IMPLICATIONS OF THE CENTER-LEFT EXPERIMENT IN ITALY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A023600060001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 3, 1963
• Content Type: NIE

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SE RET NIE 24-63
CONTROLL DISSEM 3 January 1963
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 24-63
Implications of the Center-Left
Experiment in Italy
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
3 JANUARY 1963
SE RET
CONTROLL D DISSEM
N? 364
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of
this estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.
Concurring:
Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
Director of the National Security Agency
Abstaining:
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, and the Assistant
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their
jurisdiction.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 24-63
Implications of the Center-Left
Experiment in Italy
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 1
DISCUSSION 4
I. FACTORS LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF THE CEN-
TER-LEFT COALITION 4
II. PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE CENTER-LEFT
COALITION 6
III. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CENTER-LEFT EXPERI-
MENT 10
A. If Collaboration is Formalized and Broadened 10
B. If Center-Left Collaboration is Terminated 12
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CENTER-LEFT EXPERIMENT
IN ITALY
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Center-left cooperation in Italy?the so-called "opening to
the left"?has succeeded quite well since its initiation in February
of 1962. The coalition has hung together, the parties have dem-
onstrated the resiliency necessary to survive the vicissitudes of
coalition rule, and some important legislation has been approved.
There have been no fundamental changes in Italian foreign
policy, although Fanfani's ambiguous performance during the
Cuban crisis may have been an effort to avoid actions or
pronouncements which might upset coalition arrangements.
(Paras. 1, 8-9)
B. The present arrangement for Socialist parliamentary sup-
port of the Christian Democratic-Social Democratic-Republican
Cabinet is clearly viewed by the parties themselves as an experi-
ment. Conceivably, this arrangement could go on indefinitely,
but we believe that the leaders of both the major parties involved,
having come so far, will seek within the next year or two to
formalize their collaboration and bring the Socialists into the
Cabinet. (Para. 11)
C. The Christian Democrats will probably require further evi-
dence of Socialist dissociation from the Communists before they
agree to formalization and extension of their collaboration with
the Socialists. Collaboration has been increased since February;
additional Christian Democratic-Socialist local coalitions have
been established. At the same time, Socialist-Communist po-
lemics have been increased. Nevertheless, the Socialists continue
their participation in the General Confederation of Labor, which
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is Communist led. They have resisted pressures to withdraw, and
it is unlikely that they will withdraw for some years to come.
If the Socialists can and will take some further steps toward dis-
sociation from the Communists, the Christian Democratic leader-
ship can probably obtain party backing for broader collaboration
after the elections. (Paras. 11-15)
D. The parliamentary elections which will take place in the
spring of 1963 will probably not produce any dramatic changes
in the party distribution of the Italian electorate. The results
will probably neither repudiate center-left collaboration nor in-
controvertibly endorse it. It is possible that collaboration may
be suspended or dissolved between now and the elections, but this
event would not itself prejudice re-establishment of collaboration
after the elections. (Paras. 17-18)
E. If collaboration is formalized and extended over a period
of some years, significant changes in Italian political life would
occur. Some leftist elements within the Socialist Party would
probably break off and ally themselves with the Communists.
There would be strong pressure for the resorption of the Social
Democratic Party into the Socialist Party. The isolation and re-
duction of Communist strength would come about slowly and
would depend greatly upon the depth and duration of Christian
Democratic-Socialist collaboration and the degree to which social
and economic reforms were in fact achieved. We believe extended
collaboration would come about only if the Socialists provided
more explicit commitments than they have to date regarding
Italian participation and active cooperation in NATO and the
European Economic Community, and we believe the Socialists
will provide such commitments. Nevertheless, their participa-
tion in the government would probably lead to some changes in
the conduct of Italian foreign policy and probably to some reduc-
tion of support for US and allied positions on international issues,
particularly on those not directly related to the North Atlantic
Alliance. (Paras. 21, 23-24)
F. The consequences of terminating center-left collaboration
would depend greatly upon the conditions under which the
breakup occurred, how long the collaboration had endured, and
what had been accomplished during its existence. If the cir-
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cumstances were such as to drive the Socialists back into the
arms of the Communists, the consequences would be worse than
if the experiment had never been tried. We believe the Christian
Democrats would be aware of the dangers of such a breakup and
would seek ways of preventing a polarization of political forces.
We believe they would not give themselves over to rightist leader-
ship, would try to adhere to a left-of-center course, and would
leave open the possibility of re-establishing collaboration with the
Socialists. Termination of center-left cooperation would con-
front Italy with serious problems of government, but it would
not necessarily lead to a crisis of regime. (Paras. 25-27)
G. It is noteworthy that the center-left experiment has been
initiated during a period when Italy is enjoying rapid and un-
precedented economic growth. Gross national product rose
by eight percent in 1961, and unemployment has been re-
duced to 3.2 percent. The economic lot of the average Italian
has improved, but many of the old problems remain. Italian
wage levels are still the lowest in the EEC, and southern Italy
remains poverty-stricken and economically underdeveloped. The
experiment does not appear to have significantly affected the
so-called Italian economic "miracle"; 1962 will also register high
growth rates although possibly slightly below those of 1961.
(Para. 6)
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DISCUSSION
I. FACTORS LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF THE CENTER-LEFT COALI-
TION
1. The formation in February 1962 of a center-left coalition govern-
ment depending upon the parliamentary support of the Italian So-
cialist Party, led by Pietro Nenni, is the most important change in
Italian politics since 1948. The new coalition, led by Amintore Fanfani,
consists of the Christian Democratic, Social Democratic, and Republican
Parties. The arrangement for Socialist parliamentary support is based
upon an informal agreement between the Socialists and the coalition
partners, and it does not extend to all matters. Nevertheless, it is a
major reversal of policy for the Christian Democratic Party, which took
the final decision to enter into this arrangement only after much soul-
searching and years of discussion and preparation.
2. One of the most important factors encouraging this step was politi-
cal arithmetic.1 Prior to 1953 the Christian Democratic Party held an
absolute majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In the
general elections of that year the Christian Democrats lost this parlia-
mentary majority but retained enough strength to enable them, by
combining with the Social Democrats, the Republicans, and the con-
servative Liberals, to create a bare parliamentary majority. However,
governing with a coalition dependent upon Social Democratic votes
on the left and Liberal votes on the right was a very difficult task; these
two parties were so far apart on domestic issues that little important
legislation could be enacted. Moreover, the Christian Democratic Party
itself contained a strong right-wing faction and was unable to develop
a consistent and unified approach to Italy's domestic problems. The
general elections of 1958 somewhat improved the strength of the center
parties, but differences among them still prevented the emergence of
strong and effective government. Nevertheless, these elections did show
a slight shift toward the moderate left and a decline in the extreme right.
Within the Christian Democratic Party the left and center factions were
somewhat strengthened. From 1947 on, the Communists and Socialists,
who came to control almost 40 percent of the Chamber of Deputies, were
in opposition.
r
3. After 1953, developments within the international Communist move-
ment disoriented the Italian left. The anti-Stalinist revelations of k
1
Khrushchev and the suppression of the uprising in Hungary shook
1
the Italian Communist Party to its foundations and precipitated a series
1See table on page 14 for the party distribution of seats in the Chamber of
Deputies resulting from the elections of 1948, 1953, and 1958. A pie chart (Figure
1) shows the current distribution of parliamentary strengths.
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of intraparty debates and a loss of party morale which continue to this
day. More important, a large sector within the Socialist Party, includ-
ing Nenni himself, became increasingly disillusioned with Soviet Com-
munism, began to view association with the Communists as damaging to
their interests, and initiated moves to disengage from the Communists.
4. A number of other developments occurred which made the so-called
"opening to the left"?a subject which had been widely discussed since
the mid-1950's?a more approachable goal. One was the failure of the
experiment undertaken in 1960 by the Christian Democrats to work
out a coalition with the extreme right (the brief and turbulent Tambroni
government). Another was the growing trend toward the creation of
Christian Democratic-Socialist coalitions in the local governments of
numerous cities and towns in north and central Italy, including most
of the major industrial areas of the country. Finally, the apparent
effort of the new Pope to withdraw the Church from an active role in
Italian politics and the willingness of the hierarchy to tolerate center-
left cooperation as an experiment left the Christian Democratic leaders
free of a possible Vatican veto if they succeeded in forming a working
relationship with the Socialists.
5. In the last analysis, it was the determination and political acumen
of the leaders of both parties which finally brought off the agreement
of February 1962. It required considerable planning and skill over the
past five years for Fanfani and Moro in the Christian Democratic Party
and Nenni in the Italian Socialist Party to win sufficient consent in
their own parties to undertake the experiment. For Nenni, in his
declining years, this experiment is an effort to leave the ranks of the
opposition, to play a role in shaping the new Italy, and?hopefully?to
win for the Socialists the leadership of the Italian left. For most of the
Christian Democratic leaders, the experiment is regarded as the only
acceptable way of avoiding the weaknesses of minority government, of
broadening the base of Italian democracy and insuring the continuation
of parliamentary government, of isolating the Communist Party and
drawing away its mass following, and of undertaking and executing a
reform program to correct the evils and imbalances in Italy's social and
economic structure.
6. It would appear to be paradoxical that this cooperation between
center and left, between Catholics and Socialists, should have been
initiated, not during a period of national crisis, but rather when the
Italian economy was enjoying a period of rapid and unprecedented eco-
nomic growth. In 1961, Italy's gross national product (GNP) increased
by about eight percent. In the same year gross investment amounted
to 25 percent of GNP, and exports rose by 15 percent. Unemployment
has been reduced to about 3.2 percent, and shortages of skilled labor
exist in some industries. The economic lot of the average Italian has
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improved, but many of the old problems of Italy still exist. Italian
wage levels are still the lowest in the European Economic Community
(EEC) , and southern Italy remains poverty-stricken and economically
underdeveloped. The economic expansion of the north has in fact cre-
ated problems for both north and south; migration to the north has
stripped the south of many of its best trained and most energetic
workers and added new population to the already congested community
facilities of the north. The experiment does not appear to have sig-
nificantly affected the so-called Italian economic "miracle"; 1962 will
also register high growth rates although possibly slightly below those
of 1961.
7. Indeed, it appears that the current rapid economic expansion per-
mitted, rather than deterred, the materialization of center-left coopera-
tion. It has made the experiment seem less dangerous than before
because there was now less reason for radical measures, and it has
made the experiment more likely to succeed because there were greater
financial and economic resources with which to work and less fear that
economic reforms would lead to economic stagnation. Finally, the two
parties, seeing Italian life being reshaped by economic change, must
have seen the opportunity to win some of the credit for themselves
while weakening their political competitors on the extreme left and
extreme right.
II. PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE CENTER-LEFT COALITION
8. Success to Date. No postwar Italian Government has been invested
after so much controversy, with so much advance preparation, or with
so many hopes?and fears?riding on its progress. The Fanfani coali-
tion has, thus far, succeeded quite well. Some important legislation
has been passed in the fields of economic planning, education, and social
services. Nationalization of electric power, one of the major Fanfani
commitments to Nenni, has been approved by Parliament. The coali-
tion has hung together and, to date at least, has demonstrated the
resiliency necessary to survive the vicissitudes of coalition government.
It survived the wheeling and dealing of the presidential elections, the
strain of formulating and enacting the electric power bill, and the
popular test provided by local elections in June and November of 1962.
Indeed, the elections appear to have strengthened the cooperation be-
tween the parties; additional Christian Democratic-Socialist coalitions
have been established in local jurisdictions, and today most of the major
cities in Italy are administered by center-left coalitions.
9. Foreign Policy. Since its investiture, the coalition has adhered
strictly to the principal cornerstones of Italian foreign policy?NATO
and the EEC. The Socialists neither sought nor received any commit-
ments regarding foreign policy, except for a broad statement that Italy
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would work with her allies toward the peaceful solution of international
problems. If there has been any change in policy since the coalition
was formed, it is a matter of tone rather than substance, of emphasis
rather than content?but some of these changes in tone would probably
have occurred in any case, simply as a consequence of growing Italian
self-confidence. Nevertheless, the support of the Socialists for the coali-
tion does pose problems. Fanfani's ambiguous performance during the
Cuban crisis may have been, in part at least, an effort to avoid actions
or pronouncements which might upset coalition arrangements or
prospects.
10. Socialist foreign policy is officially neutralist, but in fact had a
pro-Soviet coloration during the days of Socialist-Communist collabora-
tion. Today, the Socialists interpret neutralism differently. They now
say that "to withdraw from NATO under present conditions would
jeopardize the European equilibrium" and might upset the present
"truce" between blocs. What they desire is an Italian policy which,
while remaining loyal to Italy's commitments within the Western
Alliance, is directed at a detente which makes military blocs unnecessary.
In general they oppose military buildups and military solutions, favor
compromises on international issues, and believe that the West should
rely upon those in underedeveloped areas who "espouse liberal and demo-
cratic ideals" rather than upon "ultra-conservatives" and "military ad-
venturers." These foreign policy views, though not in direct conflict
with those of many Social Democrats and some Christian Democrats,
nevertheless do suggest considerably less agreement with some sig-
nificant Western foreign policy views than that demonstrated by past
Italian governments. On the other hand, the Socialists approve of
European integration, favor EEC, and want to see the UK enter the
Common Market.
11. The Question of Continuance. The present arrangement between
the coalition parties and the Socialists is clearly viewed by both sides
as an experiment. It goes as far as the Christian Democratic and
Socialist Parties permitted their leaders to go, and neither party appears
to want to alter this arrangement before new parliamentary elections
take place in April or May of 1963. Nenni has recently called for a
five-year pact with the coalition parties and is apparently prepared to
widen his collaboration after the elections, but the Christian Democrats
will probably require further evidence of Socialist dissociation from the
Communists before seriously considering such a pact. The strength of
the present informal arrangement lies partly in its limited nature and
partly in the desire of Nenni, Fanfani, and Moro to make it work. Con-
ceivably, it could go on indefinitely, but we believe that the present
leaders of both parties, having come so far, will seek within the next
year or two to formalize their collaboration and bring the Socialists
into the Cabinet. Whether they can go so far depends, of course, upon
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a variety of considerations, including the situation in the parties them-
selves and the election outcome.
12. The Problem within the Christian Democratic Party. The Chris-
tian Democratic Party contains powerful figures who remain opposed
to collaboration with the Socialists; these include the ex-Premiers Pella,
Scelba, and Tambroni. They would certainly prefer to terminate the
arrangement; at present they are doing their best to keep it as limited
as possible. They are calling for a general "clarification" of Socialist-
Communist relations. They make much of continued Socialist partici-
pation in the Communist-led General Confederation of Labor, and they
point out that the government's policy of establishing semi-autonomous
regional governments could open the way for Communist-Socialist domi-
nance in some important areas of the country. These are problems
with which Fanfani and the other party leaders must cope if they are
to satisfy their opponents that the course of collaboration is not a
dangerous one. If the Socialists can and will take some further steps
toward dissociation from the Communists, the Christian Democratic
leadership can probably obtain party backing for broader collaboration
with the Socialists after the parliamentary elections.
13. The Situation within the Socialist Party. Nenni's problem within
the Italian Socialist Party appears to be at least as difficult as that of
Fanfani and Moro. His margin of victory for authorizing collaboration
with the Christian Democrats was narrow, and much of the left wing
of his party remains obdurately opposed to the loosening of Socialist-
Communist ties. Nevertheless, the success of Nenni in getting legisla-
tion approved which the party has desired has strengthened his position,
and he probably now has wider support within the party for collabora-
tion with the Christian Democrats than he has had in the past. But
the carristi, the party's left wing, are clamoring for the full implementa-
tion of the government's program and are resisting even token assur-
ances to the coalition partners that the Socialists are moving further
away from cooperation with the Communists.
14. Socialist Cooperation with the Communists. There is continuing
Socialist-Communist cooperation in the various labor, consumer, agricul-
tural, and other cooperatives. The Socialists and the Communists also
still collaborate in many more communal and' provincial governments
than do the Socialists and Christian Democrats. However, most are
small cities and towns, Bologna being the only major city still run by
a Socialist-Communist administration. Many more people, by far, are
governed by Christian Democratic-Socialist local administrations than
by Communist-Socialist ones.
15. Socialist-Communist cooperation is closest in the General Confed-
eration of Labor, whose membership totals about 2.5 million and in which
the Communists have a predominant role. The Socialist leaders have
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resisted pressures upon them to withdraw their workers, or at least to
permit their workers to withdraw, from the Confederation. Their goal,
they say, is to achieve a unified labor movement free of political affilia-
tion (all three Italian labor federations are party connected), and in
any event many Socialist labor leaders and workers are so entrenched
in the Confederation machinery that it would be personally disadvan-
tageous to withdraw. Although the Socialists probably will make some
gestures toward greater cooperation with the Social Democrats and the
Christian Democrats on matters of labor policy, it appears unlikely that
they will withdraw from trade union cooperation with the Communists
for some years to come. Meanwhile, there is a danger that the Com-
munist leadership of the Confederation might conduct a strike in such
a manner as to provoke government suppression, and this would put
a severe strain on Christian Democratic-Socialist political collaboration.
16. Consequences of the Experiment for the Communist Party. Cen-
ter-left collaboration has made some progress toward its goal of weaken-
ing and isolating the Communists. It has sown further dissension and
confusion in their ranks, and it has stimulated Socialist-Communist
polemics on both internal and foreign policy matters. The Communists
lost votes in the 1962 local elections, although it cannot be demonstrated
that this loss was a consequence of their isolation?it may have had
other causes. The Communists have reacted to the prospect of increas-
ing isolation by identifying themselves with the most popular features
of the government program. They have, of course, made the most
of the sensitive points of difference between the Socialists and the coali-
tion partners, especially internal security and trade union matters.
They have considerable means for applying pressure on the Socialists
in the Labor Confederation and in the cooperatives; they almost cer-
tainly will step up the pressures as the spring elections approach.
17. The General Elections of 1963. It is possible that collaboration
may be suspended or dissolved between now and the elections to permit
the parties greater freedom in campaigning. Collaboration may
founder in the next few months on some such issue as the establish-
ment of additional regional governments. Should this occur, it would
not reduce the importance of the elections as a major test of the center-
left experiment and would not in itself prejudice re-establishment of
collaboration after the elections. There will probably be some changes
in the electoral system, in particular an increase in the ,size of the
Chamber of Deputies likely to enlarge the representation of the indus-
trial cities of the north. This will probably in itself result in some
increase in leftist strength in the new chamber.
18. We believe it unlikely that the election results will produce dra-
matic changes in the party distribution of the Italian electorate. The
extreme rightists will probably lose further strength, some of this going
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to the Liberals, and the Communists might also lose some ground.
There will probably be a continuation of the slow drift to the left of
center within the electorate as a whole. Any gains for the Socialists
and Social Democrats, and any losses by the Communists, would be
interpreted as justification for continuing and broadening center-left
collaboration. Indeed, it may be that the leftist and left-center gains
which probably will occur will be a natural product of this collaboration,
although it may not be demonstrable on purely objective grounds.
19. While the Italian voters will almost certainly not repudiate the
principle of center-left collaboration, neither is it likely that their voting
pattern will incontrovertibly endorse it. Nor is it likely that the results
will so change the political arithmetic as to eliminate those considera-
tions which led to the initiation of the experiment in the first place.
In any case, the two major parties involved will probably still be con-
fronted by divisions within their ranks and the need to take account of
irreconcilable elements within their parties. More significant, however,
the election results, whatever they may be, will not erase the basic
ideological differences between the two major parties, and they will not
enable the Socialists at one easy stroke to separate themselves finally
and completely from the Communists.
III. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CENTER-LEFT EXPERIMENT
20. Center-left collaboration has been a political fact in Italy for
almost a year. It has had some successes, it has weaknesses, and it has
problems which must be surmounted if it is to continue or to expand.
The parliamentary elections will not eliminate either the weaknesses or
the problems. We believe the chances are good that the experiment will
continue, or even be expanded, after the parliamentary elections, but
some of the factors involved are so complex and unpredictable that we
cannot estimate its longer term future with confidence. In the para-
graphs below, we consider some of the consequences which might follow
from either broadening or terminating the present arrangement.
A. If Collaboration is Formalized and Broadened
21. Broader collaboration, whether or not it provided for immediate
and direct Socialist participation in the government, would provoke
significant changes in the parties involved. The Socialist left wing has
already been somewhat reduced in size and influence, but some of its
elements always have been and remain pro-Communist, and would
probably break off and ally themselves with the Communists. The
right-wing Christian Democrats would probably not break away?the
pressures for Catholic political unity have always been strong and will
remain so. They remain unreconciled and uncooperative, neither fully
submissive to party discipline nor openly rebellious, hoping for the
collapse of the coalition in order to reassert their leadership. As col-
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laboration developed, most of these opponents would probably become
reconciled to it and seek to play a role within it.
22. Progress toward the major goals of center-left collaboration,
namely execution of a program of major social and economic reforms
and isolation and reduction of Communist political strength, would
come slowly and depend greatly upon the depth and duration of the
collaboration among the parties. The longer the relationship went
on, the more changes in Italian society would be made, and the greater
the chance that Communist strength would be sapped. It should be
noted, however, that while some Communist voters in Italy are merely
poverty-stricken people who might be expected to desert the cause once
economic betterment was a fact, others are dedicated to a thorough
revamping of Italian society, and these will probably never become con-
vinced that a Catholic party can or will consent to the changes they
desire. In our view, continuing and deepening collaboration would
indeed produce more and much needed reforms, but it would probably
not lead to an early and dramatic reduction in Communist popular
support.
23. Continuation of the experiment would probably cause some
changes within the Italian left. The Social Democratic Party would
lose its raison d'etre, and there would be strong pressure for its resorp-
tion into the Italian Socialist Party. If the coalition then broke up, the
center might have permanently lost an important component. On the
other hand, such a unified party would be more moderate and closer
to the center than the present Socialist Party. We doubt that the trade
union movement would become reunified for many years to come. The
General Confederation would probably continue to be led by Commu-
nists, although the degree of Communist control might gradually be
reduced.
24. We assume that the present coalition partners would not agree to
formalization and extension of their agreement with the Socialists with-
out more explicit commitments regarding continued Italian participa-
tion and active cooperation in NATO and the EEC. The Socialists have
already demonstrated a capacity for modifying some of their historic
doctrines; we believe they will provide such commitments and indeed
they might even go so far as to find a rationalization for supporting
current levels of military expenditure. Nevertheless, their participa-
tion in the government would probably lead to some changes in the
conduct of Italian foreign policy and probably to some reduction of
support for US and allied positions on some international issues, par-
ticularly on those not directly related to the North Atlantic Alliance.
Individual issues would probably be decided as they arose, and some of
these?such as those related to nuclear weapons?might be very difficult
for the coalition to resolve. It is possible that on some particularly
difficult problem the coalition would collapse. It should be noted again
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that there is a secular trend toward greater Italian independence in
foreign policy, and the Italians will probably strive for a larger voice
both inside and outside the councils of the West, whether the Socialists
participate in the government or not.
B. If Center-Left Collaboration is Terminated
25. The consequences of a termination of the center-left collaboration
would, of course, depend greatly upon the conditions under which it
occurred, how long collaboration had endured, what had been accom-
plished during its existence, and what changes in party alignments and
strength had occurred during its tenure. For example, a breakup ac-
companied by a sharp shift in leadership in either party would probably
foreclose further efforts toward collaboration for perhaps years to come.
On the other hand, a breakup after several years, especially if the
Socialists had already broken most of their remaining ties with the
Communists, would probably be less consequential; a Socialist opposi-
tion on the left, though disgruntled, would be less dangerous to the
future of Italian democracy than the Socialist-Communist unity of five
years ago. In any event, if the circumstances of the breakup were such
as to drive the Socialists back into the arms of the Communists, and if
in addition the Social Democratic Party had given up separate existence,
the consequences would be worse than if the experiment had never
been attempted in the first place.
26. On the whole, we believe that the dangers of a breakup under
the conditions we have just described are fully appreciated by the
Christian Democrats. These dangers will, in effect, deter them from
permitting center-left collaboration to terminate in acrimony and
lead them to seek ways of preventing a polarization of political forces.
If the present Christian Democratic leaders come to the point where
they can no longer compromise issues with the Socialists and feel that
they must terminate the arrangement, we believe that they will not
give themselves up to rightist leadership within the party or lead it
into cooperation with the extreme right. Having established them-
selves as a progressive force, they would probably seek to keep that
image alive, trying to win left-of-center votes to their own standard
while leaving open the possibility of re-establishing collaboration with
the Socialists.
27. Termination of Christian Democratic-Socialist cooperation would,
of course, create serious problems of government. The Christian Demo-
crats, if they sought to govern alone, would have a very difficult time
patching together a working parliamentary majority. There would
probably be recurrent governmental crises, some of which might be
tense and prolonged. At the worst, continuation of parliamentary
government might become impossible. On the other hand, the leaders
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of the Christian Democratic and Socialist Parties?in the face of
threatened political collapse?might find some way of composing their
differences or at least of developing a modus vivendi. We believe that
this course would be more likely than a breakdown of parliamentary
government.
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PARTY STRENGTHS IN THE ITALIAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES FOLLOWING
THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS OF 1948, 1953, AND 1958
1948
DEPUTIES
NUMBER PERCENT
1953
DEPUTIES
NUMBER PERCENT
1958
DEPUTIES
NUMBER PERCENT
Christian Democrats
304
53.1
262
44.4
273
45.8
Social Democrats
33
5.8
19
3.2
22
3.8
Republicans
9
1.6
5
0.8
6
1.0
National Bloc'
19
3.3
Liberals
14
2.5
17
2.9
Communists
b
143
24.2
140
23.5
Socialists
183
31.9
75
12.7
84
14.1
Monarchists
14
2.4
40
6.8
25
4.1
Neo-Fascists
6
1.0
29
4.9
24
4.0
Other
5
0.9
3
0.5
5
0.8
A combination made up largely of the Liberals and the National Reconstruction
Union.
b Popular Democratic Front of Communists and Socialists.
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PARTY COMPOSITION
OF THE
ITALIAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
November 1962
GENTER-LEPT
ca4 s
.1013(
"
otols"'
vi-?*.Nos
so')
OM.54.1
Figure 1
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
596 SEATS
36816 11-62
?Monarchist
Includes seats held by deputies who cannot be readily classified
with any of the above parties because they represent individual,
dissident or regional points of view.
Wg Government
0 Support
0 Opposition
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FR.1 8 1 LURCH.
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SWITZERLAND
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12 16
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
Treeste
enice
Zagreb?
Y U
?Genoa
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FRANCE
x
rfMONAC
-40
Leghorn
TOSCANA
?Florence
SAN MA NO
4'Po
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Ancona
ELBA
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