NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 28 NOVEMBER 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T01422R000100220001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 28, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Trn= of up vrei
11 i Central
. Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
I.
Saturday
1,
'? 11
28 November 1987
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"Top-Seer-et_
CPAS NID 87-276JX
28 November 1987
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Contents
Philippines: Decisive Weekend for Military Rebels
1
Haiti: Tension Persists on Eve of Election
2
Nicaragua: Military Developments
3
Notes
USSR-US: Propagandists Preparing for Summit
4
UK-USSR: Gorbachev Invited for Presummit Meeting
4
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Romania: Popular Hatred of Ceausescu Grows
6
Bangladesh: Ershad Declares State of Emergency
6
Chile-US: New Strains in Relations
7
Panama: Anti-US Resolution
7
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Philippines: Aquino Focusing on Economic Problems
8
In Brief
9
Special Analyses
USSR-China: Signs of Progress on Cardinal Issues
11
Pakistan: Local Elections
13
USSR-Nordic States: Soviet Initiatives Advance
15
Too Secret
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PHILIPPINES:
Decisive Weekend for Military Rebels
A military pay increase to take effect next week may neutralize
the threat to the Philippine Government from rebel Colonel
Honasan and his supporters,
President Aquino signed legislation on Thursday authorizing pay
hikes?averaging 60 percent?for all active-duty soldiers, ending
rumors the government would renege on its promise. The raise takes
effect on Tuesday and is scheduled to appear in paychecks on
15 December, although there is some uncertainty about the source of
funding,
Yesterday a Manila newspaper ran a letter reportedly authorized by
Honasan that states he and his supporters will desist from hostile
action against the government because of the pay increase and other
efforts by Aquino to address military grievances and improve the
government's performance. Various press reports suggest Honasan
may surrender this weekend because he and his supporters will lose
their military pay and family benefits if they remain absent without
leave after Monday
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Comment: Honasan has been losing supporters and credibility as
Aquino has moved to address military grievances. The pay increase is
a major concession to the military and a strong incentive to surrender
for rebels who do not want to be dropped from the payroll. But
dissension in the ranks will begin to grow again if funding becomes a
problem and the pay hike is slow in coming.
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HAITI:
Tension Persists on Eve of Election
Tensions are high throughout Haiti on the eve of a national
election as vigilante groups engage in retaliatory violence
against rightwing attempts t7 derail the electr process.
Neighborhood vigilante groups`have killed at least six people this
week. Several attack ' ' s1
appear indiscriminate. The ruling council has denounced the
vigilantes and affirmed that the Army has sole responsibility for
providing security during the election period. Some troops have been
deployed to trouble spots in Port-au-Prince in the past several days,
and military commanders have said they will provide election workers
security and transoortati including helicopters if ordered to do so
by the councils
The council, however, continues to shoW little regard for the security
of the election and the electoral commission. On Erm.8452 two leading
commission members publicly accused the council of failing to
provide deauate security and of ignoring their requests for logistic
support.
Vearrovh-i5 campaigning by the many candidates who are running for
__pLesident)hai intensified, and several centrists are exploring the
possibility of forming coalitions after the first round of balloting.
Campaigning for legislative
offices also has increased: there now are 76 candidates for 27 senate
seats, and 247 candidates for 77 seats in the chamber of deputies.
More than 70 percent of the eligible voters have been registered, but
some pollin places may not have ballots and other supplies
tomorrow.
Comment: The emergence of_vigilante groups to protect the election
process increases the likelihood that balloting will proceed but also
risks a rising spiral of violence. Such violence, regardless of the
motivations of the perpetrators, might drive a large number of voters
from the polls and give rightists in the military an excuse to attempt a
coup in the hope of preempting the elections. Although balloting
probably will occur on scheduleComeffoB continued violence at the
current level could seriously(com_plicate efforts to install a democratic
civilian government in February)
Top Secret
2 28 November 1987
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NICARAGUA: Military Developments
The Sandinistas have increased counterinsurgency operations in
the north amid continued insurgent hit-and-run attacks.
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A government sweep operation that began two weeks ago to relieve
rebel pressure on towns in the north has intensified as the Sandinistas
have committed additional troops to encircle rebels.
? ?
dary area betwee I z
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Insurgents in the south`attack'ed a government microwave facility
early last week, destroying two 30-meter towers and a control
building Telephone
communications between Managua ana tne south of the country were
interrupted for at least six days as a result of the attack, according to
press reports
Comment: The Sandinistas probably hope any rebels not killed or
captured in the current operation will be forced to seek haven farther
east in one of the government's proposed cease-fire zones. Thus far,
however, government forces have failed to dislodge rebel units from
the Quilali area
The rebels have evaded government forces by dispersing into smaller
groups, reforming, and ambushing their pursuers. The insurgents-
-
.. ? ris4-an4-d, however, appear
to have moved closer to Sandinista radar-guided antiaircraft batteries
that might threaten their aerial resupply operations.
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Top Secret
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Ton Sacrat
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USSRfritUS: Propagandists Preparing for Summit
Some 100 Soviet journalists have reque`sted US visas for next
month's summit,
underscoring the regime's awareness of the importance of image
building to a successful foreign policy and to General Secretary
Gorbachev's prestige at home. They include the heads of Novosti,
TASS, and the State Television and Radio Committee, as well as
several leading newspaper editors and political commentators. The
rank of the applicants exceeds that of the Soviet media
representation at either the Geneva or the Reykjavik summit
: ?
Comment: Gorbachev's propaganda chief, Politburo member
Aleksandr Yakovlev, reportedly ordered the strengthening of Soviet
press representation at Reykjavik and apparently is aiming higher for
Washington. Several of the media officials planning to attend are
members of the party Central Committee. The presence of such
senior media figures might presage a major Soviet statement on
Afghanistan or some other key issue.
UK-USSR: Gorbachev Invited for Presummit Meeting
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Prime Minister Thatcher's invitation to General Secretary Gorbachev
for a meeting in the UK on 7 December on his way to Washington will
buttress her image as a world leader and provide her with an
opportunity to help shape the post-INF agenda. Thatcher told the
House of Commons she plans to discuss internal reforms in the USSR
and prospects for arms control in post-INF Europe; the Soviets have
not announced the issues they will raise
Comment: Thatcher is likely to use her meeting to ensure that
Gorbachev understands European interests and priorities in arms
control before he signs an INF deal in Washington. She has stated
that the West should not remove other categories of nuclear weapons
from Europe without progress in reducing conventional and chemical
weapons. Foreign Secretary Howe said this week the UK had not
absolutely ruled out putting its submarine-launched missiles on the
negotiating table, and Gorbachev may want to explore British
attitudes toward limiting the number of warheads in London's
modernization program if the US and the USSR negotiate 50-percent
cuts in strategic weapons. He may also be seeking Thatcher's views
on a prospective START agreement and support for continued US
adherence to the ABM Treaty.
ToD Secret
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ROMANIA: Popular Hatred of Ceausescu Grows
Popular hatred of Romanian President Ceausescu, which has been
building for several years, has taken on a harder edge in recent
weeks, a/recent
series of minor and unconnected protestsslirected against the
President and his even less popular wife
increased grumbling that the time has come for someone to kill the
Ceausescus. Still other Romanians reportedly amuse themselves by
speculating openly about painful ways for them to die
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Comment: The reemergence of grim humor and bitter grumbling
undoubtedly reflects intense concern about the approaching winter.
Many Romanians believe they face record food, heat, and energy
shortages as well as crumbling social services and punitive wage cuts
and layoffs. As in late 1985, when memories of the previous severe
winter produced similar fears, exaggerated rumors of further
draconian restrictions might trigger spontaneous protests such as the
recent riot in Brasov. The situation is likely to be most tense in late
winter when privately stored supplies are depleted and economic
production slows in the face of energy cutbacks and transportation
bottlenecks. Ceausescu probably faces little direct threat from
popular discontent, but the grim mood contributes to his growing
isolation within the party leadership, where a move against him would
have a greater chance of succeeding.
BANGLADESH: Ershad Declares State of Emergency
President Ersh?declared a state of emergency throughout
Bangladesh steiin a bid to head off a 72-hour general strike
scheduled to be teffter-fea3 According to press reports, the
measure was taken after opposition parties announced plans for fresh
protests in defiance of earlier orders banning demonstrations. The
overnment rrested nearly 50 people onrUtifs?1,2147rto weaken further
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the opposi ion's organizational ability.
Comment: Ershad almost certainly is under pressure from the military
to end the general strikes that have crippled the Bangladesh
economy. He is likely to order his police and paramilitary forces to do
whatever is necessary to bring order to the streets. Heavy casualties,
however, might provoke military intervention and Ershad's
deposition, even though the Army fears Ershad's removal could split it
into competing factions. Possible successors include Major Generals
Noor Uddin Khan, Abdul Wahed, or Mohammed Salam. Chief of Army
Staff Maj. Gen. Atiqur Rahman also could be called upon to head a
new government, but his advanced age and poor health would
probably make him an interim figure. No successor military
government would offer a civilian replacement more than a figurehead
position
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28 November 1987
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Ton Sperpt
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CHILE-US: New Strains in Relations
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The Chilean Ambassador to Washington has warned the US
Ambassador to Chile of potential adverse reactions in Santiago to
certain US initiatives. He charged the US was putting increasing
pressure on Chile by lifting privileges for Chilean imports under the
Generalized System of Preferences, supporting postponement of a
World Bank vote on a structural adjustment loan for Santiago, and
leaking false information about alleged Chilean cluster bomb sales to
Nicaragua. He warned that these steps might harm bilateral trade and
threaten Chile's free market economic model and implied that?in
response to US pressure?President Pinochet might reverse the
"progress" being made in opening up the political system and easing
restrictions on the moderate opposition.
Comment: Senior Chilean officials, who are customarily defensive 25X1
about foreign criticism, have shown even more sensitivity in recent
months. They probably fear a broad international effort to reject the
World Bank loan in order to undermine Pinochet's campaign for
reelection. At least some of them apparently believe that loss of GSP
privileges and of the World Bank loan will be followed by US trade
sanctions unless Pinochet shows more political flexibility. Pinochet,
however, is not likely to abandon his reelection plans or democratize
the political s stem si nifi a ly in response to foreign pressure.
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PANAMA: Anti-US Resolution
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A nonbinding resolution calling for the closure of "unauthorized" US
military facilities and restrictions on the entry of US military personnel
is the Panamanian Legislative Assembly's response to US Senate
draft legislation that would end aid to Panama. The resolution
accuses Washington of attempting to overturn the 1977 Canal
Treaties and calls on the government to refuse to negotiate an
agreement on US base rights after 1999. The US Embassy says that
members of the ruling coalition supported the resolution unanimously
and that opposition deputies abstained or walked out.
Comment: The ruling coalition, presumably with the approval of 25X1
Defense Chief Noriega, is probably trying to marshal public support
for the regime by highlighting perceived US interference in Panama's
domestic affairs. Opposition members routinely boycott any
legislative proposal by the majority. President Delvalle ignored
Assembly demands for the expulsion of the US Ambassador and the
Deputy Chief of Mission last summer and is not likely to act on most
of the new proposals. The regime, however, may limit entry of US
personnel and their freedom of movement in Panama, in hopes of
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7 28 November 1987
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PHILIPPINES: Aquino Focusing on Economic Problems
President Aquino is taking a renewed interest in the Philippine
economy, frequently asking her
advisers on how best to promote economic growth. Over the past few
weeks, she has made several tough policy speeches, promising to
reduce the government's role in the economy and to enforce labor
and anticorruption laws. According to the US Embassy, government
officials are following up on Aquino's agenda and increasing efforts to
sell government-owned and -run companies to private investors,
while the Labor Department is enforcing back-to-work orders and
removing illegal barriers from strike sites.
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Comment: During the first half of the year, the economy grew at
5 percent, well short of Manila's 6.5-percent target?largely because of
lackluster performance in exports, agriculture, and foreign investment?
and some private economists believe growth for the year will be no more
than 4 percent. Moreover, any slowdown in world trade would
undermine the export growth that Manila is counting on to sustain the
recovery. Foreign investors are reacting cautiously to Aquino's
speeches, citing bureaucratic red tape, political uncertainty, and
electricity shortages as reasons for not investing. The attacks on US
servicemen and multinational companies by the New People's Army
probably will deter additional investment by US companies, which
account for more than half of foreign investment
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28 November 1987
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In Brief
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Europe
UK Prime Minister's fainting spell Tuesday acknowledged ...
probably from exhaustion...
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.. reflects Thatcher's determination to maintain
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vigorous schedule, end speculation on health
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Foreign Minister Dizdarevic, 61, nominated vice
president of
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Yugoslavia's collective state presidency... if
one year as chief of state beginning next May...
elected, will serve
may retain
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foreign policy influence,&e-been- ettiettepefetive-withaQ
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Africa
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Massacre by Zimbabwean dissidents of 16 missionaries
Emelttefing-1we-146-eitizet5possibly for government killing of leader
... dissidents tribally related to ZAPU opposition party... may
complicate ruling party's unity talks with ZAPU
South Africa's move to ban rally, speech by by ANC leader
Mbeki reflects security concerns.., sudden decision to withdraw
government permit will probably provoke scattered violence ...
Pretoria likely to respond harshly if organizers ignore ban.
,f17NZ
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Americas
Oceania
2.63(1
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Aeroflot landed in Panama Thursday for first time in decade to
rotate fishing fleet crews... USSR reportedly negotiating
agreement for two flights per week, servicing of fishing ships..
Panama expecting to profit from deal, irk US
Speaker of Papua New Guinea parliament Akoka Doi appointed
Foreign Minister ie-cf-14 no foreign policy experience ...
strengthens Prime Minister Wingti's coalition after fractious
cabinet shuffle earlier this month
continued
Top Secret
9 28 November 1987
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Top Secret
Middle East
Asia
Tunisia onweefieseleyi announced arrest of 73 people, includin
military and police officials, in plot by fundamentalists to 25X1
assassinate government leaders... may lead to renewed
government crackdown on fundamentalists. 25X1
nav4
- Arab League delegation planning to visit USSR before US-Sovie25X1
summit to press for enforcement of UN Resolution 598 ...
probably hoping consensus at recent Arab summit will sersuade
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Moscow to support sanctions against Iran
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Cambodian Government press reports Vietnamese troop
withdrawal under way ... major reductions unlikely... Hanoi wii25X1
claim it shows growing strength of regime, progress toward 1990
deadline for withdrawal, desire for diplomatic solution. 25X1
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? South Korean opposition candidate Kim Dae Jung preparing for-
rally tomorrow in Seoul ... hoping for 3 million ... litmus test foi
Kim's popularity among pivotal Seoul electorate 25X1
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10 28 November 1987
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Ten Secret
Sino-Soviet Disputed Area
Soviet
Union
Are of
main map
In
dispute
Soviet Union
Khaba
Chinese boundary claim
/
_-/-- g / (Ostrov
(Ostrov
Tarabarovskiy)
.c.- Bol'shoy Ussunyskiy)
N
. . '."-- ?
/re
.44.e
China
Heaxiazi
Dao
Soviet boundary claim
The Soviet Union regards the disputed area
as two islands named Borshoy Ussuriskiy
and Tarabarovskiy while the Chinese regard
the area as one, named Heaxiazi Dao.
Top Secret
Soviet Union
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
1p Kilometers
io Miles
711915 (1300354) 11-87
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
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USSR-CHINA: Signs of Progress on Cardinal Issues
Moscow and Beijing seem to be narrowing their differences on
Cambodia and reportedly have made headway on their border
dispute. Although neither matter is likely to be resolved soon, the
two sides may be making progress on one or more of the key
points dividing them.
The Soviets are taking seriously Chinese concerns about Cambodia
and have tried to convince the Chinese?who have called Vietnam's
occupation the major obstacle to improved Sino-Soviet relations?
that Moscow is interested in a political solution.The-Chinese-Feeeritly
tiald-Urieler-aecretarrof-State-Arniacopiat the Soviets were
somewhat more flexible during discussionsAp Beijing last month in
that they agreed for the first time that Cambodia should emerge as a
neutral country and offered to help bring about apolitical settlement.
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping this month reiterated his willingness to
meet with General Secretary Gorbachev if Moscow persuades Hanoi
to withdraw its troops from Cambodia, according to press reports.
This time, however, Deng stipulated the withdrawal must take place
within two years?ostensibly because of his advanced age but
probably to remind the Vietnamese that Beijing is holding them to
their commitment to withdraw from Cambodia by 1990
ibsi-ehtrreseirdve-acknowledgedto &J&diplornatsihet-the3Istand on-
Cambodia has shifted and-t4;pat they are now more committed to
Prince Sihanouk as the choice to head a neutral government. The
Soviets also,are touting the Prince as the key to a settlement.retel;
-tielping-te-arratige-a-meeting
fleti -a sn-of-the-PtrOVIrr
PieptktliG-Gtf-K-aropwetiea--taiks-ttrat-Beijing-pubiitljisaynt 'al sb
s?apper4srefespRevithrrYerftetigw-rebervatignA
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continued
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Border Marathon
Although the Sino-Soviet border dispute is not one of Beijing's "three
obstacles" to improved relations with Moscow, resolution of this
longstanding problem could create a favorable environment for other
agreements. The two sides have already made progress toward
resolving the status of a contested group of islands opposite the
Soviet city of Khabarovsk,,
*4ie.:13
Soviet and Chinese experts met in Beijing last week to exchange
Itechnical information on the eastern sector of the
riverine bounClaraksser41ng-te-a-Semiet--dipienacaT They'dre to meet
again in Moscow early next year to examine the entire eastern sectio
of the border,g5ser-sliag-te.RegftelleMLeme-goulet-ettisials-14ave
euggested-that the main reason ? /the next round of
normalization talks between Rogachev ancJian until June?rather
than reconvening them in April as usual?was to leave a window for a
new round of border talks in the spring, if the working group makes
progress by then.
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Outlook
Both sides handled the recent Chinese party congress and
70th anniversary of the Soviet Bolshevik Revolution in ways that
underscored their interest in putting a gloss on their relationship. This
may encourage them to look for new steps to narrow their differences
on one or more of the key issues dividing them.
Moscow and Beijing will consider a number of domestic and foreign
policy factors?including the results of the forthcoming US-Soviet
summit?before making major moves. Although a successful summit
41-WerAftejtei9 might reduce the Soviets' immediate interest in their
own "China card" and encourage them to stand firm against Chinese
demands, it might stimulate Chinese interest in improved relations
with Moscow, if only to balance progress in Soviet-US relations.
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28 November 1987
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Pakistani Local Elections
Soviet Union
China
Iran
0
V
Admin. 1.)t)
f ?bay (
) P?
Areas/)
ALI),
Paki
?
zad
North-West
Frontier ield--6-e.?se.z.ice
3
....41saftiABAD
Iran
Baluchistan
Indian claim
1
Chinese line
of control
Punjab
a-/
Arabian Sea
NEW DELHI -k\\
India
Projected party winner
by province
Ti PakistanMuslim League (PML)
Pakistan People's Party (PPP)
No clear majority
Province-level boundary
200 Kilometers
200 Miles
Boundary representation is
not neceseargy authoritative.
711921 11-87
TOD Secret
28 November 1987
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Special Analysis
PAKISTAN:
Local Elections
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Prime Minister Junejo's Pakistan Muslim League probably will
defeat Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party in local elections 25X1
on Monday. The ground rules have been shaped to favor
incumbents, most of whom are PML members. Even a fraudulent
PML victory would not incite Benazir to launch street
demonstrations. Violence would undercut her long-term strategy
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Although the local elections are nominally nonpartisan, they shape up
as a test of strength between the two parties. Voters will elect officials
to district, township, and municipal governments. Both parties are
making major commitments to the nationwide campaigns because
the local overnments disburse federal and provincial development
funds
Party Maneuvering
Election ground rules favor incumbents, most of whom are PML
members. Under these rules, candidates will run on a nonpartisan
basis; the use of political party names or platforms is prohibited, and
political rallies are forbidden. But officeholders can exploit the
patronage?historically a powerful tool?their position gives them.
Despite these PML advantages, the PPP regards the local elections
as its best chance to regain the momentum lost after street
confrontations with the government in August 1986.
The PPP faces a stiff uphill battle in trying to defeat the PML. Prime
Minister Junejo has sought to throw the PPP off balance by
establishing a short election campaign that will limit the opposition's
ability to organize. Moreover, the party has been weakened by
defections of many of its local leaders since it fell from power in 1977.
The most recent setback occurred in a National Assembly byelection
in Punjab in September when the PPP candidate was roundly
defeated, accelerating defections to the PML.
best hope for th
rganizational
PP is that the PML may be overconfident The
blema
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*nto-compiseenc
continued
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28 November 1987
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/18: CIA-RDP88T01422R000100220001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/18: CIA-RDP88T01422R000100220001-3
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Outlook
The PML will probably win the elections because candidates
associated with it will win a majority of the seats in Punjab Province,
which includes more than half of Pakistan's population. Victories
outside Punjab would enhance the PML's success but are not crucial
to a credible showing
A PML defeat would be a severe blow to Junejo's prestige,
particularly if many PML candidates who also are members of the
provincial and national assemblies are defeated. Junejo might face a
parliamentary vote of no confidence, but no strong challenger to his
authority has emerged within the PML. Benazir would probably still
bide her time until 1990, fearing that President Zia and the Army
would rally to Junejo's side and that the public would be unwilling to
face Army bullets to force a change in government
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28 November 1987
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/18: CIA-RDP88T01422R000100220001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/18: CIA-RDP88T01422R000100220001-3
Special Analysis
USSR- Soviet Initiatives Advance
NORDIC STATES:
Keen Nordic interest in Soviet economic and environmental
proposals is providing openings for Moscow's regional security
initiatives and might ultimate! sow disagreement within NATO.
In a speech in Murmansk last month, General Secretary Gorbachev
proposed Nordic-Soviet cooperation on arctic research, resource
exploitation, environmental protection, and the opening of a northern
sea shipping route. He also revived two longstanding regional security
concepts: a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone and naval confidence-
building measures in northern waters. Gorbachev expanded previous
Soviet arms control proposals by suggesting NATO-Warsaw Pact
consultations on the reduction of naval and air activity in northern
seas.
Gorbachev tried to project an image of sensitivity to Nordic concerns
and support for broad arms control measures. Moscow hopes to
engender a regional discussion of security issues and erode support
in the area for any increase in regional NATO activity or defense
spending
Although Nordic governments are skeptical of Soviet security
proposals?Copenhagen labeled them a step backward?they take
pride in being treated as a distinct region with special concerns and
are actively pursuing Soviet economic and environmental offers. Oslo
and Moscow are planning joint projects in oil exploration, fishing, and
mining. The Finns and the Soviets have launched three joint
ventures?two more are being negotiated?and recently renewed a
longstanding barter trade agreement. All the Nordics are anxious to
negotiate pacts with Moscow on environmental protection.
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Forthcoming high-level visits will provide the Soviets opportunities to
renew offers of cooperation on nonsecurity issues, helping to foster a
favorable atmosphere for Soviet security proposals. The leader of
Denmark's opposition Social Democrats told the US Embassy he is
willing to discuss security issues with Moscow in order to obtain
economic and environmental benefits. Nordic governments have
shown interest in advance notification of NATO and Warsaw Pact
naval exercises and in exchanges of observers?issues that NATO
successfully kept out of the CSCE and that, if pursued, would create
friction within the Alliance. Moscow may also try to exploit Nordic
fears of increased NATO deployments of nuclear-capable air- and
sea-based systems in Western Europe to compensate for INF
reductions
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/18: CIA-RDP88T01422R000100220001-3
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/18: CIA-RDP88T01422R000100220001-3
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