MANAGEMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS AT PLANT 659, SVERDLOWSK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81-01030R000100270005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 4, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
SECURITY INFORMATION
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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COUNTRY
USSR (Sverdlovsk Oblast)
SUBJECT Management and Working Conditions at
Plant 659, Sverdlovsk
DATE CW 140
PLACE ACQUIRE
REPORT
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
REQUIREMENT
REFERENCES
4 December 1953
17
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50X1-HUM I
THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)
50X1-HUM
1. Turbomotorny zaVod, paragraph 4, should read turbomotornyy zavod.
2. Dispecher; paragraph- 17, should read disOetcher.
3. Sturmovshchina, paragraph 19; should read shturmovshchina.
4. Otdel Tekhnicheskoi Kontroli, paragraph 21, should read Otdel
Tekhnicheskogo Kontrolya.
5. Mitingi; paragraph 39, should read mitinRY.
6. Pen' otdel, paragraph 64, should read.pervyy otdel.
2. Otdel naimov i uvolnenii, paragraph 65, should read otdel naimov i
uvolneniv.
8. Starshi prepodavatell paragraph 78, should read starshiy prepodavatel.
9. Remeslenniye uchilishchi, paragraph 96, should read remeslennyye
uchilishchya.
Comment
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Zhukin, paragraph 11, has been previously referred to as Shchukin.
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SE?CniET SECURITY,INFORMATION-
STATE
x#
ARMY
x#
NAVY .
x#
AIR
x#
FBI
AEC
(Note: Washington Distribution indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)
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SECURITY INFORMATION
?
COUNTRY s. USSR::
. SUBJECT? management...and Working CanditiOne at Plant
No _659 SVerdlevsk..
'.PLACE.
? ACOUIRED
DATE
ACqUIRED
DATE bF:11
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
REPORT
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DATE DISTR. 110 C 7:33
t ?
NO. OF PAGES 16"
NO. OF ENCLS.
BASTED BELOW)
? SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO. 50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
PLACE OF EMWT.GYMEN;
14ANAGEKENT:AT PLANT
:Planning ProOodtrisie
Party yeiptieahtir,iind
Trade UniOnActiwities
TABLE -OF CONTENTS ? 50X1-HUM
NO. 659 '
Activities .
9
ieD4OB Sctivitie? 10
CLassificatiOn: Of Industry 'in the USSR .11
? LABOR AND. WORKING. CONDITIONS AT .PLANT No.. 659 11
Sal4ries. and Wagee' 11
Performanee_LNermi.and Real Income of Workers 13
Restrietioal'on Employment liobility, 14
PLACE OF EMPLOYEENT
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? Plant To; 659 produced large?.generators, . transformers. and other e1ect4.7
.eqIiipment. Most products were mantifaCtured?Individually and not ?
? otst.asiiinbly line. basis. Approximately 34000spereons.?were employe
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3.
5,
6.
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at the plant in 1946. The number of ? 50X1-HUM
employees increased during the following six years, probab1:50x1
:5,000 at the time of my departure. .1 --
Sotsgorodok was neither
a suburb of Sverdlovsk nor an independent
workers' settlement but an integral part of the city itself.
The inhabitants of
Sotsgorodok were mainly employees of Plant No. 659, Plant No, 76 ,
.
(a so-called turbomotor7 zavod). Zavod No. 8 and numerous smaller
enterprises' in the:area '
40,000 to 50; 000 inhabitants oi botsgorodok. there were'sbout 50X1-HUM
the population of Sverdlovsk
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in 1951 was approximately 600,000. Incidentally, this figure was 5
never mentioned in the press and was in general kept secret;
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MAHA0E)ENT AT PLANT No. 659
Planning Procedures
7: Plant No. 659 was supervised by the Ministry of the Electrical
Industry. KAHANOV was Minister of the Electrical
Industry until about 1949 when he was replaced by YEFREMOV.
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8. The ministry drew up the yearly production plans for Plant No... 659.
These plans were established in consulation with the plant .director
and the chief engineer. However, it should be stressed that the
production plane drawn up by the ministry were not subject to any
alterations at'the plant level. Any deviations from the plan which
. occurred as a result of, for example, the failure of outside agencies
to deliver necessary raw materials had to be thoroughly .justified
and cleared with the ministry. Working relationships between plant
and industry were facilitated by frequent trips to Moscow on the
part of the director and his chief engineer. Ministry officiale?also
held inspections at the plant four or. five times A year.. The
minister himself put man appearance once or twice a Year;
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9? the misIstry also established the quarterly Production
plans as the plant was required to submit plan fulfillment reports
everutbreesonths to the ministry.. On the other hand, the drawing
lip of Monthly production flans was the responsibility of the plant .
management.. These monthly plane were developed by the chief engineer
444'nonsultat56n-with the director. ?The plant's Party secretary was .
also consulted On this matter.
. .
10. The plant's planning department (planovoye otdeleniye) evidently drew
up monthly planafor'individual shops and departments. At any rate,
it was clear that a shop chief'received a written order each month
from the planning department Which stipulated exactly *hat his shop
had to produce in theMoming month. The primary task of the planning
office Of.ithe plant was to check up on the fulfillment of production
plans by.sthe various production' shops and offices. More important,
it alded a shop Chief in overcoming production difficulties when plan
fulfillment wan Let jeopardy'. Most of this work was done bytelephone.
The planning official called up a shop chief and asked him how far .
he Ras along in hie plan, whether he was faced with any problems and
whether, he 'would meet his monthly production goals. The planning
department hae no 'officials assigned permanently to the production
shops nor did it dispatCh inspectors throughout the plant to check
on-the progress toward plan .fulfillment.
11. Plant No. 659 always fulfilled or orimfulfilled production plans
between the middle of 1950. Then 'd break-
? down occurred when the plant was overloaded with orders for large 50X1 -HUM
? electrical machinery. This part of the plan was only fulfilled by.
6,5 per cent. it was about this time that the plant
? director; ARAKUMOV, was transferred to a post of far lesser im-
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porianoe with e'small plant in the Ukraine. .ka was reputedly.
' demoted-because the plant failed to fulfill its production plans.
He was succeeded by .ZEUKIN.
?
12. There was a certain tendency to falsify plan fulfillment reports at
Plant No. 659. These reports were not out-and-out lies but were
written up to give a better picture of the state of affairs than
was.actually the case. Two types of plan fulfillment were recognised
in. the USSR. A plan could be fulfilled according to the total
? monetary .value of production. It could also be fulfilled according'
4o assortment (nomenklaturs); that is, every artiole,of-ProductiOn
was. manufactured in the quantities called for in the original plan.
.This was considered true plan fulfillment.. It Was a oommon.practioe
to facilitate matters by fulfilling production pland bnly-a6dCrd-
: ing to-. total production value and not according to assortment. The
:Plant- used materials. on hand to make products which were easier to .
produce and which had a relatively high book value in rubles instead
f.'producing, as-foreseen in the plan, articles which were more.
-difficult to manufacture.
13.
14.
the Soviet planning system impaired production
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striciesoy at 111ant-No. 659. This was most evident in the procure-
ment of raw materials or semifinished products-, by far the most
serious production problem at this enterprise. According to a
regulation which governed operations at Plant 659, no more than a
74.5?.-day scpply.of.raw-materials could be kept ofland. Aid-eVen-
this :amount. or raw materials was seldom available. Forty-five days
is an extremely short or material teseriew in such an electri-
mal plant. (In German nerally maintain reserves sufficient 50X1-HUM
for six months': operations.)
Furthermore, the planningt systeth was very inelastic. An annual
plan normally could not be altered, in regard to either production
/pale or supplies. This feature complicated procurement procedures
. egg
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as it was difficult to obtain raw materials or semifinished:products
which had not been provided _for in the plant's annual plan. When ?
.the need for a Particular material arose which had not been foreseen,
the plant attempted to procure.. this material by direct negotiations'
with the enterprise producing it. This was difficult as other
enterprises were also limited in their operations by annual plans.
This manner of procurement was also not entirely legal. As A result,
only small quantities of materials could be obtained through these
channels.
5. The procurement of materials outside of the plan depended con-
siderably upon the initiative of the individual shop chief and plant
director as well as their personal contacts in the supplier industry.
In a word, it depended on blat(pull).
. Asa result of these policies and procedures preventing the accumula-
tion of sufficient material reserves, complete or partial work
stoppages were a frequent occurrence in the workshops. The prodUc-
t'ion cycle followed an erratic course.
1,7. To illustrate this point, practically no work wa;
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done in a workshop during the first ten days of each month. Some
key parts or supplies were always missing. In view of this situation,
a shop chief had to reconsider what raw materials he needed for the
coming months operations and had to attempt to acquire these materials
in one way or another. He was aided in this task by his dispecher
(one was assigned to each shop) whose main job was just that. All
of this meant a considerable and unnecessary waste of man-hours.
18. When a shop found itself 'behind in its production schedule on about
the 20th of the month and the raw materials were finally on hand,
then all available human reserves were committed to fulfill the
plan by the appointed date. Workers put in a 12-hour instead of an
eight-hour day. And during the last three or four days of each
month the shop worked around the clock. Luckily for the workers,
they Sere generally given time off at the beginning of the month for
some of the overtime hours which they were required to put in at '
the end of a month.
19. No special measures such as shop meetings or the use of shock
brigades were taken towards the end of the month to bring about
plan fulfillment. Such steps were unnecessary as the lorkers and
employees were accustomed to this production cycle. In fact,
there is even a special Russian word - sturmovshchina - to describe
this speed-up at the end of a month.
20. Soviet planning procedures also hindered personal initiative. The
whole system was handled very bureaucratically, was built on an
almost military chain of command. Everyone waited for an order
from his superior before he did anything. Personal initiative was
extremely limited. There were only a few people in the plant who.
were truly interested in fulfilling the plan and they were not
always able to muy the broad masses of the workers. These were top
officials who had material interests at stake. They received bonuses
when plans were completed on schedule.
21. There was a technical control department (OTK Otdel Tekhnicheskoi
Kontroli) in every Soviet plant, which operated independently of .1
the plant director. An OTK reported directly to some outside agehay
on the ministerial level. The OTK at Plant No. 659 checked each
finished product to determine if it conformed with the predetermined
specifications (tekhusloviya)0 Specifications were drawn up for ?
every piece of mechanical or technical equipment produced in a plant.
Products were rejected when they failed to measure up to standard.
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22. There was an OTK representative, generally an engineer, assigned to
each shop in our plant. Inspectors under him carried out the
actual examination of finished products. As on the plant level,
this OTK representative was not subordinate to the shop chief but
reported directly to the plant OTK.
23. The OTK was supposed to function independently of the plant director
and to act as a neutral observer in maintaining the quality of pro-
duction. In practice the OTK at Plant No. 659 made every effort not
to cause the plant director any difficulty. OTK officials frequently
looked the other way when a faulty product came up for inspection.
The department made sure that final products were more or less in
order but that was about all. It is possible that OTK officials were
on friendly terms with the plant director or received monetary con-
siderations for their "services." 50X1-HUM
24. no inspection commissions which were sent to Plant No. 659
by ministries other than the Ministry of Electrical Industry for. the
purpose of checking on plan fulfill-client, quality of production or
financial administration. The only ministerial conimissions which
appeared were those sent three or four times .a year
by the supervising ministry. 50X1-HUM
Party Meibership arid Activities
25. Only a very small percentage of the workers and employees at Plant'
No. 659 were Party members;. perhaps only 2 per cent to 3 per. cent.
Probably about 50 per cent of the Party members were employees
(sluzhashchiye) and 50 per cent were workers. This ratio is .explained
by thief fact that all leading managerial personnel had to be Party
members.
26. It was an .unwritten law that only Party
from shop ohief on up. All shop chiefs
Party members. No person who was not a
have been chosen for such a post.unless
the necessary technical qualifications.
AbsolUte prerequisite for the positions
chief engineer and plant director,
members could occupy positions
and department chiefs were
member of the Party would
he were the only one who had
Party membership was an
of chief engineer, assistant
27. These requirements meant that Party members were given preferential
treatment in regard to professional advancement. Furthermore, a
Party member would always be given the nod over a non-Party member
in competing for a promotion, other qualifications being equal.
And Party members in some cases were advanced ahead of non-Pertv
members who were more qualified professionally. 50X1-HUM
28 this type of preferential treatment had certai 5.2X1-HUM
neuative effects on productive efficiency at the plant. For example,
a Soviet engineer who was an ex50X1-HUM
capable designer but had ILL-title to say in favor of communism. 50X1-HUM
Nobody prevented him from working at the plant because of his saea
of sympathy with the regime. Hoiever, he undoubtedly would have
occupied a leading position in this ministry as an advisei on the
construction of electrical machinery if he had been a member of the
Party. Any advance in his career was blocked because he was not
pariioularly in favor of the regime and because his application
for Party membership had been rejected. Although had a
number of inventions to his credit, he had received practioeFly
nothing from the Soviet Government in recognition of thesesefforts.
He certainly would have reoeived the Stalin Prize if he hid''
Party member and in sympathy with the government. 50X1-HUM
29. most Party members at Plant No. 659 were convinced
communists. There might have been a few opportunists who simply.
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joined the Party to further their careers but they were in the
minority. After all, being a member meant that one had to devote
an enormous amount of free time to Party activities. Few Party
members were ever able to enjoy a free night at home.
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30. no tension or rivalry between Party members'and non.
Party members, the latter regarded 50X1-HUM
Party members with a certain degree of respect. They recOgnized
that members.of the Party had to sacrific much of their free time
and outside, interests. '
31. The Party organization at Plant No. 659 was represented bY a
committee headed by a secretary. The secretary was .the leading
Party official in the plant and therefore was one of the most
influential individuals there. In addition to directing internal
Party affairs, he participated in all important production confer&
ences held by the plant director. He was consulted by the plant
director .on all important decisions concerning plan fulfillment.
The two individuals who occupied the post of Party secretary during
my employment there were both engineers. The Party secretary's
deintty was also an engineer.,
32. The Party was represented in each shop or department by a Party
organizer, or partorg. These functionaried reported directly to
the Party secretary. The position of Party organizer was a part-
:tithe job. Perhaps this explains why most Party organizers were
employees and not 'workers. Employees had more time for such
activities. .
34.
the plant Party committee consisted of the secret Y
his deputy and the ten or so Party. organizers. Fir-50X1-HUM
it is.noteworthy that not a sinee worker was a member
of the Party hierarchy. 50X1-HUM
There also was a Party office, or partkabinet, at the plant.' In
fact, the term "partkabinet" was popularly used by Soviet?workers
to refer to the Party leadership. ? Nowever, the term actually
referred only to the rooms housing the Party officials. The offioe
consisted of a reading room, stocked with propaganda material, and
a conference room where workers and employees were allowed to
discuss their problems with Party officials. Four people were '
employed there on a full-time.basis, including the Party secretary,
his deputy and two female stenographers.
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35. it was the primary task of the Party organization
to aid and support the plant management in fulfilling production
plans. This meant that the Party organization intervened in
? technical matters. should be kept in mind that the Party
? secretary was an engineer himself.)
36. is mentioned above, the Party secretary .Was consulted by the
director on all important decisions concerning plan fulfillment.
The Party bommittee intervened in some personnel matters. It
sometimes suggested new forms ofi'brganization or arranged for
the transfer of workers from one shop to another in order to
overcome production bottlenecks. The Party Opmmittee, through
the Party organizers in the individual shops, kept its eye out
for production problems such as shortages of raw ?materials and.
personnel... The committee received such reports from the Party
Organizers and presented these problems to the plant director
for solution.
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37. This intervention in production matters certainly produced no
negative results. Energetic action by the Party sometimes solved .
production problems or halted the progress of others which could ,
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have become more serious. In general, this intervention had a favor-
able effect on plant operations.
38. the disseMination of political propaganda, the political guidance
of plant personnel was a second major function of the Party 6ommittee.
It sponsored political meetings which were held on the occasion of
Major holidays and important political developments. Five or six
of these meetings were held in the course of a year. Perhaps two
were held oh a plant-wide basis while the remainder were held in
shifts in the individual shops and departments. Attendance at politi-
cal.meetings was compulsory in. 1947.
Ili:later years, the workers and employees were not forced to attend
3e;
them.
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These assemblies were referred to as "mitingi" when convoked on a
plant-wide basis. "Ritingi" were customarily held at 1700 hours. As
employees worked until 1800 tours and workers only until, 1700 hours;
the former constituted most of the people who attended them. . Politi-
cal meetings held on the shop level were simplYcalled "sobraniya."
Political meetings were held on a shop basis in order to save time 4
and to simplify their organization. The political "sobraniya" were'.
usually held during the lunch hour and were brief--20 to 30 minutes
long. The time was made up by overtime or by cutting the length of
the lunch hour.
40. The first meeting at Plant No. 659 was held in 1947 to
501
protest against death sentences imposed on 25 Greek communists,
petition on this theme was circulated throughout the plant follow-
ing...the meeting. Later meetings inaugurated petition campaigns in
connection with the Stockholm appeal and another "peace" drive.
Other meetings protested against American "aggression" in Korea and
the use of bacteriological warfare there.
41. Party organizers conducted the political meetings which were held
on the shop level. In particular, a partorg determined beforehand
who would take part in the discussions and at would be said. Before
a Meeting, he called together his men who were to lead the discussion-
they were always the same people - and informed them of the subject
to be discussed, what they should Bay and when they should speak. 50X1-HUM
The entire discussion was organized in this way.
42. these tactics werewolf knownto the rest of the workers:
It would have been impossible to develop a diecussion any other way
because of the passivity of the average worker; Ark& furthermore,
what could-the average worker say at one of.these meetings? He
could not challenge the validity of what the.speaker said and proba-
bly saw no sense in simply agreeing' with him.
43. There was also a network of agitators at Plant No, 659. Modt of
these agitators were young people - mainly Party candidates and a
few Komsomol members. Two or three agitators were assigned t6 each
shop. They worked together with the partorg in a shop and were
subordinate to him. The agitators were responsible for carrying out.
various propaganda drives, particularly in support of May Day
celebrations, the October Revolution anniversary and the various..
elections which were held almost every year. An agitator called on
the workers and their families in his section before each election
and imp?essed them wfth the necessity of voting. They also held
short political talks during the lunch hour (usually every two weeks).
on current political events. They received printed material for
these talks from the partkabinet - usually the Agitators Notebook
or 'a recent Pravda editorial'.
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44. Printed-propaganda was distributed only in the form of so-called wall
newspapers. The distribution of pamphlets and leaflets was probably
hindered by a paper shortage.
45. The Party committee conducted courses on Marxism-Leninism and Stalin's
History of the All-Union Communist Party. These oourses lasted from
Thur to six months with classes meeting once a week in the evening.
They were primarily attended by Party candidates, Komsomol members
and others who wished to further their careers by acquiring the
necessary knowledge of Party dogma. Attendance at these courses was
completely voluntary. No pressure was necessary as the successful
completion of such courses was a prerequisite for certain higher
positions in the plant.
46. It was also necessary to attend the more advanced courses at the
Sverdlovsk evening school for Marxism-Leninism in order to qualify
for leading managerial positions. The course of studies at this
Party-sponsored university lasted two years. Classes there were held
after working hours, two or three times a week,
50X1-HUM
47*
48.
no difference between the treatment of proPaginda
themes by plant propagandists and the treatment given these same themes
by the Soviet press and radio. Central Party organs determined not
only the subjects of plant meetings but also the texts of the talks'
!hich-were given by local propagandists. So-called "self-oritidism"
published in wall newspapers was the only informetionyhiCh was not '
in conformity with the central press. The "self-criticism" was some-
times very hard on the individuals under attack..
The Soviet workers reacted to these various propaganda meetings much
like a herd of sheep being driven into a pen. When the order came
down to attend the meeting, they went along without any apparent
thought of distaste or enthusiasm. Once there, they showed little
interest in the proceedings. Everyone knew what was goihg to be
said: attacks on the West and appeals to double their efforts at the
werkbenoh. Some fell asleep, talked during the meetings or simplk
Walked out. A speaker's remarks were certainly not greSted with wide-
awake attention on the part of the aUdience.
These propaganda measures served the primary purpose Of reMinding.the
Soviet workers time and time again of the basic; tenets of 'Party;
doctrine. So in this respect, it is difficult to judge whether the
political talks were successful or not. The propagandists were not
trying to indoctrinate but rather to remind the workers, just as a- -;
prbet in,a church uses the Holy'Soriptures over and over again in. '50X1-HUM
50.
delivery his weekly sermons.
; with the
exception
shop.
which
interest
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observe,
-
"
were
'of Closed Party meetings, free to attend.all.of the
meetings, political demonstrations
held at the plant. The only
and politioarlsoturts
limitation was the lack of
of a Party organizer was to
-HUM
50X1-HUM
Another "political? function
the political reliability and sympathies of the workers
and employees
in his shop. People were judged
by opinions expressed
in chance
conversations and by their
attitudes toward work.
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every Party organizer was an out-and-out
was
undoubtedly expected to keep an eye out for suoh matters.
50X1-HUM
51.
the planttrade union committee was 50X1-HUM
primarily responsible for encouraging the development of socialist .
competitions and the assumption of socialist pledges. These questions.
were generally discussed at meetings convoked by the trade union
oommittee. It is possible that the Party committee sometimes had a
voice in these matters. But if so, that was the exception rather
than the rule.
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'Trade Union Activities
53. In contrast to the Party committee, the plant trade union committee
(zavkom) was predominantly staffed by workers0 not believe 50X1-HUM
that any of its members, even the secretary, were full-time trade
union functionaries. The trade union was also represented-in every
shop or department by a two- or three-man oommittee.
540.
the zavkom was elected by the members of the various5?X1 -HUM
shop committees0 the shop committees 50X1-HUM
themselves were chosen by the workers in direct, secret elections. A
worker received a ballot at election time which contained the names
of quite a few candidates. He crossed out the names of those whom
he did not wish to vote for and placed his folded ballot in,a ballot
box. Elections were held each year.
55. Almost all workers and employees at Plant No. 659 were trade union
members. Trade union membership carried with it certain advantages,
particularly in reference to vacations at rest homes (somatimes
financed by the trade union) and wage payments during periods .of
sickness (subsidized in part by the trade union). The trade union
and not the plant paid for wages of workers and employees during
annual leave.
56. Workers and employees who were allowed to spend subsidized vacations
at trade union recreation homes were selected by the zavkom on the
basis of work performance, political activities and contribution to
welfare activities. Only a relatively small number were able to
spend their vacations at these rest homes as they were limited in
capacity. Perhaps only ten or 12 workers and employees were able to?
visit a rest home in Crimea or in other well-known resort areae in
the course of a year. The plant also owned several rest homes in
the Sverdlovsk area. Competition for assignments there was not
so keen.
57. One of the primary tasks of the zavkom was to act as a sort of
welfare agency for workers and employees. The zavkom was responsible
for seeing that housing conditions were relatively sanitary and
satisfactory. It collected private contributions from plant-personnel
for workers and employees who were seriously ill. And, as noted
above, it subsidized the vacations of some workers.
58. Its-second major task was to introduce production improvement
measures and to mobilize the workers in support of production plans.
Each shop held a meeting once a month for the purpose of announcing
production goals for the coming month. The shop trade union repre-
sentative or perhaps the shop chief himself discussed individUal
assignments, the importance of particular projects, the need of
improving the quality of work and the necessity of conserVing raw
materials and semifinished projects.
59. Socialist pledges (obligations) were also announced, disouribed and
approved by the assembled workers at these meetings. Socialist
pledges were undertaken either by individuals, by a group :of workers
or by an entire shop or section. "Mese pledges generally called for
the completion of production plans ahead of schedule. Similar were
the socialistoomietitions which were normally oonduoted between two
enterprises. Each plant fried to outdo the other in overfulfilling ?
its production plan.
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50X1
60. These various forms of socialist competition and'pledges were not
? taken very seriously. They often represented' just a scrap of paper..
? It was certainly true at Plant No. 659 'that at least Ons-hnlf nf
? these Pledges were never fulfilled. 50X1-HUM
61. The.zavkomActed as a grievance committee for plant personnel. A
worker who felt that he had been treated unjustly was entitled to
lodge a complaint wiWthe committee. The zavkom was often effective
ln?correcting injustices brought to Us attention, at least in those
oases where there was a legal fOiindition fot?such action. In a :
case 'several Morkersjp:myAhop were assigned to a -
prdjent-Whinh-ddUld prove injurious'tOltheir health. However, they
were not granted additional.annual leave for?dnhealthy or dangerous
work as is required by Soviet law: 'They submitted a complaint to
the zavkom and the zavkom organized an inapection oommittee to study
the case. It was determined by this committee that the workers were
justified in their-demands and the.plant management bad to grant them
the additional leave.
62.. The zavkom played A secondary role in comparison with the pint's
Party committee 'In general, the Farts: Committee was resPonsible
for political tutelage within the plant while thezavkom handled
the workers' daily problethe of making a living.
MVD-MGR Activities
50X1-HUM
63, It was only in the last two or three year? that the term "MOB" came,
into'use by'SoViet workers andlemplOYee0.at'Plant No. 659: Most
'of them continued to 'refer to all eeeret-police as the "MVD" simply
because it Was the older Or the two Agencies: They seemed to make
no preciee'distinction botieen the-two. And'althougk 50X1-HUM
'the MOB assumedAdditional .reepondibilities in 1949 or 1950
no Merreenondind Changes within Plant No. 659. For these
reasons refer to all police agencies at the plant aa the
?
64. Like all:other plantain the Soviet Vhion, Plant No. 659 had A first
'department (nervy Otdel) which was responsible for the safekeeping
of classified documents.. The section was not responsible for any
Other security.Measures Within the4laiit Only 50X1-HUM
the.plant director; co4ercial direetor, personnel-chief and'Party ?
secretary had direct access to the safi.roomMf the first depart-
ment where 'classified documents were kept. Other plant personnel
who were authorized?to withdraw documents from thie section were -
'waited onin'a small anteroom nett to the safe room.
65. The personnerdepartient.at.thed.plant,waS known as'otdel naimov.
uvolnenii.- The chief of this deliartient;Xeceived orders from
both the.plant director and a higheilTD dffidew. The personnel
chief was :a senior lieutenant in the DUD: ? While on duty, he wore
a Soviet army officetis' uniform and a:visor nap With green band. ?
The Soviet eiployeei referred to this man as an MVD officer. ? He
was traneferred in the winter of 1951r52 and was replaced by .8,
civilian employee. -The citlian was apparently not an 'IND official
as he had previously been employed as a?shop chief in the Plant.
?
66. The personnel department dealt with all personnel matters: It .
considered employment applications and requests for job releases.
It also dealt with personal complaints and requests (regarding
housing, 'for example) which were tdo.sorious to be handled by
the zavkom.
67. But the personnel department was also responsible for maintenance
of security within the plant. It 'issued all identification cards
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and gave permission *Or visitors to'enter the plant grounds. In
fact, the plant 8UarA detachment took orders from the personnel chief.
It is noteworthy that once a month the chief of the'personnel section
Made a detailed inspection of the plant facilities. He was aCcompanied
on these tours by two or three MVD officers from outside the plant.
the inspections were held .for the purpose of determining
the enforcement of security regulations. The personnel department was
undoubtedly responsible for assembling and maintaining dossiers on 50X1-HUM
plant personnel, although these dossiers werekept in the safe room of
the first department. And finally, the pereannel chief had some
connections With the fire department. .
68. There was a network of informers at Plant. No. 659. .In every shop
and section, two or three Party membere (including the partorg)
reported on the political reliability of their fellow workers and 50X1-HUM
employees, these informers reported directly to the
Party secretary and that the Party secretary and personnel chief
cooperated closely in each matters!
?
69. poliica1 surveilliance was relatively lax
A person would not be in niegrace for any petty 50X1-HUM
Statement whichcould be interprpted as a sign of disloyalty or
dissatisfaction.. In fact, Many Mtcrkere were quite open in their
complaints about certain workinecoSitions.,:Perhaps this situation
is explained by the location of'Sverdlovsk. That is, the Urals
area was considered a place of partial exile. The authorities
? there were not so sensitive about such matters.
At any rate, the average worker or employee:wee apparently not
? bothered much by the presence of Party'or MND informers. But persons
? Opposed to the regime were, of-oaniee, .very cautious in making any,
? statements oritipal of the Soviet Union. On the several occasions
when.euch.individuals were discussing politically sensitive subjects
with me, they always opened the door., irst to make sure that no
onevas-eaveadropping..
Clasdification of Industry In the USSR
71.. There were three categories of industry in the USSR. 50X1-HUM
the first category included the armaments industry, coal 50X1-HUM
ng, ferrous and hon-ferrous metal industries, heavy machine
building and large conetrnotion projects. The third category
included the food processing olothing and other goods industries;
probably all republic and union-republic economic ministries.
In 'the second category were found all other industries; for
example, the electrical industry, light madhine building and
the chemical industry. Although the exact breakdown is not clear
these 50X1-HUM
categories existed; the armaments industry was found in the first
category;. the Minietry of the Electrical :Industry(superviding '
Plant No. 659)was in the second category; and the consumer goods
industry was in the third.
72. Industries were placed in these' categories in accordance With
their importance (Category One being the Most important and
Category Three the least important) anewere4iven corresponding.
privileges in respect to wages, assignment Of personnel, housing,
rationing of consumer goods (prior to the .currency reform) and
in other ways.
t
LABOR and WORKING CONDITIONS AT PLANT No. 659.
Salaries and Wages
73. Workers Were assigned td'eight job cetegories (narYady). A specific
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hourly wage was establishe& for each job classification.
a worker in Group VI'received 3.03 rubles per hour
that he fulfilled performance norms by 100 per cent)
50X1
50X1-HUM
assumin 1450X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
74. Included in Group I and Group II were apprentices ("ucheniki")
with no previous knowledge of a trade. Unskilled workers Were in
Group III. Graduates of a two-year trade school were placed in
Group IV. They started on the job in this class. In Group V were
workers only slightly more advanced than those in Group /V. Group
VI included workers who had advanced from the previous class by
passing an examination. Most workers Were in Group V and VI. In
Group VII were workers who had advanced from Group VI by passing an
examination. At the most, 10 per cent of all workers were in this
class. And Group VIII included workers who had advanced from Group
VII by passing an examination. Workers in thie class, the top
75.
category,
were very
listedbelow
and salaries
or charwoman
Only women took
rare.
the average 50X1-HUM
at Plant
50X1-HUM
to 300 rubles.
.menthly.wages
NO. 659:*
Janitor
of Soviet workers and employees
. 250
this job.
Plant guard 450 to 480
rubles.
Stevedore 600
rubles.
Beginning machinist 650
rubles.
Average machinist 800 to 900
rubles.
Better-than-average machinist 1,200
rubles.
The best paid received 1,500- 1,800
rubles,
Brigadier 800- 1,000
rubles.
Typist ? 500
rubles.
Stenographer 800 to 900 rubles.
A good stenographer wgs hard to find. The combined skills
deserved this salary.
Draftsman
Bookkeeper
Accountant
Foreman
A bonus sometimes amounted to one-half
salary.
Technician
Beginning engineer
Experienced engineer with no administrative
500 rubles.
500 rubles.
800 to 900 rubles.
ppisto 900 rubles
of monthlybonus.
responsibilities
The top salary was 1,700 rubles pills
Shop or department chief
Chief engineer
600 to 750 rubles.'
plus bonus. '
780.- 1,200 rubles
plus bonus.
. 1 200- 1,400 rubles
plus bonus.
bonus.
e. 1 400 rubles plus
The ministry Sometimes authori-zed 2,500
tion of-special-performance.
Plant director
bonus.
2,000- .2200 rubles
plus bonue.
rubles in recogni..
2,500 rubles plus
bonus. -
76. It should be emphasized that Plant No. 659 was a plant in' the
second category. Personnel in first category enterprises -received
higher wages and salaries than those listed above while personnel
in consumer goods and otherithird category industries were paid
less. In this connection few engineers with 50X1-HUM
the degree of kandidat of sciences were employed at Plant'No. 6596
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-Being-an enterprise in the second category and thu ..nmitea.inthe,
salaries it. could offer its employees, it was not able to!bid for
the services of such individuals. Pereons engaged in indUstrial.
production who held higher academic degrees were normally employed
in first category. industries.
77. Foreign specialists were not paid in accordance with this wage scale.
a doctor of sbiences, received 6,000 rubles per month: Thatoxi -HUM
corresponded to the salary of a university professor.
78. The salaries in scientific institutes and educational institutions
were far more favorable than in industry. 50X1-HUM
It the Sverdlovsk Min-
ing InstitUte an instructor, or starshi
Prepodavatel was paid relatively little- 1,300 rubles per month.
This man had completed an engineer's course at a higher educational
institute. A docent at the mining institute held the degree of
? kandidat of sciences and was paid a beginning salary of 2,800 rubles
per month. The top salary for a docent with a kandidat degree was
? 3,500 rubles per month.
79. Professors received a base salary of 4,000 to 6,000 rubles per
month. A professor serving as a dean (dekan) or department chair-
man (nachalnik kafedry) received an extra 25 per cent of his base
? salary. The director of the institute received an additional
30 per cent to 50 per cent of his base salary as professor in
recognition of his administrative responsibilities.
Performance Norms and Real Income of Workers
80. Performance norms at Plant No. 659 were established according to 50X1-HUM
the estimated time required for a given production process and not
according to piece rates (number of units produced in a given time).
These norms were bases on a norm bode which
was Ann11-
cable throughout the Soviet Union,
50X1-HUM
81. Thp norms were generous by western European standards. In Germany
llot less time for production processes than was allowed
at the Sverdlovsk plant. This was primarily due to poor organiza-
tion. A worker had to spend considerable time finding the tools
and raw materials necessary for a given job. Be had to do all that
himself as this type of procurement was not centralized. Further-
more, much time was lost because of the poor condition of lathes
and other machine tools.
82. Every year, production norms (in terms of quantity of output) were
-increased throughout Plant No. 659 shortly before the introduction
of a price reduction law. Everyone at, the plant knew that a
general price cut would follow within four to eight- weeks when a
norm increase was announced.. Norms were -raised soMewhat more than
prices were reduded: On the average, norms about 20 per cent and
prices., about 17 per cent.
? 83. performance norms were. increased similarly 50X1 HUM
throughout the Soviet Union. First, the norm increases at Plant
No. 659 were not undertaken on the initiative of the plant manage-
ment but on orders' from above.. .Second, all plants in the Sverd-
lovsk area introduced these wage puts at the same time. They.were
a general topic of conversation in the city when they occurred.
The Soviet press did not ,publicize these measures but they were
well known to the local population.,
84. The department responsible fpr performance.norms at Plant No. 659
had the task of adjusting ite norm codes to. conform to these
annual increases. Representatives-of the zavkom "technical
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85.
86.
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engineers" and shop chiefs were busy with the norm office for weeks
on end in making these adjuetment. They tried to soften the blow
as much as possible and to arrange that no one job was more affected
than others. 'For some. jobs this was very difficult as the norms
could hardly be increased any more. In such cases, the norms for
other work processes had to be increased more than foreseen, more
than 20 per cent.
50X1
These measures applied only to the performance norms, of workers.
Salaried employees were not affected. The workers, of course, 50X1-HUM
complained bitterly about the norm increases. On several occasions
a worker, on receiving an assignment in accordance
with the new norm schedule, returned the work slip to the foreman
and said in effect: **For this pay the machine can do the job itself."
The political propagandists went to work when such cases occurred.
The Party organizer or the zavkom representative invited the worker
in for a talk. They explained that such steps were necessary for
the economic growth of their country. They appealed to his better
self and tried to make him see the wisdom of this policy.
87. The purpose of this wage policy was to increase productivity. This
policy was successful. Increased productivity was achieved by
harder work on the part of Soviet workers and by a rationalization
of production processes. This wage Policy was probably the only
way of forcing workers to put in more work.
88. This meant that the earned wages of the average Soviet worker
slowly increased in the course ofa, given year as a result of 1
increased productivity. To be more exact, these wages followed
a zig-zag path. They reached a high point shortly before an annual
norm increase, a low point immediately,thereafter, and gradually
returned to their former peak in the course of the following 12 50X1-HUM
months. the average workers's wages decreased
somewhat from 1946 to 1948. However, they remained approximately
constant during the following four years, subject of course to the
yearly, zig-zag fluctuation Oust described.
Restrictions on Employment Mobility
89. A worker or employee at Plant No. 659 who wished.tofind employ-
ment elsewhere first had to establish contact with his future
place of work. This was generally accomplished through personal
contacts and friends. Then he had to obtain a job release from
the plant management, as required by law. This involved lengthy
negotiations with the personnel chief who had to-give his approval.
Success generally depended on the initiative and cleverness of the
applicant in softening up the personnel chief. An application was
never approved the first time it was submitted. But after months
of effort, a persistent individual was generally .successful in
obtaining his employment release.. After all,'a-dissatisfied
employee was of no great value.
90. The situation outlined above apPliSdito skilled workers.
engineers and technicians faced an' additional hurd
in that they also had to obtain the approval of.the ministry.
Unskilled workers, -on the other hand, had no difficulty in
obtaining a job release.
91. Exceptions were madelln the case of personnel who wished to
transfer from an enterprise in the second or third category to
an enterprise in the first industrial aktegory. ,Ihe personnel
chief had An Approve such applications, as first-category enter-
prises 'were given priority over Lower-ranking enterprises in -
hiring personnel. SuCh cases were quite gammon
at :Plant No. 659
.8ECREt
50X1-HUM
le ?
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in 1949. Several large armament plants in the area
Hwhich were being put into operation were
workers at. that time.
92 Graduates of higher educational. institutions were compelled to
remain for three years at the Work assignment they received upon
50X1-HUM
graduating. this period of compulsory employ.
ment was three years.
seeking
50X1
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
. .
93. There were .two exceptions to this A.young engineer could
leave his place of Work during this period if he received permission
to enter into graduate studies (aspirantura). He was only released
by the plant on passing his entrance examinations. A young engineer
could also change his place of employmdht during this three-year
period if he transferred to a plant in a higher industrial catedopvi.
50X1-HUM
I For xample a.yOung, man was allowed to transfer
froth:Fihnt- No. 659 to a research institute in Moscow because the
latter was a first-category enterprise. '
94. Gracuates of higher educational institutions received their initial
*assignments on the decision: of the university or institute director.
The director made these. assignments in accordance with applications
redeived:from various enterprises for the Services of students
about to graduate. A prospective graduate's personal contacts were
also of some importance in determining his assignment.
95. Most tekhnikumy were affiliated with or owned by an industrial enter-
prise. Therefore, tekhnikum graduates reported to work it the
controlling enterprise as a matter of course. Graduates of tekhnikumy
were required to work for, three. years at jobs designated by the state.
*96. A worker Who was unemployed wad free to look for and find a job in
accordance with his own wishes. He wad not assigned a job by order
? of a labor office. But graduates of trade schools (remeslennlye
uchilishchi) had no such freedom. Most trade schools were directed
or owned by an industrial enterprise. Graduates of these schools
were automatically assigned to the controlling enterprise. -
50X1-HUM
Comments, The reader's attention ie called to the follow-
topice in this revert
ing
time limitations imposed on the ac-
6imulation of raw materials cenilother stooks by Soviet industrial
enterprises; the Mlassification.ef Seviet industry into three group',
(not identified with the all-union, Union-1;4%1bn? and republic categories),
with attendant privilege's for high-priority 'industries.
50X1 -HUM
one point in the interview that most workers 'were 50X1-HUM
in Group V and Group IV and workers in'the latter category receivedgml -HUM'
5,05 rubles per .hour. This would mean that an average worker received
650'.rubles per month, assuming 100 per cent fUlfillment Of norms and a
work-month of 208 hours. the average 50X1-HUM
machinist received from 800 to 900 rubles per month. It is possible that
the average worker worked more than 208 hours per month or that he over-
fulfilled performance norms and that these. factors explain this discrepancy.
There is a slight
possibility that the three categories of 50X1-HUM
industry estabiishe
oerning directors'
resolution placed t
Aviation Indus
belong In the
din the resolution of the Council of Ministers con--
funds,.issued on Deoember*5, 1946. However, the
he Ministry of Munitions 'Industry, the Ministry of the
lid cthers in the 'second-ranking group which clearly
first category. Moreover, the resolution on
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director's funds makes
bonuses) or exceptions
nrnl,nhl
publisneal
SOR4T..
no mention mention of wage differentials (except for
to restrictions on emplojilent mobility:
a regulation which has not been
The restrictions placed on the accumulation of raw materials and *
other supplies by Plant No. 659 indicate tfiet the entire Soviet
industry operates on a narrow margin of reserves on the enterprise
level.
Two conclusions may be drawn
from this information. In the absence of central stockpiles of all
types ,.of industrial supplies, this shortage of reserves on the entere
prise level*oould prove disastrous to Soviet industry in the event of
war or ooula create inflexibility. in Soviet foreign trade policies.
If extensive 6entral stockpiles do 'exist, the lack of .local reserves
might indicate that the Soviet Union *does not contemp?late any major
aggression at the present time.
Plant No, 659 raised labor productivity ,
by 20 per oent each year during his employment* there. This figure
appears much too high.
50X1
50)6 :HUM.
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
? 50X1 -H UNA j
50X1 -H UM
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