CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002800040002-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 23, 1946
• Content Type: REPORT

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ORE 2
COPY NO
23 July 1946
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN PROPAGANDA BROADcASTS ?
- 1. Enclosed is an analysis of Soviet foreign propaganda broadcasts 'pre-
pared by the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service: The 'salient points of
the "Enclosiire are. summarized below..
2. A large proportion of all Soviet propaganda broadcasting 'is devoted
to extolling the success of the Soviet system in the U.S..S.R.' The 'Chief ad-
ditional note in broadcasts directed toward countries 'outside the Soviet -
sphere is condemnation of specific "reactionary" activities or. utterances.
Otherwise little comment is made on matters of local interest; except in the
case of the following countries evidently under special propaganda .pressure:'
a. Spain: ' forceful propaganda almost exclusively concerned, with the
"anti-Franco struggle" both within and outside of Spain.
, b. Austria: frequent criticism of, the::. Austrian :government and ,
the U:S. and British zone military .governments, with particular refer-
ence: to the lenient treatment of Nazis, war :crimihalS, and Fascist
refugees.
c. Greece: intense and sustained propaganda -against.. the present
-regime and in support of the E.A.M.
d.: 'Turkey:. ? . the :".absence ? of -freedom" in.:that7 country-is streiSed;
,With particular reference to the forthcoming 'elections (imputing to the ,
Turkish .Government in -advance an Unrepresentative character)',
_
e.- Iran . and the Arab states:. the powerful Tabriz ? radio 'has:
con-
ducted an . intensive propaganda .against, the, Iranian :Government. '.7,,IThe' -
Soviet broadcasts stress denunciations of British and Turkish :policy,
past and?present.'
?
. China: broadcasts about China support the'. Conununlits: -and de-
nounce the National Government as the -Pawn of -"foreign, reactionary
.groups" bent on preventing the attainment of real unity." U.S. .policy
in China is vigorously condemned. , ?
Korea: U.S. attempts to dominate the countrythrough its un? 1-'
dation under a "reactionary" provisionalA9vernment are Contrasted
h the benevolence of the Red Army, to which , alone Korea' ot,es
eration While the Soviet Zone enjoys unity and. efficiency, ;
dhe has to endure;party politics.
niment on theisituation-in- Germany is a functiorr,o ,:ithetBerlin..rathe
hano,fthe Mos COW.,-radi di, and as.,,notco.Vere
. ..?..
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h- Japan: The U.S.S.R. champions the cause of the Japanese Com-
munist Party, and complains that the U.S. is fostering the American,
but not the Soviet, type of democracy. Its propaganda implies obliquely
that, in seeking to accomplish the purposes of the occupation with a
minimum of disruption and the U.S. is retaining in power "re-
actionaries" whom it regards as potential allies.
i., Great Britain and the United States share scathing attacks on -
"zealous warmongers" who seek to prevent "further development of the co-
operation among democracies that arose (during) the war against Fascist
aggression." Britain .is criticized more severely than the U.S. with re-
:gard to. occupation policies, treaty drafting,., and reparations questions..
In .addition British policies with respect to Spain,: Greece, the Middle
East, and Colonial issues are heavily attacked.
- ?
Reactionary developments in the U.S., such as:,the Ku Klux Klan, are
streSSed, as are strikes, unemployment, and the disadvantages- of living
-in a capitalist economy.
3. Soviet, foreign p6licy is presented as consistently.directed-toward_
the establishment of peace., democracy, international cooperation, and uni-
vp,-gtecurity. All 'resistance to Soviet policy istikat of "reactionaries"
seeking to -defeat these purposes. , _
In contrast, the policy, of the United States is to dominate the world by
means' of the -atomic bomb. In the United Nations the attitude of-the United
? States ii a domineering denial of the equality of States, And particularly of
the Soviet Union's well earned right to equal leadership in world affairs.
In occupied areas the United States supports "re'actionary" elements; its in-
,
terest In overseas bases is "imperialistic."
' -Soviet propaganda does not admit the possibility of a conflict of in-
terest between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. The trouble is that, under "reac-
tionary" influences, the U.S. Government has departed from the policies of
President Roosevelt. The American people, however, are alarmed by and op-
posed to this development..
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ENCLOSURE 1% v
' 'ANALYSIS OF SOVIET.FOREIGN PROPAGANDA BROAIKASTS
Prepared by the Foreign Broadcast IntelligenOe.ServIce
22 July l946
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
' The SOviet Government uses ,foreign-language broadcasting as an instrument
for,implertlenting and promoting Soviet foreign policy. Its comprehensive
foreign language service, embracing most areas of the World, it clearly .
guided by a central propaganda-directive which changes:in accordance with' the
changing reqUirements'of,$oviet policy abroad.
The current schedule of Soviet foreign language broadcasting, introduced
in April 1946, contains 88 transmissions in 31 languages, for which 37
different, wavelengths- are used, the total daily broadcasting time being 42
hours, 15 minutes. This reriresents a considerable drop from the wartime
peak, in March 1944, when Soviet programs abroad consumed 65 hours daily.
A breakdown of the current schedules reveals the following allocation
of broadcasting time:
345 minutes: English.(of whiCh 100 minutes are eiclusively for.,
North America and 55 minutes are taken up by a joint
program for, North America and Britain)
German (75 minutes of which are directed to Austrian
listeners)
Spanish (i50 minutes for SouthAmeriCa)
Chinese, French, Polish
'Bulgarian
Italian, Turkish
Finnish, Rumanian.
Arabic, Japanese,_Persian, Swedish
Greek"
Czech, Danish, Dutch, ,Hungarian, -Norwegian, Serbo-Croat,
Slovak, Slovene .
-Albanian, Bengali,- Hindustani, Indonesian Malay, Korean, '
Portuguese (for Brazil only)
Yiddish
-120.
-90:
66
(50.
45 :"
..e
?
. . . e .
-. .
..,..... .
:In-Addition,.it should be pointed Out that-a:separate apd.extefisive ?
., .
._ , _
:.telegraphic service conducted by the Tass agency .transmits material In -
English and French (-both helltchreiber and morpe).forniversaf.consumption
, . _ ..
1:Lnd'thriqqh_241ours.with-slight.intervalt. The jlendy?also.transmits.. -
anothertEnAlish:service of approximately 18 hoUrseielisively,for,NOrth
.-. AileriClia German'hellschreiber service from.-1000tO02.01afa:Sinish morse',-
4-erVipe-:,!Toi Latin'America,:ind-tWO-French morse:tra4pMitsionSfor'the Near,
-tigtNald'Aorth'Africa-
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_?Alor'"
- 4 , . .
sOVIET RADIO ATTITUDES TOWARD SIGNIFICANT GEOGRAPHIC AREAS' '
?
? ? ?
, .
Turning to the structure and content of Moscow's foreign broadcastg,
a rough division Can also be made between those directed to countries which
may be. termed political pressure points and those which have no immediate
gignifieance in the Soviet scheme. In broadcasts to both groups a large
amount Of time is devoted to the success of the Soviet system in the USSR.
In addition, the chief note in broadcasts directed to countries outside the:.
Soviet sphere of influence is what the"Moscow radio itself Calls "vigilance."
This in effect Means that no activity or utterance, even of-minor, interest,
which"could.be interpreted as "reactionary" or anti-Soviet is allowed to:
pass without notice, and more-frequently, without an elaborate_reply.. At
the same time; it ?i's constantly emphasized that Soviet pplicy.is funda-
mentally-based-upon peace and security and rigidly upholds the principles
of UN.) ;
:to those countries which lie.Within.the?Soviet sphere of influence,
andWhoge-radio itations,.'evenif.not Under direct control,. may be relied
upon to reflect the Soviet viewpoint,. Moscow radio does not devote much .
specific propaganda.. This applies in varyingdegreestd Poland, Rumania,
Bulgaria, -Yugoslavia, Jklbania and Hungary and, also,it-may,be noted to...
?Czechoslovakia and Finland, although broadcasting from the.lattereountrieg,
particularly Czechoslovakia, a definitely.indePendent.note. compared
_ . .
with the :others. ' .- ?
?
?
'.8toadCasts:for 'these counries.folloW variations:of-a. general 'pattern,
comprising news of.Soviet-home gffairs, intetnatiOnal?news and articles
from?theSoViet.Press or commentaries also broadcast in other languages,
and;:Of,PoUrte,:=Music. .liittlenews*.or comment is given-ofepecifip.intetest.
c).:th...',COuntrycOncerned, whose_home.affairs are-only'occaskonaIlY discussed '
? in ArlpieS''quoted'frOm:-"New Times"and?other Soviet papers, written fot.a?..
wider :aUdienee...The:apParen.trtindividual.talk:by OycharoV,Ur Balkan
?
pOiMent.gtOr!H addressed to Ountries.in-the Balkan, groUP,- is usually a
rewtiten:werSion'Of some.commeniarylpreyiOusly broadcastin_pther languages
\.?
perhaps slightly -altered to enphasiie.thelSlavic angle.;--IA/niay;also be
,nOtedgS''anexampIeof the:BOviet.method, thatcommentariegdi?cusSingan
. _ .
,
often strongly criticizing Hungarian internal' affairs have not heard
in broadcasts for Hungry2iiiiCethe reorganization of the Government and
the subsequent visit OfItheTrethier.and hiS delegation-to MosPow.
, . ? , : .
roadcasts,for Greece and the Middle. 'East ?
.:Transmissions to Greece present a sharply contrasting picture As?entially
yconditioned by that country'STOlitical.situatiOn.. As in-the'CaSe-Pf Turkey ,
-
-, and Spain, the present political regime is openly attacked and the propaganda
,
. -
offensive is intense and sustained Extensive use .ig:,:madePf,:jiiewP of Greek
home interestsuch as statementS-bfy,the E A M delegation during its visit
WMOg69?nd.:Popi-oubextract.S.:fromthe,:Gteek..Lef007teggn-,addi_t,ipn
to generally dist'ribUted.artraes:-and.,-comilentnriesiChhen2POnCerninC,
the',::dtk?ittiationchave:OnpePagion been-broadcasteatlietandat greaterlength than in other :,
,
languages,-talks exclusively directecrfito,;.a Greek9%audience,
are frequently grireri.
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?
A similar tendency is to be found in comment for Turkey. and Iran which
sore often than not is mainly directed against "reactionary" and anti-Soviet
influences in thosecountries. At the same time, the Azerbaijan National
Radio, with its powerful transmit-ter at Tabriz - a parting "gift?." it was
stated, of the Red Armir - has been broadcasting intensive propaganda -in
Turkish Azerbaijani against , the Iranian Governtnent, and this station
also broadcasts in Persian, Kurdish, Russian, Arabic and French, "to enlighten
world opinion on our national aspirations and achievements."
As in the ease of Greece, transmissions in Turkish tend -to pay great
attention to internal politica and to stress the "abenceofifr?om"in
Turkey, a familiar theme which Moscow's Turkish commentator ? Erdem has
repeatedly embroidered in connection ?with the elections. For Arab and
Iranian listeners, on the other hand, Turkish policy "past and present ii
strongly attacked, and in Middle Eastern transmissions for . all destinations,
anti-British propaganda is marked and listeners are intermittently warned
against the activities of Nun-El-Said, of the alleged, implications of 'the
Anglo-Transjordan Treaty and the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, and of Britian
policy generally.
Broadcasts for Germany and Austria:
Although similar in treatment to broadcasts for the ,Soviet sphere of
influence, the Moscow radio in German; provides certain indiliidual. aspects
which merit a More detailed .examination. With the emergence of the, Berlin ?
radio and ,its satellites inside the Soviet zone as the mouthpiece ofSoviet,
policy in Germany, German broadcasts from Moscow have :lost most of the personal
character they displayed during the war, when broadcasts under ?the aegis, of
the "Free Germany Committee" proved a.: most effective propaganda medluth.
Moreover, the amount OT time allotted to broadcasts for .,Germany has been:
gradually reduced since the-end of the war, A large -proportion of these.:
transmissions, as in .the case of :other languages,, is now devoted to publicizin
all aspects: of Soviet ,life and progress, and ,to the Soviet : line on interna-
tional affairs through :the usual medium of long, extracts from the Soviet
press, commentaries and carefully selected and 'arranged news A.tema,
?
? ,Relativeliittle ,time ia- given to German domestic affaira':
I Strictly German features are limited largely to-'?local?reportage" on
- .
economic," political and cultural progress in the Soviet zone,- attributed_
"our ,correspondent" and. duplicating to a considerable extent
? the much-
wider service of the Berlin radio.' Such commentaries, as are '..addressed :
dii-eotly--to the German people are delivered anonymously_ and follow the :
propaganda line of the Berlin radio, although with a more.latereotyPed and
monotonous -presentation.
Broadcasts for i?Austria contain very few reports originating from the;
Soviet.- or other Zones,- apart' from _extracts ' froM, the ;pre.s.;.'t..,main..lythet:,',',,s;:.
2:ComniUnial4aperS.'- These broadcasts; differ in . tone from
,whichiano-doubt under --.Soviet censorship- but no t.,apparentr3r:under direct
Soviet or,Communist.contrb).-. 2.7 The subjects treated in the anonymbliSi:donimen
-..;_tarie,siaddres sect to .?Austrian,;liatenera and thei,proPagandatrendatax*in.
the main those ventilated by the Austrian ComniunisV:Parti" but with some
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change of emphasis. They are frequently critical of Austrian policy, a ?
most frequent topic being the lenient treatment accorded to Nazis, war ?
criminals . and .Fascist refugees by the 'Austrian authorities and the American
and British military governments.
? Broadcasts fer Scandinavia and Western Europe.
The Content of these broadcasts for all areas excluding Spain. conforms
with the general policy .of 'presenting. the general Soviet. picture- except ?
when, in accordance -with the guiding principle of Soviet "vigilance"
referred to above, internal .events call for fuller comment. Thus, individual
attention is 'paid :to "reactionary" activities? in .Swedeni . Norway, Finland -
and Denmark in commentaries for these countries, butonly,?cin occasion
An attempt at less stereotyped presentation is; evinded by Moscow's
broadcasts to France. Among. the 'broadcasts'. which Seek for a local flavor
are the -"Listeners' -Mailbag" sponsored by the 'France7USSR;AsSociation and
an. objective .review of 7the Soviet press presented in, the French -manner
Such .news ' items as the:arrival of a Soviet wheat ship in Marseilles are
given prominence and individual-treatment,
,other broadcasts for Western Eur OP e these in Italian . reveal _little;
of individual interest.: Dutch broadcasts, . too, conform to the -general ?
pattern, and -there appear ' to . be no broadcasts _ in 'Flemish. or specifically
? directed to; Belgium. '
is ?
- SPaniSh .broadcasts. from Moscow, on the other hand,: are notable far
their ,commentaries of ?purely ?Spanish appeal Aracil who; delivers. them,
is ' reputed to be a well-known Spanish literary figure I :-and his Torceftl?.
propaganda: is almest exclusively concerned with ther,antt7Frdnce struggle?
in and outside Spain. - His commentaries are . deinetined(:1:ncluded._in:the'SRanidh-
tervide for Latin America, which, however, more eftentireSd?east :talks of '
wider interest' and in line :%.7i-th the. general -Sovieteillit-; .
?? ? ?
Bioadastd. for. the United' States' and Great. Britaini
?
? ,.
, The large allocation of .time to Moscow's programs in Englidh_ to'
: United- States and .Great Britain is also reflected, intheindividual attention
?, ? . ?
to their composition ' and predentation. -Certain minOr:diYergenei es::between
the treatment of the Serviced ' for the United Stated- and Britain are to be
found both in ?the use of announcers ?with an American accent for the former
.
?? . ? ?
and in:'0e.variatien. of propaganda twists aCcOrding to 7;;-the. destination of
: the :cemmentary. ' - ? _,. ? _?
? ..
?
In general, the Soviet -radio is. ?more criticalthan aPproving its
, ,
references tc'D the United Stated. References to,-th9nited Kingdom, while
;.- fewer l- flanull.lber, are even. more critical Scathing itt"acks are directed
against "those :British and AmeriCan-reactionaried who are seekinte:?preven
? 'sthe further developmentof the cooperation ajiiinW.Aiii134.,gis'.ih;:"*i.4.*
thelaWer!'.the!'l,iar: against Fascist aggression " Opposed to the "zealous
warMengeare the bulk, of: the people of the ?I17..6,04if,9v.i.ng nations" who
'
are iii;ine'fwith the pe4le-bf:thse Soviet Union in their desire to preserve
peace. (i6i.;:wteli,the'United Stated that if American foreign policy is
moving he direction of an Anglo-American milttary bloc, this polic
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?Jdoler IX L. I
does not have the support of American and other citizens.
The largest number of.news reports dealing with domestic events-in'
the United States are devoted to economic affairs. There are frequent
references to items in the American press giving statistics .= strikes and
unemployment, and to the disadvantages of living in-a Capitalist economy.
Direct and detailed comment is Made on reactionary developMents in the -
United States and the persons and organizations opposing manifestations such
as the Ku KluxKlan are applauded.
While Soviet criticisms of American and British foreign. policy and
attitudes toward the United Nations 'are directed concomitantly against the
United States and Britain, Britain is singled out for heavier attacks on -
such' matters as:occupationpolicies 'in Germany and'attitudes toward treaty
. and reparation questions Heavy Criticism is also directed at the British
attitUde_toWard.Spain during. and after theCivil War, colonial policy,
activities in the Middle East and -interest in the Greek elections.: .
,Broadcasts for Japan
For months after VJ-Day, Moscow's broadcasts to the Japanese: people
eschewed Comment on events in Japan or even the Far East.. Such commentaries ,
as were given were devoted to i glorification of life in the,Saviet-Union,
_ .
while news reportswere limited to Straight accounts of international events-,
drawn:moitly from Europe.
- .
In April, coincidental with the Japanese. elections and. the outspoken.
'criticisms of MacArthur's occupation policies voiCe4;by the Soviet delegation-.,
to:the:Allied Council for Japan, Moscow's transmissions assumed'anewtone
and pOint. From that time to the present, the tWOdally.broadcasts in
_
Japanese and one in English,directedt& Japan have delved thbroughfy:into:-
Japanese.domestic affairs agd,their;relationshiP to occupation policy, with
the conclusionthat Japan. IS being allowed to PursUea:course inimical to
'-the bestinierestS:of the Japanese.people and :the. world:-
In'substance, Moscow would give the Japanese' people the impression
that United ,States policy in Japan is based'on the following Objectives:
(1) to keep the Japanese tractable without provoking too much ill-feeling;
(2) to punish the most notorious war criminals without impairing the. -
Japanese political and economic structure to the point where occupation
problems Would become overwhelmingly burdensome; (a) to implement the:
terms of the Potsdam Declaration in word but not necessarily in spirit;'
(4) to, develop in Japan the United States version_cf..democracy and at the
same time to keepi the -Soviet system from gaining ascendancy; (5)- to convince
the Japanese public that in the future, Japan and theUnited States,shOuld
have close ties; (6) to "reduce considerably the poWer ot the Zaibatrsu-with-
out basically altering Japan's Capitalist system Implied but:only very
_obliquely is the view that the United States seeks in many' respe?ts-to keep3:
militaristic clique intact as the nucleus of a Japan;yhickonsday-:
mightkbe militarily allied with the United States General MacArthUr.'aS
?
an Individual is not the object of.atiacki
,
?
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The burden of Moscow's message is that the Japanese reactionaries are
at the helm, steering the.Country according to the pre-mat compass,. with ,
utter disregard forthenrgent needs of the people. Although it does not
.
bulk large in point of volume, the link is made between Japanese reaction
.and the Occupation policy on all key issues, such as the Preservation of
the Emperor system, the failure to dissolve the great industrial and trade
combines, the withholding of full freedom of speech and agitation on the
part of the progressive patties and groups, and the unrepresentative
pesults, of the Diet elections attendant upon the premature ballot. In
more direct fashion than in most of its other overseas beams, Moscow
exhibits partisanship for the Japan Communist, Party-which is depicted as
growing,.despite formidable obstacles.
, ?
Broadcasts about China ,
No broadcasts from the USSR to China are at present intercepted 'by
the Poreign Broadcast Intelligence Service. .The only *material aVailable,.
therefore, is comment abOnt China in broadcasts. to other- areas.
?
,
? The Moscow radio line on China represents:a clear-cut attempt to ?
. discredit the National .Government, on the one hand,' and to solidify the .
- .
poSitinn:-ofthe.Chinese Communists, Ontheother. Chiang*Kai-shekre:
_government. is, depinted'asthtYpaWn of "foreign-reactionary-groups," which
- seek-to"hlockthe attainment of real unity. - . . .
-
..., . . . -
' - , . .? ? . ,
. ,Under vigorous attack is the American policy in China.- United States
?-edonoMlC And military aid to the tiational:doverntent_ia labelled as un-
warranted interference in China's domestio.affairsIt is noted that '
'-althoughj2ed:Army troops have evacuated ChineSe'soilj'..in-deference to the
jeople's,.will,the::United:States has failed to ocelipation.
.fores-.:;..j;ibeal-use is made of the American -press. foi.;.qUotatimnsn-
suplit:91the thesis that-right-mindedspeoPle not only in the United
-
'States but in China' are Opposed to the American'pOlinhich is aimed at.
.tlie Ultimate dominance of Chiang Kac-shek's:r'egime)diverall,cif.China
inclnding the Northeastern' ProvinceS.- : H: . , _.?,:
? ? ?
B'r?dcasts' to' Korea'
,
- iimaboWs broadcasts o and about Korea-eatabliahthe antithetical ?
Ainrposes;ofAmptican and. Soviet poliCy. in*that.eountiThe-United:States
.policy,--as,:Moscnweees-it, is based on -these objectivesl-
'1r,4'.gstablish "dominant rights" in Korea.
'.4t0
Set.up a-provisional government including:.thteactionaries".
1.3nt'eicruding those Koreans with'a*cOm'iini.Stfinge.
reaki.down the occupation barriers, do away ith thediViSinn-
tones:and:.nnify the cpuntry,economicaIlyasapmary-ptep..:1.tOwar
olitical unification
!!"
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:4) Criticize Soviet policy in northern-Korea and combat Soviet .
criticism' of the United States policy in-southern'Korea. ?
By contrast, Moscow disseminates the following.view of its own policy
in Korea:. '
1) .The Koreans have nothing to fear from the Red Army, which. is?
"peculiarly different" .from Other armies. .The Red Army, no matter
in what.country its troops are stationed, ,feels that the people
whose:country it occupies are "quite capable' of setting up .
their "political life, not for the secondary, benefit of
reactionaries, but'for the primary benefit "of democratic elements..
The Red Army is a "liberator"? and-a preSerVer,of the interests of
Mankind.
21 The Koreans owe Russia' an everlasting debt :of gratitude -for liber-;.,
-ating.them from Japanese oppression.' That'is,-the atom bOmb-did
not crush Japanese militarists, -who-would:havenontinued to fight
in Korea-and'elsewhere on the Asiatic Continent it was. the Red
Army 'that proved, the, -deciding 'factor. ./
;17.41
'3) ''Northern Korea.is_solidly united:and efficiently administered,,
-while Southern KOrea,has 'no United front", ? as. a'"fight_is:going'
'on. between.politICalpartles. (Whenever possible, such state;-
,.menta are credited to.Koreans.l.
Broadcatts about Other:AreaS'of the.Par East -
The Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service does not intercept Moscow
broadcasts to the areas discussed_ in this section, but asindicated in? "
other.broadcasts the Sovietsposition- seems to 'be:, ' . -
...,poilt4i Sakalin and the Kurile.s.:, -11: To.emphasitSthit..southern Karafuto
(Sakhalinand.the ChiSchime:AKuriles1-:grouli belt!nge4:5togussia: in the .761..d.--:
. . : ?? ..
days", that the.:Red.ArMY':'"liberated" these islands,frOplapaneSeoppreaeirOn
and' theSoviet'Union inthe.-.71egai.owner"- 2)- To convince the native
.populationfthat:itls:receiVingeqUal rights and iii.i7i1:_ig*s.wit.h-th 15,1-0,:
"citizenean&that:the-worki Of 'rehabilitation analionifructiOn:i06:ing-
,pughed:forward:_speedil4.- .3-) To assure "Japanpae.laborer residents" that ?
they.WillnOtbe:punished for"trimes.:committed:by Japanese. imperialists'"
. .
Indonesia : Moscow points Out that the Netherianda:Government:proposal
. :
:for recognition ofthe'Ipdoneslan-RepubiIcan.:Go*erilmwould involveonly
'"insubstantial cOncessionS,!! anci,Would mean- ihe IeOiating.of yarioU-parts
_ . ?? ? .. , .. .. ? ? ? ?
., .. .? ? _ ... ? ?
of Indonesia, thus dooming.the-republic to "politlOalaii4.-ecOnomi6 weakness-:'!!
? ,, .,
?
SUMMARY OF FOREIGN PbLICY:-.AS.:REFLEOTED IN USSR BROADCASTS
?
.. p_iMoicow:dejakets,,S6V.i:e-L,T9ieigni:RolicY:::. :..1.....sp.,9nsidtent,,, 47.nt,gi:0;0"?
,..
,arge:;;;:eriki*L.:bespt by the pul?ling7,-;61','reactitinarir:-:;p1:0646.,,::..,;.ple general line
. '`..,,ifia..`,'4dil"):ii'Vei.?,policy'!iii4s af,:i..iY6g:le, cooperation..international i.- and .1!1e6
:,.:--. . .-.
4eplocrAcyr whIle:arlHpolicistich,cari:_be,1:hterpre.4Aappop.64 pa.;A9y;e.,.?
-4aths, e,ven in.fthe,giigh-:tecfe'ta:fiP ilr,:-ldz.%i/6',3t6re.I'a'clf6'rdei"f .'.poif-tS:CiO;1
-.-1-:,::',";..7.',-,,g,Pnt; f -- ,*,, *::: , :, ; ?,. ?',.: .;, , ,; ,., : , , ., . ? . , ?:' ., . ,
A ,
-%"an -!'eabrioin0 ,1,4y6ry,:-Or%elie,n,W.iyai.:' '
,?4
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Broadcasts maintain that the Soviet policy is aimed at eradica ing -
fascism and strengthening democracy, and at working for a firm and lasting
peace through international cooperation. Soviet behavior both within the
United Nations and in her bilateral relations, is described by the Soviet
radio as bearing, out this description of general foreign policy. No
opportunity is lost to convince the world that a "heroic" Red Army saved
mankind from "the claws and teeth of,fascism" both in Europe and the Far
East, and that the atomic bomb did not materially alter the. course of the
war. The Soviet radio combats, all attempts to keep.the Soviets from
participating in "the leadership of this new world" and' to prevent "interna-
tional reactionaries" from using the victory over fascism as.a means to
benefitthemselves. .
.With respect to the control of atomic energy, the broadcasts. reflect
"the Soviet policy of peace and defense "ofuniversal security." The Soviet
proposals for atomic control "aim at prohibiting the manufacture and use of
atomic weapons, just as the civilized world has already.vetoed'poisOn.gaS
and-bacteria'in warfare."
The broadcasts on domestic affairs give testitony:that the Five-Year-
Plan is one of "peaceful development" in accordance-with the over-all
peaceful policy of the USSR. These domestic broadcaStS present conditions
in the Soviet Union at their best, with everybody contented and. happy,. all
loyal to the government, and .proud of Stalin.
SUMMARY OF U. S. FOREIGN-POLICY AS REFLECTED IN USSR BROADCASTS'
Soviet broadcasts describe American foreign policy. In terms of a
conflict between the 'forces of fascism-or reaction.and.the:.fores'of
-democracY. .While'the efforts of the late President Roposeveit'AO.lay the
foundations Of international peace are:unstintingly'pralsedv. arid the efforts
of men all Over the wOrld'to help.expand.and consolidate "democracy" are
.applauded, the Russians olaimthat the past year has witnessed- growing
activity on the part of "reactionary forces (who) ai0o disrupt:the
? cOoperatiOn of freedom-,loving 'people and 'undermine the;collab'oration of
the Big Three." According to the Soviet Radio, "such 'activity 'l's making
itself felt in the United States, 'too. It is not by ,accidehtthat American
domestic elements are-sounding thealarm'and exposingthe:plans Of American
,reactionaries, aiming at world supremacy, for an Anglo-American military ?
alliance against the USSR."
A fuller exposition of the Soviet attitudetowar?inited States foreign:
policy is found :in. broadcasts on the United StateSattitUde'toWard-the
United Nations organization .The Russians see the approach to the solution
Of international Problems as increasingly being set byo..:different
- tendendies.' The.first,is_"imperialist", one g.roup:ofp0Fors seekin, to
dominate theentire'international organization; witty:the-other natiohs.
..pUbmitting:to-theirdomination. Against this tendency, Radio Moscow SetS,
-a "democratic" : tendency based on peacefUl collaboraiOn, a policy which has
the adherence of the. Soviet people .Soviet broadcasts stake that'UN.shouild-
guide.4taelf."by the principle Of equality of SiateS:land.not:by the principle .
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?
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of the: domination of. some States over others." .Cireles who uphold the. .
latter principle are regarded by Radio Moscow as enemies of internatiOnal.
collaboration who realize that the preservation.of.Unanimity.among-the
major powers is a necessary Condition forthe-exiStence.of the UN,' and are
therefore trying to defame the USSR. The -"reactionary" press of the
United -States is accused by the Russians of creating an atmosphere of
suspicion and mistrust of the USSR and of. "sowing the Seeds of conflict and
anxiety," But, as in their treatment of the.U..p..foreign policy, the
Russians, in their reports on UN, attribute to the mass of' citizens' a
deep concern and a desire to dispel that atmosphere. of suspicion: .
Omtneeubject of atomic energy the' Soviet radio represents the United
States policy as an attempt to Consolidate its monopoly of atomicweapons
far an indefinite period in order.t0 dominate the,
The Russian radio reaction on United StateeMgcupetion.polley in
Germany is that the'politicaleituatiOn in the United States is not
,calculated toipromote.dethocracy, but is serving tO:Strengthenreactionarv
.tendencies among: the Germans. American occupation authorities are said
to support these reactionary elements.- This judgment ie:based%mmmewS
. of ."WerewolD" activities2and?the existence of reactionary political. .
parties, and in reports that industry is etillihe:handeof'"MagnateS
of monopoly.mapital".and land in the hands of -b44 landowners..-. The Soviet -
radio:66.Mment:on the United States Far Eastern.ocationipoli.cyhas:neen.
'adequately covered in the geographic-sectioMeaboV
Reports ancleditoriereomMent on the Posi:tiom of the UnitedStates?,
AM:regard to'-military-bases.are frequently quoted'from the Scandinavian.
and-AmeriMan'Press. Tne Russian:radio quotes:artielWfroiAhese.sources
.to?suppor?te claim that the'United States should.Withdraw:from.bany _of.
? . .
.the for4'&07aseg. ocCupied during the war.
? Thejinited.States policy toward Russia, as.:RadifY/MoetoW,,Teiorts.it,. lp
to beebeinereesingly ".firm"-with the Si)Viet-UnipMandttoTturn:eWay
rfroitilloosevelt's policy of_friendShip;' tbec:inVinee:theworid:that
ilueelate-part-in,Wimning the war'WaebY no meanS:aP*eaV:ae,:Russie:itself.
prcielaiMsto."twist.popular.wprId opinion". 6oneerniMOne:SpViet Union's.
equal-right to perticiPate in wcirld leadership andt9..burb:Russie's.aSpira-
- tions-.bir-employing "atOmic diplomacy."
. -
SOVIET.VER4US AMERICAN FOREIGN-POLICY ACCORDING'TOAliiiiiti MOSCOW-.-
Out mf. the vest-aMount of Soviet foreignleng4Aeadeasting:eonSidered
for this report emerges the conclusion that the SoViet radio reflects a
serious cleavage between American and Soviet foreign policy. The two;
nations are presented, more often by implicatiOnhan by-direct:,statement,
as workingat cross-Purposes in many areas throughout the world While the
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- 12 -
USSR pursues a course unswervingly aimed at peace, unity among the ,
nations and democracy for all, the United States, prodded by a relatively
small group of reactionaries in high places, pursues a policy detrimental
to the people and, at worst, engendering conflict. Nowhere does Moscow
voice the opinion that the basic interests of the two nations bring,them
into opposition. Trouble arises only insofar as the United States departs
from the policy enunciated by President -Roosevelt and, in opposition to
the will of the American people, .moves in the direction of imperialism.
The most succinct and perhaps the sharpest expression of divergencies
between. the two countries appears in a "Pravda" comment, on the American
plan for international control of atomic energy. Summarizing the "Pravda"
statement in a broadcast to Japan, Moscow states:
"The Soviet proposals and the American plan, the ,"Pravda"
observer Concludes, reveal two .different trends in current
international politics. The first reflects the unswerving
Soviet policy of peace and the defense of universal security.
The American plan is the product of atomic diplomacy ,and re-
flects an obvious desire for world domination, but nowadays ?
'desires Of that sort have no. chance for success."
. As Moscow sees'it, the United States must, and if the great mass of
the American people have their way:, inevitably will' abandon its "desire
for World domination" in favorof a foreign policy in-which the two '
nations may live in harmony.
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