INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AND THE IRAN ISSUE: LEARNING FROM THE PAST AND CHANGING FOR THE FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M01264R000100020026-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 2, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

M
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP90MO1264R000100020026-8
E 680 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks March 2, 1987
under this title with respect to any article
or with respect to any beneficiary country if
he finds that such a country does not pro-
vide adequate and effective intellectual
property protection or fair and equitable
market, access to United States persons,
unless the President certifies to the Con-
gress, and continues to certify at six months
intervals, that such country has taken sub-
stantial action toward providing adequate
and effective intellectual property protec-
tion and enforcement of fair and equitable
market access for United States persons."
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AND
THE IRAN ISSUE: LEARNING
FROM THE PAST AND CHANG-
ING FOR THE FUTURE
HON JIM COURTER
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 2, 1987
Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, as a member
of the House Select Committee to Investigate
.Covert. Arms Transactions- with Iran, I will be
studying for months to come the administra-
tion's dealings with Iran and the Nicaraguan
resistance. In the back of our minds, all Mem-
bers will be considering what, if any, changes
are needed in congressional oversight of-cla-
destine intelligence operations.
Already, as evidenced by numerous bills
submitted in the first days of this Congress,
many are inclined to tighten the leash still fur-
ther, especially by imposing inflexible notifica-
tion requirements.
Others, however, are stepping back to ex-
amine the causes, rather than the circum-
stances, of what has become a foreign policy
and domestic political fiasco. As revealed by
the articles I am submitting for the RECORD,'
many believe the venture might have been
halted in its infancy if the people directing it
had not been convinced, that damaging leaks
to the media were inevitable unless the oper-
ation was tightly held. Therefore, the White
House excluded those-both in the adminis-.
tration and in Congress-who might have
counseled caution or at least shared some of
the political risk. One cause of this debacle, in
short, was lack of trust. It was because of dis-
trust that the White House waived even
pared-down congressional notification require-
ments. The problem was not that there were
insufficient restrictions on administration free-
dom, but rather that exisiting procedures, both
internal to the executive branch and relating
to Congress, were bypassed.
As HENRY HYDE, a member of both the In=telligence and Iran Committees, has conclud-
ed, "it is clear the President and his closest
advisers have lost faith in the existing intelli-
gence oversight arrangement. Mutual trust is
the key ingredient here, and right now it is
conspicuously missing."
"The test of a policy is not its openness,
but its wisdom," Charles. Krauthammer ob-
serves. "If the outcome of. the North affair is
that the covert becomes impossible, then it
will have been far more damaging than we
now imagine." Strategic theorist Edward
Luttwak likewise agrees that the highly secret
nature of the venture and primary reliance on
private individuals rather than on CIA was an
attempt to avoid leaks. Harvard Prof. James
Q. Wilson adds that "our allies do not trust us,
and we increasingly do not trust each other."
Leaks have flourished, he says, because the
United States consensus on foreign policy
aims and methods was destroyed during the
Vietnam war and has never recovered. None-
theless, he judges that extensive leaks about
sensitive operations have served hardly any
American interests. He suggests a "new com-
pact" to help control the debate without pub-
lishing "every secret, every name, every Swiss
bank account"
Wilson, like Luttwak and Krauthammer, be-
lieves part of that should be consolidation of
congressional oversight into a joint committee
with a small professional staff. Again this ses-
sion, HENRY' HYDE has offered a bill to accom-
plish that goal, which he explains in the at-
tached submission. HYDE argues that such a
committee would be more efficient, reliable
and bipartisan, as well as more secure. He
notes that one hurdle to overcome will be
congressional reluctance to reduce drastically
the number of Intelligence Committee slots.
Already, Members vigorously compete for
these, : positions, which are considered "a
major political asset." Let us hope, as the
Daily Oklahoman editorialized, that this time
around Members are "able to subordinate
their political considerations to the national in-
terest" by supporting a joint committee.
[From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 20,
1987]
CONSOLIDATE THE INTELLIGENCE PANELS
(By Henry J. Hyde)
Now that the 100th Congress is under
way, both the Senate and House have select
committees probing the Iran-contra affair.
A new challenge confronts the majority
Democrats, however, as to whether they
really want to improve congressional over-
sight of the administration's covert and
other intelligence activities.
A case in point was the president's deci-
sion to defer informing congressional lead-
ers on the intelligence oversight committees
of what he was up to in Iran. That decision
may have been legally correct; but surely it
was politically disastrous, as prior notifica-
tion would have provided the president with
some political risk insurance against the in-
evitable day this initiative would become
public knowledge. Interestingly and iron-
ically, Jimmy Carter also postponed report-
ing to Congress in instances related to hos-
tage rescues, according to former CIA Direc-
tor Stanfield Turner. Mr. Carter, like Mr.
Reagan, believed prior notification to Con-
gress risked revelations that would have
jeopardized the lives of those involved in
these operations.
After serving two years on the House In-
telligence Committee, I can understand the
president's concern about leaks. Time after
time, the president has seen the details of
extremely sensitive covert operations dis-
closed in the media. As we all know the well-
timed leak is a Washington art form that is
often used to torpedo an administration ini-
tiative that some informed source doesn't
agree with. Admittedly, many of these rev-
elations come from within the executive
branch, but Capitol Hill is culpable as well.
Indeed, the leaks have become so perva-
sive that the president has been bypassing
many of the people within his own adminis-
tration who ordinarily would have known
about these sensitive activities. The same
holds true for Congress, where it is clear the
president and his closest advisers have lost
faith in the existing intelligence oversight
arrangement. Mutual trust is the key ingre-
dient here, and right now it is conspicuously
missing.
While the president revamps his National
Security Council, a parallel overhaul is
needed in the legislative branch that will re-
store the president's confidence that Con-
gress can keep a secret. Specifically, it is
time to merge the current House and Senate
Intelligence committees into a Joint Com-
mittee composed of a small group of Repub-
licans and Democrats who, in addition to
the requisite trustworthiness, competence
and responsibility, also possess the restraint
to subordinate political considerations to
the national interest. Such a committee
would have full and exclusive legislative au-
thority over all intelligence matters and be
staffed by a small cadre of nonpartisan pro-
fessionals with the same exemplary person-
al qualities as the committee's members. In
recognition of political reality, the majority-
party membership from each house would
have a one vote edge.
A joint oversight panel would diminish
the possibilities for partisan posturing and
significantly reduce the number of people
with 'access to. sensitive information. This
would not only minimize the risk of damag-
ing unauthorized disclosures, but it would
also substantially increase the likelihood of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Justice Department identifying leak
sources-something that rarely occurs now,
because of the large number of individuals
in the "intelligence information loop." As
the outgoing chairman of the House Intelli-
gence Committee, Rep. Lee H. Hamilton,
once noted, "Leaks are inevitable when so
many people handle secrets." I agree and
believe that Congress has a. real opportunity
.
to set an example for the executive branch.
It is also worth noting that Congress has
increasingly insisted upon being briefed and
consulted by the executive branch concern-
ing national-security and foreign-policy
questions. A significant percentage of these
"leadership" briefings are intelligence-relat-
ed and require the involvement of high-level
executive-branch officials who are. often
hard pressed to meet the demands of both
the House and Senate Intelligence commit-
tees. This is particularly true during fast-
breaking crises. A consolidated, secure over-
sight panel would provide one point of con-
tact for consultations and briefings in those
instances when time is of the essence.
In short, . a Joint Intelligence Committee
would provide a much more efficient,
secure, reliable and bipartisan oversight en-
vironment, thereby drastically reducing the
possibility that the president might again
postpone informing Congress of clandestine
activities. Consequently, I have Introduced a
revision of a proposal to bring this about
that had nearly 170 bipartisan co-sponsors
in the last Congress. Giving it new-found
momentum is the sorry spectacle of almost
daily leaks from those involved in the Iran-
contra investigation.
Can the momentum behind this proposal
be sustained? The test will come when the
leadership of both parties must turn down
the many applications from members of
Congress who view service on an intelligence
oversight committee as a major political
asset.
[From the Daily Oklahoma City
Oklahoman, Jan. 21, 1987]
ONE PANEL BETTER THAN Two
Members of Congress sincerely interested
in avoiding the kind of situation that led to
the Iran-Contra affair could do worse than
heed the advice of one of their colleagues,
Rep. Henry J. Hyde, D-Ill.
He believes merging the current Senate
and House Intelligence committees into a
joint, bipartisan intelligence committee
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March 2, 1987 CONURESSIONAL RECORD - Exteprsions of Remarks E 681
would produce a more compact, secure con- coordinate the venture with key allied gov- The arms-for-Iran turned into cash-for-
gressional oversight operation that would ernments; the C.I.A. would have done that, the-contras scandal is just beginning to un-
win the confidence of the administration while preserving secrecy, by relying on its ravel: One sure consequence of that tmrav-
'and the public. His premise is debatable, contacts with officials in foreign govern- tiling will be .an endless series of disclo=
politicians being what they are, but it is cer- ments. As it was, the handful of overbur- sures-names, dates, places, faces-that will
tainly worth a try. dened- individuals who conducted the Irani- make it very unsafe to be an American
With the 100th Congress now in session, an operation lacked both the required con- agent. For some Americans that will mean
the inquiry into the.arms sales to Iran and tacts and the ability to minimize the the end of a political career. Elsewhere sur-
alleged diversion of profits to Nicaraguan damage when word got out-as it always. will vival has a different meaning. In the early
rebels will get bigger and broader. Appar- sooner or later. '80s, Israel had. then lost, contacts In the
ently nothing will keep it from developing Past experience shows that secrecy. can be middle levels of the Iranian military. "They
into a full-scale Watergate-type circus. Too combined with coordination with our allies. died out," said an Israeli official to the New
many people in Washington have a vested The French kept a secret of Henry A. Kis- York Times. "I mean that literally. Our con-
interest in making it so. singer's talks with Vietnamese envoys in
executed."
Secrecy is the key word in all of this. Last Paris; Pakistan helped to mediate his talks The facts U.S. were
only in
Saturday marked the first anniversary of with the Chinese; the British have kept se- where "covert" the ndingf for"secret" or the world
Reagan's signing of a secret order authoriz- crets many times, and so have the Israelis not only yfont-pa funding news but the subject wars is
ing direct, U.S. arms shipments to Iran and the Saudis. But individuals operating open r debate. a meeting
through the Central Intelligence Agency on their own from an office in the White open parliamentary
lumn is and editors At a r, Pre
and other government channels. It also di- House basement will inevitably find it diffi- with columnists and edtors last year, was not
rected the CIA not to inform Congress of cult to manage a delicate initiative like the dent Reagan was asked why he was not
the operation. Iranian mission and at the same time to doing more to help efforts in Congress to
The unusual degree of secrecy surround- maintain liaison with allied. capitals. The send aid to the rebels in Angola. Reagan re-
ing the order and the failure of the White result is certain to be a severe loss of confi- plied than he didn't want to go that route,
House to consult with congressional leaders dence when the inevitable disclosure fol- but that he would give covert aid instead.
are responsible for much of the present tur- lows. The President was speaking on the record.
moil. By law the president is supposed to Why then was the C.I.A. not in charge of In - American political debate, the words
inform Congress of such actions either in. the Iranian affair? Because as matters now covert and secret have lost all meaning. It is
advance or "in a timely fashion" afterward- stand the C.I.A. simply cannot carry out not just that, as the European traveler in-
Defining that phrase is the gist of the prob- genuinely secret operations-as opposed to variably notes, Americans are more open
lem. pseudosecret "covert" actions, such as the and informal in their social relations. It is
Hyde says Reagan's decision to defer tell- supply of arms to the Afghans, which was a that the very Idea of secrecy carries a moral
ing Congress may have been legally correct matter of public knowledge almost from the taint. Americans are passionately. democrat-
but it was politically disastrous. Prior notifi- start. ic, and thus acutely sensitive to the contra-
cation would have given Reagan some "po- The problem is twofold: the C.I.A. will not dition between democracy, with its promise
litical risk insurance" against the inevitable now act without permission from Congres- and premise of openness, and the secret
day the operation would become public sional intelligence committees, and Con- world of diplomatic and paramilitary, in-
knowledge. gress has failed to develop practicable over- trigue.
But Hyde also says that, after serving two sight procedures and safeguards. The result Only what Is known can be consented to.
years on the House Intelligence Committee, is paralysis: No official of the C.I.A. In his Secrecy smacks of tyranny. Americans do
he understands the president's concern senses would knowingly particpate in a not readily accept.the argument that secre-
about leaks. Not only Reagan but other secret operation unless duly authorized by cy is necessary for reasons of state. Ameri-
chief executives have had this problem. In Congress, lest he - find himself answering cans would never stand, for example, for
the current situation the leaks were so per- charges and possibly going to jail as a result Britain's Official Secrets Act. In Europe the
vasive Reagan has been bypassing even of future investigations. On the other hand, state predates democracy. In America,
people within his own administration, Hyde no professional would risk taking part in a where the state and democracy were joined
says. supposedly secret operation overseas if the at birth, reasons of state are not permitted
He proposes a joint intelligence committee _ details had been communicated-as they to supersede reasons of democracy.
composed of Republicans and Democrats must be-to -congressional . committees. The contradition between secrecy and de-
who would not only be trustworthy, compe- There are simply too many people involved, y did not much matter to Americans
tent and responsible but would also be able with too many reasons of their own for leak- during during their first century and a half when
to subordinate their political considerations ing to the press. _ they looked mostly inward and let two great
to the national interest. That may be asking It was this paralysis that the President's oceans and the British navy keep the world
too much of members of Congress. volunteers tried to overcome in the Iranian at bay.. It was only .aster America suddenly
and Nicaraguan cases, no -doubt out of a became a great power after World War' l
[From the New York Times, Nov. 17, 1986] sense of responsibility as well As sheer frus- that the contradition presented itself most
How To ADMINISTER--COVERT- OPERATIONS . tration. Starkly. Woodrow Wilson immediately pro
(By Edward N. Luttwak) So long as the United States remains en- posed a typically American solution. From'
WASHINGTON.-If nothing else, recent gaged all over the world, each Administra- the New World, a new way to do interna-
eventSHparticularly the t intrusion r tint tion will face the need to act secretly in deli- tional business: open covenants, openly ar-
eves- eft Eugene Hasenfus a into cate matters large and small, often entirely. rived at, America would Indeed enter the
Nicaragua
and a ic the that still pris- uncontroversial.. If we are to 'do so at all corrupting arena of great power ?politics-
ohow by imelstill oEuge on that a a the Iran ar alms a s deal- competently, Congress must provide proper but incorruptibly without secrets. In 1929
oversight. The most effective arrangement Secretary of State Henry L. Stinson found
phant" C.I.A. of the 1960's is now well and would include a single joint committee, with out about American code-breaking and
truly tamed. The White House has declared a small, stable staff, operating under strict interception operations. He abruptly termi
that C.I.A. operatives were involved. in the rules (along the lines of -the Joint Atomic nated them with his deservedly famous
Iranian mission, but it was current or re- Energy Commission, which. kept the most dictum. "Gentlemen do not read each
tired employees of the National Security sensitive secrets quite intact for decades). other's mail."
Council who were reportedly, in charge of Policy would still Another world war, the cold war and now
both operations. be disputed, of course, and ,~ _
phant" Central Intelligence A resume its proper function-and we would [mess. The first of these gave birth to the
gency-and be spared the embarrassments and real dip- .OSS, the second to the CIA and the third to
that is the present situation, in which the lomatic everything from secret Delta Force com-
delicate business of conducting secret oper- damage caused by unprofessional
ations is left to White House officials and and uncoordinated secret operations. mandos to Lieut. Colonel Oliver North and
the other NSC "cowboys" who' dreamed up
the volunteer helpers they enlist- the
[From Time magazine, Dec. 8,1.986]
The resulting lack of professional exper- Iran-contra connection.
tise was evident in the Nicara.vnan nacu if WHEN SECRECY MEETS DEMOCRACY Still, Americans remain uneasy about se-
?~ fiasco has much to do with, its secrecy..
craft that crashed north of Managua would ' Can Americans do anything in secret any- "They were running the State Department,
not u: a have been careful carrying search for any compromising docu-
men - more?, You are a Russian or zit Israeli or an the CIA and the Defense Department out of
Iranian. Tomorrow you are approached by the basement of the White House without
papers and labels is. a routine part of pre- an American agent to help his cause in a any kind of congressional oversight," com-
flight preparations for clandestine C.I.A. secret operation. Do you accept the offer? lamed Patrick Leahy, vice chairman of the
missions. In the Iranian case, the problem Not unless you have a lot of life insurance Senate Intelligence Committee. Sure, disclo-
was not so much amateurism as a failure to and a craving for publicity. sure would have prevented the fiasco, but in
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E 682 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks March 2, 1987
the same way that the guillotine prevents From Vietnam, through Watergate, to the
headaches. Disclosure of a secret mission to present, in Democratic and Republican Ad-
a leaky Congress might kill it, and thus kill ministrations, the estrangement between
any chance of failure (or illegality). It also the White House and Capitol Hill has deep-
kills any chance of success. ened. Congress distrusts the President and
As will undoubtedly be proved in the insists on multiplying checks-oversight
North affair, secrecy is a breeding ground committees, the War Powers Act, media
for genius. Without secrecy we would not leaks and legislative vetoes. The White
have had the Kissinger trip to China or the House responds in kind-building up the Na-
interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers tional Security Council staff as an isolated
above the Mediterranean (North's idea, by and autonomous operational agency, appeal-
the way). The problem with the North oper- ing over the heads of Congress to the.
ation was not the secrecy. It was the policy public, managing its own pattern of leaks
of trading arms for hostages and then mis- and counter-leaks.
appropriating the profits. The test of a I do not know all the facts, but it appears
policy is not its openness, but its wisdom. If that. use of the National Security Council
the outcome of the North affair is that the . staff for the Iranian arms transfer may
covert becomes impossible, then it will have have reflected a desire to avoid the seeming-
been far more damaging than we now imag- ly inevitable public disclosures that have
ine. been facilitated by the competitive and de-
American antipathy to secrecy could be centralized pattern of Congressional over-
somewhat mitigated by one act of flsrniture
rearranging that would deal Congresss back sight of foreign operations. If that is true, it
d +~- means that the very methods Congress has
n ++ a ...,?...
i
n o
an
exist for advisory purposes only. They will
not conduct sensitive operations.
2. Congress will merge the House and
Senate intelligence committees into a Joint
Congressional Committee on Intelligence
with a small, bipartisan membership and a
small, highly professional and nonpartisan
staff.
3. The executive branch will adopt and en-
force procedures designed to minimize intel-
ligence leaks from its agencies. These leaks
occur for purposes of aggrandizing one's
own agency and policies and punishing
those of one's bureaucratic rivals. (There is
a widespread impression that the executive
branch already tries to detect and punish
leakers. With rare exceptions, it does not.)
4. Congress will adopt and enforce proce-
dures designed to detect and punish unau-
thorized leaks from the Joint Intelligence
Committee.
None of this will prevent a spirited debate
over our role in Central America and the
Middle East. And none of this is an ade-
"' " ""... "~ '' policy powers have led to results wholly a4 quate substitute for our lack of national re-
In the past two decades congressional over-
sight of intelligence operations has in- v a:iance with what Congress intended. As solve to act like a great power with vital,
creased dramatically. The CIA must report ewe :have so often learned, in government often difficult responsibilities. But it is a be-
some of Its activities to as many as eight
committees (Intelligence, Foreign- Affairs,
Armed Services; and Appropriations in both
houses) with hundreds of members and
staff. Because of these reporting arrange-
ments, certain to lead and to endanger
policy and people, both the Carter and
Reagan Administrations increasingly en-
trusted secret missions to the NSC, which is
not equipped to run them. One change that
might encourage the return of secret work
to the CIA (which is so equipped) would be
the consolidation of congressional oversight
into a single Joint Committee on Intelli-
gence modeled after the old Joint Atomic
Energy Committee, which had an almost
spotless record of maintaining confidential-
ity.
But the deeper issue remains. Americans
abhor secret covenants secretly arrived at
because they smack of Old World real-poli-
tick, a way of doing business that the Amer-
ican Republic was to make obsolete. But
this objection is today no more than nostal-
gia and sentimentality. America cannot be,
Sweden. (And without America, where,
would Sweden be?) Americans may not like
being a superpower, but they have no
choice, there being no one else to carry the
burden. So they have to face the responsi-
bilities of power. And one of them is the ne-
cessity for secrecy.
There will be future covert actions, and
some are sure to go wrong. No amount of
structural tinkering will prevent that. A
world of Ayatullahs and Sandinistas is a
world that will often demand clandestine
deals. The particular deal now unraveling
was cockeyed to begin with and probably il-
legal. Nevertheless, we may have to deal se-
cretly again. If we are going to play the
great power game, and ask others to risk
their lives to help us win it, we had best
accept the need for sordid secrecy. Or give
up the game altogether.
[From the New York Times,' Dec. 24, 1986)
REDUCING DISCORD OVER FOREIGN POLICY
(By James Q. Wilson)
CAMBRIDGE, MA.-In time, the investiga-
tion into the Iranian arms controversy will
end. There may be prosecutions, new laws, a
reorganization of the National Security
Council. But one thing that is vitally neces-
sary may not happen at all-creation of a
new compact between the executive and leg-
islative branches that will permit the
United States to discharge more effectively
its responsibilities as a great power.
With respect to foreign affairs, the Con-
stitution is, as the late constitutional schol-
ar Edward Corwin put it, an "invitation to
struggle." That is desirable, for it insures
that essential checks and balances will oper-
ate. But of late the struggle has become an
alley fight-a cacophonous, decentralized,
unmanaged public quarrel over every detail
of every policy.
From World War II to Vietnam, this
struggle was moderated by a bipartisan con-
sensus as to the major aims and methods of
foreign policy, a consensus given effect by a
strong pattern of leadership in Congress
and a Presidency sensitive to the need for
Congressional support. Vietnam destroyed
that consensus. It has not been rebuilt. Per-
haps it cannot be rebuilt, but reasonable
people in both branches of government
want, and I believe can obtain, a moderation
of the inevitable discord.
We may disagree over foreign policy, but
hardly any American interests are served by
extensive leaks about every sensitive oper-
ation we may wish to undertake.
They are not served by detailed public re-
porting of financial contributions by friend-
ly governments to efforts made on behalf of
Afghan rebels, 'even when assistance to
those rebels enjoys strong bipartisan sup-
port on Capitol Hill.
And they are not served by detailed disclo-
sures of intelligence-gathering operations.
People may disagree about how greatly all
this helps the Soviet Union. But there can
be no disagreement about this: our allies in-
creasingly do not trust us, and we increas-
ingly do not trust each other.
There is no point in assigning blame; both
branches of government, always informa-
tion sieves, have of late become geysers.
This torrent of leak and counter-leak once
did not exist, despite the separation of
powers. This means that it need not exist
now, even though we retain the separation
of powers.
I suggest that when the Iranian issue has
subsided, the White House and Congress at-
tempt to establish a new compact that per-
mits the fullest debate over the goals and
major methods of foreign policy without
aiding and abetting the media's understand-
able desire to track down and publish every
secret, every name; every Swiss bank ac-
count.
The compact might take the following
form:
1. The White House will make clear that
the National Security Council and its staff
HON. DON EDWARDS
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 2, 1987
Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker,
last December, the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights which I chair; held a
hearing on so-called fake clinics.. These are
centers operated by prolife activists which are
set up to look exactly like abortion clinics and
which advertise in the yellow pages under
headings such as "birth control information
-services" or "abortion information and referral,
services."
We heard compelling testimony from a
number of women who had been to these
centers believing them to be real clinics. In
some cases, as the editorial below points out,
the effect of their visits reached far beyond
than the duration of the visits themselves.
Prolife advocates have a right to speak out
against abortion and to try to persuade
women to seek alternatives. However, as this
recent editorial from the New York Times
makes clear, they do not have the right to lie.
I commend the editorial to my colleagues' at-
tention.
[From the New York Times, Feb. 21, 19871
THE RIGHT TO LIE?
More than 100 law enforcement agents
are now searching for Dennis Malvasi, a sus-
pect in recent dynamite attacks against New
York City abortion clinics. He. is a fireworks
expert who worked on last year's Statue of
Liberty celebrations and is described as
"clever, elusive and experienced." A similar
description could well be applied to other
"pro-life" zealots; to judge by a recent hear-
ing before a House subcommittee. These ac-
tivists prefer deceit to violence.
When Carla Abbotts decided to terminate
her pregnancy, for Instance, she looked up
clinics in the San Francisco phone book and
chose one called A Free Pregnancy Center.
She told a counselor she wanted an abortion
and was shown a slide show that had "pic-
tures of bloody fetuses in trash cans, and it
said abortion led to sterility, death, de-
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