BREAKFAST WITH SENATORS DANFORTH AND GLENN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B01306R000500030025-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: February 2, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Breakfast with Senators Danforth and Glenn on 6 February
FROM:
John L. Hel gerson
Di rector of Congresstonal Affatrs-
EXTENSION
NO.
DATE
. I FEB 1999
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
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SE ET
OCA 89-0271
0 2 FEB 1999
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Breakfast with Senators Danforth and Glenn
1. You will host Senators John Danforth (R., MO) and
John Glenn (D., OH) for breakfast at 8:30 AM on
6 February. Each is a new Member of the Senate
Committee. Biographic information is attached.
Evan Hineman and I will join you.
Monday
Intelligence
Dick Kerr,
, 2. This breakfast is our initiative. It is intended to
6erve as a low key get acquainted session with the new
Intelligence Committee Members. You may wish to welcome the
Members to the intelligence world and discuss your views about
our relations with the Congress. Each of the Deputies could
briefly discuss their Directorate's missions and any key issues
we will be bringing to the Committee in the next few months.
Perhaps the more important part of the breakfast would be to
provide the Senators with an opportunity to ask questions about
the Agency, the Intelligence Community or issues of interest to
them.
John Danforth
5. Senator Danforth has not been particularly active in
foreign affairs or intelligence matters. He does have a deep
personal interest in Cambodia stemming from his 1979 trip to
the Thai-Cambodian border. We have briefed him on Cambodian
political developments. He was interested in prospects for
Khmer Rouge involvement in the Cambodian government.
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John Glenn
6. Senator Glenn has been a longtime consumer of Agency
products and very active in both intelligence and foreign
affairs. He has often stopped at this building on his way to
the Senate to read our products or receive briefings. He is
particularly interested in strategic arms monitoring and
nuclear proliferation issues. As Chairman of the Governmental
Affairs Committee he sponsored legislation to authorize General
Accounting Office audits of CIA programs. That bill was not
enacted. We understand he does not plan to bring it up again
this year.
SECRET
John 4j. Helgerson
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?
SUBJEC1: Breakfast with Senators D:Amato, Danforth and Glenn
OCA/Senat
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 -? DDCI.,,designate
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1?=?A-/DDO
1 - D/DS&T
1 - D/OCA
1 - OCA R
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Chrono
(1 Feb 89)
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John C. Danforth (R)
Of Newburg ? Elected 1976
Born: Sept. 5, 19:16. Si. Louis. Mo.
Education: Princeton L. A.B. 1958; Yale L. BE).,
1.1-13. 1963.
Occupation: Lawyer: clergyman.
Family: Wife. Sally Dobson: five children.
Religion: Episcopalian.
Political Career: Mo. Attorney General. 1969-77: Re-
publican nominee fin Senate, 1970.
Capitol Office: 497 fRoell Bldg. 20510: 224-6154.
In Washington: Danforth has earned a
considerable amount of respect and goodwill
over a decade in the Senate. but he called some
of it into question with an unusual performance
on the 1986 tax bill :ha quite a few of his
colleagues are still at a loss to understand.
The problem was not that he opposed the
conference version of the tax revision bill ? so
did 22 of his colleagues, few of whom offered as
cogent and detailed a set of reasons for their
opposition as he did during an eloquent, after-
noon-long speech just before the final vote on
the measure.
Nor. for that matter, would many senators
have found cause for resentment in the fact
that he had switched from backing the legisla-
tion in the Finance Committee, where he was
one of a small group of members who helped
Chairman Bob Packwood put the bill together,
to opposing the final compromise with the
House. The conference committee defeats he
had experienced on provisions important to
Missouri interests ? notably, a tax accounting
change harmful to McDonnell Douglas and
other major defense contractors in the state ?
would have been enough to make many mem-
bers withdraw their support.
It was the manner in which Danforth both
supported and opposed the bill that proved
disturbing. In both cases, he took a strongly
moralistic approach that seemed to suggest
that anyone who disagreed with his views was
corrupt or dangerous.
The measure Danforth called "the most
significant tax reform bill in decades" a few
months later became "a very bad hill f that)
runs the risk of severe economic damage in the
future." Some of his colleagues suspected that
Danforth was using a tone of righteous indigna-
tion to cover his pique at losing out on his
home-state concerns.
Danforth's attitude towards the conference
process with the House seemed either disingen-
Missouri - Senior Senator
uous or strikingly naive for so experienced a
legislator. Although he had participated in doz-
ens of House-Senate conferences, arranged
deals with other legislators and worked out
compromises with the House, he seemed per-
sonally outraged that the Senate accepted some
key House provisions and that agreements were
made privately between Packwood and House
Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski.
Danforth left the impression that he had
entered the conference thinking the Senate bill
would somehow emerge untouched. Beyond
that, many of the arguments he offered against
the conference report could have been made
just as well against the original bill. which
Danforth had praised in generous terms. As
eloquent as Danforth proved to be, he left more
than a few senators wondering what was really
on his mind.
In the end, of course, Danforth's attack on
the bill may earn him a measure of vindication,
should the economy turn sour as a result of the
tax restructuring. The essence of his argument
was that the measure's combination of business
tax increases with personal tax cuts would
foster immediate consumption at the expense
of long-term investment in the economy.
Danforth was active on a wide variety of
fronts in the 99th Congress. Perhaps his most
visible was as chairman of the Finance Trade
Subcommittee. In the surge of congressional
concern over the spiraling international trade
deficit, he was the leading GOP voice in the
Senate seeking a middle ground between the
Reagan administration's strict free-trade policy
and the increasing appeal of protectionism.
An advocate of free trade when he arrived
in the Senate. Danforth grew increasingly con-
cerned over the importation of vast numbers of
Japanese autos and the weakening of American
839
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John C. Danforth, R-Mo.
auto manufacturers, some of crucial economic
importance to Missouri. At the beginning of the
97th Congress, he and Texas Democrat Lloyd
Bentsen introduced legislation to limit the
number of autos imported from Japan; it was
one of the reasons the Japanese agreed to
impose their own voluntary limits.
In the 98th Congress. he helped push
through a "reciprocity" measure strengthening
the administration's hand in trade negotiations
with other countries without imposing strict
barriers on imports. By 1985, though, Danforth
was angry enough with the Japanese to call for
sterner actions. Bitterly criticizing Japan's re-
strictive trade policies, he proposed a bill to
require restraints on imports from Japan if that
country did not remove harriers to the sale of
American-made goods. Approved by the Fi-
nance Committee, the bill signaled the first
wave of tough trade sentiment to move through
the Senate that year.
But some of the most popular efforts to
impose legislative restrictions on imports did
not win Danforth's support. He argued against
proposals, such as the textile-import quota bill.
that singled out specific U.S. industries for
protection. Instead, he favored a "generic" ap-
proach, under which the basic procedures for
resolving trade problems would be strength-
ened through negotiations among trading part-
ners:
At the same time, Danforth was sharply
critical of Reagan's trade stance. He blasted the
president for refusing to provide import protec-
tions for the hard-hit domestic shoe industry.
calling Reagan's decision "a disaster for U.S.
trade policy." Danforth said the administration
"tends to define anything that walks as protec-
tionism."
Meanwhile, Danforth was serving as chair-
man of the Commerce Committee, where he
had a rocky two years. While he scored some
successes, he encountered serious problems on
several of the major bills to come before his
committee.
Danforth brought a more positive attitude'
towards federal regulation to the chairmanship
than did Packwood, his Commerce predecessor.
He had strongly opposed, for example, Pack-
wood's efforts in 1984 to loosen federal broad-
casting laws that require radio and television
stations to air contrasting views.
Danforth's reluctance to abandon regula-
tion was most apparent on the issue of auto
safety. Over the years, he had come into con-
flict with both the Reagan administration and
the auto industry, both of which had tried to
reduce federal regulation. He once accused a
Reagan-appointed highway safety official ..r
840
? _ .???%
wanting to "search and destroy" auto safety.
In the 98th Congress, Danforth pushed
through legislation increasing regulation of
trucks and buses, and pressuring states to curb
drunken driving by raising their legal drinking
age to 21. He added to that record as chairman,
sponsoring a successful hill to set national
, licensing standards for truck and bus drivers
and toughen penalties against drug- and alco-
hol-related driving convictions.
Danforth made less progress, .however, in
his efforts to settle the contentious issue of
product liability. After the Commerce panel
deadlocked in 1985 over legislation to set fed-
eral standards for lawsuits on defective prod-
ucts, he proposed a compromise measure aimed
at encouraging out-of-court settlements of li-
ability claims. A key feature of his plan called
for a $250.000 limit on awards for pain and
suffering in cases in which the plaintiff rejected
a pretrial offer from the defendant.
A sharply divided Commerce Committee
approved Danforth's bill. But the bill did not
reach the floor for months, and when it finally
was called up it fell victim to the threat of a
filibuster. Danferth was, however, able to se-
cure final passage of a bill making it easier for
small businesses and non-profit institutions to
join together to provide their own liability
insurance.
Danforth also ran into problems with the
proposed sale of the CONRAIL system to pri-
vate enterprise. Working with the administra-
tion, he pushed through the Senate a bill
allowing sale of the system to the Norfolk
Southern railroad. House opposition blocked
the idea, however. and Congress eventually
agreed to permit sale of Conrail stuck to the
public.
Danforth's background as an ordained
Episcopal priest makes him even more distinc-
tive in the Senate than the snow-white patch he
has had in the front of his hair all his adult life.
But he makes a conscious effort to play down
his unique status. "The people of Missouri
elected me to be their senator, not their pas-
tor," he says.
Some of Danforth's legislative efforts re-
flect the humanitarian and moral ideals that
led him into the ministry. Deeply concerned
About world hunger. he helped win $150 million
in emergency food aid for Africa after touring
the drought-ravaged continent early in 1984.
He also has been active in pushing the Reagan
administration to step up the pace of nuclear
arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union.
"The possibility that a nuclear holocaust could
occur has become the most important moral
issue, in human history,- he has said.
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At Home: A former Wall Street lawyer
and Ralston-Purina heir hardly seems the type
to represent a state whose political hero is
Harry S Truman, champion of the common
folk.
Danforth's pedigree was no hindrance in
his early political career; he won his first elec-
tion in 1968 as an outsider, a young insurgent
vowing to rid the state attorney general's office
of deadwood that had collected during a succes-
sion of Democratic administrations.
But after eight years in state office and six
more in Washington, Danforth by 1982 was
striking many Missouri voters not as a reformer
but as a wealthy man distant from their eco-
nomic concerns. That is why he was nearly
ambushed by a clever liberal Democrat who
sold herself as a populist under the slogan
"Give 'em hell. Harriett."
Well into the election year, Democrats
were embarrassed by their failure to find a
well-known candidate to challenge Danforth.
The entry of state Sen. Harriett Woods brought
little cheer to party leaders. She had gained
valuable media exposure representing a liberal
St: Louis County constituency, but offered a
record of questionable appeal to rural and
conservative voters and to business interests
the Democrats needed to compete with Dan-
forth's campaign spending. Woods supported
legalized abortion and opposed efforts to pro-
hibit use of busing as a tool to desegregate
schools.
But Woods managed to portray herself as
an average working person and hit Danforth as
an aristocrat who supported cuts in health care,
social services and education. As the only fe-
male Democratic candidate for the Senate in
1982, Woods became a priority for women's
groups.
Danforth's fund-raising advantage over
Woods was more than 2-to-1. But his money
and excellent organization were offset by
Woods' most important asset: desire. Voters
were impressed with her enthusiastic dawn-to-
midnight campaigning, while Danforth gave
the impression he was not really hungry to be
re-elected. More than once, he lamented that
? the campaign was making it difficult for him to
watch the baseball playoffs.
But Danforth's strategy changed abruptly
Oct. 15. when the St. Louis Globe-Democrat's
poll showed the race deadlocked. Less than a
month earlier, the newspaper's poll had given
Danforth a comfortable lead.
Danforth went on the attack. He called
Woods a liberal throwback to an era of discred-
ited Democratic tax-and-spend practices and
accused her of demagoguery for portraying the
Missouri - Senior Senator
Republican Party as a menace to Social Secu-
rity without offering any constructive sugges-
tions of her own. He brought up abortion and
busing, topics he had avoided earlier in the
campaign.
The shift to a negative campaign had the
desired effect. Some conservative Democrats
took a second look at ?Voods and lost their
enthusiasm, and complacent Republicans were
jolted into realizing that a high GOP turnout
would be necessary to keep the seat out of
Democratic hands.
Danforth prevailed with slightly less than
51 percent of the vote. Woods won where
Democrats usually fare well in Missouri ? St.
Louis, Kansas City and the majority of rural
counties ? but in each of those areas, her
liberalism cost her just enough votes to enable
Danforth to escape.
Despite his 1982 struggle, however, Dan-
forth still enjoys the reputation of being the
founder of the modern-day Missouri GOP.
Elected state attorney general in 1968 in his
political debut, Danforth became the first Re-
publican in 22 years to win statewide office. He
lured bright young lawyers to the attorney
general's office ? among them Christopher S.
"Kit" Bond, elected is Missouri's junior sena-
tor in 1986 after two non-consecutive terms as
governor, and John Ashcroft, who was elected
to replace Bond as governor. Danforth also
developed a reputation as a protector of con-
sumers and the environment.
In 1970 Danforth was the GOP's only hope
to dislodge Democratic Sen. Stuart Symington,
who was seeking a fourth term. In an expensive
campaign that introduced Missouri to modern
media-oriented politics, Danforth won 48 per-
cent of the vote. Two years later, he returned as
attorney general by over 450,000 votes, and
awaited his next Senate chance. ?
It came, as expected, when Symington de-
cided to retire in 1976. Democrats appeared to
seize the momentum by nominating U.S. Rep.
Jerry Litton, described by a state political
expert as -one of the most exciting political
personalities to come along in years." But Dem-
ocratic enthusiasm was tragically brief. Litton
died in a primary-night plane crash, and Dan-
forth was suddenly the favorite in a contest
that had been looking bleak for him.
The state Democratic committee chose as
its replacement former Gov. Warren Hearnes,
whose courthouse-style administration had
been the focus of Danforth's campaign attacks
in 1968. Hearnes had finished a poor second to
Litton in the primary. Against Litton, Danforth
would have had a difficult contest; against
Hearnes, he won easily.
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John C. Danforth. R-Mo.
Committees
Commerce, SciencCand Transportation (Ranking)
National Ocean Policy Study (ranking).
Budget (9th of 11 Republicans)
Finance (415 o19 RepJblicans)
International Trade (ranking): International Debt: Taxation and
Debt Management.
Elections
1982 General
John C. Danforth (R)
Harriet: Woods (Di
1982 Primary
John C. Danforth (RI
Niel Hancock (R)
784.876 (51%)
758.629 (49%)
217.162 (74%)
61.378 (21%)
Previous Winning Percentage: 1976 (57%)
1982
Danforth (R)
Woods (D)
842
Campaign Finance -
Receipts Expend.
Receipts from PACs itures
51.766.934 $572.658 (32%) 51.806.350
5 1, 194.854 $265.151 (22%) 51.193.966
Voting Studies
Presidential Party Conservative
Support Unity Coalition
Year S 0 ? $ 0 S
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
80 20
81 17
86 13
80 16
71 19
85 13
77 21 82 17
77 20 70 20
55 15 83 17
72 27 64 32
72 21 76 18
54 15 83 16
S = Support 0 = OPposihon
Key Votes
Produce MX missiles (1985)
Weaken gun control laws (1985)
Reject school prayer (1985)
Limit textile imports (1985)
Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)
Block chemical weapons production 11986)
Impose sanctions on South Africa .1986)
Interest Group Ratings
Year ADA ACU AFL-C10 CCUS
1986 30
1985 15
1984 35
1983 40
1982 40
1481 25
57 33 61
65 19 75
68 27 63
32 13 53
50 23 52
73 17 89
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Ohio - Senior Senator
John Glenn (D)
Of Columbus ? Elected 1974
Born: July 18, 1921, Cambridge, Ohio.
Education: Muskingum College, B.S. 1962.
Military Career Marine Corps, 1942-65.
Occupation: Astronaut; soft drink company executive.
Family: Wife, Anna Margaret Castor; two children.
Religion: Presbyterian.
Political Career Sought Democratic nomination for
U.S. Senate. 1970; sought Democratic nomination
for president. 1984.
Capitol Office: 503 Hart Bldg. 20510; 224-3353.
In Washington: When he took over as
chairman of the Governmental Affairs Com-
mittee at the start of the 100th Congress, Glenn
decided it might be necessary to expand the
panel's workload beyond its traditionally small
agenda. But in keeping with his personality and
style, he warned against expanding it too far.
"The problem," he said, "is to make sure you
don't have too many balls in the air."
That is a problem Glenn has never had to
worry about in his own Senate career. He has
spent more than a decade focusing on a handful
? a very small handful ? of issues with the
single-minded intensity he displayed as a mili-
tary pilot and astronaut earlier in life.
The preoccupation of Glenn's. career, pre-
venting the spread of nuclear weapons to other
nations, is an unquestionably important goal
shared by most of his fellow senators. But
Glenn has pursued it to the frequent exclusion
of other issues, both foreign and domestic, that
would round out a comprehensive Senate
record. He is the polar opposite of the typically
ambitious legislator struggling to get his finger
into every pie. Colleagues who admire Glenn's
character and dedication wonder whether he
might have accomplished more if he had not
been so narrowly focused.
To a great extent, Glenn's career has been
restricted because that is the way his mind
works. He is not a man who takes readily to
new concepts, or easily shifts his tactics in mid-
course if circumstances warrant. But once he
gets an idea into his head, he sticks to it with
an unbending tenacity.
The obstacles posed by Glenn's style were
evident in his 1984 presidential campaign. Ad-
vertised for months as the main competitor to
Walter F. Mondale for the Democratic nomina-
tion, he made weak showings in a succession of
primaries and caucuses and quickly dropped.
out of the race. Poor at public speaking and
1154
unable to draw much audience attention. Glenn
found himself portrayed increasingly often as
the astronaut candidate ? something that only
weakened his credibility.
Glenn has been no more exciting on the
Senate floor than he was in his presidential
campaign. His tendency to read speeches in full
? even when no one is listening ? can drive
his colleagues to distraction.
He is no horse-trader. When he is seeking
to muster support for an amendment, he
merely explains the facts and hopes they will
prove persuasive. Often that is not enough.
Glenn is the acknowledged expert in Con-
gress on the nuclear non-proliferation issue and
the author of key laws designed to prevent the
United States from being the source of nuclear
weapons capabilities.
In 1976, Glenn successfully pushed an
amendment prohibiting U.S. aid to countries
that exported or imported nuclear reprocessing
equipment or materials ? technology that can
be diverted into nuclear weapons production.
He was the chief sponsor and floor manager of
the 1978 act that placed controls on the U.S.
export of nuclear materials.
Glenn's anti-proliferation efforts have
brought him into frequent conflict with the
Reagan administration. He has sought to block
foreign aid to nations not complying with inter-
national efforts to control the spread of nuclear
weapons. In 1981, Glenn persuaded the Senate
to approve a provision threatening to cut off
aid to India or Pakistan if either detonated a
nuclear device. "If we can't draw the line there,
then we are incapable of ever drawing the line
anywhere," he said. The Senate agreed 51-45.
Glenn kept up his efforts in 1984, winning
initial Foreign Relations Committee approval
of an amendment barring military aid to Paki-
stan unless the president certified it was not
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trying to develop ? nuclear weapons. Under
heavy pressure from the administration. how-
ever, the committee later switched and ap-
proved a much less stringent substitute ?
spurring an uncharacteristic outburst from
:Glenn, who denounced it for "waffling, knuck-
ling under and giving in- to the administration.
The next year. Glenn took on the adminis-
tration's proposal to sell nuclear-power materi-
als to China. Although the resolution approving
the sale called for efforts to prevent the Chi-
nese from transferring nuclear weapons tech-
nology to other countries, Glenn argued that
more protections were needed. The Senate ap-
proved his amendment requiring the president
to certify that ali nuclear exports to China were
covered by .riternational standards ensuring
peaceful use. But the administration quickly
mounted an all-out effort against, the provision,
and it was dropped in conference.
At the start of the 99th Congress, Glenn
opted to leave the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, where he had spent his whole Senate
career, for Armed Services. He seemed eager to
move beyond nuclear proliferation issues to
broader questions of global defense.
Over most of his career, Glenn has tilted to
the hawkish side on national security matters.
"No one has ever accused me of being soft on
the Soviets," he says. But he has disagreed with
much of Reagan's arms buildup.
In 1982, for example, Glenn offered a floor
amendment to stop development of the MX
missile. He argued instead for a smaller missile
that could be hauled around on trucks using
civilian highways ? an argument that had
serious political drawbacks. His amendment
was rejected 65-29.
When the Reagan administration proposed
selling AWACS radar planes to Saudi Arabia,
Glenn was willing to listen to the idea that the
Saudis needed advance warning protection for
their oil fields. But he insisted that the planes
should be delivered only on the condition that
American personnel accompany Saudi pilots on
their missions ? an idea that reflected his
concern over the possible loss of U.S. technol-
ogy to other countries. It was unacceptable to
the Saudis, and Glenn voted against the sale.
Glenn has backed the administration on
some key weapons systems, however. He is an
ardent advocate of the B-1 bomber,.working in
the 99th Congress to add funds to make possi,
ble continued production of the plane in case
proposed development of a radar-evading
iistealth" bomber proved unfeasible. Glenn also
has supported "binary" chemical weapons.
Glenn's love for detail played an even more
^I portant role in the debate to'er the SALT II
John Glenn, 0-Ohio
treaty. He became the foremost Senate expert
on "verification." the procedures for monitor-
ing Soviet compliance with the treaty.
While the Carter adtnihistration prepared
to bring the treaty before the Senate. Glenn
was holed up in the archives cif the Intelligence
Committee, studying the extreme complexities
of the verification problem. After the fall of the
Shah and the consequent loss of C.S. monitor-
ing stations in Iran, Glenn decided that ade-
quate verification was impossible, and the
treaty unacceptable ? a position that nearly
drove the Carter White How,e to despair. With
the onset of the Reagan administration. how-
ever. Glenn warmed to SALT II and to further
arms control efforts.
At Home: Not long after he became a
national hero as-the first American to orbit the
earth, Glenn returned to Ohio to challenge 74-
year-old Sen. Stephen M. Young in the 1964
Democratic primary. His space career had
brought him into close contact with the Kenne-
dys, and he was influenced by them to make his
political career as a .Democrat. But he did not
get very far in 1964. A bathroom fall injured his
inner ear, and he. had to drop out.
Following that, Glenn's political energies
subsided. Instead of attending party functions,
he immersed himself in business interests. He
served on the boards of Royal Crown Cola and
the Questor Corp.; oversaw four Holiday Inn
franchises he partly owned, lectured and filmed
television documentaries.
In 1970. with Young retiring, Glenn de-
cided to run for the seat, competing for the
Democratic nomination against Howard M.
Metzenbaum, then a millionaire businessman
and labor layer. Initially a strong favorite,
Glenn found that his frequent absences from
Ohio over the preceding six years had hurt him
politically, giving him the image of an outsider
among state Democrats. Metzenbaum had the
support of the- party establishment and a su-
perb and well-financed campaign organization.
Through saturation television advertising,
Metzenbaum erased his anonymity. And Glenn,
whose celebrity status was bringing out large
crowds, was overly confident. On primary day,
Glenn carried 75 of the state's 88 counties but
was badly beaten in the urban areas. He lost
the nomination by 13,442 votes.
Metzenbaum was beaten himself in the
general election by Republican Robert A. Taft
Jr. Three years later, however, he made .it to
the Senate as an appointee, chosen by Demo-
cratic Gov. John J. Gilligan to fill a vacancy.
Metzenbaum immediately began campaigning
for a full term in his own right. and Glenn
decided to challenge him for the nomination.
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John Glenn, 0-Ohio
The Metzenbaum appointment outraged
Glenn. and gave him an issue during their
rematch in the 1974 primary. Glenn rejected
Gilligan's offer to be his running mate as lieu-
tenant governor and denounced the governor as
a "boss" who practiced "machine politics."
The underdog Glenn of 1974 proved to be
much tougher than the favored Glenn of 1970.
With a reputation of impeccable integrity in a
year dominated by Watergate, he pointed to
Metzenbaum's long legal battle with the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, although Metzenbaum
had never been charged with any wrongdoing..
A Metzenbaum countercharge ? that Glenn
didn't pay a state levy on his securities for one
year ? failed to halt Glenn's momentum.
This time, Glenn did much better in Metz-
enbaum's base of Cuyahoga County (Cleve-
land). Coupled with his customary strength in
rural areas, this allowed him to achieve a
91,000-vote primary victory.
In the fall, Glenn crushed a weak Republi-
can opponent, Cleveland Mayor Ralph J. Perk,
who was disorganized and underfinanced. Six
years later, he had only nominal opposition for
a second term.
In 1986, Glenn drew a slightly stiffer chal-
lenge front GOP Rep. Thomas N. Kindness, a
better-financed and more aggressive opponent
than the sacrificial lambs the GOP had offered
against Glenn before. Kindness pounded away
at what he saw as Glenn's main weakness ? a
lingering multimillion-dollar debt from his un-
successful 1984 presidential campaign.
Glenn had worked hard to mend fences
with Ohio voters in the wake of his failed White
House bid, making dozens of appearances
across the state in 1984 to boost both the
Democratic ticket and his own political stock.
But he was unable to erase the debt, which
included $1.9 million worth of loans from four
Ohio banks. /(Glenn did not reach an agreement
with the Federal Election Commission on pay-
ing off the debt until 1987.) Kindness main-
tained that Glenn received preferential treat-
ment from the banks, which the average
Ohioan would not get. But Kindness was un-
able to drive home the point. Not well known
outside his conservative southwest Ohio dis-
trict, he lacked the money to mount, a statewide
media blitz that might have shaken Glenn's
image.
Kindness lost in a landslide, although he
did have the consolation of carrying nearly a
dozen counties. None of Glenn's previous GOP
challengers had carried more than one.
Committees
Governmental Affairs (Chairman)
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.
Armed Services (8th of 11 Democrats)
Manpower and Personnel (chairman): Conventional Forces and
Alliance Defense; Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence.
Special Aging (2nd 01 10 Democrats)
Campaign Finance
Receipts
Receipts from PACs
1986
Glenn (0) 52.088.191 5637,186 (31%) $1319026
Kindness (R) $664227 $172.648 (26%) $657,908
Expend-
itures
Tier
1986
1985
1064
1983
1982
10131
1156
? _ -
Voting Studies
Presidential
Support
42
42
'39
.39
35
53
Party
Unity
0 S 0
52
56
43
35
45
42
74
79
55
57
67
74
23
18
25
12
17
21
Conservative
Coalition
S 0
29 70
42 57
28 51
20 52
26 51
34 66
S = Support 0 = Opposition
Elections
1988 General
John Glenn (0)
Thomas N. Kindness IR)
1988 Primary
John Glenn (0) 678,171
Don Scott ID) 96,309
Previous Winning Percentages: 1980 (69%) 1174
1,949,208 (62%)
1,171,893 (38%)
Key Votes
Produce MX missiles (1985)
Weaken gun control laws (1985)
Reject school prayer (1985)
Limit textile imports (1985)
,Amend Constitution to require balanced budget (1986)
Aid Nicaraguan contras (1986)
Block chemical weapons production (1986)
Impose sanctions on South Africa (1986)
(88%)
(12%)
(65%)
Interest Group Ratings
Year ADA ACU AFL-C10 CCUS
1936 65 30 87 44
1985 75 27 86 34
1984 65 5 67 38
1983 65 16 93 31
1982 70 28 87 55
1981 80 7 68 44
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