THE CURRENT WESTERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003900100002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 27, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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COPY NO. 200
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THE? CURRENT WESTERN EUROPEAN
ATTITUDE TOWARD THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
DOCUMENT NO.
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Published 27 April 1950
Document No.
NO CHANGE
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Auth:
DC NTRAL INTELLIGENiCE AGENCY
This docummt has been
apprri fet relaas through
the IIIST3RICW,. REVIEW PROG!IMI of
tale central Intelligenee Agency.
Date ar-Suj
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: TS?s
, 4 Apr 77
77 1763
By: *1?
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the .United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50. U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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THE CURRENT WESTERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDE
TOWARD THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
SUMMARY
As the North Atlantic Council prepares to
meet one year after the NAT's signature, the
European members are concerned over the
global situation and its effect on the security
value of the NAT. Beyond their natural
second thoughts about the serious risks of
having concluded a defense pact before the
means to guard against those risks were avail-
able, the continental participants in particu-
lar are disturbed over the increase in Soviet
power and aggressiveness during the past
year and the absence of sufficient counter-
balancing increase in Western military
strength. In part this has been due to a
delayed reaction to the loss of the US atomic
; monopoly, which the Europeans had largely
relied upon to offset Soviet superiority in con-
ventional armaments. At the same time; -de-
spite the initiation of a US military aid pro-
gram, there are still lingering Western Eu-
ropean doubts as to both the firmness of the
US (and UK) commitment to defend Western
Europe and the constancy and scale of US
support.
Although these developments have had
little effect in the UK and Canada, their effect
on the continent has been to heighten the
underlying fears and hesitations still preva-
lent in Western Europe today. Despite a
large measure of economic recovery, the Euro-
peans are still acutely conscious of their ex-
posed position and present weakness and
afraid they will be "obliterated" in another
war. Although the member governments
and the great majority - of their peoples are
nonetheless still firmly behind the NAT as the
only realistic course available, they are some-
what fearful that the pace of Western con-
solidation is not great enough to provide an
adequate deterrent to the USSR.
Therefore, the principal objectives of the
European NAT members are to strengthen
and revitalize the NAT structure and to in-
crease its strength-in-being. Increasingly
aware of the need for unity in the cold war
as well as in defensive preparations, they will
urge an expansion of the treaty machinery
into the political and economic as well as mili-
tary fields. Acutely conscious of their own
economic weakness and themselves lacking
in decisiveness, they will look to the US for
leadership and substantial assistance in
achieving these goals.
? Note: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force
have concurred in this report; for a dissent by the Intelligence Organization of the
Department of State, see Enclosure A. The report contains information available to
CIA as of 22 March 1950.
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THE CURRENT,WESTERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDE
TOWARD THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
BACKGROUND
One year ago when the North Atlantic
treaty (NAT) was signed, it was favorably re-
ceived in Western Europe as an expression of
firm US commitment to defend Western Eu-
rope and of Western European determination
to seek common security against the Soviet
threat. At that time, owing largely to the
European Recovery Program, the USSR had
been placed on the defensive in Western Eu-
rope and the Western Powers had gained an
advantage in the cold war. The NAT, coming
on top of these developments, was looked upon
as further; evidence of joint Western determi-
nation to create a power base in Europe suffi-
cient to hold the USSR in check. Western
European official and public opinion focused
on the fact that agreement had been reached
and had not yet begun to examine critically
the defensive strength of the combination
thus formed.
Even at that time, however, it was gener-
ally recognized that the treaty itself was no
more than a formal declaration of intent and
that its ultimate security value could be real-
ized only through subsequent implementa-
tion, including the necessary military aid pro-
grams. It was therefore estimated that its
early impact would be primarily psychological
rather than strategic and that in the next
stage, when implementation began, the in-
itially favorable European psychological at-
titude might become less favorable. In this
later stage, it was predicted, Western Euro-
peans would realize that they had accepted
serious risks before creating the means to
guard against those risks. The limited US
aid available, and the slow growth in Western
military strength would only emphasize the
disparities between security needs and actual
defense capabilities. Under these circum-
stances, West Europeans would tend to re-
gard any US aid program as falling short of
what they considered necessary. Strains
would develop during the stage of implemen-
tation and a sense of insecurity would prob-
ably begin to reappear. The USSR would at-
tempt to take advantage of European inde-
cision by magnifying the risks that had been
taken, emphasizing disagreements Over de-
tails, and encouraging second thoughts and
reservations.
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17.41
CURRENT WESTERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDE
Today, one year after the signing of the
NAT, this estimate has been largely borne
out. With the initial psychological stimulus
of the NAT worn off, Western Europeans are
examining more critically the NAT grouping's
ability to build adequate defensive strength.
Concerned over the apparent increase in So-
viet power, they are more fearful that West-
ern countermeasures will be developed too
slowly to provide the deterrent to Soviet ag-
gression envisaged when the NAT was signed.
Tired and war-weary, the continental Western
Europeans in particular are not yet confident
that the West will win the cold war, that
armed conflict can be avoided, that present
defensive measures will prevent the physical
obliteration of Europe in such conflict, or that
the East-West struggle is worth the effort.
In short, Western Europeans are still suffer-
ing from the deep-seated psychological inde-
cision that is their heritage from two world
wars.
The persistence of this fear and indecision
in continental Western Europe is attributable
to numerous factors which in turn shed light
upon the present West European attitude to-
ward the NAT concept. In part, Western Eu-
ropean leaders are having natural second
thoughts with regard to the NAT, brought on
both by the lag between the treaty's signa-
ture and its implementation and by a grow-
ing appreciation, now that planning has be-
gun, of the huge gap between paper plans and
Western strength-in-being.
The feeling of insecurity thus aroused has
been heightened and sharpened by changes in
the world situation since April 1949, chiefly
the improved power position of the USSR and
a renewal of Soviet aggressiveness. West Eu-
ropeans are alarmed by Soviet successes in
the Far East, continued Soviet progress in
developing the Satellites, the accelerated So-
viet campaign of subversion in Western Eu-
rope, and the intensified Soviet peace offen-
sive. They have reacted particularly strongly
to the change in the East-West defense equa-
tion implicit in Soviet development of the
atomic bomb, well ahead of Western anticipa-
tions. When the NAT was signed, Western
Europeans generally believed that the US en-
joyed a commanding lead over the Soviet
Union in its exclusive possession of the A-bomb
and that this superiority not only counter-
balanced Soviet superiority in conventional
armaments but afforded ample time to restore
Western European power before the USSR
could approach atomic parity with the US.
Now, however, they realize that US atomic
and industrial potential no longer acts as a
safe deterrent to the overwhelming Soviet
strength-in-being. Although West Europeans
believe the Kremlin is not yet willing to accept
the risks of open conflict, they fear that the
marked increase in Soviet self-confidence and
the more aggressive Soviet attitude may well
manifest itself in further expansionist moves.
This fear of Soviet power and aggression has
been fanned and in some instances magnified
by the renewed Soviet campaign of propa-
ganda and subversion. By contrasting grow-
ing Soviet strength with the "developing US
economic crisis," the USSR and local Com-
munists have sought to undermine European
confidence and to breed a sense of futility and
defeatism. Through "peace offensive" propa-
ganda they have sought to portray the NAT
and MDAP as preparations for the war so
dreaded by the average European. They have
attempted to arouse latent European fears
of US "imperialism" by insinuating that Eu-
rope has become more subservient to the US.
Although these divisive efforts have had only
limited success among non-Communists, they
have contributed to the prevailing confusion
and indecision in Europe, particularly in Italy
and France, where the local Communist
parties are strong.
As a natural corollary to their uneasiness
over growing Soviet power, West Europeans
are concerned over the lack of any comparable
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6
increase in Western military strength. Pain-
fully aware of their delicate economic situ-
ation and defenselessness, the Europeans be-
lieve that primary responsibility for reinforc-
ing Western defenses must lie with the US
and to some extent the UK. Yet despite the
initiation of a US aid program, they still have
lingering doubts as to: (1) the firmness of the
US and British commitment; and (2) US will-
ingness to continue or expand the MDAP and
maintain a large and combat-ready military
establishment of its own. In the shadow of
expanding Soviet power, Western Europeans
are hypersensitive to reports of a revival of US
isolationism, Congressional economy drives,
or the imminence of a US depression which
would deprive Europe of American aid.
Despite the persistent and growing inde-
cision and hesitation, West Europeans still
believe that collective security, with full US
participation, offers the only hope of rebuild-
ing adequate defensive strength. Although
SE
a small portion of the press and intellectual
circles, which have traditionally leaned to-
ward the "neutrality" and "European third
force concepts," have become more vocal, the
continental governments and the majority of
the people realize that their own- weakness
and Soviet expansionism make any policy of
neutrality futile at this time. It must be
emphasized, however, that their support of the
NAT stems as much from recognition that it
is the only alternative as from any firm con-
fidence that it will suffice as a deterrent to
war. Thus, their still deep fear of war makes
them highly susceptible to presumed changes
in the East-West balance of power. Conse-
quently, any slackening of US support or de-
cline in US strength, or any dramatic demon-
stration of Soviet superiority, might so under-
mine their will to resist as to reduce materially
their ability to contribute effectively to the
NAT.
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SEC
CURRENT OBJECTIVES OF THE NAT GOVERNMENTS
Acutely conscious of the relative growth of
Soviet power, the Western Europeans see a
concomitant urgency in filling the power
vacuum in Western Europe by stepping up
the consolidation and rearmament of the
West. In this effort they are tending to: (1)
shift from reliance on superior US atomic po-
tential to a reliance on the NAT as a means
of building the conventional strength of the
Atlantic community; and (2) demand greater
contributions and leadership from the US.
Aware as well of the present Soviet emphasis
on revolutionary as opposed to military means,
they also seek a greater degree of Western po-
litical and economic unity in the cold war.
Thus, the chief objective of the European
representatives at the forthcoming NAT Coun-
cil meeting will be to strengthen and revital-
ize the NAT by expanding the treaty ma-
chinery, increasing the pace of rearmament,
and using the NATO more vigorously as the
collective nerve center of the Western Powers
in the cold war. In all these respects, the
Europeans will look to the US for leadership
and substantial assistance, and the conti-
nental nations in particular will seek the
maximum spelling out of US (and UK) com-
mitments, if possible to the extent of when
and what forces will be available in the event
of war.
Although anxious for a more rapid increase
in NAT military strength, the Europeans be-
lieve their present economic condition pre-
cludes any substantial rise in their own de-
fense budgets at this time. While, therefore,
favoring whatever limited rearmament is
within their capabilities, they will insist on
giving priority to economic recovery measures
as being indispensable to strong and lasting
defense. Even some countries (such as Bel-
gium) which could afford to do so have been
reluctant to make marked increases in their
military outlays. Moreover, the Europeans
tend to look upon US aid as a legitimate quid
pro quo for having to face the first onslaught
in event of war. Consequently, they will ex-
ert pressure on the US to agree to and pay
for a more rapid increase of NAT strength.
Western Europeans will also have some
difficulty reconciling their desire for strong
US leadership in strengthening and reinvigor-
ating the NATO with their concern lest US
domination of the NATO and the multiplica-
tion of US military missions lead to excessive
US interference in European affairs. The de-
sire for greater US participation, however, will
override these latent fears. Aware that the
US is the key participant and themselves war-
weary and indecisive, the Europeans have al-
ready come to rely on the US to take the initi-
ative in proposing measures to strengthen the
West in the cold war. Nevertheless, they will
remain sensitive to any signs of US dictation
and jealous of their own prerogatives.
In their desire to strengthen the NAT, West-
ern Europeans are increasingly concerned over
recent divergences in individual national poli-
cies and feel with greater urgency that the
NAT should be broadened from its original
purely military concept to a more comprehen-
sive structure for the development of common
policies in the political and economic fields
as well. Increasingly aware of the necessity
of unity in the cold war as well as in defensive
military preparations, and anxious to coun-
teract Soviet aggressiveness, several European
governments have already suggested that the
NAT structure should be expanded in this
manner, both as a symbol of Western unity
and as a focal point for the coordination of
Western policies in the cold war. Of equal
significance are French and Dutch sugges-
tions that a NATO economic agency might
later be created rather than continue the
OEEC after the end of Marshall Plan aid in
1952. In the military field, the continental
countries in particular, which are still in the
first stages of rebuilding their defense estab-
lishments, appear more willing now than at
any time in the past to undertake such meas-
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8
ures as standardization of equipment and
joint training programs. These European
proposals for greater coordination and expan-
sion of the NATO sphere of activity stem from
a desire to bring the US into an even more'
direct and constant relationship with its Eu-
ropean allies.
This growing interest in the development
of common NATO policies and institutions,
however, is matched by a continuing tendency
to think in terms more of individual than com-
mon defense. Many NAT governments, and
even more the peoples, do not yet appreciate
fully that the strength of the NAT lies in the
deterrent posed by its aggregate resources,
not in its provision of immediate and full se-
curity for every portion of each national ter-
ritory. This tendency to think in national
instead of global terms makes it almost a po-
litical necessity for each country to seek the
maximum of available resources for its own
defense, irrespective of over-all needs.
Another problem assuming greater impor-
tance in European official circles, although it
does not yet appear ripe for official discus-
sion, is that of Germany's eventual relation-
ship to Western European defense. Despite
acute fears of German resurgence, a growing
body of Western European governmental and
military opinion is becoming increasingly con-
vinced that there can be no satisfactory solu-
tion to the defense problem without some
form of German contribution. The contrast
between overwhelming Soviet strength-in-be-
ing in nearby Eastern Europe and the other-
wise slim prospects for creating an adequate
counterforce within the reasonable future is
driving many Europeans, particularly in the
Benelux countries, to this conclusion. A fur-
ther factor is the desire to push the defensive
line as far to the East as possible. Finally,
the West Germans themselves are beginning
to ask how they are to be defended if they
establish closer economic and political rela-
tions with Western Europe.
On balance, however, European reluctance
to rearm Western Germany still outweighs
the growing desire to enlist German aid in
Western defense. The fear of Germany re-
mains especially strong in France, where bitter
memories of World Wars I and II are still
fresh. Such countries as France also are fear-
ful lest the US allow Western Germany to re-
arm before they themselves have rearmed, di-
verting limited US aid.
Finally, the smaller NAT countries will con-
tinue their efforts to play a larger role in
the NAT organization. They are concerned,
for example, lest they find themselves under-
taking to carry out policies in which they do
not have a full voice. There is also some con-
cern, though mitigated at present by generous
US aid allocations, that small-country needs
will be neglected. This feeling will manifest
itself in the small-country desire for full rep-
resentation on key NATO bodies.
Although many of the above concerns may
not be openly manifest at coming NATO meet-
ings, they will remain latent in European
minds and may influence European positions
on what otherwise appear trivial issues. In
particular, if Soviet aggressiveness becomes
greater during 1950, European hesitations and
fears will tend to multiply. This uneasiness
will remain a major psychological factor af-
fecting NAT implementation until such time
as economic recovery, US aid, and the develop-
ment of common defensive strength have
fully restored Western Europe's confidence in
its ability to survive.
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,:o?Volitt T
SPECIAL COUNTRY ATTITUDES
United Kingdom.
The British Government and public remain
firmly committed to the NAT and have in
general been unshaken by the developments
of the past year. Britain favors a strength-
ening of the NAT structure and Foreign Sec-
retary Bevin has urged that it be revitalized.
The UK may hope through such an expansion
of NAT functions to promote the development
of an Atlantic community in which the US,
Britain, and continental Europe would have
roughly equal stature. The British would
thus hope to provide an alternative which,
while meeting US desires for greater Western
unity, might simultaneously relieve US pres-
sure pushing the UK further toward integra-
tion with Western Europe than it is presently
willing to go. Beyond this, the UK is anxious
by every means to draw the US into closer po-
litical and economic as well as military ties
with Western Europe as a means of fully com-
mitting the US.
There is some British feeling that the US
does not fully appreciate Britain's major con-
tributions to Western defense nor its special
problems as head of the Commonwealth and
a global power. The UK believes that because
it is the second strongest participant in the
NAT, has close ties with the US, and like the
US is ar net donor nation, it is entitled to a
special position within the treaty organiza-
tion similar to that of the US. Lacking great
confidence in the continental countries and
considering them poor security risks, the
British tend to favor the development of an
inner circle within the NATO, comprising the
US, UK, and perhaps .Canada, which Would
previously consult on policy and present a
united front. Parallel to this British attitude
is an apparent feeling that the NATO sphere
should be limited strictly to the present North
Atlantic area, and that defense problems in
other areas should be handled separately, as
a primary US-UK responsibility.
Britain, while willing and anxious to under-
take any feasible increase in defense expendi-
tures, is firm in its determination to place eco-
nomic recovery first and not over-extend itself
by making unrealistic commitments. The UK
believes that not only is it thus making its
maximum contribution but that recovery will
in the long run contribute more to the
strength of the NAT nations. At the same
time the British are dissatisfied with the con-
tributions of some other NAT members and
feel that mutual defense expenditures might
well be geared to roughly comparable per-
centages of national income.
While realizing that they must soon alter
their negative position on firm military com-
mitments to the continent, the British are
stalling because of their own general weak-
ness, their far-flung non-European respon-
sibilities, and their reluctance to face another
Dunkerque. However, as Western rearma-
ment and Britain's own military strength de-
velop, the British themselves are coming to
realize the necessity of some such boost to
continental morale.
France.
The French Government is wholly commit-
ted to the NAT, but the bulk of French public
opinion, while accepting the pact, remains
unenthusiastic. This general lack of enthusi-
asm for the NAT and MDAP reportedly springs
from the conviction that French territorial
integrity is not insured and that in event of
war France would be crushed whatever the
outcome. The French fear of war is sympto-
matic of the general European pessimism
noted above, and will tend to decline only as
Western armed and economic strength re-
vives. The substantial and aggressive Com-
munist minority in France seeks to capitalize
on these fears.
The current French official attitude toward
the NAT is a mixture of general satisfaction
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that France's key role has been recognized
through French inclusion in the Standing
Group and the promise of the bulk of MDAP
aid, with a continuing concern that France is
still a junior partner in a US-UK "show." De-
spite such encouragement as the US promise
of newer types of equipment instead of ob-
solescent materiel, the French still feel that
insufficient attention is paid to their pivotal
position in Western European defense ar-
rangements and their status as a world power.
They are jealous, for example, that they are
not advised of the latest US and UK military
developments, and urge that they be taken
fully into US-UK confidence. This exagger-
ated French pride will be a constant factor to
contend with in the NATO.
In addition, the French still have lingering
doubts about the constancy of the US-UK
commitment for initial land defense of West-
ern Europe, a feeling which will not be fully
dispelled by anything short of the firmest US-
UK commitments and possibly the physical
presence of stronger US and British forces on
the continent. This fear is reinforced by the
suspicion prevalent on the continent that the
US and UK do not believe any effective defense
of the continent is yet feasible.
Strong French misgivings about long-term
US-UK intentions with regard to Western Ger-
many's role in European defense are also prev-
alent, although some military opinion recog-
nizes that German participation may be es-
sential, particularly if defense lines are to be
pushed toward the Elbe. This attitude may
soften as growing French confidence in collec-
tive security arrangements offsets French
fears, and as France's own military and eco-
nomic recovery develops.
There is some desire on the part of the
French to extend the NAT to include all of
their North African possessions and now
probably Indocliina as well. They argue
logically that defense against the USSR is a
global problem and that the NATO should
therefore be global in its scope. By such
means they probably hope to secure US-UK
support in maintaining the somewhat shaky
French Union.
ET
Italy.
Despite the present Italian Government's
complete Western orientation, an attitude of
semi-defeatism?tending toward an incipient
neutrality?tends to permeate the public mind.
The masses are fearful of war and have no
confidence that Italy can be defended against
the USSR, especially under the peace treaty
limitations. The result has been widespread
apathy, which though present since the end
of the war, is tending to crystallize into neu-
trality sentiment. The existence of a strong
Communist and pro-Communist minority
which plays upon these fears obstructs the de-
velopment of a strong will to resist.
The Italian Government and military are
afraid that Italy is considered a peripheral
area, expendable in terms of over-all Western
strategy. Italians are aware that the other
Western Europeans were dubious over their
entry into the NAT and that US insistence
was primarily responsible for Italy's inclusion.
This persistent feeling of not being wanted
may strengthen latent neutrality and defeat-
ist sentiment.
Conscious of its over-all military weakness,
Italy will eagerly participate in any mutual
defense measures. At the same time the
Italians are somewhat disturbed at their rele-
gation to secondary status in the NAT struc-
ture, and will seek a more equal role. They
also hope that eventually the major Western
Powers will support their desire to lift the
peace treaty restrictions on their military es-
tablishment.
Belgium.
Notwithstanding the Belgian Government's
strong support of the NAT, it tends to take
somewhat of a "business as usual" attitude
and to be reluctant to undertake its full share
of defense responsibilities. As a result the gov-
ernment will probably do no more than satisfy
the minimum financial demands arising out
of mutual planning. Belgium, however, is a
strong exponent of the concept of Western
unity through the development of suprana-
tional machinery and will favor any strength-
ening of the NAT. There is also a growing
though reluctant Belgian feeling that Ger-
e
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osiSopiWAIT 11
man participation with adequate safeguards
is essential to Western European defense.
Netherlands.
Strong Dutch official support of the NAT
is also tempered by budgetary considerations.
Metropolitan Dutch defense expenditures
have been limited by earlier needs in Indonesia
and the prior demands of Dutch recovery.
The Dutch will probably be reluctant to ex-
pand their defense budgets beyond the mini-
mum envisaged in combined planning. How-
ever, military and official levels in general
are enthusiastic over NAT and the US aid pro-
gram as offering the only real prospect for
security. They also feel increasingly that
only with some form of German participation
can Western Europe hope to meet successfully
any Soviet aggression. Dutch interest in this
connection stems largely from the fact that
extension of ' defense lines further into Ger-
many would help protect the whole Dutch ter-
ritory. ?
Portugal.
Since Portugal firmly believes in the prin-
ciple of collective security, Portuguese ad-
herence to the NAT was an acceptance of the
"realities of the situation" and a natural out-
growth of Portugal's alliance with the UK and
existing ties with the US. The government
feels little present need for expansion of its
forces and evidently regards the potential
use of the Azores as an adequate contribution
to the common defense. Although not par-
ticipating actively in most NAT activities, the
Portuguese will be jealous of their prerogatives
and tend to assert their rights. Portugal be-
lieves that Spain must eventually be included
in any realistic defense arrangements and will
raise this question again, without pressing it
too vigorously.
Denmark.
Although the Danish Government and
people still consider sound their adherence to
the NAT, Denmark remains gripped by a sense
of futility in the face of the East-West struggle
and because of its proximity to Soviet-held
areas tends to be fearful of the pact's effect
on the USSR. Denmark abandoned Its long
standing neutrality. policy reluctantly and
joined the NAT largely because of its inability
to, promote a neutral Scandinavian defense
bloc. While Danish hesitations and second
thoughts will tend to diminish with the de-
velopment of Western strength, the Danes will
adopt a cautious attitude in NAT councils to-
ward any measures which might tend to af-
front the USSR.
Norway.
The Norwegians appear to have taken to
heart the lessons of World War II, and rely
upon the combined military strength of the
NAT countries to counteract the threat posed
by the USSR. Despite the continuance of
some neutrality sentiment, Norway is ready
to cooperate fully in mutual defen6 measures
and favors a strengthening of the NAT.
In fact Norwegian officials are disappointed
over inadequate utilization of the NAT ma-
chinery and point out that although the NAT
Council already provides a forum for discuss-
ing the common political objectives of member
countries, proper advantage has not been
taken of this body. Behind this attitude is
some concern that Norway's vigorous opinions
will not be taken sufficiently into considera-
tion on issues involving the East-West
struggle.
?0?I'r?wrr
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003900100002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/22 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003900100002-6
.01.1,,peet T
ENCLOSURE A
DISSENT BY THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The Intelligence Organization of the De-
partment of State agrees with the major con-
clusions of ORE 22-50. We disagree, how-
ever, with certain statements relating to Italy,
Portugal and Denmark, because we feel that
they are not supported by available evidence
and convey an incorrect impression.
1. With. respect to Denmark and Italy we
agree that public sentiment reflects, respec-
tively, sentiments of "futility" and "semi-de-
featism." In Italy a majority of the people as
well as the government are western oriented
but this outlook is in turn clearly modified by
"an attitude of semi-defeatism tending toward
incipient neutrality" which definitely exists.
We do not agree, however, that this attitude is
so extensive as to "permeate the public mind."
Similarly, with respect to Denmark, large seg-
ments of the Danish public do reflect a dis-
cernible "sense of futility" in the face of the
East-West struggle. However, the statement
that "Denmark is gripped by a sense of futil-
ity" is not warranted and incorrectly conveys
the impression that the entire nation is in a
state of paralysis.
2. With reference to Portugal we believe
that, in contrast to the statements made, the
Portuguese Government is definitely inter-
ested in strengthening its defense forces.
Judging from recent experience, moreover,
rather than considering the air base facilities
in the Azores "as an adequate contribution"
to the NAT, the Portuguese intend to tie the
use of these facilities for common defense pur-
poses to the development within the NAT of
defense plans satisfactory to Portugal. With
reference to Spain, moreover, Portugal has
continually insisted that this country must
eventually be included in any defense arrange-
ments for Western Europe, and can be ex-
pected to press this position with increasing
vigor as the opposition to such action dimin-
ishes among the NAT members.
13
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GPO?State Serv.-50-50.6
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