LETTER TO WALTER BARROWS FROM DEAN F. BLAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100050001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 10, 1989
• Content Type: LETTER

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April 10, 1989
Dr. Walter Barrows
National Intelligence Council
Room 7E48
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Sir,
It is with pleasure that I send you a copy of my research paper
on the NIC. As you will note, it has been revised according to
our discussion on 17 March. I hope that the paper will indeed be
useful to you and your colleagues.
I am grateful for the interest you have shown in the paper.
I wish again to thank. you for the opportunity to interview you.
Research on this subject sparked an interest in me that will
surely continue throughout my life.
As an intelligence officer whose primary interest is sub-Saharan
Africa, I sincerely hope to have the privilege of associating
with you in the future.
DEAN F. BLAND
Captain, Military Intelligence
United States Army
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THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL: DEVELOPMENT AND IMPACT
by
DEAN F. BLAND
Captain, U.S. Army
Research Paper submitted to the Faculty
of the Defense Intelligence College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for SM605
November 1988
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and
do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the US Government
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THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL: DEVELOPMENT AND IMPACT
The day that will live in infamy, 7 December 1941, was also
the day that US policymakers realized that something had to be
done to improve coordination in the US Intelligence Community.
The institution that serves this purpose today is the National
Intelligence Council. National Intelligence officers for Africa,
East Asia, Europe, Latin America, Near East/South Asia, the USSR,
counterterrorism, economics, general purpose forces, narcotics,
science and technology, and strategic programs, for example,
represent the Director of Central Intelligence in these regional
and functional arenas. If this system is the one that is to
prevent future Pearl Harbors, it is necessary to trace its
development, to examine how it works, and to determine whether it
is sound.
EVOLUTION: FROM BNE TO NIC
As Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), William Colby, in
1973, was able to implement a reform he had envisioned over
several years. The Board of National Estimates (BNE), the
Central intelligence Agency (CIA) body that produced formal
finished intelligence estimates on behalf of the entire national
Intelligence Community, was down to only six members out of the
normal twelve, because of a number of retirements. Rather than
replenishing the BNES membership, Colby dissolved the body, along
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with its supporting Office of National Estimates (ONE).'
According to Dr. Harold Ford, whose 38-year intelligence
career included such assignments as a CIA Chief of Station,
Chief of the Estimates Staff at ONE, National Intelligence
Officer (NIO), staff member with the Senate Intelligence
Committee, and Vice-Chairman and Acting Chairman of the National
Intelligence Council (NIC), the BNE and ONE were created by DCI
General Walter Bedell Smith in 1950. This was to rectify the
situation that led to intelligence "failures," such as the
surprise. Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941, and more
relevant at the time, the recent failures to predict the June
1950 invasion of South Korea by the North, and the massive
Chinese intervention in Korea in October and November. In these
cases, plenty of information was available within various
agencies with intelligence capabilities that could have done a
better job in forecasting these events, but information was not
pooled together for comprehensive analysis. Additionally, some
information was withheld from key personnel because it would
refute strongly held views (advisors were afraid to provide
General MacArthur with evidence of Chinese intervention since he
had indicated he would not believe such a position.')
'William E. Colby, and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 351-52.
'Harold P. Ford, Adjunct Professor, Defense Intelligence
College, interview by author, 8 November 1988.
'Capt. Ross S. Kelly, US Army, "The Real Stories Behind
Those Intelligence 'Failures,'" Army 32 (January 1982): 12.
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The ONE, whose creation was concurred with by President
Truman, had three guiding principles: (1) it would bring
together all Information collected by members of the Intelligence
Community; (2) it vould produce national intelligence estimates
which would be as objective as possible (analysts would "call it
as they see it"); and (3) once produced, these estimates would
be the most authoritative documents upon which national
policymakers would base their decisions.`
For many years, the BNE system worked very well in terms of
its guiding principles. The Board, composed of 12 generalists in
world affairs, each with a significant background in various
aspects of intelligence, was supported by a brilliant ONE staff.
Specialists in the ONE drafted estimates, based on the first two
guiding principles. The third guiding principle was achieved
because Board members were well known and respected within the
policymaking community. Thus Board members could "sell"
estimates to the consumers; they could personally deliver
estimates to key policymakers, and they could argue the merits of
the products." In addition, Board members were able to gauge the
needs of intelligence consumers, and were thus able to establish
schedules and frames of reference for products that would be of
interest to the policymakers.6
"Ford.
`Ford.
`Stephen J. Flanagan, "Managing the Intelligence Community,"
International Security 10 (Summer 1985): 85-86.
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Eventually, however, problems developed in the BNE system.
As policymakers and BNE members rotated in and out of office, the
personal contacts that had proven so beneficial ceased. A new
governing philosophy emerged within the BNE: to retain
credibility as objective analysts, to avoid accusations that
their estimates were tilted towards supporting pre-conceived
views of policymakers, Board members were to remain as distant as
possible from consumers.' The advantages of the close
relationship, mentioned above, were lost; estimates became less
and less the guiding documents behind policy decisions, and were
more frequently completely ignored by key decisionmakers.
At the same time that the BNE was insulating itself from
policymakers, the predictive quality of estimates was
deteriorating. An estimate on Cuba failed to reveal the Soviet
missile buildup; the importance of Cambodia as a shipment route
of enemy personnel and materiel into Vietnam was underestimated;'
elements of Soviet strategic capabilities were both overestimated
and underestimated.' Finally, there was concern that the ONE,
located as it was within the CIA headquarters, tended to discount
the contributions of the other members of the Intelligence
Community as it drafted estimates.zO
'Ford.
'Ford.
'Flanagan, 88.
'"Flanagan, 86.
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Disenchanted with the BNE's generalist composition and
insulated nature, Colby got rid of it. In its place, he writes:
Thus, I created the positions of National Intelligence
Officers, and I told the eleven men and one woman whom I
chose for the jobs that they were to put themselves in my
chair as DCI for their subject of specialization. . . .
They were chosen from the intelligence community and private
life as well as from CIA, and they served as the experts I
needed in such subjects as China, Soviet affairs, Europe,
Latin America, strategic veaponry, conventional forces, and
economics, ranging throughout the intelligence community and
out into the academic vorld to bring to me the best ideas
and to press the different disciplines to integrate their
functions."",
NIOs were encouraged by Colby to revert to the process of
interacting strongly with policymakers in their specialized areas
of concern. "Thus," says Flanagan, "the NIOs have advised DCIs
on collection shortfalls and ways to rectify them, priorities in
intelligence collection and production, resource allocation
questions, and satisfaction of requirements by (Intelligence)
Community elements. "X2
Criticism of the new system quickly surfaced. William
Barnds, a former member of ONE, predicted in 1974 that without
Its own production staff, the new system would produce fewer and
poorer estimates, because NIOs would require drafts from
intelligence agencies that would, (1) task inferior analysts to
the time-consuming drafting process, and (2) produce drafts that
reflected the political considerations of. the drafting agency.
Furthermore, Barnds lamented the end of the collegial nature of
""Colby, 352-53.
"'Flanagan, 89.
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the BNE, which had (1) encouraged a broad exchange of views among
analysts with various backgrounds and expertise, and (2) allowed
for a feeling of strength and Independence within the executive
structure.l' Ford indicates that these concerns were well
founded. Between 1973 and 1979, under the direction of 12
"unguided missiles," the number and impact of estimates
decreased. The system failed to produce a National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) prior to the fall of the Shah in Iran, and CIA and
DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) "semi-estimates" concluded that
Iran was neither in a revolutionary, nor even a pre-revolutionary
state. Only a dozen NIEs were prepared in 1979.1'
With some "encouragement" from President Carter, DCI Admiral
Stansfield Turner sought to strengthen the NIO system. He
instituted the National Intelligence Council (NIC) system,
whereby the NIOs were brought together into a collegial body.
The NIC was given a Chairman with extensive authority, a Vice-
Chairman, and an Analytic Group (AG) as an estimate drafting
body.1" In 1981, DCI William Casey moved the NIC from under the
control of the CIA's Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI) to a
position under his direct control, thus emphasizing the community
12William J. Barnds, "Intelligence and Policymaking in an
Institutional Context," in The National Foreign Intelligence
Community, Vol. 1, eds. Capt. Susan Perrin and Mast. Sgt. Tom
Baldwin (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence College, 1988),
316.
"Ford.
1sFord.
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nature of the body." This system has remained basically
unchanged since 1981.
The NIC today successfully meets the requirements of the
intelligence cycle. That is, it is well suited to identify
intelligence requirements, to mobilize the collection community
to gather necessary information, to produce finished intelligence
products for national-level consumers, and to evaluate the
products..
Identifying Requirements
In order to determine what the Intelligence Community should
focus on in terms of collection and production, the DCI, in
consultation with the National Security Council (NSC), issues a
document called National Intelligence Topics of Current Interest
on an annual basis. The DCI also produces the US Foreign
Intelligence Requirements Categories and Priorities document
which prioritizes the most urgent requirements.17 These
documents provide the NIOs with a formal statement of needs from
which they can plan a production schedule.
It is apparent, however, that NIOS plan production schedules
based on a more informal process. According to Dr. Walter
Barrows, NIO for Africa, direct access to policymakers provides
"Flanagan, 92.
"Flanagan, 64.
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the NIO with their concerns; a NIO often asks his "counterpart"
at the NSC Staff, Department of State, or Department of Defense
how the Intelligence Community can be of help, or "where It is
falling short."10 The DCI himself may direct a NIO to produce an
estimate, as Casey did for a NIE on Mexico.l' According to Maj.
Gen. (Rtd) Edward Atkeson, who served as NIO for General Purpose
Forces between 1982 and 1984, preparation of an estimate on the
reliability of Warsaw Pact nations to remain loyal to the Soviet
Union in wartime was proposed by the NIC Chairman. The Chairman
did not task Gen. Atkeson to produce the estimate, but "used the
Socratic method" to persuade him to do so.'O Although the DCI
has ultimate decisionmaking authority, the NIO himself generally
determines what will be produced and when. Some estimates are
planned well in advance, whereas others are initiated with little
advance notice.
Focusing Collection
The NIO Is responsible for insuring that the intelligence
collection community allocates its resources, whether clandestine
human agents, or technical signal or imagery intelligence
systems, or overt human sources and literature, to gather
i?Walter Barrows, National Intelligence Officer for Africa,
interview by author, 10 November 1988.
"Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987
(New York: Pocket Books, 1987), 386-87.
2OMai. Gen. (Rtd) Edward B. Atkeson, US Army, Adjunct
Professor, Defense intelligence college, Interview by author, 14
November 1988.
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necessary information. From a multitude of collection
requirements documents and requests, which essentially require
collectors to collect "everything about everything," the NIO must
focus their efforts.2l
NIOs hold monthly Warning Meetings, gathering about 50
people from every collection agency. The typical agenda will
include two presentations concerning new problems or developments
In the field. When the floor is open for discussion, attendees
can volunteer their systems' capabilities, or may recall
information that had been gathered but had seemed insignificant
at the time. Attendees leave the meeting with a memorandum that
highlights the needs for specific collection targets.22
Additionally, NIOs and their assistants often take trips to
visit collectors "in the field"; these include CIA Chiefs of
Station, ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, defense attaches,
and National Security Agency (NSA) officials. When these
individuals are in the Washington area, they usually visit the
NIOs."
If the NWO has a particular concern, he can generally
contact a collection committee or the agency concerned directly.
His stature is such that he can usually resolve matters without
22Ford.
"Ford.
"Ford.
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"going through the normal bureaucratic machinery."" The NIC
Chairman can add increased weight to the NIO's requests;
however, his main function in the collection process is simply to
insure that adequate NiO/collection community interaction Is In
fact occurring, according to Maj. Gen. Frank Horton, DIA Deputy
Director for Foreign Intelligence, and a recent NIC Chairman."
Finally, the DCI is the ultimate collection tasker who can be
turned to for crucial decisions.
Producing zstimatss
Three types of formal finished intelligence products are
coordinated by the NIOs. National Intelligence Estimates (NIES)
examine a country or international issue and include projections
as they relate to US policy. Special National Intelligence
Estimates (SNIEs) are usually shorter, more narrowly based
products, developed quickly as a response to a pressing foreign
policy concern. interagency Intelligence Memoranda (IIMs)
address short-range policy concerns and normally are not
predictive." NIOs coordinate production of these documents for
their particular regional or functional areas. Issues that fall
outside specified NIO regional or functional areas are handled by
a NIO at-large, a position conceived of and first held by Hans
"Barrows.
Z"Maj. Gen. Frank B. Horton III, US Air Force, Deputy
Director for Foreign Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency,
interview by author, 8 November 1988.
"Flanagan, 65-66.
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Heymann. During his at-large tenure in the early 1980s, he
became the national intelligence focal point for such policy
concerns as Law of the Sea, chemical and toxin warfare, and
nuclear proliferation."
Because a NIO has only one or two assistants and one
secretary at his direct disposal, the process of selecting a
drafter for an estimate is crucial. Only about one third of
estimates are assigned to the NIC's Analytic Group for
drafting." This is due to the very small size of the AG and to
a sincere effort to involve the entire Intelligence Community in
the estimates process.
The NIO may seek volunteers to draft an estimate.
Volunteers are plentiful because agencies want the advantage of
producing the draft that, more often than not, will conform to
the final product." In other instances, the NIO vill favor a
particular analyst as a drafter. His personal rapport with the
agency official who controls the desired analyst is generally
enough to have that analyst released from his normal duties to
work on the estimate draft. 20 In any case, the NIO ultimately
chooses the drafter from among those available to do the job, and
then monitors the drafter's progress. When necessary, the NIO
'Hans Heymann, Jr., Distinguished Professor, Defense
Intelligence College, interview by author, 10 November 1988.
"Flanagan, 92.
"Atkeson.
"Barrows.
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will intervene to insure the drafter receives necessary raw data
from throughout the Intelligence Community.
Once prepared, the draft estimate is reviewed by the NIO,
who may rewrite portions. The NIC Chairman, too, will review the
draft and suggest improvements." The NIO will present the draft
to the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB), composed of
the chiefs of the Intelligence Community agencies, for formal
review. In reality, the NFIB members will allow assistants at
the working level to discuss the product.'
The NIO plays a major role in managing the resolution of
differences of opinion. He will allow objections to provisions
of the draft to be aired, but will normally challenge the
objector to substantiate his claim with evidence. 33 If
disagreements persist, either compromise language will be worked
out, or the minority opinion will appear as a footnote in the
final product. "we don't want a product cluttered with 18
footnotes, nor one with wishy-washy language," says Dr.
Barrows." Thus, differences on minor points will generally lead
to compromise language, while differences on major points will
appear in the body of the estimate as a footnote.i"
'iHorton.
"Ford.
"Atkeson.
"Barrows.
7"Barrows.
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The final product is once again brought before the NFIB,
whose members can either concur or nonconcur with it. Final
approval, in every case, comes from the DCI, who releases the
estimate to the policymaking community over his signature.
Informally, NIOs are constantly involved in what Dr. Ford
calls "estimating"." Due to their frequent exposure to
policymakers, in policymaking forums, at congressional hearings,
or even in Informal social settings, NIOs are often asked to
provide their opinion on Issues of concern. They are also able
to suggest potential problems that policymakers may wish to
consider.
Evaluating Estimates
Several mechanisms are in place for evaluation of estimates.
The role of the NIC Chairman in the quality control process has
been mentioned. Review by the NFIB insures that each member of
the Intelligence Community has a say in the quality and content
of estimates. Before the DCI approves an estimate for release,
his Senior Review Panel, composed of distinguished scholars and
former officials, will review It for qualitative and substantive
matters."
Outside of the DCI's control, the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), a group of distinguished
private citizens charged with evaluating substantive aspects of
"Ford.
"Horton.
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the US intelligence program, does reviev estimates. The PFIAB's
assessments of estimates in the mid-1970s were so negative that
the President adopted its recommendation In 1976 to have a B-Team
composed of personnel from outside the government produce
competitive estimates, using the same data available to the
Intelligence Community." Although this practice was quickly
discontinued, the point is that the PFIAB is an important player
in the evaluative function.
As far as the actual consumers of intelligence estimates are
concerned, there exists no formal mechanism of feedback to the
NIC. Whether estimates satisfy the needs of policymakers can
only be ascertained by NIOs and the DCI in their normal
interactions with these officials.
EVALUATION OF THE NIC
The NIC is a sound and flexible institution that serves the
US policymaking community well. It produced over 100 estimates
in 1987. Its strengths, however, can only be maintained as long
as it is staffed appropriately, with NIOs who combine functional
or regional expertise, an ability to work effectively with large
and small groups of people, and a keen awareness of the role of
intelligence in the US policymaking arena.
The movement of the NIC to a position directly under the
control of the DCI was a wise one. As long as the US retains an
"Flanagan, 70-71.
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Intelligence community composed of several agencies, rather than
a single super-agency, any intelligence input to policymakers
must be the result of a community effort. The natural
differences between members of the community provides the healthy
effect of stimulating discussion, and that of offering
alternative valid viewpoints to decisionmakers. Rightly or
wrongly, while the NIC reported to the CIA's DDI, it was
perceived as a CIA asset; it is now viewed as a community asset.
Composition of the NIC must similarly reflect the community
nature of the organization. While the professional background of
most NIOs reflects a CIA career, the trend is to bring in a
greater number of personnel from other intelligence agencies, or
even from outside of government. Out of the four former or
present NIOs interviewed by this author, only one had a
predominantly CIA background; the others were drawn from the
Army, DIA, and the Rand Corporation. According to Maj. Gen.
Horton, current NIOs also include a State Department official and
a congressional staff member. Gen. Horton was the first military
officer to serve as NIC Chairman and attributes this to DCI
Casey's effort to emphasize the community nature of the NIC."
The trend toward increased community representation among NIOs
must continue. Beyond symbolic reasons, rotation of agency
participation in the NIC will prevent institutional biases from
becoming entrenched within the powerful NIOs.
"Horton.
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Former DCI Stansfield Turner, a retired admiral, curiously
enough believes analysis from the DIA and military services is
inherently veak and cannot contribute effectively in the
national estimates process: "Sometimes it was because of a lack
of competence, sometimes it was the result of pressures against
saying anything that could endanger some military policy, or
endanger some military program that was up for consideration by
Congress."'O While this assertion is an unfair indictment of
many independently-minded Defense Department analysts, the notion
that institutional bias exists cannot be discounted. Using
Turner's own logic, one could argue that CIA analysis is tilted
toward protecting its many covert actions, an equally ludicrous
assertion. The point is that a degree of institutional bias is
an inherent characteristic,of bureaucratic society. Competition
within such a pluralistic setting is necessary in order to
produce the most favorable results. The NIC, as it is
organizationally structured and in the evolution of its
composition, is an adequate body to stimulate this favorable
competition.
In a constant effort to improve the quality of analysis,
NIOs often organize forums whereby analysts can exchange views
with members of the academic community. This practice should be
institutionalized and broadened so that a series of such
40 Adm. (Rtd) Stansfield Turner, US Navy, "The- CIA and
National Security," Naval War College Review 37 (May-June 1984):
10.
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conferences would be held on a regular basis. Besides scholars,
participation should be extended to persons from a wide variety
of backgrounds with an interest in the subject matter.
Businesspeople, volunteers from private aid organizations, and
missionaries could all provide valuable insights into various
societies, for example. This practice would have the added
benefit of "opening" the intelligence world to larger portions of
US society and might serve to reverse negative public perceptions
of the Intelligence Community.
The close link between NIO and policymaker is necessary to
drive the intelligence cycle, but can be precarious. A NIO could
potentially cross the threshold as a policy advocate. An
unsubstantiated charge of this type has been levelled at the NIO
who wrote in 1985 that providing military assistance to Iran
could diminish Soviet influence in that country; this estimate,
according to one writer, was used by the NSC Staff to justify Its
decision to sell arms to Iran.41 This allegation may be quite
unfair to the NIO in question, but it is the type of allegation
that is serious enough to warrant an eternally vigilant attitude
within the NIC. The DCI and NIC Chairman must insure that NIOs
understand the limits of their influence, and, on the other hand,
must protect NIO9 from unwarranted charges of political
motivation which can only discredit the contributions of NIOs.
`2David C. Morrison, "From Iran to Trade to Soviet
Intentions, Can Government Intelligence Officers--Keep Their
Judgments Free of Politics?," Government Executive 19 (June
1987): 23-24.
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There is no cure within the NIC structure to the lack of a
formal feedback mechanism between policymaker and NIO. To put
the matter on a higher plane, there is no way to insure that
policymakers even make use of national intelligence products.
Many policymakers are their own analysts; many hold their
positions due to subject matter expertise; and they generally
have access to the same rav intelligence data that estimate
drafters do. It must also be recognized that intelligence is but
one component that is considered in the policymaking process;
pre-conceived notions, ideology, budget, and political realities
also play a role. These problems, however, are rooted outside of
the NIC structure. The best a NIO can do is use his pover of
persuasion to Increase the impact of the intelligence estimate
component In the policymaker's decisionmaking process.
Today's NIC is the result of a lengthy evolutionary process.
It benefits from the mistakes of the past. It is a sound,
flexible institution that serves the US policymaking process
well. As long as it remains filled with dedicated and competent
personnel, the NIC vill continue to play a vital role in US
national security.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Atkeson, Edward B., Maj. Gen. (Rtd), US Army. Adjunct Professor,
Defense Intelligence College. Interview by author, 14
November 1988.
Barnds, William J. "Intelligence and Policymaking in an
Institutional Context." In The National Foreign
Intelligence Community, Vol. 1, eds. Capt. Susan Perrin and
Mast. Sgt. Tom Baldwin, 299-318. Washington, DC: Defense
intelligence College, 1988.
Barrows, Walter. National Intelligence Officer for Africa.
Interview by author, 10 November 1988.
Colby, William E., and Peter Forbath. Honorable Men. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1978.
Flanagan, Stephen J. "Managing the Intelligence Community."
International Security 10 (Summer 1985): 58-95.
Ford, Harold P. Adjunct Professor, Defense Intelligence College.
Interview by author, 8 November 1988.
Heymann, Hans, Jr. Distinguished Professor, Defehse Intelligence
College. Interview by author, 10 November 1988.
Horton, Frank B. III, Mai. Gen., US Air Force. Deputy Director
for Foreign Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency.
Interview by author, 8 November 1988.
Kelly, Ross S., Capt., US Army. "The Real Stories Behind Those
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/30: CIA-RDP93T01132R000100050001-8 ,,,