U. S. POLICY GUIDANCE AND ACTIONS TAKEN TO EXPLOIT THE ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000700010015-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: May 28, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON
May 23, 1956
UN 1956 ,
MEMORANDUM FOR 'THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT: U. S. Policy Guidance and Actions Taken
to Exploit the Anti-Stalin Campaign
Transmitted herewith, for the information of the
National Security Council, is a report on the subject by a
Special Working Group established by the Operations Coor-
dinating Board, on February 29, 1956, to coordinate actions
taken to exploit the current Soviet campaign against Stalin.
,4 A
(7
7AMES S. LAY, JR,
Executive Secreta
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Special Assistant to the
President for Disarmament
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
STAT
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SECRET
OPERIITIOS COORDINATING BOARD
Washington 25, D. C.
May 25, 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
SUBJECT: Report of COB Special Working Group on Stalinism
Attached is a report by a Special Working Group established
by the Operations Coordinating Board on February 29, 1956 to
coordinate actions taken to exploit the current Soviet campaign
against Stalin.
This paper was discussed at the meeting of the Operations
Coordinating Board of May 23, 1956. It was agreed that the
contents of the paper were such as to be of possible interest
to the members of the National Security Council and that it
should be made available for the information of the Council.
/S/
Elmer B. Staats
Executive Officer
Attachment:
Report of OCB Special Working Group on Stalinism,
dated May 17, 1956, with Annexes A, B and C.
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UNCLASSIFIED
ANNEX A
PERTINENT EXCERPTS FROM RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT
AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE ANTI-STALINISM CAMPAIGN.
1. Excerpts from President Eisenhower's speech of Anril 21:
"It is still too early to assess in any final way whether the Soviet
regime wishes to provide a real basis for stable and enduring relations.
"Despite the changes so far, much of Stalin's foreign policy
remains unchanged. The major international issues which have troubled the
postwar world are still unsolved. More basic changes in Soviet policy will
have to take place before the free nations can afford to relax their vigilance."
"First: We must maintain a collective shield against aggression
to allow the free peoples to seek their valued goals in safety.
"We can take some cautious comfort in the signs that the Soviet
rulers may have relegated military aggression to the background and adopted
less violent methods to promote their aims. Nevertheless, Soviet military
power continues to grow. Their forces are being rapidly modernized and
equipped with nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems.
"So long as freedom is threatened and armaments are not controlled,
it is essential for us to keep a strong military establishment ourselves
and strengthen the bonds of collective security."
"Our third guide line is this: We must seek, by every peaceful
means, to induce the Soviet bloc to correct existing injustices and genuinely
to pursue peaceful purposes in its relations with other nations.
"As I have said, many of the wrongs of Stalin against other nations
still prevail under his successors. Despite the efforts of the West at Berlin
and Geneva, Germany is still divided by the Soviet veto of free all-German
elections. The satellite nations of Eastern Europe arc still ruled by Soviet
puppets. In Asia, Korea remains divided, and stable peace has not yet been
achieved."
"The interests and purposes of the United States and of the free
world do not conflict with the legitimate interests of the Russian nation or
the aspirations of its people. A Soviet government genuinely devoted to these
purposes can have friendly relations with the United States and the free world
for the asking. We will welcome that day."
2. ExcerpIa_from Secretary Dulles' News Conference of_Lall_l:
"The official Soviet line, which seems to repudiate the last two
decades of Stalin's rule, is highly significant. It is too early to judge
its full meaning, but some important conclusions are now possible.
"The Soviet rulers must know that the brutal and arbitrary rule of
the Stalin era led to a great yearning by the subject peoples for legality
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and personal security; for tolerance of differences of opinion, and for
government genuinely dedicated to the welfare of the governed.
"Also the Soviet rulers must now see that their foreign policies
encounter effective resistance when they are identified with the use of
violence.
The essential question is this: Are the Soviet rulers now
attacking the basic causes of this domestic discontent and foreign dis-
trust, or is their purpose merely to allay this discontent and distrust
by blaming them on the past? The down-grading of Stalin does not of
itself demonstrate that the Soviet regime has basically changed its
domestic or foreign policies. The present rulers have, to be sure,
somewhat modified or masked the harshness of their policies. But a
dictatorship is a dictatorship Whether it be that of one man or several.
And the new Five Year plan Shows a continuing purpose tO magnify the
might of the Soviet State at the expense of the well-being of most of
the people who are ruled.
"In the field of foreign policy, the Soviet rulers have taken a
few forward steps, notably the belated liberation of Austria. But they
continue other predatory policies. They forcibly hold East Germany de-
tached from Germany as a whole. The East European nations are still sub-:
jugated by Soviet rule. They have not renounced their efforts to subvert
free governments. In Asia the present Soviet rulers seek to stir up
bitterness and, in the Near East, increase the danger of hostilities.
In the Far East they are seeking to coerce Japan to accept a peace treaty
on Soviet terms. These and other current actions fall far short of the
accepted code of international conduct,
"Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviet rulers now denounce much
of the past gives cause for hope, because it demonstrates that liberal- -
izing influences from within and without can bring about peaceful change.
If the free world retains its strength, its faith and unity, then subversion
cannot win where force and brutality failed. And the yearnings of the
subject peoples are not to be satisfied merely by a rewriting of past
history. Thus we can hope for ultimate changes more fundamental than any
that have so far been revealed. The United States, and indeed all the
free nations, will eagerly welcome the coming of that day."
3. Excerpts from Secretary Dulles' Address of April 23:
"We are not dedicated to perpetual hatred of RusSia. What we hate
is the evil that Russia's rulers do. The arbitrary despotism of a police
state, governmental intolerance and enforced conformity, the enslavement
of people for the magnification of the State, the use of violence and the
threat of violence in international relations, the use of fraud and trick-
ery to corrupt and overthrow free governments these are all things which
we abhor and against Which we stand. But United States foreign policy is
not merely negative. Le seek, above all, to advance the inevitable day
when the historic friendship between the Russian and American peoples can
again be fully manifested. Therefore, we take deep satisfaction from the
fact that WQ can today see within Russia some signs of light which could
mark the dawning of that new day."
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"They mean) I think, that unity and strength of the free nations
have shown the Soviet rulers the futility of their policies of violence."
"Stalin has been denoted. But we do not yet see, in the Soviet
bloc, the reality of representative government or respect for the basic
aspirations of the peoples.
"The Soviet rulers profess to have renounced violence. But they
press feverishly to develop their military establishment, particularly
nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery.
"The countries of Eastern Europe, including East Germany, are
still under the iron heel of Soviet force.
"In Asia and the Near East the Soviet rulers have become merchants
of hatred and fomenters of violence.'
"In relation to Japan, Soviet foreign policy is still ugly in its
aspect.
"In some places Soviet foreign policy is baited with economic lures
which may superficially seem attractive. But close scrutiny shows that the
bait is attached to a hook and that the hook is attached to a line, the
other end of which is purposefully held by Moscow.
"And, if they have admitted some of the lies and false testimony
which marked political trials of the Stalin era, they have failed to repudi-
ate two of the most outrageous lies ever perpetrated by any government) and
both perpetrated by Stalin -- the lie that South Korea was the aggressor in
the Korean War, and the lie that the United Nations forces in that war used
germ warfare against the Chinese Communists.
"Khrushchev said last December, We never renounced and we will
never renounce our ideas, our .struggle for the Victory of Communism'. So
long as that victory is the Soviet goal; so long as it is backed by a vast
military establishment and the underground apparatus of International Com-
munism; so long as these instrumsnts are at the absolute disposal of
despots Who repudiate moral principles as restraint upon their conduct --
so long as this combination exists, it would be folly for the free nations
to consider that they can safely lower their guard and fall apart.
"I have often said in relation to the Soviet Communist problem that
the moment of greatest danger would be the moment when we relaxed. Never
was that statement more relevant than it is today. If we treat the prospect
of success as being itself a complete success, that could turn into an
ultimate disaster,"
"Soviet rulers and their agents) in their new garb, have somewhat
greater acceptability, and therefore more chance for mischief.
"Allies no longer feel the same compulsion to submerge differences
as when they faced together a clear and present danger."
"Because Soviet military capabilities remain so vast and because
their intentions are subject to rapid change, we must maintain our vigilance
and our strength. But also we must increase the unity and dynamism of the
free world by greater emphasis on cooperation for something rather than
merely against something. Let us exalt freedom by showing better what free-
dom can
LL. Excerpts from Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 24:
"Q. - Mr. Secretary, in regard to the changes in Russia, is there
any evidence of any kind that the Russians are modifying their hold on the
satellites?
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HA. - There is no evidence that they are voluntarily modifying their
hold. I would say that there is a little evidence that their hold is getting
somewhat weaker; not because they want it to be so, but because the changes
that have occurred in the Soviet policy have put a certain premium now upon
Titoism. And while we think always in terms of the effect of Soviet policy
in creating neutralism in the free world camp, the acceptance now of Titoism
in the Soviet camp has a certain disturbing influence upon the Soviet hold
over the Satellites Who think that perhaps Tito is getting the best of both
worlds, and that seems to be entirely acceptable now to the Soviet Union;
therefore, why shouldn't they follow on that same path? So I do think that,
while the Soviets have not indicated any policy of relinquishing their hold,
that their hold is becoming looser."
"Q. - Mr. Secretary, you referred to certain changes in the Soviet
Union as putting a premium on Titoism. Could you specify for us which par-
ticular changes you have in mind?
A. - Of course, the most important characteristic of Titoism is the
fact that it recognizes that communism can be a national organization; not
necessarily an international organization. That was the thesis which was
held in Russia by Bukharin and his associates, Who were purged and executed
in the Nineteen Thirties because they took the view that you could have com-
munism within a country but did not necessarily have to be a part of what is
commonly called rinternational communism.t
"The view then held by Stalin was that you could not have communism
just within one country, but that you had to have communism as a dynamic
movement which was trying to get control of all countries. In that sense
Stalin's communism was incompatible with nationalism.
"Indeed, Stalin himself said that Soviet communism is the most inter-
national of all organizations because it tries to break down all of the
national boundaries. As against this, some people held the view that commu-
nism could be a national phenomenon rather than an international phenomenon.
That was the view that Tito held, and he broke with Stalin on that issue,
because Moscow did not admit his right to have a national Communistic state
which would primarily be dedicated to the welfare of Yugoslavia.
"If the Soviet Communists now say that it is all right to have com-
munism on a national basis, that offers a great prospect to the Poles, the
Czechs and so forth, who would much rather have their own national brand of
communism than be rin by Moscow."
UNCLASSIFIED
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Office of Intelligence Research
Intelligence Brief
No. 19122 Date: April 24, 1956
CURRENT STATUS OF THE ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN
IN THE SOVIET BLOC".
The campaign to downgrade Stalin and to eliminate
the shortcomings of one-man rule continues to unfold
relatively slowly in the USSR and in most of the
satellites. Soviet mention of two figures in the purge
trials of the 1930's raises speculation whether these
proceedings will be re-examined. In Eastern Europe,
Poland (where the campaign is most active) and Czecho-
slovakia are beginning to replacte current officials.
Within the Soviet Union
Exposure of Stalin. Soviet publications have yet to reveal many
of the charges against Stalin, in contrast to the satellites, and have
failed to give any details concerning the charges already published. The
allegations made by Pravda on March 28 and the few added subsequently by
other Soviet publicatione are being repeated without elaboration. Re-
prints of the Pravda article and the recent Chinese Communist report on
Stalin apparently have been published in the regional press.
Oral dissemination of the text of Khrushchev's secret speech and
the Central Committee's circular based on it appears to be almost com-
pleted, although some local raion Party meetings continue to be reported.
Instructions for further dissemination of the line on Stalin were given
to meetings of press workers and editors of local newspapers during the
past week.
Remedial Actions. Measures to correct some of the results of
one-man rule also are being instituted gradually and at a slower rate
than in the satellites. During the past reek announcement was made of
the publication of two volumes of reminiscences about Lenin by "old
Bolsheviks" and others and of plans to print previously unpublished writ-
ings of Lenin for the period 1917-22. A new edition of Lenin's works is
to contain 50 volumes rather than the current 35. These announcements,
3.2-71a'
1. For earlier developments, see 1B-1902 and IB-1912.
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coupled with appearances of L. A. Fotiyeva at some meetings in Moscow as
a speaker and public reference to her as Lenin's secretary, suggest
that publication of Lenin's testament (in which Lenin criticized Stalin)
may be forthcoming.
The likelihood of further rehabilitations of purge victims was
indicated by two events in the past week. Pravda on April 22, in honor
of Lenin's birthday, printed a previously unpublished letter of Lenin's
addressed, among others, to A. I. Rykov and N. Osinsky. Rykov, who was
Lenin's successor as head of the government and a member of the Politburo
until 1930, is the highest ranking of prewar purgees to be mentioned so
far. Both he and Osinsky were victims of the purges of the 1930's,
Rykov being condemned to death in March 1938 at the last of the major
trials. Publication of Rykov's name in this manner, without any
derogatory reference, resembles the favorable treatment given a number
of other purgees during the past weeks and is the first case in which
one of the victims of a major trial has been so cited.
At the same time, the legal basis of the purge trials and the
chief prosecutor, the late A. Ya. Vyshinsky, have come under attack in
the latest issue of the leading Soviet legal journal. This marks the
first public criticism since the Party Congress of a Stalin cohort other
than Beriya. The article criticized the Soviet investigation system
"for recognizing the guilt and responsibility for crimes on the basis
of individual confessions of the accused themselves," and Vyshinsky,
specifically, for his stand that it was unnecessary to establish
"absolute
truth' to obtain a conviction.
Articles in the same journal in the past year had emphasized the
need to obtain all types of evidence and to strive for absolute truth,
but the question of confessions had not been discussed directly. There
was no forewarning that Vyshinsky would come under attack in this
field since his name was cited as authority on evidence in earlier
articles as well as other legal comentary as late as January. The
Institute of Lew, which is co-publisher of the journal, continues to
bear his name.
Reactions. The first provincial echo of Pravda's April 5 attack
on "cer;77-7a-ren elements" for taking advantage of the campaign against
the cult of Stalin to question current Party policy was heard in Armenia
last week. The local newspaper Kommunist attacked anti-Party statements
of certain Party members in Yerevan University and a similar occurrence
in a meeting of the Armenian Union of Writers, where "slanderous" state-
ments against Party policy were made. In contrast, a Leningrad official
informed a Western correspondent that no such incidents had occurred
in his city.
From Tbilisi, Western correspondents, permitted to visit the area
for the first time since the demonstrations in early March, succeeded in
filing stories through Soviet censorship revealing some details of the
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riots there. The rector of Tbilisi University admitted to interviewers
that unorganized demonstrations started on March 5 and continued through
March 9, when they were officially authorized. He referred to "dark
elements," which he said included former students, relatives of kulaks?
and liberated purgees of 1937, as having taken advantage of this
situation to the extent that some groups got out of hand, and he
admitted that casualties, but no deaths, had occurred. Other sources
indicated that from five to 100 persons might have been killed by troops.
It was reported that on March 9 a crowd descended upon the main post
office in the city and was met there by machine-gun fire. Pockmarks on
buildings from gunfire were pointed out to correspondents. Although the
reports on the number of fatalites vary considerably, it now is evident
that Moscow was compelled to resort to foroe to put down the demonstrations.
Within Other Communist Bloc Countries
The East European satellites are increasingly devoting attention
to local manifestations of the cult of the individual. Bulgaria had
downgraded its leading Communist official, Vulko Chervenkov, charging
that the country's progress would have been considerably greater but for
his "Vicious methods of work." There are signs that the Czechoslovak
Party will not stop at attributing the cult of personality solely to the
deceased President and Party Chairman, Klement Gottwald, but is getting
ready to take action against the latter's son-in-law, Alexej Cepicka,
Minister of Defense and Deputy Prime Minister. In Poland the stress is
on the necessity for full public discussion of shortcomings, especially
in the matter of "socialist legality." In Albania violations of
"socialist legality" have been blamed on Koci Xoxe, removed from his post
as Minister of Interior over seven years ago and executed as a Titoist
in June 1949. East Germany and Rumania have so far taken no corrective
actions, and Hungary has not gone beyond rehabilitating the executed
Titoist, Laszlo Rajk, and claiming the release of all imprisoned Social
Democrats.
Exposure of Stalin. For the first time Albanian and Bulgarian
Party leaders have publicly criticized Stalin, though only in limited
and generalized terms. The Bulgarian Central Committee merely noted the
importance of decisions reached at the Soviet Party Congress for
"merciless struggle against the remnants of the cult of the individual
which spread in the last few years during the life and activity of
Stalin." The Albanian First Secretary admitted that the cult ''brought
great misfortune to the Soviet Union," but limited himself to the charge
that "Stalin began to put himself above the Party and the people and to
detach himself from the masses."
Removal of Stizall, So far, no campaign has been reported to re-
move public reminders of Stalin--statues and names of streets, squares,
and factories. There are unconfirmed reports that in Poland Stalin's
works are disappearing from bookstores and that some portraits in public
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places have likewise been removed. The Rumanian bibliographical bulletin
has not mentioned any work of Stalin since last December, though
previously such works were always mentioned on the first page. Students
at a Rumanian university are rumored to have demolished a statue of
Stalin in one of the university buildings.
Corrective Actions
Poland. Poland is still far in the lead within the Soviet bloc,
both in repeating detailed charges against Stalin and in encouraging a
frank discussion of mistakes committed by the Polish regime. A Trybuna
Ludu editorial of April 17, entitled "The Great Renaissance," pr-g".
the Soviet Party leadership for its decision to make public the charges
against Stalin and to conduct in public the struggle against his errors.
The editorial stressed that the Polish Party "has its list of mistakes
in the past period" and that an account of these mistakes is being given
at hundreds of Party meetings. It called for "public and frank criticism
of mistakes made, reaching their deepest sources," for "lively dis-
cussions," "clash of views," "exchange of ideas," "bold and determined
changes demanded by life." The paper admitted that at these meetings
"angry and impassioned words are heard, words of bitterness and hurt,
of sharp criticism." Though stress was laid on the sweeping reforms made
in the security apparatus, the editorial admitted that "there is per-
haps no field of life not in need of a critical scrutiny and changes."
Particular attention was given to "improvements in living conditions,
which are still so hard for many people in Poland."
The most notable application of this campaign for a"more open
public life" has been the extensive reporting of committee sessions of
the Sejm (the National Assembly). Deputies are reported to have
criticized the workings of several ministries, especially the Ministry
of Justice and the Office of the Procurator General, for lack of
initiative in reviewing trials and sentences in which "inappropriate
methods of investigation" were uzed or "wrong classification of crime"
was made. Deputies drew attention to the need to compensate those who
had suffered injustices. A Polish radio commentator resumed an attack
on the trade-union organization for its failure to enforce laws for the
protection of workers' rights.
On April 20 the Justice Committee of the Sejm recommended: (a)
that revision of the criminal and civil codes should be speeded up;
(b) that the Council of State should extend its control of the Prosecutor
General's work; (c) that the terms of reference to the ,,71.1stice Ministry
should be regulated; (d) that judges should be rranted independent
authority. The Committee also put the Minister of Justice and the
Prosecutor General "under the obligation to submit not later than by
September reports on results of action concerning persons who had been
unjustly sentenced and who had suffered as a result of the work of court
organs. Such persons should receive moral and material compensation."
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Thus the regime has taken action on the "Open Letter to the Minister of
Justice," published March 28, which called for a public statement on the
legal status of certain released generals. The letter insisted that
full satisfaction for injustices committed required public announcement
of facts and implied that charges made at trials should be publicly
withdrawn.
On April 21 the Party newspaper reported that Stanislaw Radkiewicz,
former Minister of Public Security and since February 1955 Minister of
State Farms, had been removed from the latter post. Also removed were
Central Committee member Stefan Kalinowski, the Prosecutor General, be-
cause of "serious neglect in past years of supervision of the security
organs," and Brig. Gen. Stanislaw Zarakoski in connection with "abuse-
in the Military Prosecutor's Office and neglirent supervision of the
investigative organs of the Polish Army Intelligence Service." It was
also announced on April 21 that the Ministers of Justice and Culture had
been removed without explanation.
At the same time, an amnesty has been drawn up by the Sejm provid-
ing for the first time for the pardoning or mitigation of sentences of
persons jailed for political crimes. Five-year sentences are to be
quashed, 10-year sentences cut in half, higher sentences reduced by a
third, life imprisonment to 12 years, and death sentences to 15 years'
imprisonment. Emigres accused of crimes will be pardoned if they return
by July 22, 1957. People sentenced for illegally crossing the frontier,
for engaging in subversive propaganda, or for not denouncing criminal
activities known to them will be pardoned and reference to their puni0-
ment expunged from the record.
Czechoslovakia. Alexej Cepicka, son-in-law of the deceased
President and Party chief Klement Gottwald, has been singled out in
three press articles for specific abuses in connection with the cult of
personality. Cepicka, Minister of Defense and Deputy Prime Minister, was
criticized by a playwright in the weekly literary newspaper for stopping
work on the filming of his play dealing with Army resentment over the
Munich decision. Cepicka, who had discussed his criticism of the play
with the author, was reported later to have called a meeting of 200 top
political officers of the army at which a one-sided condemnation of the
play was made. Afterwards, all work on the filming of the play was
halted by Cepicka. The paper cited this action as a practical example
of the cult of personality.
The second newspaper criticism appeared in Mlada Fronta, journal
of the youth league. It stated that the army had taken over for its
own use the only cultural and recreational facilities in some towns,
thus harming the "unity of the army with the people." It also criticized
the army for hanging pictures of Defense Minister Cepicka in military
offices. Earlier, it was reported that Cepicka's picture had been
removed from the Army Museum and other military offices. Finally, the
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organ of the Ministry of Defense itself, Obrana Lidu, admitted that "the
consequences of the cult of personality had ref1;71-3d themselves un-
happily in our People's Army."
Hungary. The Hungarian regime in a Szabad Nep editorial of
April 15 admitted widespread dissension within Ihe-Pqrty, by implication
a resurgence of the right-wing deviationism associated with ex-Prime
Minister Nagy's "new course" policies of 1953-54, and criticism of the
Party leadership. The editorial criticized by name Communists who made
*vile attacks on the Party under the guise of criticism" at Party meet-
ings. At one district Party meeting no one criticized a Communist who
"had the nerve to slander the whole socialist system." Certain people
are admittedly questioning whether there ever was a rightist deviation
in the Party during 1953 and 1954 and whether the policy pursued by
Nagy had not been a specific type of application of Marxism-Leninism.
Behaviour of this sort was sharply condemned in the editorial: "It
is evident that this kind of conduct, demagogy and anti-Party spirit
cannot be tolerated in the Party. These things have nothing in common
with the Twentieth Congress." The editorial is clearly intended to put
a damper on the wave of criticism and dissatisfaction which has broken
out since the rehabilitation of Rajk.
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian regime is endeavoring to place the full
blame for all harmful effects of the cult of personality on the dis-
missed Prime Minister, Vulko Chervenkov. The Party newspaper,
OtechestV t, an Front in an editorial on April 18 eMitled "The Lesson,"
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charged that much more would have been accomplished in Bulgaria "if the
cult built around the person of Vulko Chervenkov and the wrong method of
work linked with it had not caused some harm to the state management."
It charged that the central administration *was concentrated in the
hands of one person, who considered that his word was law. This type
of leadership was passed on to the lower offices of the administration.
Brutal administration and ordering about was practiced from top to
bottom." The editorial insisted that such methods must be eliminated
and that at every level from top to bottom "individuals who neglect
collaboration with and criticism by the masses should not be tolerated."
Albania. Party First Secretary Enver Hoxha, in an editorial in
the Party newspaper on April 14, joined the chorus of satellite leaders
decrying the cult of personality and admitting that its manifestations
have not yet been entirely eliminated from the Albanian Party. Illegal
practices of the state security forces were also admitted by Hoxha, but
not blamed on any living member of the regime. Instead, Hoxha claimed
that after the First Party Congress in November 1948 the Party reasserted
its authority over the security apparatus. The clear implication is that
the be for violations of "socialist legality" is being placed, as in
Czechoslovakia, on a long-purged former Party leader. In this case it
is Koci Xoxe, Minister of the Interior until his arrest in December 1948.
Xoxe, accused of being a Titoist, was executed in June 1949. The Albanian
regime has thus shown itself unwilling to appease Tito by rehabilitating
Party leaders purged as Titoists, as has now been done both in Hungary
and Bulgaria.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNCLASSIFIED
;
Office of Intelligence Research
Intelligence Brief
No. 1912.3 May 5, 1956
CURRENT STATUS OF TiE ANTI-STALIN CAMPAIGN
IN TBE SOVIET BLOC'
During the past week Soviet media have added new
material to the public charges against Stalin, particularly
the charge that he was guilty of military negligence on
the eve of World War II. The satellites have continued
to remain in the lead in taking actions to correct some
of the abuses of one-man rule. At the same time, warnings
in both the USSR and the satellites to those accused of
taking advantage of the anti-Stalin campaign to criticize
current Party policies leave no doubt that the regimes
intend to limit criticism closely.
Within the Soviet Union
Exposure of Stalin. A Soviet military periodical, Vbyennyi
Vestnik, for the first time provided details of the charge that Stalin
had been guilty of military negligence. The only previous Soviet press
reference to this subject was in a Chinese People's Daily article
reprinted in Pravda on April 7, which referred merely to his "serious
mistakes" in "failing to take necessary precautionary measures on the
eve of the anti-Fascist war." The Soviet journal stated that Stalin
had not mobilized Soviet industry in time, although'new weapons had been
designed and the defense industry was capable of meeting military needs.
Stalin was said to have attempted to explain away early defeats in the
war by characterizing Soviet strategy as "active defense" and alleging
that the German attack was unexpected, although he had had ample warning.
The journal claimed that Soviet military intelligence revealed in the
spring of 1941 the "concentration of a large quantity of German-Fascist
forces including large tank units along the western border of the USSR"
and that, although the attack was a surprise for Soviet armed forces
units, it was no surprise to the top leadership, "at that time concentrated
1. For earlier developments, see IB's 1902, 1912.1 and 1912.2
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campletely in the hands of J.V. Stalin." (No mention was made of
similar warnings to Stalin by Churchill and Roosevelt.) Because
Stalin failed to take adequate precautions, the journal said, the
USSR suffered heavy losses of aircraft and operations of Soviet
military units were dispersed and unorganized. False conceptions
of the retreat to Stalingrad and other losses of territory were
propagated to "gloss over tolerated mistakes and defects."
The latest issue of Kommunist provided another addition to the
public charges against Stalin. It attacked as mistaken Stalin's thesis
that the class struggle would intensify in proportion to Soviet
successes in the building of socialism. East German. Party chief Ulbricht
in March had said that Stalin had used this thesis to justify purges of
innocent Communists whose only crime was that they disagreed with him.
However, the Soviet press had omitted this claim from its summary of
Ulbricht's statement.
It is uncertain to what extent the Soviet people have become
acquainted with the details of the anti-Stalin campaign. Only the
Pravda items, which have 'been of a general nature, are likely to have
? ?
reached the bulk of the population. The military failures noted above,
recent signs that certain purge victims have been rehabilitated, and
articles on the rewriting of history have appeared for the most part
in specialized journals with limited circulation.
Local Party meetings to discuss orally Khrushchev's secret speech
are apparently no longer being held, although post-Congress Komsomol and
trade union gatherings were still being reported last week. Instructions
for further dissemination of the line on Stalin were also given to
local meetings of cultural workers and leading personnel of armed forces
political organs.
Removal of Symbols and remedial Actions. Preparations for May Day
celebrations in the USSR reflected the anti-Stalin campaign. In contrast
to May and November 1955, Stalin's portrait was dropped from the Marx-
Engels-Lenin-Stalin quartet, and foreign observers in Moscow found few
pictures of Stalin displayed. Some which were seen were later removed-.
No further rehabilitations nor revisions of Stalinist history were
noted during the week. Kammunist in its latest issue presumably was
casting reflections on Stalin's system of rule when it said that Lenin,
while merciless in matters of principle, never imposed his views on
others and in case of opposition always put his proposals to a vote.
The tone of the article left little doubt that this procedure was not
followed by Stalin; it is also notable inasmuch as the procedure cited
closely resembles that of the Party Presidium as described by Khrushchev
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-3 -.
and Molotov recently at a reception in Moscow. Presumably lower Party
organs are to make this one of their principles of decision-making in
committee or in bureau sessions.
Reactions. Party determination to limit closely ctiticism from
below was given new emphasis during the past week. The latest issue of
Party Life published another attack, similar to Pravda's of April 5,
on members who dared to question Party policies. It indicated that
some had proposed fundamental 'revision of these policies and others had
"openly aianted allegations made by bourgeois propaganda abroad." Party
Life suggested that such conduct would lead to expulsion from the Party.
In this connection, Embassy Moscow reported that Party Secretary Shepilov
was said to have had a difficult time recently when addressing Moscow
University students, same of whom wanted to know what the current leaders
were doing "while Stalin was committing the actions now criticized."
Within the Satellites
Poland remains in the lead anong the satellites both in repeating
the detailed charges against Stalin and in launching a broad campaign
of criticism against manifold shortcomings in Polish national life.
There are signs that a similar, though more cautious, campaign is being
prepared in Czechoslovakia.
Removal of Symbols. Bulgaria is the first satellite to rename
a place which bore a name in honor of Stalin. A Bulgarian broadcast
of April 28 referred to the port city of Varna, previously called Stalin.
None of the other satellites are known to have taken similar action.
Remedial Actions
Poland. The First Secretary of the. Polish Party, Eamard Ochab,
admitted in an article published in Pravda (Moscow) on April 29 that
groups within the Polish Party had shown "political instability" in
directly attacking the Party's political line. He accused "petty
bourgeois elements" in the Party of influencing some newspapers and
magazines to go along with their "anti-Party" attacks and demanded an
end to such "opportunism and nationalism." Publication of this article
in Pravda lends it greater authority within Poland and was also
undoubtedly meant to emphasize to Soviet and other satellite Party
organizations that criticism is to be carefully limited.
Perhaps the most publicized follow-up in Poland of the collectiage-
leadership idea currently is the activity in parliament. .The Polish
Communists so far are alone among the satellites in this action, though
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- 4
the Czechs appeared about to follow suit at the end of April. The
Polish move, though foreshadowed last year, actually began with a
leading Communist editorial in March condemning the "rubber-stamp"
character of the Sejm (national assembly), followed by unprecedentedly
lively activity of the Sejm commissions during April.
The new line was then formally laid down by Premier Cyrankiewicz,
who declared that the Soviet Party Congress in February was the turning-
point toward democratization and that one important consequence must be
infusion of active legislative content into what he admitted had been
the empty form of Communist parliamentarism up to now. He called for
genuine parliamentary debate and criticism of the government henceforth,
the use of interpellation, more publicity for legislative proposals,
supplying of more information to the Sejm by the government as a basis
for law-making, less governmental secrecy, and a swing away from
governmental decrees to parliamentary bills as the normal way of
legislating.
There was every indication that the hand-picked Polish Sejm would
from now on go through more of the democratic-type gestures enumerated
by the Premier. On April 27, for example, the government publicized
the fact that five "Catholic Progressive" deputies (representing a
Vatican-anathematized lay group of fellow-traveling churchmen) had voted
against the government -- a step previously unheard of -- on a bill to
legalize abortions,
Czechoslovakia. That Czechoslovakia might follow Poland's lead
in respect to the parliament was signified by the Czech trade-union
daily Prace's criticism of the National Assembly and the National Committees
for not carrying out the role assigned to them by the Constitution and
its call for a "start toward a wide democratization of life in
Czechoslovakia."
Czechoslovakia has now followed Bulgaria in taking action against
a top official in connection with the campaign against the cult of the
individual. The Party Central Committee, meeting on April 19 and 20,
expelled Alexej Cepicka from the Politburo and removed him from his
posts as First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense.
Though the public announcement was not made until April 25, Cepicka
earlier had been accused in a number of press articles of specific
abuses. Cepicka, Defense Minister since April 1950 and son-in-law of
the deceased President and Party Chairman Klement Gottwald, has perhaps
the most unsavory reputation of any member of the regime, being noted for
his arrogance, brutality, and ruthlessness,
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East Germany. The East German Ministry of the Interior announced
on April 27 that a number of imprisoned persons who claimed membership
in the Social Democratic Party had been granted amnesty by the
President. The announcement emphasized that the persons involved had
committed particularly grave crimes" and that their release was
intended as a "contribution to a dftente." The previous day, President
Pieck had announced that 88 persons, including Max Fechner, Minister
of Justice purged after the Berlin riots in 1953, had been pardoned and
released. Fechner had favored dealing leniently with the strikers
and had also upheld publicly the workers' right to strike.
Although the East German regime has thus begun to release
prisoners, it is not fully rehabilitating them. A further indication
that it does not intend to go very far in confessing past errors was
the statement by the Party's propaganda chief that Fechner's successor
as Justice Minister, 1-hide Benjamin, and Security Chief Ernst Aellweber,
would survive recent attacks on "violations of socialist legality." The
East German Government is also releasing, according to an announcement
of April 26, a total of 698 persons jailed for crimes connected with
the Second World War, Only 52 persons are still jailed because of the
particular seriousness of their crimes.
State -- FD, Wash., D.C.
UNCLASSIFIED
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