THE OGADEN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000100190006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 7, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Tl~e C)~d~n it~:~~r~
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THE OGADEN SITUATION
Information as of 7 April 1980 was
used in the preparation of this paper.
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SCOPE NOTE
This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum is intended to be a
review of the historical development of the current situation in the
Ogaden leading up to an assessment of the possible future course of the
military situation in light of the continuing conflict between Somalia
and Ethiopia over the Ogaden. The growing level of conflict over the
past six to nine months and the introduction of growing numbers of
Somali regular forces give rise to heightened concern in light of the
expressed American interest in military facilities in Somalia. The period
covered by this assessment is the next two to three years.
This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the
National Intelligence Officer for Africa. It was drafted by analysts in
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, in
the Defense Intelligence Agency, and in the Central Intelligence
Agency. It was coordinated at the working level with representatives of
those agencies and the Army.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ........................................................................................................ iii
KEY JUDGMENTS ................................................................................................ 1
DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................ 5
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE OGADEN PROBLEM ...................... 5
II. THE OGADEN WAR: 1977-78 ................................................................ 7
Somali Goals and Obiectives ........................................................................ 7
The Somali Government's Relationship With the Guerrillas .............. 7
The Outbreak of War ................................................................................
Soviet-Cuban Involvement ............................................................................ 8
The Ethiopian Counteroffensive ............................................................... 10
Outcome ............................................................................................................ 10
III. MARCH 1978 UNTIL THE PRESENT .................................................. 10
Renewal of Insurgency .................................................................................. 10
Reintroduction of Somali Regular Units .................................................... 11
IV. OUTLOOK AND IMPLICATIONS FOR US INTERESTS ................ 14
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Since Somalia became independent in 1960, Mogadishu has
intermittently supported and directed insurgency in the Ogaden. In
recent years the Somali Government seems to have exercised f airly close
control over the insurgents.
Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden in July 1977 was an attempt to
capitalize on the weakness of revolution-torn Ethiopia. Somali leader
Siad's decision may also have been prompted by the judgment that the
newly established Soviet-Ethiopian military relationship would eventu-
ally shift the military balance against Somalia.
Although the Somalis took most of the Ogaden in two months, their
military effort had serious weaknesses. They apparently lacked a
coherent strategic plan and suffered from severe logistic constraints.
The most decisive factor in the Somali defeat, however, was the
intervention of Ethiopia's new allies, the Soviet Union and Cuba. The
Soviets provided massive military assistance. A Cuban expeditionary
force of 17,000 provided the cutting edge for the Ethiopian
counteroffensive which drove the Somali Army from the Ogaden in
March 1978.
Since the end of the conventional war, the Ogaden insurgency has
undergone phases of varying intensity. Beginning roughly in mid-1979,
the fighting intensified. By November 1979 and possibly earlier, regular
Somali units had began operating in the Ogaden. At present, we believe
that six battalions are operating
there (some 3,000 to 4,000 men). We have no basis at this point for
judging whether the deployment of regular units into the Ogaden will
be sustained at present or higher levels.
We believe that the upsurge in fighting is related to Siad's
calculations about the battlefield situation and the wider political
environment:
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- The regular units are intended to bolster guerrilla capabilities,
prevent the Ethiopians from consolidating control near the
border, and guard against a possible direct attack on Somalia.
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- Ethiopian setbacks in Eritrea and elsewhere probably reinforce
Siad's long-held belief that Ethiopia is disintegrating.
- Siad wants to discourage the guerrillas' interest in an
independent Ogaden state, prevent them from fragmenting
along tribal lines, and counter attempts by Ethiopian-supported
dissidents to exploit tribal discontent in the borderlands.
It is doubtful that Siad will reduce his commitment to the Ogaden
insurgency for the foreseeable future. The backing that virtually all
Somalis give the Irredentist cause and the destabilizing potential of ~ari
armed force the size of the guerrillas give him little choice. His ultimate
goal remains the annexation of the Ogaden. For tactical reasons he
might, as an interim measure, accept internationally guaranteed
autonomy for the Ogaden, but there is no sign that Ethiopia is prepared
to grant such a concession.
The fighting in the Ogaden will therefore go on. Because of
resource limitations on each side,, the cyclical pattern of hostilities will
not necesarily result in a major war. But with the reintroduction of
Somali regular units, we cannot exclude the possibility of major battles
between regular forces as a result of miscalculation or misperception.
The Somalis would perceive (and eventually derive) advantage
from a new relationship with the United States. Somali capabilities
would be markedly improved by arms and training assistance. US
military aid might not immediately affect the pattern of hostilities in
the Ogaden, but it would be a psychological boost for Siad and might
encourage him to step up support for the insurgents. On the other hand,
if Siad should become disappointed with US arms aid, he would likely
use Arab offers of .military assistance as a bargaining chip.
We doubt that arms aid would give the United States much
leverage over Siad on the Ogaden issue. We believe that he would be
equally prepared to launch another conventional war if he thought that
the balance of forces had shifted substantially in his favor. But it is
possible that at some future point Siad might decide to wind down the
insurgency temporarily, for expedient reasons.
If fighting stays at about present levels, the Soviets and Cubans
probably will confine themselves to support activity within Ethiopia. If
it markedly intensifies, Havana might expand the size of its forces and
approve an expanded combat role for them within the Ogaden, and
Moscow probably would provide Ethiopia with more arms and advisers.
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Increased fighting could lead to a stepped-up Ethiopian campaign
of sabotage and terrorism against Somalia and a widening of Ethiopian
airstrikes that could cause collateral harm to any US installations and
personnel in Somalia. In addition, the Ethiopians if
Somalia again invaded,~~ould exercise the right of "hot pursuit"
into Somalia.
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Ethnic Groups of the Horn of Africa
Sudan
LakA~
Albert
Zaire /.
8urund~
rBUJUMBURA
i' . ~ r m
1111 Assab ~
Q. Zvi ~g ADEN Gulf of Aden
~ , ("~AGAU p GA~~A` ~Q" tbouti'?P~
~ Tana / R Q' ~ p~, DJIBOUTI '
,F. Hayk~ N P J pF, ~
~ ,_ -
Q P ,`
~= 6erbera
y~ ~A AEthio ~a
/ ~.. ,~ Hargeiaa
ADDIS ABABA(/ AirB"Dawe~ 'Burao
~ ~ ~ ,,
r...r.e
Boundary representation ie
not necessarily authoritative.
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Saudi Arabia
d?aan
be
Ethnic Groups
Q Approximate area inhabited
by Somali people
AGAU Other ethnic group
SOCOtfe
~~
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DISCUSSION
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE OGADEN
PROBLEM
1. The Ogaden problem is a modern manifestation
of a centuries-old struggle between Christian high-
landers and Muslim lowlanders in the Horn of Africa.
It is also a conflict between an African state that
stresses the principle of territorial integrity and an
African nation that stresses self-determination and
regards the Ogaden as a "colonial" issue. Finally, the
dispute centers on the ecological interrelationship be-
tween Somalia and the Ogaden rangelands, which are
an integral part of Somalia's economy and social
system.
2. The roots of the contemporary Ogaden problem
go back to the late 19th century expansion of Ethiopia
into the Ogaden, which up to that time had only rarely
experienced Ethiopian overlordship. This expansion
(to Ethiopia's approximate present boundaries) re-
ceived international recognition from European pow-
ers (Britain, France, and Italy), which were then
colonizing along the Somali coast, in a set of treaties
signed in 1897. (See map on next page.)
3. Ethiopia came under the rule of Mussolini's Italy
from 1936 until 1941, and the Ogaden was absorbed
into Italian Somaliland. During the interwar period
Rome had stimulated the emerging sense of national-
ism among Somalis living under the different flags of
the colonizers and abroad in exile and had used this
nationalism and Islam as weapons to help subjugate
Ethiopia. In 1941, British forces defeated the Italians
in East Africa. The Ogaden came under British rule
and continued to be administered as part of Italian
Somaliland.
4. The cause of Somali nationalism was taken up by
the British during their military administration of the
Horn from 1941 until 1950. London favored the
creation of a new state within the British Common-
wealth that would unify all Somali-speaking peoples-
a Greater Somalia. But the concept foundered on
Allied opposition to what was regarded as British
imperial expansion, the diplomatic skills of Emperor
Haile Selassie (who played on Allied guilt feelings over
the League of Nations' failure to prevent Mussolini's
invasion of Ethiopia), and the refusal of the financially
strapped postwar British Government to allocate
funds. In 1948 London returned the Ogaden to Ethio-
pia (with the exception of the Haud pasturelands
adjacent to British Somaliland, which were not re-
turned until 1954).
5. The United States was initially a bystander in the
Anglo-Ethiopian tug of war over the Ogaden, but
gradually became more involved. In 1944, Washington
had favored Ethiopian concessions on the Ogaden in
return for agreement on a US proposal to give all or
part of Eritrea to Ethiopia. But the US position began
to change after Sinclair Oil Company signed a conces-
sionary agreement with Haile Selassie in 1946 permit-
ting oil exploration in the Ogaden. By 1948, Ethiopia
had assumed a strategic importance in US global
strategy
This laid the foundation for a
US-Ethiopian military and political relationship that
Haile Selassie strongly desired as a shield against his
foreign enemies.
6. The British revived the plan for a Greater Soma-
lia in the late 1950s, but once again met opposition
from Ethiopia, France, and Italy-and, implicitly, the
United States. London was able only to bring about the
merger of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland
(an Italian UN Trust Territory from 1950 until 1960)
into the state of Somalia, which became independent
in 1960.
7. In 1963, at the founding meeting of the Organi-
zation of African Unity (OAU), Haile Selassie strength-
ened his hold on the Ogaden by using his stature as
one of Africa's senior statesmen to win the organiza-
tion's endorsement of existing colonial boundaries and
to relegate Somalia to an "odd man out" position in
inter-African affairs.
8. The result is an Ethiopian-Somali boundary that
Somalia does not recognize. Mogadishu claims that the
1897 treaties violated treaties signed in the 1880s
between the Europeans and various Somali clans.
Further, the 1897 treaties' definitions of borders are
vague and contradictory. (The Ethiopian border with
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Boundary Adjustments in the Horn of Africa
?' South
YemerfA'"` ADEN
(INDEPENDENCE 19771
.DJIBOUTI
?D'o f~~a~4a
.0
Vim,
me
.~
FORMER BRITISH SOMALILAND
(INDEPENDENCE 1960) I
~~~
errusn fiasa)
~~Italran (1894) ~~
L~~,oopo~
~~de~
.`
Iscia Baidoa
- - Anglo-French zones of influence 1888
-._ Anglo-Italian Treaty 1891 (zones of influence) ~
_..._ Anglo-Italian Protocol 1894 (zones of influence) i
- - - Franco-Ethiopian Convention 1897
~
Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty 1897
~
--- Italian interpretation of 1908 Conventio
n
-??- Ethiopian interpretation of 1908 Conve
ntion ~
-?- Jubaland transferred to Italy 1925
- - United Nations Provisional Line 1950
Present boundaries
0 50 1p0 t50 Kibmelers
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Italian Somaliland had never been defined and re-
mains aprovisional administrative line. Ethiopia and
Italy failed in an attempt to define it during 1955-60,
despite UN and US pressure.) In addition, Somalia
claims-with justification-that Ethiopia never effec-
tively administered large parts of the Ogaden until the
last 25 years.
9. The existence of an independent Somali state
championing aPan-Somali ideology led to an insur-
gency in the Ogaden in 1963-64. It is unclear whether
the insurgency was spontaneous or was ordered by
Mogadishu. In any case, the Ogadenis had reasons of
their own to revolt. Although Haile Selassie had made
a few attempts to co-opt the local leadership, the
Ethiopians distrusted Somalis as Muslims, largely ex-
cluded them from the government and military, and
in general treated the Ogaden as an occupied territory.
A major grievance was Ethiopian taxation of Somali
seasonal migrants into the Haud pasturelands. A more
fundamental source of discontent was the deteriora-
tion of the Ogaden's ecology over the past 40 years
that seems to have stemmed partly from political
interference with grazing patterns. The resultant over-
grazing may have stimulated friction that contributed
to the insurgency.
10. The insurgency briefly escalated into a border
war in early 1964. In April 1964, the OAU negotiated
a cease-fire, established a demilitarized zone 10 to 15
kilometers deep on both sides of the border, and
created a joint commission on border incidents.
11. By the mid-1960s, Mogadishu developed second
thoughts about its active pursuit of irredentist goals.
The Ogaden fighting and another insurgency in north-
eastern Kenya that had begun in 1963 had siphoned
off resources needed for economic and social develop-
ment. Moreover, Somalia had failed to win interna-
tional support for its cause. Despite Soviet military aid
that began in 1963, Moscow refused to support the
irredentist claims. In addition, Soviet arms aid was
inadequate to change the military balance in the Horn
in Somalia's favor. Mogadishu's other major sup-
porter-Nasser's Egypt-lost most of its interest in the
Horn after the defeats of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
Within Africa, Somalia was isolated. Finally, Mogadi-
shu hoped for economic aid from the United States,
which was trying to mute the Ogaden conflict by
encouraging an expanded association of East African
states.
12. Through the good offices of Presidents Nyerere
of Tanzania and Kaunda of Zambia, a detente was
arranged between Somalia and its neighbors toward
the end of the 1960s. Agreements were signed with
Kenya in 1967 and with Ethiopia in 1968 that pro-
vided for the ending of the state of emergency in the
border areas and improvement of political and eco-
nomic relations. Detente survived General Mohamed
Siad's military takeover of Somalia in 1969 and lasted
until early 1973, when a spate of border incidents
(triggered by stepped-up Soviet arms deliveries to
Somalia and reports of oil discoveries in the Ogaden)
led to renewed and largely ineffective OAU media-
tion. Siad signaled that he had only deemphasized the
irredenta until he could consolidate his political con-
trol and rearm his military.
Somali Goals and Objectives
13. Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden in July 1977
was an attempt to capitalize on the weakness of
revolution-torn Ethiopia. The very survival of revolu-
tionary leader Mengistu's regime appeared to be
threatened not only by the Ogaden insurgency but
also by rebel advances in Eritrea and by the opposi-
tion of other dissident movements. Ethiopian military
capabilities had declined because of defeats by the
insurgent groups, purges, low morale within the armed
forces, and the ending of the military supply relation-
ship with the United States in April of that year.
14. Perceiving Ethiopia's vulnerability, Siad sought
a quick decision in the Ogaden. He may have hoped
that a stunning defeat would bring down Mengistu,
leading to either an effective dissolution of Ethiopia or
to a successor regime willing to concede Somalia's
territorial claims in the face of its military success.
Somalia would then absorb the Ogaden or set up a
puppet state. Siad's decision to act quickly may have
been prompted at least partially by the judgment that
the nascent Soviet-Ethiopian military relationship-
arms aid agreements had been signed behveen Mos-
cow and Addis Ababa in December 1976 and May
1977-would eventually lead to a shift in the military
balance against Somalia or at best the establishment of
parity between the t~vo forces.
The Somali Government's Relationship With
the Guerrillas
15. Although guerrillas had operated in the Ogaden
for years, the Western Somali Liberation Front
(WSLF) was created in 1975 by the Somali Govern-
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anent to strengthen its control over them and make
them more responsive to Somali policy. From its
inception the WSLF obtained virtually all of its
training, arms, supplies, and funds through the Somali
Government. Siad tightly controlled the WSLF politi-
cal leadership, replacing those who opposed his poli-
cies, and assigned Somali National Army (SNA) cadres
to the guerrilla forces.
16. Somali control over guerrilla operations was
tenuous, however. The guerrillas preferred to engage
in raids that often had little to do with Somali tactical
or strategic objectives. Predictably, the guerrillas did
poorly in set-piece battles with the Ethiopians. By late
1976, the Somalis attempted to remedy this situation
by intermittent introduction of small SNA specialist,
artillery, and reconnaissance units into the Ogaden.
The WSLF gradually stepped up its attacks on the
isolated, poorly equipped garrisons in the southern and
eastern Ogaden, attacks that the Ethiopians were
increasingly unable to counter.
The Outbreak of War
17. In June 1977, WSLF guerrillas destroyed key
bridges on the Djibouti-Addis Ababa rail line near
Dire Dawa. The WSLF, aided by some regular Somali
military and paramilitary elements, then mounted
widespread attacks in early July, which were unsuc-
cessful. 1'}~e failure of the WSLF to achieve decisive
results precipitated Siad's decision to invade the Oga-
den. Regular Somali armor and mechanized units
entered the battle in late July, and by mid-September
lead captured the key town of Jijiga. Within two
months, the Somali forces had taken most of the
Ogaden region.
18. The Somalis scored these successes because they
enjoyed a local superiority in equipment, morale, and
numbers, including guerrillas. (During the war the
guerrillas were absorbed into the SNA.) From the start,
however, the Somali forces suffered from a number of
weaknesses that were to be factors in their subsequent
defeat:
Other than the goal of taking the Ogaden, the
Somalis seemed to have had no well-thought-out
tactical or strategic plan. Attacks were launched
impulsively as opportunities and resources per-
mitted rather than with a coherent objective in
mind, more often than not merely forcing Ethio-
pian units back rather than capturing or destroy-
ing them.
- Lengthening supply lines and logistic weakness
forced the Somalis to fight by fits and starts-a
few days of attacks followed by days or even
weeks of building up resources. This gave the
Ethiopians time to augment their forces. More-
over, the Somalis could not replace major equip-
ment losses because of their lack of foreign
support and, after November 1977, the ending of
Soviet arms aid.
- Somalia lost the air battle early on and, with the
later introduction of Soviet aircraft and Cuban
pilots, found its supply lines, especially in the
northern Ogaden, under day and night attack.
The most decisive factor contributing to the Somali
defeat was, however, the intercession of Ethiopia's
newfound allies-the Soviet Union and Cuba.
19. Although the Soviet-Somali military relation-
ship dates from 1963, Soviet arms shipments to Soma-
lia stepped up after Siad seized power in 1969, the
same time that the Soviet Navy began to seek access to
Indian Ocean facilities. Cuban economic and military
aid to Somalia began in the early 1970s. But the
Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 aroused Soviet and
Cuban interest. By late 1976, Moscow had decided to
play both sides in the Horn by giving military aid to
Addis Ababa, and Cuban military adivsers arrived in
Ethiopia in the spring of 1977.
20. Siad invaded the Ogaden in the face of Soviet
disapproval. Moscow's hope of arranging a political
settlement of the dispute between its two clients led to
an initially cautious Soviet reaction. In August 1977
the Soviet tilt toward Ethiopia became pronounced as
the Soviets publicly criticized Somali aggression, and
Siad returned from a trip to Moscow emptyhanded.
Soviet arms flowed into Ethiopia, while Soviet arms to
Somalia were reduced to a trickle. On 13 November,
concluding that Moscow had sided irreversibly with
Addis Ababa and probably under heavy pressure from
his Army, Siad expelled Soviet and Cuban advisers and
broke relations with Havana. He also hoped that this
would improve his .prospects of acquiring Western
arms aid.
21. Immediately after the expulsion, Soviet arms
shipments to Ethiopia expanded dramatically. Follow-
ing the visit of a high-level Soviet delegation to Addis
Ababa in mid-November, a Soviet airlift delivered
some 1,300 tons of cargo (primarily combat aircraft)
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between then and April 1978. During the same period
Soviet and allied ships delivered over 100,000 tons of
military equipment-worth on the order of half a
billion dollars. Soviet deliveries during this period
nearly tripled the size of the Ethiopian arms inven-
tory-with generally more modern, sophisticated
equipment than the Ethiopians had hitherto possessed.
To help Ethiopia operate and maintain this equipment
the Soviets sent more than 1,000 of their own advisers
and technicians.
22. Equally decisive was the intervention of 17,000
Cubans, mainly combat troops, who provided the
cutting edge for the Ethiopian counteroffensive. Cu-
bat~ pilots flew combat air missions, while troops
manned one mechanized and two armored brigades,
and performed support functions.
The Ethiopian Counteroffensive
23. Because of this massive foreign support the tide
was turned against Somalia. Ethiopian and Cuban
units broke the siege of Harar in late January 1978.
After building up logistic support, flying preparatory
airstrikes, and gradually expanding their control of the
territory north of Jijiga, they mounted a major offen-
sive, recapturing the city in March.
24. Somali troops, who had been putting up stiff
resistance to the Cuban-Ethiopian forces, retreated to
the south and east. Under pressure from air and
grotmd attacks, the retreat in the north became a rout.
The Somali troops fled across the border, leaving most
of their major equipment behind. Faced with an
untenable military situation, Siad ordered a with-
drawal from the rest of the Ogaden on 9 March. This
withdrawal was orderly with little loss of equipment or
personnel.
Outcome
25. Siad gambled on a quick victory in the Ogaden
and lost. Somali success was predicated on the assump-
tions that: (1) the Ethiopians would not recover from
the shock of early and decisive Somali victories;
(2) the Soviet Union and Cuba would remain neutral
or at least fail to respond in time to aid Ethiopia;
(3) Somalia would attain its objectives with only light
losses, or at any rate before its resources were de-
pleted. All three assumptions proved to be basically
false, and Somali defeat was thus assured.
26. The Somali armed forces were left with no
capability for large-scale conventional offensive action
and only limited defensive capability. Although
Somali manpower losses were relatively small consid-
ering the scope of their defeat, they lost more than a
third of their heavy equipment. Much of what re-
mained was inoperable because of wear and tear and a
lack of spare parts.
III. MARCH 1978 UNTIL THE PRESENT
27. Since the end of the conventional war, the
Ogaden insurgency has undergone phases of varying
intensity, reflecting not only Mogadishu's perceptions
of opportunities to be exploited, but also the complex
relationship between the Ogaden insurgency and So-
mali domestic politics, and considerations of Somali
foreign policy. Since roughly mid-1979, the war has
intensified and regular Somali units have once more
gone into the Ogaden.
Renewal of Insurgency
28. On 9 March 1978, Siad ordered the withdrawal
of the SNA from the Ogaden. The Ethiopians were
briefly in control of the Ogaden for the first time since
late 1975. An unknown number of guerrillas remained
inside the Ogaden, although they were initially in
disarray. Cuban combat units were subsequently with-
drawn from border areas, and Ethiopia's best fighting
units were sent to Eritrea.
29. By early May the insurgents had been reorga-
nized and resupplied by Mogadishu, and once again
started to harass Ethiopian units and supply lines.
Siad's decision to renew the insurgency at this junc-
ture-despite US offers of military aid if he would
desist-was made largely for internal reasons, particu-
larly concern for his own survival. He faced several
challenges-from dissident tribal groups and elements
which had been uneasy with the Soviet connection and
sought an opening to the West. These groups had long
disliked Siad and now sought to blame him for the
Ogaden debacle.
30. Siad moved quickly to wrap himself in the
Somali flag by renewing support for the insurgency.
He reestablished the command linkages between the
SNA and the insurgents that had existed before the
war and again seconded individual Somali regular
soldiers to fight with the insurgents. But he eschewed
the use of SNA units in the Ogaden.
31. On 18 June 1978 the insurgents cut the Addis
Ababa-Djibouti rail line after it had reopened follow-
ing its closure a year earlier. In retaliation, the Ethio-
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pian Air Force hit targets in the border region of
northern Somalia-the first air raids into Somali terri-
tory since the end of the war. These continued
periodically through December 1978.
32. From the late summer of 1978 into early 1979,
the center of action shifted south and east to the area
around Uardere. Late in 1978, however, Siad decided
to try to distance his government from insurgent
operations in a new attempt to satisfy US conditions
for military aid. By then he had strengthened his
domestic position by espousing the Ogadeni cause and
by pursuing pro-Western and pro-Saudi policies. In
addition, the successful Ethiopian offensives in Eritrea
in 1978 probably caused him to fear an Ethiopian
redeployment to the Ogaden.
33. In Siad's view, US conditions for military aid
were, and are, vague and confusing. He seemed to
believe that he did not have to end all involvement in
the Ogaden, but only give more authority to the
WSLF leadership and decrease arms shipments to the
WSLF, while continuing other aid. There was, in fact,
a lull in the Ogaden fighting in early 1979 and the
Somali Army apparently reduced its ties to the
guerrillas.
34. But by mid-May 1979, the SNA reasserted its
control of the WSLF. The shift appeared to be related
to several developments-a more aggressive Ethiopian
threat to WSLF base camps, tribal dissension within
the WSLF, and the interest of some WSLF elements in
declaring an independent Ogaden state. Moreover,
Somalia's complex ethnic politics probably were a
major element in Siad's decision to resume control of
the insurgency. Siad's political power had become
increasingly dependent upon his appeasement of. the
important Ogadeni subclan. Siad also feared that
discontented elements of the WSLF might join the
disaffected Majertaini clan (long at odds with Siad),
which provided the base for the Somali Salvation
Front (SSF), which is fighting alongside the Ethiopians
in the Ogaden. '
35. Despite its small numbers (fewer than a thou-
sand) and its association with Ethiopia, the SSF is a
problem for Siad. The Ethiopians had in the past tried
to work with Somali political exiles. But the impetus
for the SSF came from Somali military officers who
staged an abortive coup against Siad in April 1978,
fled the country, and eventually obtained Ethiopian
backing. From Siad's perspective, the SSF is a threat
not because it can overthrow his regime, but because it
can exploit interclan friction within the WSLF and
encourage separatism in the borderlands.
Reintroduction of Somali Regular Units
36. By May 1979, this range of concerns (and
perhaps as well Mogadishu's perception that the Ethio-
pians were in trouble in Eritrea) appears to have led
Siad to increase the SNA presence inside the Ogaden
and this in turn led to a general increase in the level of
military activity. Moreover, Somalia's ground force
capability had been somewhat improved by materiel
deliveries from Western Europe, Muslim countries,
and China. It is not clear when SNA units were
introduced into the Ogaden. They may have been
there as early as July 1979, but this has not been
confirmed.
37. These units have operated primarily in the
Uardere salient of the Ogaden. The original purpose of
these operations is not altogether clear, although it
seems likely that they were related to efforts to take
advantage of Ethiopian weakness, to an attempt to
prevent the SSF from operating from the Uardere
area, and to fears that Ethiopian efforts to resupply
and reinforce garrisons in the southern Ogaden pre-
saged an attempt to dislodge the guerrillas from their
bases in that area.
38. The presence of the SNA units in the Ogaden
and the increased guerrilla activity seem to have
prompted the bombings carried out by Ethiopian
aircraft against Somali towns and guerrilla strongholds
in the Ogaden over the past five months. In late
November 1979 Ethiopia conducted the first air raids
inside central and southern Somalia. Further attacks
were conducted in mid-January 1980, late February,
and middle and late March. With one exception, the
recent attacks have been no more than about 70
kilometers inside Somalia, generally against SNA in-
stallations. WSLF facilities are located with the SNA
39. The focus of the current fighting in the Oga-
den-during March and the early days of April-has
been the Ethiopian convoy routes from the north.
Somali efforts to interdict the movement of resupply
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and reinforcement convoys to the Uardere salient have
probably reflected a Somali predisposition to believe
that the aim of recent Ethiopian military movements
has been to increase pressure on the insurgents or to
attack Somalia itself. As a result, in early April the
Somalis had six confirmed
battalions inside the Ogaden
4,000 men).
(some 3,000 to
IV. OUTLOOK AND IMPLICATIONS FOR US
INTERESTS
40. The upsurge in fighting in the Ogaden over the
past six months-involving the reentry of regular
Somali Army units and the renewal of Ethiopian
airstrikes after a year's hiatus-is related to Siad's
calculations about the battlefield situation and the
wider political environment:
-The dispatch of regular troops, supplementing
longstanding Somali Army support for the insur-
gents, is intended to bolster WSLF military
capabilities, to prevent the consolidation of Ethi-
opian control near the border, and to guard
against a possible direct attack on Somalia.
- Also important is Siad's desire to discourage
WSLF interest in an independent Ogaden state,
prevent the WSLF from fragmenting along tribal
lines, and counter SSF attempts to exploit tribal
dissidence in the border lands.
-Further, the continuing rebellions in Eritrea and
elsewhere reinforce Siad's long-held belief that
Ethiopia is a disintegrating imperial state.
- In addition, he may calculate that the fighting
focuses international attention on the dispute and
reminds the United States and the USSR that the
issue must eventually be resolved.
41. We doubt that Siad will reduce his commitment
to the insurgency for the foreseeable future, if for no
other reason than to stay in power. The backing that
virtually all Somalis give the Irredentist cause and the
destabilizing potential posed to the Mogadishu regime
by an armed force the size of the WSLF compel Siad
to support the insurgency.
42. Siad's ultimate goal remains the annexation of
the Ogaden. If he should come to believe that this was
unattainable at present, for tactical reasons he might
accept as an interim measure internationally guaran-
teed autonomy for the Ogaden. But Ethiopia would
have to make the major concessions, and there is no
evidence that Addis Ababa regards the Ogaden mili-
tary situation as grave enough to warrant concessions.
Further, the Ethiopian regime cannot let itself be
popularly perceived as a less effective defender of
Ethiopia's territorial integrity than the discredited
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imperial regime. Moreover, it is willing to grant only 2 5x 1
nominal automony to the Ogadenis, fearing the imita- 25x1
tion effect of looser forms of association on other
restless minorities. Finally, there is the elusive promise
of oil discoveries in the Ogaden.
43. Therefore, the war in the Ogaden will go on.
We have no basis at this point for judging whether the
deployment of Somali regular units into the Ogaden
will be sustained at present or higher levels. If the
primary purpose of the deployments is to block the
perceived threat of an Ethiopian attack, fighting may
in time subside and the Somali regular units may
withdraw. If Siad has some more extensive end in
view, or if Ethiopian airstrikes lead to a new spiral of
retaliation and counterretaliation, the deployment of
SNA forces in the Ogaden could continue indefinitely.
44. Because of the finite resources of each side, the
cyclical pattern of hostilities will not necessarily lead
to an upward spiral of increasing violence that would
end in large-scale warfare between the two countries. /
Nevertheless, the reintroduction of regular Somali ~~
troops is a qualitative change in the situation, and we
therefore cannot exclude the possibility of major bat-
tles between regular forces arising out of miscalcula-
tion, misperception of the other side's capabilities or
intentions, or an attempt to take advantage of a local
situation.
45. Both countries face severe economic problems.
Ethiopia has a greater domestic resource base, but
must allocate these resources among more military
fronts. In the Ogaden it must maintain garrisons and
supply routes and can only incrementally attempt to
pacify a hostile countryside, while using airstrikes to
punish Somalia. Somalia is sustaining insurgent forces
at considerable cost and must support close to a million
refugees, although this burden is partially alleviated
by international assistance.
46. Certain developments, however, could lead ei-
ther or both parties to make a larger input of resources
in the conflict. First, Ethiopia recently agreed to allow
Soviet geological exploration in the Ogaden, and dis-
covery of commercially exploitable petroleum reserves
or other minerals would change perceptions on both
sides about the region's value. Second, a settlement of
the Eritrea problem would free Ethiopian resources
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 for the pacification of the Ogaden. A third develop-
ment would be the provision of US arms aid to
Somalia. The first two possibilities would probably
result in significantly increased pressure on the insur-
gents by Ethiopian forces. Under these circumstances
Siad certainly would not withdraw support from the
WSLF under such pressure, but he might not choose at
that time to match Ethiopian escalation of the
fighting.
47. While both Ethiopia and Somalia will plumb
the extent of military support they can extract from
the superpowers, the Somalis would initially perceive
(and eventually derive) an advantage in a new rela-
tionship with the United States. Somalia's capabilities
would be markedly improved by arms and training
assistance.
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50. The Soviets
48. We doubt that arms aid would give the United
States much leverage over Siad on the Ogaden issue.
He intervenes primarily because of domestic impera-
tives and perceptions of the Ethiopian-Somali military
balance that had little to do with Soviet policy in 1977
and will have little to do with US policy in the 1980s.
49. In July 1977, despite a Soviet presence in
Somalia of 2,500 advisers (1,500 of them military),
$280 million worth of Soviet arms, nearly total Somali
dependence on spares, and partial dependence on
Soviet petroleum supplies, Siad defied Moscow and
invaded the Ogaden.
in view of the large stake the Soviets
had acquired in Ethiopia by then, and Moscow's
resultant interest in averting a war between its two
clients.
51. Introduction of US aid might not immediately
affect the pattern of hostilities in the Ogaden, but it
would be a psychological boost for Siad, confirming to
him the rightness of his Ogaden policy, and perhaps
encouraging him to step up support for the insurgents.
We believe that he is prepared to launch another
conventional war in the unlikely event that the bal-
ance of forces were to shift substantially in his favor.
On the other hand, we would not rule out that at a
future juncture Siad himself might decide to wind
down the insurgency temporarily, but, again, it would
be for reasons of expediency.
52. If too many conditions were attached to US
arms aid (particularly relating to restrictions on the
Ogaden) or the arms package is too small, Siad might
opt for the support already offered by Iraq and other
Arab states. He is more likely, however, to try to use
Arab aid as a bargaining chip for as long as he can, since
he would prefer a significant military relationship with
the United States to exclusive reliance on the Arabs.
53. If the fighting stays at approximately the pres-
ent level, we believe that the Soviets and Cubans will
probably confine themselves to behind-the-lines sup-
port within Ethiopia. If the situation should deterio-
rate dramatically for the Ethiopians, or if the fighting
should intensify, Havana might expand the size of its
forces and approve an expanded combat role for them
within the Ogaden.
54. We believe that Moscow will continue to dis-
courage an Ethiopian ground invasion of Somalia. But
if the fighting should escalate into a major confronta-
tion between conventional forces, Moscow probably
would support Ethiopia with more arms and advisers
as it did for the Aden regime in 1979.
55. Ethiopian support to anti-Siad elements in the
Ogaden and in Somalia proper, particularly the SSF,
provides Addis Ababa with an additional weapon.
While there are distinct limits to the following an
Ethiopian-backed group can attract in Somalia, Ethio-
pian assistance to Ogadeni and Somali subversives
could be augmented relatively cheaply, aggravating
Siad's problems. Greater Ethiopian encouragement of
anti-Siad forces could be expected to produce more
sabotage and terrorism.
56. If US aid to Somalia were to result in a signifi-
cantly increased tempo of fighting in the Ogaden, a
stepped-up Ethiopian campaign of sabotage and ter-
rorism against the Siad regime could also cause collat-
eral harm to any US installations and personnel,
part from this possibility,
we o not at present foresee any internal security
threats to US personnel or facilities during the two to
three years covered by this memorandum.
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58. Any marked increase in fighting in the Ogaden
could require Ethiopia to increase its entreaties to
Moscow for aid. In return for greater Soviet military
and political support, Addis Ababa would probably
grant Moscow increased military access to Ethiopian
facilities, such as expansion of facilities at Dahlak
Island or even establishment of a previously planned
naval base north of Assab. But this greater access
would have only a marginal impact on the Soviet
Navy's capability to operate in the region as long as it
continues to have access to South Yemeni facilities.
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Chronology of Major Events in the Ogaden, 1975-80
Increasing guerrilla activity in Oga-
den. Abortive "people's March" in
Eritrea.
1977
February-
April
First Soviet-sponsored arms deliv-
eries; PDRY (South Yemen) equip-
ment transferred in ships.
US advisers withdrawn from Ethio-
pia.
First direct Soviet arms deliveries to
Ethiopia.
WSLF destroys railroad bridges in
northern Ogaden.
WSLF-mounted offensive repelled,
regular Somali units invade Oga-
den.
Somalia occupies most of the Oga-
den.
Jiiiga falls on the 13th.
Soviet airlift to Ethiopia begins on
the 28th.
December 1977- Arrival of Cuban combat units,
January 1978 counteroffensive begins.
1978
February
Somali-Ogadeni
Relations
Founding of WSLF under Siad's Chaos and purges in Ethiopia
auspices
SNA general staff establishes sepa-
rate command to maintain liaison
with WSLF insurgents.
SNA liaison unit disappears as sepa- Siad visits Saudi Arabia in early
rake entity. Guerrillas are brought July.
under direct Somali Army com-
mand.
Continued political chaos and
purges in Ethiopia
Mengistu in Moscow, signs second
arms deal.
Siad abrogates Somali-Soviet Friend-
ship Treaty on the 13th. Two days
later Soviet military delegation ar-
rives in Addis Ababa.
Somali regulars withdrawn from
Ogaden.
Revival of guerrilla activity in the
Ogaden.
Addis Ababa-Diibouti rail line re-
opens, but, on the 18th, WSLF
guerrillas destroy a bridge, closing it
again for two to three weeks.
Somali regulars, "volunteer" into
WSLF. WSLF units directly subor-
dinate to SNA.
WSLF adopts structure of a con-
ventional army (divisions, brigades,
battalions, etc.). Use of specific So-
mali words suggests close parallel to
contemporary SNA restructuring
effort inside Somalia.
Abortive coup in Somalia; plotters
flee and eventually become part of
Ethiopian-backed SSF.
Mengistu warns against further So-
mali activity in the Ogaden.
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Chronology of Major Events in the Ogaden, 1975-80 (Continued)
1978 (Continued)
From August on Heavy fighting in Ogaden.
November-
December
December 1978- Ethiopian air raids in northern So-
January 1979 malia.
1979
February
WSLF activity drops off as Siad
reduces support. Ethiopians con-
duct sweeps in the southern Oga-
den.
April-May Heavier military activity in the
Ogaden.
May
July Somalia sends Darawishta (para-
military police) into Ogaden to help
guerrillas.
September Continued Ethiopian sweeps have
little effect.
November Ethiopian air raids on WSLF sup-
ply bases in the Ogaden. First
strikes into Somalia in late Novem-
ber.
December 1979- Air raids continue; they last for two
March 1980 to three days and come at intervals
of up to two to three weeks because
of Ethiopian resupply problems.
Heavy but intermittent ground
combat continues in the Ogaden.
Somali-Ogadeni
Relations Political Events
Tribal splits, anti-Siad sentiment in
WSLF.
WSLF guerrillas come under direct
SNA administration.
Siad reduces aid to guerrillas, ap- SSF founded in Addis Ababa.
parently to gain military assistance
from the United States.
Guerrilla command structure shift- Civilian and military discontent in
ed from Somali Ministry of Defense Somalia over reduction of support
to the WSLF. for guerrillas.
Regular Somali soldiers operating
with guerrillas given choice of re-
turning to Somalia or resigning.
Somali Government restores pre-
vious levels of logistic support.
Kosygin in Addis Ababa. Apparent
disagreements with Mengistu over
the level of Soviet aid.
WSLF guerrilla commands adopt
exact designators of their counter-
part SNA commands. WSLF there-
by effectively becomes auxiliary
army to SNA.
Regular Somali units in the Ogaden.
May have been there as early as
July.
SNA appears to implement broad
and well-coordinated program of
intervention in Ogaden.
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Chronology of Major Events in the Ogaden, 1975-80 (Continued)
1980
January
WSLF and Somalia regulars at-
tempt to stop Ethiopian supply con-
voys.
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