SHORT-TERM INDIAN INTENTIONS TOWARD GOA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A018400070001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 13, 1961
• Content Type: SNIE

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SNIE 31-61
13 December 1961
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 31-61
SHORT-TERM INDIAN INTENTIONS
TOWARD GOA
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The
Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 13 December 1961. Concurring were the Director of Intel-
ligence and Research, Department of State; The Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief
of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy;
the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director
for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National
Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Repre-
sentative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside
of their jurisdiction.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy
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d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, for the Department of the
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the Office of Central Reference, CIA.
3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it
for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should
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4. The title of this estimate when used separately from the text, should be classified:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
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SHORT-TERM INDIAN INTENTIONS TOWARD GOA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the likelihood of Indian military action
near future.
THE ESTIMATE
1. During the past few weeks India has set
the stage for military action against Goa.
Nehru has publicly hedged his longstanding
policy that the Portuguese colony must be
obtained only by peaceful means. Thirty
thousand Indian troops have been concen-
trated in the area adjacent to Goa; air and
naval forces are on the alert. There is little
doubt that India has the military power to
take over Goa in very short order, although
an attack would probably meet with stiff re-
sistance, at least intially. Governmental ma-
chinery over a wide area has been set in mo-
tion to prepare and support an invasion.
Public opinion is clamoring for military action
to respond to border incidents portrayed as
Portuguese provocations, and agitation by
Goan elements in India (mostly leftist-ori-
ented) is going into high gear.
2. The Government of India is well aware
of the value of these actions as psychological
pressure on Portugal; indeed many of them
may originally have been taken primarily as
part of a war of nerves. Evidence concerning
the Indian intention to launch an invasion
of Goa is conflicting; however, a strong mo-
mentum in favor of invasion has been de-
veloped.
3. As of the present date, we believe that
Nehru has yet to make a final decision as to
whether there will be an invasion. This de-
against Goa in the
cision will be influenced by numerous and com-
plex factors. Probably the most important
factor militating against an invasion is what
we believe to be Nehru's longstanding con-
viction that the acquisition of Goa is not so
essential to India's national interests as to
justify its seizure by military force. This is
reinforced by his general desire to discourage
the use of force as an instrument of policy
and by his concern over the adverse impact
such action would have on his own and India's
image abroad. Opposition by responsible
Western press and public opinion, as well as
by friendly Western governments (not least
the US) , would also have considerable restrain-
ing influence.
4. Influencing Nehru in the other direction
will be the temptation to eliminate in a rapid
one-shot operation a longstanding and per-
sonally distasteful colonial problem about
which he feels deeply. He will also be con-
scious of the favorable effect vigorous action
is likely to have on the Congress Party's po-
sition in February's elections. In addition, it
might be useful in rehabilitating India's im-
age with the more radical Afro-Asian nations,
whose coolness towards Nehru's moderate ap-
proach to colonial problems has grown since
the Belgrade meeting. Krishna Menon, who
needs public support in a tough re-election
contest and who has strong anti-Western in-
clinations, is using his position as Defense
41111411W.W...:
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Minister and his considerable personal influ-
ence with Nehru to try to swing the balance
in favor of action.
5. In general, the balance of all those forces
on Nehru will vary from day to day. The
decision could be forced by events. Killings
caused by the movement into Goa of Indian
political agitators, an uprising within Goa,
or aggressive action by Portuguese forces
could precipitate an invasion. On the other
hand, a conciliatory approach by Lisbon or
a successful take-over of one of the lesser
Portuguese enclaves outside Goa itself might
be interpreted as victories eliminating the
need of invasion.
2
6. Clearly there is strong evidence pointing
to an invasion?the military and political
preparations have gone so far as to be difficult
to reverse without some loss of prestige to the
Indian Government. Although the Indians
perhaps still hope that their warlike activities
will extract concessions from the Portuguese,
we doubt that the Lisbon Government will
move far enough?if at all?to meet the In-
dian requirements. However, relying chiefly
on our judgment of what Nehru conceives to
be India's basic interests and our assessment
of his past behavior, we believe that the
chances of a direct military invasion are still
about even.
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