WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 126

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002400130001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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WEEKLY SUMMARY
NO CHANGE in Class.
DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C
Number 12 6 Auth:
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
DDA, $EG.77/1763
27 nn,,,...._ Date: l/ 1 By. tQ :;
CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force. .
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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HIGHLIGHTS ................. ......... 1
EUROPEAN ECONOMY AND SECURITY
France's Role in Western Defense ....... 2
French Stability.. ..................... 2
The Schuman Plan ................... 3
German Police ..................... 4
Italian Security ....................... 4
Export Controls ...................... 5
British Potash.,..... .................. 6
-.THE UNITED NATIONS
Soviet Position 7
Korean Problems ................... 8
Indochina Issue ................ ... 8
FAR EASTERN TRENDS
Indian-Chinese Relations ............10
Pressure on Tibet. .10
Indochina Military Situation ............... 11
r Indochina Political Situation.......: . . . 12
U Ambon Issue.. .12
ARTICLE
66:: The Prague Conference .... .........14
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Western efforts to rearm Europe and Soviet counter-
measures vied for this week's top.billing with Chinese Com-
munist activities and continued deterioration of the French
military and political position in Indochina. Meanwhile, the
United Nations was confronted with complex problems in Korea
and the possibility of having to grapple with the Indochina
question (see page 8).
In Western Europe, France's attitude toward West
German rearmament remained the crucial issue; there ap-
peared: little likelihood of an early resolution of the impasse
caused by French refusal to agree to German military con-
tributions, but it seemed likely that the French would eventually
accept safeguards on German military power short of their
sweeping proposal that European unification must precede
creation of German armed units (see page 2). The recent
Soviet note to the US regarding German rearmament and the
Prague Conference, while part of a stepped-up Soviet effort to
retard Western defense measures, suggest no fundamental change
in Soviet strategy toward Germany (see page 14).
In the Far East, Chinese Communist announcements
hinting.that the invasion of Tibet had begun are largely dis-
counted (see page 10). The French military and political
position in Indochina continued to deteriorate with the loss of
the important border post of Langson and the abrupt attack on
French policy by the previously pro-French Vietnam Premier,
Tran Van Huu (see pages it and 12).
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EUROPEAN ECONOMY AND SECURITY
France's Role As military talks continued in Washington,
uU the French attitude toward German-rearma-
ment remained the critical factor in Western defense efforts.
Although the latest French Government proposal calling for a
European defense minister and a unified army has satisfied the
French Assembly temporarily and eliminated prospects, for the
present at least, of a parliamentary crisis over the German re-
armament issue, it has demonstrated clearly that the French
still regard a Europe unified politically and economically, as
well as militarily; the best safeguard against German militarism.
In addition, the recent parliamentary debate has made it clear
that the French are intent upon limiting German military units
Ili to less than division size and will insist that conclusion of the
Schuman Plan negotiations precede agreement on German mili-
tarization. Although this French position is likely to prolong
the present impasse, the recent parliamentary debate revealed
a great progress in popular acceptance of the inevitability of a
German contribution to Western defense, and the French will
probably come to accept safeguards on German military power
short of their sweeping proposal that European unification must
precede the creation of German units. US and NATO pressure,
growing reluctance to leave the Germans free of responsibility
for their own defense while the French economy is regimented
for war, and growing realization of the danger of Soviet aggression
will be the principal factors in resigning the French to some form
of German rearmament.
French Stability Meanwhile, numerous complex issues
may seriously threaten the stability of the.
Pleven Government during the next few weeks, thus raising the
possibility of an additional obstacle to French agreement with
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the other NAT countries on Western defense. In addition
to the critical Indochina situation, such issues as a new
electoral law, constitutional reform, and financing national
defense will probably all elicit stormy Assembly debates.
The fall of the Pleven Government is entirely possible over
any one of these issues'and the Popular Republicans and the
Socialists particularly will be restrained from withdrawing
their support only by such considerations as the difficulty
of finding another working coalition, the possibility that new
elections would be necessary, and the realization of the thank-
less tasks that would confront. any new government.
The Schuman Plan As negotiations continue in Paris on
the Schuman Plan, it is becoming more
apparent that the Germans, as well as the French, no longer
regard the plan as an end in itself, but rather as a means of
or a preliminary to gaining other objectives. The German
Government had originally seen in the Schuman proposal an
opportunity, among other things, for obtaining a greater voice
in Western European affairs. The relaxation of German occupa-
tion controls, the rapid revival of the German economy since
the Korean war, and the key. position German industry has be-
gun to assume in European defense plans have persuaded the
Germans that they need no longer accept the obligations imposed
by the Schuman Plan without receiving adequate compensation.
The Germans are consequently adopting a stiffer attitude in the
Schuman Plan talks, hoping thereby to obtain further relaxation
of occupation controls. German officials have linked the elimina-
tion of occupation controls.with acceptance of the Schuman Plan,
and look upon the recent Allied order liquidating the six largest
steel combines as incompatible with the objectives of the Schuman
Plan. Final German acceptance of the Schuman Plan will thus
depend largely upon the attitude of the German industrialists and
s
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 the Socialists toward such Allied controls as the recent
steel dissolution order and the International Authority for
the Ruhr, Concessions on these issues would greatly strengthen
the government's band in obtaining Bundestag approval of a
treaty embodying the plan.
German Police Creation of an effective West German police
force under central federal control and cap-
able of serving as a cadre for a future army will probably be
delayed as a result of strong objections by the Land authorities
and the Socialist Party. The force will probably be restricted
initially to 15,000 (the Foreign Ministers authorized a force of
30,000), largely appointed-by the Laender and stationed by them
in sensitive areas. It appears unlikely that the Federal Govern-
ment will have control of more than 25 percent of the total force.
These restrictions will prevent the mobile police from becoming
an effective emergency force for some time and will seriously
limit Adenauer's ability to use the force as a cadre for a future
Germany army. , Adenauer, however, will probably attempt to
create a rudimentary organization with a background of military
training, through a new External Security Office, If set up, this
office will coordinate military planning efforts and may attempt
to sielect and train officer cadres under the guise of a guard and
escort battalion organized ostensibly to protect federal officials.
Italian Security As the Italian Government grapples with the
twin problems of making the maximum con-
tribution to the Western rearmament effort and organizing a
civil defense organization capable of combatting Communist
fifth column activity;. the danger is increasing that the govern-
ment will attempt to militarize existing political and religious
groups. There are indications that both the Vatican-sponsored
society, Catholic Action, and a pro-Fascist rightist organization
led by Valerio Borghese are developing their own militia for the
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TOP S E C R E T
defense of Italian democracy. Moreover, various government
officials are said to be discussing the possibility of using such
groups in the new civil defense organization authorized by
Parliament. Although Interior Minister Scelba has denied that
he will incorporate Catholic or Rightist militia in the new
organization, these groups offer the most convenient source
of trained manpower.. A defense organization built around such
groups would: (1) weaken popular respect for the government be-
cause resort to a Fascist-type militia would be regarded by many
Italians as an admission of weakness on the part of the police;
(2) subject the government to further charges of domination by
the Vatican; (3) antagonize moderate non-Communist -elements
who already have expressed fears that a "political" militia will
emerge; and (4) create a new security problem and retard the'
development of democratic institutions.
.Export Controls The Paris export control committees are
not likely to be ablq to translate into a suc-
cessful program the Foreign Ministers agreement of 19 September
to extend the scope and effectiveness of controls over strategic ex-
ports to the Soviet orbit. There is increasing evidence. that the
ECA countries have become convinced of the ineffectiveness of the
Paris mechanism, which has already demonstrated its inability to
resolve the various conflicts between short-range and long-range
and between national and collective interests. The Paris com-
mittees have made little progress toward agreement on the strategic
importance of many particular items, on methods of quantitative
control, or on a formula for allocating exports among competing
suppliers. The participating governments have been harassed
continually by the politically difficult problem of refusing export
orders which might be taken up by some other country, and by
embarrassing uncertainties and delay in concluding' trade agreements
with'Soviet orbit bounty. ies. An example of current discontent is the
rec,ent'statement of Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland to
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the effect that the working groups in Paris are inadequate
and lack authority and that this activity should be transferred
to the Finance and Economic Committee of NATO. Continued
ineffectiveness of the Paris committees is likely to negate, at
least for the near future, what. appears to be an improved dis-
position of the Western European governments toward broader
export controls as a result of their growing consciousness of the
realistic requirements of Western military security.
British Potash Commercial development of the recently
proved potash deposits in Yorkshire, Eng-
land, will enable the UK to become completely independent of
foreign sources of potash, principally from France and the
Soviet Zone of Germany. It is believed that the UK is rapidly
overcoming the numerous technical problems in developing the
deposits. When fully developed, they will permit the British to
increase agricultural production through greater use of potash
as fertilizer and will provide the British with potash for the
manufacture of chemicals* having important industrial and
military uses. Independence of foreign sources of supply also
will mean a reduction of annual Biritish shipping requirements
by several hundred thousand tons and annual foreign exchange
expenditures .by several million pounds.
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THE UNITED NATIONS
With the General Assembly session now in its sixth
week, current UN interest is centered on the sharp debate
in the SC over the reappointment of Secretary General Trygve
Lie. In view of the deadlock in the SC over this issue, the GA.
will probably extend Lie's term for another two or three years.
Meanwhile, the adoption by the GA Political Committee of the
"United Action for Peace" resolution and the establishment
of the new UN Commission on Korea will have far-reaching
effects on the United Nations, the first in its effect on Soviet
tactics in the UN and the second in raising numerous problems
for the UN in war-torn Korea. Moreover, the UN may soon be
confronted with the problem of Indochina.
Soviet Position Expected passage in the General Assembly
of the United Action for Peace resolution
will seriously restrict Soviet capabilities for using the technique
of "local aggression" without incurring firm and prompt UN
counteraction. Although passage of the resolution will be a
blow to Soviet prestige and limit the usefulness of the UN as
an instrument of Soviet policy, the resolution will actually
strengthen Soviet determination to remain in the UN in order
to: (1) place obstacles in the way of the GA in the exercise of
its new responsibilities; and (2) retard as much as possible the
further development of the UN into an effective collective security
instrument. In attempting to achieve these goals, the USSR, no
longer able to rely exclusively on its SC veto power, will to a
greater extent resort to persuasion, subterfuge,,and diplomatic
pressure as means of preventing UN action contrary to Soviet
objectives. Under these circumstances, Soviet obstruction of UN
intervention against Soviet-inspired aggression could probably be
successful only if: (1) the aggression achieves its goal with great
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rapidity; and (2) concurrent Soviet occupancy of the SC
presidency provided exceptional opportunities for obstruc-
tionism.
Korean Problems The seven-nation UN Commission for
Unification and Rehabilitation in Korea
(UNCORK) scheduled to arrive in Korea in November faces
numerous, complex problems which may not only plague the
UN for several years but in their solution may have an im-
portant effect on world confidence in the ability of the UN to
discharge its obligations in a divided world. The most basic
of the many problems. facing UNCURK will be to define its own
jurisdiction and its relationship with the Unified Command and
the ROK-Government, as well as to interpret and clarify the GA's
7 October resolution, which in broad terms pledges the UN to
provide for recovery, effect unification, and ensure security
throughout an independent Korea. The problems connected with
new elections will present the most pressing difficulty; President
Rhee will resolutely oppose nationwide elections while sentiment
is growing among the Asian members of UNCURK against re-
stricting elections to North Korea. Controversies will also develop
over the timing of elections and who should be allowed to vote. Re-
solution of the unification problem and the beginning of the recovery
program will still leave.the UN facing such problems as the size of
the Korean army, guarantees regarding Koreas boundaries, and how
long the UN will have to protect the new state.
Indochina Issue The disposition evident among some French
officials to bring the Indochina issue before
the UN suggests either a misconception of.probable UN action or
a desire to escape from a desperate situation. Prompt UN military
action in support of the French in Indochina is most unlikely be-
cause the Indochina situation contains none of the special circumstances
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which enabled the UN to take prompt action in Korea,
namely: (1) a UN-sponsored state; (2) an internationally
recognized boundary line; (3) a UN commission to observe
an&lreport the invasion; (4) a sudden, coordinated aggression
which shocked the UN into action; and (5) an independent state
unsupported by foreign troops. Thus, barring. overt invasion
by the Chinese Communists, it is highly unlikely that authoriza-
tion for a UN military effort in Indochina could be secured.
Initial UN action would probably be limited to a cease-fire
order and the dispatch of an observation mission. UN debate
of the Indochina situation would reveal the widespread distaste
among UN members for the French "colonial" regime in Indo-
china, and Soviet propaganda would capitalize on extensive feeling
in Asia that the struggle is one of Western colonialism against
Asian nationalism. Furthermore, it is quite possible that the
UN might make recommandations concerning Indochinese independ-
ence which might prove highly unpalatable to the French.
On the other hand, some French officials may decide that
UN action would be the best means of extracting themselves as
gracefully as possible from a hopeless struggle. They may hope
that the UN could establish an independent non..Communist Viet-
namese state which would permit France to salvage some com-
mercial interests.
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FAR EASTERN TRENDS '
India-China Although there are indications of momentary
Indian disillusion with Communist China, there
is no reason to believe that the Government of India will re-
vise its basically friendly policy toward China. Certain Indian
officials are angered because of their embarrassment following
the Chinese Communist Government's failure to fulfill its avowed
intention to resist a crossing of the 38th Parallel by UN troops in
Korea. Inasmuch as India took positions within and outside the
UN designed to prevent the crossing. and thus forestall the entry
of China into the war, these officials now feel their country was used
as a catspaw. The Indians'are therefore somewhat skeptical of
Chinese Communist assertions that they desire a peaceful settle-
ment of Tibetan-Chinese relations, and the Secretary General of
the Ministry of External Affairs now claims that India will react
strongly to any Chinese attempt to force the submission of Tibet
either by armed invasion or by pressure tactics. Nevertheless,
India's relations with Communist China are not likely to suffer
any lasting deterioration. Whatever anger India may feel over
the Korean affair and a possible conquest of Tibet will probably
be subordinated to its desire to maintain friendly relations with
China. In any event, India is not expected to take effective steps
to prevent the loss of Tibet to China; sending Indian troops to
assist in a defense of Tibet has never been considered,and any
other measures would be inadequate.
Pressure on Tibet Meanwhile, Chinese Communist announce-
ments hinting that the invasion of Tibet
has begun are largely discounted. The directive broadcast by
the Peiping radio calls on Communist forces to make adequate
preparations, develop communications, and carry out propaganda
work for the " long-term task" of establishing control over Tibet.
No timetable of advance was mentioned nor was it stated where
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the "liberation" troops are presently located. It appears
that this directive was deliberately timed to coincide with
the departure for Peiping of the Lhasa delegation which
had been negotiating a settlement in New: Delhi and is pri-
marily a move to pressure Tibet into meeting Peiping's
demands. Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai recently
emphasized Peiping's hope that force would not be needed in
order to secure Tibet's recognition of Chinese sovereignty.
The transfer of Sino-Tibetan negotations from New Delhi to
Peiping and the simultaneous publicity given to the Chinese
Communists' directive to their "liberation" troops reveals
the same pattern of negotiation combined with threatened
force which was used with such success in securing the suc-
cessive surrenders of the Chinese Nationalists.
Indochina Military The Viet Minh will lose no time in ex-
ploiting the opportunities for assuming
the offensive afforded them by the recent French evacuation of
the vital border post of Langson. Although the French garrison
apparently did not suffer serious losses in withdrawing, the
abandonment-of Langson will seriously weaken the over-all
military position of the French. Viet Minh control of Langson,
which is on the main line of communications from Indochina to
China, will greatly facilitate Chinese logistic support of Viet
'Minh operations as well aij the movement of Viet Minh troops
into China for training. The main body of Viet Minh forces in
the border area now appears to be regrouping south of Langson,
and.an all-out Viet Minh offensive in North Vietnam within the
next six months is highly probable. French strategy will perforce
be limited to attempts to hold the Red River delta and the Tonkin
coast pending the arrival of urgently requested US aid, principally
light bombers, artillery, vehicles, radio equipment, and ammuni-
tion. The French then hope, perhaps unrealistically, to return to
the offensive.
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Indochina Political The weakening of the French military
position in Vietnam appears to have
sharpened the conflict, already in evidence during the Pau Con-
ference, between French and Vietnamese views on the status of
Vietnam. Vietnam Premier Tran Van Huu, abruptly abandoning
his earlier disposition of friendly acquiescence in French policy,
has publicly criticized the attitude of the French delegation at the
Pau'Conference and called for the supersession of tli'e 8 March
Agreement. in favor of a treaty based on equality between France
and Vietnam. Huu, who is a naturalized French citizen, has hereto-
fore been regarded as spokesman for the "loyal" Vietnamese, i.e.,
those who accepted the principle of French tutelage during a period
of gradual evolution toward full independence. French official re-
action to his defection indicates that the French will continue to
treat the Indochina problem as a primarily military problem, to be
solved by increasing US aid, rather than by meeting the demands
of Vietnamese nationalism.
Ambon Situation After eight months' delay, representatives'
of the UN Committee for Indonesia (UNCI), the
Netherlands, and Indonesia have resumed meetings on the subject
of demobilization and repatriation of former Netherlands Indies
Army troops (who are predominantly Ambonese). Although the
first meeting, held on 25 October, accomplished little, the fact
that the three parties are again working together will give them
an opportunity to discuss the present Ambon situation. The Indo-
nesian Government, disturbed over the prospect of a possible UN:
Security Council debate regarding the Ambon report, hopes that
the meetings will give UNCI an excuse for withdrawing its request.'
that the Security Council consider the affair. It will be virtually
impossible, however, for the present Indonesian Government to
retreat from its position of opposition to UNCI intervention in the
"internal" Ambonese affair without losing the parliamentary suppor
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necessary for its survival, and therefore it is doubtful that
UNCI will find a basis for reversing its position. Meanwhile,
the Indonesian Government's decision to settle the insur-
rection on Ambon by force is meeting serious setbacks be-
cause of resistance by approximately 5,000 superior Ambonese
troops,.and the Republican Government may have to jeopardize
security in other areas in order to send reinforcements to Ambon.
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The recent Soviet note to the Western Powers on
German rearmament and the declaration issued by the
Prague Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR and
its European Satellites appear to be a major propaganda.
and diplomatic attempt to exploit opposition in France and
West Germany to West German rearmament. The USSR
apparently estimates that these statements will strengthen
French and West German fear of provoking Soviet military
action by West German rearmament and .:will .arouse hope
in West Germany of attaining unity by peaceful means. Al-
though these declarations demonstrate Kremlin concern at
increasing Western rearmament and the possibility of West
German contribution to it, neither the content of the declara-
tions, propaganda treatment of them, nor recent Soviet tactics
in East Germany suggest that. the USSR is considering any sub-
stantial alteration in its current German strategy--the com-
munization of East Germany and its integration into the Soviet
orbit.
Nevertheless, the USSR may decide to carry its recent
actions a little further for the increased propaganda advantages
which could be gained. East Germany, for example, may formally.
request the West German Government to fulfill the Prague pro-
posal, particularly the provision calling for creation of an "-`All
German Constitutional Council" as a step toward establishing'a
provisional "All German sovereign government." If the USSR
decides upon further-formal moves, it will.be.in the full realiza-
tion that the Prague proposal is unacceptable to the West, and.they
will be designed to strengthen the Soviet propaganda aim to prove
that the West is interested in neither peace nor German unity.
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1. , , . , , The President
Secretary of State
6,7,8...... Secretary of Defense
9,,,.,,.,. Secretary of Army
10.....,.,, Secretary of the Navy
11,.,.,,,,, Secretary of the Air Force
12, ... , > , .. Special Assistant to the President, W.A. Harriman
13,14,15..... Chairman, National Security Resources Board
16,17.... , . , Executive Secretary to the National Security Council
18, , , . , .... Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aix-
19 .. , n ..... Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
20. , .. , .... Chairman,'Joint Chiefs of Staff
21922. . ..... Chief of Staff, US Army
23924,25... , ; Chief of Naval Operations
26,27,28..... Chief of Stafff, US Air Force
:29.... n . , , . Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations,US Army
30...... , ... Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), US Air Force
?31, . n . < .... Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
32. , , . , .. , . Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
33,34,35.. , , . Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
36,37,38,39,40,41,
42,43,44,45. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, US Army
46,47,48,49,50,51,
52,53,54,55,56,
57,58,59,60, Director of Naval Intelligence
61,82,63,64,65,66,
67,68,69, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, US Air. Force-
70 , , , ... , , Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
71, ., Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
?L~~L 1[T _ n _. n
78,79,80,81,82,
83,84,85. , , Chief, Acquisition and Distribution Div,, OCD, State
86, , , ... , , , Chief, Policy Planning. Staff, Department of State
87. , > . , . > .. USAF Rep. on joint Strategic Survey Committee
88. , ... , , . Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
89,90.. , , , , > Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
91, , .. , . , . , Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
92... , , , ... Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
936 < . , , . , . , Deputy Director, Joint Staff
9.4,95,96..... Director, Armed Forces. Security Agency
97.. n . , .... Ambassador .At Large Philip C. Jessup
98. n ; . , , . , Secretary of the Air Force
99..... < ... Assistant Secretary .of the Treasury
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 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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