AN APPRAISAL OF SOVIET PLANS TO REMAIN IN THE ANTARCTIC AFTER THE IGY AND OF THE REPORTED ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUBMARINE BASE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A010900010019-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: February 28, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
164
AN APPRAISAL OF SOVIET PLANS TO REMAIN
IN THE ANTARCTIC AFTER THE IGY AND
OF THE REPORTED ESTABLISHMENT
OF A SUBMARINE BASE
CIA/RR?GR-145
28 February 1957
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AN APPRAISAL OF SOVIET PLANS TO
REMAIN IN THE ANTARCTIC AFTER THE IGY AND OF THE
REPORTED ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUBMARINE BASE
CIA/RR-GR- V+ 5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
S-E-C-R-E-T
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1
CONTENTS
Page
The Problem
1
Conclusions
1
Discussion
2
I. Foreword
2
II. Soviet Interest in the Antarctic Prior to the IGY .
2
III. Soviet Complex Antarctic Expedition
5
IV. The Reported Submarine Base Construction and Soviet
Naval Capabilities
14
V. Soviet Intentions to Remain After the IGY
16
Photographs
(abbreviated titles)
Figure 1. The observatory at the South Pole station Nirny" 9
Figure 2. The grand opening of "Mirny" Observatory 10
Figure 3. Temporary camp at Bunger Hills 11
Figure 4. The erection of the station [Mirnyy] 12
Maps Following page
Soviet Antarctic Stations, 1956-57 (24401) 6
Cruises of the Ob' 14
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AN APPRAISAL OF SOVIET PLANS TO
REMAIN IN THE ANTARCTIC AFTER THE IGY AND OF THE
REPORTED ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUBMARINE BASE
THE PROBLEM
To appraise Soviet intentions of continuing continental activi-
ties in the Antarctic after the termination of the IGY in 1959 and
to examine the validity of reports concerning the establishment of a
Soviet submarine base in Antarctica.
CONCLUSIONS
I. There are indications that Soviet Antarctic activities, both
economic and scientific, are likely to be exploited for political
purposes in support of the Soviet demand for the right to participate
in any settlement of Antarctic sovereignty questions. Definite evi-
dence indicates that the Soviets intend to remain in Antarctica after
the IGY. They are also considering the strengthening of future
scientific research and development activities, the establishment
of settlements, and the possibility of constructing ports and airdromes
at some future date.
II. Although available evidence does not support the report that a
Soviet submarine base has been set up in Antarctica, this estimate
is based on a recognized deficiency in our on-site surveillance of
activities at both 'Soviet coastal bases. Nevertheless, it is believed
that the establishment of a submarine base is highly unlikely at this
time, even though some Soviet submarine operations could take place
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in Antarctic waters, ostensibly for scientific purposes. Of much
greater long-term importance is the prospect that the Soviets will
substantially improve their Antarctic naval capabilities as a result
of the Comprehensive and extensive oceanographic and hydrographic
surveys to be undertaken in Antarctic waters during the IGY.
DISCUSSION
I. Foreword
A brief summary is given of the origin and evolution of Soviet
official interest in Antarctica through three phases that have gradu-
ally been developing since 1939 -- the initial diplomatic approach,
the launching of a whaling fleet during each year of the past decade,
and the activities of the Soviet Complex Antarctic Expedition. Follow-
ing an examination
post-IGY Soviet
of evidence bearing on the subject, a fourth phase
plans -- is anticipated and discussed.
the establishment of a submarine base in
the Antarctic is discussed with the Expedition programs since, were
such a base established, it would be closely related to whatever
facilities are maintained in the Antarctic.
II. Soviet Interest in the Antarctic Prior to the IGY
Little Soviet interest was manifested in the Antarctic prior to
1939, and none of it reflected official sponsorship. The first of-
ficial action was taken in January 1939 in the form of a Soviet note
to Norway disputing the latter's claim to Peter I Island and assert-
ing that the USSR "would reserve its opinion as to the national status
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of territories discovered by Russian citizens." This may be viewed
as initiating the first official phase -- the diplomatic -- in the
development of a Soviet political policy for Antarctica.
None knew better than the Soviets that the reservation of rights
on the basis of a discovery nearly 120 years old would have little
validity, particularly in the face of some prior territorial claims
and a subsequent history of exploration, discovery, and some research
by citizens of a half-dozen or more countries. To establish a valid.
basis for the reservation of rights to participate in an international
settlement of Antarctic sovereignty would require some form of current
activity. According to recent Soviet statements, proposals for
scientific research in the Antarctic were made as early as the 1930s
by the Institute for the Study of the North and again in 1944 by the
Arctic Scientific Research Institute. It has been recently reported
that in 1945 Soviet scientists proposed a systematic study of
Antarctica by means of a "continuously operating geographical
observatory." If such reports are true, Soviet entry on the
Antarctic Continent would have occurred regardless of the IGY.
Following the interruption caused by World War II, Soviet action
to advance its interest in Antarctica entered its second phase with
the organization of a whaling expedition, which sailed into Antarctic
waters for the first time in December 1946. Whaling expeditions
became even more significant in the 1947-48 season, when whaling
was combined with scientific research consisting of a limited range
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of meteorological, oceanographic, glaciological, and biologic investi-
gations. Combined activities of this type have continued to the
present. As subsequent events disclose, this dual activity appears
to have been designed not only to secure the immediate benefits of the
whale catch and scientific data but also to lay the initial groundwork
for the USSR assertion of the right to participate in any international
agreement on the unresolved question of Antarctic sovereignty.
This attitude was reflected in the Soviet memorandum of June
1950 delivered to the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia,
New Zealand, Argentina, and Norway which (1) noted the economic
importance of the continent and adjacent waters not only to the
claimant countries but also to other countries of the world, (2) empha-
sized the scientific importance of Antarctic meteorological obser-
vations to the entire Northern Hemisphere, (3) reaffirmed the position
expressed in the Soviet note of 1939, and (4) maintained that, in
accordance with international practice, the determination of sover-
eignty of any given region should include all interested countries.
The period from 1950 to 1954 was marked by the absence of field
activity other than whaling, probably because of the assignment of
polar research resources to the Arctic Basin to undertake a greatly
expanded geographic and geophysical program by a combination of
"flying laboratories," drift stations, mobile research detachments,
and icebreakers. Operations in the Arctic effort provided the Soviet
Union with experienced personnel and the equipment needed to make
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possible a grandiose Antarctic program that would be second to none.
In 1955 the Soviet Union announced its plans to participate in the
Antarctic program of the IGY, thus introducing the third phase of
its developing interest in the area. In the plans for participation,
the Soviet program was first linked to the Bellingshausen expdition
and shortly thereafter to the scientific activities of the whaling
fleet.
Soviet participation in the IGY could not be forestalled since
the USSR was a member of the World Meteorological Organization, one
of the member organizations of the Special Committee for the Inter-
national Geophysical Year under the International Council of Scientific
Unions.
III. The Soviet Complex Antarctic Expedition (SGAE)
With entry on the Antarctic Continent, the Soviet Union has
launched what may be viewed as its third and major phase in the
establishment of a record of activity to support its assertion of
rights in Antarctica. It is not possible to say as yet whether the
modest early announcement of planned activities was intended to
Obscure the true magnitude of Soviet scientific interest. The fact
is, however, that the early announced intention of setting up "one .
or two" bases has expanded into a full-scale Soviet program that
will include six bases and cover a broad sector of Antarctica that
is likely to extend from coast to Pole in the deepest part of the
continent (see Map 24401). This coverage deep into the interior not
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only may be desirable for scientific objectives, but might also be
exploited for political purposes. Shcherbakov, Chairman of the
Council on Antarctic Research, notes that claims have been made to
sectors extending to the Pole after an expedition has studied only a
part of the sector coast. The Soviet Union, by pointing to the conti-
nental depth of its activities, might thus attempt to dilute sector
claims based in the main on coastal activities.
The operation of the Antarctic Expedition has been assigned to
the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route, Ministry of the
Maritime Fleet, USSR, and the scientific planning to the Academy of
Sciences, with coordination by the Council on Antarctic Research.
Support of the broadest type has been provided by many scientific
institutions and by "over 100 enterprises" representing many minis-
tries. Soviet scientists claim that unlimited funds are available
and that the only limitation is the manpower for implementing the
program.
Since the scope of the program is so extensive for land and sea
investigations, the Expedition has been organized into two detachments
-- continental and marine. Particularly noteworthy is the extremely
ambitious oceanographic program, including surveys connecting both
polar areas (see par. IV). Also impressive is the comprehensiveness
and extent of the continental program. In announcing the substance
of these programs, the Soviets have been inconsistent. Eleven
"themes," or topics, were announced at the Brussels conference in
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SOVIET ANTARCTIC STATIONS
1956-1957
? Station established in 1956
0 Station to be established in
1957 (location approximate)
Australian Claim
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UNCLASSIFIED
20 DECEMBER 1956
24401
MILES
100
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1955; at the Paris conference in 1956 the number was increased to
twelve. Between the two conferences D. I. Shcherbakov and V. F.
Burkhanov (Chief of the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea
Route) listed fourteen themes. Significantly, both conference plans
omit three groups of studies -- sea and air navigation and whaling
resources. The Paris plan, however, included, aerial surveys for
mapping at 1:200,000 which is related to the study of aerial navi-
gation.
,Of the 14 themes which now comprise the Soviet program, 5 are
devoted to oceanography, 3-to other IGY topics, and 6 to non-1ga._
- research fields --including geology, mapping, whaling resources,
.biogeography, methods of air and sea navigation, hydrographic charting,
and the "navigational-hydrographic" characteristics of the .oceans.
It is believed that such comprehensiveness of scientific studywas
designed to fulfill two fundamental Soviet requirements: (1) to
obtain basic knowledge of the characteristics of the continent, its
waters, and'its atmosphere to serve as basis for, formulating future
Soviet political, economic, and scientific policy; and (2) to obtain
the geophysical data on 4 large but little-known region of the world
that are. essential to the worldwide scope of the Soviet integrated
multidisciplined study of the Earth as a whole. .
The achievements of the Expedition in the course of its 1955-56
season testify to the soundness of its planning and organization, as
well as to its. operational capabilities. With three vessels (the 012',
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Lena, and Refrigerator Ship No. 7) and a peak complement of over 350,
the Expedition not only delivered the aircraft, rolling stock, fuel,
provisions, equipment, and instruments required to build and equip
the main base, Mirnyy (Figures 1 and 2), and one of the four planned
intracontinental stations, Pionerskaya, but it also managed to es-
tablish a hitherto' unannounced coastal station, Oazis, in the ice-free
area of American-discovered Bunger Hills, 220 miles east of Mirnyy
(Figure 3).
Over and above this preparatory work, the Soviets began a program
of comprehensive meteorological Observations and conducted extensive
air and ground exploration aerial mapping, and geologic and topographic
research. In addition to meteorology, some geomagnetic and ionospheric
observations were started, even though IGY observations are not due
to begin until 1957. One indication of the intensity of Soviet ac-
tivity is the completion during the three wintermonths of June,
July, and August of 33 flight missions that ranged nearly 1,400 miles
inland and over 600 miles along the coast. In addition, the marine
detachment on the Ob' completed oceanographic and hydrographic obser-
vations along 20,000 of the 33,000 miles cruised, 4,000 of which were
in Antarctic waters. Of even more immediate significance than the
scientific work is the evidence of action taken with an undeniable'
eye to political Objectives, including reported discoveries (some of
which were marked by the ceremonial raising of the Soviet flag and
by placing records under stone cairns); the naming of 'a mayor for a
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Figure 2. The grand opening of Nirny" Observatory was held on February
13, a month after the beginning of unloading on the "Pravda" coast.
The head of the expedition, M. M. Somov lifted the State flag of the
U.S.S.R. (Soviet photo and caption)
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Figure 3. Temporary camp at Bunger Hills, January 1956; the
Oazis station was not set up until the following October.
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Figure 4. The erection of the station [Mirnyy] was under the guidance
of architect A. M. Afanasyev (on the left) and the head of the sea
coast base of the expedition, the mayor of the future city H. I. Greku
(on the right). (Soviet photo and caption)
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4
"future city" (Figure 4), and at least one announced instance of
administrative action (the proclaiming of a game preserve).
These actions were complemented by a persistent publicity cam-
paign in which the Soviet Union (1) claimed a number of "firsts" in
the correcting of maps and charts and in the mapping and charting of
virgin territory and coastal waters, even claiming the opening of the
"first interior scientific station"; and (2) succeeded in deferring
about a month the convening of the
August 1956 in order to be able to
maps, photographs, and preliminary
Paris Antarctic Conference of
distribute an impressive
research reports. There
little doubt that the Soviet efforts are part of an overall
array of
can be
policy
aimed at establishing undeniable evidence of outstanding activities
and achievements equal to or surpassing those of present claimant
nations. Such an accomplishment would correct a basic deficiency in
the position of the Soviets with respect to their insistence on the
right to participate in any sovereignty settlement.
Phillip Law, Antarctic explorer and Director of the Antarctic
Division, Australian Department of External Affairs, expressed the
following opinion of the Soviet continental operations and intentions
after his visit to Mirnyy in January 1956:
The Russian station at Mirnyy is now firmly established.
It is larger and more elaborate than any station in
Antarctica other than the U. S. bases. Although no
hint of the future of this station has been dropped,
it is my firm opinion that the USSR will continue to
man the station as a permanent establishment at the
conclusion of the IGY.
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IV. The Reported Submarine Base Construction and Soviet Naval
Capabilities
There is no evidence whatever to con-
firm A report that a Soviet submarine base is under construction in
Antarctica.
It is
believed unlikely that the Soviets would undertake the readily
observable constructional or logistic activities related to submarine
base development. Such an overt demonstration of Soviet military
interest at this time could jeopardize .a worldwide program that
promises to secure a vas.tamount of geophysical data, which are much
wanted by the expanding Soviet geophysical sciences. Moreover,
repeated Soviet emphasis on the military aspect of, U.S. Navy partici-
pation.would argue against any overt military or naval activities on
the part of the USSR at this time. On,the other hand) it is not
inconceivable that some naval experience may be sought in Antarctic
waters or in the approaches thereto. Under the guise of supporting
the IGY, Soviet vessels, surface or submarine, could serve on a
picket-rescue mission to cover Soviet flights from southeast Asia to t
Antarctica, and (2) submarines might engage in gravity surveys at sea.
A more serious and plausible cause for concern is the substantial
increase in naval operational capabilities that will accrue from the
comprehensive and extensive Soviet oceanographic and hydrographic
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of the 1956-57 cruise and does not show the coastal survey east from Mirnyy to Balleny Islands and New
Zealand, across the South Indian Ocean to Kerguelen Island, and the return via the Red Sea, nor does it
show the proposed 1958-59 cruise.
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survey program in Antarctic waters and the correlation of them with
Soviet Arctic surveys. In addition to the 1955-56 cruise, three
other seasonal cruises are planned (the 1956-57 cruise will last 7
months and cover 35,000 miles), as well as an unprecedented winter
cruise in Antarctic waters in 1958. It is estimated that well over
150,000 miles of surveys will be undertaken by the Ob' alone (see
map). Substantial additional observations will be undertaken
by the Lena, and supplementary observations will be made by other
vessels of the Expedition, including refrigerator ships, tankers,
and ships of the whaling fleet with its scientific group.
The naval operations are designed to cover the waters around
the entire continent and are being coordinated with the whaler activi-
ties of the past 10 years. Since the whaling fleet has concentrated
its activity in the American-African quadrants, the new coverage of
the Ob' and Lena will overlap from the African area and extend into
the Indian Ocean quadrant. As a part of its overall operations the
Ob' will also undertake coastal surveys including radarscope photogra-
phy ("radio location surveying") and echo-soundings, together with
scattered onshore observations (including gravimetry). By the end
of the 1956-57 season, the coastal survey will have covered the
Antarctic coast from the Balleny Islands at 162?E on the east to
200E on the west.
The practical importance of these surveys to the improvement of
Soviet naval capabilities is clearly indicated by D. I. Shcherbakov,
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who Underscored the importance of the oceanographic program to
navigationshipbuilding, compilation of charts, improvement of
navigational aids, testing of navigational-piloting equipment, and
improvement of weather forecasting.
Any surveillance of Soviet naval activities that may be required
in the future is confronted by the complexities associated with
physical conditions in the Antarctic and the great distances between
bases. The marked'drop in open Soviet reporting of its operational
activities this season as compared to that of 1955-56 suggests the
possible cessation of reporting in the post-IGY period.
V. Soviet Intentions to Remain After the IGY
To remain in the Antarctic after the close of the IGY would
seem to follow logically the three phases of Soviet policy that have
already emerged -- all of which are directed toward gaining for the
USSR at least equal rights with other nations for participating in
the determination of sovereignty in the Antarctic. This fourth or
post-IGY phase would serve to consolidate and confirm the Soviet
position stated in the notes of 1939 and 1950 and further developed
by the Whaling fleet and the current Expedition.
Although not indicated in the IGY plans, there is definite
evidence to indicate'that the Soviets intend to remain in the.
Antarctic. The politically oriented activities of SCAE have already
been mentioned. The erroneous concept voiced by some Soviets that
IGY activities in Antarctica have been allocated to countries,
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including the USSR, by "Sectors" may be a reflection of official
thinking. An increased long-term economic interest in Antarctica
is demonstrated by the fact that the Soviet whaling flotilla has
been increased by the addition of three vessels for its eleventh
season. Another Soviet report indicates that construction has begun
on a whole new whaling fleet, which may include one or more atomic-
powered vessels. The most direct evidence of intentions, however,
has been provided by the two leading figures in scientific planning
and operations, D. I. Shcherbakov and V. F. Burkhanov.
In a lecture given in March 1956, which was widely published in
the Soviet Union, Shcherbakov categorically stated that "the Antarctic,
its shores and islands, are strategically important." At about the
same time, in a widely-disseminated journal, he expressed his personal
conviction that the Soviet Union will continue its scientific research
activities in Antarctica "since they are extremely necessary to
strengthen a variety of applied branches of science: sea and air
navigation, forecasting service, the whaling industry and others."
Shcherbakov then continued to explain that after the IGY the funda-
mental Soviet bases will gradually be improved by the installation
of more and more modern facilities and that they will ultimately
become continuously operating bases for strengthening scientific
research as well as productive activities in the "Far South." He
speculates that settlement and development will progress as they
have in the Soviet Far North. Meteorological and radio stations
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will be established, with little settlements around them, and this
will be followed by the construction of ports and airdromes.
Burkhanov, in an extended interview in June 1956 with Dr.
B. B. Roberts of the Scott Polar Research Institute, made remarks
indicating that he did not believe that any nation had established
sovereignty to Antarctic territory and made it clear that the Soviets
planned to remain after the IGY.
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