UNITED NATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002400120001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 20, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

AnnAn
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HIGHLIGHTS .
CONTENTS
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UNITED NATIONS
GA Strengthened
Korean Rehabilitation 2
Ambon Affair. 3
PalestineDebate000000000000000000000. 4
EASTERN EUROPEAN PROBLEMS ? ?
USSR-East Germany. 000000000 . ? 5
Bulgarian Provocations. . 0 0 0 0 0.......... . 6
Balkan Drought . ..... , ? , 6
Discontent in. Hungary . . ; .......... 7
'INDOCHINA CRISIS . ....... ....... 8
LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS ..,
Israeli Political Crisis .12
French-US Civil Air Impasse 13
ARTICLE
Yugoslavia and the West 000000000........ 14
Document No. 001
NO CHANGE in Class.
DECLASSIFIED
:1 ss. CHANGED TO: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA R? . 77 1763
Date:
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HIGHLIGHTS
In the continuing East-West struggle, the Western
Powers succeeded in strengthening the United Nations as
an-instrument for preserving peace while -the French posi-
tion in Indochina continued to deteriorate rapidly.
The capability of the Soviet Union to prevent prompt
and effective UN action to oppose future aggression will be
materially weakened as a result of the overwhelming vote in
the GA Political Committee for the US-initiated proposal
to give the General Assembly a freer and stronger hand in
dealing with the troubled areas of the world (see page 2).
Meanwhile, French military reverses in Indochina
have produced a most critical situation (see pagZ) There
are no indications of French willingness to take quick and
drastic measures necessary to turn the tide against the Wet
Minh rebels, particularly in the direction of political con-
cessions which would enlLst greater Vietnamese support for
the anti-Communist effort. There is even some doubt that if the
French do reverse their previous policy they can maintain
their position in Indochina.
The steady improvement in Yugoslav relations with
the West continues and has been accelerated by such develop-
ments as the Korean aggression and increased Yugoslav reliance
on Western aid to overcome the acute economic crisis arising
from the current drought (see page 14).
1
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UNITED NATIONS
GA Strengthened Adoption of the US-initiated "United
Action for Peace" resolution by the
General Assembly Political Committee demonstrates the? .
determination of the non-Soviet world to take steps which
would prevent the USSR from undermining the UN as an
effective instrument for preserving peace. Spurred on by
UN success in dealing with Korea in the absence of the USSR,
the General Assembly will almost certainly approve the US-
backed resolution, thus culminating a trend of several, years
toward expanding the functions of the General Assembly in
? dealing with international trouble spots. The basic question
has been whether the Charter vests the General Assembly
with authority to recommend the Use of force to repel aggres-
sion after failure of the SC to act. Admittedly only the SC has
the legal power to order police measures; however, nations
supporting the US proposal would probably regard themselves
morally committed to honor a GA call for armed action against
aggression. Furthermore, if a custom should develop whereby
members of the UN recognized a moral obligation to comply
with such GA recommendations, these might in time acquire
the force of law. In opposing the resolution, Vishinsky :was
quick to recognize this danger when he alluded to the remarks
by other delegates indicating "that a recommendation, morally
speaking, is tantamount to an order."
Korean Rehabilitation In view of the improbability that an
early solution of the political problems
resulting from the Korean war will be reached, it is a matter
of considerable importance that the General Assembly reach
early and practicable decisions on Korean rehabilitation, which
has been estimated to call for nearly $1 billion during the next
three years. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
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charged with drafting a proposal for the GA, has been studying
two different approaches to problem. An Australian proposal
would make Korean rehabilitation essentially the responsibility
of the proposed UN Commission for the Unification and Re-
habilitation of Korea (UNCUFtK). The other proposal, pre-
pared-by the US in consultation with the UK, Canada, Brazil,
and France, would establish a UN Korean Reconstruction Agency
(UNICRA) under a-UN Agent General. UNKRA would carry out
programs determined by ECOSOC and the GA but would other-
wise be largely.independent and would work in close coordination
with UNCURK. An outstanding feature of the proposal is its
provision for use of the facilities and personnel of "existing
international agencies,st making possible participation by the
ECA, whose 'knowledge and techniques should be of considerable
assistance. -
Prospects for promptECOSOC acceptance of the pro-
posal, perhaps witty-incorporation of some Austrailian points,
are-good. Its later acceptance by the GA is almost certain.
Meanwhile, a seven-member ECOSOC committee will report
to the GA next week on probable Korean requirements. Al-
though appointed to this committee by ECOSOC President
Santa Cruz, the USSR has declined membership on the grounds
that representatives from both North and South Korea should be
allowed to participate in its work.
Ambon Affair Continued Indonesian refusal to accept the
good offices of the UN Commission for
Indonesia (UNCI) in the Ambon dispute diminishes prospects
for avoiding consideration of the matter by the Security Council.
If the case should come before the SC, the,Soviet representa-
tive would certainly seize the opportunity to champion Asian
sovereignty against "Dutch colonialism" and charge the US
with using the UN to intervene in Indonesian internal affairs.
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The stand of India, which has already taken the side of the
Indonesians, would accentuate the East6West character of
any SC discussions. Open discussion of the fulfillment of
the Hague Round Table Agreements, moreover, would -
further exacerbate relations within the Netherlands-Indo-
nesian Union and would complicate a settlement of the trouble-
some problem of Netherlands New Guinea. If consideration
by the SC becomes unavoidable,-the Western Powers will
probably seek to hold discussion to an absoluteS minimum and
reaffirm the authority of UNCI. The Commission, however,
is not likely to exert much influence on:the-Republic of Inthial ,
nesia, and the Indonesians *ill probably continue to hope that
more active UN intervention can be forestalled by early con-
clusion of the military phase of the Ambon affair.
Palestine Debate Security Council consideration of the
charges and counter-charges filed by
Egypt, Israel, and Iraq (on Jordan's behalf) is unlikely to
resolve the current Near East disputes or relieve tension
in the area. At issue between Egypt and Israel are Israel's
expulsion of Bedouin nomads into Egyptian territory and
Israeli objections to Egyptian blockade practices at Suez.
Jordan's complaint concerns alleged Israeli aggression into
the disputed Yarmuk area, which, although within the old
boundary of Transjordan, falls under Israeli control accord-
ing to the general armistice agreement. Although SC dis-
cussion may clarify some of the points at issue, it may also
add to the bitterness of the disputants. It is probable that the
SC will merely refer the problems to the Mixed Armistice
Commission for study and report.
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EASTERN EUROPEAN PROBLEMS
USSR-East Germany The USSR is unlikely to use the recent
East German elections and the increas-
ing "sovereignty" being granted to the German Democratic ? ?
Republic (GDR) ? as a pretext lor concluding in the near future- ?
either a unilateral peace treaty or treaty of mutual assistance
with the East German state. The USSR may, however, parallel
Western action by declaring a termination to the state of war with
Germany. Furthermore, in an??attempt to increase the prestige
of the GDR, it may remove. overt Soviet controls from the East -
German economy and permit the Soviet diplomatic mission to the
GDR to carry on the duties of the Soviet Control Commission. As
.the USSR *ill retain its overt status as an occupying power, it
is likely that the USSR will limit the role of the sovereign" GDR
to minor harassment of the Western Powers.
A unilaternl peace treaty with the GDR would give the
.USSR no significant additional advantages, and would present
the Kremlin with certain difficulties which it is under no com-
pUlsion to face at this time. A peace treaty would gain little
support from the German people and would produce little pro-
paganda advantage unless accompanied by the withdrawal of
'Soviet occupation forces. In view of present international tension,
? the Western ,decision to increase occupation forces in Germany,
and the probability of limited West German, rearmament, it is
not likely that the?USSR is contemplating even a reducticin in its
occupationforces. Moreover, a separate peace wohld openly
violate the 'POtsdam?Agreement'and weaken considerably a basic
Soviet propaganda 'contention that?the -division of Germany is the
result of Western violations of the Potsdam Agreement. Finally,
the USSR may not desire at this time to erect a legal barrier to
future four-power consideration of the German problem.-
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With regard to a mutual assistance pact, the current
preponderance of Soviet military strength makes such a pact
unnecessary at this time. Moreover, the Kremlin-probably
wishes to avoid a formal military commitment because of as
realization that the struggle for Germany will -always entail
a grave risk of global war.
? Bulgarian Provocations The continuing and deliberate acts
of provocation initiated by Bulgaria
against Greece and Turkey, as well as Yugoslavia, not only
demonstrate the Kremlin's policy of using its Satellites to '
create tension and unrest but also point up Soviet ability to
pursue mutually contradictory tactics. Bulgaria has recently
added to its routine propaganda attacks, diplomatic pressure,
and minor border incidents, a demand that Turkey repatriate
immediately 250,000 Bulgarians of Turkish ancestry and an
attempt to seize a small piece of Greek territory along the
border by changing the course of the:Evros River. Aside from
the advantages of inciting unrest, obstructing the Turkish and
Greek economies, and creating a pretext for possible aggression,
it is difficult to see what profit the USSR expects to gain from
these provocative acts. They are patently inconsistent with
the Soviet peace campaign and serve to lessen any effect it
might have in Greece and Turkey. Moreover, by arousing Greek
and Turkish nationalist feeling, these acts tend to increase Greek
and Turkish popular resentment against the Communist movement.
Balkan Drought Drought conditions in extensive areas of
Hungary, Bulgaria; and Rumania may seri-
ously retard Communist economic plans for developing these
countries, intensify peasant resentment against the regimes,
and complicate the entire problem of implementing agricultural
collectivization programs. Normally an exporter of foods,
Hungary has experienced food shortages since April, and the
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current drought offers little prospect of remedying the
situation. The reduction in agricultural production will
require tighter rationing, reduce Hungary's exports?thus
restricting the ability to import items essential for the
industrialization program, andlurther reduce the declining
standard of living. Although less seticualy affected at present,
Bulgaria may suffer, as a result of drought conditions, food
shortages next spring. The government has apparently forced
the farmers to complete the fall sowing program by 10 October,
despiite the danger that continued drought conditions until
freezing weather would materially lower seed germination
In the spring and produce a serious bread grain shortage. Mean-
while, Bulgaria's food prospects may be further endangered by
the speed with which collectivization is being pushed, particularly
in areas being evacuated by the forced emigration of Bulgarians
of Turkish ancestry. The principal problem is the shortage of
trained personnel capable of managing the newly created collec-
tive farms. Rumania is also suffering drought conditions in the
western and southern provinces, but fragmentary information
indicates that the effects will not be as serious or as widespread
? as in Bulgaria or Hungary.
Discontent in Hungary Popular discontent in Hungary, partly
caused by rising prices, has led the
government and the Communist Party to institute additional measures
to curb the expression of dissatisfaction among the people. Large
numbers of people have been arrested, from all elements of the
population, on charges appropriate to their particular backgrounds.
Of special significance is the campaign against the Social Democrats
and the leadership of the trade unions. The Social Democrats, hither-
to accepted by the Communists as allies, are now accused of being
opposed to the interests of the workers. Hundreds of Social Demo-
crats from factory ,workers to Cabinet Ministers have been arrested.
So far, the severe criticism of the trade unions has been accompanied
only by purges among low-level officials.
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INDOCHINA CRISIS
French Military Position The recent Viet Mitt military
successes resulting in the
abandonment of several French border posts. in North
Vietnam and the heavy .personnel-losses sustained in the
course of these withdrawals have forced the French to re-
examine the military strategy they have been following ?
since the end of World War IL This strategy has been two-
fold: to drive the Viet Minh from the Red River delta of North
Vietnani and to maintain, a series of fortified posts along the
Sino-Vietnam frontier. .This strategy involved tolerante of
Viet 'Minh control over considerable areas of Vietnam, ex-
cept for occasipnal French "thrusts, and the concentration of
Frenth pacification operations in those areas in which the.
French had established either a fairly ?well-defined perimeter
? or a series of mutually supporting block-houses along the major
lines of communications. Nonetheless, it was hoped that the
maintenance of French posts on the Sino-Vietnam frontier
would prevent or minimize large-scale Chinese Communist'
aicito the Viet Minh while, at the same time, the extension of
French control over the rice-growing areas of North Vietnam
would eventually starve the Viet Minh into submission.
Viet Minh Strategy Meanwhile, Viet Minh military strategy
has attempted to ensure a maximum
dispersion of -French forces throughout Indochina while building
up military strength for a future decisive engagement with
French forces. This build-up has taken place chiefly within the
upland areas bordering on China, where the Viet Minh has for
many, months been virtually immune to French counteraction.
In implementation of this strategic aim and as the build-up
takes effect, the tactics employed by the Viet Minh are now
gradually shifting from guerrilla operations to positional warfare.
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Ithas not been possible to determine the exact
extent to which the increasing capabilities of the Viet
Minh have been attributable to technical and material
aid from Communist China. The assistance which the
-WettIVIinh has derived from its physical andideological
proximity to CommunistChina, however, has probably
been considerable. Moreover, the Viet Minh's policy of
total mobilization of all human and material resources in
areas under its control has certainly constituted an im-i
portant factor in its growing strength.
Policital Factors French policy in Indochina has been
the product of attempts to appease
Vietnamese nationalist aspirations while refusing to relin-
quish French claims to political control over Vietnam. The
French have faced the problem of competing with. a Com-
munist-controlled Organization, the Viet Minh, which has
succeeded in persuading the vast majority of Vietnamese
that the cause of nationalism is best served by the armed
rebellion which the Viet Minh leads. In order to meet the
combination of political, and military threats posed by the
Viet Minh, the French have had at their disposal two corn-
plementary methods of counteraction: (1) military repression
of the Viet Minh; and (2) encouragement of a non-Communist
Vietnamese' government capable of contributing effectively to
a combined program of : (a) undermining the Viet Minh's claim
that it alone represents vigorous and unequivocal nationalist
demands; and (b) military action under Vietnamese command
In alliance with the French against the Viet Minh. Owing tp the
considerable influence which purely colonial objectives have had
In the formulation of French policy, however, the program
followed by the French has largely neglected political methods
and placed almost exclusive reliance on French military force.
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The delays, reservations, and ambiguities which have
attended the progress of the FrenchTsponsored Associated
State of Vietnam toward its anomalous status of "independ-
ence within the French Union" have severely stunted its
growth, disillusioned the great majority of Vietnamese who
originally saw hope in that government, and prevented all
but marginal utilization of the considerable non-Communist
and anti-Communist sentiment which exists in Vietnam.
Present French Plans In meeting the current military
crisis, there is no indication that
the French are yet ready to make any fundamental changes
In their approach to the military or political aspects of the
Indochina problem. They continue to take an obstructive
attitude at the four-month-old Pau Conference toward the
transfer of fthcal autonomy_ to the Associated States. Unless
Chinese Communist troops invade Indochina in force, the French
are likely to persist in claiming that they alone must direct the
war against the Viet Minh; the situation would have to deteriorate
markedly before the French would alter their present program
or appeal to the UN. They will, however, sharpen their appeals
for faster deliveries and increased allocations for US arms, but
without any increased willingness to permit greater US influence
in the area.
Future Prospects Given the present framework of French-
Vietnamese political relations, a French
military campaign against the Viet Minh is almost certain to
end in the defeat of French forces, even assuming a program
of considerably increased military aid to the French. One
major difficulty facing the French is low to achieve maximum
utilization of available Indochinese natives in military operations.
An6ther problem is the high morale among the Viet Minh forces.
Both of these difficulties are to a large degree politically derived
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because of French reluctance to permit the creation of
native armed forces, and because of the rebels' conviction
that they are following the only road to liberation. It is
not possible to determine with certainty whether a re-
orientation of French policy would serve to correct these
weaknesses sufficiently to effect a reversal of the present
trend of increasing Viet Minh strength. All that can be
stated as a certainty is that the French have made no bold.
and determined -effort- to: make-the-maximum effective use
of non-Communist nationalism in Vietnam. If such an effort
were made (whether under the auspices of the French them-
selves, the UN, or one or more third parties), it is at least
conceivable that a vigorous, anti-Communist indigenous army
could be raised and that serious dissension or uncertainty
could be created between the Communists and non-Communists
who are now fighting under the leadership of_Vtht Minh. The
essential elements of such an effort would be a thin 'Mid
credible guarantee of Vietnam's independence and the most
;rapid feasible implementation of a generous program aimed
? at achievement of this goal.
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LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS
ISRAEL.
Political Crisis Prime Minister Ben-Gurion has acted
with characteristic boldness in Israel's
first major political crisis. When the Orthodox Religious
Bloc failed to go along with the rest of the coalition in accept-
ing his proposed Cabinet shakeup, Ben-Gurion promptly re-
signed and subsequently went to the Knesset with. a demand for
new elections. Although the Knessees refusal to accept Ben-
Gurion's proposal that he head a pre-election minority "care-
taker" government may result in his temporarily vacating the
premiership for the first time since Israel's establishment in,
May 1948, his decision to seek new elections may pay off in
the end. Despite a general deterioration of the economic situa-
tion and the-emergence of considerable anti-government criticism
over the austerity programrthe spiraling prices, and the appear-
ance of .black markets, Ben-Gurion's party, MAPAI, still appears
to have the backing of most of the people. MAPAM, Israel's
second-ranking party, has probably lost some support-within
the last year because of the strongly pro-Soviet position it has
adopted despite Israel's obvious economic dependence on the
West. MAPAI may also pick up votes because of popular criticism
of the Orthodox Religious Bloc for insisting on the use of strictly
kosher meat (an expensive practice) and on separate religious
schools. One unknown factor is the voting preference of the sub-'
stantial number of immigrants who have entered Israel since the
1949 election. Ben-Gurion probably reasoned, however, -that while
new elections represent a gamble, it would be better to go to the
polls now than to attempt the formation of another coalition govern-
ment -which almost-certainly would have only a Slim majority in
the Knesset.
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FRANCE
Civil Air Impasse US and French civil air officials have
reached an impasse in recently con-
cluded technical discussions, during which the French not only
refused to permit the addition of PAA to existing TWA airline
services through Paris but also proposed an arbitrary and un-
acceptable restriction on US-French North Atlantic traffic. The
US has therefore decided to pursue the question at Cabinet level.
The intransigent French attitude, which is reflected in a number
of European and non-European countries operating international
services in competition with US airlines, appears to be motivated
by fear of increased US competition and by domestic political
considerations. It does not seem likely, in the context of over-
all US-French relations, that the French will persist to the point
of abrogating the present bilateral air agreement, but any US
concession of principle to prevent this eventuality would establish
a precedent which other countries might exploit to the disadvantage
of US international airline operations.
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0 inillinEWEinaar
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE WEST
Yugoslavia's official altitude toward the West has ?
perceptibly improved during the past year, at least in its
outward manifestations. With Yugoslavia facing a? critical
economic phase and possibly dangerous repercussions on -
the stability of the regime, Yugoslav leaders are obliged to
?make concrete decisions increasingly at variance with their
world Outlook as orthodox Communists. This evolution has
produced some indications of disagreement within the top
leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party overthe impli-
cations of Yugoslavia's position as the sole orthodox Com-
munist state and indications of doubt and confusion-among the
rank and file of the Party in the face of the government's in--
creasingly critical attitude toward the USSR and correspond-
ingly less .intransigent attitudelaward the West; It is doubtful,
however, whether.. these developments will lead to .a serious
split among top Yugoslav rulers.
,The course of events during the last year has strongly
favored the adoption by Yugoslavia of a policy of accommodation
with the West. The Korean aggression, which came as a shock
to Communists and non-Communists alike, appears to have
accelerated Yugoslav disillusionment with the Kremlin and to
have strengthened Yugoslav adherence to the UN. The developing
?
economic crisis in Yugoslavia, rendered acute by this year's
poor harvests, has made early Western support on some terms
vital for maintaining the stability and independence of the Tito
regime. These developments have been reflected in a noticeable
improvement in Yugoslav relations with Austria, Italy, and
Western Germany, and although Greek-Yugoslav relations are
still at an impasse, there are signs that efforts at a rapproche-
ment are likely to be renewed.
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incrip mitosit
The evolution of internal policy in Yugoslavia has
also favored.the establishment of a long-term modus vivendi
with the "West. During the past year there was evolved a
Yugoslav version of "democratic sbcialism" which in theory
would premit far greater flexibility than Stalinism. The.govern-
ment now stresses .the possibility of coexistence of-independent
socialist and capitalist states. The government, moreover, has.
recently invited leading European trade union and SbcialiSt
leaders to freely inspect the .YUgoslav exp9rirnent, indicating
that the government may be willing to permit, within limits,
the freer intercourse that is an indispensable condition of
? understanding between. nations.
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ignrIEWEITINIIErlanent No.
DISTRIBUTION
The President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
? Secretary of Army
? Secretary of the Navy.
? Secretary of the Air Force
Special Assistant to the President, W.A. Harriman
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Executive Secretary to the National Security Council
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Mr Force
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations,US Army
Deputy Chief af Staff (Operations), US Air Force
Deputy Chid of Naval Operations (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
33,34,35. . . Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
36,37,38,39,40,41,
42,43,44,45, Assistant Chief at Staff, G-2, Intelligence, US Army
46,47,48,49,50,51,
52,53,54,55,56,
57958,59,60. Director of Naval Intelligence
NO CHANGE in Class.
)(k.
Cj DECLASSIFIED
Lass. CHANGED TO:
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DD G. 77 1763
Date:
0
TS S
20
21,22
23,24,25. .
26,27,28
29 . . ...
30
.31
32
61,62,63,64,65,66,
67,68,69, . . Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, US Air Force
70. .....?. Director of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission
71. . Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
72,73,74,75,76,77,
78,79,80,81982,
83,84,85. . Chief, Acquisition and Distribution Dive, OCD, State
86
87..
88 ..
89,90. ..
91. .a o ..
92,. .
93. . C...
94,95,96. .
? ?
00
Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
. USAF Rep. on Joint Strategic Survey Committee
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, joint Staff
Deputy Director, Joint Staff
Director Armed Forces Seeurity Agency
Ambassador At Large Philip C. Jessup
98; . ; .. Secretary of the Air Force
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
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