INTRODUCTION OF RESOLUTION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 15, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050002-2
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050002-2
14266 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE August 15
our foreign information and intelligence
Programa.
In My remarks this afternoon, how-
ever. Mr. Speaker. I do not intend to
dwell at meat length on the predse terms
of this particular resolution. I think it
IS a good resolution but Lam perfectly
retell to be persuaded that a better one
might be devised. The question of the
met structare and composition of this
committee seems to me significantly lees
Important than the more general ques-
tions of principle involved. I rne today.
not to make propaganda on behalf of a
particular proposal of mine, but rather
to raise a matter which I think is in need
of the widest possible and most intent-
gent public diaminsinn. - -serratrInekrE---- ? Join$ ,Vocesstiitee cm Atomic*new, In
thorn, in these areas? Of course it does
not. Congras has always asserted its
right to concern tied/ with even the most
sensitive areas of Government. And,
-Where matters of the Whet maw
dors been: involved, Members of both
Howes have shown themselves perfectly
capable -of . exercising the utmost re?
strain& This was never more clearly
demonstrated than by the experience of
the Manhattan project during World
War 11. when members of the two men-
priatione committees were kept folly w-
onted of the program , of the project
without on any occasion breaking secu-
rity. And I. am sure all Umbers of the
ikon will agree that the record of the
As mod Members are aware the pro-
posal of a Joint Committee on Foreign
Intelligence is Isot a new on. -In one
form or another it has been introdueed
-into this Rom in each of the. lest . 10
sessions: in 1166 11 was the stained eta
4-day hearing by the Rules Committee.
Bs the Saabs the Committee on Rules
and Adahdatration reported on it tam-
ably in and for 2 data it was de-
bated on the floor of that body. ? Marie
this eamoctio* has been inspemble. ?
Ai bribe ease of the Atomic Reseal
lbag. I take it 'for granted of
cOurse that mash of the work of the new
Momintee?gerhage almost all of it--r
would be conducted li private end that
the mulls would be math public only
after adage etTebning by the appropriate
Goverment 14.001111 Nevertheiees. I
admit that particular comern mien din
be felt 5boU Cli. since ?breaches of
It partisan in nature. Bad In INS rw aseurlly tnvolving , might endanger
?wietions Mbar to minerwers Agaiwored -Abe limo( Anagram Ceerathes in ether
In the House by eight Democrats slid pian;r110, and .11041to 14mis of agents or
tour Republican'. Radler this year the other.i.natione walking -z afegierances
'UAW maa brought ? to our attenttohlry - with us. I think this is 0 legittetate
a member of the other party, thedie.'
thignished tenderloin from Platte Mr.
Room). Mormer? when Mr. Mass-
resolution came to a vote in the
&mu in line the minoittr An favor
btabaded MOM Members en both sides
of the able. On that oceadon one gbf
those who voted to favor was the then
innar Senator from Massachusetts, now
the President of the United Stale& --""
If the treposil for a John Coninintee
cm Foreign Intelligence has tame. elf 'so
often and been supported liy lejp
Members, why hs.s It never Seen
adapted? Frankly do not find ? that
intendon easy to answer, particularly
since some of the arguments against it
seem to me so feeble. Take, to begin
with, the argument about secrecy. It IS
an argument that has been advanced
every Ms the proposal has been dis-
cussed. Inutile the Senate debate in
UN the chairman' of ,the Senate
Armed Services Committee. Mr.. Rho-
ma, went so fin as to sor that. rather
than have a committee bet nii and til-
ler:nation made availed* to Members of
Congress. 'it would be better to abolish
the Central Intelligence Amer and. IV
doing so. to save the money appropriated
and the lives of American cithen&?? A
farmer Woe President, Mr. Shrkley. toot
the tame view in Ow male debate.
Now no one denies that CIA and other
Intelligence agencies must conduct a very
high proportion of their operations in
secret. Secrecy is of the essence of their
? work: without it they could not function,
and the security ''cif our countiy would
be Jeopardised. No one denies that. But
Sits& Is true of the intelligent* mime-
nitg is also true in many other areas of
government: in the fields of atomic en-
era, weapons development, and foreign
colic,. for example. But does this mean
that Congress is to have no elective au-
calk .bot, DoPo So gym later say
speech that thecae,* many important
Aspects at intelligent* ;work which weld
.nemendbt be studied without ens need le
lawns in detail into the adivitles,
particular pawns sod usins in the field.
So moth tor the t000serit for secrecy.
find myself in even less sympathy with
another arguesent Abet has also been ad-
Sewed frequently in dieenalons cd Ship
,gtesstinst?nnonlra tiMe
coorminIti. existe. Adair? to 'save. the
President and the National thicurttir
Coupon, and that !therefore we in the
Congress have DO rialti to seek a Able-
dictiona position. This doctrine was
stated hs an extreme Sonn in 1964 by,
Mr. Baleen in the Senate. He said at
that UAW;
?
The Central nanneesee Agency is am ens
et the liceeddent. Vales Me Conetibanosk. y
Yeel ben no ,riest to attempt to refute,"
an agency which Is essimest solely to tarn-
eine the Prsialent, who. anew the dolastr-
lotion. is rimmatithin for Ott 'foreign Ma-
nnar. 'with leterseatineto"enable him' be
Desks decisions.
I. for one, cannot accept that doctrine.
As every Member knows. Ahem , two
,branches of our Government, the exam;
the and the legislative are not water-
tight oompartmenta separated by deal
.inditheacts: the material between them is
flexible and porous.' There are any num-
ber. of congreadotial ocannittees winch
keep a watch over the executive agencies.
this MUM We have, to name only two.
Sbe Foreign Alfalra Comandes which M-
antra constantly into the pansies end
actions at the President and his agent&
and the Goversiosent ?mations Com-
mittee which dowdy annitnisei the an.-
the organisation , the. -,executtire
branch. The Senate bass subcommittee
_whose area of operations borders on the
very area I am discussing : the SubconS-
.:.
Mites on Noncom] Security Stalling and
Operation&
.If we see going to refrain from looking
Into the affairs of executive sondes,
even agenehliAthich moot Omni to
the President, than I tear OP are going te
have to distend "a WM Annlber of .ein
consmitteseelet Mist to curtail severely
their activities eft amuse we in the
legislature canna and should not inter.
vent ID math benend our competence
Set in my view we have not, only a right
but s duty to maintains general surveil-
lance over agencies like the Central In.
Wiliam Agency, which are established
by "taut* and sustained by !wide voted
by the Mocabeni,e1 these two noose&
secrecy
and Um erthistvely mantle natured
the intelligens* emnionlig...-are Mind
gonsistent:-Ratt strandrell' ileningh.ihose
whoCa1010 stillIttez SO tids
have often ittlemptati.to mandate not
that for these reasons Congress abode
abstain entirely ft mei owatheingthe in-
telligent* 0111222IntitiW. but that ch.the
contrary eenmessional ?larded; U.' sit
ready mare . dm adequate. : gistsaler
Ross= made this dila hi the debate
_already gusted. sod 1$ was reiterated by
Mr. Allin Deem the foam Diesetor.of
Central Intelligens. in his Isola article
,to liecpus-'g.4V/Ixst la hi last
the Mont ct acemesalood onveMing"
at the nisminth. ? se ? ;.1r,
' In both' the ticase 'and 'Senate 'the
bodies reepondble ler everselang the tro-
teingenot Miasinity are eidil Mears-
undoes of the Aggrepdadoeit and Armed
denim Costatittess. Nether thit Please
Foreign Affairs Cicamittgo nor the Sol-
ate Foreign .leeladens Cemniittee hag
foriediehos-111 -Ode arei despite their
ebvioe. Merest in tetelifirenee natters.
? Bight not swatter were it not ler the
tier that the 'IniraMence "esstatted by
the four existing subcommittees' It itillent
talTantilly bath anew, and tograllie.,For
example, last year during a debate in the
Senate the distingsdabsd senior Senator
from, Massachusetts, mg friend. Mr.
lestroventua. was asked hoer mob time
the Armed Services Subcommittee dm-
voted to the CIA affairs Mr. Sorme.
arms. was perfectly frank., Di :
I my on the Soar at the lisnele ChM ? Ma
mmail eirmeat bans and go WM mg" Onatils
imseetions. Cl letplIMPOO. Cl
'WO a, 4112* . ' ?
I ask Members to note the phrase
?veneral hoore?not seeks or even dies,
but hours. The ambers of one of the
most insportant sommittess in the other
Neese devote only ham to the affabs
of one of the most important ileabelie of
our Cieveremord. The name for this
are sendr dear. The methers of the
agiscemeattees 1st any%stal ape-
clanged. In Um inatestin they Mtn.
selves can have little time or thought to
devote AWOL ;Abut mot if Mee outworn-
tattier do have more time for Meth-
pence no/esthetes' the disadvantages
at having resocogibilits for the . intellt.
genes community divided op Mang tour
different subcommittees would. I think.
be obvious to graven& I maintain that
congressional surveillance of the bytelli-
'awe community is not now adequate
??? -
1100INIff..?????
- ?
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1963 ? ? CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 14267
and cannot be adeousts es long as it
continues to be organised as it b at
present.
A moment ago I referred to the Cen-
tral intelligence Agency as are of the
most important agencies of our Govern-
ment What Is true of CIA is, of course;
even truer at the intelligence commu-
nity as a whole. Yet from time to time
those irlso maintain that intelligence ot-
emboss fall excluelvely within the emu-
the sphero-those. hi other words. who
are Messed to the estebnahrrient at a
Joint congremional committee-147 to
Persuade us. despite ell we have heard
and seen during the past few years, that
nimniheless CIA ? is a Inaeli ablaut
-body, that that It la not directly me-
oerned with the making of ratimml
Icy. Kr. Anal Dulles himself remelted
several years ago:
CIA Is nal ? potteriolatog Ammer we
furnish tatellimnios to midst In tali torunda-
tion of polday. -
Senator Boum dining a debateto
the ethw body was wen More blunt:
some asnatois' who artereesat theelesas
to 1210 11110111110M Mooney Wet. assmed to
hold the opinion that the CIA was a politly.
making apsney. That theme ran aIl through
' the ribliarth ehlds'emre 'outdo in aucesey
of the alaptlas of the meolution. *-
Wx. ? ?MIMI* the ..tientral Intenlyenco.
? Agency Is -lir_ team bibs a pollbsymetteg
*vac,. ? IMMO Mo pointy. ?. 4
'rhodisthiguilbd Senator went on to
say that CIA vu merely a *sardine**
end lutessootion-sattering body whose
function was BMW, to Present its nut:-
loge to the actual polio:making body. the
National Meouriti Council.
Sauter Roseau. said all this in OK
In my view is was scarcely pbuelble even
then. tiow La INS after our eitpert-,
tome ha Globs. Laos and eleewhiti.t to
say that CI& le In sso sense a pongees/r-
ing body is to say something that Is
Pablo wins& The National Security
Act, under which CIA operates. does not,
of anima foresail, allsign it PoLicsinalt-
ing functions. But CIA Is a policymelr.
tag body, and we all know it. 'Ms see,.;
aona have boss well put by Prof. Harry
Bowe Ransom, our leading lay student
of Waimea affairs. In his Andy
"Central Intelligence and National Be-
cznity.? Published as early as UM. he
has ' to seo: ? -
ressionelb1111y. TM policy malibmP?Ultirsillot a
Certainty -the CIA hoe no
simple untie action. Sather It is a Owings
process. A key einnent In On prisons Is the
Infonnallati anttlabbe to palleymaters.
man. or group, oontrollhig the Interalatlost
avadeble to ponersiskire dem In toot pay
a aspic It team* eels la policymalikom
Astev. Plies later Ptufeeme Rained
adds: - ?
Ti voted bevomeallstio to sanest that the
bright young men m CIA. by training. MUM.
and PenenallaY. 40 not bete arttoeg Menu we
policy. It tt le granted that InicaltAltial
controrerMal Mews of national
indeed power. Ti win be recogabsed that In
reality the A. through as morembeg
dels eceoseiromelly Mang small eshdi
responsible decision makmo-bas ease la
play a major Ms In cresting national mow
rity policy. .
No. 12/-4
? Surely those statements can no longer
be regarded as attatblue but tbas simple
truth. In fact even Senator Roseau.
appears to have came round. .last year.
-during the hearings mi the confirmation
of Mr. John Manse to be Ohmic, of
Central intelhomes. assales Bale=
remarteed: ? ? r *LA ?
III this pawl throeb ishishwe int panel-
ing, this oaks Is pumps second only to the
ProWacrel th tio failiertIMPIL ? ?
A few moments late be yipested the
Debit / am inclined to agree with sen-
ator Roam& And I submit to pm that
one does not describe a man as holding
an edike "mond only to the Presidency
In Its importance if the agency of which
bits the head b not SOO it pelieloret-
InS stem, of -thetett OM' 01.,? - ? I,
mlawoko Oft point. Kr'. Biseitir. I hue'
been =MB, concerned to clear the
grotmd, as it were-40 state- its cleans
as I ecodd my *Nations to tnogrgo-
nsents most coonnonb? used bropporienta
of the proposal I am importing -Only
by implication have l'enggellted positive
reasons why I think a Abst'Cohinnttos
an Pereira Inforznatioband Irdelligenos
should be establiahaL Imint now to ad-,
dress 62 the -COW?
*hi eb I kINA 11,Joint
It noessiarn MOO! linportant
-wild lurk d. z *tit wow *Neal? .
undertakes
Mit TIMM w 'hike; Oft ftrillei
paha.' The Omen&Ide=eteelloy.
and Wised the "tedbo' coos-
rromity. is highly-and ?Iseeessarier-ele-
cretin In its mode Of OMMIlitIont Per
this reason outsiders Mte myself have no
alternative but to rely far their Informs-
bon on mierammer Sports, en the
we-
e'.1 'pabildbed belatiale enHOUR
and Illmate 1101111dItteld, ctsthis vat et
whams like Profemor Ilehmeh. and on
a miseellanlitle virlety Othet eburem
In the very naeore of thing oar atom-.
marts and erttielonemanot be authori-
tative% We are watt* In the dart. or
at lent in the mensiterillghtf, Weverthe-
bee. I think we dr know anew* Whets
loaeonable ereurds her impedes that
all is not we within the Intelligente
ocannunity, Zion loth astpertant
Mink we Imow enceigh to be certain that
we need to knout siore-andr by "vs."
of coarse. I moan not. hosonartly ih? r
getretel peels nor eye ,sitley Member
of Congress. but thieflilecabses IMO
Would save on the kin* .et ecentedttee
have In olds& ' '3' ?? "
WhY, then. do I think knit a Min.
mines should be sstehlished? ?'
have two genital Mom& . The flat
cams= the eartmordlnorl number of
sputa& criticisms that he.. been leveled
over the years &DAY the Central 111-;
taligenes Aiwa and trf,
itisalit the Intaligenos .community as
S whole. AML... AIM
Dulles reoacIli Poona ? -- -
. Toe mime ISO of opeatiome that
alongwatt. Those VMS ge baby guoersfly
spesh tor themselves.
And I would not- want OW a IsiOtlislid
to deny that the Central Intelligeno?
??????,--n.
Agency has scored a number of quite
spectacular sumesses-the U-2 over-
flights, for example. and the overthrow
of the Maude* nettle In Iran. On
balance it is ainsost certainly this to sal
that ?am astrenuntty has
served the Ratios leelL But the fact
does ransin'that an abasion the oom-
mann? has blimdered seriondy. and that
for Its blunder the elitivu of the Volted
Mates have paid a hour Mieo ?
Let we refer to Ault a few instanesa-
Back In IMO, as Mr. Miss blussolt hag
tacitly admitted, the bitellieenee eon-
nutnitzt faded to anticipate the Chinon,
Comnumlit Intervention in Kama. We
are .101 Owing with the otaisyneneas at
that particular failure. A eve Tem
later gel -11001Ving new* CIA
toused
as orlon erahatrassesseg hs HO
Middle Bast and WILY have ecestillintsd.
hollyetly to ths:etwe 'affair.44111-Stihr
OM President Nagar of Rapt ebboed
In a Apes* at Abeandsta that he had
been Arena, advissd as CUB. Odaallst,'
mart W1131'110 boron an forpoet Mos.'
sags that be was about to reestin from
tag State DeVertessist..ft Ins MOW
qamitly cardlonad that the odielai
question had been the segtonal Mire-
Oritgitre.ot CIA. ? n
1.14ste seesitft"aratasCrar the'
lies000t the By et Piga. Chief room-
Obtlity. for that1siantabis Affair=
teeklrtth the Progido et the
it '
States. However, there can bs ne
ton but that *be Central Intelligeties'
Amoy was dwell involved hi the whole
affair, and that Its actions and advice
bad a decisive effect" on the eventual
ouroons. Bureb most lleasbent of the
Bonne will agree that it would be in the
national interest to know whether stab
incidental
were merely DArticlahr Oar-
Wipes or whether. In tact. they farm a
Pattern that is tlitelY to he Melded to
the tuhve. - --
- secood general reams for prg
tar the establishment at this committes,
I am stets Writs bristly, it la this. I
abhor government by secrecy. .1 regard
It as iniadeal to the effective function-
ing of our institution& I regard it as
alien to our American WAY of lifa... Above
I regard it us threat to out funds--
mental liberties. I fully _realise. at,
Calina1 It should ba akar 'freed, what? I
luive said already that a. high doom a
sewn/ . Antenna' to the 'moraines at
Sb. Intelligence oottultunitg.----;-_-?
. MS, I fear that- with raped . to the
intelligence communits we are ohm the
victhas of soma foe secrogra
Things are done soy and In our risme
which. we /mow nothing at. I do not
wish to see the legitinsato swot* at the
intolligenot eammunity reported In the
press and on the air. Of course I do not.
Huai* does sem to nie at ancemous im-.
Portance that a few selected representa-
tive, at -the yeavls. chases by the two
Hamm ot.Coditess. abonklbapauthin-
stab 'aware at *bat the-Intelatrusto
ocionmushq Is doing and of the wag In
which it Is going about doing S. -The
Amarican people have at stabs. we
moldy their liberties but their lives.
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CONCrittbarkriNrva.
? 121268
Despite all I have 'es.id so :tr. there to do with the activities of the Nation-
would. of oourse, be little point In ertab- dist Chinese. Our Ambassador of course'
lishing this Joint committee unless we believed he was telling the truth. But
had some fairly dear ides of What we what he was saying was to fact not true,
thought it should do, of whet subletts and naturally the Burnicee were shacked
we thought it should study. I propose, by this apparent , evidence of American
therefore, to continue by discuising tour duplicity. ? What was the shot et this
questions. All of bigh importance, which episode? The American Ambassador re-.
I think might usefully be investigated:- signed. the U.8..0overrunent was deeply
fink the relations between the Central embarrassed. and the ?monument et
Intelligence Agency and the State De- Burma threatened for a thne to tweak off
partnsent. especially overseas; second, diplomatic relations. ? .
the relations between intelligence-gatb-? Admittedly, tins incident was partial-
en the one band end so-called !any ludicrous. But it is not without
=operations on the other; third, Parana. Our Police the early Magee
dim and training of intelligence of the Laotian crisis appears to have
personnel; and fourth, the whole QUM. been constantly bedeviled by a lack of
'don' st ? intellleence .ervaluation. I pro- effective 000rdination between the CIA
pose to deal briefly with the first throe of *and -the State Denertnieni. _ffimilarLY
these questions and to say rather nom with Cuba prior to the Biy Of Pas tu-
eibout the fourth. rodeo. .Mr.. Tad Sento and Mr. Marl
Whit, the makes bitten* CffA and: -Meyer; In thde,:ablejeceetnit? of that.
the State Department. ? '? ?? riffraff describe bow, on Its own initiative;
ribse problem Imre his been posed Mc: CIA estabbshed does wanting relate's
cinder by Henry Rowe Ransom in the with exiled stronortme of the former clio-
book I have already cited. On page 2111 tater Batista. They add: , .
he writes:: ? .? ? ? This Amnion misted the inanguratlinel
- The operatles. by the US. necessities% et lent. In meg* beeinte b10111112dent fCE;
a waves asset apparatue tar *Attaining** di% Peng /cairn Man to Maths dare-
grAthering and peilliesi action easild have Pat ge law Udadring In tat Iniito 11~
40,
diplamatie is Sims There me the lilatelDepartuant; ' ? -
=aleal:areele taetantaabaltt aftwl" 1**' Itirgiati;iO4 OriPhe tbS
seendise diplemane ads- "
- -Sam ta asineyit tentgo poses (as of Sestetery ft Strits.-
" The number would ? be. irraitlirati-n?ene ur -likerjee rale 0=111:airest
CIA. Strum then the IlerteNilien Danes
agreement
on the relations between Am-
bernackes and CM MIMennel in the field
bes been realenned by Mr. therk and Mr.
Weans And by now we have ream,
to bops that the responsible foreign
Policynialuna-the Proficient and the
Ratko& Security Coursoli-heve
=etre anthority over the Central
? Agency.- agree that to
aanattkeibla *glint this is a problem of
particular wraps and particular thus
-
tacos. -But IS Is also the ems that, err
keg es both StaM,Departanent and CIA
Pereconsi saw marking. In tits add. as
loos sa both agencies are responsible few
the 1101100tiell tnionnaticer. and--per-
baps most importnnt-e* ices
eautinues to be responsible for special
oPerations. the problem of integrating
U). Central Biteiligenoe Agency thtd our
general foreign /1012lanpandos will re-
main althorn end remain worthy at
dose and eontinuons swasaination, The
exercise off Antreelllance In this add I
gent/she to be eibe postale lunation of
a Joint Congreedonal Cern:maid ele
elan Info:earthen and Intelligence. ?
A teamed" ago / alluded to the con-
duct by the CIA of so-called special op;
orations; that ts, the fomenting of appa-
rition againse-hostile governments, the
arming of tesingents, the provocation of
enemy action. and so on. The question
of housing these. wend operations-or
additional earned or other functions or
whatever you Oath to eel them-under
the earns roar as the CIA's ',web tritel.:
ihtenceitatheringl aberatiams' Nigh a
course. bong been a matter of contrnversy,
and it is this question that I suggest
might ussfully be the second of the new
Joint eopursitese's areas of study.
I do not suppose we need to be re-
minded of the importance of this quern-
???
non. The Bay of Piga invasion was only
the most spectacular and best publicized
of CIA's special operations. There was
the 'nudger. affair In 061. and the fol-
lowing yea; the overthrow of the Athens
regime In Cluatemala. CiA also appears
-to here beds hand in the main risings
In Eastern ihrreee. In'tad Berlin and
Hungary. ?thrones= of this sort, unless'
carefully supervleed_and controlled by
responsible political -albeere-Could un-
wittingly involve the United States in *
maim Anternetkinal nrida. possibly in
war; If this was not dear before the
Bay of Pkgs. -1, Ought to be deer now.-
The institutional danger hero Is reed-
ily aPParent and bag often been stated:
As Prufemor Ransom Puts fl? '
- To ids the Ina ressersam- ? ? '
7' TVIiireat
__ gethering lad oPendions- .? ? , : ?
timbres thaisieric that emirs minas sot-
lecUng this Sad 'hying at the WM nits
to bother or OWN the overthrow at a foreign
gmermasta in daisies% apparent Jalereig
may develop ? Mei Use enjoins, sewn for
distinguishing basest test Andampastion.
Mears. Seale end Meyer Make the
same point inirepes oe Cuba:
. The CIA men more not rely thaping. In
etteet, fornea po=dbr Wan pl from
tInat."6141=11bily we is, the .endeliu.
position of boa ormniaby elandestine
elation and preparing the intelligmair data
Weep wither .tha vandlty. ?ges :vasters
mud to SAW. .t. ? - ) ? ?
ThiGlisters soltdion iiOdic mobilise*
would. of MOM be to donee CLa Ott
-
*hely of Its medal Operations funetion.
Unfortunately the Pallas hi the most fa-
vorable position to ? colleen etannestine
hiformadost are often deo the peonie
best plead to dream In "stemeterie polit-
e/at seties. Zn addition. a total A-
rmee- Worith MC ten funatiniur, sageht
lead, in Itaneem'a weds. ta ?arecelpeti-
don. thiplieetion. and men egteignt cart-'
filet.?
?M.O. Urn. the Maxwell ?Oyler Com-
antes. mot:abed by the Prodder/I In in-
quire into the Bay of Pigs affair. op-
Peas to have toyed, at tee* with an
alternative Ides-the idea et
ring the the bulk of CIA's spode* operations
to the Defense Department. Bat this
solution would have had the squally ob-
vious disadvantage of ensuring that the
enthrone Yilflitary-heire ? hew the
olitt_i4t arearatige ofthe Carrera-
ta benne imbed as soca sr
al* Paramilitary oneratioer bei",
matter
of pebble knowledge. -
tn the event. It seems that main
omen operations have been left -be Us
hands at CIA. with control to be tram
!erred to the Pentagon only if a partite
lar project li?Maies so big as to gnaw
open military partielpation. het Range
Baldwin 111 the NOW York TIMM sumnw
un the Matter thus: '
The pima* role d amen Sr the tutu
is time the Cad Ant 1,0?44, _gar r
manly mdllary aparatiese, or aim of war
also that they atatact be hip* searet. Yier
414W, lea on. idu appessrily - be peat
on to merits there Is no hardomd-A
formals that MU put one opersties
the CIA and another under the Ilantepa
greater now--
and Ma ealeMnoe Azanken secret agents
In most or these mos foreign *mac Chaos.
titt are must be eserefted in teapot( AM
diplimmey amustat Amps isyMg and best-.
Maio pontamd maneuvering, Mamma On the
mime, yet the tlisionnte probably shoved
sot be esepierigy In Sao dant ea to lao
warns.. of Anignese serge ambit. -
The posdbly disruptive effect tie Ito-.
Mg. on the premises of Arne:lean 'ow.
Meths abroad or in the fidd. smuts.
who owe allegiance to 1101000t le other
than the ambassador end to en argent-,
lotion other than the State Department
and who may be engaging in aothttiee
rinming oounter to expressed Stata De of -
partment policy, sanely needs epellimg
out In ?
? Nor are these dangers satiety thoen-
'attn. It seems, for example, that to-'.
ward the end of the Cl/brew civil leer
remnants of Chiang led-eheit's Ba-
Army moved trite Parts eff
northern Runes:. 'Thme traced claimed
to be sager to harem the Comminute
tame the border, and CIA secomitenly.
stivpIted them with large eUtintitiee of
money and arms. But aocceding 00
available reports the anneal had lone
sinee tired of fighting. Instead a at-
Woking the Communists, they promeded
to settle down, to eeeepy mush of the
beet agricultural lend in northern
Burma, and to cultivate opium-sin with
the amistanell at U.S. funds. -
* sreuld have been a nielandidi
Episode in any case. ' But wird made et
worm was the fact that our Ambassador
in Rangoon anParenibr had not the
faintest idea of what CIA wee doing.
When the Burmese Government fort:raft
complained to the United States, the
Ambassador issued a categorical denial;
he said the United States had nothing
? ' ?
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All of us. I think. will agree that this Is it wi.ee. for exemole, to rely to the
is an area In which hard-anti-fad for- extent CIA seesaw to do on the services
unites are not appropriate and in which at retired service officers? One would
in the nature of things. Organisational =More that retired Berries oflicers.
innuendo cannot solve the major dill- though almost always men of greet obit-
culties. As In the case of relations be. itY, would hey* on inginotivo tentiena
tween CIA and the State Department. to take a rather Darrow. Atka/ roDert-..
much depends on particular people and ? Weal" view of the prehlems confronting
Particular ..situations. _But largely be- them. Similarly. is It wigs 10 rely too
COMM the probbmi lad this sort. because Issavily en the MOMS otos/Waal exiles
it Is a problem which can never finally and refugees?. Itsome resembable; for
be solved. I reel very strongly that con-j example. to suppose that an exile from
tinning ? congressional " surveillance - Raritan* enteciallY gamete* who hal
urgently required. Il a joint committee passionate canvietiens about what mune
had been In evidence in the early stages events M his homeland might to take.
of the Brat Cuban crisis, and if it hid may not be ? the beet per to emcee
had cognisant* of this matter, would the what Walille events In his homeland Attu-
Bay of Pigs nada. have occurred? I ally are taking, especially it what is oohs-
think it Is at Bast passible that it would ally happening is sot to his taste.
not. ? - releemPsrPlease &Apt eileundentand nix I
Discussion of the Bar of Pigs leads me do not mean to impairs ;ffie,,anarrooue.
notarial), to .the.third of the questions I amount of valuable wet losing done bp
think a Joint ecesmittee adght Wadi- "--retired girdle eflemi !Ind hr aage. and
gate: the whole question of recruitment retugses in the CIA. ?Whoa their.holP...
ant personnel within the Intelligenee the argeniseeaa laisril=anee
conimsmttx. To r ft seems to me perface- . Boa. Altogether the total.
le dear that cocci the things that went genes Agency undoubtedly ,awassnands
wrong with the abortive Cuban inia. some of the ablest minds in the U.S. Oar-
don?not the only thing. but one of the enamels'. And of course I do not mean.
things?was that much of the CIA per? ? for a moment to suggest that CIA should
sonnet reeponsible for the operatice con- be staffed with 'Imift-nners" or people
sisterly/ the sort of potpie who could ant who have bad no Pecorouti eXperieneeof
distinguish between the reactioneer?and ?the eenntriee to etwitless.-Ibist would
the democratic elements In the ? anti- absurd. , ;- , f?,? ? ? ? ?:
Cedeo canip.-leetween the opPments edBut what I de Oda* that ire haws
Castro who were acceptable to the Cuban to be sure that -What we are getting . are.
people and those who. as former ettp- actually the facia and net what we
Porters of Batista were anathema to would bke to he the teas. This is not st
them. matter ot persona/ preference one war
Let me quota again from Smile and or the other. It Is a matter at !lading
Meyer. In their book. -The Cuban In- out what is actually taking place?and
vision." they write: personal prefetences enter only as the"
Una the CIA ereabliehed anted, hi 111. MI7 00kir Orin judgment. I sweet
and with pre-Datista arganinatiosa and With that the indgMent of fhtt CIA isiollith?
war irooPB wboott estsly Pellth**1 5b5oso567 times colored by the priderence of He
was dedicated to the Mans tO tia? pra-Ointiv anugarasa; iluspatt that tzt mot to
dame' quo II Cuba. ? ? ? lbws faetiOlto take special ears to media asid employ
ww pledits themedvee not oni, aphid OM-
tro but nosiort Metal; whether or not the mea and of woof Weft* imok-
CIA operatives were aware that Weil wiper ground* brosperaments: and opthfene.-I
awn is Impossible. us? cesteete with the that in thee Wadi Of siteations
rightist teettons ran oottatier to ordinal us. asa gets at the truth only when a wide
voila,. ablest at esoonzegine WOW flitOrlft Milt, Of Indinatida. isWaft* to bac
in Latin dimilaa." But remember that Uwe me my feelings
A tow owes way they syroirk this only. I have tittle dda at my comment.
she amnia of the rgA agents reseculd All I am 1167121g is that I have ? hunch
a desire to promote anti-Castro groups that CIA Twoolltulont Puna ano had on
which they could manipulate. They pop- affect on Ciall Derforsomiew r he
Untie: wrong. but I intent Mei the only wet
it ala ratiaatadan "mud, Cl foamy to we in Canaries an BadOut is by out-
Isse-se.cessasy paw group' ay aftead.ist. Viteel 0011daeting an Infer, ? into the
newt operatives. Me In tam affeeted Ithe subject. -4 ? ??- ? -I _ ? ?
top levet Cl the wpm* and malted in a leolc The whole eueltion- of Personnel end
ot naderstreading at the tap. It le het deer reernitment is, tam the ogre of ths
to what antost tii? CIA atittud? vas Wisoiar- mom I groom ukto. to me a mot 00m..
Many motivated or woe dimply a napalms mittee study. I would only add that of
towed on the agent's view ot what re preo- course no Investigation need Inquire Into
tioal or redlinc. the names and Milgrim Cl . particular
This tendency on the part of the CIA Individuals lambed: thew need be nes
to seek out and support the mod wen- ameba of smutty ? or asensey. ? The
Communist groups in the add. regard- maker we are coacessoi with is on. of
Iasi Of whether or not Buell groUps are general policy. ? .
Politically viable, has of course been Pinally. I want to bun to what is
manifested on ? number of ocher oda-- perhaps the mod /WWI 01 the four
sione-4n Laos as well ea in Cuba, end gmetlena I reared In artier: Me gimp
allPhrengi in Algeria and the Congo as tion of how best 10 'manias Use
well. It is a persistent tendency, and Atkin cd the enormous snow* of ma-
one that on occasion hat had a damag- Serial collected area day by the various
Mg effect on our policy. I lusPeCt it has agencies of. the intelligence ?ammonite.
something to do with the kinds of people Obviously evaluation of some sort takes
the Central Intelligence Agency gets-to place at every echelon within the tom-
work for IL munity, but I am particularly concerned
? ? -?-? , _
s.
. .
- ?
?-
with the top-level U.S. Inicingenee
Board and its auxiliary bodies.
Probably a few words are in order on
how these agencies :are organised. I
think the following descrtption la roughly
accurate, though the Central Intelligence
Agency refused to provide me with au-
thoritative infonnation sci?I base bad to
nay on data from published sources.,
abe phrase .3.1ntellfgence
-musdb?"I mean libe fin- menus monde*
within the esaentive branch concerned
with intelligence collection and evalua-
tion: the CIA, the new Defense Weal-
game Aram., the atom DapartMent.
BAND, and so en. ,The ocanniunili ass a
whole 10 responsible for wothies the
national aetim - by Pinter-
ear ? Baum as lbw- vital building
blocks of national Emanate Paler." . With
'lb. exception cd the ultzesscret net esti,-
matte ntichato peedimiedtpwidel AM-
eibinea Adthlri-the iftWoal "flitheity
''060noll, mint silthatssAns ~dm!,
4se aegis Of tissi Board:of
National Zstimatee.'
*.Thle Board eamatiot stuallhictiber
of Intelligenc*. egpertesoldleru-dtplo-
nude. and scholars-tic,. to Coate Ren-
eges Win. "peed& as &Rind of Olanning
general staff tacit* inbeffigenee. com-
munity." The Board. can. Initiate the
Preparation of an estimate. though it
usually doteritrouly mewl from the
Iftesident. the Director of Central Intel-
ligence. or some Other Mtn bar of the Na-
tional Security CoimelL'"In afi eames.4110
Board of Itational Ifettniates seta -the
terra of referen* brinks the WOW=
op Into feasible ecainmente. and sedan'
&mandate tasks to the various agencies.
The resulting staff studies are collated Ws
the smell Mae of Nations/ Estimates.
The Board then drone either a straight
admate?that is. ene which Wasp* lo
amine a feedlot Isalikees Intentions et
tura roadie with !MOM emigoiplient au
to Mare U.S. .Icy?or A moral stip
mate?that ia.one involving stated AD.
imptions tonoenniis papelble cheeses in
U.S. policy. Atter the draft estimate bee
been returned to the pertionedieg 'agen-
cies for their 00111111112te and ertUteetaa Vs
is aubenttted. Poselble with disease* to a
oonsmiltee which used to be Miami se the
ratellsenre Advisory Committee but is
now named fin U.S. InteLligenoe Beard.
If the Board of &inmates is the plan-
ning board for the Intelligence . opm-
amity, the httelligenes 'Board b
board cif directon. As Ransom puts to, to
is the *final terms for the . professional
Intelligence coannunity.? It /Wolves
nutglictional disputes within Use eon-
moseist and is Arany responaibie for for-
warding the nations& eistimalies to -the
Ifiitionat fidomity CouncIL Invarlakey
this attempt is made to produce agreed
estbniste& and usually the attempt is ono-
earful; but OD 0001100111 dimenting min-
ions will be stibmitted. The Inteletense
Bawdmete usually on.. a, WeilL It
coned, et the leading Malone* orb-
dale Cl the community and is Oohed by
the =realer et Central Xisteillfana
Two allpeCal at this process in partial.-
tar are worth noting. The first Ii the
central role at the Central Intelligence
Agency. A high proportion of the Intel-
ligence conumnitra fact gathering is
done by CIA. 'The Board of National
1910
???????.
?
? ?-??????..1.4. ???????- 0??????????????,..????????? ..?????????
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i4270 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE August 1.;
estimates fUnctiona as a part of CIA.
The chairman of the U.S. Intelligence
Board is Director of CIA. And, of course,
the intelligence community's spokesman
on the National Security Council itself
Is also the CIA Director. The Second
thing worth noting, however. is the
-duality of CIA. role. ? Under the na-
tional Security Act the agency is not
only one Cl the participants in the in-
telligence community, it is also the chief
agency responsible for coordinating it.
In other words, at many points in the
process of evaluation, CIA Ls both player
and umpire, both witness and judge.
This ambiguity is implicit in the Otte
of the Director who is formally not the
-Director of -the ?Central -Intelligence
Agency" but simply -Director of Central
Intelligence."
the danger here is char. - it is
that the Central Intelligence Agency Will
beconte?Perhalei it has ahead' be-
oome?not merely the chief Intelligence
agency but the dominant Intelligence
meaty, and that it will develoP pereistent
institutional tendencies, biases, and even
'Sondes. This type Cl Probleld is. or.
Mune, not peculiar to the American In-
? telligence community but Is charaehr-
? iitic Of 'any oxiipleit
Paratus. That is the reason it has con-
stantly. to be guarded smiths!.
Shaman- tent, a Yale iiiiifessiteiiiad?
a World War U intelligence officer, put
Sb. point this way:
Almost any man or vat* 01 man aa.
fronted with the duty at getting ennething
Vermeil or getting something done win
wooer or later hit upon what they coninder
a single most dastrable opines of action.
Visually It is sooner einnetinse& under du-
? 1$ Is a snap tudgment of the top et the
hold. I cannot Image the beim that ender
the etroureateumer *Waned. hiteillestioe will
and itseit tight In the middle ot policy, and
that non occasions it will be the unabashed.
apologist for a given policy rather than Its
Imperial and objective analyst.
BMW and Meyer, writing of the Bay
of Pita conclude:
girt MA wee not believing idiotically: it
was In many mime responding to the Mee-
lets* ml .-fl- that infects a sheltered
bureaucrac7. Indeed. If there is an institu-
tional villain. It Is bureaucracy itself?that
hulking. stubborn giant that seenUngly can
only look where it bas been and not whither
11 1. tending.
Professor Ransom calls It simply the
problem of "feedback."
Naturally in the early months of 1961
the adfilinistretton addressed itself to
this problem. After the Bay of Pigs it
could scarcely do otherwise. In partiget-'
lar it reactivated a watchdog grout, set
UP by President Xisenhower in OK_
originally called the President's Board Cl
Consultants on Poreign Intelligence Ae-.
Unties and now named the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
This Board, under the chairmanship of
Dr. James R.. =Ulan. Jr., of the Mama-
euhetta InsUtute of Technology, studied
the question of evaluation and appar-
ently forwarded one or more retorts to
the Prendent in the course of the year.
These reports have not been made pub-
lic. but I think it is possible to piece to-
gether from nelniPaPer reports roughb
what happened. It aeons that the NO-
Ilan committee, or at least some Of its
members, were unhappy about the dual
role being played by CIA. They proposed
that in future the Director Cl CIA should
be more o( .s technician, and that a new
post should be created. Trebel* 'at-
tached to the White Hamm with IMO
mush 'Mk ;as "Coordinntor of Intel-
ligence." the new coordinator would be
In a political to stairs* and ateett the
results achieved by the intelligence com-
munity without having any bias in favor
of CIA. Reports to this effect appeared.
frequently in the pries in June and July
1961. In August Mr. Mien Phillips of
the New York Times stated that the new'
post bad actually been offered to Mr.
Poerler Hamilton.
Zither' these 'reports were inaceurele,
of the adminletration changed its mind,
or they Could not find itnyone te'oboitpy
the new-poet, bemuse In Setrtember Itel
the President announced that Mr. John
A. McCabe had been named Director of
Central Intelligence without any mire
change being made in the structure '
the Intelligence community. 'Subs,-
tinently, however. In January 1942 Moe'
such change was announced. Mende- '
forth the Director of Central Intellignise
wog notte Inaction both se Chairman el-
the A. Intelligenoe Board and alio as
CIA imelaber cd the Board. Insteid;
though the Director was to remain Chair--
Man Of the Board. ah deputy weft to het
as reeireeentative of the CIA. In a leiter;
to Mr. W.cCone. the President noted this
change with approvaL Ile added: ?
As heed ot the Central fatalness?, Agoonf,
while you will omicaul to have *mad re-
sponsibility tar the agsney. II shall aspect
you to debilitate to your principal deputy.
es you may deem necessary; so muds et Use
ellserition ot the *MOW opiention At the
lleeney ss you may?be required to permit you
to Anity out your primary task as infector
Or Central fineldgenos.. _
- Closely there. was a dnenuna here. On
the one hand, it was evident that CIA's
intelligence slithering and operational
functions could conflict with its 000rdl-
natant function?and. of mune. what
was true of the Agency was also true of
Its Director. On the other hand. the
President and his advisers were almost
certainly aware that an independent co-
ordinator, who was not himself the heed
al maps agency, might first himself
weak even Powerless, in the face ol the ?
vast intelligence bureaucracies. Inde-
pendence in theory might mein im-
potence In practice. So a compromise
was struck. omit the duties of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence merely
redefined. :
How succemtui this compromise has
been It Is probably too early to sax . But
from all?that I hen said. It ought be be
obvious Unit the problem of evaluation.
like the other problem" I have already
mentioned, is a continuing on*. and not
one that can be minted out of existence
by airily institutional gimmickry. It
is also obvious that the problem of evalu-
ation is an enormously important prob-
lem, probably the most important con-
fronting the intelligence community.
For there reasons, I think that it, 100,
should be a continuing subject of scru-
tiny by a well-qualified and well-staffed
committes of Conine& ?
Mr. Sgiesker. I do not wish to detain
the Home further. I have spoken at
considerable length. yet I am only too
well swan, that I have only drimmed the
surface Cl thh extraordinarily compli-
cated and difilcidt *object There are
any number CI further questions that I
alga havirposor exannile, concern-
ing the apparently there? aging ooncentra-
tion Cl authority Within the intelligence
community. or about the tote of the
U.S. Information Agency: T And. of
course, I must repeat that this has
been essentially an outsider's analysis.
I have been trying merely to suggest
what kinds at inqtdry a joint eommittee
Might undertake, not to whelped* what
the results cg,theei Inquiries viould he.
? Nor as I rentaritad at the outset: do
wish to insist that the reeohition I am
intradadbcterlig.hrovitei the only Pee-
rage way at proceeding: 'Perhaps the
joint mennittte, abash' be given rather
different terms of reference. Or perhaps
a body should be established comprising
private Mame as well as Members of
Congress. I do not want to be dogmatic
about this. My purpose in speaking to-
day has been to reopen public dimmed=
of an Ionic that has too long been dor-
mant, and imoreorer to-reopen 11 -at a
thee of relative tranquillity; when the
intelligence ecesmuntly is not in the
Plebe sPittight.otisliaie therefore when
them mattes eon be considered soberly.
and dispassionately. . ? ?
- But we In Congress should not be too
timid about putting ourselves' forward.
I wonder how many Members of. this
House are aware Cl the enormous body
Cl opinion in favor of the creation of a
congressional joint committee. Both
the Hoover Commisdon and its special
Inteingenareask Imes favored congres-
sional Intention. The New York
Times - has eolvdetcntly "supported the
Ides in its editorial columns.. Two years
ago the distinguished military analyst,
Mr. Hanson Baldwin. stated that one of
the lemma to be drawn from the Bay of
Pigs was "the necanity Cl keeping all
secret Intelligente activities and opera-
Uons under constant top-echelon sur-
veillance and renew." Be noted that
the machinery for achieving this would
be greatly strengthosed by the creation
of a Joint congrandonal watchdog com-
mittee.
lir. Speaker. I should like to
quote just once more from the writings
of Professor Harry Howe Ransom who.
as I have already said, is our country's
leading lay student of Intelligence affairs.
think his comment deserves all the
greater consideration because it comes
from a member of the political science
profeerdori.?e extension which, as we all
know, has always had a strong bilis in
favor of the executive branch of gov-
ernment. On page -2011 of 'Central in-
telligence and National Security" Pro-
fessor Ransom remarks: ? ?
ft is eitenraini impatience for security
polltimakers, military and etorilian. to And
their fear of imogreseional intension=
oteinged Into gratitude tor congressional
support, frequently mare effective sappers
than has been awarded on the executive Ade
of Oovernruent. ? No executive agency today
reveals everything to ocseressicess/ otos-
maims with Valediction over its operation&
Oilktals of antral intelligence may be ea-
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i4270 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE August 1.;
estimates fUnctiona as a part of CIA.
The chairman of the U.S. Intelligence
Board is Director of CIA. And, of course,
the intelligence community's spokesman
on the National Security Council itself
Is also the CIA Director. The Second
thing worth noting, however. is the
-duality of CIA. role. ? Under the na-
tional Security Act the agency is not
only one Cl the participants in the in-
telligence community, it is also the chief
agency responsible for coordinating it.
In other words, at many points in the
process of evaluation, CIA Ls both player
and umpire, both witness and judge.
This ambiguity is implicit in the Otte
of the Director who is formally not the
-Director of -the ?Central -Intelligence
Agency" but simply -Director of Central
Intelligence."
the danger here is char. - it is
that the Central Intelligence Agency Will
beconte?Perhalei it has ahead' be-
oome?not merely the chief Intelligence
agency but the dominant Intelligence
meaty, and that it will develoP pereistent
institutional tendencies, biases, and even
'Sondes. This type Cl Probleld is. or.
Mune, not peculiar to the American In-
? telligence community but Is charaehr-
? iitic Of 'any oxiipleit
Paratus. That is the reason it has con-
stantly. to be guarded smiths!.
Shaman- tent, a Yale iiiiifessiteiiiad?
a World War U intelligence officer, put
Sb. point this way:
Almost any man or vat* 01 man aa.
fronted with the duty at getting ennething
Vermeil or getting something done win
wooer or later hit upon what they coninder
a single most dastrable opines of action.
Visually It is sooner einnetinse& under du-
? 1$ Is a snap tudgment of the top et the
hold. I cannot Image the beim that ender
the etroureateumer *Waned. hiteillestioe will
and itseit tight In the middle ot policy, and
that non occasions it will be the unabashed.
apologist for a given policy rather than Its
Imperial and objective analyst.
BMW and Meyer, writing of the Bay
of Pita conclude:
girt MA wee not believing idiotically: it
was In many mime responding to the Mee-
lets* ml .-fl- that infects a sheltered
bureaucrac7. Indeed. If there is an institu-
tional villain. It Is bureaucracy itself?that
hulking. stubborn giant that seenUngly can
only look where it bas been and not whither
11 1. tending.
Professor Ransom calls It simply the
problem of "feedback."
Naturally in the early months of 1961
the adfilinistretton addressed itself to
this problem. After the Bay of Pigs it
could scarcely do otherwise. In partiget-'
lar it reactivated a watchdog grout, set
UP by President Xisenhower in OK_
originally called the President's Board Cl
Consultants on Poreign Intelligence Ae-.
Unties and now named the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
This Board, under the chairmanship of
Dr. James R.. =Ulan. Jr., of the Mama-
euhetta InsUtute of Technology, studied
the question of evaluation and appar-
ently forwarded one or more retorts to
the Prendent in the course of the year.
These reports have not been made pub-
lic. but I think it is possible to piece to-
gether from nelniPaPer reports roughb
what happened. It aeons that the NO-
Ilan committee, or at least some Of its
members, were unhappy about the dual
role being played by CIA. They proposed
that in future the Director Cl CIA should
be more o( .s technician, and that a new
post should be created. Trebel* 'at-
tached to the White Hamm with IMO
mush 'Mk ;as "Coordinntor of Intel-
ligence." the new coordinator would be
In a political to stairs* and ateett the
results achieved by the intelligence com-
munity without having any bias in favor
of CIA. Reports to this effect appeared.
frequently in the pries in June and July
1961. In August Mr. Mien Phillips of
the New York Times stated that the new'
post bad actually been offered to Mr.
Poerler Hamilton.
Zither' these 'reports were inaceurele,
of the adminletration changed its mind,
or they Could not find itnyone te'oboitpy
the new-poet, bemuse In Setrtember Itel
the President announced that Mr. John
A. McCabe had been named Director of
Central Intelligence without any mire
change being made in the structure '
the Intelligence community. 'Subs,-
tinently, however. In January 1942 Moe'
such change was announced. Mende- '
forth the Director of Central Intellignise
wog notte Inaction both se Chairman el-
the A. Intelligenoe Board and alio as
CIA imelaber cd the Board. Insteid;
though the Director was to remain Chair--
Man Of the Board. ah deputy weft to het
as reeireeentative of the CIA. In a leiter;
to Mr. W.cCone. the President noted this
change with approvaL Ile added: ?
As heed ot the Central fatalness?, Agoonf,
while you will omicaul to have *mad re-
sponsibility tar the agsney. II shall aspect
you to debilitate to your principal deputy.
es you may deem necessary; so muds et Use
ellserition ot the *MOW opiention At the
lleeney ss you may?be required to permit you
to Anity out your primary task as infector
Or Central fineldgenos.. _
- Closely there. was a dnenuna here. On
the one hand, it was evident that CIA's
intelligence slithering and operational
functions could conflict with its 000rdl-
natant function?and. of mune. what
was true of the Agency was also true of
Its Director. On the other hand. the
President and his advisers were almost
certainly aware that an independent co-
ordinator, who was not himself the heed
al maps agency, might first himself
weak even Powerless, in the face ol the ?
vast intelligence bureaucracies. Inde-
pendence in theory might mein im-
potence In practice. So a compromise
was struck. omit the duties of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence merely
redefined. :
How succemtui this compromise has
been It Is probably too early to sax . But
from all?that I hen said. It ought be be
obvious Unit the problem of evaluation.
like the other problem" I have already
mentioned, is a continuing on*. and not
one that can be minted out of existence
by airily institutional gimmickry. It
is also obvious that the problem of evalu-
ation is an enormously important prob-
lem, probably the most important con-
fronting the intelligence community.
For there reasons, I think that it, 100,
should be a continuing subject of scru-
tiny by a well-qualified and well-staffed
committes of Conine& ?
Mr. Sgiesker. I do not wish to detain
the Home further. I have spoken at
considerable length. yet I am only too
well swan, that I have only drimmed the
surface Cl thh extraordinarily compli-
cated and difilcidt *object There are
any number CI further questions that I
alga havirposor exannile, concern-
ing the apparently there? aging ooncentra-
tion Cl authority Within the intelligence
community. or about the tote of the
U.S. Information Agency: T And. of
course, I must repeat that this has
been essentially an outsider's analysis.
I have been trying merely to suggest
what kinds at inqtdry a joint eommittee
Might undertake, not to whelped* what
the results cg,theei Inquiries viould he.
? Nor as I rentaritad at the outset: do
wish to insist that the reeohition I am
intradadbcterlig.hrovitei the only Pee-
rage way at proceeding: 'Perhaps the
joint mennittte, abash' be given rather
different terms of reference. Or perhaps
a body should be established comprising
private Mame as well as Members of
Congress. I do not want to be dogmatic
about this. My purpose in speaking to-
day has been to reopen public dimmed=
of an Ionic that has too long been dor-
mant, and imoreorer to-reopen 11 -at a
thee of relative tranquillity; when the
intelligence ecesmuntly is not in the
Plebe sPittight.otisliaie therefore when
them mattes eon be considered soberly.
and dispassionately. . ? ?
- But we In Congress should not be too
timid about putting ourselves' forward.
I wonder how many Members of. this
House are aware Cl the enormous body
Cl opinion in favor of the creation of a
congressional joint committee. Both
the Hoover Commisdon and its special
Inteingenareask Imes favored congres-
sional Intention. The New York
Times - has eolvdetcntly "supported the
Ides in its editorial columns.. Two years
ago the distinguished military analyst,
Mr. Hanson Baldwin. stated that one of
the lemma to be drawn from the Bay of
Pigs was "the necanity Cl keeping all
secret Intelligente activities and opera-
Uons under constant top-echelon sur-
veillance and renew." Be noted that
the machinery for achieving this would
be greatly strengthosed by the creation
of a Joint congrandonal watchdog com-
mittee.
lir. Speaker. I should like to
quote just once more from the writings
of Professor Harry Howe Ransom who.
as I have already said, is our country's
leading lay student of Intelligence affairs.
think his comment deserves all the
greater consideration because it comes
from a member of the political science
profeerdori.?e extension which, as we all
know, has always had a strong bilis in
favor of the executive branch of gov-
ernment. On page -2011 of 'Central in-
telligence and National Security" Pro-
fessor Ransom remarks: ? ?
ft is eitenraini impatience for security
polltimakers, military and etorilian. to And
their fear of imogreseional intension=
oteinged Into gratitude tor congressional
support, frequently mare effective sappers
than has been awarded on the executive Ade
of Oovernruent. ? No executive agency today
reveals everything to ocseressicess/ otos-
maims with Valediction over its operation&
Oilktals of antral intelligence may be ea-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A000100050002-2