NATIONAL OPERATIONS SECURITY PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 9, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
v ?
1 Ulf
DRAFT
Revision 10/9/87
National Security Decision
Directive Number ATTACHMENT `Q
NATIONAL OPERATIONS SECURITY PROGRAM
OBJECTIVE
Security programs and procedures already exist to protect classified
matters. However, unclassified information generally available to the public
as well as certain detectable activities exist that provide indications
concerning classified or sensitive information or undertakings. Such
indicators may be exploited by those seeking to neutralize or to take
advantage of US Government actions that affecrnational security. Application
of the Operations Security (OPSEC) process promotes operational effectiveness
by guarding against the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified US
Government activities, capabilities, or intentions.
BACKGROUND
The operations security process involves five steps: identification of
critical information, analysis of the threat, ,Inr!lysis of the vulnerabilities,
assessment of the risks, and application of apprupriate countermeasures. It
begins with an examination of the totality of an activity to determine what
'exploitable but essentially unclassified indicators could be acquired in light-.
of the known collection capabilities of potential adversaries. Indicators
usually evolve from openly available data and other debectable actions.
Certain of these indicators may be pieced together or interpreted to
UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
UNCLASSIFIED
discern critical information. Indicators most often stem from the routine
administrative, physical, or technical actions taken to prepare for or execute
a plan or activity. Once the indicators are identified, they are analyzed
against the threat to determine the extent to which they could reveal critical
information.
Commanders and managers then use these threat and vulnerability analyses
in their risk assessment to assist in selecting and applying practical
countermeasures to mitigate or nullify selected indicators. Indicators may be
controlled or protected, as appropriate, using the full range of OPSEC
measures. These OPSEC measures may include, but are not limited to:
counterimagery; cover, concealment, and deception; and physical, information,
personnel, signals, computer, communications, and electronic security.
OPSEC is, thus, a systematic and proved process by which the US Government
and its supporting contractors can deny to potential adversaries information
about capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting
generally unclassified indicators associated with the planning and execution
of sensitive government activities.
APPLICATION
Indicators and vulnerabilities are best identified before activities start
through detailed OPSEC planning. They may also be identified during or after
the conduct of routine functional activities by analyzinp how functions are
2
UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
urfuLiA331r tt)
actually performed and what procedures are used. Planning and analysis
proceed from the adversaries' perspectives. To assist in OPSEC planning and
analysis, OPSEC planning guidance must be developed jointly by those most
familiar with the operational aspects of a particular activity together with
their supporting intelligence elements.
OPSEC planning guidance should consider those critical aspects of an
activity that should be protected in light of US and adversary goals,
estimated key adversary questions, probable' adversary knowledge, desirable and
harmful adversary appreciations, and pertinent intelligence threats, as well
as an outline of projected OPSEC measures.
In the OPSEC process, it is important to distinguish between the threat
and vulnerability analysis phases and the phase in which OPSEC measures are
applied. Recommendations on the use of OPSEC measures are based on the joint
operational-intelligence analyses, but ultimate decisions on their
implementation
are made by commanders, supervisors, or program managers who
determine what aspects will be protected.
responsibility for mission accomplishment
total authority for determining where and
POLICY
The decisionmaker with ultimate
and resource management must have
how OPSEC will be applied.
A National Operations Security Program is hereby established. Each
department and agency assigned or supporting national security missions with
3
UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
? uNuu-km ILD
classified or sensitive activities shall establish a formal OPSEC program with
the following common features:
o Specific assignment of responsibility for OPSEC direction and
implementation.
Specific requirements to plan for and implement OPSEC in anticipation
of, and where appropriate during, department or agency activity.
o Direction to use OPSEC analytical techniques- to assist in identifying
vulnerabilities and to select appropriate OPSEC measures:
o Institution of positive measures to ensure that all personnel,
commensurate with their positions and security clearances, are aware
of hostile intelligence threats and understand the OPSEC process.
o Instructions to conduct an internal annual OPSEC review that will
Outline the current OPSEC program of a department or agency and
highlight successes or problem area; that may aid other OPSEC
programs.
o Provisions for support of and cooperation with other departments and
agencies in their OPSEC programs.
4
UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
1LLJ
Agencies with minimal activities that could impact on national security
need not establish a formal OPSEC program; however, they must cooperate with
other departments and agencies to minimize damage to national security when
OPSEC problems arise.
RESPONSIBILITIES
Heads of departments and agencies assigned or supporting national security
missions. Establish organizational OPSEC Programs; issue, as appropriate,
OPSEC policies, procedures, and planning guidance; and designate departmental
and agency planners for OPSEC Advise the NSC on OPSEC measures -required of
other departments and agencies in order to achieve and maintain effectiveness
in operations or activities. JCS should advise the NSC of the impact of
nonmilitary US policies on the effectiveness of OPSEC measures taken by the US
military and recommend to the NSC policies that would minimize any adverse
effects.
Chairman, Senior Interagency Group for Intelligence (SIG-I)
The SIG-I is designated as the NSC's instrumentality for national OPSEC
policy formulation, resolution of conflicting interagency OPSEC issues,
guidance on national-level OPSEC training, technical OPSEC support, and advice
to individual agencies. The National Operations Security Advisory Committee
(N0/\C), as part of the SIG-I structure and functioning under the aegis of the
Interagency Group for Countermeasures (Policy), will:
5
UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
LLLJ
o Provide the SIG-I structure with advice and recommendations
concerning measures and methods for reducing OPSEC vulnerabilities
and propose corrective measures.
o As requested, consult with and provide advice and recommendations to
the various departments and agencies concerning OPSEC vulnerabilities
and corrective measures.
o On an ad hoc basis, chair forums for two or.more agencies having
competing interests or responsibilities with OPSEC implications that
may affect national security interests. Analyze the issues and
prepare advisory memorandums and recommendations for the competing
agencies. In the event of an impasse, make appropriate
recommendations to the SIG-I structure for resolution of the dispute.
o Bring to the attention of the SIG-I those major unresolved OPSEC
vulnerabilities and deficiencies that may arise within designated
programs and activities of the executive branch.
o Articulate to the SIG-I national-level requireMents for intelligence
and counterintelligence support to OPSEC.
6
UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Nothing in this Directive:
o Is intended to impinge on the authorities and responsibilities of the
DCI to protect intelligence sources and methods, nor those of any
authorized agency or department to conduct intelligence-related
activities.
o Implies any authority on the part of the SIG-I, Interagency
Group/Countermeasures (Policy), or' the NOAC,to examine the facilities
or operations of any department or agency wtthout the approval of the
head of such department or agency.
7
UNCLASSIFIED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
,
...,rtl..t,:. THE UNDE R SECRETARY ')F" DE FENS/ ....7 ...?..
'.. .'.
WASIIIN(.1()N I) C .'0.41) I
t
1
s4rfl1 ATTACHMENT ___J___: ______
i
13 NU n66
POLICY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, NAT1ONAI, OPERATIONS SECURITY ADVISORY
COMMITME (NOAC)
SUBJECT: Civil Satellite Remote S4 sing Proprams
Under section 101 of the Land Rvtiote-Sensing Commerciali-
zation Act of 1984, (Tal) A), the Congress declared that,
among other things, the national interest of the US lies in
maintaining international leadership in civil remote sensing
and in broadly promoting the beneficial use of remote-sensing
data. The Congress declared, also, that land remote sensing
conce'rns of the US.
by.. .private parties of the US affecm...national security
Section 402 of ,the Act prohibits any US person from
operating any private remote-sensing,syst.em without a
license (issued by the Secretary of Comme,:ce).
Section 607 of the Act requires the Secretary of Commerce
to consult with the Secretary of DeFese on all matters
under the Act affecting national secuttity (including the
issuance of the requisite license); aTi, the Secretary of
Defense shall determine the conditions necessary to meet
national security concerns.
The National Oceadic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), under the Department of Commeribe, issued a Notice of
Proposed Rulemakinp (51 Fed. Reg. 9971, March 24, 1986) (Tab
B) which, accordirip to the Radio-Televlision News Directors
Association (RTNDA), would violate thel First Amendment. The
thrust of RTNDA objections to the Notice is that the rules
are unconstitutionally vague and. would authorize NOAA to
impose impermissible prior restraint. According to RTNDA,
the question is not whether NOAA Can take action to protect
national security, hut what standards must it use when doing so.
Given that commercial multispectril imaging resolution
of other countries, such :is France and Japan, is at least as
pood now as the US, and over the years along with US commercial
satellites, will achieve even better rc'solution, the question
becomes, "How does the US accommodate necessary and inevitable
commercial growth in
space
infomation?" and still protect US sensitive
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7 _
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
It seems to rte that,
(1) The Department_ of Defense needs to develop and
publish clear, defendable standards for the guidimce of rho
Secretary of Commerce in applying the national security
concerns of the Secretary of Defense to his licensing criteri
Without these standards, there is a possibility that, on the
grounds of vagueness, the plea "national security" would
not, in and of itself, be sufficient to forestall issuance
of a license.
(2) As the department with the greatest enuitv in
overflight security, the DOD nevertheless should develop iis
standards in coordination with the entire counterintullipenc
community. (in this connection, all departwents and agencies
should recognize that their sensitive otiLduor ricCiviieS, at
least, are vulnerable HOW to overhead collectiop and will
become more so as technology advanc(s.)
Accordingly, I ask that your committee undertake an
interapency review of the.subject and recommend 'to the
Secretary of Defense standards for the guidance of the
Secretary of Commerce in meeting the necessary national
security concerns in the licensing process.
Aide
Declassified
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
? (.71s.r.' 7".
2
(U) Satellites could be used extensively to "monitor"
status of US developmental efforts in controversial areas
of research and development. Much is published in open
sources which indicates where (in general terms) such research
is done. This initial targeting data could be used for the
periodic "looks" by the media's overhead systems. Consequently,
if not already in place, steps would have to be taken routinely
at these locations to avoid observation by the systems.
(U) There are very significant dollar/time costs
associated with avoiding overhead platforms at research and
development locations. Some tests can be conducted only under
certain weather or atmospheric conditions. It is misleading to
assume that the use of avoidance countermeasures will always
work because the costs of postponement may be prohibitive and
test preparations cannot always be hidden.
(U) The difficulty of hiding a large-scale military
operation would be complicated by adding to the list of
potential intelligence collectors. Large numbers of troops,
equipment, and supplies must be massed at the decisive time
and place. Barring the availability of ground, ship, or
airplane observation posts, satellites provide the best means
of verification. Low resolution systems are sufficient for
detecting mass buildup.
Indirect Threats
(U) Media publication of "facts" they gather about
their targets' (military, economic, or political) capabilities,
problems, or intentions might give hostile intelligence services
an insight into true US intelligence assessments.
.(U) FrienOly intelligence collection could be
affected by foreign efforts to accelerate their counterimagery
programs based upon the added threat .to their operations
posed by increased US satellite activity.
(U) Target antisatellite efforts could be accelerated
to the detriment of US military capabilities since media
satellites would also have to be taken out in early stages of
war or preparation for war. (On the other hand, a US-licensed
commercial system could augment US capabilities.)
MEASURES 'AVAILABLE TO PROTECT NATIONAL SECURITY
Notification
(U) The key ingredient to achievement cif protection from
any overhead threat, including that of a postulated MEDIASAT,
is notification, the necessary elements of which are tracking
and reporting.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
UrLtWiNTIVii
4
Licensing Provisions
(U) The Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of
1984 (15 USC 4277) requires the Secretary of Defense to
determine the conditions necessary to Meet national security
concerns with respect to issuance by the Secretary of Commerce
of the requisite license for a remote Sensing system in space,
such as a MEDIASAT.
(U) The NOAC recognizes that the conditions of licensing
under 15 USC 4277 of the act are for the sole determination
of the Secretary of Defense; and, the NOAC understands that
the current DoD position on the subject is that the DoD must
have the "widest possible latitude" in determining the national
security concerns. The NOAC, therefore, merely suggests the
following possibilities for consideration of the cognizant,
DoD officials:
(U) When the Secretary of Defense, after conferring
with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declares
that the disclosure of data collected from particular orbits
during a particular time frame would pose a serious and
immediate threat to distinct and compelling national security,
that data shall be withheld from public distribution or
disclosure for so long as the threat exists or until the same
data can no longer be held undisclosed because of actual
public disclosure by other means, e.g., a military action has
been launched and reported.
(U) Discussion: There are two principal methods
for imposing ad hoc limitations as suggested above:
a. Imposing constraints on the timeliness of data dissemina-
tion in specific situations or specific geographic
areas where directed for national security reasons. In
peacetime such constraints should be in writing and
limited to specific periods of time, or to the specific -
situation.
b. Imposing constraints on the collection of imagery in
such specific situations or specific geographic areas.
(U) Either method will probably be subject to legal challenges
by an applicant for a MEDIASAT license as a violation of the
First Amendment of the Constitution, and specifically as an
iMpositiOn of impermissible prior restraint. S4Juld the
MEDIASAT concept become a reality, this issue could be expected
ultimately to go to the Supreme Court for resolution.
(U) (Our initial advice is that the second method may be more
defensible because, i) it does not involve the prior restraint
rrhiA proF-rrr
1?3::?,?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
. ? ,
6
equipment which is available today, some of which is approved
by the Government. The prevention of loss may well be worth
the price of protection to the applicants who may consider
incorporation of protection in any satellite system.
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
(U) In the preceding sections the NOAC working group has
addressed the narrow issue of protecting sensitive Defense
information from reconnaissance by overhead satellites.
There remain two different kinds of problems that, in the
view of the working group, need to be 1ponsidered by the
Department of Defense: i) Guidelines For review of license
applications and, ii) Guidelines for determination as to the
need for imposition of controls on an Operating system.
1
Guidelines for Review of License Applications.
(U) A primary concern should the completeness of the
information provided according to the Rules, including,
1
The date of intended commencement of operations
and the expected duration of such operations;
The method of launch, and the name and location
of the operator of the launch vehicle and the launch site;
The range of orbits and altitudes requested for
authorized operation;
The range of spatial resolution or instantaneous
field of view requested;.
The spectral bands requeste8 for authorized
operation; and
Timeliness of reporting.
(U) (Whether or not a .resolution limitation is to be imposed
will be determined by National Space Policy, revision of
which is under White House study.)
(U) In deciding later whether national security interests
are involved, timeliness of dissemination of the imagery
will be a factor.
Guidelines for Determination of' the Need for Imposition
of Controls on an Operating System.
rfPl
dz.t.t 1LIJ
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
o.?
UNCLASSIFIE5
7
(U) Once a license has been granted and the system is
operational, consideration of what spatial resolution "ought
to be" is no longer pertinent. The problem now is the
determination of how, when, and in what manner any controls
that the national security requires may be imposed.
(U) As has been indicated, control may be either i)
prior restraint on the release of information already obtained
or ii) constraints on collection so that the sensitive imagery
is not obtained in the first instance. Both of these methods
raise constitutional questions but the latter course seems to
be the more reasonable. The obvious OPSEC problem with the
latter course, however, is "tipping one's hand" since the
media--and, through them, the whole world--could he warned
both as to the geographic area and the timing in which something
the Department of Defense considers very important is about
to occur.
OVERSIGHT
(U) Notwithstanding the availability of remedies other than
license conditions as discussed above (notification, concealment,
and deception), the working group perceives the need to
establish in the Department of Defense a single operational
entity--an executive agent--with oversight responsibility for
all matters arising from US media-controlled satellite imaging.
The terms of reference for the executive agent should be
established well ahead of the first application for a license
and may include the following elements:
a. (U) Who, specifically, is to be responsible for
following the situation eo continuously and so carefully as
to be able to identify situations in which a MEDIASAT could
endanger-the national security?
(U) (Note( Knowledgeable DoD working group members
suggest the possibility of designating the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff as executive agent with the day to day
responsibility--perhaps through a special group in the
NMCC/NMIC--of advising the Secretary of Defense when the
Secretary of Commmerce needs to be notified of the application
of predetermined controls. It is belieVed that an OSD staff
element is too far out of the operational environment to
fulfill this role.)
b. (U) How is the determination by the Secretary of
Defense that action is needed to be conveyed to the responsible
official in the Department of Commerce, the official who will
actually impose the controls? Procedures in this area need
t t
Allr!PrI
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
-UNCLASSIFIE6
to be quite carefully spelled out sinc there could be
situations in which time would be of the essence; delays of
as little as 1 hour in initiating the proper reaction might
make the whole exercise one of futility.
c. (U) What policy decisions
handling of applications for licensing
8
need. to be addressed for
of remote sensing systems?
d. (U) What policy decisions must be addressed as a
basis for recommendations as to how and under what circumstances
imaging controls would be imposed on a MEDIASAT because the
Secretary of Defense had "determined" that the national
security required those controls?
SUMARY
(U) The NOAC working group believes that the following three
statements summarize the thrust of this report:
a. Realistic protection from overhead imagery is through
notification and OPSEC measures.
b. Given the current commercial imaging capabilities,
constraints on spatial resolution by the US Government are
not an effective control.
c. The Department of Defense should consider the designation
of an executive agent to be responsible for all matters
arising from US media-controlled satellite imaging.
11.Plr:rcri';i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NATIONAL OPERATIONS
SECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
MEDIASAT WORKING GROUP
Review of Security Implications of Civil
Satellite Remote Sensing Programa
I. TASK The Department of Defense has asked the NOAC to
review the US Civil Satellite Remote Sensing Program
and recommend to the Secretary of Defense standards for
the guidance of the Secretary of Commerce in meeting the
necessary national security concerns in the licensing
process.
II. BACKGROUND
- Under section 101 of the Land Remote-Sensing Commerciali-
zation Act of 1984, the Congress declared that, among other
things, the national interest of the US lies in maintaining
international leadership in civil remote sensing and in
broadly promoting the beneficial use of remote-sensing data.
The Congress declared, also, that land remote sensing by...
private parties of the US affects...national security
concerns of the US.
- Section 402 of the Act prohibits any US person from
operating any private remote-sensing system without a
license (issued by the Secretary of Commerce).
- Section 607 of the Act requires the Secretary of Commerce
to consult with the Secretary of Defense on all matters
under the Act affecting national security (including the
issuance of the requisite license); and, the Secretary of
Defense shall "determine the conditions necessary to meet
national security concerns.
- The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), under the Department of Commerce, issued a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (51 Fed. Reg. 9971, March 24, 1986)
which, according to the Radio-Television News Directors
Association (RTNDA), would violate the First Amendment.
The thrust of RTNDA objections to the Notice is that the
rules are unconstitutionally vague and would authorize
NOAA to impose impermissible prior restraint. According to
RTNDA, the question is not whether NOAA can take action to
protect national security, but what standards must it use
when doing so. NOAA has responded to the comments and has
issued Final Regulations effective August 10, 1987,
(52 Fed. Reg. 25970, July 10, 1987)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
- Given that commercial multispectral imaging resolution
of other countries, such as France and Japan, is at least
as good now as the US, and over the years along with US,
commercial satellites will achieve even better resolution,
the question becomes, "How does the US accommodate necessary
and inevitable commercial growth in apace and still protect
US sensitive information?"
III SCOPE OF REVIEW
- What are the national security implications of an
extensive media use of high-resolution satellite imaging
capabilities?
- What measures are available to protect national security
concerns relative to media use of civil satellite imaging
systems, both US and foreign? (Responds to first bullet,
above.)
+ Notification a la SATRAN (Satellite Reconnaissance
Advanced Notice) and FRNDSAT
+ Concealment and military deception
+ Licensing provisions unaer section 607 of the Act.
IV REPORT
a. Scope Consistent with the NOAC charter, para-
graph 2.c., the mediasat working group should limit
its report to discussion of the national security
implications, that is, the OPSEC vulnerabilities,
and to corrective measures to overcome those vulner-
abilities. ,
b. Disposition. The report should be forwarded to the
Chairman, NOAC, who will decide its further disposition.
That is, if he concurs in the report, provide its advice
and recommendations concerning OPSEC vulnerabilities
and corrective measures to the Secretary of Defense,
ATTN: DUSD/P, Washington, D.C. 20301-2??0.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7 I
TAB B
National Operations Security Advisory Committee
MEDIASAT Working Group and Advisers*
John Hoover ODUSD/P, Chair
Major General Jack Thomas, USAF-Re t . C3I*
A. R. Cinquegrana, D0J-0IPR*
Mark Evans, DoJ-0IPR
697-7641
697-2720
633-5604
633-5607
Peter Modley, State, INR*
Alan Brown, Commerce
MAJ Bill Puddy, Army/DAMO-OD
LCDR Bob Golding, JCS/J33
647-8651
377-1 722
694-8199
695-1653
CPT Mary Moffitt, ODUSD/P/CI&IP
fl
697-9586
STAT
STAT
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
R
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
o
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICAT IONS
AND INTELLIGENCE
Date June 5, 1987
Memoftw Mr. Latham
Attached is the background paper you asked
for in preparation for your TV interview with
Nodding Carter on "Use of imaging satellites by
news media."
All pertinent information in the tabs has
been summarized in the paper itself. The only
real, written policy of the U.S. Government on
this topic is Public Law 98-365, "Land Remote-
Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984," and
NSDD-42, "National Space Policy," from 1982.
DoD's only written position on this is a DUSD(P)
letter to NOAA commenting on their proposed
rules for implementing PL 98-365.
I have included some other information on
current activities, some discussion of possible
national security concerns, and some potential
pitfalls that might come your way during the
interview. Your staff expert on this issue is
,MGEN Jack Thomat, X72720, in DASD(I). He
provided most of the information here.
?
Jan HOdanyi sent me an audio tape of Mr.
Carter's interview with Mr. Sims, done on 2 June
1987. It might be good preparation, if you are
interested.
Je ey ?. S er, LtCol, USAF
Mi itary Assistant for Space
Policy Development
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
? V
Background Paper
for
MacNeil-Lehrer Interview on
"Use of Imaging Satellites by News Media (MEDIASAT)"
INTERVIEW SPECIFICS
ASD(C31) to do interview (tentatively 1630, June 5, 1987)
with Mr. Hodding Carter for MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour.
They want DOD/Administration spokesman to discuss DoD
concerns over possible security problems when media uses
remote sensing satellites (i.e., SPOT).
What is potential for abuse when media uses remote
sensing satellite information?
Are there legitimate national security concerns?
If so, what are they?
Examples?
OUTLINE
Paper is structured as follows:
I. Current Policy Framework
O General Observations.
o -Public Law
o Presidential Directives/Policies
o- Department of Defense Directives/Policies
Current Activities/Ongoing Actions
o NOAA Licensing Rule Development
III. National Security Concerns/Issues
o Specific Interview Questions (as above)
IV. Cautions/Potential Pitfalls
V. Classified Addendum
PREPARED BY: LtCol Shaver/X50210/4 Jun 87
Page 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
I. CURRENT POLICY FRAMEWORK
o General Observations
Current policy framework appears limited in scope.
Public law (PL 98-365, "Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act of 1984") really only aimed at
getting U.S.G. out of funding LANDSAT system;
recognized potential national security implications,
but.did not really anticipate MEDIASAT type
developments (i.e., use of satellite remote-sensing
for collection of "intelligence-like" information
for rapid dissemination to the public through the
media).
Presidential policy (NSDD-42, "National Space
Policy") establishes goal of expanding private-
sector involvement in space and space-related
activities, and requires U.S.G. to provide climate
conducive to this expanded private-sector
involvement, with due regard for national security;
not very clear on how resolution is achieved when
commercial interests, first amendment rights and
national security interests collide.
DoD Space Policy, February 4, 1987, concentrates on
military space program policies, but recognizes as a
contributory goal the need for a strong technology
base and a healthy space industry; policy requires
DoD to cooperate with civil and commercial sectors
for mutual benefit.
Only official DoD written poiition specific to issue
of land remote sensing is DUSD(P) letter of January
22, 1987, to ,NOAA commenting on NOAA's proposed
rules for licensing private remote sensing space
systems; rules have not been finalized, so we do not
know if contents of this letter have been accepted
by NOAA (i.e., do not know if this position will
become U.S.G. policy).
Current policy framework (PL 98-365, NSDD-42) does not
appear to have kept pace with new issues in satellite
remote sensing; policy apparently did not anticipate:
Speed of technology developments related to civil/
commercial remote sensing systems and capabilities;
Extent of growth of commercial medip interest in
exploiting capabilities of such systems;
Page 2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
I. CURRENT POLICY FRAMEWORK (Continued)
Significant growth of foreign remote sensing
satellite capabilities beyond the reach of potential
U.S. regulatory constraints
o Public Law
Public Law 98-365, "Land Remote-Sensing
Commercialization Act of 1984", July 17, 1984 (Tab A)
Lawmakers recognized value of commercial remote
sensing capabilities, but also recognized existence
of impacts on national security and expressly
required protections for preservation of national
security.
"TITLE I-DECLARATION OF FINDINGS, PURPOSES AND
POLICIES
FINDINGS
Sec. 101. The Congress finds and declares that--...
(1) the continuous civilian collection and utilization of
land remote-sensing data from space are of major
benefit in managing the Earth's natural resources and
in planning and conducting many other activities of
economic importance;...
(4) land remote sensing by the Government or private
parties of the United States affects international
commitments and policies and national security
concerns of the United.States;...
(13) certain Government oversight must be maintained
to assure thatprivate sector activities are in the national
interest and that the international commitments and
FcTirgof the United States are honored;....
PURPOSES
Sec. 102. The purposes of this act are to--...
(2) maintain the United States worldwide leadership in
civil remote sensing, preserve its national security, and
fulfill its international obligations;....
Page 3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
I. CURRENT POLICY FRAMEWORK (Continued)
POLICIES
Sec. 103....(c) It shall be the policy of the United States
both to commercialize those remote-sensing space
systems that properly lend themselves to private sector
operation and to avoid competition by the Government
with such commercial operations, while continuing to
preserve our national security, to honor our
international obligations, and to retain in the
Government those remote-sensing functions that are
essentially of a public service nature."
[Underlines added]
Law establishes Secretary of Commerce as manager of
commercialization program; gives Secretary licensing
authority for private remote-sensing space systems;
establishes conditions for operation of such
systems.
"TITLE IV-LICENSING OF PRIVATE REMOTE SENSING
SPACE SYSTEMS
GENERAL AUTHORITY
Sec. 401. (a)(1) In consultation with other appropriate
Federal agencies, the Secretary is ,authorized to license
private sector parties to operate private remote-sensing
space systems for such period as the Secretary may
specify and in accordance with the provisions of this
title.
CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION
Sec. 402. (a) No person who is subject to the
jurisdiction or control of the United States may, directly
or through any subsidiary or affiliate, operate any
private remote-sensing space system without license
pursuant to section 401.
(b) Any license issued pursuant to this title shall
specify, at a minimum, that the licensee shall comply
with all of the requirements of this Act and shall--
(1) operate the system in such manner as to preserve
and promote the national security of the United States
and to observe and implement the international
obligations of the United States in accordance with
section 607;...." ,t
[Underlines added]
Page 4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
(ISCOM)
ATTACHMENT -- ---
SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP (INTELLIGENCE)
INTERAGENCY GROUP/COUNTERMEASURES (POLICY)
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
9 November 1987
ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE
INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE (ISCOM)
SECTION I
A. This section of the annual report,of the ISCOM is based on
the ISCOM charter, minutes, and special reports of the ISCOM.
1. The ISCOM charter was approved Ly the chairman of the
Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Policy) (IG/CM(P)) on_2 Decem-
ber 1986. The charter piovides an authoritative basis for the
ISCOM, and sets forth its mission, functions, responsibilities,
composition and organization.
2. In its first year of operation, the ISCOM met four times;
the meeting dates were 21 August 1986, 13 November 1986, 3 Feb-
ruary 1987, and 22 July 1987. (The next meeting is set for 18
November 1987.)
3. Some of the activities of the first year were devoted to
establishing a charter document that would be acceptable to the
many diverse interests represented by ISCOM departments and
agencies, namely:
Department of Defense
Department of Army
Department of Navy
Department of Air Force
Defense Intelligence Agency
National Security Agency
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of State
National Security Council Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of Justice
Department of Commerce
Department of Energy
Department of Treasury
Information Security Oversight Office
Intelligence Community Staff
However, most of the ISCOM's first-year effort was devoted to the
task of determining the disposition of the many significant recom-
mendations contained in the so-called IG/CM(P) "collated list of
action items" dated 24 October 1986. Of the 95 action items, the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
ISCOM initially was assigned 38 for actio. In the process of
disposing of most of those, the ISCOM made contributions to the
solution of other recommendations, including input to the Person-
nel Security Committee for the recommendations on government-wide
training objectives, use of the polygraph for counterintelligence
purposes within the Department of Defense, and reimbursement to
the government for personnel security investigations based on
false information. The ISCOM reported its progress on the col-
lated list of action items on 30 March 1987, 7 April 1987, and
9 October 1987; only a few of the action items remain to be
addressed.
SECTION II
B. This section of the annual report pertain g to the ISCOM'
projected activities for its second year of operation.
1. The ISCOM's course for its second year of operations has
been set to some extent 'by past events. It is clear that the
following will have to be addressed:
a. Dispositon of the remaining action items from the
collated listing cited above. (Included are the recommendations
to ensure that plans are developed to maintain the security
awareness of the public at large and the possible significance of
foreign contacts, and closing out action on other recommendations
such as welcoming the opportunity for joint discussions between
Congress and the Executive Branch to examine various approaches
to legislation regarding unauthorized disclosure of classified
information.)
b. Address the many information security questions con-
cerning the STU-III that is about to be placed in wide-spread
use. (It is likely that this will become a tasking derived from
the "1987 National Assessment of the Hostile Intelligence Threat
and U.S. Countermeasures.")
c. Ways and means to stimulate and provide better clas-
sification management. (The initial decision to classify infor-
mation drives all other classified information security counter-
measure programs.)
d. support and guide implementation of the 13 initia-
tives of the Information Security Oversight Office. (Approval of
these by the President is anticipated soon.)
2. The ISCOM can and should play a larger role as a forum
where department and agency representatives can exchange views,
problems, and solutions that impact both interagency and internal
settings. The cumulative expertise represented in the ISCOM is
enormous and this national resource should be used to the fullest
extent, and in harmony with, the Information Security Oversight
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Office. The ISCOM should be more active in its second year. It
is anticipated that the ISCOM will meet six times, at least, and
may form working subcommittees to address particular matters such
as the STU-III.
3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
?
ATTACHMENT
SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP (INTELLIGENCE)
INTERAGENCY GROUP/COUNTERMEASURES (POLICY)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Physical Security Committee Report
November 10, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman,
Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Policy)
VIA: Director,
Community Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Staff/IC Staff
FROM:
Chairman,
Physical Security Committee
SUBJECT: Status of the Physical Security Committee
Efforts
The attached synopsizes the current status of this
Committee's activities in regard to the initiatives raised by
the President's and SSCI reports on counterintelligence and
security countermeasures. A summary of our other efforts and
planned action is also discussed.
Attachment:
As stated.
Regraded Unclassified when
Separated from the
Classified Attachment
Doc. 43 Brandt
SECRET/NOFORN
DECL:OADR
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
SECRET/NOFORN
November 10, 1987
Physical Security Committee Progress Report
1. Synopsis:
The Committee's Charter was approved by the sitting membership
at its third meeting, on May 22, 1987, and forwarded to the IG/CM
(P) for approval and dissemination. The Committee has held seven
meetings since its inception and has gathered consensus in
establishing direction and priorities. Currently we are actively
involved in the combination lock initiative, determining existing
centers of excellence, and reviewing the GSA Interagency Committee
on Security Equipment (IACSE) master plan. Action initiatives from
the President's Report may soon become an active issue for the
Committee to address because of the budget's impact on certain of
the recommendations. A summary of our progress in each of these
areas follows.
The President's and SSCI Reports:
Enclosure 1 is the most recent report of the Physical Security
Committee's efforts on implementation of the initiatives stemming
from the President's and the SSCI Reports. To summarize our efforts:
The SSCI recommended in item 103 of their report that
intelligence agencies be given the opportunity to
participate in the planning and oversight of new office
building construction efforts, the CIA should strive for
timely involvement in,this endeavor, and long-range
security plans for East Bloc missions should be
accelerated. CIA and other interested intelligence
agencies have personnel assigned to the Foreign Buildings
Office. These elements continue to participate in the
planning, design and construction phases of new building
work. The CIA has taken the lead role to ensure timely
participation and response by the intelligence community.
Current initiatives in this arena are focusing on the need
for the long-range plans of the intelligence community to
be vetted early by the Foreign Buildings Office.
The President's Report stressed the need for the community
to sustain Congressional funding of programs developed from
the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (The Inman
Report). The current fiscal restraints required to meet
SECRET/NOFORN
DECL:OADR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
SECRET/NOFORN
-2-
reduced funding level projections will impact continuance
of security enhancement work in the physical security
area. Without an increased Base in FY 1989, the Department
of State will only be able to sustain a base program and
maintain security postures at a portion of the missions
overseas requiring service and support. No new
enhancements will be fundable. We will fall short by
roughly 60 posts from meeting the Secretary of State's goal
of a standard level of security for all our Missions,
world-wide.
This matter will be raised at the next Physical Security
Committee meeting to determine what support may be
solicited from others who have involvement in the foreign
arena and would stand to benefit from maintaining the
enhancement program to completion.
The most recent action by the Congress to use Diplomatic
Security Capital Funding for temporary off-setting of
reduced S&E funding levels may impact compliance with the
SSCI Report item 1020, implementation of the Inman Panel
recommendations for relocation of our most vulnerable
overseas facilities. The Panel's original listing has
already been payed back for budget as well, as real estate
reasons. We can not predict the impact of further
reductions until the Congress produces an FY 1988
appropriation. At that time the Department of State will
reopen and review the list.
3. Combination Lock Initiative:
Development of new specifications and test criteria for dial
combination locks is underway. GSA has received an adequate level
of commitment to funding from other agencies to fund the NCEL lock
program. The Committee will request quarterly status from NCEL on
this project.
The Department of State, working with the CIA, has initiated a
contract with Sargent & Greenleaf (S&G) Locks Company to produce a
modified S&G 8500 series combination lock unit that will address the
vulnerability to technically assisted manipulation. S&G is
evaluating several different approaches and will be reporting their
findings shortly.
SECRET/NOFORN
DECL:OADR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7
SECRET/NOFORN
-3-
The Lock Initiative Subcommittee of this Committee is
responsible for the lock initiatives effort. Their next agenda will
involve determining the need for criteria and standards and
certification of a testing facility, commercial or government, and
the process for support, qualification and certification of
commercial vendor security equipment.
4. The Master Plan:
A representative of GSA briefed this Committee in September on
that agency's efforts to develop and implement a Master Plan to
standardize security equipment terminology, and testing and
certification standards and processes in meeting the common needs of
the Government. To this end, the GSA formed the Interagency
Advisory Committee on Security Equipment (IACSE). The IACSE
prepared a Master Program Plan of 13 taskings and contracted for
support of the effort to Dynatrend, Inc. Enclosure 2 is a
background and status report on the IACSE.
According to the GSA brief to this Committee:
The Master Program Plan was projected as a $3.4 million
three-year effort but only partially funded for start-up.
Full funding was never budgeted by GSA.
The Contractor had completed some of the taskings and
reported their findings to IACSE.
GSA would maintain its responsibility for specification and
standards but did not have the expertise required to manage
such a technically specific program. GSA would have to
remain dependent on user agencies to fund and drive such
efforts.
The Physical Security Committee is currently reviewing the
IACSE initiated Master Program Plan to determine the need and
feasibility of continuing the Plan. The general consensus of this
Committee is to continue the Master Plan. In the next meeting we
will be determining the taskings and priorities, and the contract
support required to continue the plan or portions of the plan
considered applicable to the Committee's Charter.
Doc. 44 Brandt
SECRET/NOFORN
DECL:OADR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000300420004-7