WEEKLY SUMMARY #101

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002300130001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 5, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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Number 101
5 MAY 1950
No
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CW_ING2 in Class. rn
Werr-207-127F D
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Auni: 77
Date:
By: 0 3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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1. This publication contains current intelligence exclusively
? and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of 'State, An/V.
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
?tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C.. 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
Page
HIGHLIGHTS 1
GERMAN RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE 2
WESTERN EUROPE
EASTERN EUROPE ........ ...... a 8
NEAR EAST - AFRICA ...... ? 10
FAR EAST 12
WESTERN HEMISPHERE.. ....... 0 14
ARTICLES:
Decline in Chinese Communist Popularity . . . 16
Latin American Arms Program 18
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HIGHLIGHTS
fl Onthe eve of the Foreign Ministers' Conference
In London, progress toward building a strong and united
Western Europe was being complicated by developments
concerning two long-standing controversial issues--West
Germany's relationship with the Western Powers (see
? page 2) and the problem of Trieste (see page 8). The
Adenauer regime is under growing internal pressure to
obtain a relaxation of Western occupation controls and to
improve West Germany's international status in relation
to Western Europe, as the price the West must pay for
active West German support in the cold war. In Italy, the
possibility of an Italo-Yugoslav agreement on Trieste which
would give Zone B to Yugoslavia is still meeting violent
popular opposition, some influential Italians even suggest-
ing that Italy reconsider its membership in the North Atlantic
Treaty.
In the Far East, the capture of Hainan has improved
the capabilities of the Chinese Communists to supply technical
and material aid to dissident groups in Southeast Asia, but an
invasion of that area by Chinese troops is highly improbable
at this time (see page 12). Meanwhile, the prestige of the
Chinese Communist regime has continued to decline as a
result of continuing economic difficulties and popular resent-
() ment against both the imposition of social controls and Peiping's
apparent subservience to the USSR (see page 16).
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GERMAN RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE
The Adenauer Government is showing signs of grow-
ing dissatisfaction over the relationship of West Germany with
the Western Powers. This disquiet has already manifested
itself in resignation threats by various government leaders,
including Chancellor Adenauer himself, and may reach serious
proportions after the Foreign Ministers' Conference scheduled
to begin in London on 8 May,
German Resentment The Adenauer Government believes
that the present system of occupation
controls is damaging its political influence. Allied criticism
of the government's key economic policies, restrictions placed
on East-West trade, and limitations imposed on industrial ex-
pansion have all been unpopular with the German people, and
the government has lost prestige as a result of its failure
both to block the recent Franco-Saar Conventions and to im-
prove West Germany's international status in relation to
Western Europe.
Council of Europe Chancellor Adenauer and other government
leaders believe that the forthcoming Foreign
Ministers' Conference offers the best immediate opportunity to
secure the concessions they are seeking and to regain popular
support for their pro-Western policies. Although Adenauer has
estimated that after the Conference he will be able to obtain
Bundestag agreement to West German associate membership in
the Council of Europe, his chance of doing so will be improved
in proportion to the extent that the Western Foreign Ministers,
meeting in London, indicate their intent to: (1) give West
Germany a greater role in Western European political and
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military organizations: and (2) reduce the scope of economic
and political occupation controls.
Neutrality Sentiment Meanwhile, gradually increasing senti-
ment in Germany favoring neutrality
in the East-West conflict also complicates Adenauer's problems
In dealing with The occupation powers and the nations of Western
Europe. Numerous influential groups are promoting the idea
that a unified Germany can be re-established only by reaching
some -sort of understanding with the East. This movement is
being supported by: (1) industrialists who desire to develop
trade with East Germany and the Soviet bloc; (2) agricultural
Froups controlled by Andreas Hermes, who joined in forming
'The Association for the Reunification of Germany"; (3) ex-
pellees from East Germany who wish to return to their former
honies; and (4) extreme nationalists who feel that the unifica-
tion of Germany and its restoration as a world power can
only be achieved by coming to terms with the 'USSR.
,Adenauer's Plans A decision by Adenauer to resign or to
call for new elections will be based
primarily on his estimate of his own political position. He
may calculate that ,a tactical resignation in protest against
the Western occupation would restore his prestige. He may
also believe that he would profit more by calling early elections
than by waiting until the end of his term. The outcome_ of the
provincial elections which begin on 18 June will have an im-
portant effect on Adenauer's control over his coalition Cabinet ?
and the stability of his regime.
European Attitude Meanwhile, a pattern of European reaction
, to German participation in European affairs
Is beginning to emerge. With the Netherlands, Italy, and the
Scandinavian nations long disposed to favor closer ties with
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West Germany as indispensable to building a strong Western
European bloc, progress in this direction has in the past
been retarded largely by France. The French are now favor-
ably disposed in principle to integrating Germany more closely
with the nations of Western? Europe,? but fear of German domi-
nance is impelling the French to move cautiously and to insist
that any steps toward German integration be taken collectively
rather than as a result of bilateral arrangements. Meanwhile,
re-emergence of Germany as a member of the Western Euro-
pean community can be expected to find increasing support
from the Italian Government and the Vatican. Although anxious
to form a solid bloc of European nations as an effective check
against any future expansionist tendencies in Germany, Italy,
more strongly than France, will urge German membership in
multilateral arrangements leading eventually to a strong Euro-
pean union, Specifically, Italy will press for the admission of
Germany as a full member of both the Council of Europe and
the propoged European Payments Union.
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WESTERN EUROPE
FRANCE
Political Tension The political calm which has prevailed
in France during the recent recess of
the National Assembly will probably be broken during the
next few weeks, but a crisis of serious proportions is not
likely to develop before June. The National Assembly will
consider numerous controversial issues during May, but
party leaders will attempt to avoid a crisis until after the
London Foreign Ministers' Conference and after the MRP
and Socialist Party conferences at the end of May, Parlia-
mentary action on the budgetary deficit?the issue most likely
to cause a crisis--will probably be postponed until June.
GERMANY
Sovzone Trade The failure of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) to renew a single trade
agreement with the West in 1950 is another indication cit the
further integration of the East German economy into that of
the Soviet orbit, During 1949, the Soviet orbit absorbed
more than 80 percent of East German exports; as a result,
the GDR was unable to fulfill its trade commitments to
Western Europe, and the various countries concerned have
expressed little interest in renewing the agreements for
1950. Trade with Belgium became practically nonexistent
by late 1949, and negotiations for 1950 have been postponed
indefinitely, Deliveries to the GDR from the Netherlands
have reportedly been suspended because of the large balance
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GERMANY
already owed by the East Germans. Deliveries to Denmark
lagged in 1949, although they apparently picked up in March 1950.
Trade with Finland was deliberately cut, in an apparent attempt
to exert pressure in conjunction with the USSR. GDR commit-
ments calling for a 35 percent increase in trade with the USSR
and 50 percent with Czechoslovakia indicate that East Germany's
ability totrade with the West will decline still further during
1950-51.
BELGIUM
Royal Controversy The Belgian elections scheduled for 4 June
are not likely to reveal any substantial
change in popular opinion on the controversial royal question.
Although it is entirely possible that the pro-Leopold Catholic
Party will obtain the two additional parliamentary seats needed
for a majority, thus paving the way for restoration of the King,
such a solution would not bring political peace to Belgium. The
current elections; coming after a prolonged political crisis, will
further arouse public feelings, and political bickering will con-
tinue unless :King Leopold can be persuaded to abdicate In favor
of his son.
SPAIN
Soviet Talks Current "secret" negotiations between agents
of Spain and the USSR on trade development and
prisoner exchange are probably calculated by Franco to arouse
alarm in the US over possible Spanish rapprochement with the
USSR, and, at the same time, to obtain whatever material benefits
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SPAIN
are possible through trade with Eastern Europe. Except in
the unlikely event that the USSR grants extensive credits
to Spain, the amount of such trade cannot be large, and ex-
portable supplies of strategic materials which Spain
can offer (such as cork, mercury, wolfram, pyrites) are
quite limited. Although the exchange of prisoners in-
volved (Spanish members of the Blue Division held in
Russia in return for certain Soviet veterans of the Spanish
Civil War or Communist agents captured since then) is
incidental, the exchange would provide the Franco Govern-
ment with a useful "explanation" which would allay domestic
doubts and criticism from those who would denounce any
rapprochement with the Soviet Government.
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EASTERN EUROPE
TRIESTE
Italian Reaction Marshal Tito's recent conciliatory
gesture toward Italy in. an address
to the Yugoslav National Assembly has done lithe more than
leave the door slightly ajar for further progress on the Trieste
issue. Speaking in apparent recognition that the De Gasperi
Government is being confronted by a major political crisis
as a consequence of bitter Italian feeling over the Yugoslav
proposals to take over Zone B, Tito specifically mentioned
Trieste. as a problem that should not be permitted to stand in
the way of improved Italian-Yugoslav relations. Although high
Yugoslav officials have recently expressed the opinion that
the present Italian Government cannot make a reasonable settle-
ment of the Trieste issue without risking violent political re-
actions throughout Italy, Tito apparently feels that the door
should be kept open for taking advantage of the earliest oppor-
tunity to resolve the issue.
The Italian Government, which realizes that the terms
on which the Trieste problem could be settled now would be
totally unacceptable .to the Italian public, has offered to re-
sume negotiations with Yugoslavia on the reparations question,
in the hope that the scope of these talks can be enlarged to in-
clude broader issues at a later date. In view of the excited
state of Italian opinion, Premier De Gasperi may call upon the
Western Powers to reaffirm their adherence to the 20 March 1948
declaration, in order to soothe the Italians. De Gasperi would then
probably remove the Trieste issue from the public arena, and con-
duct unofficial secret negotiations with Yugoslavia with a view to
preserving the status quo and averting any further unilateral
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TRIESTE
Yugoslav moves in Zone B, until such time as a reduction
of tension gave piomise of a satisfactory solution of the
whole problem. On the other hand, if De Gasperi is unable
to quiet the public clamor on the Trieste issue, it is possible
that resentment against the West for its apparent failure to
support the Italian position will produce strong pressure for
Italy's withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty and for
denunciation of the Italian peace Treaty.
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NEAR EAST-AFRICA
SYRIA
Anti-US Campaign The continuing vituperative anti-US
campaign in Syria, launched by the
blistering statements of Minister of National Economy
Dawalibi, has precipitated a serious political crisis. The
extremely nationalist Moslem Brotherhood, which advocates
closer ties with the USSR, is using the campaign as a means
of arousing popular support and of increasing its influence in
the government. Opposition to the Moslem Brotherhood cam-
paign is apparently centered in the army, which hopes for US
arms and equipment and which is strongly anti-Soviet The
resignation of Defense Minister Hawrani, who is believed to
have represented the interests of the army in the Azm Govern-
ment and who was considered to be the dominant figure in the
Cabjnet, will probably lead to a major Cabinet reshuffle. Neither
Hawrani nor the army leaders have been associated with the
anti-US campaign, and the Cabinet shuffle may precipitate a
showdown between them and the Moslem Brotherhood, possibly
bringing about the downfall of Prime Minister Am, who is trying
to steer on middle course between the two groups.
Soviet Policy
relations with
ment would do
IRAN
Although there are rumors that Iranian Premier
Ali Mansur may favor a "soft policy" in Iran's
the USSR, it is doubtful that the Iranian Govern-
anything Which would definitely prejudice its
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IRAN
relations with the US. The Premier, who considers him-
self a shrewd bargainer, has allegedly advised the Shah to
revert to a "neutral" policy in the East-West struggle, and
he may be inclined to broaden discussions apparently now
going on with the USSR regarding trade relations, in the
hope of improving political relations between the two coun-
tries. Most of the important men in the Iranian Government,
however, realize that Iran must continue to look to the US for
moral and economic support and would probably block any
attempts by Mansur to grant major concessions to the USSR
FRENCH AFRICA
Communist Tactics The new Communist emphasis in
French Africa on Communist doc-
trine instead of on national and racial themes of more popu-
lar appeal will tend to contract the sphere of Communist
influence in Africa at least for the short term. Heretofore,
Communist policy in FrenchSorth and West Africa has been
one of collaboration at almost any pr,ice with iridigenous move-
ments in the hope of eventually capturing their lendership. The
new Communist policy coincides with the world-wide Communist
trend toward developing a militant, hard-core strength. Nation-
alism and race feeling will continue to be exploited but will be
adapted to the orthodox Communist revolutionary thesis rather
than constituting the principal line, and the doctrine of class
struggle will be even more openly advanced. In competing with
the Nationalists for control of the masses, the Communists
will thus be at a disadvantage by virtue of having to sell the
straight Communist line, which has less popular appeal than
the themes used by the Nationalists.
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FAR EAST
CHINA
? Military Plans Although the capture of Hainan has placed
The Chinese Communist Army in a position
to invade Southeast Asia, there are no concrete indications
? that the Communists are ready to depart from previous inter-
national Communist strategy or to run the risk of precipitating
general hostilities by taking such ,a step at this time. Moreover,
the Communist troops available for such an invasion probably ?
will be needed for more immediate and pressing problems con-
fronting the Peiping regime. Many of the troops involved in
the Hainan invasion will be occupied for some time in consolih
? dating Communist control over that island; other troops in South
China willte needed to strengthen Communist control over the
many wide areaswhich remain in the hands -of local authorities,
? brigands, or organized thieving bands. Moreover, a consider-
able number of Chinese troops probably will be employed to ?
establish a strategic reserve for the coming invasion of Nation..
alist4ield Taiwan. The Communists have already stated that
? they are planning to utilize a force of one million men for the
invasion of this last Nationalist stronghold. There is also the
possibility that the Chinese Communists may wish to augment..
their forces along the Hong Kong border in preparation for in-
creasing their pressure against the British crown colony. Al-
though the communist conquest of Hainan probably will not
result in organized, military invasion of any Southeast Asian
areas, the Chinese Communists, in addition to supplying advisers
and technical personnel to the various Communist-led resistance
groups iri Southeast Asia and the Philippines, will be in a posi-
tion to facilitate the shipment of material aid to these same areas.
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THE PHILIPPINES
Quirino Opposition President Quirino's continued inability
to cope with serious domestic problems,
coupled with administrative corruption and abuses of authority,
has so-undermined-popular confidence in Quirino that he will
soon be forced either to make sweeping political concessions
or relinquish his office. Quirino has already lost effectite con-
? trol over his own Liberal Party to Vice President Lopez, Who
with active Senate support is seeking political concessions from
Quirino that will in effect transfer Quirino's authority to him.
Although the Lopez group would probably be content to have
Quirino take extended leave, continued stubbornness on Quirino's
part could lead to impeachment proceedings. Lopez would com-
mand greater support than Quirino and might eradicate some
administrative abuses, but he would probably not institute the
sweeping reforms needed to eliminate the basic causes of
economic and political instability in the Philippines.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE
BOLIVIA
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Communist Conference The recent proposal'of the?Boli-
vian Government that a conference
of Latin countries be held in La Paz this month to discuss
Communist activities in?South America is believed to be an-
other attempt by Bolivia to focus attention on its "Communist
problem." -By emphasizing-the Communist threat, Bolivia -
probably hopes that its request for US economic aid will be
given more consideration. It is virtually certain that such a
conference of Latin countries will not be held, but bilateral
consultations between interested governments may take place.
WEST INDIES
Communist Sabotage Dutch and British. recognition of Com-
munist China may present a security
problem the West Indies. In Curacao and Aruba, where about
.60 percent of all Venezuelan crude-petroleum exports are re-
fined, oil companies currently employ, over three hundred ?
chines!: nationals, for the most pert as seamen in the tanker
? . fleet, viiih a few in the refineries themselves. Oil .company ?
officials had relied heavily on the recently resigned Chinese
? ? Nationalist consul at Willeinstad in screening these employees.
If, as seems entirely possible, the Chinese Communist Govern-
ment appoints a consul,his ?presence in the. vicinity of the highly -
sensitive refinery installations Would be a Matter of considerable
.condern, as these. installations constitute one of the most re .
numerative targets for sabotage in the Western Hemisphere. In
'T.rinidecti the principal source of petroleum 'Within the British
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WEST INDIES
Empire, there are several thousand Chinese, for the most
part small shopkeepers, and at least one Communist cell
has emerged among them since the defeat of Nationalist
China. Sentiment among the Chinese residents of Trinidad
appears to favor the appointment of a representative of the
Communist regime to replace the recently resigned Nation-
alist consul.
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DECLINE IN CHINESE COMMUNIST POPULARITY
The popularity and prestige of the Chinese Communist?
regime has steadily declined in recent months. The enthusiasm
of many former supporters has begun to wane and the apathy of
the general population has turned to disappointment, resentment,
and, .in some instances, to open hostility. Although the public -
attitude poses a serious problem for the Peiping regime, there
is no prospect that popular disaffection will lead to the over
of the regime in the foreseeable future.
The principal causes for dissatisfaction are: (1) eco.-
nomic hardship (2) the imposition of social controls; and (3) the
apparent subservience of the Communist regime to the USSR.
Thus far, Communist performance in these spheres of govern-
mental responsibility and public policy appears to be giving
most Chinese reason to doubt that the new regime can offer
any more than did the old toward a solution of their problems
and the fulfillment of their national and personal aspirations.
China's serious economic plight has been the principal
cause of the new regime's declining prestige. The famine, the
cumulative effects ofthe war, and the curtailment of foreign
trade have combined to bring about the worst economic con-
ditions in years. Communist efforts and capabilities to cope
with this situation have been inadequate and in many instances
have aggravated popular discontent. Unpopular Communist
acts have included: (1) the extortionate seizure of all available
agricultural produce; (2) the levying of excessively high taxes;
(3) the failure to alleviate industrial unemployment; (4) the
coercive Victory Bond campaign; and (5) the policy of forcing
business enterprises to continue unprofitable operations.
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?? Although the Chinese traditionally regard government
.a necessaryevil and thus have tended to accept the Com-t
munist apparatus of political dictatorship, they are beginning.
to 'resent the Communist program of indoctrination and organi-
zation as an irritating invasion of their leisure- and privacy: The
brutality Of Communist cadres in manyrural areas has also ?
alienated the elements of the population whose suppoit is most
'necessary to the Communist program. This resentment will
unquestionably increase if the Communists take drastic steps .
to interfere with social customs and practites, a trend already
begun by the recent promulgation of a Comprehensive law govern-
ing ma.rria.ge and divorce.
? . Finally, Communist prestige has suffered in some degree
from popular suspicion that the interests of China are being ?
sacrificed to those of the Soviet Union.- Although the issue ?
of Soviet relations is a sensitive one only for Chinese intellectual
circles, the present Soviet position in China is so strong and so
? obvious that the Chinese Communists are kept constantly on the .
defensive in attempting to justify the situation.
The Chinese Communists are not immediately. threatened.
bythe present popular discontent' they. realize, however, that
?04 cannot 'successfully organize China if a state of open
hostility develos between the masses of the people and the
TPaitsr:-. The large rural population scattered over a tremendous
area almost wholly lacking in adequate transportation arid corn,
munications facilities confronts the Chinese Communists with
Control problems not faced by the Eastern European Communist
governments. The Chinese Communists can therefore by ext
pected to adopt vigorous measures to gain popular support for
their regime and to progress slowly and cautiously in imposing
on the people all the trappthgs oft Communist state.
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LATIN AMERICAN ARMS PROGRAM
Recent Latin American purchases of arms from
'European sources indicate that the trend is now definitely
toward greater heterogeneity in war materiel and away
from any "standardization of arms program.'! Favorable
prices and payment?terms offered by European arms manu-
facturers as well as dollar shortages in Latin countries,
are causig these countries to resume the prewar practice
of arms procurement without regard to standardization. The
increasing heterogeneity of war materiel acquired since 1949
has also resulted from aggressive European sales tactics and
from the fact that Latin American countries have traditionally
secured arms from Europe rather than the US. Procurenient
of aircraft, small arms, and naval equipment is diversified
to a varying degree in nearly all Latin American countries.
Argentine purchases of British jet fighters and bombers
have reduced the percentage of US aircraft in the Argentine
airforce from 42 to 17 percent. The percentage of US aircraft
owned by the Dominican Republic has also dropped (from 100
?to 84 percent); and jet fighter purchases by Venezuela have
caused a decrease from 100 to 94 percent. Brazil is negoti-
ating for 30 British jet aircraft, and some Latin countries are
building up their air transport systems with British commercial
craft.
Almost all Latin American orders for small arms are
now being placed in Belgium. Further diversification can be
expected as the result of energetic and successful efforts by
Switzerland and Czechoslovakia to sell machine guns and the
likelihood that France will share in the mortar trade.
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The prewar reliance on the UK for naval equipment
? has also been resumed, and purchases by Peru, Argentina,
Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic have already reduced
the percentage of US-built naval units in Latin America. Pur-
chases from Canada have also been considerable.
? In addition to increased purchases from Europe, the
growing small arms industry in Latin America is contributing
to diversification, since European patents and calibers are
generally used. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have ordnance
industries which produce a large part of their ammunition
requirements; and Chile and Peru manufacture some ammuni-
tion as well as replacement parts.
In contrast to this increasing procurement of non-US
materiel, purchases from the US remain negligible. Although
all the Latin American republics subscribe to the principle
of standardization, arms purchases by Latin American countries
will probably, as at present, be governed by local short-term
considerations. As long as European manufacturers retain
their competitive advantages, the Latin republics are likely to
continue to accumulate miscellaneous assortments of arms.
- 19 -
SECEtET
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/14 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300130001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/14 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300130001-1
C
C
C
a
a
a
a
a
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SECRET
DISTRIBUTION
1 The President
2,64 Secretary of State
3,4... Secretary of Defense
5 . .... ? Secretary of the Army
? Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
? Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations
Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), US Air Force
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
? Director'of Plans and Operations, -US Air Force
Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 , Intelligence
7
8,70 ? .
9,71 .
10
11,69 . .
12,13,14
.15,16,17
18 . . .
-19
20
21
22,23,24 . . .
25,26,27,28,29,
30,31,32,33,34.
35,36,37,38,39,
40,41,42,43,44.
45,46,47,48,49,72,
73,74,75. .
50
51 .
...
? .....
52,53,54,55,56
57
58
59......
60 . . .
61 . . . .
62,63 .
65 ?
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.....
.....
68
Director of Naval Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USAF
Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Comm.
Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
Chief, Acquisition & Distribution Div. OCD, State
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigition
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Secretary of State (Attention: Policy Reports Staff)
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, joint Staff
US Air Force Representative of Joint Strategic
Survey Committee
Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
SECRET
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/14 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300130001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/14 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300130001-1
Docunient No. e I
NO CNANGE in Class. CI
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Clataa C TO: 73 S C
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Lath: T. 1. ' :3
Date: 31.-q-= 7 e By : 3
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/14 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300130001-1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/14 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300130001-1
U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFIC
2631-S---1948
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/14 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002300130001-1