort, in order
to escape arrest.
As might be expected, the rate of defection varies
considerably with the field of academic specialization, that
is to say, with the degree of pressure to which students are
subject in the different faculties and with the type of
career for which they are preparing. Although one would need
complete statistics on refugee students' subjects of
specialization to determine exactly how defector rates differ
from field to field, such material as is available points to
certain general facts and tendencies.
Political drill and other manifestations of the control
system obviously are least effective and troublesome in the
natural sciences, engineering, and medical schools; they
are stronger in the liberal arts and humanities; and they
encroach most heavily on the life of students specializing in
STAT
philosophy (Marxism), modern history, social and economic
sciences, law, and education. For students in such fields as
physics, medicine, machine construction, and metallurgy,
formal political instruction is limited to the basic courses
in social science and in Ruaian and German literature (Marxist
interpretation) that are compulsory for all students, and most
of them seem to
there is strong
case in medical
take these requirements rather lightly. Where
solidarity among fellow-students, as is the
faculties, such courses may even become the
STAT
occasion for an exchange of critical ideas. But such criticism
is usually directed toward emphasizing the detachment and
independence of thaprofessional group and rarely becomes
political in the broader sense.
The curricula of the humanities have been strongly
influenced by communist interpretations and perspectives, but
there are limits to the degree to which the content of the
liberal arts can be fitted into a dogmatic frame
Also, students of language, literature, art, and
are often apolitical, and, although tensions and
of reference.
architecture
conflicts do
arise, they are apt to achieve a certain degree of detachment
from the political approach.
In the social sciences, economics, philosophy, and
history, on the other hand, the impact of Marxist interpretation
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146.
and dialectic is all-pervasive. Detachment cannot be found
by simple withdrawal; the student can reach it only through
the fire of controversy, alone or at best with only a few
trusted friends. However, such a personal
supposes a strong critical ability. Where
the students' training allows little scope
purgatory pre-
that is lacking,
for the development
of independent thought. In addition, students in these fields
are necessarily concerned with their own professional future
in positions in which they will be expected continually to
manifest their political loyalty. They know, also, that any
credits earned in these fields at East German universities
would have no value anywhere in the West. Finally, we must
assume that very few students of basically pro-Western
orientation would have elected to study philosophy or social
sciences in the DDR to begin with. Yet it is here that we
find critical Marxists developing revisionist ideas.
Studies of readers and distributors of a Western publi-
cation, among whom university students are prominent, suggest
that the student's activity as a dissenter is related to his
age as well as to his field of study. In all departments,
the youngest dissenters were apt to be quite active in
distributing the forbidden literature. Aftera year or two,
at about the age of twenty-two, student dissenters would
?
?
STAT
1 7.
STAT
suddenly come face to face with the dilemma of reconciling
their activity with the thought of their career and safety
under communism. The crisis then was sharpest in the
humanities, to which many students originally had turned with
the naive illusion that, in studying languages, literature,
or the arts, they would remain free from political supervision.
By the same token, the crisis was weaker and recovery quicker
for those preparing to be economists, administrators, jurists,
and educators; that is to say, for students who had elected
careers which they knew to be closely supervised by the
regime. Most students in this second group had been aware of
the problem they faced, and realization of their dilemma was
therefore less sudden and shocking for them. Also, the
longer students had read and distributed forbidden Western
literature the less severely affected were they by the crisis
described above. While the crisis lasted, relatively
inexperienced students tended to become almost entirely
inactive. More experienced ones often restricted their
communication severely for the remainder of their stay at the
university. However, students twenty-five years and older
who had recovered from the crisis and remained dissenters
often became not only more active but also more careful than
the very young, especially if they had been reading and
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sharing Western periodicals for some time. Questioning
showed that students in this category frequently were headed
for academic careers or for other kinds of positions that the
regime considers politically important. Nevertheless, their
activity as dissenters was balanced and mature, and they
often carried it beyond the university into the broader
community.
Taken by field, the most active dissenters were medical
students, reputedly the most independent element in the
student body, with what appears to be an unusually strong
sense of solidarity. By contrast, the least adive students
were those in engineering and the other natural sciences,
where inactivity is directly attributable to total lack of
interest in politics.
Political Opinion Among Students
The most systematic analysis of students in the DDR is
that by Gerd Btittger, mentioned above. BUttger isolates four
major groups within the student body: the adherents of the
Party line; the "spontaneous opposition"; the idealistic
opponents of Marxism; and the critical Marxists.
(1) Among followers of the Party line, B8ttger distinguishes
two subgroups. The first of these consists of sincere
?
?
STAT
149.
STAT
enthusiasts, who start out by accepting everything uncritically
(and no doubt are most numerous in the younger age groups).
Their subjective honesty easily runs afoul of political reality
and Party practices, especially since the Twentieth Party
Congress. Once disillusioned, they may stick to some of their
convictions and may even become "critical Marxists," or they
may retreat behind a mask of ostensible participation during
their remaining semesters and continue in their later careers
with minimal political involvement. Alternatively, they may
join the second subgroup: that of unscrupulous, often fanati-
cal, politicians and careerists,
detect the dividing line between
(2) What B8ttger calls the
in his opinion the single largest
who are opposed to, or skeptical
in whom it is difficult to
ambition and conviction.
"spontaneous opposition" --
student group -- are those
of, the regime from the out-
set. He attributes their attitudes largely to parental in-
fluence. They are to be found primarily in the natural sciences,
especially in medicine. These are the fields that permit them
the greatest degree of political aloofness, for not only are
controls less severe, but medical, science, and engineering
students are aware that the state needs them.* Their knowledgt
Both in their sense of indispensability and in the strongly
materialist direction of their personal interest they re-
semble the industrial workers, though, of course, far more
? privileged.
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row%
150.
of Marxism-Leninsim is superficial, and their antagonism to
the regime arises more often from the self-centered desire to
be "left alone with one's profession" than from any well-thought-
out ideology. But their relative freedom from political con-
trol encourages spontaneous reactions against the encroachments
of the state on their private interests, and in October and
November of 1956, when the timid trend toward de-Stalinization
reached its climax in the DDR, medical students were in the
forefront of those who openly demanded university reforms and
separate student organizations, and who fought the obligatory
"social science" lectures on Marxism-Leninism. As to the
depth of their convictions, however, B8ttger is probably close
to the truth when he says: "If the state would give up trying
to make conscientious class-fighters out of them and make
concessions to their interests, they would be the last ones to
rebel against the state."
(3) The motivations of idealistic opponents of Marxism
among students vary in origin. For one thing, there are intele.
lectual or academic family backgrounds that foster a conserva-
tive or liberal-humanistic sense of values. To judge by
students interviewed in 1958, these traits do not emerge in
the form of a set of consistent ideas, but are reflected rather
?
STAT
STAT
in a general tendency toward moderate and well-balanced judg-
ments on the part of some children from well-situated academic
families. It is quite different with another type of young
idealist, the conscientious Christian. B8ttger believes, and
refugee students bear him out, that the Christian student is
not easily shaken by communist ideology, whose postulates he
accepts, if at all, only critically and with reservations. His
views tend to be fairly specific and consistent, and he can
even find shelter and support in one of the legal (though much-
hounded) student organizations of the two major churches.
11 Particularly the Protestant "Young Community" (Junge Gemeinde)
has concerned itself critically with Marxist-Leninist philosophy,
and during 1956 engaged the Communists in an open ideological
contest. However, the anticommunism of the Christian students
does not often lead them to take issue with the bases of the
social and economic system, and they are anxious not to appear
"disloyal" to the state.
(4) Critical Marxists, in Battger's definition, are those
who are convinced that the future belongs to communism, but
who, by intensive study, have become persuaded of the inadequacy
of orthodox Marxism or the harmfulness of Stalinism.* Critical
A sizable minority of refugee students might be classified
as critical Marxists. But they very rarely show the degree
of reflection and maturity specified by Btittger. The pro-
filed revisionist or critical Marxist student groups in the
Zone sometimes maintain contact with left-wing Socialists
in West Berlin. '
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Marxists are most often found among advanced students or young
assistants, and particularly in the social sciences. Within
this category, Bdttger again distinguishes two subgroups:
those who are willing to consider certain Western approaches
and break with the Party should this be necessary to safeguard
their ultimate goal; and those who foresee no possibility of
true national communism in the divided country, will not rebel
against Party discipline, and fear for the "achievements" of
the DDR if concessions should be made to the West. The first
group is more reluctant than the second to subordinate "humane
socialism" to tactics, and its representatives range from
Ranch supporters to Po Prostu revisionists, including also
some Gomulka followers.
Wolfgang Ranch, a young professor in East Berlin and
editor-in-chief of the Deutsche Zeitschrift fir Philosophie,
vainly sought the support of SED leaders and Soviet repre-
sentatives for a radical program of reform. He foresaw an
evolutionary road to socialism for Western Europe and took
the position that the SED should take a back seat after free
elections in a reunified Germany, provided that "restorative"
forces were eliminated by the SPD in West Germany. In March
1957, Ranch was convicted of conspiracy to form a group
hostile to the state, and was sentenced to ten years in prison.
Stronger than the influence of East German revisionists has
been the impact of greater intellectual freedom in Poland
on critical Marxist students in the DDR. After the Twentieth
Party Congress and the Poznan strikes, the student newspaper
Po Prostu became the major popular organ of revisionism
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?
STAT
STAT
Battger's analysis seems to imply that all university
students are politically decided. No doubt, the strict political
control of their environment by state and Party precludes
anything like the rate of political indifference that we ob-
served, for example, among white-collar employees. It is much
more difficult for the student to separate his personal world
from the field of academic training. Also, personal com-
pensations and satisfactions such as home, family, and acquisi-
tion of property, which might encourage withdrawal from politics,
usually do not yet exist for the university student. On the
10 other hand, interviews with student refugees, and even the
impression created by student readers of forbidden Western
magazines, cast considerable doubt on the assumption that all
students are politically alert.
The views of one of the experts consulted on this subject
are somewhat more elastic. He estimates that between 10 and
15 per cent of the students are unconditionally tied to the DDR.
In his definition, this would include not only WIttger's ap-
parent fanatics, but a type of careerist who is not necessarily
?
in Poland. Some Po Prostu editors favored restoration of
a free multiparty system. Although the newspaper had been
influential in bringing Gomulka back to power in October
1956, Gomulka, after repeated warnings, suppressed it in
September 1957.
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aggressive, as well as many of Bdttger's "critical Marxists"
who are preparing for careers that would make a professional
transfer to the West difficult, if not impossible.
There is still another type of careerist who, although
politically dangerous, is not at all "tied" to the communist
system. A few refugee students exhibited the purest kind of
opportunism in their identification with communism. Wholly
uncritical and conscious only of personal ambition and inter-
est, these students seemed to have embraced wholeheartedly
all the judgments and goals of the regime in order to be safe
and make good. But when questioned on their ambitions in
West Germany and their opinion of how things should be done
there, they seemed likely to become just as fanatically and
successfully conformist in trying to pursue careers in the West.
The consultant cited above put the number of decided
opponents of the system at 30-35 per cent of the student body.
This number would include the more thoughtful element of
Bdttger's "spontaneous opposition," as well as what has been
known since Nazi times as the "inner emigration" in Germany --
people who deliberately withdraw from their political surround-
ings into a private spiritual life that permits them to nourish
deviant interests and live by their own moral code. The remain-
ing 50 per cent the informant considers merely Mitldufer
?
?
STAT
155.
STAT
that is to say, those who will just "go along" with whatever
ideas and institutions are in fashion -- a group that would
seem to overlap with the remainder of Bdttger's "spontaneous
opposition." Once disaffected, members of this group have
neither the Christian idealist's notion of self-sacrifice nor
the Marxist revisionist's sense of mission to prevent them
from leaving the Zone, if by doing so they can live more safely
and prosperously.
Ambivalence and Revisionism
The following are impressions gathered from interviews
and conversations with student refugees, chiefly in 1958, and
some of the students' attitudes on specific subjects.
As already indicated, our findings from these interviews
did not always tally with Bdttger's clear-cut divisions and
his picture of a fairly large proportion of thoughtful and
politically knowledgeable students. Rather, one finds here,
too, a surprisingly high incidence of confused, ambivalent,
and often superficial thinking. The influence of communist
ideology and propaganda on the refugee students' opinions and
thought habits made itself felt throughout, even among the
half-dozen or so whose parents had suffered social degradation
under the regime. For example, quite a few, even though they
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had fled, still maintained that communism was superior to
Western forms of government and that it would one day rule the
world. They did not necessarily thereby acknowledge communism
as the better economic system; more likely, they had arrived
at this judgment purely in terms of power politics and because
of the vitality they sensed in the Soviet Union.
There were few signs of violent emotional reaction against
Communists as such; most of the students had known, or thought
there existed, what they called "decent" Communists. Some
spoke of the "idealistic Communist" who practiced a kind of
"socialist morality"; others, however, denied that there was
such a type. Many of the students thought there was a dis-
tinction between Leninism and Marxism, but few were able to
define the difference.
Communist conditioning was noticeable especially in the
students' frequent references to "classes" and to "antagonistic
class interests." Even those who found workers to be better
off in West Germany than in the DDR often thought that there
was a class struggle in the Federal Republic. But refugee
students were perhaps even more inclined to find class antago-
nism in the DDR. The less analytic and thoughtful among them
might parrot the definitions of orthodox communist doctrine
STAT
157.
STAT
and speak of a conflict between the workers (or "the people")
and what remained of independent property owners. But the
larger and more perceptive group would point to the "new class"
-- or, to use a term preferred by critical-Marxists, the
"stratum" -- of functionaries, whose ascendancy, some of them
thought, had shifted the class struggle to one between the
workers and this new elite.
There was no mistaking the vestiges of Nazi and national-
ist sentiment in the judgments and attitudes of quite a few
students. Such residues of Nazism as were observed, however,
were not so much aggressive as they were nostalgic and apolo-
getic, and parental influence had clearly been at work. Nazi
echoes turned up mostly among children of parents whose sense
of self-importance under the Nazis had been most rudely shat-
tered by the East German state. The tendency to look back with
some longing to the days of greater personal comfort and
national self-esteem had been a common one also in West Germany
before the days of the "economic miracle." But in East Germans
it was combined in a very curious fashion with communist
formulas. Some of those who displayed both Nazi and communist
elements in their attitudes were not at all bothered by, or
aware of, any conflict between them.
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Students were likely to exhibit striking misconceptions
about the West in general, and its stand on communism in particu-
lar, often combining a conscious liberalism with the uncon-
sciously assimilated legends of communist propaganda. Quite
a few believed, for:example, that there was an official Nazi
party in the Federal Republic. Most of the students condoned
the outlawing of the West German Communist Party (KPD), though
for a surprising variety of reasons, some of them having first
described the KPD as a party of idealists fighting for true
communism. Others disapproved of the ban because they thought
it violated the tenets of democracy.
Although nearly everyone could name the major West German
parties, many thought that the government was a coalition of
CDU and SPD, and showed complete unawareness of the function
of an opposition party, a common failure throughout Germany
in the first years after the war.
Positive comments about West Germany concerned the high
standard of living far more often than they did personal liber-
ty or the "free way of life." Negative views had many earmarks
of the wild-west picture painted by the Communists: extrava-
gance, rowdyism, cheap entertainment, and pornographic literature
were mentioned often and spontaneously; allegations of selfishness
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?
STAT
STAT ?
or lack of interest in reunification usually required prompting.*
Criticism of East German institutions varied considerably.
The "derived achievements" of the DDR educational oppor-
tunity, social welfare, free vacation trips with pay, etc.
had fairly general approval. The so-called "basic" ones
Imo Olio
land reform and state ownership of industry -- though rarely
cited as "achievements," were nevertheless thought desirable,
and a great many of the students questioned, possibly the
majority, wanted to see them retained in case of reunification.
A large majority wanted continued state ownership of heavy
industry, but almost everyone favored reprivatization of small
As to the students' personal interests in various political
areas, especially by comparison with nonstudents, the inter-
views were somewhat less revealing than the responses of
a smaller number of students among readers of Western
publications who, in 1954, were asked how they felt about
coverage of certain subjects. At that time, students
seemed to have resigned themselves to the gradual eclipse
of the prospect of liberation and were escaping into other
areas of interest. They were less anxious than others to
read about "communism" and "East-West tensions," and did
not share very heavily in the then widespread interest in
the idea of European federation. Disappointment with
America found expression in their desire to read less about
that country; interest in "internal German affairs," on
the other hand, was markedly greater here than among other
(older) groups. To appreciate this last fact, we must
remember that revisionist perspectives had not yet crystal-
lized at that time. However, a strong "inner emigration" --
an esoteric withdrawal from politics into literary and
intellectual interests alien to communism -- is probably
as common among student dissenters today as it was in 1954.
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160.
industry and particularly of trade.
Asked about various features of university controls, refugee
students, on the whole, were only moderately critical. For
example, a great many were not opposed to the idea of having
only one youth organization that included the students, although
they tended to wish for a greater degree of autonomy for the
student section in it. Also, many approved in principle of
the "social science" courses, objecting only to their being
obligatory; they would have preferred that such courses be
elective. Few criticized the idea of centrally controlled
higher education, but quite a number felt that more room should
be left for electives, and many asked for assurances against
political drill.
It is true that the student community showed itself sus-
ceptible to rebellious influences during and after the revi-
sionist crisis of late 1956. We have already pointed out the
two chief reservoirs of potential dissenters: (1) students in
fields that politically are relatively untouched, who feel
free at times to put forward their grievances over minor, local
issues; and (2) the more profoundly and lastingly discontented
"critical Marxists," most of them from fields where political
supervision is inescapable, who may rally to the spiritual
1:0
161. STAT
?STAT
leadership of such intellectuals as Harich, Bloch, Havemann,
or Vieweg.* It is all the more remarkable, then, how limited
an impact the controversy surrounding the revisionist profes-
sors appears to have had in terms of the total student community.
Not more than 15 per cent of the students interviewed could
identify Harich, whose case had made headlines in the press,
and even fewer knew Bloch. Even some of the students who
regarded themselves as critical Marxists were ignorant of the
Ernst Bloch, born in 1885, is an unorthodox "Marxist"
philosopher and Soviet apologist. He re-migrated from
the United States in 1949, and returned to the University
411 of Leipzig, where he exercised a strong influence on a
whole generation of communist youth. After the Twentieth
Party Congress, anachronistic elements in his approach
suddenly assumed an immediate political significance.
Although he was not a Party man, the SED had used him as
a parade horse. When Ulbricht could no longer afford to
do this, Bloch was retired, in January 1957, under heavy
attack for "subjectivism." He had always been less of a
Marxist than Georg Lukacs, the Hungarian mentor of
revisionism.
Robert Havemann, a natural scientist and professor in East
Berlin, branded the application of dialectical materialism
to the natural sciences as "philosophical dogmatism."
Unlike Bloch, Havemann recanted when attacked by the Party.
Kurt Vieweg (born 1911), a lifelong Communist, was a lead-
ing agrarian expert and director of the Akademie der
Landwirtschaftswissenschaften (Academy of Agricultural
Sciences). He came under sharp attack for suggesting the
dissolution of collective farms that cannot support them-
selves, and for favoring family agricultural establishments
of medium size. Vieweg fled to West Germany in the spring
of 1957, but returned to the Zone the following October.
In May 1958, he was sentenced to four years and eight
months in prison.
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conflict and the men involved. Among those who did have some
idea -- and they included some alert and thoughtful minds with
reform-communist leanings -- the influence of a communist
environment was apparent in the way in which knowledge and
beliefs intermingled with hearsay and secondary impressions.
Quite characteristic were remarks about Harich such as this
one, by a woman student of German (an essentially uncritical
person): "I heard his lectures on the history of philosophy.
We were enthusiastic about him, and we were shocked when we
learned what a terrible man he was supposed to have been."
A remark by a student who can be described as the most
perceptive "critical Marxist" we have met (and who is still in
the Zone) may be typical of one segment of student opinion not
represented in the refugee interviews. He said: "I know
Ranch's platform from the SBZ-Archiv [published in West Germany]
He took a socialist position....Subjectively he was honest
enough, but objectively he could have led to the weakening of
the DDR and cleared the way for a pogrom atmosphere like that
in Hungary." Perhaps this informant is representative of a
group of dissenters whose resistance follows certain patterns
of protest and evasion, but shrinks from such major action as
might endanger the system as a whole. This attitude, like the
?
?
?
V
STAT
STAT
more incisive and uncompromising kind of revisionism, feeds on
communication within small groups whose members are not inclined
to flee. Certainly, the manner of reasoning of this particular
informant presupposes a degree of knowledge and curiosity about
the internal Party struggle that was not evident in most of the
refugees, and must not be assumed to be widespread among stu-
dents in the Zone. On the other hand, attitudes such as these,
even though they may be rare, gain importance from the fact that
they are found among the very people whom the regime is groom-
ing for strategic positions, from which one day they may exercise
41 considerable influences.
Summarizing our impressions from interviews and conversa-
tions with student refugees, we might say that, as of 1958, the
political thinking of most students in the Soviet Zone was
still diffuse, their resistance behavior particularistic and
self-defensive, their rejection of the communist system rarely
the result of a consistent philosophy. Intensive training in
Marxist-Leninist dogma had had its effect -- not perhaps to the
extent of forming strong convictions and patterns of thought,
but in planting in the young minds many abstract concepts that
today affect their political judgment. The postulates and
formulas that students accept from communism, which they might
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easily apply critically to East Germany, are far more evident
in their criticism of the Federal Republic. But we have al-
ready noted that abstract thought does not necessarily carry
over into concrete action; and the fact is that large numbers
of students, critical as they may be of West Germany, neverthe-
less prefer to live there, even though they usually lose several
semesters when they transfer to Western universities.
As for those who remain behind, the Ulbricht regime is
doing its utmost to keep revisionist tendencies and the elements
of "spontaneous" resistance from jelling into a movement.
Nothing, however, can prevent these forces from smoldering under
the cover of small, intimate groups, and thus slowly maturing
into a potential for aggressive anticommunist action.
Entrance requirements there are different, and indoctrina-
tion courses are not credited.
VIII. The Intellectuals
STAT
STAT
The intellectual professions have traditionally enjoyed
high social status in Germany. Today in the DDR, as in
virtually all communist states, they are even more obviously
privileged. University education, or its equivalent at an
institute of technology, is becoming a prerequisite for most
positions of leadership and responsibility. The state
attracts and rewards its intellectuals by providing them with
a financial security and a standard of living far beyond those
of the general population, and sometimes even of their
colleagues in West Germany. This favored treatment extends to
the creative artists and nembers of other "free-lance"
professions, who enjoy a security unknown to their brothers in
the West.
Any analyst who attempts to formulate generalizations
about the class of professional intellectuals in the Soviet
Zone is bound to be hampered -- perhaps even more than in an
analysis of white-collar employees -- by the enormous range of
functions that this category includes. He must take into
account the many variations, not only in the individuals'
exposure to Party control and to the moral temptations
by the communist reward system, but also in the extent
which different occupations permit their practitioners
afforded
to
to
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divorce private political opinions from their work and to keep
professional associations -- and thus political controls
out of their personal lives.
To begin with, it is important to distinguish between the
"old" and the "new" intelligentsia. The former, who were
educated in the precommunist order, are still indispensable,
and hence are tolerated and even promoted; the latter, raised
and indoctrinated in the "socialist" spirit, meanwhile are
being groomed to replace them as fast as possible. Ulbricht,
however, has been facing a twofold problem: older intellectuals,
as might have been predicted, have by and large persisted in
undogmatic, rational habits of thought and behavior, and have
remained aloof from political ritual. The new intellectuals,
the regime's hope for spiritual leadership of the coming
generation, have been unexpectedly susceptible to the influence
of their older colleagues. The intellectual elite of the party,
in particular, has been infested with revisionism.
In coping with this problem, Ulbricht has steered a very
cautious zigzag course, alternately tightening controls and
making grudging concessions. However, the usefulness of this
technique is limited by the fact that people can leave East
Germany; neither approach has succeeded in stemming the flood
of defectors. Concessions on the mataial side may prove
STAT
effective while the living standard of the East German
intellectual is still below that of his West German colleague.
But once it reaches a certain saturation point, he is likely
to become increasingly sensitive to the spiritual straight-
jacket that Ulbricht has thrown on him and his children. Any
effort by the regime to exact compliance by tightening the
jacket thereafter results merely in a higher refugee rate.
In 1958 this process was especially apparent in the growing
defection from university faculties
STAT
and the medical profession.
It may be useful to compare some of the figures on
defectors for the last four
Intellectual
calendar years.
Table 8
1955-1958*
1958
Defectors,
1955
1956
1957
University teachers
56
43
58
208
Other teachers
2,720
2,453
2,293
3,089
Doctors, dentists,
veterinarians
344
467
440
1,242
Pharmacists
108
125
99
184
Judges and public
prosecutors
31
26
27
11
Lawyers and notaries
126
130
55
65
Engineers & technicians
1,835
1,431
1,894
2,522
5,220
4,675
4,866
7,321
"Der permanente Flucht1ingsstrom" (The Permanent Flow
of Refugees), Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes
der Bundesrepublik, January 17, 1959, Table 2; supple-
mented by Friebe, "Die deutsche FlUchtlingsfrage," p. 298.
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In 1956-57 a majority of defectors from the Soviet Zone
were people who, having traveled to West Germany legally,
with interzonal passes issued by East German authorities,
refused to return to the DDR. This led the regime to issue a
severely restrictive revision in the law regulating pasports
and passes. Instead of an average of 225,000 interzonal
passes for travel to the West issued each month in 1957, the
average of such legal travelers in 1958 was only 57,500 per
month, and the number is constantly being restricted still
further. As a result, the proportion of defectors coming to
West Germany with the help of legal visitor permits has
dropped sharply (from 54 per cent in 1957 to 21 per cent at
the end of 1958), and West Berlin is becoming ever more
important as an escape hatch.
Despite the rising number of "illegal" departures,
however, there has been a radical decline in the total number
of defectors since the revised passport law went into effect
at the end of 1957. Significantly, though, this development
does not hold for the intellectuals. As the above table
indicates, they continue to flee with their families, although,
by going through West Berlin without legal passes, they run
the risk of being caught. The large-scale defection of
intellectuals is all the more remarkable because most of them
?
STAT
leave behind more privileges and personal property than do
most - other defectors.
It is also worth noting that the combined number of
university and other teachers who fled in 1958 included 2,144
"new" and 1,153 "old" educators, an indication that the
disenchanted and noncompliant element is not confined to the
precommunist intelligentsia.
State interference in the professional and private
sphere has been a strong motive in the flight of
lectuals. Having opportunities for professional
West German colleagues and attendance at foreign
German conventions once more curtailed came as a
after the relatively liberal policy of 1956-57.
many intel-
contact with
and West
heavy blow
Another
STAT
particularly sore point concerns the children. The old
intellectuals have long been disturbed by their children's
difficulties in gaining admission to the universities in
competition with the children of workers and of newly privileged
groups. The issue of the communist Jugendweihe (youth conse-
cration) also remains very much alive.* Furthermore, as of
the fall of 1958, school children from the seventh grade up
have been compelled to spend one day per week in factories or
See pp. 56 ff.
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agricultural co-operatives, and additional periods in various
phases ofFroduction, a practice that is likely to antagonize
a great many parents who formerly may not have been overly
critical of the regime. And, beginning in 1960, no one will
be able to enter a university without first having spent his
"practical year" in production.
As yet no empirical study has been made of the opinions
of the East German intelligentsia that is comparable to the
surveys of workers and white-collar employees. We can safely
assume, however, that intellectuals are experiencing many of
the same conflicts, arising out of the attempt to adjust to
the present system, as are the upper-level white-collar
employees. Professors, engineers, theater directors, writers,
and the like also face political trouble when they are called
to account for their own and their subordinates' work. West
German authorities, by a very formalistic system of classifi-
cation, at one time estimated that no more than 8 to 9 per
cent of all refugees
threats left them no
has, however, always
intelligentsia; and
rate of intellectual
in the proportion of
defected because political compulsion and
alternative. A purely political motivation
been most common in the flight of the
the statistical effect of the increased
defectors has been an almost twofold rise
such primarily "political" refugees.
STAT
At the same time it is safe to assume that the thinkini?TAT
of many intellectuals has been affected by "socialist" changes
and communist ideology. Though the impact is likely to be
greater on the younger intelligentsia, the Party cadres, and
people in education and other cultural fields, it does not
fail to reach Protestant ministers, social scientists, and
engineers. Though intellectuals may well be politically more
alert than the average white-collar employee, they
likely to be impressed with the major "achievements"
system, and to favor their retention in the event of
are more
of the
reunifi-
cation in freedom. We must add to these factors the intel-
lectual's strong pride in past achievement, which ties him to
his life in the
intelligentsia,
the West. Many
Zone, and the fact that members of the younger
in particular, are often severely critical ot
of them, in the
do not feel that the West today
tive. It is in this atmosphere
Marxist tendencies develop most
Much of what we said about
opinion of at least one expert,
offers them a genuine alterna-
that revisionist and
readily.
the state of mind of
reform-
today's
students no doubt applies also to the intelligentsia. It
would be true especially for the new intellectuals, for the
students share much of the latter's educational and doctrinal
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experience and will one day inherit their positions as well
as their moral problems.
As with the student.s, the intellectual's field of
specialization is bound to make a difference. Engineers in
responsible jobs, who have to meet production schedules,
easily run into political difficulties. Such areas as
creative writing, theater, and film, which are subject to
constant doctrinal interference, are ridden with strains and
tensions. And, obviously, people in positions that carry
direct political responsibility are least likely to find
relaxation from control in their professional lives.
Of the many factors that enter into the intellectuals'
dilemma,
They are
standard
their isolation from other social classes is one.
separated from the masses by more than just a higher
of living. The regime sees to it that:, as far as
possible, the social life of intellectuals takes place in a
separate, esoteric world, and chat their contact with the
rest of the people, and with the realities
of the latter's
lives, is limited co a few, contrived situations designed to
keep up the egalitarian fiction. One of the privileges of
intellectuals, aimed at fostering this social
their access to "club houses," which are open
isolation, is
to both members
and nonmembers of the SED and have become truly popular.
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STAT
Here, all heavy-handed political pressures are turned off;
members and their wives may relax with the feeling of belong-
ing to a privileged elite. In the most exclusive clubs Western
newspapers and fashion magazines are available to the trusted
caste.
For Party cadre intellectuals, disillusionment, intellectu-
al frustration, and estrangement from the masses are most acute
and most painful. These people are ideologically rooted in
the communist order and understandably reluctant to break away.
Even if they secretly wish they could leave, they know how
410 limited are their chances of establishing themselves success-
fully in the West. Yet it is because they tend to stay in
the Zone that the Party intellectuals have been a more severe
headache to the Ulbricht regime than any other group.
The upheavals in communist parties throughout Europe that
came in the wake of the Twentieth Party Congress in the Soviet
Union had profound repercussions on Party intellectuals in the
DDR. Willi Bredel, a novelist and member of the SED Central
Committee, is reported to have described the situation at a
Party gathering in the following terms:
Comrades, what I'm going to say isn't for
the public....Comrade Stalin's tragic mistakes
cut me to the quick. I know others who enter-
tained thoughts of committing suicide. I
STAT
D la s fied I Part- Sanitized Copy Approves or e ease
spent nights discussing things with
some of these comrades. Believe me,
they weren't our worst comrades.
Then came the October events in Poland
and Hungary. For many writers, it is
true, wounds were opened that had
scarcely healed....Many lost their bal-
ance, and not only young comrades did.. ? ?
With many intellectuals...one has the
feeling they belong to those who think
our Workers' and Peasants' State is a
passing thing. They want to survive it
They are waiting for it to end. Well,
they're going to lose on that bet.
They're not going to outlive socialism.
The opposition most dangerous to Walter Ulbricht has
always come from the very top ranks of the SED. After the
1953 uprising, it came from the Minister of State Security,
Wilhelm _disser, and the editor-in-chief of the major party
newspaper, Rudolf Herrnstadt. In 1956-57, it was led by the
chief of Party cadres and intelligence, Karl Schirdewan; by
the then Minister of State Security, Erich Wollweber; and by
Fred Oelssner, Deputy Minister President and major economist
and Party theorist. In both periods, a top-flight opposition
failed to secure Soviet support for Ulbricht's removal and
for a more moderate policy.
Moreover, Ulbricht's opponents in the top leadership have
never dared to seek support among Party cadres or in the masses.
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Both after the 1953 workers' uprising and in the suppression
of reform-communism among Party intellectuals in 1957, the
secret police did its brutal work even though the Minister of
State Security was himself part of the opposition; and at
the very moment that Karl Schirdewan was pressing for a new,
"safety-valve" policy in the Central Committee, he was warning
students: "lhe Party and Government will permit no change!"
The opposition leaders thus preserved outward solidarity with
Ulbricht almost up to the point when they were destroyed.
Consequently, the Party cadres, many of whom were them-
selves deeply alienated, always learned of the full import of
the struggle in the Party leadership only after Ulbricht had
managed to finish off his major rivals. Not until Schirdewan
had fallen did Minister President Otto Grotewohl tell the
Party world: "In recent times, our work was in danger of
becoming paralyzed."
It may well be, of course, that the brewing opposition
on lower levels creates the setting in which leadership strug-
gles occur. At the time of the revisionist controversies, for
example, Ulbricht often found that, when he addressed Party
cadres, he faced a wall of silence, while behind his back there
was disquieting chatter. A former SED functionary described
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this as symptomatic of a condition in which a potential opposi-
tion was isolated from any leadership and hence powerless to
act. Concerted action of discontented elements was hindered
also by the fact that the economic planners, industrial managers,
writers and artists, and other SED intellectuals, although in a
rebellious frame of mind in 1956-57, were confused by what they
saw happening in Hungary and Poland. On one hand, they were
deeply afraid that the system might collapse in a blood-bath
of popular vengeance, which is what most Party people imagined
had happened in Hungary before Soviet intervention. On the
other hand, they were tantalized by the liberal ideas that
were flowing in from the East across the Polish border.
However, the weakness of critical Party intellectuals is
caused not merely by their isolation from the struggle among
the top leaders, or by their fear of setting in motion a chain
of events they could not control, but by the gulf that separates
them from the really popular levels of discontent, especially
the working-class. We have already noted the workers' distrust
of the "new intellectuals." In this lack of understanding
between workers and intellectuals lies one of the major weak-
nesses of any resistance to Ulbricht's regime. In Warsaw and
Budapest, for example, the course of events in 1956 would have
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?
STAT
STAT
been entirely different had it not been for the solidarity
between intellectuals and workers. In East Germany, on the
other hand, the workers who revolted in June 1953 received no
support from the intellectuals. And, in October 1956, when
intellectual circles were making motions in the direction of
rebellion, the workers stood aside, watchful, waiting, and
distrustful.
It is easy enough to see why the opposition of 1956
failed to find the popular echo in East Germany that it re-
ceived in Poland and Hungary. For months after the Twentieth
1P Party Congress in the Soviet Union, revisionist trends had
successfully been kept hidden in the Soviet Zone, Ulbricht
having put the lid on deviationism at the first stirrings of
unrest. By October 1956, dissent was nevertheless evident
in the ranks of the Party and among economists, technicians,
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and planners, and it
sphere, where people
and are sensitive to
was rampant in the academic and cultural
are most intimately concerned with ideas
atmospheric changes. But none of this
added up to anything like the "thaw" in Poland and Hungary,
where for half a year an intellectual renaissance had been in
progress against a retreating and vacillating Party leadership.
In those two satellites, the rebels' loud voice in the press,
43
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178.
in clubs, and through other vehicles of public controversy
had convinced all those who listened that the Communists were
divided at all levels. As the promise of emancipation grew,
so did the popular understanding for the role of the dissident
Communist and the non-Party intellectual, and the sense of
solidarity it engendered between the intellectual leadership
and the working-class proved crucial in the actions that were
to follow.
This union, however, was further cemented in Poland and
Hungary by an element
that, to this day, remains lacking in
East Germany, namely, the community of national interest and
purpose that can unite dissident Communists and the masses.
This factor, which played an important role in bringing about
the defection of the "people's armies" in both Poland and
Hungary, does not have the parallel in Soviet-occupied Germany
that one might expect to find. Here, the national question is
more likely to divide the critical German Communists from the
masses. The chief reason for this is that national interest
is synonymous with reunification, which up to now has meant
political suicide for German communism, so long as the Federal
Republic is the larger and stronger of the rival states.
Still, one might imagine that so acute a national issue
as the division of their country could be felt deeply enough
STAT
STAT
by German intellectuals to make them take such a risk even
though they be convinced Marxists and Communists; certainly,
the Hungarian example shows that, in a dilemma between patri-
otism and communism, many Communists will (like Imre Nagy)
ultimately choose the nation. Yet it is extremely difficult
for German communist intellectuals to do so. Their distrust
of German nationalism is so strong that their critical facul-
ties fail as soon as they are exposed to propaganda about a
"West German militarist restoration." Their memory of national-
socialism is very vivid, and their sensitivity in this respect
40 creates one of the few spots where even critical Communists
are vulnerable to compromise with Ulbricht's "hard course,"
not out of opportunism, but from genuine conviction. It is
difficult, therefore, for "national Communists" to mature in
the Soviet Zone. Even the most disenchanted revisionists --
including many who might consider fleeing to the Federal
Republic if it became necessary -- are seldom anxious to see
Germany reunited under the hegemony of the West German system,
which they continue to misunderstand and distrust.
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IX. East Germany's Basic Instability
It is clear that more and more East Germans are coming
to terms with the existing state of affairs in the Soviet Zone.
Very few like the Ulbricht regime, and most object strongly
to some aspects of the system. Nevertheless, by withdrawing
into their families or professions or by taking part in a
minimum degree of political activity, large numbers have been
able to adjust to the state of affairs in which they find
themselves.
This process of adjustment is important, but neither its
extent nor its permanence should be overemphasized. As one
student put it, "The Zone is now teetering on the brink of
political stability." It has not yet achieved stability. The
staying power of the Ulbricht regime has been due not to its
solid foundations but to Ulbricht's ability to convince the
Soviets of his indispensability and to his skill in balancing
one opposing force against another. As of now, relatively
little is needed to arouse dormant hopes and create new ones.
For instance, when the Western powers, in a diplomatic communi-
cation, recalled the fact that Thuringia and Saxony had origi-
nally been occupied by forces of the West, and had been evacuated
by them only when the Soviets evacuated West Berlin, this was
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reported to have
tionaries in the
inhabitants hate
STAT
STAT
caused signs of nervousness among SED func-
two provinces. The great majority of the
the regime and would like to see many aspects
of the system changed. A newspaper correspondent, who has
specialized in East German affairs for many years, has summa-
rized the combination of resentment and adaptation by saying
that the symbol of the DDR is a clenched fist -- in the pocket.
Contradictions Within the System
The basic instability of the DDR is caused by a number
of factors, many of which have been pointed out above: the
regime is unpopular, a small part of a divided country cannot
easily achieve a national existence, hopes of reunification in
freedom have not been extinguished entirely, and so on. In
addition, the communist system, as it is known in the DDR, has
within itself a number of contradictions that limit the extent
to which people can adjust to it. Two of these are believed
to be of particular importance.
One such contradiction is the inclusive, all-pervasive
nature of the communist system, which is the source of much
of its strength, but is also proving to be its greatest weakness
Die Welt, June 18, 1958.
43
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in East Germany. People bitterly resent the fact that Party
and state are trying to penetrate all aspects of the life of
the individual. Most refugees mention some aspect of this
meddling interference as one reason for their having fled.
Even a former West German Communist, who had emigrated to East
Germany and then defected back to the West, gave this as one
of his principal reasons for returning.
The same story is heard from persons still resident in
the Zone. A school teacher complained about the extra duties
he was continually being asked to perform: making house calls
to see parents, taking part in special youth evenings, volun-
teering for construction work, volunteering to work on holidays,
assisting in the instruction of the "Young Pioneers," and so
on. A professor from the University of Halle, presumably a
Communist and certainly not an opponent of the regime, was
quoted as saying in a public meeting that university teaching
personnel were now so loaded with extra activities that they
did not have the "inner peace" that was necessary if they were
to do fundamental thinking.
Attempts of the Party and state to reach into every sphere
of public and private life are all the more obnoxious in view
of the essentially arbitrary nature of the system. This
t--
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STAT
STAT
arbitrariness caused a second important internal contradiction.
Law in the DDR is not primarily a body of legislation and preced-
ent, as in the West; added to it are administrative orders,
Party resolutions, articles in official communist publications,
and public speeches given by high officials. Often, this legal
hodgepodge leavesa large area of discretion to the executive
personnel. One hears from refugees and students of East Germany
that even the personality of an individual local Party chair-
man may make a sharp difference in the local interpretation
of the law. For example, when asked why the Church was perse-
cuted so much more harshly in one area than in
Lutheran administrative official ascribed this
differences between the Party officials in the
Because of lack of specificity in the
the arbitrariness of those who apply it, no
be sure that he is on the right side of the
another, a
to personality
two districts.
law, combined with
citizen can ever
law-enforcement
machinery. Even convinced Communists must live in doubt, and
this quality of unpredictability makes it more difficult for
many individuals to achieve a stable adjustment. Nevertheless,
Cf. Otto Kirchheimer, 'The Administration of Justice and
the Concept of Legality in East Germany," Yale Law Journal,
Vol. 68:705, 1959, pp. 705-749.
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184.
vagueness and arbitrariness appear to be essential to the
efficient functioning of the system as it exists in East Germany,
since the law must be sufficiently elastic to follow the twists
and turns of the Party line emanating from both MOSCOW and
Pankow, and commu45t officials must always be assured legal
grounds for dealing with any individual whose activities
threaten to hamper the policies of the moment.
But at the same time that arbitrariness of official behav-
ior and the intrusive nature of Party and state are necessary
for the preservation of the regime, thEnr also help to prevent
a firm commitment to the state by just those individuals whose
loyalty is most important if stability is to be achieved.
The Sense of Im ermanence
One thing most politically -alert East Germans agree on
is that the present state of affairs cannot last; that the
DDR is a "provisional arrangement." There is, however, little
agreement as to when the supposedly inevitable changes will
take place, or what the nature of these changes will be.
Furthermore, it is generally agreed that the forces for change
will have to come from outside East Germany. Since most East
Germans no longer expect to be able to bring about any change
themselves, the best thing for them to do, they feel, is to
STAT
185.
STAT
make themselves as comfortable as possible, and wait. Never-
theless, this sense that the existing state of affairs is
transitory is another factor making for instability in the
Soviet Zone.
When asked why they are so sure that the DDR cannot last
in its present form, refugees from East Germany give several
kinds of reasons. Some point out that the DDR can never be
organized along national lines, because it is only a very
small part of a nation. "National communism," a form of
adjustment that many consider more stable, and mention as
having been achieved in Poland or Yugoslavia, is believed to
be impossible in East Germany because no truly national forces
could ever develop without reference to the larger and
powerful West German state. Nearly all refugees agree
the DDR cannot be considered a German state because it
more
that
is not
ruled by and for Germans. The real source of support for
Ulbricht is known to be the Soviet Union, and the policies
of the DDR are believed to be governed by directives from
Moscow. Thus, the Soviet Zone clearly resembles a colonial
area, and is in an "unnatural" state that simply cannot endure.
Other respondents mention contradictions within the
existing system, both those contradictions that have been
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pointed out immediately above and others. The DDR calls itself
a "worker's state," but gives the greatest rewards to white-
collar personnel. People hear Ulbricht promise over and over
again that the Oder-Neisse border with Poland is a permanent
one, but they know that even many SED leaders are in favor of
revising this border. East Germans frequently have to say
things they do not believe and listen to others make equally
insincere statements. They are able to live with these con-
tradictions and often manage to build a satisfying personal
existence in spite of them, but they still tend to think of
them as indicative of a state of affairs that is somehow
abnormal and cannot last.
One may suspect, although it is not so often explicitly
stated, that the most important reason for the sense of im-
permanence that most residents of the Soviet Zone have about
the DDR is the awareness of the existence of another world.
Whether he approves of conditions in the West or not, the
East German is constantly aware of West Germany, of Western
Europe, and of more distant areas living under a different
system. He may be convinced that capitalism is doomed and that
the future belongs to some form of communism, but at the same
time he is conscious of the German tradition as part of the
f
it)
STAT
STAT
Western world and feels that the East Germans will eventually
have to come to terms with this tradition. Furthermore, even
though the East Germans were disappointed by the West in 1953,
there is a chance that some day the West might be willing to
help.
The Significance of Potential Instability
Contradictions within the communist system, combined
with the sense of impermanence that so many people have about
the DDR, limit the degree to which East Germans have identified
their own futures with the existing order. While there is no
question that the Ulbricht regime is firmly in the saddle, and
that no large-scale spontaneous move to throw off Soviet domina-
tion can be expected from within East Germany, a high degree
of potential instability remains. There are still many in the
Soviet Zone who would participate actively in a struggle to
improve their condition if they saw any chance of success.
If they had a clear-cut promise of Western military assistance,
large numbers would be willing to fight for reunification in
freedom. Others, if they saw any sign of Soviet acquiescence
or weakening, would make new attempts to revise the DDR along
Polish or Titoist lines. Still others, seeing no chance to
improve conditions, will defect to the West as long as the
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opportunity of doing so remains.
This potential instability limits East Germany's useful-
ness to the Soviet Union, and must also be a source of con-
stant anxiety to the Ulbricht regime. Even though it has been
possible to make great strides in organizing East German society
along communist lines, and to increase its economic productivity
during the past few years, both developments have been hampered
by the constant exodus of refugees and by the mental reserva-
tions of those who remain. Furthermore, both Ulbricht and the
Soviets must realize that any military value the DDR armed
forces might otherwise have in a European war could be cancelled
out by the disaffection the East German regime would face at home.
The potential instability of the DDR thus detracts substantially
from the military capability of the Soviet bloc in Europe --
although observers do not agree on the precise extent of this
loss in military capability -- and conversely, this element
of instability improves the military position of the West.
One must assume that the Soviets and their German agents
are aware of this problem and are making strenuous efforts
to reduce it. Some factors underlying the lack of stability
are difficult to overcome except perhaps over a long period of
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189.
STAT
time, especially those rooted within the system itself. Others
are being successfully attacked by communist organization and
indoctrination.
Certainly nothing would solidify the DDR more rapidly
than recognition by the West. At one stroke this would wipe
out the hopes still entertained by a large proportion of the
East German population, even though faintly, that the West
might sometime intervene actively on its behalf. Furthermore,
recognition would confer a degree of legitimation on the
Ulbricht regime that even communist revisionists have sought
to deny it.
was here to
East German
If the West indicated that it believed the DDR
stay, it would be very difficult for the individual
to continue to look on it as a provisional arrange-
ment. Full recognition would, of course, be most desirable
to Moscow, but even partial recognition would substantially
increase the value of the DDR to the Soviet bloc.
Conversely, emphasis by the West on the principle of
German reunification in freedom, on the illegal character of
the Ulbricht regime, and on the necessarily provisional nature
of the present state of affairs in East Germany, tends to
preserve the potential instability of the DAR. ?
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Efforts at Geneva on the part of the Soviet Union to
force the West to give greater recognition to the DDR must at
least in part be occasioned by the current state of political
opinion in East Germany.
AMP=
10)
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
STAT
STAT
Following are selections from the literature bearing on
the subject of the present memorandum. Although the list is
far from exhaustive, it may prove a useful point of departure
for the student who wishes to go more deeply into one or
another aspect of institutions and prevailing political atti-
tudes in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Bearing in mind the prob-
lem of availability to Western scholars, we have not listed
any materials originating in the East Zone or other satellite
countries. Nor have we attempted to include the abundant
40
newspaper literature on the subject, or to mention any but the
few most informative periodicals.
For the benefit of readers interested primarily in English-
language sources, we whould like to draw attention to a very
recent bibliography, "East Germany: A Selected Bibliography,"
compiled by Fritz T. Epstein, Slavic & Central European Division,
Reference Department, Library of Congress, Washington, 1959.
(Mimeographed)
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192.
Sources of publications on the East Zone of Germany:
The "Institut:far Politische Wissenschaft," in Berlin, has
published several volumes on the Soviet Zone, the SED,
education, science, agitation, and propaganda. Several
of these are listed below. Others (e.g. on socialist
morale, on the mass organizations, etc.) are in prepara-
tion. The Institute's primary interest is in the policy
and practice of the regime. But some of the published
material deals also with popular responses to the system.
The "Ministry of All-German Affairs" of the German Federal
Republic is a continuing source of publications on the
East Zone, among them:
Deutsche Kinder in Stalins Hand. Bonn, 1951.
Injustice the Regime: Documentary Evidence of the Systematic
Violation of Legal Rights in the Soviet Occupied Terri-
tory of Germlny. Berlin, 1952.
Der Juni-Aufstand: Ein Tatsachenberichc vom Volksaufstand
in Ostberlin und in der Sowjetzone. Berlin, 1953.
Die rote Flut: Tatsachcn und Zahlen aber die Bolschewisie-
rung der Sowjetzone. Bonn, n.d.
The Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany 1945-1953: A Chrono-
logical Review. Berlin, 1954.
Two pamphlet series (dealing chiefly with formal aspects
of the system, including treatment of individual pro-
fessions, but also including general observations by
qualified experts on responses to the system):
Bonner Fachberichte aus der Sowjetzone.
Bonner Berichte aus Mittel- und Ostdeutschland. See
especially:
Dubel, Siegfried. "Die Situation der Jugend im
kommunistischen Herrschaftssytem der SBZ."
2nd ed., 1958.
Koehler, Hans. "Zur geistigen und seelischen
Situation der Menschen in der Sowjetzone."
2nd ed., 1954.
9
STAT
STAT
periodicals:
Deutsche Fragen: Informationen und Berichte aus Mittel-
deutschland als Beitrag zur Wiedervereinigung. Published
by the Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher Juristen,
Berlin. A monthly.
St2-Archiv: Dokumente, Berichte, Kommentare zu gesamtdeutschen
Fragen. Published by the Verlag far Politik und Wirtschaft,
Cologne. Semimonthly.
Reprints many documents and other primary material
originating in East Germany, and also contains articles
on developments in the Soviet Zone. Several of these
are listed below individually by author.
Books:
Baumgart, Fritz. Das Hochschulwesen der sowjetischen
Besatzungszone. Ministry of All-German Affairs, Bonn, 1953.
Blacher, Dr. Viggo Graf. Industriearbeiterschaft in der
Sowjetzone. Stuttgart, 1959.
Bohn, Helmut, et al. Die AufrUstung in der sowjetischen
Besatzungszone Deutschlands. Bonn, 1958.
Bosch, Werner. Die Sozialstruktur in West- und Mittel-
deutschland. Ministry of All-German Affairs, 1958.
An approach to social structure via a study of income.
Cerf, Jay H. "Blue Shirts and Red Banners: Political
Indoctrination and Control of Students in East Germany."
Doctoral dissertation. Yale University, 1957.
This manuscript contains an extensive bibliography,
with special attention to the periodical literature.
Friedrich, Gerd. Has published a series of books on the
Free German Youth (FDJ). Verlag Rote Weissbucher,
Cologne, 1951 and 1953.
Institut far Demoskopie (Gesellschaft zum Studium der dffent-
lichen Meinung m.b.H., Allensbach am Bodensee). Jugend
zwischen Ost und West: Eine Umfrage unter ostdeutschen
FDJ-Angehdrigen in West Berlin. Bonn, 1951.
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Lange, M. G.--Totalitere Erziehung: Das Erziehungssystem
der Sowjetzone Deutschlands. Vol. 3 in "Schriften des
Instituts fer Politische Wissenschaft." Frankfurt a.M.,
1954.
- Wissenschaft im totaiiteren Staat: Die Wissenschaft der
sowietischen Besatzungszone auf dem Weg zum "Stalinismus."
Vol. 5 in "Schriften des Instituts f?r Politische
Wissenschaft." Stuttgart & D?sseldorf, 1955.
Willer, Valentin. Soziale Umschichtung in der sowietischen
Bestazungszone Deutschlands. Westdeutscher Verlag,
Cologne & Opladen.
Now in preparation.
Nettl, J. P. The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany.
Oxford University Press, London, 1951.
Richert, Ernst, et al. Agitation und Propaganda: Das System
der publizistischen Massenfehrung in der Sowjetzone.
Vol. 10 in "Schriften des Instituts fUr Politische
Wissenschaft." Berlin & Frankfurt, 1958.
Richert, Ernst. Macht ohne Mandat: Der Staatsapparat in
der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Dcutschlands. Vol. 11 in
"Schriften des Instituts f?r Politische Wissenschaft."
Cologne & Opladen, 1958.
Schultz, Joachim. Der Funktioner in der Einheitspartei:
Kaderpolitik und Berokratisierung in der SED. Vol. 8 in
'Schriften des Instituts f?r Politische Wissenschaft."
Stuttgart & D?sseldorf, 1956.
Stern, Carola. Die SED: Handbuch eber Aufbau, Organisation
und Funktionsweise des Parteiapparates. Institut fer
Politische Wissenschaft, Berlin, 1954.
- Portret einer bolschewistischen Partei: Entwicklung,
Funktion und Situation der SED. Verlag fer Politik und
Wirtschaft, Cologne, 1957.
?
Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for
it
?
Articles:
STAT
STAT
38ttger, Gerd. "Die politische Situation an den Hochschulen."
SBZ-Archiv. June 25, 1957.
Cantor, Peter. "Kirchenpolitik." SBZ-Archiv. April 25, 1956.
^ "Kirche, Staat und SED." SBZ-Archiv. December 10, 1957.
Friebe, Dr. Siegfried. "Die deutsche Flechtlingsfrage."
SBZ-Archiv. October 20, 1958.
Kirchheimer, Otto. "The Government of Eastern Germany."
In H. Morgenthau (ed.), Germany and the Future of Europe.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951.
"The Administration of Justice and the Concept of Legality
in East Germany." Yale Law Journal. Vol. 68:705, 1959.
Lange, M. G., E. Richert, and O. Stammer. "Das Problem der
'Neuen Intelligenz' in der SBZ: Ein Beitrag zur politischen
Soziologie der kommunistischen Herrschaftsordnung."
Veritas Justitia Libertas. Festschrift. Berlin, 1954.
?1111
Willer, Valentin. "Die Prestigeordnung der Berufe als
Masstab Or die Wandlungen des sozialen Wertbildes."
Revue Internationale de Sociologic. Vol. 1, No. 2/3, 1957.
"Zur Wandlung der sozialcn Prestigeordnung unter
sozialistischem Einfluss." Zeitschrift fer die gesamte
Staatswissenschaft. Vol. 11, No. 2, 1959.
Stammer, Otto. "Sozialstruktur und System der Werthaltungen
der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands." Schm8llers
Jahrbuch. Year 76, No. 1.
Stern, Carola. "Variationen zum Thema Wiedervereinigung."
SBZ-Archiv. August 10, 1957.
"Die Familie in der Sowjetzone." SBZ-Archiv. November 10,
1955.
lb "Der permanente Flechtlingsstrom." Bulletin des Presse- und
Informationsamtes der Bundesrepublik. January 17, 1959.
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APPENDIX
THE STANDARD OF LIVING IN THE SOVIET ZONE*
The End of Rationing Has Not Yet Resulted in Noticeable
Improvements for the Consumer -- Rationing through High
Prices -- Norm Fulfillment and Overfulfillment as Guid-
ing Principle
197.
STAT
On May 29 of last year, thirteen years after the war and after
nineteen years of rationing, the Soviet Zone abolished the
food-rationing card. It was the last of the participants in
the Second World War to do so. The Soviet Zone press gave
much publicity to this fact, not only within the Zone itself,
but also abroad and in the Federal Republic. This propaganda
effort was designed to cover up a certain skepticism within
broad circles of the population. The lifting of rationing,
promised for years, and actually fixed by law in 1951 as due
by 1953, had been postponed again and again. In the end, it
4110 brought no noticeable improvement in living conditions.
Parallel with the lifting of rationing went a reform in the
price system, and simultaneously certain changes in the income
structure were also making themselves felt. It is therefore
worthwhile to compare the levels of living in the two parts of
Germany as of the end of 1958.
Reform of the Price System
In connection with the abolition of food rationing, the price
system of the Soviet Zone was completely revamped. The prices
of goods previously available on the free market were lowered,
while those for [formerly] rationed products were increased.
Prior to May 29, 1958, for example, according to official
Soviet Zone statements, on the average 45 per cent of all meats
and sausage, 27 per cent of butter, 60 per cent of margarine,
34 per cent of animal fats, and 11 per cent of sugar had been
This account of the standard of living in the Soviet Zone
IS is a free translation of an article that appeared in the
Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundes-
regierung, No. 72, April 18, 1959, pp. 688-691.
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sold "on the Handelsorganisation (HO) basis," that is to say,
at excessive prices. While it is true that since 1949 the
authorities had enforced seventeen price reductions -- which
applied, however, largely to hard-to-sell textile and in-
dustrial products -- it is worth noting that HO prices in 1950
were far above prewar prices and above comparable prices in
the Federal Republic.
One can at best speak of a step-by-step reduction in the
legalized black-market prices that had prevailed in the state-
owned HO stores in the Zone. As can be gathered from indi-
vidual figures in the Statistical Yearbooks of the Soviet Zone,
however, prices for formerly rationed goods quietly went up.
Members of the Zone "government" continually and inaccurately
maintain that prices for rationed foodstuffs were fixed at the
1944 level. However, as soon as an item was removed from the
rationing system, its price, at least at first, would go up
considerably. Subsequent [enforced] reductions were negligible
by comparison with this price increase. This was true, above
all, of shoes, textiles, and household equipment. The only
prices that were consistently kept low, corresponding roughly
to prewar prices, were those for potatoes, bread, and rolls,
which make up only a minor portion of the total cost of living.
It appeared from statements by Soviet Zone Deputy Minister
President Rau to the Zonal parliament in East Berlin that the
introduction of the new price system would result in added
per capita expenditures of an average of 14 East Marks per
month. Thus, instead of the hoped-for reduction in the cost
of living, the consumer in the Soviet Zone had to accept new
burdens. Whether in practice these higher expenditures would
be adequately covered by the increase in wages that went hand
in hand with the lifting of rationing had to remain an open
question for the time being. Previous prognoses, however, that
the abolition of the food-ration card would be followed by
rationing through [higher] prices were soon confirmed.
In view of the impending Fifth SED Party Congress, due to
convene in mid-July 1958, and in view of the fact that sales
of milk, cheese, and meat were declining, it became necessary,
five weeks after the end of rationing, to make the first
corrections in the new price structure. Effective July 7, 1958,
retail prices for milk were lowered by 15 per cent, those for
cottage and other cheese by 11 per cent, pork and various types
of sausage by an average of 8 per cent, and lard by 13 per cent.
Since the demand especially for milk could not be adequately
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met, it was necessary to introduce special permits Berechti- STAT
pngskarten) that guaranteed a privileged supply of milk for
households with children and infants. Lower prices for first-
and second-grade lard, although originally to be effective
only from August 11 to September 30, 1958, subsequently were
reduced still further, by 18.4 and 20.6 per cent, respectively.
The low prices for lard were designed to compensate the many
people who had been forced to change their consumption habits
by higher butter and margarine prices. As of October 6, 1958,
prices were lowered for shoes, leather and synthetic leather
goods, and work trousers, the reductions varying considerably.
At the same time, it,was announced that the originally
temporary price reduction for lard would be retained. In
addition, it was announced that soap prices would be lowered
by 30 per cent, and eggs would be subject to different prices
in summer and winter. To compensate for lagging potato
supplies, the prices for rice of various grades were lowered
by an amount varying from 32 to 44 per cent effective January
1, 1959, and those for a number of rice products by between
12 and 50 per cent. As of February 2, 1959, the two leading
40 brands of margarine...went down 20 per cent, prices for grade
1 and 2 margarine were reduced by 14.3 and 25.9 per cent,
respectively, and sugar.. .came down 16.3 per cent.
Higher Consumer Prices
In spite of these measures, retail prices for these goods in
the Soviet Zone are still far above those in effect in the
Federal Republic. The following picture emerges if one
compares prices of the most important and basic food products
as they prevailed in the Soviet Zone prior to May 29, 1958,
and then at the end of January 1959, with those that were in
effect in the Federal Republic at the latter date.
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sold "on the Handelsorganisation (HO) basis," that is to say,
at excessive prices. While it is true that since 1949 the
authorities had enforced seventeen price reductions -- which
applied, however, largely to hard-to-sell textile and in-
dustrial products -- it is worth noting that HO prices in 1950
were far above prewar prices and above comparable prices in
the Federal Republic.
One can at best speak of a step-by-step reduction in the
legalized black-market prices that had prevailed in the state-
owned HO stores in the Zone. As can be gathered from indi-
vidual figures in the Statistical Yearbooks of the Soviet Zone,
however, prices for formerly rationed goods quietly went up.
Members of the Zone "government" continually and inaccurately
maintain that prices for rationed foodstuffs were fixed at the
1944 level. However, as soon as an item was removed from the
rationing system, its price, at least at first, would go up
considerably. Subsequent [enforced] reductions were negligible
by comparison with this price increase. This was true, above
all, of shoes, textiles, and household equipment. The only
prices that were consistently kept low, corresponding roughly
to prewar prices, were those for potatoes, bread, and rolls,
which make up only a minor portion of the total cost of living.
It appeared from statements by Soviet Zone Deputy Minister
President Rau to the Zonal parliament in East Berlin that the
introduction of the new price system would result in added
per capita expenditures of an average of 14 East Marks per
month. Thus, instead of the hoped-for reduction in the cost
of living, the consumer in the Soviet Zone had to accept new
burdens. Whether in practice these higher expenditures would
be adequately covered by the increase in wages that went hand
in hand with the lifting of rationing had to remain an open
question for the time being. Previous prognoses, however, that
the abolition of the food-ration card would be followed by
rationing through [higher] prices were soon confirmed.
In view of the impending Fifth SED Party Congress, due to
convene in mid-July 1958, and in view of the fact that sales
of milk, cheese, and meat were declining, it became necessary,
five weeks after the end of rationing, to make the first
corrections in the new price structure. Effective July 7, 1958,
retail prices for milk were lowered by 15 per cent, those for
cottage and other cheese by 11 per cent, pork and various types
of sausage by an average of 8 per cent, and lard by 13 per cent.
Since the demand especially for milk could not be adequately
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STAT
met, it was necessary to introduce special permits Berechti-STAT
gungskarten) that guaranteed a privileged supply of milk for
households with children and infants. Lower prices for first-
and second-grade lard, although originally to be effective
only from August 11 to September 30, 1958, subsequently were
reduced still further, by 18.4 and 20.6 per cent, respectively.
The low prices for lard were designed to compensate the many
people who had been forced to change their consumption habits
by higher butter and margarine prices. As of October 6, 1958,
prices were lowered for shoes, leather and synthetic leather
goods, and work trousers, the reductions varying considerably.
At the same time, it wasannounced that the originally
temporary price reduction for lard would be retained. In
addition, it was announced that soap prices would be lowered
by 30 per cent, and eggs would be subject to different prices
in summer and winter. To compensate for lagging potato
supplies, the prices for rice of various grades were lowered
by an amount varying from 32 to 44 per cent effective January
1, 1959, and those for a number of rice products by between
12 and 50 per cent. As of February 2, 1959, the two leading
? brands of margarine...went down 20 per cent, prices for grade
1 and 2 margarine were reduced by 14.3 and 25.9 per cent,
respectively, and sugar...came down 16.3 per cent.
Higher Consumer Prices
In spite of these measures, retail prices for these goods in
the Soviet Zone are still far above those in effect in the
Federal Republic. The following picture emerges if one
compares prices of the most important and basic food products
as they prevailed in the Soviet Zone prior to May 29, 1958,
and then at the end of January 1959, with those that were in
effect in the Federal Republic at the latter date.
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Commodity
Quantity HO-Price
until'
May 29,
1958
Soviet Zone
Federal
Republic
Rationed
Goods
until
May 29,
Jan./
Feb.
1959
Jan./
Feb.
1959
1958
East Mark East Mark
EastMarkWest Mark
Rye bread 1 kg
White bread 1 kg
Wheat flour,
type 405 1 kg
Cream of wheat 1 kg
Oatmeal, by
weight 1 kg
Noodles, with-
out egg 1 kg
Peas 1 kg
Rice 1 kg
Potatoes 1 kg
Whole milk
(bulk) 1 liter
Eggs 1
Butter 1 kg
Margarine,
grade 1 1 kg
Rapeseed or
soy oil 1 kg
Beef (for stew-
ing, 25% bone)1 kg
Beef (for
braising) 1 kg
Pork chops 1 kg
Liver sausage 1 kg
Hard sausage
(Salami-type) 1 kg
Fat bacon
(smoked) 1 kg
Sugar (cubed &
granulated) 1 kg
Jams & marmalade 1 kg
Raisins 1 kg
Whole milk
chocolate 100 g
Cocoa 125 g
Coffee 1 kg
0.52
1.00
1.32
1.34
0.98
1.84
1.04
3.80
0.12
1.12
0.32
19.20
4.40
6.00
6.60
10.80
11.20
12.20
12.20
7.50
3.00
1.70
16.00
4.80
8.00
80.00
OD OM
a. 00
0.28
0.13
4.20
2.20
2.80
2.08
3.14
2.86
3.94
3.60
2.65
1.12
--
0.52
1.00
1.32
1.34
0.98
1.84
1.04
1.50
0.12
0.68
0.32
9.80
3.00
4.40
5.80
9.60
8.20
8.40
6.80
4.00
1.54
1.70
6.40
3.85
4.00
80.00
0.85
1.10
0.96
0.98
1.06
1.20
1.33
1.02
0.26
0.43
0.20
7.02
2.35
2.15
4.96
5.43
6.13
4.66
5.81
4.12
1.24
1.52
2.34
1.29
1.22
18.70
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STAT
The enormous discrepancy in prices that this table reveals
STAT
does not apply merely to food products. Shoes, textile
commodities, and other industDial products of comparable
quality are also far more expensive in the Soviet Zone than
in the Federal Republic. Lately, complaints about creeping
price rises can be found more and more often in the Zonal
press. With respect to the quality of available goods, the
Soviet Zone remains considerably behind the Federal Republic.
The difference in quality is generally presumed to be 10 per
cent, a figure that emerges from comparisons of purchasing
power between East and West Germany for the year 1958. The
improper packaging of food and luxury products has frequently
been the subject of severe criticism. Also, the East German
consumer continues to have to put up with a delivery system
that varies the supply of consumer goods irregularly according
to region. He is committed in advance to receiving certain
commodities at certain times and in certain localities, and
for the most part does not have sufficient opportunity to
exercise his prerogatives as a consumer according to his
individual habits or to take advantage of favorable prices.
Shifts in the Wage Structure
The Soviet Zone government plans to counter the full effects
of the price increases through an intricate system of differ-
entiated, tax-free bonuses. To be sure, the argument goes,
these increments will gradually have to be absorbed into the
wage structure. In connection with such measures, a raising
of work norms cannot be ruled out. For the time being, since
June 1958, the married wage-earner receives a tax-free bonus
of 5 East Marks for his wife, and of 20 East Marks for each
child, in addition to a pay increase that is determined by his
wages and varies by a progressive principle ("gestaffelt") for
all incomes between 183 and 800 East Marks. Annuitants receive
only a small cost-of-living adjustment (Ausgleichsbetrag) of
9 East Marks per month over and above dvir pension. Also, by
the "Decree of May 28, 1958" the gross amount of all wages
between 183 and 410 East Marks per month was increased through
changes in the wage schedule.
Since June 1958, this wage increase amounts to 23 East Marks
per month on a base pay of 183 East marks, and goes down [as
the wage goes up] to only 1 East Mark on a base pay of 410
East Marks. Members of the free professions, artisans, and
tradesmen are entitled to bonuses for wives and children only
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if their gross annual income does not exceed 10,000 DM. If
it does, they receive only a children's bonus of 15 East Marks
per child. At the same time, however, these occupations are
subject to tightened income tax regulations, which, among
other things, involve a tax increase for incomes over 15,000
East Marks per year. Furthermore, these handicraft and small
trade enterprises must assume the burden of the aforementioned
wage increases and bonuses of their workers and employees. For
barbers, painters, and photographers, who in addition have been
compelled by state decree to lower the prices for their services,
the new burdens have been particularly painful. Members of
agricultural and handicraft production co-operatives, as well
as independent farmers, are subject to specific regulations,
which in general, however, are in line with the legislation
outlined above.
The East German wage structure, which from year to year had
shown an ever greater concentration in the upper wage groups,
has undergone a change as a result of the principle of
progressively smaller increases that operates under the system
of wage increments described above. The first attempts in
this direction could be observed as early as the fall of 1957.
From a table published by the German Institute for Economic
Research (Deutsches Institut fir Wirtschaftsforschung DIW),
showing the changes in the income structure for industrial
workers in the Soviet Zone, it is apparent that, as a result
of the wage increases and bonuses that became effective on
June 1 of last year, the average earnings in wage group 1 rose
by 13.5 per cent, whereas those in wage groups 6 to 8 went up
by only 2.3 per cent each.
Wage Group Average
earnings
May 1957
Bonuses and
Wage increase
ace. to Decree
of 5/28/58
Average
Earnings
June 1958
Increase in
Average earn-
ings, June
1958 over May
1957
East Mark East Mark
East Mark Per Cent
1 237.11
2 280.55
3 314.94
4 363.81
5 423.54
6 476.03
7 481.46
8 474.22
269.11
308.55
338.94
382.81
436.54
487.03
492.46
485.22
13.5
10.0
7.6
5.2
3.1
2.3
2.3
2.3
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rt-
S TAT
An analysis of the DIW based on the average earnings cited
above showed that the gap between the highest and the lowes?TAT
wage group had been reduced by 20 per cent. The fact that
wage groups 6 and 7 list actual wages higher than those in
group 8 is to be explained by the better opportunities of
workers in these [lower] groups to increase their income
through overfulfillment of the norm. Workers in wage group 8,
on the other hand, tend predominantly to exercise controlling
and supervisory functions.
Comparison of Wages of Industrial Workers
Soviet Zone statistics thus far have furnished no datanbout
the distribution of wages by individual wage groups, and no
figures have been published for workers within each of these
groups. We therefore can get only an approximate picture of
the wage structure. Information is available only for production
workers in industry, but this permits us to draw certain
conclusions as to the total picture. Whereas in the entire
Soviet Zone roughly 6.6 million employed persons and their
lb families are dependent for their existence on wages and salaries,
the figures on average earnings given in the above table apply
to about 28.8 per cent of that number, that is to say, to a
little under 1.9 million wage earners.
As regards the wage situation of industrial workers in the two
parts of Germany, the average gross earnings of those in the
Soviet Zone rose by 6.5 per cent during 1958, reflecting the
wage increases and bonuses that went into effect in June 1958.
In the Federal Republic, the rise in gross earnings between
the end of 1957 and November 1958 was 7.1 per cent. The average
income of the industrial worker in the Zone was thus 435 East
Marks, as compared to 467 West MaIIG for his West German counter-
part, a difference of 7.4 per cent. Not only therefore does
the Soviet Zone worker have to paylmavily for food, clothing,
etc., but his income is lower than that of the West German
worker. In addition, his income is taxed at a much higher
rate, which makes the discrepancy even greater when it comes
to net wages.
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3 -
Considerable Difference in Level of Living
Even after the end of rationing an appreciable difference in
the level of living existed in the Federal Republic and the
Soviet Zone, as far as a majority of the population was con-
cerned. Taking as a standard the "market basket" of an average
family in the middle-income group of consumers in the Federal
Republic, a comparable family in the Soviet Zone in June 1958
would have had to spend about 33 per cent more if it wished
Co live in exactly the same manner. The following table gives
an overview of the individual categories of expenditures:
Nature of
Expenditure
Soviet Zone Federal Republic
(East Marks) (West Marks)
Soviet Zone
Expenditures
as per cent
of Fed. Rep.
Expenditures
Total Cost of Living
463.50
347.97
133
Food
237.79
175.91
135
Luxuries
32.58
16.92
193
Housing
26.00
33.80
77
Heat and Light
17.96
21.23
85
Furniture
23.41
15.15
155
Clothing
82.66
37.89
218
Cleaning and
hygiene
13.59
11.49
118
Education and
entertainment
18.17
24.03
76
Transportation
11.34
11.55
98
Outlays for food, luxuries, furniture, and clothing, which are
subject to high excise taxes, make up a particularly large
share of the entire cost of living because of their relative
size. In the case of costs of housing, education, and enter-
tainment -- which are intentionally held very low in the Zone
the hidden political purpose involved should not be ignored....
In all categories of expenditure, attention should be given
to the difference in quality, which has already been mentioned
above.
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Only about 15 to 20 per cent of all families of wage earners
and salaried employees have a family income with which they
can buy the same things that are purchased by an average
family in the middle-income group in the Federal Republic,
even adding in the family bonuses that the government has
recently started paying. 'Less than half the production workers
in industry (about 900,000 in wage groups 5 to 8) can be in-
cluded in this (relatively high-income] group. Since June
1958 these workers have on the average achieved a monthly net
income that varies between 424 and 465 East Marks. The various
categories that make up this income can be seen from the
following table:
Wage Group
Categories of Income
5
6
7
8
Average Monthly Gross Income
423.54
476.03
481.46
474.22
Less:
Contribution to Social Security
42.35
47.60
48.15
47.42
Payroll tax
15.30
24.40
24.40
24.40
Plus:
Wage bonus
13.00
11.00
11.00
11.00
Bonus for 2 children
40.00
40.00
40.00
40.00
Bonus for a wife
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
Total disposable income
as of June 1958
423.89
460.03
464.91
458.40
Achievement of such an income, however, assumes correspondingly
high fulfillment of work norms. In the case of other workers,
in order to afford the "market basket" of a comparable family
in the Federal Republic, it is necessary for the wife or some
other family member to contribute to the family income. If a
family of four in the higher consumer group wants a "market
basket" that would cost 606 West Marks in the Federal Republic,
it would have to spend 874 East Marks in the Zone, or 27.7 per
cent more. The proportion of families of employed persons with
such an income is certainly under 5 per cent in the Soviet Zone.
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To summarize, it can be seen that -- compared with West German
purchases -- more than three-quarters of all East German
families of employed persons have a standard of living below
or somewhat below the level of the middle-income consumer
group in the Federal Republic.
Comparison of "Market Baskets" Shows Low Standard of Living
The contents of the East German "market basket" are actually
less varied and more modest than the West German. Now that
the double price system in the Zone has been dropped, a re-
vised price index can be worked out and the value of the
actual purchases calculated. As far as the middle-income con-
sumer is concerned, the Economic Research Institute of the
West German Labor Unions (WI) determined on the basis of the
actual livings costs -- as of the end of January 1959 -- that
the buying power in the two parts of Germany was in the re-
lation of 100 to 128. That is, the average standard of living
of the Soviet Zone population is actually 78 per cent of that
of the population of the Federal Republic. A comparison of
the development of the cost of living since May 1958 (before
the end of rationing) shows the following picture:
Year and Month Soviet Zone Federal Republic Soviet Zone as a
(East Marks) (West Marks) Percentage of the
Federal Republic
1958 May
June
August
October
1959 January
390.60
423.50
417.00
407.00
407.00
319.50
317.80
316.25
314.70
317.80
122
133
132
129
128
For the contents of his smaller "market basket" the East German
"normal consumer" still has to pay about 30 per cent more than
the West German does. In the Soviet Zone, after the end of
rationing and through the introduction of new price regulations,
living expenses have risen almost to the level of 1954. The
loudly announced price reductions, which had been imposed
periodically between 1955 and 1958, were thus wiped out again.
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Retail Trade - Change in Consumer Habits
Since ration cards were abolished, there has been a change in
consumer habits in the Soviet Zone. This process of change
is still in progress and not yet completed. Most noticeable
is a trend toward the purchase of cheaper foods. Although,
for example, since May 29 of the previous year the average
retail prices of alcoholic beverages have been raised 20 per
cent, the share of such luxury items in the total retail turn-
over has not risen as fast as the proportion of foods and
manufactured consumer goods. The production plans within
the planned economy anticipate that, by 1960, manufactured
consumer goods will constitute 45 per cent of the retail trade
turnover, and food and luxuries 55 per cent. Since clothing
and household equipment are far more expensive in the Zone
than in the Federal Republic and the amount of food needed to
cover requirements has always been figured very closely, the
state-directed retail trade system is always able to absorb
excess purchasing power by offering more manufactured con-
sumer goods. A lady's rayon dress, comparable in quality to
one that could be purchased in the Federal Republic for 27
West Marks, still costs two-and-a-half times that much in the
Zone. A similar relationship, to take another example, exists
in the case of a man's poplin sport shirt. Leather shoes,
stockings, wool products, and so on cost on the average more
than double in the Soviet Zone what they would in the Federal
Republic. In this connection it is worthy of note that the
price figures given in Soviet Zone newspaper advertisements --
insofar as they do not concern special sales of goods whose
quality is no longer up to standard -- are considerably above
those given in the official statistics.
An overview of the retail trade in the last three years,
according to [the main] categories of goods, is given in the
following table:
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208.
Year
Unit
Total
retail
turnover
Of this:
mftd.
cons.
food luxuries goods
1956
1957
1958
1958
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
Quart.
Quart.
Quart.
Quart.
Billions
Per Cent
Billions
Per Cent
Billions
Per Cent
Billions
Per Cent
Billions
Per Cent
Billions
Per Cent
Billions
Per Cent
of Marks
of Marks
of Marks
of Marks
of Marks
of Marks
of Marks
32.6 12.9 5.9 13.8
100 39.6 18.1 42.3
34.8 13.2 6.5 15.1
100 37.9 18.7 43.4
38.1 14.8 6.9 16.4
100 38.9 18.1 43.0
8.1
100
8.9
100
9.8
100
11.3
100
3.1
38.1
3.4
38.2
4.0
40.8
4.3
38.1
1.5 3.5
18.5 43.2
1.7 3.8
19.1 42.7
1.8 4.0
18.4 40.8
1.9 5.1
16.8 45.1
Absorbing the Purchasing Power of Bonuses and Wage Increases
According to statements of Soviet Zone "Deputy Minister
President" Rau before the parliament in East Berlin, the
average per capita increase in expenditures occasioned by the
introduction of the new price system in June 1958 is 14 East
Marks per month. If one estimates that there are 17.3 million
people to be supported (not counting the national armed forces),
this amounts to 242.2 million East Marks per month, or 1,695.4
million East Marks during the months from June to December 1958.
Taking into account the price reductions up to the end of 1958,
which amounted to about 4 per cent of the cost of living, this
total is reduced to 1,627.6 million East Marks. Since the
retail turnover of food and luxury items increased by only
1.4 billion East Marks in the second half of 1958 as compared
to the same time period in the previous year, it must be con-
cluded that, in general, the Zone population was not notice-
ably better supplied during the second half of 1958, that is,
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after the abolition of ration cards, than it had been in thisTAT.
second half of 1957.
In the whole year 1958, there was an increase of 10.2 per cent.
in the value of turnover of food and luxury items as compared
with 1957. If we take into consideration the increased costs
occasioned by the new price regulations, an increase in turn-
over of only 1.5 per cent in terms of 1957 prices can be
established. By way of comparison, the increase of 1957 over
1956 was 4.8 per cent. When the Soviet Zone government, at
the end of May 1958, predicted an increase in the buying powet
of the population of 1.7 billion East Marks, the responsible
planners nevertheless knew in advance that they could at any
time easily bring back into the coffers of the state the
bonuses and wage increases that were granted in connection
with the abolition of the ration cards.
Real Purchasing Power of the Hourly Wage
A particularly striking example of the actual "situation of
the working class" (a Soviet Zone propaganda slogan) in both
parts of Germany is furnished by a comparison of the purchasing
power of the net hourly wage. Taking an average for the year
1958, and including the family bonus, a married industrial
worker with one child in the Soviet Zone received a net hourly
wage of 1.97 East Marks. A comparable industrial worker in
the Federal Republic, as of November 1958 (taking an average
for the month), received 2.12 West Marks. According to the
price level obtaining in his part of Germany in late January/
early February 1959, each of the two workers would have had to
work for a different length of time (figured in hours and
minutes) in order to pay for a given quantity of consumer goods
of varying kinds. The following table gives a comparative
overview:
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Commodity
Working Time Necessary Soviet Zone
Quantity (in hours and minutes) as a Per-
Sov.Zone centage of
Fed.Rep.
Fed. Rep.
Rye bread
1 kg 0/22
0/11
50.0
Flour, type 405
1 kg 0/27
0/40
148.1
Sugar (granulated)
1 kg 0/35
0/47
134.1
Fat bacon (smoked)
1 kg 1/57
2/02
104.9
Pork chops
1 kg 2/53
4/10
144.6
Pork (cheaper cut)
[Schweinebauch]
1 kg 2/03
3/22
164.2
Beef (for stewing)
1 kg 2/20
2/57
126.4
Beef (for braising)
1 kg 2/34
4/52
189.6
Liver Sausage
1 kg 2/12
4/16
193.9
Salami-type sausage
1 kg 2/44
3/27
126.2
Rice; grade 1
1 kg 0/29
0/47
162.1
Noodles (without egg)
1 kg 0/34
0/56
164.7
Cream of wheat
1 kg 0/27
0/41
151.9
Peas
1 kg 0/38
0/32
84.2
Potatoes
5 kg 1/28
0/18
20.5
Butter
1 kg 3/19
4/58
149.7
41
Margarine, grade 1
1 kg 1/07
1/31
135.8
Whole milk (bulk)
1 liter 0/12
0/21
175.0
Eggs
12 1/08
1/57
172.1
Cocoa
125 0/34
2/02
358.8
Tea, black
50 0/44
1/01
138.6
Coffee
125 1/06
4/32
368.5
Whole milk chocolate
100 0/37
1/57
316.2
Man's suit, with
synthetic wool
1 58/29
63/42
108.9
Lady's dress, rayon
1 12/44
34/16
292.7
Mens' shoes, boxcalf
1 pr 16/33
42/54
259.2
Womens' shoes,
boxcalf
1 pr 15/08
35/09
243.3
Ladies' stockings,
per ion
1 pr 1/36
4/08
258.3
Man's sport shirt,
poplin
1 6/33
18/16
278.9
Lady's sweater, long-
sleeved, part-wool
1 10/03
20/18
200.9
tia
STAT
The thesis that the speed-up system continues to exist as a
result of high prices is supported here in connection with t,_,,,_,
a""
real net hourly wage of a Soviet Zone industrial worker. Only
to cover the minimum require-
those goods that are necessary
ments for existence are more easily earned in the Zone than in
the Federal Republic. More than ever the key to the standard
of living of the East German worker has become fulfillment and
overfulfillment of work norms. Nevertheless, the propaganda
pressure of the Soviet Zone government for the increase of
per capita production in all branches of industry is far from
guaranteeing the worker a better level of consumption.
In addition to the disadvantages of the everyday life of the
Soviet Zone inhabitant that can be expressed in figures, there
are a whole series of factors to which he is exposed and
against which he has no defense. We can mention only examples
here: the allegedly voluntary contribution of unpaid hours of
work. in so-called "national construction," the arbitrary
separation from his relatives in the Federal Republic and in
West Berlin, the constant surveillance by informers of the
almighty secret police in the factory and in daily life, legal
insecurity, and political compulsion.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2014/04/03: CIA-RDP81-01043R003700170001-8
STAT
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